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# SEATTLE'S COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM: A CASE STUDY

Prepared for  
The National Institute of Justice

March 25, 2004

**BOTEC Analysis**  
C O R P O R A T I O N

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## Overview

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In Seattle, the police department— with considerable public input— coordinated the development of an overall program strategy and engaged other organizations to implement pieces of the Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP). The CCP consortium involved both city agencies and community-based organizations. They received funding for a broad range of projects that meshed easily with the established programs and organizational structures. During the first year of CCP, the police department finalized its plan for transforming to support community policing. Police used their share of CCP funds to support a training program that featured the problem-oriented strategies they planned to adopt, and to launch a new citizen advisory group. A large percentage of the city's CCP funds were committed to partner agencies with whom the police have an expanding relationship. These funds extended the scope of existing services to support one-time projects and to build organizational infrastructure. Both the police and their partner agencies strove to develop CCP projects that would be sustainable within existing resource constraints, or could be terminated without disruption.

This case study of Seattle's CCP program was written as a result of site visits made to various CCP programs and interviews with CCP participants between September, 1995 and December, 1996. It also incorporates data from BOTEC's CCP Coalition Survey and Community Policing Survey, as well as information contained in federal and local documents and reports. Follow-up phone calls were made during December, 1997 and January, 1998, to key participants in order to write the epilogue.

## Background Context

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### City Profile

Founded in 1852 on the mist-clad shores of Puget Sound, by 1995 Seattle housed 533,000 residents. The city is 84 square land miles in size, but encompasses another 59 miles of water. Its biggest employers are Boeing Aircraft (which has facilities throughout the region) and the University of Washington. Seattle is located in King County, which has a total population of about 1,600,000. The city and region enjoy an up-beat, friendly reputation, and residents are famous for their relaxed lifestyle in the face of an average of 310 cloudy days per year.

### Crime Trends

Like many cities, Seattle's crime rate has fluctuated over the last decade. The robbery count peaked for the decade in 1987, and in 1995 was down by 25 percent. Homicides topped out at 69 during 1994, and dropped to 47 during 1995. It dropped again between 1995 and 1996. Rape and aggravated assault topped out in 1990, and by 1995 had dropped by 46 percent and 47 percent, respectively. There were 16,880 recorded burglaries in 1988, but only 7,695 in 1994; this 54 percent decline was dramatic by any accounting. Auto theft peaked in 1992, and in 1995 was down by 10 percent. Informants indicated that Seattle has been spared the emergence of large, cohesive and well-armed gangs, and that efforts by Los Angeles gangs to colonize the city have not succeeded.

### Unified Crime Report Data

Seattle		1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Crime	Population	495,190	501,279	494,426	505,380	514,398	516,259	532,418	544,940	531,274	540,268	529,526
Murder*	Raw	61	50	54	56	38	53	43	60	67	69	41
	per 100,000	12.32	9.97	10.92	11.08	7.39	10.27	8.08	11.01	12.61	12.77	7.74
Forcible Rape	Raw	441	443	465	439	478	481	398	353	356	318	260
	per 100,000	89.06	88.37	94.05	86.87	92.92	93.17	74.75	64.78	67.01	58.86	49.10
Robbery	Raw	2843	2792	2959	2709	2448	2695	2761	2577	2670	2536	2213
	per 100,000	574.12	556.98	598.47	536.03	475.90	522.02	518.58	472.90	502.57	469.40	417.92
Aggravated Assault	Raw	318	3505	3618	3675	3914	4551	4019	4337	4344	3615	2390
	per 100,000	64.22	699.21	731.76	727.18	760.89	881.53	754.86	795.87	817.66	669.11	451.35
Burglary	Raw	16262	16215	17254	16880	14162	11181	10639	9250	9247	8186	7689
	per 100,000	3283.99	3234.73	3489.70	3340.06	2753.12	2165.77	1998.24	1697.43	1740.53	1515.17	1452.05
Larceny-Theft	Raw	37534	41625	43586	43196	39540	39522	40502	41125	39176	36758	35970
	per 100,000	7579.72	8303.76	8815.47	8547.23	7686.66	7655.46	7607.18	7546.70	7373.97	6803.66	6792.87
Motor Vehicle Theft	Raw	2783	3110	5001	5739	5816	6570	6846	7698	6819	6423	6944
	per 100,000	562.01	620.41	1011.48	1135.58	1130.64	1272.62	1285.83	1412.63	1283.52	1188.85	1311.36

\*Murder includes non-negligent manslaughter

## Local Government

The city has a mayor-council form of government, and its nine-member city council exercises a great deal of sophisticated oversight on individual lines in the budgets of municipal agencies. Tax increases and major bond issues require referenda. The public school system and the Port Authority (which also runs the airport) are separate taxing bodies, led by elected boards. Because the State of Washington does not have an income tax, property and sales taxes are high in Seattle. Most discussions of public policy therefore eventually boil down to their implications for the tax levy. City politics are difficult because unionized employees who fear for their jobs and their future are fighting a rear-guard action against municipal downsizing. There are constituencies for existing city services that probably will be cut. However, the public is skeptical of government, and is unwilling to pay for what it would cost to continue on its past trajectory. The city's pocketbook grew thinner in early 1996, when a court ruling invalidated a significant city tax and forced the refund of collected moneys. This setback temporarily stalled some planned projects that would have operated in conjunction with CCP.

The opportunity for Seattle to apply for CCP funding came on the heels of important changes in municipal government and in the police department. During the last eight years, Seattle developed a distinctive vision of municipal governance, one formalized by the State's requirement that every city and county draft a comprehensive plan. Seattle's resulting Urban Villages Comprehensive Strategic Plan emphasized geographically defined neighborhoods as the unit for the integration of the efforts of all city departments. But the evolution of local government in the city was more driven by the sophisticated activism of Seattle's cohesive neighborhoods, pressure for community policing, and the ambitions of the Mayor, who came to office promising to respond to them.

The Urban Villages plan called for downsizing city government while increasing its effectiveness by reorganizing municipal services around geographical areas. A cabinet-level Neighborhood Planning Working Group developed a strategic plan for "seamless government" that adopted an interdepartmental, problem-solving model for service delivery. A number of cabinet-level retreats held with the mayor attempted to focus everyone's energies on making this plan work. However, the implementation of this plan was delayed late in 1996, a casualty of the city's fiscal stress and the mayor's focus on his campaign for governor. The director of the Seattle Police Department's Community Policing Bureau served as their regular representative on the Neighborhood Planning Working Group.

Community policing dovetailed neatly into this plan, and the mayor engineered top-level personnel changes in the Seattle Police Department in order to ensure the department's cooperation. Our informants indicate that before about 1990, the Seattle Police Department was at odds with most city



agencies and had the support of practically none of them. This antagonism began to change after 1990, in part as a result of the service integration developed in the city's special Weed & Seed Program area.

With its emphasis on community policing, interagency coordination, and community involvement, CCP fit neatly into Seattle's comprehensive plan. This convergence helped ensure that Seattle finalized and implemented its CCP programs as quickly as any of the recipient cities. CCP supported inter-organizational and government-community partnerships already formed. One civic activist noted, "The grants fit. We have good strategic criminal justice system planning. There's lots of innovation ... that support these kinds of grant activities." The Neighborhood Planning Working Group had found it difficult to be in contact with front-line personnel; CCP gave it some resources to do so. CCP's boundaries were meshed with those for selected Neighborhood Action Team areas. As an agency head noted, CCP "helped speed up the process. It gave us the resources and requirements that enabled us to do things we wanted to do." However, he continued, "I don't think of it as 'the CCP program.' It's the community policing program ... It's integral to what we are doing."

## **Police**

The Seattle Police Department had a 1995 budget of \$120 million. Like most departments, almost 90 percent of its budget was dedicated to salaries: 1,260 sworn and 645 civilian employees. The city's ratio of sworn officers to population was slightly above the national average (1-to-420, contrasted to the national average of 1-to-454). Its ratio of sworn to civilian personnel (2-to-1) was substantially below the national average (3.5-to-1). The large role played by civilian employees in the department stood out as a noticeable feature of the organization. The city was divided into four large precincts, each of which in turn was divided into three sectors. Downtown, the Seattle Police Department was divided into six bureaus, five headed by Assistant Chiefs and one (Community Policing) by a civilian Director. The Community Policing Bureau includes the city's well-known crime prevention unit. The Community Policing Bureau also encompasses the crime analysis unit, a victim assistance program, a school safety unit, and a unit devoted to research and grants management in the area of community policing.

During the 1980s, Seattle's police department was known for its traditional, top-down management style. Insulated from the public and isolated from other city agencies, the department had little interest in projects that brought police closer to the public, nor in expanding the capacity of communities to defend themselves. During the late 1980s, considerable pressure from the community pushed the agency to open up to citizen input and to change its style of operations. With the support of the city's political leaders, a 1989

referendum approved an increase in department staffing levels to support new community policing initiatives. Precinct Advisory Councils were set up, and many partnerships were forged with the community in special projects. The first of these formed in conjunction with the South Seattle Crime Prevention Council in the Rainier Valley. Around the city, newly-created and autonomous Community Policing Teams worked in support of the community and engaged in problem-oriented policing. These teams became well-known through the country, perhaps out of proportion to their importance within the department. Even after several successful years, these units had virtually no impact on police organization or the traditional orientation of the “regular” department.

The creation of a special Weed & Seed area in 1992 formed new linkages with city agencies. While this program became a source of controversy with the community (see below), it did lead to increased cooperation between the police department and agencies delivering services in the area. This experience laid the groundwork for later interagency coordination under CCP. In 1992, the department also released a new Long Range Plan, a blueprint promising future expansion of the Community Policing teams and a renewed emphasis on cultural diversity training within the department. In 1993, pressure on the organization for change increased when a mayoral task force called for the creation of a civilian review board to better deal with mounting hostility between police and Seattle's minority communities.

In 1994, a new Chief of Police was selected to speed the change process and to bring the police department's plans into accord with those for the rest of city government. He quickly put in place a process for planning a “second generation” of community policing for the city, a process involving extensive consultation within the department as well as with the Seattle community. He began by reorganizing the upper echelons of the agency to create the Community Policing Bureau. The CCP award in February, 1995, promised the resources to begin the next step in his plan for transforming the department, namely officer training. The organization and content of that training was spelled out during the first months of the CCP program. By late 1995, it was apparent to all that the department was to change its stance vis-à-vis the community, and the stakes involved in the organizational change process went up considerably.

The department had a direction—problem solving, in the San Diego tradition—that was codified by the training curriculum. However, until the report of the principal internal committee, the Design Coaching Team, in 1996 (see below), the specifics of change were not apparent. With the approval of that report, the Chief had a blueprint for the transformation of the entire department. Before the report, community policing had largely been an “add on,” conducted by special units. Now, the established culture of

the department was at risk, with CCP providing important resources for the agency's change managers.

Employees of the police department are represented by two unions. The Seattle Police Management Association (representing mid-level managers) has been generally supportive of the department's reorganization plan, even though it eliminated the rank of Major as part of restructuring the department. This group is mostly concerned about retirement and health care issues. The Guild (sergeants and officers) was supportive of the department's adoption of a 4-day 9-hour shift pattern as part of its community policing staffing plan.

The unit driving the development and implementation of CCP is the Seattle Police Department's new Community Policing Bureau. One of six bureaus that report to the Chief, the Community Policing Bureau was one of two new bureaus he created in a reorganization of the department. The Community Policing Bureau spearheaded the development of a new mission statement for the Seattle Police Department. The Seattle Police Department's Planning Unit conducts budget planning, but the Community Policing Bureau is the organizational home for department strategic planning efforts. All community policing training was developed and conducted by the Community Policing Bureau, and not by the department's small Training Section. The Community Policing Bureau was reportedly "100 percent committed to the 'SARA' model [the Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment approach to problem-solving]."

## **Community**

The department-wide transition to community policing responded to concerns raised by community activists during the period before the current Chief of Police joined the department. Some of those concerns focused on the federal government's Weed & Seed program, a source of contention between the city and the Seattle Police Department on one hand, and progressive community groups on the other. Many in the community feared the implications of the "weeding" stage of the program, which was funded first, and more rued the negative connotations of the program's name.

The new Chief of Police attended about 100 community meetings in order to get acquainted with concerned citizens and hear their views about the department. The Seattle Police Department considers its outreach efforts—detailed below—successful and responsible for generating a great deal of political support for the department's transformation. An advisory Community Policing Action Council was formed that represents most of the city's communities. A Downtown Business Council enjoys participation from all neighborhoods and ethnic communities. As an informant noted, "Seattle politics are friendly. Everyone is sickeningly cooperative here." Members of

the City Council's Public Safety Committee supported the agency's restructuring under the new Chief and the incorporation of community policing into its everyday operations.

## CCP Planning and Organization

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Seattle was one of sixteen sites invited by the Bureau of Justice Assistance to apply for both planning and implementation funding to develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to combat crime. As stated in BJA's *Fact Sheet on the Comprehensive Communities Program*, "(t)he two defining principles of the CCP are (1) that communities must take a leadership role in developing partnerships to combat crime and violence, and (2) that State and local jurisdictions must establish truly coordinated and multi-disciplinary approaches to address crime and violence-related problems, as well as the conditions which foster them."<sup>1</sup> Each site was mandated to include jurisdiction-wide community policing and community mobilization prevention initiatives in their strategy. In addition, sites were asked to create programming, based on the area's needs, in the areas of youth and gangs, community prosecution and diversion, drug courts with diversion to treatment, and community-based alternatives to incarceration.

The Comprehensive Communities Program was implemented in two phases. Under Phase I, the invited jurisdictions submitted an application for approximately \$50,000 of planning funds to support the design and development of a comprehensive strategy. All proposals for Phase I funding were due April 29, 1994. Most of the sites were notified within a month that they were awarded funding for Phase I. During this planning phase, technical assistance in the form of workshops and meetings were offered to the sites. During July, 1994, representatives from each site were mandated to attend a two-day Phase II (Implementation Phase) Application Development Workshop. All Phase II applications were due to BJA on August 15, 1994.

Although Seattle's official start date was October, 1994, it did not receive official notice of funding until February, 1995. Throughout 1995, the city applied for three adjustments to its grant, geared mostly toward the shift of CCP from police training to program implementation in the social services sector (see below). The initial end date was extended to December, 1996, and Seattle is currently in its second year of implementation.

Figure 1 presents a timeline detailing the administrative history of Seattle's CCP program. It documents the grant planning period, budgeting stages, and CCP project staffing changes.


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<sup>1</sup> Bureau of Justice Assistance, *Fact Sheet Comprehensive Communities Program*, U.S. Department of Justice, 1994.


# Seattle Timeline

1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997


## Planning Grant




## First Year Implementation Grant



## Second Year Implementation Grant



## Other Important Dates



## **The Planning Process**

The CCP in Seattle is one of several federal, state, and local funding streams used to implement components of the city's comprehensive plan and the Seattle Police Department's transition to community policing. Although the Mayor's Office was the grantee, the Community Policing Bureau authored the proposal and managed the grant. Initially, half of CCP's resources were to be used by the Seattle Police Department itself as part of its transition to community policing. These one million dollars originally were budgeted for curriculum development and overtime salaries for training supervisors and officers for community policing. The remaining CCP resources were awarded to other Seattle Police Department units and city and county agencies such as the Department of Neighborhoods, the Department of Housing and Human Services, the Parks Department, Superior Court Drug Court, Seattle Center (a city department), community organizations, and contractors and subgrantees. The latter include non-profit service providers (e.g., YMCA), community organizations (e.g., Refugee Women's Alliance), and individual adult and youth recipients of "Small and Simple" grants for anti-violence projects. Detailed descriptions of these and other programs are presented in Appendix A of this report.

## **Grant Preparation**

The Community Policing Bureau prepared the CCP grant application and administers the grant. According to the Chief, he sought Seattle Police Department leadership in competing for the award because it already had a demonstrably successful grant writer in the Community Policing Bureau. He recalled, "I probably volunteered Dan [Fleissner, the Seattle Police Department's grant specialist]." The department was also interested because CCP fit with the Chief's vision of community policing as a "truly comprehensive" approach. The Chief therefore created a new Community Policing Bureau that could serve as the organizational home for the project. The soon-to-be Director of the Bureau helped develop the proposal and traveled to Seattle for two Advisory Committee meetings even though she did not join the department until later. As Figure 1 notes, the city's proposal was submitted in April, 1994.

## **Community Involvement**

Community leaders and civilian agency representatives that we interviewed described a highly inclusive CCP planning process. The Chief, Community Policing Bureau staff members, and several agency heads stressed the important role played by an advisory committee of about 30 people of diverse background that met three times to discuss CCP priorities. The group was

officially appointed by the Mayor of Seattle. A key City Council member indicated that one of her major contributions to the planning process was insisting on the involvement of a diverse group of citizens who understood the difficulty of making changes in a police organization. She and others also noted that most of the major players were concerned not to repeat the experience of Seattle's Weed & Seed program, which began in bad circumstances because of little civic involvement—and thus understanding—in defining the Weed & Seed program. Several Seattle neighborhoods instead mobilized in opposition to the program, put off mainly by its name. The Council member noted, “We learned from past experience—such as Weed & Seed, which received less than positive recognition by community people. We were very conscious to learn from that and structure this application process based on that learning.”

Several respondents noted with gratitude the \$50,000 CCP planning grant awarded to Seattle; it helped smooth the planning process. The Department of Neighborhoods used those funds to provide staffing and logistical support for community involvement in planning, and at one point all the key players met in the mayor's office. Public forums were held to discuss the project, and these were attended by advisory committee members “to hear what people were saying.” “You begin early to build trust with the community, like that.” Special outreach efforts gained youth input, and distinctive Seattle social groupings like “the Samoan Chiefs” were consulted. Old grant proposals to city agencies that had not been funded were reviewed to avoid omitting previous good ideas. One member of that advisory council noted, “I was really impressed by the preliminary work, by the outreach, by the discussion of how this opportunity fit with what the city was already doing. It was part of the strategic plan for the community. CCP is not a stand-alone animal.” Another senior agency manager noted that Seattle used the planning grant “to get input, not to write the grant.” One reason for the somewhat muted conflict over budgetary priorities in the final proposal was that the various agencies involved in this process tried to find other funds to support deserving projects identified by the planning group that could not be included in the CCP request. The citizen advisory panel reconvened after the completion of the proposal, “to see what the final shape of the proposal was.” That was “an effort to keep the citizenry involved.”

The Seattle school system did not participate in CCP planning, reportedly despite department invitations to do so. Their absence was notable because several CCP components, some run by the police and others by other governmental and volunteer organizations, involved students, operated in school facilities, or required coordination with school operations for other reasons. Longtime police department staff pointed to a difficult history. The department considers school safety a high priority but has “locked horns” with the school system over its open campus policy during free periods and over maintaining an officer presence on school grounds. School system



opposition to the latter recently decreased in the wake of major cuts in the school system's own safety officers, and department staff hope for a better relationship with the newly-appointed school superintendent. However, collaboration was admittedly still weaker with the school system than with other local agencies. The weak link may also stem from the independence of the school system itself, which was not overseen by the City Council.

### **Effects of Constraints on Planning**

Participants in the planning process stressed the extent to which BJA's RFP guidelines and subsequent negotiations with federal officials shaped the final proposal. Several respondents involved with the citizen advisory board agreed that its number one priority was jobs and job training, but those did not fit the Request for Proposals for CCP awards. Another issue that greatly concerned the committee was "criminal justice system (racial) disproportionality issues." By this term they meant the relatively high rate at which African-Americans and Pacific Islanders were arrested in Seattle, and these groups' even larger over-representation in jails and prisons. Although the group discussed the racial implications of the operation of the system, the board felt the problems could not be addressed in a successful proposal. The grant proposal's author noted that the federal government dictated the shape of the program: "We were told we had to put money in certain categories." The federal "strings" associated with CCP clearly defused intensely divisive issues that might have dominated discussion about allocating resources under the more autonomous control of the city.

Several subgrantees reported that federal restrictions made them comfortable with smaller shares of the total grant than they might have otherwise sought, another conflict-alleviating consequence of federal constraints on CCP budgeting. From the point of view of the City Council, however, federal guidelines diverted far too much CCP money to the police department. One Council member believed the City Council would never have supported spending \$1,000,000 on overtime salaries for police training. In her view, the planned training should have been conducted more modestly during officers' regular working shifts. If spread out over a much longer period of time it could have been carried on the department's regular budget. This less grant-based system, from her point of view, was a more sustainable training plan. (Interestingly, the department later adopted that model of training when it rebudgeted its CCP funds.) She also thought there were not enough options in the RFP to enable the city to craft a proposal that truly fit its vision of where Seattle was headed. The Council member attended a CCP conference "with a wish list for youth violence programs," but found it hard to force many of them into CCP's categories. She also thought that youth and family services for immigrant families should have taken precedence. She stressed the difficulty of arguing that proposed CCP funding would not sup-

plant existing city commitments while trying to promote programs already begun because the Council thought they were truly important.

Another Council member strongly supported the emphasis on training (at least under the reprogrammed structure), considering it fundamental to long-term change. She was convinced, moreover, that the path selected by the Chief would remain in place even if a new mayor were elected, because he enjoyed such broad support on the Council—from which a new mayor would likely come. She thought the Council would remain strongly behind the Chief's choice of direction, even if more community policing meant a short-term slowing of response time to 911 calls—a possibility that surprised her.

Police leaders defended the initially heavy allocation of grant funds to training for community policing on several grounds. In their view, training was a good management use of one-time funds. Because the training was department-wide, CCP could assist in transforming the organization and driving the Seattle Police Department for many years to come. They agreed that the Seattle Police Department could have done the training without CCP funding, but argued that this system would have spread it out across too much time—an understandable argument, since even after rebudgeting, CCP funds supported \$383 in training per officer compared to a customary annual in-service training budget of \$25 per officer. Police leadership would also have been forced to scrimp on funds for other training components; CCP funding allowed them to hire a consultant to help develop training materials tailored to Seattle Police Department's needs, which in turn created follow-up training capacity. As one senior city department manager put it, "training and capacity-building make a lot of sense with one-time money."

Other representatives of the police, citizens, and some city agencies also thought the initial emphasis on training appropriate. As one top police official stated, "you're always driven by the need to shape the proposal to fit the program. But the CCP emphasis on community policing was really a boon to us because it allowed training." An involved citizen noted, "training fit right into the over-all community policing plan. It came at the right time." An agency head argued that community policing takes "really heavy training," because "we are trying to build something that is permanent." For example, if called upon to decide about a trade-off between hiring more police or doing a great deal of training, he would opt for the latter.

Several subgrantees spoke of last-minute surprise phone calls from the Community Policing Bureau, representatives of other agencies who were involved in the CCP planning process, or City Council members, offering them the opportunity to participate and requesting that they submit a written proposal. It appears that for the non-Seattle Police Department components included in the CCP proposal, the Community Policing Bureau generally took their program proposals as given, so they operated under their

own vision, not under any "police vision" of what the organizations should be doing.

Speaking for many, one senior police official noted the main external problem facing CCP was "overcoming perceptions that CCP is (only) a police department program. That sets up certain (negative) expectations." Others noted this issue as well: for another senior department official, it was one of the two biggest challenges to the program. A member of the mayor's staff indicated, "we don't want to send the impression that this is heavy on law enforcement." He recalled the lesson of Weed & Seed in this regard. On the other hand, an agency head noted, "we were bugged about this in Baltimore [at a CCP grantee conference], and we could only point out that no police people had come to the conference!" He, like other top agency staffers, did not perceive that managing CCP through the Seattle Police Department was a real issue. The mayor's aide stressed that CCP should be sending the message that there was a different strategy for the police department; the message to the community should be, "there's a new way of doing things."

In relation to Washington, DC, one of the program's biggest challenges was "letting the Bureau of Justice Assistance know that this is not just a police program even though it's housed here." Another was obtaining timely technical assistance. After failing to get technical assistance in training through the Consortium, they used other funds to invite a well-known expert for a presentation on problem-solving. When they learned they would be receiving CCP funds, they requested technical assistance from the Police Executive Research Forum on management information systems, from the Police Foundation on strategic planning, and from the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Officials on community empowerment, but aid came slowly. The Community Policing Consortium claimed it had to conduct a needs assessment of all CCP sites first, so the department moved ahead without it. Later, two NCPC staff members made well-received technical assistance visits.

The Seattle Police Department received verbal notification of CCP award in October, 1994, and received the funds in February, 1995. They held their "kick off" in May, and some programs (especially those sponsored by the Parks Department) spent their share of the award by the end of Summer 1995.

## **CCP Administrative Structure**

The content of Seattle's CCP was spelled out during the preparation of the city's proposal by police department's longtime grant coordinator. The CCP had one full-time grant administrator, who was housed in the Community Policing Bureau. The CCP coordinator managed the components through agreements negotiated shortly after the CCP grant award notice, assembled

quarterly progress reports, made site visits, and held meetings to resolve problems that arose under the grant. CCP's components operated with varying but substantial degrees of autonomy. This coordination was intended primarily to monitor implementation of the negotiated agreements, but also helped to keep all grantees generally informed on all components of the program. The Community Policing Action Council formed to work with the Chief was expected to expand these informal ties in the future.

The grant administrator position had considerable turnover. The first CCP administrator transferred to act as a temporary replacement for the department's grant writer, and then left the agency. His replacement as CCP administrator then shifted to fill the grantwriting spot, creating a need for yet a third CCP administrator. At the end of January, 1997, the grantwriter returned to his position, and his substitute reverted to the role of CCP coordinator. However, it is our judgment that this turnover had little impact on the program. All of these staff members had adjacent desks and remained in close communication, and the first CCP coordinator created an orderly administrative and reporting structure the others executed with ease. The most recent CCP coordinator developed a sustainability plan that met with the approval of the Community Policing Action Council, the department's civilian advisory board.

Because of this decentralized administrative arrangement, and because CCP funding was temporary and small in relation to the city agencies and their subgrantees' overall budgets, CCP had little program identity for most recipients. Concepts such as "the overall CCP program," "the CCP coalition," or (except for the Coordinator) "CCP staff" had little meaning, even to people who were actively implementing CCP-funded activities. This lack of awareness about the CCP can be seen in the results of our evaluation survey of program staffers, for whom "don't know" was the modal response when asked about other participants in the program. For "vision," such people looked to sources such as Seattle's Comprehensive Plan, the Chief's blueprint for transition to "second generation" citywide community policing, or the mayor's neighborhood planning process—not to some entity labeled the Comprehensive Communities Program. This situation was very much in keeping with the city's overall plan for CCP, to integrate it with on-going or planned activities the city hoped to sustain over time. It may also reflect the city's decision to create a very low-overhead program with minimally funded coordination; a larger, central CCP staff might have generated more cross-agency interaction and closer involvement of the coordinators in the daily operations of subgrantees.

The CCP Coordinator helped produce a newsletter that reported on the successes of CCP, community policing, and problem-solving. Each subgrantee submitted quarterly reports reviewing expenses and the expected outcomes of the expenditures. The Coordinator met on occasion with

grantees. Because virtually every organization participating in the CCP conducted domestic violence projects, the Coordinator held a day-long training session that involved domestic violence “players” from all the agencies in order to foster communication.

The Chief of Police participated actively in the police components of CCP: he conducted leadership training for community policing, facilitated meetings, and met with community groups. He heard a bit about CCP issues at his daily staff briefing meeting, where the Community Policing Bureau Director was responsible for bringing up any CCP issues. The group also had a longer weekly meeting at which sensitive, controversial, or strategic issues could be brought up as well. In the future there will be a yearly executive staff retreat to further focus their attention on key issues.

## **CCP Strategy**

Prominent in discussions of Seattle's CCP were sustainability issues. Government there was not growing. The current mayor's vision of city government includes “right-sizing” it by selectively downsizing it, currently through attrition. Most city functions will be maintained with shrinking, or at best, static resources. This funding situation implied that many agencies and individuals will have to radically change the way they operate.

As a result, the desire to avoid increasing any agency's base budget drove CCP planning, and we only encountered two city employees hired—clearly on a temporary basis—using CCP funds. Seattle did not hire employees using CCP money if they could not sustain the position over the long run. As one agency director noted, “we do not see this as a two-year effort. This is an ongoing effort. It's not, ‘let's do something nifty for two years, and then move on to the next grant.’” In discussing projects that did not make it into the CCP budget, one senior agency manager noted that because of “the one time money ... lots of things were not suitable. Things that did not stand on their own, that required city staff.” Indeed, the vast majority of CCP funds were used in ways that could be “turned on and off” easily: one-time training costs, overtime, purchase of services for designated clients from existing providers, and grants to organizations and individuals for projects rather than programs, for example. Such uses were consistent with reluctance to launch new programs that might develop constituencies for continuation after the CCP grant(s) expired. As one informant put it, “What we're really doing ... is making strategic investments in resources that will ‘keep on giving’ or will initiate on-going, no- or low-cost activities. For example, training trainers instead of buying one-time training; focusing on training rather than on service provision; funding outreach and coordination efforts that will continue to work post-CCP.”

The climate of downsizing affected CCP and the Seattle Police Department in many ways. For example, the Department of Construction and Land Use was targeted for dramatic downsizing, and as a result there were not enough building inspectors to coordinate with Seattle Police Department officers who wanted to use code enforcement as a community policing tool. The City Council had recently authorized an increase in the size of the police department, and so was unwilling to budget for more officers with the partial support of federal Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grants made available by the 1994 Crime Act. Virtually all of the funding flowing to the Seattle Police Department, either through its training effort or its participation in the Seattle Team for Youth program, was budgeted for overtime for existing officers. Agencies that primarily contract for services, such as the city's Department of Health and Housing Services, paid careful attention to the impact of CCP funding on the sustainable capacity of their contractors. Sustainability was also an important issue for school-based programs. Most or all of the cost of anti-gang and violence programs in the schools was being paid for by the city or CCP, especially since 25 of the 37 school safety officers were recently cut from the school district's budget, and it was not clear that the School Board will support CCP's school programs when these funds run out.

## **CCP Program**

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### **Implementation of Community Policing**

Seattle's plan for community policing had three components: a "mission, vision and core values" statement and strategic plan; an operational plan for realizing the strategic vision; and a training plan. The mission statement was developed first, but because it was understood that the foundation of Seattle's program would be problem-oriented policing (POP), certain aspects of training began before the strategic or operational plans were in place. Support for this training was the largest item in the city's original CCP budget, until the original \$1,000,000 figure was reduced to \$483,000 as the department changed its plans.

### **The Planning Process**

The Design Coaching Team worked out the main lines of Seattle's community policing program during March, 1995, to June, 1996. The 14-member Team formed in April, 1995, and worked under the direction of a Steering Committee consisting of two lieutenants and a Crime Prevention Unit civilian staff member. The Team was charged with reviewing existing systems, conducting focus groups, investigating developments in other police agencies and city departments, and brainstorming about organizational change issues. The Team was to develop a new departmental "language" for problem solving and identify the barriers to implementing it throughout the department. The Team acted as advisors to senior department managers, and marketed the new program within the department.

A number of Strategy Teams dealt with practical implementation problems, and they reported to and worked with the Design Coaching Team. The Strategy Teams were more operational. They were to work out how to imbed problem solving into the work of each employee; find ways of documenting problem solving efforts without (much) new paperwork; work on inter-shift coordination, beat integrity, and dispatching problems; explore ways of organizing communities and enhancing their self-help capacity; and find ways to support the development of community partnerships. Many officers attended forums to discuss elements of the plan, and a department-wide newsletter documented the progress of the Team.

In June, the Design Coaching Team recommended their plan to the Chief, and it was then reviewed by his Senior Leadership Team. The department's executives agreed with many of its proposals, and called for further work on others. The major recommendations called for:

- strategies for reducing the number of calls for service, a reassessment of call prioritization, the development of non-emergency numbers, and the use of volunteers to handle some calls;
- plans to decentralize decision-making, eliminate diversionary performance measures, develop new unit performance indicators, increase the use of technology, and develop new performance evaluation criteria;
- reassessment of dispatch policies, redeploying officers on the basis of new workload measures, reviewing the status of special units, developing team relationships among officers, and moving toward a system that supports beat integrity;
- reintegration of the department's specialized community policing teams into the patrol division;
- expanded use of civilian volunteers;
- establishment of community storefront offices or, where feasible, joining neighborhood offices set up by other city agencies;
- refocusing the efforts of district managers on supporting the work of line officers;
- enhancing the role of first-line supervisors; reengineering the role of field-training officers;
- focusing the department's information technology on the support of patrol;
- expansion of training, including of civilians and other city employees; exploration of flexible labor policies and more inclusive labor relations;
- soliciting community and employee input into the planning process.

The next step in the operational planning process was to conduct Community Roundtables to discuss the plan and gather public input. About 25 community sessions were held, some of which were very well attended. Community Policing Action Council members, Assistant Chiefs, and facilitators from the Crime Prevention Unit attended these meetings. A Crime Prevention Unit staff member was also charged with developing a series of "representational" committees that would also meet with the Chief about policing matters. There will be more roundtables for department employees as well. At the same time, specific recommendations have already been



forwarded to the department's various Bureaus for further development, budget analysis, the formulation of actions plans, and implementation.

There is no doubt that this plan will meet resistance within the department. One informant characterized the Chief as facing "14 years of entrenched administration," and that "the old tradition was top-down micro-management." He noted that there was "considerable anxiety over how this will work," because it was perceived that it will be hard to get the Assistant Chiefs to take responsibility for the new program. Like employees of many organizations, Seattle's officers often are unwilling to step forward to express their views until they know what their superiors want to hear.

The final piece of the puzzle will be the department's 1998-2000 budget (Seattle agencies have a two-year budget). At the same time the department has been reorganizing, the city has shifted to a performance-based budgeting system, so the financial implications of all of the planning processes described above must be carefully crafted into the department's budget requests. One informant characterized it as "the official party line" that the planned reorganization has no overall budget implications, but did not believe it to be true. Each of the department's Bureaus has been instructed to propose six key performance measures on which they could be assessed. The city's goal is to announce baseline performance scores for its agencies in the 1998 budget, measures that stress outcomes or results rather than activity or effort. The Police Department hopes to develop problem-solving performance measures within this time frame.

## **Training**

At the outset, the Seattle Police Department's organizational change process emphasized training as one of the most important components. To begin the process, all supervisors and managers received four full days of training to ensure their understanding of the roles and responsibilities that later would be imparted during training of the line staff. As one department document put it, "Because supervisors and managers can either help or hinder our cultural change effort department-wide, this initiative is a critical step in Seattle Police Department's process of transitioning to the 'second generation' of community policing and problem solving where this philosophy is being implemented at every level and in every unit of the organization." After management training came "training the trainers" programs. Then came special training for Field Training Officers, police entrusted with the mentoring of rookie police officers.

Department-wide training in community policing was the largest single item funded by CCP. About three-quarters of the funds were initially budgeted for overtime to facilitate the participation of sworn and civilian personnel in training, but some moneys also went for a curriculum development

consultant with a background in designing adult education programs. The consultant adapted community policing and Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment (SARA) materials from San Diego, the Police Executive Research Forum, and elsewhere, as well as developing new texts for Seattle. The Community Policing Bureau Director and the Chief of Police actively involved themselves in curriculum development, drawing on their experiences in other cities. "SARA is everything here," an observer noted. Without the CCP, the department's training budget was painfully slim.

As we made our first site visit, an initial training plan was developed, and the instructors were being trained in the building. The Community Policing Bureau conducted all community policing training. One informant claimed the Community Policing Bureau did the training because the remainder of the department, including the Training Section, "has no clue about community policing." The plan would eventually train all sworn and civilian Seattle Police Department employees and representatives of other city agencies. At our first visit, several managers in other city agencies mentioned they were already scheduled to go through the training program, which promised to review the city's community policing plan, spend one hour on the SARA model, and then guide them through a homelessness problem. Initially, a large emphasis was placed on training the trainers, because they were viewed as an important "residual resource" that will be left behind in the Seattle Police Department when the CCP money had been spent. One informant referred to this as a "human capital" strategy for making use of the money. We were told that domestic violence would be a high priority in training and in the transition to community policing because of a finding in San Diego that it accounted for about 40 percent of all crime.

By our second visit, the training plan had begun. The new training plan, which was just being implemented, required a substantial rebudgeting of CCP funds. Management-level training went as initially planned. The top command staff went through a four-day session, and sergeants and supervisors went through another four-day course. Field Training Officers received a special 3-day course. The most attention was lavished on the eventual trainers themselves. They went through an initial 3-day course, followed by a continuous series of in-service sessions stressing communication and teaching skills, and giving them feedback about their own presentations. About 45 trainers were trained. In each case, one full day of training on leadership was provided by the Chief. Other days were devoted to problem-solving, coaching skills, and a cultural awareness session taught by civilians that stressed race, gender, and sexual orientation issues.

The change was in the training plan for officers. Originally, they were to receive three days of training during a massive wave of training sessions that would be conducted during overtime hours paid for by CCP. Instead, their training was reformulated to consist of one day of problem solving training.

These sessions were scheduled so that a few officers (about 25) were trained at a time, during their regular shifts. This effectively stretched training out over a full year. As before, civilians from various voluntary organizations, selected staff members from other city agencies, and representatives from other local police agencies, mingled with the Seattle Police Department's sworn personnel and civilian employees during those sessions. All of the department's employees were trained by early in 1997.

Several reasons were cited for this change. One was that this move helped stress the integration of community policing into the routine duties of the department. Training was not a special "add-on," but an integral part of their job. Seattle Police Department leaders also contended that one day of basic problem-solving training was "plenty" for getting things underway. Another view was that this retrenchment in planned training was a reaction to mounting tension within the organization, growing out of rumors about the content and motivation of the day of cultural diversity training on the schedule. In this view, keeping the training to one day and focusing on problem solving reduced the apparent "political correctness" of community policing.

### **Training in Practice**

Field Training Officer (FTO) training began during one site visit, and we observed the problem-oriented policing (POP) module; coaching and cultural competency followed on the next two days. The trainers were two officers, both recent graduates of the "training of trainers" sessions. The one-shift module began with an invitation for each trainee to describe expectations of the training. About half the attendees expressed positive expectations (e.g., "make me a more effective officer"), while the remainder ranged between skepticism (e.g., "find out where this department is headed") and hostility (e.g., "try to make us politically acceptable social workers"). Many Seattle FTOs are surprisingly young, and younger officers expressed more hostility than older ones. The trainers handled the hostility in stride, and, indeed, ran effective presentations throughout the eight hours.

After the introduction, training consisted of four main parts: a presentation/discussion of the historical context of community policing and POP (about 1 hour); alternating presentation/small-group exercises on several techniques including brainstorming, nominal group process, and SARA (about 3.5 hours); small-group and full-group discussion of problems nominated by officers (about 1.5 hours); and, a Community Policing Consortium videotape on stages of personal and organizational change (about 20 minutes).

In keeping with its "overview" billing, the POP training gave tastes of the various topics but did not provide much depth or practice in any of them. For

example, the SARA training gave overviews of all four components, but small-group exercises covered only Scanning and Analysis. No sample problem was followed through all four stages, either in lecture or in an exercise. Although the Training Guide contains nine problems scenarios, only one was discussed. There were two one-minute brainstorming exercises for the full group. Then, after each officer had nominated a real problem of concern, trainees broke into small groups for 15 minutes of brainstorming on solutions. Consistently with the brainstorming technique, no attempt was made to structure the solution process in terms of SARA or to make sure that the standard options presented in SARA (e.g., consider guardians, managers, custodians) were considered. The purpose of this last exercise was privately described as “getting officers to own the fact that they have a problem that they have been unable to solve,” rather than SARA practice. The latter was to come in future optional “tool box” training sessions. The Director of the Community Policing Bureau authored the POP module, regularly monitored training sessions, and professed satisfaction with its delivery in the one-day overview format.

In full-group debriefing, most trainees professed to benefit in some way—for example, from “having four brains instead of one working on their problems,” from using the SARA framework, and from practice (e.g., “the fourth went easier than the first”). At least one trainee remained cynical, however, noting, “a program a day keeps the chief away.”

A recurrent theme in training was that while problem-solving may not be a new technique to an effective officer, support for it by the organization is new. However, a key department manager privately acknowledged that post-training support for problem-solving was lacking. The department had not yet found how to get other city agencies to bear the extra costs of supporting community policing. One senior manager of the FTO program had criticized POP in front of supportive FTOs, which left them feeling hurt. The department also felt inhibited in publicizing its community policing success stories, but this inhibition was reportedly changing.

Many follow-up training courses were being developed for 1997 and 1998. Officers will be able to opt for one-day “tool box” sessions on leadership, problem-solving, dispute resolution, conducting meetings and working with the community, and cultural awareness. Support for these sessions will come from second-round CCP funding. Officers who participate in this training will be asked to meet with a curriculum development consultant, and to provide training to other officers about what they learned.

The Police Department's use of CCP funds was closely monitored by the CCP Coordinator. The Coordinator handled rebudgeting negotiations with BJA once the decision was made to change the training schedule. Some CCP overtime funds were retained to staff vital positions that would otherwise go unfilled while officers were in training. Other funding went for trainers who

worked off their regular shift schedule. In the end, a total of \$517,000 was moved from the police budget. Appendix A of this report describes in more detail many of the programs to which these CCP funds were transferred. The recipients included Seattle Center's Peace Academy; the Citizen's Police Academy project of the Community Policing Action Council; consultants hired to develop in-service tool-box training sessions for the Seattle Police Department; a youth advisory board formed by the Chief; conference and site visit travel funds for department employees; equipment and training supplies; and a consultant to develop a new performance evaluation system for the department.

### **Training and Organizational Change**

For the Seattle Police Department, the main internal challenge was to set up a training package that would engage the interest of internal opponents of community policing while engaging as well the exceptional officers "who really have been doing it this way all along." Internal opposition to the department's commitment to community policing was an ongoing problem. We heard reports that an informal group, Politically Incorrect Law Enforcement (PILE), formed in opposition to much of the chief's community policing philosophy. It published a newsletter, held regular get-togethers, and in 1996 celebrated their third anniversary as a group. Because of this resistance, even supportive officers stated that it would take a generation until community policing was automatically in everyone's vocabulary and thinking. They believed outside grants could accelerate the transition by providing resources to add community policing to traditional law enforcement. While they expressed concern that acceptance even of problem-solving could be delayed if the CCP-funded training "intertwined it too closely with political correctness," they thought the training curriculum was evolving in a way that would reduce that danger.

The Community Policing Bureau's response to such reports was that resistance to change was something to be expected and dealt with in a low-key manner rather than a cause for alarm. One staff member involved in the transition to community policing professed not to have heard of PILE, and concluded that therefore, it must not be a "big deal." In the October, 1995, department newsletter, the Chief explicitly designated "traditional points of view about policing" as an example of diversity to be welcomed in the department. Nevertheless, one early cultural competency training session was reportedly diverted for three hours by objections from the trainees. And a staff member within the Community Policing Bureau acknowledged that a key Bureau message was "you don't get to leadership if you're politically incorrect."

## Organization for Community Input

The community played several roles in the department's new policing plan. The department's Community Policing Action Council is described in detail below. Another part of the plan was the Organizing Every Block project. This project had the stated goal of identifying and training one citizen liaison on every block in the city. The program was developed by the mayor's Neighborhood Planning Work Group, and they expected a success rate of 40-60 percent, based on the 25 percent participation rate for the city's Block Watch program. They hoped that Organizing Every Block would be a vehicle for adapting the mayor's general concepts to ethnic customs and needs and that it would create a climate for experimentation in local government. As of June, 1996, this effort had not yet gotten underway. In addition, each of the city's four police precincts had an active community advisory board, and precinct commanders spend a great deal of time meeting with citizen's associations throughout the city. The city's Weed & Seed area has had its own citizens advisory board since 1993. The new Chief of Police has participated in hundreds of community meetings since his arrival in Seattle.

CCP funding enabled the Department of Neighborhoods to hire a half-time community coordinator who joined the staff in January, 1995. The coordinator provided logistical support for the Community Policing Bureau while it formed and trained the Community Policing Action Council (CPAC), and then worked in support of the Council. At the time of the second site visit, the Council took about half her time, with the remainder consumed primarily in staff support for the Design Coaching Team and human relations groups being set up by the Community Crime Prevention manager.

The Community Policing Action Council was a new body. Many of the people we spoke with referred to the CPAC as the "successor" to the citizen advisory committee that helped form the CCP proposal. Several also stressed that the group should be called an "action council," and not an "advisory committee" or even "CPAC"—this nomenclature to emphasize its intended action rather than bureaucratic orientation. A Department of Neighborhoods staffer characterized its members as "doers" who will "get antsy" if they cannot find an active role right away. The council was formed from a list of names nominated by a wide range of people. To solicit prospective members, over 3,000 application kits were distributed through community organizations, and the project was advertised in Department of Neighborhoods' newsletter. Applicants had to complete a form, write a letter, and solicit letters of recommendation from three community members. Checks were made to ensure that those claiming to represent organizations were indeed being nominated by their groups. Names were also submitted by City Council members.

In the end, about 30 serious applicants for a position on the Council emerged. A committee, including a Department of Neighborhoods staff member, the

director of the Community Policing Bureau, and a civic activist made the final selection of members. The naming of this committee was delayed until additional potential representatives from the Hispanic and "new Asian" communities could be identified, and this required a lengthy and aggressive outreach process. A Department of Neighborhoods staff member reported that such groups were not easily reached via mailings or through established community groups, and that Department of Neighborhoods will "do it differently next time." Two members were viewed as "genuinely low income," and two overlapped with the original CCP advisory council. CPAC was appointed officially by the Mayor, and announced to the press on September 19, 1995. Seventeen members were named, and at its first meeting the Chief of Police appointed one of them Chair of the Council.

The committee's first task was orientation and training. This task involved initial orientation meetings, a ride-along program, a visit to the dispatching center, and other experiences. In his description of the council on April 28, 1995, the Mayor described one of its missions as "to represent the people of Seattle in developing strategies for building community/police partnerships." He stated, "The Council will not merely be an advisory group that comes together to discuss issues; this group envisions itself as an umbrella planning and advisory group with citywide perspective and responsibility for developing programs and strategies that will enhance community-police partnerships." On the other hand, everyone seemingly agreed that the Council cannot consider individual incidents or complaints, and that it will not have a voice in the formation of department policies with regard to firearms and similar matters. Organizationally, the committee reports to the Chief through the director of the Community Policing Bureau.

CPAC then took on two tasks: guiding a citywide public education program, and the formation of a Community Policing Academy to train neighborhood residents. The educational effort will focus on the proper use of 911, access to department information, and the city's new community policing effort. CPAC's Media Subcommittee was to play a large role in this effort.

At one meeting we observed, CPAC approved a statement of the goals of the Community Policing Training Academy and a draft outline of its curriculum. The outline called for a thirteen-week course featuring patrol and gang unit operations, reviews of the criminal justice system, discussion of domestic violence issues, lectures on criminal law and procedure, crime prevention training, and many other topics. The Academy began operation in October, 1996. About 25 participants were chosen from 200 applicants. CPAC hopes to sponsor four sessions of the Academy each year. CCP funds paid for the training of the Academy trainers, overtime for training sessions, the development of training materials, and the salary of CPAC's staff coordinator. Four Academy sessions supported by second-year CCP funding were scheduled for 1997 (one focusing on youths).

CPAC also discussed an initiative from the Chief to form a network of 17 “identity-based” consultative human relations groups, each of which would have a communication link with the Seattle Police Department “to share concerns, issues, recommendations, needs, perspectives, and insights from their respective communities.” This effort was coordinated by a staff member of the Crime Prevention Unit, and the first group—the African-American Community Advisory Council—formed in early 1997. CCP funds also supported the ongoing staffing for this effort.

From the Department of Neighborhoods’ perspective, community mobilization was superficially easy to achieve because many strong community organizations already existed and they were eager to become involved. The difficulties were more subtle. The first was that current leadership in many communities was so strong that there was little or no turnover in neighborhood leadership. Department of Neighborhoods was using non-CCP funding to try to develop new indigenous leadership. Second, doubts occasionally surfaced within Department of Neighborhoods about how faithfully neighborhood “leaders” who present themselves actually represent their neighbors. To this end, Community Policing Action Council nominations required three letters of support from community organizations to be considered. Finally, having selected action-oriented people for CPAC and secured their commitment to being active, the Community Policing Bureau chief and the Department of Neighborhoods coordinator were already experiencing early signals of members’ impatience with the training needed to act usefully. More narrowly, Department of Neighborhoods staff and CCP leadership concurred that outreach efforts to identify Asian, Latino, and youth members for CPAC did not work well; CPAC’s public announcement had to be delayed until an Asian member could be found. Later, the Asian member was asked to resign over interference with a criminal investigation and rudeness to a precinct captain. The CPAC coordinator expects more successful recruitment in the future because of the groundwork laid by the human relations groups and because future prospective members will undergo criminal record checks.

## **Organization of Service Delivery**

This section describes some of the strategic partnerships forged between CCP participants during the program’s first two years. Detailed descriptions of specific elements of the programs are reported in Appendix A.

### **Department of Neighborhoods**

The formation of a city Department of Neighborhoods was the Mayor’s response to long-time demands from community activists to make city services more responsive to neighborhood needs. After opposing the creation



of the Department of Neighborhoods while a City Council member, he ran for mayor on a platform supporting it, and established the department as a visible sign of his new "customer service" orientation. The agency's director attributed its existence to the activism of Seattle's neighborhoods and the Mayor's plan to empower them. The agency was organized to support about 100 Seattle neighborhoods. Some of its activities were already ongoing before it was formed, while the new department initiated others. Its functions include community economic and organizational development, communication of city policy to the community, and advocacy on behalf of the community in the mayor's office. It ran 13 "little city halls," neighborhood service centers that housed legal clinics and service coordinators, and provided a place for residents to pay their bills (Seattle owns its municipal utilities) and sign up for programs. The Seattle Police Department's Neighborhood Watch boundaries matched those of the little city halls, and the latter also provided police with a drop-in center and a place to conduct meetings. The Department of Neighborhoods also conducted neighborhood programs, and coordinates historic conservation activities. It ran a matching-fund program that provided about 150 small (up to \$5,000) and moderate-sized (up to \$30,000) grants to community organizations each year; the recipients mostly contributed "sweat equity" and other in-kind contributions. The department also inherited a network of Citizens Service Bureaus that functioned as complaint centers by tracking customer service problems and maintaining a hot line.

A new relationship between the Department of Neighborhoods and the Seattle Police Department began in earnest in 1994, during a two-weekend workshop on violence and safety issues that the Department of Neighborhoods conducted after the new Chief of Police arrived in Seattle. The workshop was attended by the Chief, the Mayor, and many representatives of grass-roots and non-profit organizations. At the workshop, the Chief challenged citizens to work against violence through marches and patrols. The Department of Neighborhoods contributed funds for anti-violence projects to its ongoing program of small grants to community organizations. CCP funds continued these grants and added a special avenue for youths to apply for funding. CCP funds were also used to assign a Department of Neighborhoods staff member to provide support for the Community Policing Action Council.

The Department of Neighborhoods became more closely linked to the Police Department, as both organizations realized it was necessary to mobilize a broad range of services to do effective community problem solving. Coordination of the activities of the Seattle Police Department with those of other city agencies began to change after 1990, in part as a result of the service integration developed in the city's special Weed & Seed Program area. The master plan later developed by the city called for service coordination by geographic teams of division heads, regional managers, and other

operational-level policy personnel from all city agencies, who would be able to respond to issues over wide areas. At the point of service delivery, city workers were organized into Neighborhood Action Teams that “operationalize the Mayor’s vision of seamless service.” They worked in partnership with residents and community organizations, the final component of the plan. As the head of the Department of Neighborhoods described it, “This is key. The people understand the ‘holistic’ approach is the way to go. This meets their understanding of government services.”

Planning for the city’s CCP proposal focused new attention on coordinating the delivery of services to small geographic areas, and other city department’s redrew their administrative boundaries to match those of the police department. “We got our maps together in time for CCP,” another informant noted. By early 1997, the department was sharing four neighborhood storefront offices with Department of Neighborhoods staff to help coordinate local problem solving efforts and had plans to participate in two more offices. As noted above, these storefronts also served as drop-in centers for police officers working in the area. Seattle Police Department executives worked hard to build bridges to the rest of city government and to involve line staff in working relationships with other city workers.

### **Department of Housing and Human Services**

The City’s Department of Housing and Human Services was another strategic partner with the Police Department. It received funds to augment and expand its ongoing activities, and contributed nine distinct program components to CCP. CCP helped cement a strong relationship between the Department of Housing and Human Services and the Seattle Police Department. This linkage began with Weed & Seed, and was expanded by the Seattle Team for Youth program. The Department of Housing and Human Services recognized the content of its jointly sponsored programs would be different, more prevention focused, if they were housed outside the Seattle Police Department. But having it there kept them off limits to turf battles over resources within the Department—a definite advantage. Staff at the coordinator level would feel more comfortable if they had a better sense of how the Seattle Police Department viewed the long-term collaboration: was the Department of Housing and Human Services just a temporary partner? At her staff level, there was no sense of competition for CCP funds.

A short-term program like CCP brings several problems for Department of Housing and Human Services staff. Concerns over sustainability compelled the staff to use funds only for “safe” and successful programs that were easily started and required no change in their structure to fit into CCP. It was hard to maintain any sense of community involvement without cynicism about the come-and-go character of short-term programs. It was hard for Department of Housing and Human Services staff to “crank up” large bureaucracies in the

schools and among service providers, such as the YMCA, for small streams of money for short-term activities.

### **Seattle Center**

CCP provided partial funding for youth programs conducted by Seattle Center. Seattle Center is a city agency that operates facilities and programs in the large campus built for Seattle's World's Fair. The Center provided space for service and cultural programs and leased space to commercial enterprises. The Center actively collaborated with several other programs that were receiving CCP funds: LASER (whose volunteer attorneys served as Peace Partners, mentoring the youth-recipients), the Parks Department's Late-Night Recreation program, the Department of Neighborhoods (which advised them on administering small grants to youth and met with their grantees), and the Community Policing Bureau. Staff at the Center hoped to expand their collaboration with the Seattle Police Department's gang unit, and they saw CCP as a relationship with the Seattle Police Department that they expected to continue after CCP expires. The Department, like other city agencies and community organizations, often came to Seattle Center to find youthful participants when they need "youth input" for programs or committees.

### **Other Partners**

CCP funded two projects initiated by the city's Parks Department. Although autonomous in operation, Seattle Police Department officers provided security for late-night events, and the department trained officers and recreation personnel to handle and defuse situations typical for night-time social events for teenagers.

The King County Superior Court conducted the drug court component of Seattle's CCP program. The clients were misdemeanants convicted of reduced felony charges. CCP paid for a portion of the treatment costs of the program. The project was planned in the spring of 1994 by a committee representing all elements of the criminal justice system in Seattle and King County. Continuing oversight of the program was provided by an Executive Committee representing these agencies. The Drug Court had a part-time coordinator to serve as a liaison between the Court and the Seattle Police Department. All of this coordination was new, since before the CCP the Superior Court did not often work with municipal agencies.

### **Other Interagency Coordination**

Through the Community Policing Bureau's director, the Police Department participated in other Interdepartmental Teams and work groups on such

issues as public safety and neighborhood planning. These were problem-oriented, *ad hoc*, and went out of business when the problem was solved. They combined both policy-level and line-level participation. These were seen as steps in forming a culture of municipal problem solving, thus easing the transition to geographically defined Neighborhood Action Teams, the building blocks of the Urban Villages Comprehensive Plan. As one step in the transition, the director of Seattle Police Department's Community Policing Bureau planned to lead an inter-agency problem-solving training effort on the homeless, using the SARA model. She also served on the Mayor's Community Safety Working Group, which coordinated the work of many agencies. She saw this direct linkage to the mayor as important in establishing the clout required to make community policing viable and to give other departments a reason to work with the Seattle Police Department. The Working Groups were also a useful point to spread the word about problem solving.

## **Network Analysis**

### **Theory and Application**

Network analysis has emerged as a popular analytic strategy for understanding social relations, and is an appropriate tool for shedding light on CCP partnerships. Network analysis has a long history of use in the fields of anthropology, sociology, and psychology (see Scott, 1991), and has now been used in other fields such as political science and education. The network approach assumes that (1) individuals are not isolated but rather function as part of a social system whereby their behavior is influenced by others, and (2) these social systems are structured and organized, and therefore, can be analyzed as predictable patterns of interaction. Thus, network analysis allows us to examine the structural properties of social relations by examining the interactions between individuals actors in a social network. Knoke & Kuklinski, (1982, p. 10) describe the two essential qualities of network analysis as "its capacity to illuminate entire social structures and to comprehend particular elements within the structure."

Recent advances in the theory and techniques of network analysis have been substantial (see Wasserman & Galaskiewicz, 1993; 1994 for reviews). Despite these advances, the utilization of these techniques and models for the study of community action and public elites has been limited (see Knoke, 1993).

The Comprehensive Communities Program was designed primarily as a vehicle to facilitate the development of citywide networks and partnerships—collective entities that were hypothesized to improve the odds of preventing

urban violence and disorder above and beyond what could be expected from individuals and agencies working independently. In the context of the present study, network analysis is an important strategy for identifying patterns of interaction among those who play key roles in each CCP coalition. These wave one network data provide an empirical look at the relationships and social networks that were taking shape early on in five CCP cities.

### **Boundary Specification**

Specifying the boundaries of the network in advance of data collection is an important part of network analysis. Unlike typical random sampling approaches, limits on the population or the sample must be carefully imposed. Essentially, we adopted a “realist” (Laumann et al., 1982) approach to boundary specification by allowing each CCP site to define their own network.<sup>2</sup> The CCP proposals (prepared by the sites) were used by the research team to identify a preliminary list of potential actors and organizations within the CCP network. These lists were mailed to the CCP project director for review, who then recommended deletions and additions. The realist approach uses the criterion of “mutual relevance” to decide who belongs in a network. Here, the assumption is that individuals and groups are included in the network if they have a mutual interest in the CCP project and some capacity to influence the outcome. Indeed, there is reason to believe that individuals were included in the proposal (or later included in the network) because of their position in particular organizations or projects associated with CCP.

Sampling was not necessary in this study because the network populations were relatively small. Hence, all identified members of each network were included in the data collection effort.

### **Data Collection Methods and Procedures**


The network data in this case study were collected as part of our Coalition Survey. The Coalition Survey was sent to sites from September, 1995 to June, 1996, depending on the site. This network analysis then is a snapshot of the relationships and social networks during the first half of the CCP implementation phase.

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<sup>2</sup>The realist approach can be contrasted with the nominalist view. With the latter, network boundaries are determined by the researcher's theoretical framework.

To measure CCP-related networks, respondents were given a list of individuals who were believed to be affiliated with the CCP coalition in their respective cities, and then asked how often they have contact with each individual on the list. Possible response options were “daily, weekly, monthly, every few months, never.”

To enhance the network analysis, individual cases were dropped when they did not have sufficient contact with other members of the network. Including persons with rare or occasional contacts in the network would have distorted the results by causing more dense (and therefore less interpretable) clustering of the remaining actors. Hence, after examining the frequency distributions, a decision was made to include only respondents who reported having contact with at least 10% of the total network “at least every few months.” The effects of applying this inclusion criterion are described separately for each site. The analysis strategy can be found in Appendix B.



**Codes:**

AC: Action Council	DN: Dept. of Nghbds.	MO=Mayor's Office	PS: Pion. Sq. Com. Council	YS: King
CA: Central Area Mot. Prog.	HH: Housing & Human Services	NP=Nghbd. Plan. Office	RW: Ref. Women Alliance	Cy. Dept.
CC: City Council	IS: Interagency Schools	PA=Peace Acad.	SN: Seattle Nghbd. Group	of Youth
CV: Central Youth/Family Ser.	KC: King Cty. Org. Project	PD=Police Dept.	SP: Sam.-Pac. Island. Assoc.	Services
DH: Dept. of Health	MC: Municipal Court	PK=Parks Dept.	WN: Westlake Nghbd. Assoc.	YW: YWCA

## Seattle Network Analysis

Fieldwork in Seattle indicates that the CCP program was coordinated by the Seattle Police Department and did not require a close-working network of organizations or individuals to carry out the day-to-day operations of this initiative. The Seattle Police Department managed the distribution of funds (grants and contracts) to social service agencies, community organizations and the drug court. The network analysis provides an opportunity to examine the frequency and similarity of contacts between persons associated with the CCP effort.

A total of 75 persons were evaluated in the original network matrix. Generally, the level of interaction between these individuals was moderately low in comparison to other sites. Persons in the network had contact with anywhere from 3% to 39% of the total network (with a median of 12%). More than one-third of the total network (37% or 28 people) did not meet the minimum criterion for inclusion in the network analysis, i.e., having contact with at least 10% of the total network "at least every few months." At the other extreme, only 5% of the sample (four people) had this minimum contact with at least one-third of the total network. The demonstrably low level of contact between network members (forcing the loss of one-third of the sample) is instructive by itself, suggesting that the relations between CCP partners are relatively weak.

As might be expected with a police-based program, network members reported the most contact with the Director of the Community Policing Bureau and the Project Administrator (39% of the network each), followed closely by the Chief of Police (36%) and the Grant Coordinator (35%). Thus, the most frequently-contacted persons were all located within the Police Department.

A two-dimensional smallest-space analysis was used as the best way to depict the observed relationships. Kruskal's stress statistic was satisfactory. The stress value is .20 and the  $R^2$  value is .81. The horizontal axis, moving from left to right, is clearly differentiating between Seattle Police Department (SPD) representatives to the left of the vertical axis and the remainder of the city to the right. The interpretation of the vertical axis is less clear, but may reflect an organizational hierarchy. Clearly, at the top of vertical axis is the citywide leadership tier. Moving from left to right across the top is the chief of police, a venerable community activist, a city council member concerned with criminal justice issues, and a representative of the mayor's office. With the exception of the police chief, the leadership is not closely linked to a single cluster and therefore, may be involved with both identifiable groups as defined below.



The Seattle network, as depicted in the figure, reflects the relatively “corporate” management style of CCP in the city, in which CCP managers are quite distant from both the providers and the recipients of services. Two clusters emerged from this analysis, which we have termed “Police Department” on the left side and “Neighborhoods and Service Providers” on the right. Of the 12 persons in the “Police Department” cluster, 11 are civilian and sworn personnel of the Seattle Police Department, engaged primarily in community policing, but also including staff from records and information systems functions. The one member of the cluster who is not a SPD employee is the CCP-funded liaison to the SPD’s citizens’ committee, the Community Policing Action Council (CPAC).

The second cluster, “Neighborhoods and Service Providers,” includes community residents and community-based organizations, along with the second tier of subgrantees that received CCP funds to provide services directly to the community. Included in the cluster are: staff of city departments such as Parks, Housing and Human Services, and Neighborhoods; and community-based organizations such as the Refugee Women’s Alliance and the Pioneer Square Community Council. These are all organizations that received CCP funds but communicated with CCP leadership primarily through quarterly progress reports. Interestingly, this cluster, which is more close-knit than the police department group, contains four CPAC members, indicating that their ties to the service providers and community-based organizations are closer than their ties to the SPD.

## Sustainability

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Seattle's second round of CCP funding (\$400,000) was approved in the summer of 1996, and will be available for use through December, 1997. Like all grants, the department's proposal first had to be approved by the City Council. They shifted some of the requested grant dollars to special programs they liked, and reduced the administrative positions proposed in the budget. In the fall of 1996, the Council then had to pass an ordinance accepting the money; they could at that time have again adjusted the budget, but did not. The CCP Coordinator plans to draw down the new funds when needed. They will support:

**Community Policing.** In this category fall expenditures for: overtime for officer training, a consultant to develop new curriculum materials, classroom supplies and equipment, leadership training, line grants to officers, training for staff members of other city agencies, funding for special problem-solving task forces, developing performance evaluation measures, travel for department employees, a grant coordinator, and a summer graduate student intern.

**Community Mobilization.** In this category fall expenditures for: continuing the Seattle Campaign Against Violence, crime prevention for non-English speakers through the Refugee Women's Alliance, support for a middle-school program, staff support for the Community Policing Action Council, and further sessions of the Community Policing Academy.

**Crime Prevention.** In this category fall expenditures for: domestic violence prevention education, batterer's treatment by the Refugee Women's Alliance, Seattle Team for Youth, the Peace Academy's Peace Partners program, dispute resolution by LASER in high schools, the Department of Corrections' Tag Team, and publications about bias crimes.

But as the notes provided in Appendix A to this report document, long-term sustainment plans were being crafted by CCP's managers even before the award of second-round funding. Several strategies were involved:

**Build infrastructure.** Especially within the police department, Seattle's plan focused on developing curriculum materials and purchasing training equipment, "training the trainers," and developing in-house expertise so that an expanded training program could be sustained without outside funding.

**Support Startup Costs.** Many community mobilization projects fell into this category. CCP supported the staff time for planning activities, recruiting initial participants, training them, and setting involvement processes in motion. The Community Policing Action Council, the Chief's "identity-based" consultative groups, and community roundtables to discuss the department's community policing plan, were all supported by CCP on a one-time basis.

**Stretch Existing Projects.** Many human service delivery projects fell into this category. They temporarily expanded their client intake with the support of CCP funds, and hoped to attract future funding on the basis of their performance and the merits of their programs. As the project notes in Appendix A indicate, they were frequently successful.

Among the programs incorporated on a long-term basis into existing government budgets are: the Drug Court; the Department of Neighborhoods' Small and Simple Grants; Options, Choices, Consequences; and the Refugee Women's Alliance's batterer's program.

## Interim Summary

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In Seattle, the CCP was a consortium of organizations in which one—the police department—coordinated the development of an overall strategy, and engaged second and third-tier “subcontractors” to implement different pieces of the plan. The consortium was a large one, and large city agencies, community-based organizations, and entrepreneurial individuals received funds to pursue a broad range of projects.

Within the police department, CCP was one of a number of federal and local funding streams that supported their transition to community policing. How CCP funds were used evolved as the Chief's vision for the department became more clearly articulated during the program's first year. Initially, nearly half of the funds were to be spent on three days of training for community policing, by paying officers to attend off of their regular shift. The remainder was to be allocated through contracts to partner agencies for direct services and one-time awards to individuals and community organizations.

During the first year, the nature of the Seattle CCP changed. The CCP-supported training effort became more transformational, and the activities of the corps of officer-trainers that it fostered became more central to the department's change strategy. Training was integrated into regular shifts over a longer period, to make it clear that it was part of the regular—and ongoing—business of the organization. Being a trainer became a long-term assignment and their skills and experience became one of the important legacies of the program. The extended period for training now overlapped the release of the Design Coaching Team's blueprint for the reorganization of the department.

As a by-product of this shift in training, the saved overtime charges were reprogrammed from the police to the partner agencies. This funding enhanced their capacity to sustain their activities, and in addition a number of them received support from the city's second CCP award.

When asked to assess their successes, CCP's leaders cited the police training curriculum and their success at selecting an action-oriented Community Policing Action Council. They were pleased with the collaborative relationships that developed with the Department of Neighborhoods and the Department of Housing and Human Services; they attributed those to positive expectations that the Mayor created for the new Chief of Police, the Chief's success in outreach to his counterparts in other departments, and to Seattle Police Department's willingness to share Federal grant funds with other departments. There was some frustration with the amount of “process” needed to deal openly with the community; many of those we interviewed noted that getting anything done in Seattle takes a great deal of time

because of the city's tradition of extensive community consultation and involvement. However, CCP—unlike Weed & Seed—became a focal point of cooperation between the police and the community.

What CCP did not accomplish in Seattle was to stimulate the formation of new organizational structures or to build the capacity of the organizations involved to initiate new departures in local governance. Instead, the city augmented existing programs and “trained trainers” to get where they already intended to go. To be sure, they moved quickly. Seattle organized its program and committed its CCP funding as quickly as any of the recipient cities. Its projects did not require elaborate planning or long lead times. They were uncontroversial because they augmented activities that were largely already planned or in place. The real and perceived federal constraints on CCP proposals that would be funded ensured that divisive proposals mostly stayed off the table, and they alleviated to a certain extent organizational infighting that might otherwise have broken out over shares of the budget. There were no risky or long-term innovations sparked by Seattle's CCP. Motivated by a desire to avoid building long-term financial commitments to new programs, Seattle supported activities that could easily be “turned on,” and then “turned off,” without undue disruption at the end of the grant period.

## **An Epilogue to Seattle's CCP Case Study**

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### **New Developments and Issues in CCP**

Conducting an update on CCP in Seattle is a review of the programmatic and financial sustainment of activities funded by CCP throughout the city and of the progress made by the Seattle Police Department (SPD) in community policing. CCP funding specifically paid for SPD training in problem-solving and for a diverse group of community organizations, which were identified through an analysis of gaps in services. Many of these programs have found new funding sources and thus are continuing beyond the CCP grant.

### **Community Policing**

#### *Training*

CCP funds paid for the development and use of training materials on how to do problem-solving. SPD wants to be a change agent nationwide and receives invitations from police departments across the country to come and train their staffs. In exchange, SPD asks other departments to pay their travel expenses for training sessions. In 1998, the SPD is sponsoring a national conference, *The Heat is On*, for community police throughout the country, paid for by the Advancing Community Policing funds from COPS.

CCP-developed training has continued. The one day tool box training described in the CCP proposal took place in August 1997. The audience was supervisory level people learning how to supervise officers and others who are doing problem-solving. This is seen as a crucial element as the supervisors (who themselves were on patrol before the practice of community policing) may not understand how to supervise people doing community policing. Phase I of a four day training session for supervisors included an eight hour class by Chief Stamper on leadership issues and one on cultural diversity and phase II included a day of advanced problem-solving and one day on supervising problem-solving officers.

Almost 2,000 people in the police department have gone through the CCP-funded materials. The first level of training is considered complete, more training will be developed both in-house and for conferences with other police departments. COPS money will be used as stipends to have experts from around the country train Seattle officers.

The great majority of training being done in 1998 is a result of the instructional materials and training capability developed as a result of the CCP grant. Tool-box trainings are offered in advanced leadership and advanced problem-solving. Training the trainers classes focus on the community police academy and block watch academy. Basic problem-solving training is available for new employees and for instructors. Other training topics include the drug court and hate crimes.

Community policing training is done in the police academy. Seattle started its own academy in 1997 and includes more training in community policing and cultural competencies than the more law enforcement oriented state academy does. Other jurisdictions are now requesting for their candidates to use the Seattle academy and King County police will enter in 1998, thus spreading the community policing philosophy. The state academy currently consists of 450 hours of instruction, while Seattle's academy is currently at 900 hours but may be streamlined down to 780.

### *New Developments*

CCP had proposed a problem-solving conference which is now planned for Fall 1998. The focus will be on police working with communities that feel disenfranchised from the police department. Advancing Community Policing funding from COPS will fund this conference.

Organizing Every Block got underway after the case study was written. This concept, of using neighborhood block watches as the conduit for how city agencies communicate with residents, is being implemented. Funding is not necessary for sustainment.

A public access TV show on community policing is scheduled to start in May 1998. Officers are "screen tested" for hosting the show which will focus on different neighborhoods and their crime prevention activities and community partnerships. CCP paid for the set, video equipment and officer overtime. The plan is to produce two shows on CCP monies and then shop these around to get private funding for additional shows.

### *Issues in Community Policing*

The police department is dealing with the challenge of implementing community policing during a staff and patrol car shortage. A larger than normal attrition rate as officers hired in the 1960s chose to retire, along with minor cuts in the sworn force over the last several years, has contributed to this shortage. At the same time, the department switched from a 6-2 schedule to a 4-2 schedule and while that makes for more alert, smaller

squads that can interact between shifts, it also has the negative affect of decreasing available staff. Hiring for new officers has begun, but it can take a year to fill all the vacancies.

At the same time, community policing officers are being reassigned from their community policing teams and being put back into patrol because of staff shortages. Officers are also going through interim reassignments from the detective unit and other specialized units to go back to patrol. The community policing officers had developed special relationships with residents and with staffers at public agencies that partner with the police. Since the SPD's goal is for all officers to develop these relationships, and for such coordination to occur more systematically instead of being dependent on specific interpersonal relationships, this new system may result in more officers developing these relationships and performing problem-solving.

The Youth Academy was planned under CCP but still hasn't happened because there are not enough applicants. CCP monies were used to train instructors for the academy (and for all programs needing instructors). Increased outreach is being done to attract more applicants to the Youth Academy and the start of the program is now planned for May 1998. Support for this effort is being provided by the Law Enforcement Block Grant.

There are still sectors in Seattle that need to implement and join partnerships in community policing. Community policing administrators now acknowledge that the labor unions representing the police should have been invited to the community policing discussions at the beginning. Since they were not, it has been difficult getting union cooperation at a later time. The school system remains isolated from the rest of the city agencies. The police department reports it is still a struggle to get the schools to return their phone calls.

### *Internal Police Processes*

Community policing has changed internal processes within the Seattle Police Department, such as personnel. Now when interviewing for new hires, community policing is an important focus of the interview. Candidates that have prepared by learning how important community policing is to the SPD will be able to discuss why they want to work under that philosophy. The department has improved its background screening to include how well the officer communicates with community members and deals with diversity. In the polygraph test, officers are asked about their ability to interact with diverse populations. Increased interview time is spent discussing how the candidate would resolve conflict and work with diverse segments of the community. About half of the candidates are from outside Seattle, with some



applying specifically because of Seattle's reputation in community policing and problem-solving. Candidates "shop around" different police departments to find philosophies that suit them. Many of the candidates are college graduates and military people.

The promotion process has also changed and this remains a collective bargaining issue. The SPD has "formalized the informal process" of collecting data for years about an officer's capacity to do community policing, such as leadership ability, community interaction, and tactical skills. In the past, community policing work elements were not as explicitly included as factors in promotions. Now, those getting passed over for promotion realize that they never took community policing seriously enough. Some individuals may have been waiting for community policing to end or thought they were already practicing it, without realizing that Chief Stamper had a more extensive view of community policing than what had been practiced before.

The department is trying to improve its performance evaluation process in light of community policing. A retreat was held on this subject. Improvements have been made in evaluating specific problem-solving projects but still needs to be developed on how to evaluate individual officers. The goal is to redo the performance evaluation scheme for officers with a more problem oriented reward system. The city now utilizes an outcome-based budget process which is also moving other city departments towards new performance measures.

## **Synergistic Effects of CCP**

The partnerships between police and other agencies are being cemented, with the police contacting service agencies to relay community requests. The police department did problem-solving training for city staff, which was considered very helpful in moving towards a widespread cultural change in city governance.

CCP is seen as responsible for the court and police linkages in the King County Drug Diversion Court (90% of the clients are from Seattle). It was the third CCP coordinator, working out of the police department, who applied for the Department of Justice funding for \$200,000 to sustain the drug court. There are many examples of ongoing cooperation between the two institutions. Police personnel, both civilian and sworn, were trained at the drug court. Police expedite warrant lists and follow participants with support and monitoring. Chief Stamper participates in drug court graduation. A video about drug court is shown at the Seattle Police Academy. The narcotics captain serves on the drug court's steering committee. The court trains police for working with other drug courts in the King County Sheriff

Dept. and suburban towns. CCP encouraged this new idea of drug courts and helped it move along faster, as CCP fostered "new ways of handling old problems that weren't improving," like drugs. Seattle is currently testing the feasibility of a juvenile drug court, with the hope that it is a logical link to CCP-funded programs in drug prevention and youth issues.

Seattle has experienced good coordination among its federal grants: Weed and Seed, CCP, and SafeFutures. Weed and Seed started before CCP, but CCP was the first of these federal grants to get city-wide exposure. Each grant implementation gets easier, because collaborative relationships are already in place. There are police department representatives on the SafeFutures Advisory Group and the Police Chief sits on the SafeFutures policy board. The director of SafeFutures credits CCP with helping organize the Interagency Staffing Group and the Community Policing Board for SafeFutures. CCP "changed the mindset" for communities and this new perception of what partnerships could be was implemented in SafeFutures. CCP staff work with SafeFutures' community organizations and juvenile justice committees. There is a common vision between SafeFutures and CCP that values partnership and collaboration.

The Seattle Department of Health and Human Services applied to (but was not awarded) the State of Washington Grant for Title V delinquency prevention funding and invited the police department to be in on the planning process. This would never have happened before CCP, but shows how collaboration between the police and other agencies has become more institutionalized.

## **Sustainment of CCP**

### **Financial Sustainment of Projects**

CCP-funded projects were sustained in two major ways: general funding and federal grants. Sustainment has been achieved for some of the projects that CCP funded when the decision was made to transfer a portion of the funding originally allocated to police training to instead go to community and social service programs. General funds pay for two officers on the Community Policing Bureau and a new research position in the Bureau. This is seen as proof of the City Council's high regard for the Bureau's work. Other programs sustained with general funds includes: the Employee Recognition and Performance Evaluation; Options, Choices, Consequences (police go to 8th grade classrooms to provide education on handguns); Small and Simple Grants (provide grants for community groups that are not 501c3s); translation of anti-crime materials into the many languages spoken in

Seattle; and overtime for detectives in the juvenile division of the police department working in Seattle Team for Youth.

Other programs are being sustained with additional federal grants. The Law Enforcement Block Grants will fund the Community Police Academy and general funds will eventually take over from the block grants. COPS funding is paying for the line officer grants with money from the COPS Advancing Community Policing grants and some of the work of the Car Prowl Task Force uses a COPS problem-solving grant. The youth-oriented programs funded by CCP have been moved under the auspices of SafeFutures. This includes two groups for at-risk girls, Sisters in Common and Cambodian Girls Group. The SouthEast Diversion Program, with SafeFutures funding, has expanded to providing language support for the families as well as the juveniles. Alternatives to incarceration for youth is also now under SafeFutures.

Various departments in the State of Washington are sustaining CCP work. The Department of Health and Human Services is funding domestic violence prevention and overtime salaries for the case managers working in the Seattle Team for Youth. The LASER Conflict Resolution Program, now operating in high schools throughout the state, is funded by the Attorney General's office. CCP's alternatives to incarceration program utilized work crews managed by the state Department of Corrections and is now paid for by Seattle Public Utilities Department.

The drug court now has an array of funding from both local and federal sources: including the King County Sheriffs Office, the City of Seattle and King County general funds, along with federal grants from the Department of Justice, Byrne funds and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas.

Private monies were raised to sustain the Peace Academy at the Seattle Center. Fundraising is now being done for private monies to continue the public access TV series on community policing for which CCP funded the sets and equipment.

### **Sustainment of Processes**

The Community Police Action Council (CPAC) continues to meet monthly to set new goals and agendas. The 21 members had a retreat in Winter 1998 to discuss the best ways to be advocates for problem-solving and how to be community partners with the Mayor and City Council. CPAC intends to lobby the City Council about resource allocation to aid problem-solving and to work with the precincts and the Chief's Advisory Councils. The staff position is now funded by Law Enforcement Block Grants and may become a permanent staff position. CPAC invites representatives of community groups

and public agencies to their meetings and is setting up roundtable discussions with these groups in Spring 1998. CPAC members meet periodically with Chief Stamper to work out collaboration between police and community groups. The CPAC is now very much part of the police institution. The staffperson for CPAC also runs the Community Police Academy, a half time position covered by general funds.

The skill of the Seattle Police Department in using problem-solving and the SARA model can be seen in the major effort of The Car Prowl Task Force started in April 1996. There are over 70 members in this interagency, intergovernmental body with representatives from the public, private and local communities, such as different sections of the SPD, King County Law Enforcement, city council staff, executive office staff, city prosecutor, municipal court staff, county youth services staff, Washington Insurance Council Director, investigators and staff from insurance companies, director of Seattle Neighborhood Group, and businesses located in high incident areas. The impetus behind the task force is that car prowls are the most prevalent crime in Seattle, almost 19,000 a year. In high incident neighborhoods, the car break-ins create a sense of disorder that leads to other crimes. Neighborhoods where tourists park their cars are among those with the highest incidences. In addition, very few perpetrators are ever caught and the punishments are light for those that are caught. The three goals adopted by the task force are: 1) increase behaviors that prevent car prowls; 2) increase identification of offenders; and 3) increase consequences of the criminal justice system.

CCP funded comprehensive training in Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), bringing in a Canadian consultant to train officers, crime prevention coordinators and other city agency staff on how the design of public spaces impacts crime. This is considered a capacity building activity that can be partly sustained by utilizing the new expertise of officers in CPTED. Meanwhile grants are being sought for financial sustainment. It is also an illustration of new partnerships between the police and other public agencies. Officers and crime prevention coordinators with expertise in CPTED now sit on review boards for public projects and have input into the building permit process at the same stage as when the Environmental Impact Statements are being done. A crime prevention coordinator reviewed the plans for the new baseball stadium.

The Community Police Academy has become an established part of the department. The fourth class was held in the winter of 1998, and 100 people were on the wait list for the fifth class in spring 1998. The original goal was to familiarize residents with the perspective of the police department, but now the graduates want to put their knowledge to active use. An alumni group has formed, but the police department still is not really

sure what to do with residents once they are trained. Alumni have quarterly meetings with the police department. Some graduates have joined the Community Police Action Council and others volunteer at the SPD. CCP funding was used until February 1998, when Law Enforcement Block grants took over. The operating budget of the police department may eventually fund the staff.

The sustainment of coalition building can be seen in the two Neighborhood Action Team Seattle (NATS) that exist in the north and south precincts. NATS are partnerships for problem-solving between line staff of city agencies and are coordinated by the police department. In the North precinct, community people do not have ongoing representation, but in the South precinct they do. The North NATS was organized by the director of the Citizens Service Bureau (a city agency). It has an intervention coordinator who works with the police and a neighborhood services coordinator who works with the community. South NATS was started by Seattle Neighborhood Group, a nonprofit whose director and staff attend NATS meetings. The East precinct will probably be next to organize a NATS. It appears that the police are more readily available to attend meetings than are employees of local agencies who are very short staffed. The NATS were started under CCP and funding was used to pay the overtime for police. Their sustainment doesn't require much funding.

The Interdepartmental Enforcement Alliance Team (IDEA) was actually started before CCP but became an integral part of the CCP strategy. IDEA continues to meet quarterly as the chiefs and directors of city departments brainstorm together on policy and procedures on issues such as health and solid waste.

Under CCP the SouthEast Diversion Program addressed the issue that increasing numbers of juveniles in this community were coming into the juvenile justice system who did not speak English. CCP provided \$30,000 for language assistance. When SafeFutures took over the program, it was realized that some of the juveniles were intercepting the official letters to the parents (who did not speak English). SafeFutures decided to expand the program to provide language and other support to the parents.

## **Final Conclusions About the Success of CCP**

The big question that remained at the end of the Seattle case study was on the impact of the CCP-funded training on the police force. In retrospect, the change in training technique is definitely considered to have been a good idea. Conducting the training as part of regular officer shifts made problem-solving and community policing seem more "business as usual" instead of a

special project. Dan Fleissner, research and grants manager for the Seattle Police Department reflects on the training: "Unequivocally, without CCP we wouldn't have done this amount of training. We always wanted to do it, but we needed the funds. CCP allowed us to do it quicker and with more quality." The most lasting impact of CCP, said another CCP player, is that it moved the idea of community policing problem-solving from theory stage to implementation stage. CCP fit into Chief Stamper's priorities at the time: community policing; youth; and domestic violence. Seattle's political and social environment is amenable to the CCP activities such as community policing and coalition building. The mayor elected in November 1997 supported Chief Stamper, community policing and community partnerships, while his opponent did not.

The large amount of money and effort that went into police training has paid off in many ways. Nancy McPherson, director of community policing for SPD, finds that the training accomplished giving everyone a common language for problem-solving and started officers on the road to using the problem-solving techniques. Their new computer tracking system shows 100 current problem-solving activities being pursued just by the patrol officers. The training has also made Seattle's police department a national model for problem-solving, with the curriculum funded by CCP now the standard for the COPS regional institute. Ten states now use Seattle's model, curriculum, and trainers. McPherson feels that funding for curriculum and training was so crucial, because you can't move people in an organization towards change without standardized training.

The change in training allowed money to go to non-police organizations that carried out valuable work. Barbara Raymond, the third CCP coordinator, says CCP was both a carrot and a stick as the money encouraged people to do what they knew was the right thing anyway. Of the diverse group of programs funded by CCP, it is the King County Drug Court, a recipient of \$200,000 of CCP funds, that stands out as a long-lasting contribution to criminal justice in Seattle. CCP was the first major grantor to the drug court. Prior to CCP, it ran on in-kind staffing and contributions. This drug court is now considered a model program and is used as a mentor site by the National Association of Drug Court Professionals. Staff from drug courts nationwide come to Seattle for training. CCP funding was instrumental for startup and momentum of the drug court. Most importantly, those involved feel that the progress of the police in community policing and problem-solving under the CCP grant, is a positive contributing factor to the success of the drug court.

CCP's philosophy and funding helped develop partnerships between the police department and community organizations. These new entities – the Community Policing Action Council, the Citizen's Academy, the many Chief's

Advisory Councils for specific groups such as Filipinos, African-Americans, sexual minorities, the disabled, the Latino community – helped bring formerly disenfranchised, hostile or indifferent people to the police force as new allies. Other efforts, such as enhancing block watches by training them in problem-solving or developing a volunteer program for the Patrol Support Team, gave community members an increased capacity to partner with the police.

In summary, CCP was used as seed money to increase the capacity of community/social service organizations and the police department to partner in crime prevention activities. Both the relative ease in which financial sustainment was found for CCP-funded programs and how these new processes and entities became part of the institutions of the city attest to the value of these efforts.

## Appendix A: Program Descriptions

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This section reviews in detail major components of Seattle's CCP effort. Where appropriate it indicates both the original and re-budgeted level of support for each activity.

### Seattle Police Department Programs

#### *Anti-fear crime prevention (\$9,000)*

For this project, the Crime Prevention Unit within the Seattle Police Department identified documents requiring translation. Key documents were translated into Spanish, Korean, Chinese, Japanese, and Vietnamese.

#### *CPTED Training and technical assistance (\$15,000; increased after rebudgeting and merging with other funds)*

The Seattle Police Department hoped to engage Oscar Newman to consult with them about site layout and the design of public housing, and about design modifications for schools and other public buildings. This would have involved staff from the Seattle Housing Authority, the Crime Prevention Unit of the Community Policing Bureau, and Seattle Police Department officers. The effort floundered for more than a year over insurance, liability, and other contractual issues, and the low cap on BJA's allowable consulting fees. The Seattle Police Department instead contracted with a CPTED training group for training of officers, civilian Police Department employees, and staff members from other agencies.

#### *Conflict resolution training (LASER) (\$27,500)*

Lawyers and Students Engaged in Resolution (LASER) in Seattle currently had 30 lawyers volunteer to work with high-school-based programs to introduce peer mediation. CCP funds were used to hire a contractor for curriculum development and a training retreat, in order to develop something better and more formalized than they could have done on their own and could be adopted elsewhere by volunteers without further funds. CCP also financed LASER's incorporation as a non-profit organization and attendance at a national mediation conference. With their own funds, LASER helped Seattle Center's Peace Academy by serving as Peace Partners (i.e., mentors to the Peace Academy youths in implementation of follow-up programs back in their own schools).



LASER became involved in CCP at the invitation of a lawyer in the city attorney's office. Contact with CCP structure was and remains minimal, except for quarterly progress reports.

The history of LASER has been of a stop and start nature. The State legislature passed an "unfunded mandate" in April 1994 requiring the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the Attorney General to introduce peer mediation in schools. The state bar association's chair-elect spearheaded a statewide effort to get the association involved, following models from Indiana and New Mexico. The regional branch of the state bar association initially recruited about 30 lawyers for this project, only 10 of whom went through training. They approached two high schools about participating in the program. Garfield High School accepted, and 30 students are starting this fall. One high school accepted help for an ongoing program, but then got "a little proprietary," so LASER withdrew and substituted another.

LASER has an evaluation plan with measures such as fights in hallways and student attitudes. They recognize that the program will take time to change a school's climate. The future of this program is uncertain. A LASER representative believes the program will survive; they have a legislative mandate, the volunteers and the training materials. They also have leads to other potential funding sources. But he acknowledges they are not quite sure how to relate to schools, because "they seem to want volunteers but don't know how to use them." He was also not quite certain about how the program would be funded after the completion of CCP. The CCP Coordinator was uncertain whether the program will thrive after CCP, since LASER did not receive an appropriation from the state legislature. She has successfully encouraged the leadership to work more closely with the Peace Academy, which has more secure funding under the Seattle Center umbrella.

#### *Seattle Team for Youth (\$63,600)*

The Team for Youth focused on young high-risk youths age 11-18, many of whom were still only tentatively associated with Seattle's gangs or have family members who are. The program—which antedated CCP—was an inter-agency consortium coordinated by Department of Housing and Human Services. Seattle's schools, the Parks and Recreation Department, and King County agencies were also involved. Clients were referred to the program by schools, city and county courts, and the King County Department of Youth Services. Most services for clients—including a manager assigned to each referral—were provided by a network of contract service providers, including the YMCA and seven other non-profit organizations. A CCP grantee, New Directions, was also involved. These agencies provided counseling, drug and alcohol treatment, employment and leadership workshops, cultural activities,

sports and recreation programs, and standard social work support for families. The over-all program was funded by federal, county and city grants.

With CCP support, Seattle Police Department officers were involved in identifying and referring potential participants, out-of-home placement and follow-up with abuse victims, and working in support of the program. Police referrals were made via a special form which is passed to the Seattle Police Department Team for Youth coordinator. Seattle Police Department Team for Youth members provide the link between youths, their families, and service providers by accompanying case managers on unscheduled home visits and remaining in contact with selected youths. CCP provided overtime pay for officers on the Team. At our first site visit there was one two-officer Team, headed by the project's developer. They were later joined by three other officers, two hired using COPS AHEAD funds. This program was originally budgeted at \$100,000, but that figure was reduced by \$36,400 in negotiations with BJA.

*Regional criminal records improvement (\$55,000)*

The Seattle Police Department maintains criminal history information ("Rap Sheets") on all of its arrestees, and has for many years. The department responds to a large volume of requests for data from other police departments, city agencies, and employers, to whom they routinely supply rap sheet data. However, as in many states, Washington has never effectively organized the entry of court dispositions into its criminal history files. In Seattle, this is currently done manually. Dispositions come from the Seattle Municipal Court, the King County Superior Court, and the King County District Court as paper copy, and they are manually entered into the criminal career database at the Seattle Police Department. Data entry includes both adult and juvenile cases; the latter are handled by a branch of the Superior Court. This process is generally about six months in arrears, so special requests for more recent data on particular individuals also have to be made on a frequent basis, compounding the cost and cumbersomeness of the process. For example, Seattle's Weed & Seed evaluation required up-to-date disposition data for drug cases from all three courts, so each had to be hand checked individually.

CCP supported the automation of this process, by linking the information system for the Seattle Municipal Court (MCIS) with the Seattle Police Department's relational database. This was "only part of the problem" for JUVIS (King County Superior Court), and DISCIS (King County District Court) systems remain unlinked, but the Municipal Court provided by far the largest volume of paper data. Each court's prosecutor and public defender also maintains an independent information system as well, but they also will not be linked to the criminal history data system. CCP funds were used to contract for a systems analysis of the issues and problems involved in linking

the two systems, a task that is at least as complicated as actually writing the computer software to make the translations. The plan is to link the systems at the charge and person level, and to automatically translate court case disposition codes to Seattle Police Department's coding scheme. The goal of the project is to reduce by 75 percent the rekeying required to process disposition information.

### **State Department of Corrections**

CCP funds (\$40,000) supported work crews directed by the State Department of Corrections, as an alternative to incarceration. The program's "Tag Teams" were work crews composed of nonviolent felons and misdemeanants sentenced to community supervision. The program was administered by Northwest (Washington) Area Office of State Department of Corrections, as an element of community service ordered by the King County Superior Court. Community service was authorized under the state's Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which equated eight hours of community service to one day in jail. The Community Protection Act of 1990 listed highway work crews on as one of a list of community service activities that people could perform. Highway clean-up work gradually expanded to include clean-ups of illegal dump sites in communities, and community organizations learned of their availability for local service. The next big expansion of the project's mission was from solid waste clean-up into graffiti removal. To accomplish this, staff members had to solve several technical problems, including finding effective paint removal chemicals, safety training about the chemicals, and ways of keeping breathing masks sterile from day to day.

CCP funding enabled the Department of Corrections to add a fifth crew to its existing four. The funds supported a work crew supervisor and the purchase of supplies. There are many benefits of the program. Teams have conducted major clean-ups of visible eyesores in the community; it provided seven-day-per-week clean-up coverage to city of Seattle; and it conserved jail bed space. The project enjoyed staffing flexibility because non-Tag work crews supported Tag Teams, and vice versa, as needed. The program supported the city's transition to community policing by providing flexible work force that can respond when police officers request clean-up assistance.

The Department of Corrections was first approached by a City Council during the CCP grant application process, and the Seattle Police Department grant writer helped them craft a section of the application. The Department of Corrections expected the program to thrive even if CCP is not renewed, and they received some continuation funding from the city's Department of Engineering. The trend in King County is toward the increased use of community service as an alternative to other sanctions. The program hopes to get a city ordinance requiring graffiti to be removed by its victims within three days, but offering DOC assistance in the effort. Community groups are

clamoring for clean-up services. The director has plans to approach railroad owners regarding overpass graffiti, and the metropolitan transportation system regarding bus stop graffiti. Other customers are four major trash removal companies that use dumpsters, and local affiliates of the Chamber of Commerce, which are already requesting assistance in particular areas. A public relations campaign is beginning with appearances in senior Seattle government and on television. The Department of Corrections is also interested in running work crews for the County, which would save further jail space currently financed by local property taxes. Two future problems the project faces are finding public property to work on, and maintaining a steady flow of workers during week-days, because many of those serving a community service sentence perform their duties during weekends.

### **Department of Neighborhoods Programs**

Department of Neighborhoods funds are managed fairly autonomously. Department of Neighborhoods makes small grant awards using their normal processes. The CCP Coordinator monitors them through their quarterly reports, and occasionally refers interested parties to them. There is no formal reporting requirement for small grant recipients, and what is reported back to the CCP Coordinator comes from phone calls by a Department of Neighborhoods staff member to individual recipients.

#### *Small and Simple Grants: Community (\$20,000) and Youth (\$20,000)*

CCP funding allowed the Department of Neighborhoods to continue a community grants program, Confronting Violence in the Neighborhood, which it had added to its ongoing small grants program in 1994. CCP funding also allowed the Department of Neighborhoods to start a new program of grants to youths involved in anti-violence projects. The program awards grants of up to \$1,000 for anti-violence projects by youth aged 12-21. The required proposal is a simple two-page form. Gangs are prohibited from receiving grants, but Department of Neighborhoods staff feel certain that some gang members have received grants. Department of Neighborhoods staffers report that proposals were received in a volume and quality "beyond our wildest expectations." They attributed this to their outreach efforts among youth groups to solicit proposals, and their special focus on hard-to-reach youths. Proposals were reviewed by a nine-member youth panel, assisted by an adult. The adult's advice was intended to teach principles of good fiscal stewardship during the deliberations. They made their recommendations to the agency director, after review by the legal department. Recipients were chosen in the spring of 1995, and the grants were being awarded. Forty completed applications were considered, and 18 were funded.

Some operational problems emerged. The city has had trouble finding fiscal agents who can receive checks for the youthful grantees. A grant to clean up and repaint a dark corner was rescinded at City Attorney's request because it was on church property. A few young grantees were difficult to locate after receiving their award. Department of Neighborhoods staff believe the program did not elicit proposals from the poorest neighborhoods because the children there have to work, and as a result have little time for volunteer activities; to increase their participation, some thought is being given to raising funds for stipends for volunteers to enable them to volunteer. There was some difficulty getting competitive proposals from "unaffiliated" youths, to compete with proposals from youths who were "fronting" for established community organizations. The Department of Neighborhoods did not create a mechanism to monitor whether grantees fulfilled their commitments. Instead, a Department of Neighborhoods staff member calls each recipient to get verbal reports of their activities.

Department of Neighborhoods staff expect the adult grant program to continue. It began without Federal funds and they have been soliciting private funds for the youth program to raise the grant limit above \$1,000. The City of Seattle will contribute \$30,000 for this program in 1996, and the Department of Neighborhoods plans to sustain it in the future out of their regular budget.

### **Department of Housing and Human Services Programs**

The Department of Housing and Human Services actually conducted few programs. Instead, its staff planned programs, found funding for them, wrote contracts with service providers, and monitored their performance. Many of those contractual providers had only a dim awareness of CCP, since it provided but one small piece of a larger funding stream for their activities. Department of Housing and Human Services staff reported to the CCP Coordinator. That relationship was one of routine grant monitoring, and it worked smoothly, though one staffer wanted to have more interaction with others at her level in CCP in order to maximize the coordination of services.

#### *Refugee Women's Alliance (\$24,000; rebudgeted to \$34,000)*

The Refugee Women's Alliance provides services to immigrant women and their families, particularly counseling and parenting case management. CCP funds were used to augment Alliance case management services for referrals from the South Precinct due to domestic abuse or gang activities by youths, during the term of the grant. Project staff worked closely with police, schools, Team For Youth officers, and other social agencies. A problem is that in immigrant communities, youths in trouble generally know English better than their parents, who don't understand the "signals" of gang activity or

other troubles, and don't know how to navigate through the system to seek help. Alliance translators and social workers help with this problem. Support for five families was originally budgeted; the budget increases added coverage for an additional 10 families. Anticipated dates of operation: 4/1/95-6/30/96. Department of Housing and Human Services staff expects the program to continue even without CCP because of the strong long-term working relationship between the Alliance and the South Precinct.

*King County Organizing Project (\$5,000)*

CCP funds were used to purchase a curriculum and training for peer mediation in two elementary schools and one high school. This was dubbed Project Let Our Youth All Live (LOYAL). The training materials will be used during 1995 and 1996. Dates of operation: 1/1/95-6/30/95.

*Domestic Violence Prevention Public Education (\$20,000; rebudgeted to \$28,000)*

This aspect of CCP was aimed at educating the public about the issue of domestic violence. Ten thousand dollars were subcontracted to the YWCA of Seattle-King County, to conduct a "Love Shouldn't Hurt—There's No Excuse for Domestic Violence" campaign. Many other public and private organizations were to be involved in supporting this campaign. It was aimed at younger men, and teenagers in particular. There was to be a special Father's Day effort. This project was to include the production of 100,000 brochures in six languages, and the development of school curricula. Because Department of Housing and Human Services "does not know what the message should be," the advertising agency working with the YWCA first held focus groups with young men "to find the message." Another \$5,000 was set aside for a special education campaign among city employees; as of 9/95, almost 400 had already attended various sessions, which focused on the impact of domestic violence on the workplace. Another \$5,000 was reserved for producing and distributing a domestic violence newsletter that would enhance the coordination of efforts among all city and community agencies in this area. All of these efforts were seen as one-time projects that do not need to be sustained over time. The YWCA and the advertising agency do not depend upon the steady flow of funds of this sort.

*Dispute resolution/anger management (schools) (\$10,000; rebudgeted to \$28,000)*

CCP funds were used to train youths as trainers in conflict resolution at the Interagency School, which serves high school-age returning drop-outs, kids re-entering school after juvenile detention, and other troubled kids. A law-

related education component of the program was designed to equip students with an understanding of the legal system.

Dates of operation: 4/1/95-6/30/96. The rebudgeting extended the dates of operation and added a law component to the education program.

*New Directions (\$41,300)*

New Directions was a program for former gang members, and part of the Seattle Team for Youth. New Directions was founded in 1992, and was originally supported by the Weed & Seed program. It was a family and youth services center providing a variety of contract services. Under CCP it provided services for "formerly gang-involved" youth. Four gang-affected youths age 18-24 were enrolled at a time, and they were in contact with the program about 6 hours per day. CCP supported a total of 8 participants, half of whom were former gang members and half of whom were affected by peer or family gang members. New Directions provided them with case management, support services, counseling, GED training, and skill development activities. Participants got involved in youth in business forums, attended vocational classes at a community college, and participated in the Rites of Passage (ROPE) program as peer counselors. This program stresses cultural enrichment, job skills, computer literacy, community service, and career counseling.

Dates of operation: 7/1/95-6/30/96. This program was seeking continued funding. The city agency that supports its mandate, Department of Housing and Human Services, has been heavily impacted by declining federal funding of social programs.

*Youth employability and job training (\$40,170)*

CCP funds were to support outreach to Seattle Team for Youth clients by this ongoing program conducted by the Central YMCA. The program drew participants from the YMCAs in their areas to the services available at the Central YMCA, which include a Job Club (which teaches social skills, interviewing, etc.) and includes a computerized Job Bank. Eight pre-employment workshops were held for 47 youths. Dates of operation: 7/1/95-6/30/96. Department of Housing and Human Services staff predict that without CCP support this program will continue, but on a smaller scale. Interest among the youths had not been high, and staff guessed that the youths were too young to be seriously interested in preparation for work.

*Truancy reduction (\$40,000)*

CCP funds were used to support one truancy counselor at a middle school. The counselor did prevention education and instructed youths about the state's Becca Law, which requires police to file court petitions (i.e., charges) against their parents after five unexcused absences from school. Thirty-two youths and their families received services. The counselors also diagnosed their underlying problems and tried to find them assistance. Students were counseled, given transition to work training, were reassigned to special education programs, got class schedule changes, and took diagnostic tests. Dates of operation: 7/1/95-6/30/96. This program must continue as a requirement of a state statute, but CCP has allowed the Department of Housing and Human Services to shape it with a preventive slant, according to staff members. A new SafeFutures grant is expected to pick up the cost of the counselor.

Two problems surfaced in this project. The first was its difficulty in working with the Seattle School District—"learning whom to talk to at each school without getting caught up in their politics. It's different at each school. I also have to straighten out misconceptions about the truancy program because police are involved." Department of Housing and Human Services staffers eventually solved this problem. The second problem emerged from the bad timing of the grant funding cycle, which did not mesh well with the school year. The schools' academic programs were already well underway when notice of award came in February. Then, because CCP funds were slow in arriving, the Department of Housing and Human Services could not negotiate contracts with the schools until the end of the school year.

*Batterer's intervention (\$60,000)*

This project involves contracting with community agencies that already provided treatment for court-adjudicated battering offenders, to subsidize the treatment of additional low-income clients. These clients would otherwise have to serve jail sentences, because they could not afford to pay for the private treatment alternative offered them by the court. This project also involves special outreach to non-English speakers, who otherwise find it difficult to access the social service community. The program's administrator describes it as "aimed at the root causes of violence." All of the clients came from Seattle Municipal Court, so they involved misdemeanor cases. The project's staff worked closely with Municipal Court and the Seattle Police Department's domestic violence unit.

The recipients of the service contract were Ina Maka/United Indians, Consejo Counseling and Referral Service, and the Refugee Women's Alliance. Their programs were professionally staffed, employing trained counselors who were certified by the State of Washington to provide batterers with treatment. To



build additional provider capacity, staff members from several service providers in this area were also funded to attend 30 hours of additional training. The counselors could serve special linguistic communities. The average cost of servicing a client was \$800; CCP funds subsidized up to \$400 of this cost, on a sliding-scale basis keyed to their ability to pay. The treatment program lasted one year: half the year involved weekly sessions, the other half monthly meetings. By our second visit two groups of 16 clients had completed the treatment cycle. Although we did not observe a treatment session, it seemed clear that the therapist, a Vietnamese with only moderate English speaking skills, would face a formidable linguistic challenge; groups were described as having six clients, with as many as 4-5 interpreters into languages other than Vietnamese and English.

The Department of Housing and Human Services staff member who supervised this program helped plan the effort and drafted the services contract. She was not involved in CCP planning; that was handled by her supervisor. She was instructed to develop this project within given budget limits. The basic program was already in place, with a \$25,000 budget from the city. Program staff already worked closely with the Municipal Court and the Seattle Police Department's domestic violence unit. CCP increased the city's capacity to subsidize this alternative to incarceration among domestic batterers. She met with groups of potential service providers to discuss the opportunities presented by the program, and to assess their capacity to deliver various kinds of services. She found that the process of identifying and contracting with agencies took time, but once established it was principally a contract monitoring task. This is the specialty of the Department of Housing and Human Services, which contracts out almost all of its services and provides few on its own. She reports on a quarterly basis to the CCP Coordinator.

The Department of Housing and Human Services is concerned about the sustainability of this effort, and is interested in securing funding to support this new level of subsidy in the future. The project's monitor perceives her principal opposition in contending for funding will lie among programs providing services to battering victims. In line with her concern, \$5,000 of the CCP award was paid to a consultant whose job was to identify and work with programs for non-English-speaking batterers. The consultant developed new service options in this area, identified potential funders, drafted budgets, wrote grant proposals, and developed a grant request package that the agencies could easily tailor for individual foundations. All of this she describes as "capacity building." In addition, the boards of directors of the participating agencies know about the program and its finite future, and 2-3 are already committed to lobbying the City Council for continuation funding.

The Department of Housing and Human Services staff member thinks CCP's goals are appropriate, and appreciates its special focus on domestic violence.

She admits that “there are lots of unknowns about what to do about domestic battering,” and was fairly certain that Seattle could not have wisely absorbed much more domestic battering treatment money at this time. She was concerned that the service providers the city has contracted with not over-expand their capacity, so that they can more easily weather the possible disappearance of this additional subsidy money.

*Continuation of care (\$50,000)*

CCP funds are being used to support supervision of work crews for juveniles as an alternative to incarceration. The work involves light physical labor, and has been primarily doing landscaping in parks near the detention center. A challenge has been to get appropriate court referrals, by making judges aware of the program and to sentence juveniles who can be assigned to a nonsecure environment. Department of Housing and Human Services staff hope the new SafeFutures grant will pick up this program.

**Seattle Center Programs**

*Seattle Center Peace Academy Small Grants (\$22,500; reprogrammed to \$32,500)*

The Peace Academy is a week-long training program for high school students in conflict resolution, peer mediation, anger management, and community building. The program was held during the summers of 1994 and 1995, and a large winter event was held in February 1996. Another summer event was planned for August 1996. The 1995 session involved 100 students and included a community meeting in which the Chief of Police and the incoming Superintendent of Education, among others, participated.

The Peace Academy was developed independently by Seattle Center, and is housed in its central building. It has an operating budget of about \$230,000 per year. It receives funds from the city, Seattle Center, the Seattle Center Foundation, private sources, and CCP. Seattle Center's director approached the Mayor's cabinet about possible joint ventures between the Center and the City, and the Chief of Police responded by inviting the Peace Academy to join the CCP proposal process. CCP funds were received for making Small & Simple Grants to youth participants in the Peace Academy, for follow-up anti-violence projects in their schools. Nine grants of up to \$2,500 were awarded in February 1995 for projects supporting peer dispute mediation. These included peer mediation training, a student retreat on peer mediation, school-wide anti-violence assemblies and plays, a drop-in counseling center, and a demonstration of peer mediation to teachers and staff. Eleven schools received grants. All operated with teacher advisors and adult volunteers,

including some police officers. Using \$10,000 rebudgeted to the program by the Seattle Police Department, the Peace Academy hired a teacher in each school to be a more active representative of the program. They were to be nominated by involved students and appointed by their principals.

The biggest difficulty the project faced was getting overworked school staff to complete the applications along with their other work. "Each school is different, and they've all needed hand holding," a staff member noted. The Academy found that CCP reporting requirements were high compared to those for foundations, but the only "red tape" problem was the prohibition against using CCP funds for food. The Peace Academy director found it hard to get time enough to follow up on the small grants, but he believed that all but one of them went reasonably well. Common administrative problems included children's fear of being labeled "teacher's pets" for volunteering and poor notification of meetings and arrangements for space.

Like other subgrantees, the Peace Academy staff director had little familiarity with the overall CCP Action Plan, although he had seen it, and "feel(s) comfortable with who got what." The Peace Academy's CCP component was monitored by the CCP Coordinator, largely through quarterly reports and site visits. At our first visit a staff member predicted that the schools and the community would like the programs and sustain it after CCP expires, even if no Seattle Center funds are available for the program. By a later visit, Seattle Center had secured \$30,000 in continuing funding from the Seattle City Council for the Small & Simple grants program, and the schools were beginning to fund peer mediation projects on their own. The program director considered the CCP funding critical to launching this program. He was surprised to find fundraising more difficult for violence prevention than for an arts academy for youth. He was optimistic about continuing future success for the program, for several reasons: 1) the youth culture had changed and become more supportive of "Enough violence!" messages; 2) the program had become more visible so less time was needed to explain it; and, 3) there was a wider pool of promising applicants, since more youth had been through the Peace Academy.

## **Parks Department Programs**

### *YES (\$25,000)*

The Youth Engaged in Service program was carried out during the Summer of 1995, and produced a final report. This project's director was involved only minimally in CCP planning. She developed Parks Department data for the Seattle Police Department's grant writer, and drafted a needs assessment for a program she had already designed but needed to fund. The YES program "was an easy place to drop money." Its focus was children age 13-18 and she

already had \$13,000 to get it started, so CCP funds enabled her to easily expand the number of participants. She issued regular reports to the CCP Coordinator until the completion of the project.

YES was designed to impart life skills to youths predisposed toward voluntary service. They were taught how to supervise younger children, how to write a resume and apply for jobs, financial skills, etc. Bus service was provided to program sites. Adult volunteers came to YES gatherings to talk about real world jobs (the "life skills" piece), and these volunteers and YES staff continue to support individual children along these lines. The YES program involved 175 children at 52 sites, and cost about \$300 per participant. The budget included a separate accounting of the CCP contribution.

Among the obstacles faced by the program was the federal \$450 per day limit on consultant fees. In order to hire a good consultant to train staffers, the project director had to secure a special exemption from the limit.

#### *Late-night diversion (\$25,000)*

This program was developed and led by another staff member of the Parks Department. He was not involved in CCP planning, but was given \$25,000 to support special late-night teen events. This program took place in 23 community centers of adjoining schools throughout Seattle. About 300-400 teens attended each late-night event. The activities were run by recreation specialists, and Seattle Police Department officers were paid \$22 per overtime hour to provide security for the events. Police and recreation staff were specially trained by the Seattle Police Department to handle and defuse situations typical for such events. The Parks Department provided late night bus shuttles to the events. This was a social program celebrating diverse cultural heritages; it recruited youthful participants through schools and other forums. The program's manager estimated that the \$25,000 CCP contribution supported activity for about 1,500-2,000 teens. Without it, the program would have been much smaller.

#### *Seattle Municipal Court Information System (\$50,000)*

This project is described as "domestic violence probation services." It in fact supported the development of an automated agency case management system. The award was to the domestic violence unit of the Municipal Court's probation services division. The Court had about 3,000 people under probation supervision at any given time, and about 1,000 of them were monitored by counselors in the domestic violence unit. The domestic violence unit has been tracking cases by hand since its creation in 1991. Each of six counselors handled about 175 defendants, and their case load had been going

up about 10 percent a year. It appeared to the unit's director that under the current Mayor and City Council he would not get more staff, so he planned for years to automate the defendant tracking and counseling process; otherwise, he faced an impossible task.

CCP funds were used to purchase a Local Area Network, wiring, a Novell server, and terminals for each counselor's desk. Microsoft Corp. donated a license for 20 copies of Microsoft Office. The CCP Coordinator intervened on at least one occasion to keep the court's MIS staff from charging excessive infrastructure costs to his program's budget. A consultant wrote Office macros and Visual Basic code linking Microsoft Office's modules, producing an "off the shelf" software system that automated the production of management reports, trend analyses, data entry screens, reports for counselors, "to-do lists", and task priorities. The system interfaces the court's mainframe and moves data from it automatically. The unit's supervisor hopes the enhanced productivity of the system will help him keep up with increasing case loads without a staff increase. By a visit in June 1996, the system was fully operational and about half the staff kept all of their records on it. The administrator planned to use his remaining CCP funds to customize the system again after his staff had three months of experience using it.

The supervisor of the domestic violence unit was our chief informant about the program. He successfully lobbied the City Council for the creation of a special domestic violence probation unit in 1991, and considers himself "Mr. Domestic Violence" in the court system. He knew nothing about CCP until he received the coalition survey, which amazed him by its scope. He was "a small piece in a puzzle I really didn't understand." He thought his project was deserving, but he had no idea how his defendant tracking system fit into the overall program, or how it related to community policing.

More than two years before he had drawn up a plan for a case tracking system for his unit. He reviewed computer systems used by other courts, and requested \$60,000 from the City Council for it, but the proposal was rejected by a Council committee. A year later he received a late-night phone call from a senior Department of Housing and Human Services staff member whom he knew slightly. She explained she "was working with the police" and had asked for \$60,000 for his computer system. He thought little of it until he heard in October, 1994, that he would receive \$50,000 for the system. He then had MIS staffers for the Municipal Court work on system acquisition. The first time he heard of CCP was when he received "a very useful memo" outlining his accountability and reporting responsibilities for the money. He reported quarterly to the CCP Coordinator.

### **King County Superior Court (Drug Court) (\$200,000)**

The King County Superior Court received \$200,000 to support its drug court, which runs 12 hours per day. CCP funds provided an alternate, three-stage treatment alternative to a jail sentence. The cases all involved misdemeanor charges, many of which were reduced from original felony charges. Eligible clients could have no felony charges outstanding, and no past convictions for violent crimes. A treatment staff person was in court each day interviewing and working up background reports on potential clients. Almost all of them were represented by the Public Defender. Eligible clients were offered the treatment option by the judge. Those who accepted it were immediately interviewed and assessed. If there had been no drug-court diversion project, virtually everyone who went into treatment would have served a jail sentence. Most of the CCP money (and a great deal more) went directly to treatment. The provider was selected after a review of responses to an RFP by the King County Health Department.

The treatment program was largely non-residential, but a growing number of heroin addicts frequently required residential care in the King County Jail's hospital wing. Most clients went through three stages of treatment. During the first six weeks they had 3-4 counseling sessions per week, backstopped by frequent urine tests. Then they moved into a 3-4 month period of less frequent counseling and testing, and then finally to a stage that stressed training in life skills and finding a job. Overall the program lasted one year, but since most clients missed sessions here and there, the average period to completion was 15 months. The judge held a graduation ceremony for those that successfully negotiated the program.

The project was planned in the spring of 1994, by a committee representing all elements of the criminal justice system in Seattle and King County. After considering other models, they adopted a program model that had been developed in Dade County, and brought in a consultant from Dade County to help finalize the details of the program. The most significant disputes within the planning group were over the criteria for admission to the program (would offenders charged with other felonies be admitted?) and a requirement that offenders plea guilty to the offense as charged before they are eligible. These were reportedly resolved with an agreement to make such decisions on a case-by-case basis with a view toward the best interest of each client.

The judge of the drug court has been involved in extensive fund-raising to support these treatment programs. CCP contributed \$200,000 in 1995, which was described as "very critical for startup." Seattle will also contribute \$100,000 in 1996; King County contributed \$260,000 in 1995 and \$260,000 in 1996; The County Sheriff added \$180,000 for 1996. The court hopes to secure Byrne Grant funding totaling \$430,000 to keep the court going through April 1997. The court's goal is to always keep itself funded at least 6-9 months in

the future. Nonresidential treatment cost about \$1,700 per client in 1995, and \$1,500 per client in 1996. During the Summer of 1996, the program had enough funding to provide care for every eligible client who choose to opt for treatment. About 25 new clients were being enrolled each month.

In 1996, the City Council appropriated \$240,000 to support the program during 1997. Then an additional \$200,000 in special funding was awarded the Drug Court by the CCP office in Washington. As of December, 1996, it was uncertain whether the Council would withdraw its contribution, which might run afoul of BJA's "non-supplantation" rule.

These funds are being managed very autonomously. Oversight of the program is provided by an Executive Committee representing the major criminal justice system agencies. The CCP Coordinator monitored their activities chiefly through their quarterly reports, but early in 1997 the Drug Court hired a part-time coordinator to serve as a liaison between the Court and the Seattle Police Department. The King County Superior Court was not involved in the CCP planning process; being a county court, it does not often interact with most municipal agencies. The prosecutor works closely with narcotics detectives, but not the Court. Many we interviewed noted this project was funded principally because this was mandated in the CCP RFP. While deserving, it probably would not have received \$200,000 in an unrestricted planning process.

Drug Court has already completed an impressive evaluation that tracked the August 1994 cohort of in-coming cases until March 1995, to understand the flow of cases through the system and how well program processes were working. The Court has an additional \$50,000 in reserve for evaluation, and plans to use it for a follow-up recidivism study. During early 1997 the Court conducted a feasibility study for a new juvenile drug court.

## Appendix B: Network Analysis Strategy

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Distances among the targets were measured using a structural equivalence approach (cf. Lorrain & White, 1971), which overcomes some of the shortcomings of the conventional graph theory. Following the lead of Heinz and Manikas (1992), distances among the targets were measured by determining the overlap of acquaintances for any two actors, defined here as “the degree to which the persons who are in contact with each of them are the same people (p. 840).” The main benefit of this structural equivalence approach is that it circumvents the problem of missing data and allows us to compare patterns of contact for individuals who are not interviewed. This is only possible because our sample includes a sufficient number of respondents who know both individual targets. The alternative approach (i.e. the graphic theoretic approach, which measures similarity by counting the number of links in the communication network to get from person A to X) would require the collection of data from all people in the chain.

Multidimensional scaling was used to analyze our network data. As Scott (1991, p. 151) observes, “The mathematical approach termed ‘multidimensional scaling’ embodies all the advantages of the conventional sociogram and its extensions (such as circle diagrams), but results in something much closer to a ‘map’ of the space in which the network is embedded. This is a very important advance.” For the present analysis, we have used the non-metric multi-dimensional scaling technique called “smallest space analysis,” which uses asymmetrical adjacency matrix of similarities and dissimilarities among the targets. (See Kruskal & Wish, 1978; Scott, 1991 for a discussion of advantages over metric MDS). The data have been recoded to binary form, so that 0 indicates person X has had no prior contact with person Y and 1 indicates that X and Y have had some contact, i.e. at least “every few months.” The non-metric MDS program is able to produce a matrix of Euclidean distances (based on rank orders) which is used to create a metric scatter plot. These plots are displayed as the two-dimensional figures below.

The output of MDS is a spatial display of points, where each point represents a target person in the network. The configuration of points should inform us about the pattern of affiliations and contacts in the network. The smaller the distance between two points, the greater the similarity between these two individuals with respect to their social contacts. The location of person X in multidimensional space is determined both by X's own social connections and by the connections of those who have chosen X as an affiliate. The MDS analyses were performed using SPSS Windows 6.1.



Technically, the data could be analyzed at either the individual or organizational level and each approach has some advantages. At this time, we have decided to analyze the results at the individual level, primarily because of some highly visible individuals who played central roles in the conceptualization and implementation of CCP programs. Still, we are able to connect individuals to organizations, and tend to view them as representatives of the organizations with which they are affiliated. We are likely to use organizations as the unit of analysis for a planned longitudinal analysis because of the attrition problem in network and panel data.

To determine the appropriate number of dimensions for the data, a series of analyses were performed and a "stress" statistic was calculated for each solution. In MDS, stress is the most widely used goodness-of-fit measure for dimensionality, with smaller values indicating that the solution is a better fit to the data (Kruskal & Wish, 1978).<sup>3</sup> By plotting the stress values for solutions with up to four dimensions, it became apparent that the "elbow" point (i.e. where any additional increase in the number of dimensions fails to yield sizeable reductions in stress) occurs at two dimensions. This pattern was evident at all five sites, and hence, we elected to use a two-dimensional solution across the board. Beyond relative stress levels there is the issue of absolute stress values. Stress values ranged from 18 to 20 percent, with one exception (25%). These values are considered acceptable in the literature, although figures above 20 percent suggest a weak fit (see Kruskal, 1964; Scott, 1991).

The data were analyzed, presented, and interpreted separately for each CCP site. Statistics reported include stress values calculated from Kruskal's Stress Formula 1 and the squared correlation ( $R^2$ ). The  $R^2$  value indicates the proportion of variance of the disparity matrix data that is accounted for by their corresponding distances.

After calculating the solution and mapping a multidimensional configuration, the final step is interpretation. This involves assigning meaning to the dimensions and providing some explanation for the observed arrangement of points in space. In other words, what do the clusters of points mean and how should they be interpreted? As Scott notes (1991, p. 166), "...this process of

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<sup>3</sup>Technically, stress is defined as "the square root of a normalized 'residual sum of squares.'" Dimensionality is defined as "the number of coordinate axes, that is, the number of coordinate values used to locate a point in the space." (Kruskal & Wish, 1978, p. 48-49).

interpretation is a creative and imaginative act on the part of the researcher. It is not something that can be produced by a computer alone.”

## **Limitations and Cautions**

We should be cautious not to over-interpret or draw causal inferences about the observed networks for several reasons. First, these analyses and graphic presentations provide a one-time snapshot of interactions between individuals early in the CCP project. Consequently, these data will not allow us to tease out any pre-existing relationships and networks that may be operating. Thus, whether these networks are CCP-induced or reflect pre-existing relationships is unknown. A longitudinal look at these networks is currently in progress to see how these linkages change during the course of the CCP funding. Combined with careful fieldwork, this should give us a stronger assessment of CCP's contribution. Second, these analyses are limited to interactions between individuals, which may or may not reflect the nature and extent of partnerships between agencies. To capture interagency contacts, our unit of analysis for the longitudinal analysis will be the organization/agency rather than the individual (This analysis strategy also avoids the individual-level attrition problem that is always present in longitudinal data). Finally, the present analysis is limited by the nature of the original sample. Who ends up in the sample can have a large influence on the outcome of network analysis. While we are satisfied that this problem has been minimized by allowing sites to self-define a comprehensive list of CCP participants, nevertheless, we suspect that some individuals and groups have been overlooked at each site. Generally speaking, one might characterize this network analysis as a study of “elites” -- in this case, community, city and agency leaders. Networks that may exist among street-level employees and community volunteers are under-represented (although not completely absent) from this analysis.

Despite these limitations, network analysis provides an important empirical tool for examining the nature and extent of community-based partnerships and coalitions. While it is easy to talk about “interagency cooperation” in grant proposals or in personal interviews, it is not so easy to create the illusion of a network (for the benefit of researchers and others) when members of that network are asked, individually, about their frequency of interaction with one another. The results here suggest that the number and density of networks varies by site and that resultant patterns of contact are generally consistent with our field observations.

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