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Final Report

Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI) in St. Louis

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Abstract

The Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI) began in St. Louis in October, 2000. SACSI built on the existing foundation created by Ceasefire, beginning in 1996. SACSI employs a problem-solving approach that scans for problems, amasses data to assess those problems, and designs interventions based on that assessment.

St. Louis has long been plagued by high rates of firearms violence, including gun assaults and gun homicides. Spatial analysis revealed that despite its high levels of violence, there was a strong spatial concentration of firearm crimes in the city. Indeed, twelve of the city's 79 neighborhoods accounted for more than half of the gun homicides. In addition, there was considerable overlap in the characteristics of victims and offenders in homicide. Thus, the majority of victims and offenders were young, African-American males, with a prior history of arrest or probation, who were acquainted with each other and had prior negative encounters with each other. One goal of the group was to address what came to be known as "retaliation" homicides.

Based on this analysis of the problem, three different interventions were designed. The first intervention addressed the spatial concentration of homicides, with a targeted saturation enforcement effort. Additional resources from federal and local law enforcement were brought to bear against this problem. The second intervention was to be located in the Emergency Department (ED) of the main Level I Trauma Center in the city. This intervention was targeted at victims of violence and their associates who congregated in or around the waiting room of the ED. This intervention was intended to address the repeat involvement of victims and offenders as they recycled from one role to

another. With more than 500 victims of gun shot wounds – many of them having prior gunshot victimizations – passing through the ED each year, this appeared to be a promising intervention. The final intervention was the creation of a Most Violent Offender program. This program identified – through nominations from law enforcement – individuals with substantial criminal records who would be pursued aggressively for warrants, violation of probation or parole status, or other violations of the law.

Substantial declines in homicides and gun assaults were observed in the targeted neighborhoods compared to overall city wide levels, as well as compared to contiguous and control neighborhoods.

Executive Summary

Introduction

The Boston Ceasefire Project receives considerable attention from police practitioners and the research community. The Boston intervention used a problem-solving model to analyze the dimensions of the youth firearm violence problem in Boston, and crafted interventions based on the results of that analysis. The intervention also was characterized by a large number of partnerships. These partnerships existed within law enforcement groups (police prosecutors, probation officers), across jurisdictional boundaries (federal, state and local), and with community groups (particularly the ministerial group known as the Ten Point Coalition). The result of this intervention was a sustained reduction of substantial proportions in the youth firearm violence problem in Boston.

Despite the apparent successes in Boston, some concern existed that the methods employed in Boston were less likely to work in cities characterized by very high levels of homicide. After all, despite the increases in violence, the Boston homicide rate had never ranked among the highest cities. In addition, because Boston dominates the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in terms of population, cooperation between criminal justice groups in Boston was higher than might be the case in MSA's where the central city is a much smaller proportion of the overall population.

The Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI) was part of the National Institute of Justice's response to the high rates of violence experienced in many large American cities from the late 1980's to the mid-1990's. St. Louis was included as part of the second group of five cities that participated in the SACSI process,

beginning in October 2000. The 2000 group of SACSI cities included St. Louis, Detroit, Atlanta, Albuquerque, and Rochester, New York. Each of these cities had homicide rates that exceeded those of Boston, and Detroit, Atlanta and St. Louis consistently rank among the top ten cities in the country in terms of homicide rates per 100,000 population.

Scanning and Analysis

The late 1980's and early 1990's was a period of high rates of youth violence, a significant fraction of which involved the use of a firearm. This pattern was true for the city of St. Louis as well as the nation.

Levels of youth firearm violence in St. Louis have been well above those for the United States. For the years 1991-1993, the city's homicide rate ranked it among the highest three of large cities, with a homicide rate of nearly 70 per 100,000 residents recorded in 1991, while the US rate was closer to 8. The increase in homicide was most pronounced among those under 18 years of age, and those aged 18 to 24, with the number of homicide victims in 1990-1992 twice that of 1980-1982 and the number of homicide suspects in that age group tripling for the latter period. Firearms were disproportionately involved in homicides involving people under 24, as guns were responsible for causing death in more than ninety percent of these cases. Mirroring national patterns, young black males, especially those aged 15-24 were the most likely victims of homicide in St. Louis. In 1990-1992, homicide rates for black males 15-19 exceeded 380 per 100,000 and those for black males aged 20-24 reached 600 per 100,000. For these groups, firearms accounted for virtually all deaths, 99% of the younger age group and 97% of the older group.

St. Louis is a particularly appropriate site for research on and interventions to stem criminal violence, in part because of its extremely high rates of homicide. Nearly all of the increase in homicides since the late 1980s was accounted for by the increase in gun homicides, and this increase, in turn, is concentrated in the younger age groups. During the early 1990s, the homicide rate for black males between the ages of 15 and 19 was more than 5 times higher than the record rate for the city as a whole. The rate for 20- to-24 year-old black males was almost twice that of the younger age group -- an astounding 626 per 100,000. St. Louis is an appropriate site for such interventions for another reason. The correspondence between U.S. and St. Louis homicide rates over the thirty-year period 1960-1990 is remarkably strong. When converted to standard scores the correlation between the two data series is nearly .95, suggesting that interventions that change local patterns may have national relevance.

Additionally, there is a strong spatial concentration of indicators of violence particularly; the distribution of homicides, firearm recoveries, and shots fired calls to the 911 (CAD) system. The distribution of these indicators of violence in the city has historically been located within several distinct hotspots of violence. Twelve of the city's 79 neighborhoods account for roughly half of the homicides. In addition, individuals involved in homicide -- whether as victims or offenders -- had extensive criminal histories. Ninety percent of suspects and seventy-nine percent of victims had a prior felony criminal history, and roughly one-quarter of each group was serving a term of probation or parole. Data from the Trauma Department of the Level I Trauma Center indicated that a large proportion of shooting victims (perhaps as high as one-third) have

been treated for gunshot wounds in the past, and many gunshot wound victims do not appear in police records.

Interventions

The key findings the working group took from these analyses to help shape the interventions included the strong spatial concentration of violence, the heavy involvement of homicide victims and offenders in prior offending, and the key role of the Trauma Department at the Level I Trauma Center in responding to violence. Based on these observations, members of the SACSI working group developed three key interventions. These included: (1) the Most Violent Offenders program, known now as the Worst of the Worst (WOW), the Fifth District Initiative, and the Trauma Intervention Project (TIP).

WOW is based on the premise and data that suggests that a small fraction of offenders is engaged in a large volume of offending, and that by going after these individuals with vertical prosecution, vigorous summons and warrant enforcement, and attention from multiple law enforcement groups (federal and local, as well as gang, drug and tactical units within the police department) a reduction in crime could be achieved. A number of criteria have been developed for inclusion on the list, key among them is being wanted for a homicide or Armed Criminal Action, as well as having a warrant refused for such offenses. The goal of WOW is to take high-rate offenders off the street and in doing so to curb retaliatory violence.

The Fifth District Initiative has been the most important and sustained of the three initiatives. The Fifth District incorporates just over four square miles and roughly 28,000 residents, and the initiative spilled over into contiguous parts of the 6th District. Despite

its small geographic and population size, the district recorded 20 homicides in the year 2000 and 25 in the year 2001, a two-year average of 82 homicides per 100,000, nearly double the city level average and 11 times greater than the US average. The analysis of homicides found considerable gang involvement in homicide, both on the part of victims and perpetrators, and high numbers of multiple victim and multiple suspect homicides. As a consequence, both the Gang Unit and the Tactical Unit spent considerable time in the Fifth District every day. In addition, the undercover drug unit and detectives from the Central Patrol Area invested more time in this District. The US Attorney and the Circuit Attorney (state level prosecutor) paid special attention to gun cases that came from this district. The goal of the Fifth District Initiative is to provide visible suppression of criminal conduct, rapid prosecution and support to a beleaguered community. While not conclusive evidence, homicides in the 5th District fell to 17 in 2002, and as of April 10, 2003 no homicides have been recorded in the 5th District. In addition, serious assaults have declined in the College Hill neighborhood (the center of the initiative) from 3.16 violent incidents per month for the six months prior to the intervention to 1.21 violent incidents per month in the 13 months since the intervention was initiated.

The Trauma Intervention Project is perhaps the most compelling and tenuous of the initiatives. This initiative was tenuous because of the newly formed partnership between medical and law enforcement personnel. TIP included cross-training police and trauma personnel, improving the chain of evidence for bullets and other possessions, better communication between trauma and police personnel, in-house counseling with victims of violence (VOV), and follow up from the Emergency Department to the neighborhoods to monitor and counsel victims of violence. In addition, more police

attention was proposed for the “hangers-on” in and around the Emergency Room whose friends were being attended to by medical personnel. While a protocol for training was developed and certain chain of custody issues were resolved, the departure of the Trauma Leader in August 2002 had severe negative consequences for the program, and it essentially lays dormant at this time.

Conclusions

The St. Louis experience with SACSI has demonstrated that in a city with high levels of violence and limited experience in problem solving across agencies, this process can be integrated effectively. The intervention occurred during the time that substantial declines in homicide were experienced in the 5th and 6th district. These declines, while not linked causally to the intervention by this report¹, are notable for their size, location in the target area, and timing. The key to these successes has been leadership within the St. Louis Metropolitan Police department and the US Attorney’s Office.

What have been more difficult to achieve, however, has been sustained partnerships between law enforcement agencies and other groups outside the immediate circle of police and prosecution. This is hardly a novel finding for St. Louis or other locations (Decker and Curry, 2003), but does illustrate the difficulty of forging and sustaining new partnerships. Of considerable importance in St. Louis has been the development of new, unanticipated products of the initiative. One promising product has been the bi-weekly meeting among an Assistant US Attorney, a state level prosecutor, two representatives of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, Tobacco and Explosives, and the St. Louis Metropolitan Police department. This group reviews every

¹ This final report is focused almost exclusively on process issues, including problem selection, intervention choices, and implementation issues.

arrest in which a gun was involved to determine the appropriate venue for prosecution (federal or state) based on the strength of the case, penalties available in each system, and other considerations. The SACSI process is consistent with the Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN, www.psn.gov) approach, and the experience with SACSI has enabled St. Louis to make a smooth and effective transition toward achieving the goals of PSN.

1. History of SACSI

What is SACSI

Above all SACSI is a problem-solving approach to local crime. As such, local agencies are best suited and informed in the implementation of interventions specific to their areas. Historically, enforcement strategies have dealt with individual offenders and crime specific violations of the law. Although deterrence of individuals and crime remains an important function of crime control, the importance of place, and the possibilities for crime reduction by focusing on place, is only recently emerging as an equally viable component in the framework of crime control strategies. This place-centered strategy was important in St. Louis, owing to the strong spatial concentration of violence in the city. This phase of the problem solving process was greatly helped by the analysis that showed the strong, historic concentrations of gun violence, particularly homicide, in a small number of neighborhoods. Furthermore, because “place” per se, is neither an individual nor an act, interventions geared toward crime concentrations may call upon a broader array of agencies in the responding to and preventing crime. The formulation of multi-agency partnerships provides an additional avenue for resources to be channeled toward an identifiable crime problem (for guidance in successful partnerships see Lane, Turner, and Flores, 2004 and “In It for the Long Haul: Community Partnerships Making a Difference”). This maximizes not only classic responses to crime violations while calling upon other agencies not necessarily associated with crime control such as youth outreach or clergy groups.

SACSI is best conceptualized as a process rather than a program, and as such is distinguished by several characteristics centered on the above principles.

1. First, SACSI includes collaborative problem solving. Crime is most effectively dealt with a local level. This is the case because local agencies are those best suited and knowledgeable about their local problems and the characteristics of their crime distribution. In short, the locals know their problems, their allies and perhaps most importantly, their limitations. The formation of an interagency work group is especially important because identification of local problems is key in the implementation process. A strong partnership of inter-agencies increases the potency and reach of response more than the responses of a singular agency or ones not working together. This commitment was a key to the evolution of SACSI in St. Louis. Since St. Louis had ranked at or near the top US city homicide rates for over thirty years (Fields, 1968), the impetus to change was particularly strongly felt. This occurred at the highest levels of decision-making, including the Mayor, Police Chief, Circuit Attorney, and US Attorney.
2. Second, research driven decision-making is the key component to SACSI. There can't be a simple application of models from other cities that have enjoyed success. Once a specific crime problem is selected, a SACSI approach advocates the identification of patterns, trends, and intervention strategies that may be tailored to the locations. This is aided by the accumulation of information and data specific to local crime problems. Questions to ask include: Where is crime most prevalent? What are the

characteristics of crime patterns? What possible opportunities does this provide for intervention?

3. The creation of a place specific intervention requires considerable focus, both in terms of refining the intervention, as well as avoiding distractions. If the intervention achieves early success, there is a tendency to “displace” it to other locations that may be experiencing similar problems. There may also be a tendency to “declare victory” and conclude the intervention. Because problems in neighborhoods are dynamic, there may be a tendency to become fixated on a single problem and not be flexible as problems change. Maintaining this is a delicate balance.
4. When an appropriate strategy is agreed upon it is implemented. It is not possible to specify exactly when the strategy has been agreed upon. In St. Louis Memorandum of Understanding were not signed, and there was no other formal mechanism that specified the intervention, a commitment to that intervention or even a general set of principles. The implementation phase (Decker and Rosenfeld, forthcoming) can be the most difficult phase of all, as environmental, cultural and institutional challenges to implementation can occur at various points of the implementation phase.
5. Just as crime and community problems are not static, interventions must not be static. The SACSI process requires routine monitoring, evaluation, and modification. In contrast, to strictly offender-based strategies, assessment and modification of the intervention are ongoing according to data collection efforts. Thus, the process is continuously being fine tuned with results and

refinements to the intervention. The goal is to disrupt crime and identify and address the proximate causes of crime.

While this report will provide an overview of relevant literature, a description of the problem, a description of the target neighborhood, intervention descriptions, and conclusions, this primary objective of the report is to outline the creation and implementation of a strategic intervention that is guided by data.

2. Literature Review

Introduction

Though rates of violence have declined over the past decade, firearm violence among American youth continues to be a major problem in many cities (Zimring and Hawkins 1998). In an effort to reduce firearm related crime, record numbers of intervention strategies have been proposed at both the national and local levels including increased legislation, gun buyback programs, and weapons sweeps. Of these, targeted enforcement strategies appear to be one of the more promising approaches (Wintemute 2000; Sherman 1995). Recently, new approaches to addressing firearm violence have begun targeting both high-risk places and individuals through the partnering of multiple criminal justice agencies. The Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiatives (SACSI) is distinguished from previous crime control strategies by several characteristics. First, SACSI emphasizes multi-agency collaboration in reducing crime within communities. Second, decisions for intervention and prevention tactics are informed by real time data and research. That is, decisions on how and where to implement intervention tactics is data driven. Lastly, SACSI differs from a pure enforcement oriented approach in that resources are meant to be offered to the

community simultaneously as targeted enforcement strategies are employed. Below we describe the implementation of SACSI in St. Louis, Missouri. We begin by placing this process within the context of previous deterrence oriented enforcement strategies that target specific crime problems.

Deterrence

Most crime prevention approaches represent theoretical integrations of routine activities and rational choice. A routine activities approach suggests that a disruption in the triad of suitable target, motivated offender, and lack of guardianship will demote the opportunity for crime (Cohen and Felson 1979). Thus, strategies that successfully intercede between an offender and criminal opportunity are those most likely to realize declines in crimes. Similarly, a rational choice perspective suggests that any strategy increasing the likelihood of apprehension or severity of penalty will alter an offender's decision to engage in illegal behavior. Operating within both frameworks are the complimentary notions of specific and general deterrence. When an individual is blocked from a criminal opportunity or is incapacitated from future illegal activities, specific deterrence is affected. When such knowledge spreads throughout a community and discourages others from similar activities, general deterrence is achieved. Reductions in crime are most successful when both forms of deterrence are brought to bear, and policy makers increasingly appreciate how an altered opportunity structure may affect criminal outcomes.

Sherman (1990) suggests that crackdowns amplify the efficacy of enforcement in two ways that increase both threat and risk of apprehension for offenders. First, targeted crackdowns provide an offense specific focus. Frequently enforcement strategies are

geared to cover all types of crime; yet it may be wiser to identify and deal with specific types of crimes, especially those that contribute to higher crime rates for particular areas. Instead of focusing on all crime per se, deterrent efforts may be capitalized if all resources are directed at a specific type of crime. For example, Rosenfeld and Decker (1996) evaluated a program for the city of St. Louis designed to facilitate the confiscation of firearms from high-risk youth. Between the years of 1990-1992, 99% of all homicides with black male victims between the ages 15-19 were committed with a firearm. In an effort to remove illegal firearms from youth, a consent to search program was initiated whereby officers gained consent to search and remove illegal firearms from the homes of high-risk youths. Though the removal of firearms was preemptive, occurring before the commission of any crime, it represents a targeted effort directed at a specific offense: the illegal possession of firearms by minors.

Second, crackdowns provide a geographically focused police presence. In addition, since crime is geographically concentrated within certain areas, focused intervention strategies of this nature will increase the general deterrent effect of enforcement precisely because policing resources are concentrated in areas with disproportionate crime activity (Sherman 1990). Indeed, random variation accounts for only 4-37% of crime across geographic areas while differences among geographic locations accounts for an outstanding 34-83% (Eck 1995; see also Sherman and Buerger 1989). Obviously, focusing resources within a clearly articulated area increases the probability of disrupting a greater number of crimes.

This approach is generally well supported by the research. Eck (1995) finds that the high activity areas of illegal drug markets were easily disrupted with little

displacement to outside areas. This was especially true of open-air drug markets that depend on social networks and routine activities. Similarly, Green (1995) evaluated the Specialized Multi-Agency Response Team (SMART) in Oakland, CA. SMART sought to disrupt illegal drug sales that were operating from within private residences and apartment buildings. The program directed enforcement efforts at specific locations with high levels of drug activity. In addition to traditional narcotics enforcement tactics, SMART utilized a multi-agency force that was equipped to handle inspections of properties. Owners of repeatedly contacted properties were subjected to property inspections that ended in fines and jail time. SMART intervention increased the level of citizen reporting of drug problems and decreased the level of narcotics activities at sites that were targeted. In a similar study, Weisburd and Green (1995a) evaluated a crackdown targeting drug-related crime. Though violent and property crime were not significantly affected, service calls for disorderly conducts (e.g. public morals, suspicious persons) were observed. It may be that longer-term benefits can be affected if the public is integrated further into the problem solving process.

Interventions such as these areas increase both the individual risk of apprehension while simultaneously generating a broader deterrent effect within areas. The efficacy of specific and general deterrence is additionally magnified when targeted areas are those where crime is disproportionately concentrated. Hence, focusing directed resources at chronically crime prone areas allows interventions to be tailored in such a way that knowledge regarding the routine activities of individuals and places are incorporated in a more effective manner. Below we further elaborate on the characteristics of higher crime areas. Further, the implications for crime control in these areas are discussed.

Saturation of Hot Spots

In a landmark study, Sherman and Buerger (1989) confirm what police departments had long known: the incidence of predatory crimes is higher in some areas than would result from random chance. These areas of high crime concentration, or “hot spots”, are spatial clusters of crime activity comprised of two elements. First, places, or locations, refer to crime conducive environments (e.g. taverns, liquor stores, and check cashing stores) that are vulnerable to an increased likelihood of violent crimes (Roncek and Maier 1991). In contrast, geographic areas, or spaces are comprised of multiple locations within a certain area (Block and Block 1995) that become larger than their component parts. Within a routine activities framework, the environmental characteristics of both locations and areas contribute to the prevalence of crime by altering the opportunity structure for offenders and criminal opportunities.

Though police departments have long been aware of the nature of “hot spots”, requirements for randomized patrol frequently restrained enforcement practices that could be construed as discriminatory. However, within the last decade this has begun to change. Considering what is now agreed upon regarding the concentration of crime and the inefficiency of randomized patrol in preventing it (cf. Kelling, Pate, Dieckman and Brown 1975; but see also Koper 1995), several approaches stemming from this knowledge have emerged.

The Boston Ceasefire Project is a compelling example. Frustrated by increasingly growing youth firearm violence within the city of Boston, Kennedy and colleagues, in conjunction with Boston agencies, initiated a program to directly target resources at the problem of gangs and firearm related violence among youth. Between the years of 1991

and 1995, youth homicides averaged 44 per year with the majority resulting from gang involved youth (see Kennedy, Braga, & Piehl 1996). The project, which became known as Operation Ceasefire, was different from previous programs on several counts. First, in contrast to previous gang enforcement strategies, Ceasefire focused strictly on reducing firearm related violence. Second, the community was introduced to the program through “notification meetings” attended by gang members. These meetings were used to inform gang members that firearm violence would no longer be tolerated and that future violation would be met by many criminal justice agencies working in conjunction to maximize penalties. This became known as the “pulling levers” strategies. Lastly, any future incidents of violence were met with swift and severe reprisals. By 1998, the number of youth homicides had dropped to 15. Ceasefire is noteworthy as one of the first collaborative problem solving approaches, and, variations have been replicated across sites and crime types including drugs (Green 1995), violent crime (Braga et al. 1999), and homicide (McGarrell, Chermak, and Weiss 1999).

Enforcement strategies of this type are both specific and general and can be tailored to target specific offenders, specific crimes, weapons, or all three as in Boston’s Operation Ceasefire. Yet, this technique may prove most successful when it is directed against activities that produce violence indirectly rather than directly against the perpetrators of violence. In particular, the repercussions of firearm related violence is especially damaging to community safety. The presence of firearms increases not only the risk of violence, but has a disproportionate effect on youth. With this in mind, a concentrated seizure of weapons in a specific geographic area and time frame appears as

one of the more promising approaches to reducing not only overall firearm violence but also firearm violence among those most affected.

Firearm Seizures

The influence of concentrated seizures may be conceptualized along three related avenues. First, seizures reduce the overall level of and access to firearms within a given area. Second, a deterrent effect is realized through both enforcement and increased penalties targeted toward firearms violations. Third, these factors, in conjunction with one another, provide a diffusion benefit by spreading “word” that the streets are hot. Taken together these three elements integrate the most effective aspects of deterrence and what is known regarding the concentration of crime in certain areas.

Though existing research is generally supportive of a directed patrol approach, there are few evaluations and limited research examining seizure programs within an experimental design. As such, the exact dynamics of how and why targeted seizures produce crime control benefits remains unclear. For instance, Sherman and Rogan (1995) identify the carrying of firearms as one mechanism through which firearm violence occurs. In an evaluation of the Kansas City gun experiment, pre and post crime rates were compared across targeted and control areas. During the course of the study period, 29 firearms were seized. This translated to an increase in gun seizures of 65% in the target area. In addition a 49% decline in gun crimes was observed as well as a significant decline in drive-by-shootings and homicides.

The Kansas City (Sherman and Rogan 1995) experiment represents a specific deterrence approach with implications for place-based enforcement (see also Pate et al. 1976). The program included a high volume of contact with street population through

traffic stops, citations, car and pedestrian checks through a variety of techniques including searches incident to arrest and safety frisks associated with stops. First, by targeting individuals who carry firearms, directed patrol officers are able to remove firearms from high-risk people. Furthermore, knowledge of this in the broader community can deter others from carrying firearms illegally. Second, Sherman and Rogan, suggest that in areas where crime is concentrated, individuals will be more likely to carry firearms in public. Thus, it is the combination of carrying a firearm in areas vulnerable to violence that increases the prevalence of firearm violence.

These findings suggest that strategies designed to target specific offenders are more effective than broad based approaches. In a similar vein, McGarrell, Chermak, and Weiss (1999), compare targeted firearm seizures in two target areas. Though the number of illegal firearms seized were relatively small (forty-two and forty-five), homicides dropped from eleven to one, and one of the target areas experienced a significant reduction in levels of firearm crime. Overall they find that “focusing on individuals and situations where the police have some degree of suspicion of criminal behavior was more effective than casting a broad net over a neighborhood” (McGarrell et al. 1999). In addition, during the evaluation the researchers report a high level of awareness and support among residents of the neighborhood regardless of race. This type of awareness no doubt has a diffusion effect among citizens and possible offenders who may be less inclined to engage in illegal activities. Indeed, positive citizen interaction in the problem solving process may be one of the most under appreciated aspects of these programs.

Most recently, McGarrell, Chermak, Weiss, and Wilson (2001) evaluated a directed patrol project that focused on firearm seizures. This was a first attempt at

replicating the Kansas City study (Sherman and Rogan 1995). Similarly, their findings suggest that a specific deterrence strategy, directing attention toward “suspicious activities and locations”, produces greater crime reductions than a generalized approach (e.g. vehicle stops). In one of the target areas, the east district, a general deterrence strategy was incorporated through the use of vehicle stops that increased the number of police citizen encounters. In the north district, a specific deterrence or targeted offender strategy was incorporated through stops of particular individuals engaged in specific activities; this directed approach was most effectively implemented through searches of pedestrians and cars. The east district had twice as many stops and tickets while in the north district, higher numbers of citations, arrests, and gun seizures per vehicle were observed. These findings contradict a net widening approach and lend support for enforcement strategies that target a particular crime problem such as firearm violence. In support of this, previous research has successfully shown that the majority of firearms are seized during the course of routine police activities such as pedestrian stops and non-violent technical violations such as concealment and illegal carrying (Buruss and Decker 2001).

While most crime control strategies are frequently reactive in nature, these studies hypothesize that proactive seizures of firearms have an impact on firearm violence indirectly through (1) a reduction in the access to firearms, (2) an increase in specific and general deterrence, and (3) the confluence of the previous two by spreading the “word” that the streets are hot. Hence, targeting firearms through directed seizure programs means that individuals will be less likely to carry guns. As a result, this disrupts the mechanisms through which firearm violence is facilitated. If guns seized in high risk

areas are at a greater risk for use (Wilson 1994), and gun crimes are more opportunistic than planned (Sherman and Rogan 1995), then disrupting the opportunity for firearm crime, whether through increased patrol presence or increased penalties, has an effect beyond the immediate number of guns seized.

Yet, merely removing guns from a community is not all that may be required to realize long term declines in crime and increases in community stability. Reducing firearms violence is important for the lives saved and the reduction of fear within a community (Zimring and Hawkins 1998). Hence, any strategic approach that incorporates the health and maintenance of community networks into a crime reduction strategy will likely realize greater benefits, both in the long and short term. SACSI integrates what we know about targeted problem solving with the characteristics and needs of crime reduction within individualized communities.

3. History of SACSI in St. Louis

Final reports give projects a linear appearance. Events and activities appear to take on a logical and inter-related sequence. Nothing could be farther from the truth in describing the SACSI effort in St. Louis. Overall, the project was a series of fits and starts, exploring new avenues, rejecting some, and moving ahead with others. The effort to logically sequence the steps in the problem solving process did not always proceed as expected; typically the response phase surges ahead of analysis. This was, to a large extent avoided in this process. There were two guiding principles early in the problem-solving process. The first was that “doing the same old thing” was what caused rates of violence in St. Louis to remain high, and that therefore trying something new was in order. The second principle was that any intervention was likely to take time to evolve,

and that results would not be evident immediately. Both of these approaches were reiterated often throughout the life of the project.

The implementation of SACSI in St. Louis was a challenging process for all agencies involved. There were several advantages that the St. Louis site had working to its benefit. First, public attention was focused on the violence problem. High levels of violence in the city had focused the attention of public officials and law enforcement on the gun violence problem. Second, there was a climate that was open to trying new approaches. The key leaders in the process – the Police Chief, Circuit Attorney, U.S. Attorney and the Mayor – were all new, and took office within several months of the start of the SACSI process. These individuals were not bound by the past in ways that their predecessors may have been. Third, there was a strong Ceasefire Group that met monthly and had been convened by the U.S. Attorney. This group began meeting in 1996, and provided a platform on which cooperation and data-driven approaches could be built. Fourth, there was good leadership. The key leaders mentioned above understood the gravity of the problem, the need to try new approaches, and were committed to doing so. At several times in the SACSI process, this leadership was called upon to break roadblocks or overcome institutional and cultural boundaries. The Police Chief, U.S. Attorney and Circuit Attorney were at the center of this process.

Eventually, the formation of a SACSI approach in St. Louis was implemented as follows:

1. Monthly meetings attended by representatives of various agencies, most often enforcement related, agreeing to meet monthly. These meetings

built on the Ceasefire Process already in place. Several new groups were added to the Ceasefire group.

2. Problem identification within the group. The St. Louis working group decided to focus on firearm violence, a relatively easy choice given the magnitude of the problem.
3. Over the course of SACSI, the group faced issues pertaining to the sharing information across agencies, the compatibility of technology, and difficulties in providing data that could be used to help drive enforcement decisions. It is in these areas that leadership proved most important. The U.S. Attorney's office ensured that access to data, for even the most difficult data, was kept open. The role of a federal presence (Decker and Rosenfeld, forthcoming) cannot be over-estimated in this regard. When there were hurdles, the authority of the US Attorney was useful in overcoming them.
4. One area that St. Louis struggled with was the involvement of community and neighborhood groups. There was little effort on the part of neighborhood groups, non-governmental organizations, and ministerial groups to become involved in the SACSI process. This shortcoming is not new to St. Louis and its implementation of initiatives that are meant to involve the community (Decker and Rosenfeld, forthcoming; Curry and Decker, 2001). While invited to Ceasefire/SACSI meetings and the subject of intensive lobbying and

recruitment efforts by the US Attorney's Law Enforcement Community Coordinator, there was little response or commitment from such groups.

5. Despite many of its obvious strengths, St. Louis did not get a fast start in the SACSI process. The selection of the target area did not emerge quickly in the process. The original target area was to be the Ville and Greater Ville neighborhoods, followed by district three, with the final target for intervention being the 5th District.

4. Problem Description: Characteristics of the City and its Violence

St. Louis city has many characteristics of a classic rust-belt city. It has suffered considerable population loss since its peak in the early 1950's. Indeed, the city population peaked in 1952 at just over 850,000 residents, only to plummet to fewer than 450,000 in the 2000 census. Additionally, much of the population loss occurred among middle-class residents. The white middle class left the city largely in the 1960's, followed by the black middle class in the 1980's. Morrison (1974) regards St. Louis and San Jose as opposite ends of the population expansion/contraction continuum. These population exodus were accompanied by a loss of jobs in the manufacturing sector that only exacerbated the population loss as well as the economic downturn in the city's fortunes. The results for many city neighborhoods of these negative trends were elevated levels of crime, including violent crimes such as homicide and aggravated assault.

The city of St. Louis has consistently ranked among the highest in the nation for violent crimes. Specifically, with regard to its homicide and aggravated assault rates, St. Louis always ranks among the highest three to five cities in the nation. While violent

crime rates have dropped across the country since the early 1990's, the St. Louis rates assaults disproportionately involved the use of a firearm. In 2000, 3,729 homicides, robberies or aggravated assaults involved the use of a firearm. This equates to a rate of 1144 serious firearm crimes per 100,000 residents. Obviously, the city of St. Louis has significant crime problems.

In general, trauma is the leading cause of death in the first half of life (ages 1 to 44) and is consistently the 4th or 5th leading cause of death overall. Twenty percent of these deaths, or 30,000-40,000 deaths/year, are related to gunshot wounds (GSWs). Of more concern perhaps, is that GSW homicides have increased > 225% for those <18 years since 1987 – young blacks having an 11 times greater rate than non-blacks. For Missouri, the highest rate of trauma death is related to motor vehicle crashes (31.4%) but the second highest is related to gunshot or stab wound injury (21.8%). In 1998, there were 730 deaths from gunshot wounds and an estimated 2300 non-lethal gunshot wound injuries in the state of Missouri.

In St. Louis, nearly all of the increase in homicides since the late 1980s was accounted for by an increase in gun-related homicides and this increase was largely concentrated in the younger age groups. During the early 1990s, the homicide rate for black males between the ages of 15 and 19 was more than 5 times higher than the homicide rate for the city as a whole. The rate for 20-to-24 year-old black males was almost twice that of the younger age group - an astounding 626 per 100,000 population. Almost without exception, homicides involving young black males in St. Louis involve firearms. Ninety-eight percent of black male victims between 15 and 24 years of age were killed with a firearm in the early 1990s. Fully 88% of black male victims between

the ages of 10 and 14 also were killed with firearms. By comparison, 74% of black male victims over the age of 24 were killed with guns. There is no question that the youth homicide problem in St. Louis, as in other racially diverse cities, is concentrated disproportionately among African-American youth - and it is clearly a gun homicide problem.

By most accounts, the late 1980's and early 1990's was a period of high rates of youth violence, and a significant fraction of that violence involved the use of a firearm. In 1995, 7.6% or 1 in 12 students in a national survey reported carrying a firearm for fighting or self-defense at least once in the previous 30 days. In 1990, this was true for only 4.1% or 1 in 24 students.^{5,6} This pattern was true for the city of St. Louis as well as the nation. Sheley and Wright (1993; 1995) and Sheley, Wright and Smith (1993) interviewed incarcerated inner city male juveniles, as well as a sample of inner city females. They found gun possession among males to be common, and that involvement in drug sales had important effects in increasing gun carrying. Self-reports of gun carrying were, however, also high among those not involved in drug sales. Similarly, gun possession among females was high, much higher than expected. Taken together, these reports suggest the importance of monitoring gun acquisition by those at risk for involvement in gun violence either as victims or offenders.

In 1995, Decker and Pennell (1998) interviewed just over 8,000 arrestees in 11 cities as part of the Drug Use Forecasting program. These cities included Atlanta, Chicago, Detroit, Indianapolis, New Orleans, Phoenix, Los Angeles, Miami, St. Louis, San Diego, and the District of Columbia. These cities were chosen because they have high levels of firearm violence, interview juveniles as part of the DUF protocol, and have

provided reliable and valid interview data as part of the DUF program. The majority of interviews were conducted with adult males (58%), followed by adult females (23%), juvenile males (17%), and juvenile females (2%). Seven percent of all interviewees reported that they were currently a gang member, and twenty-two percent said that they had sold drugs in the past year. A large fraction of the sample (64%) tested positive for any illegal drug, with cocaine (37%) and marijuana (37%) by far the leading categories. This sample of arrestees reported firearm ownership at higher rates than is revealed by general social surveys, but at somewhat lower rates than prison interviews. Among gang members and those who self-reported selling drugs in the last year, higher rates of gun use, gun victimization, and attitudes favorable to the use of settling disputes with guns were reported.

Blumstein and Rosenfeld (1998) documented the dramatic increase in youth homicides between 1985 and 1993 for the nation. They observed that rates of homicide among individuals between fifteen and twenty-four more than doubled during this period. They argued for a diffusion hypothesis as the explanation for this dramatic change, which asserts that the crack cocaine epidemic in inner cities created the need for guns to protect profits and the drug. As this occurred, guns became more widely available to youth, and led to an unprecedented escalation in the youth homicide rate. While there is currently a recognized shift occurring for the types of illicit drugs consumed, in 2001 most American cities continue to struggle with drug-related violent crime and its societal consequences.

Although not typically considered as a component of crime prevention, people living in households in which guns are kept have a risk of suicide that is 5 times greater than people living in households without guns.⁷ Between 1980 and 1994, the overall

suicide rate for persons aged 15-19 increased by 29%; an increase in firearm-related suicides accounted for 96% of the increase in the overall suicide rate.¹ Data from the St. Louis City Medical Examiner's Office for the years 1990-1999 document the suicide problem for the city. In that ten-year period, 545 individuals (approximately 55/year) committed suicide in the city of St. Louis, the fourth highest cause of death in the city following natural causes, accidents, and homicides.

Of note, the St. Louis rates of violence continue to show an ongoing strong correspondence with the national violence rates. Indeed the statistical correlation between the standardized measures of the St. Louis and the national homicide rates over time exceeds .95 – a highly significant correlation (Rosenfeld, Decker and Kohfeld, 1991). The importance of this information is that it validates that the local St. Louis crime and injury rates are exceedingly important for gaining insight to the American violence problem in general. Additionally, any interventions to alter the rates for violent crime and injury can be tracked easily in St. Louis and then extrapolated to provide information of potential national significance. Since the St. Louis violence rates mirror the national rates so closely in its patterns of change in violence, any crime or injury intervention initiatives that are successful in St. Louis will clearly have relevance for other US cities.

There are strong public health components to the violence problem nationally as well as in St. Louis. It became apparent in St. Louis that the public health implications of the problem were to be a core of the problem identification, data and response. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported that firearm-related injuries were the second leading cause of injury death in the United States after motor vehicle-related death (CDC, 1998). Firearms were associated with 65.9% of homicides and 57.0% of suicides among

US residents. The majority of these fatal and nonfatal firearm-related injuries result from interpersonal violence and intentionally self-inflicted gunshot wounds, but approximately 15,000 unintentional gunshot wounds are also treated in US hospital emergency departments (EDs) each year (CDC, 1998). Although firearm-related injuries represent less than 0.5% of all injuries treated in American hospital EDs, they have an increased potential of death and hospitalization compared with other causes of injury (Shepherd et al 1989; Houry et al, 1999). Importantly, in 1994 the treatment of gunshot injuries in the United States was estimated at \$2.3 billion in lifetime medical costs, nearly half of which (\$1.1 billion) was paid by the federal government (Rand and Strom, 1997). These factors together emphasize the importance of considering firearm-related injuries as a legitimate public health concern and also begin to highlight the significant financial implications for providing trauma care to victims of violence. The death rate from trauma for residents in the State of Missouri is 20% higher than that for US residents as a whole.

St. Louis is an important policy environment for piloting and evaluating the impact of violence interventions. There are a number of major federal and local initiatives currently (or recently) at work in the city. St. Louis was one of six sites currently funded by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) to implement the SafeFutures program. SafeFutures was a five-year \$1.4 million prevention and intervention program designed to target serious, violent and chronic delinquents with a special focus on gangs. SafeFutures combines the efforts of twelve separate social service agencies to attempt to provide a seamless net of services for youth. In addition, the St. Louis Public Schools (SLPS) is one of fifty sites to be designated a Safe Schools/Health Students recipient. The grant to the SLPS is for three years and \$2.25 million. The city of

St. Louis is also the recipient of nearly one million dollars annually to implement a Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grant (JAIBG) program. JAIBG targets court-supervised youth (typically on probation) with increased supervision through home visits, enhanced supervision, and programs operated through the City of St. Louis Department of Human Services.

In addition to these federal initiatives, there are a number of local programming efforts that target youth violence. The St. Louis Metropolitan Police department operates an investigative oriented gang unit, and conducts home visits as part of a Firearms Suppression Project that has received national attention (OJJDP, *Promising Strategies to Reduce Gun Violence*, Washington, DC, 1999; Decker and Rosenfeld, forthcoming). Other notable local initiatives funded by the city include a Juvenile Drug Court, an active Gang Outreach program, Weed and Seed sites that target youth crime and violence, Trauma Center outreach programs, a domestic abuse referral program that targets youth, and an active Victim Services Unit. The combination of local and federal initiatives makes St. Louis an important site for understanding both the overall violence problem, as well as providing the network of responses to that problem. The ability to catalog these and other responses and to develop synergies between intervention efforts is an important key to understanding the role of SACSI in responding to violence problems in the city.

Another local effort, the St. Louis Metropolitan Police department received federal support to implement Assault Crisis Teams (ACT) in the early 1990's (Rosenfeld and Decker, 1993). These teams were to be comprised of 8-10 trained volunteers who would integrate a number of law enforcement, public health, and community mobilization efforts to respond - in real time - to violent incidents in targeted neighborhoods. ACT was

designed to integrate *monitoring, mentoring and mediating* strategies. This program foundered owing to the inability to obtain commitments from public health and law enforcement partners.

St. Louis is an important and appropriate site for a comprehensive intervention program such as SACSI for a variety of reasons. In addition to the extraordinarily high rates of youth violence, there are compelling reasons for locating this proposed set of crime and injury prevention interventions in St. Louis.

5. Target Neighborhood description

The Community Development Agency (CDA) originally used planning areas and planning districts, while neighborhood designations were not assigned until the late 1980's. The city of St. Louis is divided into 79 neighborhoods and these neighborhood designations are used for planning and operations purposes. For SACSI, the 5th district of St. Louis was selected which is comprised of eight neighborhoods and one city park. In some cases these neighborhoods overlap with the 9th and 4th districts. These neighborhoods are Jeff Vander Lou (5 and 9), St. Louis Place (5 and 4), Old North St. Louis (5 and 4), Near North Riverfront (5 and 4), Hyde Park, College Hill, Fairground Neighborhood, O' Fallon (5 and 6), and Fairgrounds Park.

During the 1990's, the net loss of population continued for the city of St. Louis. The out-migration is considered the result of limited metropolitan population growth and considerable development in urban areas that line the city. Over the last decade the city lost 48,496 people, or 12%, of its population. This same pattern is evident for the neighborhoods that comprise the 5th district with the exception that population loss was generally higher for these neighborhoods than others in the city. Hence, population loss

fell harder on these neighborhoods along with the concomitant effects of this on the economic and social aspects of these places.

Of the eight neighborhoods, all but one experienced a decrease in population from the 1990 to 2000 as is evidenced by census data, the decline in population ranging from 20% to 37%. Generally speaking, the neighborhoods of the 5th district experienced several other changes during the same decade. These changes include an increase in female headed households as well as an increase in vacant housing units, These neighborhoods are also characterized by high unemployment, high percentage of black residents, low median household and per capita income. A detailed description of each neighborhood can be found in Appendix 1.

6. Intervention descriptions

St. Louis is one of five Strategic Approaches to Community Safety initiative (SACSI) sites, funded by the US Department of Justice for a two-year period. SACSI is designed to use data for local problem solving efforts and to forge a comprehensive intervention. SACSI participants include the US Attorneys office, local Prosecutor, local police, federal law enforcement, public health, public schools, state and federal probation and parole, gang outreach and a research partner.

Upon assessment of the problems in St. Louis, three interventions emerged. These included: (a) the Most Violent Offenders program, known now as the Worst of the Worst (WOW), (b) the Trauma Intervention Project (TIP), and (c) the Fifth District Initiative. It is here that these three initiatives will be described.

a. MVOP/WOW

The Most Violent Offender Program (MVOP, renamed Worst of the Worst, or WOW) emerged from review two separate sources. First a review of arrest and assault data produced the observation from a graduate student that the same names appeared over and over again in the police reports. This process occurred during the coding of assault and homicide cases, where a name would appear as a witness in one case, move to a suspect in another, and finally show up as a victim in another. While the order of appearance varied (i.e., some individuals made an initial appearance as a victim or suspect rather than as a witness), the incidence of occurrence within case files was quite remarkable. This led the research team to examine more closely the incidence of involvement in violence. One of the research tasks that were undertaken was to examine all assaults for a single quarter to determine the extent to which this observation was borne out in the data.

The second source for the emergence of the MVOP program was serendipitous. The Rochester SACSI site had employed a program known as NOSE, "Notification of Special Enforcement" (See Appendix 2). NOSE identified high risk-criminally involved individuals in Rochester who authorities believed were at risk for immediate involvement in violent crime. These individuals were then "tagged" in the Rochester Records Management System, so that officers who made stops of such individuals would become aware of the individuals. This was done as an officer safety issue. The NOSE program became known to the St. Louis SACSI staff through one of the cluster meetings held among SACSI cities. This dissemination mechanism underscores the salience of cluster meetings and other such conferences among similarly involved program groups and

cities. Without these meetings, information about the Rochester NOSE and the Indianapolis VIPR list would not have been available to the St. Louis SACSI group. (The MVOP cross-city criteria are listed in Appendix 3.) On a parallel track, the Commander of the Crimes against Persons Division in the St. Louis Police department had received communication from his counterpart in Kansas City, Missouri. This communication identified the specific guidelines that were used by the Kansas City police department in implementing such a program. These guidelines were made available at a meeting of "steering committee" members, an ASUA, the LECC, a prosecutor, the Commander of the Crimes Against Persons Division, and the research team.²

The discussions that followed this initial meeting centered on identifying a common ground among these various methods of determining those most deserving of being on such a list. That was probably a mistake. The common ground for identifying the "most violent offenders" is largely an empirical decision, not a voting procedure. There are other considerations as well. One of the other second-round SACSI sites, Detroit, declined to utilize such a process owing to concerns regarding racial profiling and stereotyping. Ultimately, the St. Louis SACSI effort chose to modify the Rochester and Kansas City approaches, emphasizing the role of individuals who were targeted for arrest in shootings or homicides, but whose warrants were "taken under advisement". (The initial set of criteria, the St. Louis Most Violent Offender Program is presented in Appendix 4). This group was elevated for consideration as a consequence of the concern for immediate involvement in violence because of its history. Because warrants were

² See Appendices 6, 7, 8, and 9 for an enumeration of the different criteria considered, as well as the sources of those criteria, as well as the eventual WOW -- worst of the worst -- criteria.

sought, these individuals were thought to be of considerable interest. The fact that their warrants were refused was an indication of a variety of factors. One factor would likely be the case that individuals would not come forward to testify in the case. Another likely factor would be the case that many such cases would be difficult to solve owing to the relationship between victims and offenders. As a consequence, these cases were identified for further consideration because they involved individuals likely to be at risk for further victimization and perpetration. This set of criteria was further modified and the name changed to the WOW (Appendix 5). An email platform was developed to keep participants in WOW (police, prosecutors, federal probation) abreast of developments (see Appendix 6). Email was also used to notify participants of successful WOW prosecutions (see Appendix 7).

The first list of roughly ten names was identified in December 2001 and was based largely on nominations from the Districts to the Captain of the Crimes against persons unit. Three of these individuals were in custody within three months, and federal proceedings began against one shortly thereafter. This trial results in a conviction and lengthy federal prison time. It was noteworthy for an assault against the AUSA who tried the case (the Project Safe Neighborhoods coordinator) during sentencing.

b. Trauma Intervention Program

The most intriguing and ambitious of the efforts to emerge from SACSI was the Trauma Intervention Program, which came to be known as TIP. TIP emerged as a partnership between the Director of the Trauma Department at Barnes-Jewish Hospital, one of the two level I trauma centers in the city as a consequence of the involvement of the Director of the Trauma Department and the Vice Chancellor of the Washington


University Medical School. The Vice Chancellor became interested in law enforcement through his role as a transplant surgeon, completed the police academy and was named to the position of police surgeon. He urged his colleague from the Trauma department to become involved in violence prevention efforts in the city. The SACSI core team (the research partner and the LECC) also reached out to the Level I trauma centers owing to the involvement of these centers past violence prevention efforts (Rosenfeld and Decker, 1993) and data analysis that demonstrated the large number of gunshot wound victims that ended up in a Level I trauma center (Decker and Van Winkle, 1996).

The first step in this process was to engage in process mapping of gunshot wound victims to document the steps that they proceeded through from being shot to being released. These interviews were conducted with trauma personnel at both Level I Trauma centers. The steps of the interviews (found in Figure 1.), the results of these interviews, and the questions that were raised during the interviews are enumerated below.

Process Mapping Interviews

Potential cases move through a series of steps as they sustain an intentional injury, arrive at a Trauma Center, are treated, and released. As with any hospital patient, there are concerns of staff safety, consent, confidentiality, and ease of procedure. Specific to the TIP program, there is a need to accurately and adequately reflect hospital practice and procedures in order to insure that this program will find a receptive audience and be effective. In addition to the issue of cooperation from the hospital staff, this program also faces issues of further data needs, initiation of the process, and discretion in initiating referrals.

Figure 1. Process Map of ER/Trauma steps in intentional injury.



These interviews and process map led to further discussion and development of an intervention plan. One of the first steps in preventing violence, according to a public health approach, is to identify and understand the factors that place young people at risk for violent victimization and perpetration. Previous research shows that there are a number of individual and social factors that increase the probability of violence during

adolescence and young adulthood. It is important to note that these factors are consistent with both the public health and criminological data - this adds further credibility to the comprehensive approach. These factors, clustered in four areas, include:

{PRIVATE}INDIVIDUAL	FAMILY	PEER/SCHOOL	NEIGHBORHOOD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • History of early aggression • Beliefs supportive of violence • Social cognitive deficits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • poor monitoring or supervision of children • exposure to violence • parental drug/alcohol abuse • poor emotional attachment to parents or caregivers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • associate with peers engaged in high-risk or problem behavior • low commitment to school • academic failure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • poverty and diminished economic opportunity • high levels of transiency and family disruption • exposure to violence

Health & Law Enforcement Interactions:

Because a large majority of the victims of trauma - especially victims of gunshot wounds - pass through the Emergency Departments of the St. Louis Trauma Centers, these centers become especially important as potential intervention sites for crime and injury prevention initiatives. In a sense, Emergency Departments can become a catchment area for perpetrators of violence and retaliation victims. By state law, the Trauma Centers are required to immediately report to the local police agency whenever a victim of GSW violence is currently being treated at their facility. Unfortunately, the compliance with this reporting requirement and the documented success for follow-up police activity related to the reporting is unknown at this time. In order to facilitate an improvement to this process in the future, some background information regarding the interactions between healthcare centers and the law enforcement agencies is important to review.

In a report originating in Great Britain, for 11 industrialized countries that took part in a 1996 international victimization survey the median reporting rate of violent offences was 39%, ranging from 18% to 51% (Mayhew and Van Dijk, 1996). In the UK only about 25% to 50% of offenses that lead to treatment in emergency departments appear in police records (Shepherd et al., 1989; Clarkson et al., 1994), a proportion consistent with the findings of biennial British crime surveys, which allow comparison of householders' accounts of crime with police records. One study in the US found that the police documented only 54% of assaults treated in an emergency department (Houry et al., 1999). Systematic comparisons of emergency department and police data have not yet been done in the US, but rates of injury inflicted by intimates were found to be four times higher than rates reported to the police, according to the national crime victimization survey (Rand and Strom, 1997). Importantly, comparisons have shown that even offences in which very serious injury is sustained may not be recorded. One study found that police recording could not be predicted on the basis of injury severity scores (Shepherd, 1997). Combined police and emergency department data have, however, been used to develop a comprehensive system for tracking weapon-related injuries in Massachusetts (Barber et al., 1998). This type of initiative has not been previously attempted in St. Louis.

There were a number of reasons for the focus of the TIP program. First, injury data provides a measure of serious violence that is independent of police measures{PRIVATE "TYPE=PICT;ALT=---"}, which are often inaccurate or incomplete. Second, recording injuries treated in emergency departments has the potential for largely complete coverage of serious community violence. Third, such recording provides local

information of importance to the police – such as {PRIVATE "TYPE=PICT;ALT=---"} location, time, weapon, type of incident, and relationship with attacker {PRIVATE "TYPE=PICT;ALT=---"} that will help them respond. Fourth, injury data would provide a new performance indicator of policing at police force level. Fifth, injury data can include outcome information on the injured victim, which is currently lacking in police reports. Finally, injury data may provide a set of measures that are compatible with other data sources {PRIVATE "TYPE=PICT;ALT=---"}.

What does this mean? These points emphasize that health care centers are often the only public service that knows about many violent offenses. These aspects also confirm that the routine recording of core patient data is critical, usually by the emergency department reception staff when the victim first arrives, and that a transfer of aggregate data to the police is essential to promote crime prevention efforts.

The TIP Proposal

Crime, crime prevention programs, acute injury management and ongoing injury prevention programs are all individually complex initiatives that usually involve a multitude of individuals and become even more complex when multiple departments or institutions become simultaneously involved. Concurrently, there are several programs within the City of St. Louis with vested interests in trying to reduce the rate of violent crime and injury in the community. Many of these programs have been active for several years and have enjoyed relative successes in their own fashion. Delineating this new program's objectives and optimizing communication between the various interested entities are critical factors for the success of any program. Some of the necessary actions include the following:

- An inventory of the existing programs and their objectives for the City of St. Louis
- A review of the overlaps in the various program goals and initiatives
- Delineation of the deficiencies for providing a full spectrum of services for violent crime and injury prevention from the various programs
- Development of revised communication strategies between the healthcare institutions and the law enforcement agencies to more rapidly initiate the process of intervention and enforcement
- Development of revised communication strategies for further improving the flow of information between the other ancillary agencies involved with crime and injury prevention
- Integration of TIP's initiatives with other long-term strategies in St. Louis for improved education, recreation and employment opportunities

There are several important levels of counseling that are part of the TIP initiative.

Below is a description of the individuals involved as well as the strategies for counseling and intervention.

Patient and Family Counseling for Lethal and Non-Lethal Victims of Violent Crime

Injury

The patient who initially survives a violent crime with a non-lethal injury and is transported to a medical center for care usually experiences a period of time where they are very unsure about their potential for survival or death (mortality). They are truly scared and all pretenses concerning their social status or social position disappear. During this period, there is a prime opportunity to have the victim undergo a rapid debriefing and

to initiate counseling on the ramifications for being involved with violent crime activities – especially the propensity for retaliatory actions. Even if the victim needs to go emergently to the operating room for injury management, once awake from the anesthesia, there is still usually a variable period of time when the victim is likely more receptive for counseling and debriefing. Once this initial counseling has been initiated, the victim, with their pertinent family members, can be counseled and enrolled into an aggressive follow-up program that focuses upon the events surrounding the incident, as well as on who were the various individuals or groups involved in the incident.

This early intervention strategy allows the healthcare team to begin proactively managing the post-traumatic stress disorders that are pervasive in these individuals. If the opportune time for initiating a debriefing is missed, many of the individuals involved in these incidents will internally rationalize the events and, in many instances, will begin to aggrandize the episode so that their perceived power and survivability within their community increases. This improperly perceived augmentation in stature is detrimental to crime prevention and that cycle needs to be avoided or curtailed. There clearly needs to be a true multi-disciplinary collaboration with several individuals, agencies and institutions in order to be successful with counseling beyond the short-term. The rights to privacy and the protection of the patients' medical information are critical components to consider in the program.

Immediate On-site Counseling and Intervention for Younger Witnesses of Violent Crime Injury

Younger teenagers and children who witness acts of violence and who are not identified, counseled or followed closely have a high propensity to replicate the behaviors

that they have witnessed. They begin to identify that violence is an acceptable behavior and that the perceived power it obtains is a preferred measure of success or acceptance within their social contacts. The basic concept for this aspect of the program is that at the same time the law enforcement officers are initially dispatched to the scene of a crime, trained social workers or psychologists are simultaneously dispatched to the crime scene in order identify witnesses of the violent crime who are younger teenagers and children. Once identified, these individuals are counseled, debriefed on the effects of violence and then channeled into a follow-up program so that the longer-term effects of their behaviors can be monitored and/or modified as possible. Close ongoing interactions with these children's families are essential. Another component of this initiative involves specialty training for law enforcement officers to develop the skills for identifying and initially counseling young children who have witnessed violent situations.

Concurrent Affiliated Gang Member Identification, Counseling and Intervention

Once a victim of violent crime is identified, there needs to be immediate and effective communication with the victim in order to get further identification of their affiliated gang members who may have witnessed or participated in the violent activities. This identification is not only for law enforcement purposes, but also for initiating active counseling and debriefing on the importance for avoiding violent high-risk activities in the future. The message being, this just happened to your friend/peer, it could likely happen to you and may actually be worse. Some of this activity is already active in the St. Louis community and the integration of programs is highly critical for success. Cases and individuals need to be identified rapidly while the resources are available to mobilize aggressive counseling interventions before an acceptance of the consequences of the

violent crime occurs within the gangs, and more importantly, retaliation actions by the gangs can potentially be avoided. This type of intervention can be immediately initiated at the Trauma Centers and then coordinated with the law enforcement and social agencies. An untapped initial resource for this initiative is the crowd of related individuals that customarily collect in the area of the Emergency Departments within a few minutes after the arrival of a victim of violence at Trauma Centers.

Deterrence Counseling for Individuals with Juvenile Convictions and Probation

Requirements

The purpose of this initiative is to provide exposure of convicted individuals at the juvenile level, or younger probation cases (< 24 years), to a variety of activities and counseling sessions that graphically shows the negative biological aspects of violent injury. Examples would be to observe autopsies on injury or crime related cases and to expose the individuals to a series of lectures, slide shows and videos that also graphically demonstrate the severity of violent forces on the human body (e.g. – amputations, spinal cord injury, brain injury, etc.). The concept is not to show how much damage could be done if one managed to obtain the correct type of weapon but to achieve the opposite effect so that the individuals perceive the damage that could be done to themselves or their peers if high-risk behavior is perpetuated. This initiative needs cooperation with Medical Examiner's Office and a variety of trained counselors from a medical school or social service system.

The analysis for this aspect of the intervention depended on two sources. The first source of analysis was direct observation. Two members of the core SACSI team observed the Emergency Department on a Saturday evening in July 2001. Saturday was

selected for the volume of business that passes through the Emergency room on that particular evening. One case involved an individual who had been stabbed in the head with a knife. Since that individual had not been shot, the full patient confidentiality protections for Victims of Violence (VOV) applied.³ As a consequence they were asked if they wished to have the police notified. They declined the offer, which then meant that the case had to be kept fully confidential. Upon being treated, the individual was processed for release from the ED. They were asked if they wanted to keep the knife that they entered the hospital with since it was technically in their possession when they entered the hospital. The individual immediately responded in the affirmative, and in an ironic twist, left the hospital with both a motive for revenge – being stabbed – and a weapon with which to exact revenge. This incident led to a call for policy change, one that would have to proceed through the legislative process. The US Attorney's office in the Western District of Missouri has contacted legislative groups in the state to initiate this process.

During a break from the activity of the ED, the park across the street from the Hospital emergency room was also observed. This location was the site of considerable activity, including playing loud music, drinking beer and smoking blunts (marijuana packed into cigars). It was evident that many of the individuals milling about in the park were waiting for an associate or friend to be treated and emerge from the Hospital. This led to the expansion of the view of the ED as a site and source for intelligence. In addition, the hospital had changed its policy for visitors of VOV, limiting them to three visitors in the waiting room.

³ This preceded the HIPPA regulations.

Issues were also raised about a procedure for storing and processing bullets retrieved.⁴ Missouri state law makes it a class C misdemeanor for a health care professional who fails to report a shooting to law enforcement authorities. The bullet storage process utilized at Grady Memorial in Atlanta was reviewed by the hospital and by law enforcement as a means of standardizing practice and a suitable alternative to past practices. Given the advances in identification of bullets as well as firearms through ballistic tests, these changes also seemed important. Another issue that was reviewed as a consequence of visits to the ED was the process of contacting law enforcement. The hospital employed a process whereby the Computer Aided Dispatch system (911) was called to notify law enforcement of a shooting. This meant that all such calls were routed to the 9th Police District. As a consequence, 911 calls for shootings show the hospital address as one of the modal categories for this type of calls in the city. Discussions ensued regarding what the most appropriate routing procedure should be for this information. Since the hospital is located in the 9th district all calls to 911 for shooting victims who presented at the Hospital ED were routed to the 9th District. One concern that emerged from this was that most of those shootings occurred in other districts, and that the information may be of most use for investigative and problem solving purposes if it was routed to the appropriate district. One line of thought was that the calls should be routed to the district in which the shooting occurred, so that more appropriate investigative personnel could be brought to bear on the case. Ultimately, the procedure was not changed owing to the centralized Crimes Against Persons Unit that responded to the kinds of shootings that typically ended up in the 911 system.

⁴ Appendix 8 describes the Grady Memorial procedure.

However, these discussions raised an additional more important issue. The concern about where cases should be reported led to a more general discussion of the reporting process for gun shot cases that presented in the emergency room. One of the SACSI staff members raised the question of the reporting process for such cases. The first question was who at the ED reported such cases to the 911 system. The Trauma Surgeon indicated that the doctors did not routinely do this task and that it logically fell to the nursing staff. A representative of the nursing staff insisted that security staff rather than nursing staff were responsible for this function. The head of security present at the meeting told us that security staff did not routinely fulfill this task. This led to a more detailed auditing of the system of 911 reporting within the hospital.

There is considerable evidence from the British situation (Shepherd, et al., 1989; Houry, et al., 1999; and Rosman and Knuiman, 1994) as well as some evidence in the US (Kellerman, et al., 1996; Kellerman, 2001) that there is discordance between law enforcement and trauma assault data. That is, many gunshot wound cases that are in hospital records do not appear in police data, suggesting that the volume of gunshot wounds may be underestimated using police data alone. British estimates are that there may be an excess of 20% of gunshot wounds unknown to law enforcement; American estimates, while fewer in number indicate that a figure slightly less than half of that (9%) are recorded in medical records but not law enforcement records.

The data for this task comes from a comparison of one quarter of assault data from the Emergency department to the same quarter of assault data from police records. During the second quarter of 2001 (April-June, 2001) 329 knife and gun assaults were recorded in police data for the city of St. Louis. 115 of these assaults were committed

with a knife, and 214 of them were gunshot wounds. A total of 74 stabbing and gunshot wound cases that occurred in the city were recorded in the Barnes-Jewish Hospital Emergency Department did not appear in police files. Thirty-one of these cases were knife wounds, and 43 were gunshot wounds. That means that a total of 247 gunshot wounds occurred in the city during this quarter (214+43), and that 17% (43/247) did not appear in police files. Of the forty-three gunshot wound injuries that were not in police files, hospital records showed that in 22 cases the police were not notified, and that in 21 cases the police were notified. What is not clear is the 21 cases where hospital records showed that the police had been notified, yet those assaults do not appear in police records. This apparent mismatch between police and hospital records of shooting victims is particularly important as Barnes-Jewish is the modal hospital for gunshot wound victims in police records.

Concern was also raised about the interaction between law enforcement and medical staff. There was concern about “territory”, with the lines of demarcation between where doctors had authority and where law enforcement had authority not particularly clear. Discussions between law enforcement command staff and hospital staff led to a series of productive exchanges regarding training, jurisdictional boundaries, roles and responsibilities.

The culmination of the Trauma Intervention Program was a proposal for external funding to the Centers for Disease Control that would pilot a full-blown TIP that would include cross-training of police and emergency medical personnel, Emergency Room based interventions that would gather intelligence as well as provide social service interventions for victims, their families and associates, and a community outreach effort

that would follow gunshot wound victims back to their neighborhoods to provide follow-up services for victims, their families and associates. The proposal did not receive funding, and the key medical contact was recruited to a Boston hospital to be their head of the Emergency department. Absent the leadership of the ED medical personnel, the TIP fell apart.

Several lessons can be learned from this experiment, and its failure to become fully institutionalized. This was not the first attempt to implementing such an intervention in the emergency rooms of Level I St. Louis trauma centers (Rosenfeld and Decker, 1993), an attempt that was never institutionalized either. The first lesson is that collaborations that cut across institutional and cultural lines can be very difficult to achieve. The language, leadership and values of each group, though focused on a common problem, can be very difficult to mesh. Second, institutionalizing a new intervention as quickly as possible is the key to its survival. The new leader of the emergency department professed to have only fleeting knowledge of TIP, and a meeting with SACSI staff did little to move the standing of this program ahead significantly. Finally, the value of committed leadership cannot be overstated. When there was a champion for TIP at the hospital with enough rank and power to compel people to act, things happened. When that individual left, the intervention collapsed.

c. 5th District Initiative

The lasting outcome of SACSI in St. Louis, at least from a programmatic standpoint, is what has come to be known as the 5th District Initiative. This initiative has overcome institutional hurdles and become an institutionalized part of local and federal law enforcement and prosecution in the city.

This did not come about overnight, nor did it come about without a significant commitment from leadership. This leadership includes both the Chief of Police as well as the Commander of the Crimes Against Persons Division from within the police department. Data was presented regarding the concentrated nature of homicide within the city of St. Louis. The first presentation was to the large Ceasefire Working Group well in advance of the start of SACSI, back in 1997. Maps displaying the heavy concentration of homicide within a small number of neighborhoods were presented, and left for the various groups in the Working Group to return to their agency with and post if they would like. These data were updated and presented anew to the SACSI Violent Crime Workgroup that met at the FBI building. The presentations took several formats. First, the “nightly” Mobile Reserve activities were mapped and distributed the next day to members of the working group.⁵ This allowed a better sense of the location of violence on a more immediate basis. A second format in presenting data to this group was the mapping of homicides, gun recoveries and 911 calls for shootings citywide for the year 2000. A large number of these maps were made and mounted on corkboard, and distributed to partner agencies. The distribution of these maps may have been more important than their presentation at formal meetings. On numerous occasions members of the research team observed agency personnel reviewing a map, discussing recent incidents and their links to “dots” on the maps. The third method of data presentation to the Violent Crime Workgroup was a ranking of the top ten neighborhoods for their rate of violent crimes. These data are presented in tables 3-10, and display a rather consistent pattern. Indeed, of the 79 officially designated neighborhoods in the city of St. Louis, 12

⁵ Mobile Reserve is a tactical squad that has responsibility for responding to high crime locations or individuals regardless of their location within the city. Thus their activity should, to a large extent, reflect

are responsible for half of the homicides. These data more effectively grabbed the attention of the group, leading to the conclusion that a geographic focus might be an appropriate tactic to employ.

Since the city is organized into neighborhoods, it made considerable sense to organize an intervention around neighborhood. The neighborhoods are widely recognized by name and their boundaries are historic and generally understood by city residents. However, the police department is organized into nine Districts, and employing a district approach also made sense. Some neighborhoods span two police districts, and interventions are more easily organized around district lines. The 5th, 6th, and 7th police districts all were appealing candidates because of the large number of high crime neighborhoods contained within each District. In the end, the 5th district was selected because of the leadership of the Captain at the District level and the Major that oversees the Area Command that includes the 5th District. Each of these individuals have long-standing reputations as problem solvers interested in and attentive to data, but also had reputations of being able to produce change under their command.

The first data analysis task was to examine three months of data of assaults in the 5th District to determine the level of assault involving multiple victims and multiple offenders, as well as the residences of both victims and offenders. These data documented an interesting pattern that helped define the initial stages of the strategy within the 5th District itself. The assaults that involved multiple victims or offenders, tended to involve one of the parties who lived outside of the district. That is, when multiple victims (or offenders for that matter) were present, one of them lived outside (though not very far) of the district. Discussions with the Captain, district officers and

the current status of violence or hot spots in the city.

individuals on the gang squad led us to very quickly examine these cases for indications of gang involvement. Such indications were quite evident, including the involvement of known gang members as victims or offenders. This led to further discussions regarding problem solving of assaults with guns that involved Mobile Reserve, the Gang Squad, the Street Corner Apprehension Team (SCAT), the Crimes Against Persons, Area Detectives⁶, and the 5th District. It became clear that whatever strategy was adopted would have to involve multiple actors and bring a higher level of resource to bear on the gun problems than simply those available at the District level. This was made possible by the designation of this intervention, the 5th District Initiative, as a top priority by the Chief of Police. Until this designation, it was not a very high priority for the department. After this designation, including other symbolic and substantive gestures by the Chief, the 5th District gained considerable momentum.

The 5th District Initiative began the third week of January 2001. One of its hallmarks has been the use of data and information. The US Attorney's office issues a joint weekly newsletter with the Circuit Attorney's office detailing prosecutions and sentencing of violent offenders. This newsletter, known as the Ceasefire Roundup is included as Appendix 9 in this report. A number of other electronic means of communicating data for problem solving and considering the impact of initiatives has been piloted, and become institutionalized consistent with the SACSI strategy. These include the effectiveness analysis presented by Central Patrol Detectives (the author of the report also attended the first PSN problem-solving training) that is included as Appendix 10. Appendix 11 presents the annual review of homicide cases prepared by the

⁶ Detectives are designed to work areas, comprised of three districts, rather than a specific district. Detectives from Central Patrol have been heavily involved in Operation Ceasefire since its inception.

Commander of the Crimes Against Persons Division. This report is an important summary, and has had an impact on problem solving, particularly the finding that 79% of victims and 90% of offenders in St. Louis homicides in 2002 had a prior felony criminal history. Whenever a homicide occurs in the city, that same commander now issues a broad email indicating which district the homicide occurred and how the current count compares to the previous two years. An example of this email is included as Appendix 12. The specific information included in this email is not as important as the email itself. This email is a consistent reminder that homicide is an important problem, one that commanders pay attention to, as well as an indication of how the city homicide rate compares to the recent past. Appendices 13 and 14 provide examples of the activity of two of the squads – Mobile Reserve and SCAT respectively – in concentrating more enforcement resources in the Fifth District.

One of the vexing problems to confront the group was the inability to involve the Missouri Probation and Parole offices located in the city in the Ceasefire initiative. Probation and parole is a state function, and both are co-located in the same office. Thus it should be easier to involve one agency rather than two. A representative from Probation and Parole attended both the large Ceasefire Working Group meetings as well as the smaller Violent Crime Workgroup meetings held at the FBI building. However, the level of involvement stopped at attending meetings. Simply put, there was no buy-in from the agency or its leadership. When data were reviewed in early 2000 that showed nearly one-third of murder victims to date were under probation or parole supervision, the response from the designated representative of the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole was, “Why should we care about that?”

Subsequent to that meeting the LECC and Research Partner met with the head of Probation and Parole for the 7th District, which covers the city of St. Louis. Several issues were reviewed during this meeting, including more meaningful participation in the initiative. This was addressed through requests for data and participation in some of the problem solving issues that had been identified earlier in Workgroup meetings. The first was the notification process between parole and the police department for individuals returning to the city from the state prison system. The information about individuals being released from the state prison system to parole supervision in the city was routinely faxed to the Chief's office. This was viewed as an ineffective means of distributing the information, but one that was within the purview of the police department to change. The second issue concerned the identification of residences of probationers and parolees for mapping purposes. This information would be used for the problem solving exercises in identifying appropriate hot spots and locations for intensive policing. In addition, it would also give police some leads to pursue for patterns of offenses in neighborhoods, particularly neighborhoods in which parolees recently returned to neighborhoods. These data were promised, but not delivered. The head of District 7 indicated that he would be unable to release even name-deleted addresses of parolees or probationers to law enforcement. A meeting was called with the Director of the Department of Corrections, the Mayor, Police Chief, the US Attorney, the Circuit Attorney and the research partner. At this meeting, the Director of Corrections promised those data would be forthcoming. Nearly nine months later the data had not been received, though eventually they were provided to the co-located Intelligence Center for mapping purposes.⁷ Despite their

⁷ Ironically, the data showed a number of interesting anomalies. First, a number of unrelated parolees resided at the same residential address, a clear violation of the "knowingly associating" condition of their

heavy involvement in crime and contribution to the violent crime rate, probation and parole at the state level have declined the opportunity to become involved in the Ceasefire Initiative.⁸ The failure of probation and parole to commit to this important initiative has important implications for its success. The impact of probation and parole's Operation Night Light in Boston is clear evidence of the important role that these agencies can play in such initiatives. That failure can be directly linked to the lack of leadership within the local probation and parole office.

An early frustration within the Ceasefire initiative was the failure to engage Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Since the Boston Ceasefire has received so much publicity, the US Attorney regularly heard about its success in using results from the gun trace system in understanding and curtailing the illegal firearms market. Meetings were held with the US Attorney, the RAC from the local ATF office, the LECC and the research partner over a series of years. Indeed, such meetings involved at least three different US Attorneys and spanned a period of no less than five years. Appendix 13 details a briefing paper prepared by the research team for the US Attorney to use as a baseline of knowledge in working with ATF. The local ATF office conducted a large number of investigations, was quite active, and prepared an annual report of a summary nature that was interesting for the general picture it presented. However, there was not as much cooperation between the ATF office and the Ceasefire project, or coordination between ATF and local law enforcement as is needed to approximate the investigation and prevention successes achieved in Boston.

parole. In addition, a number of the individuals residing at the same address were also found to be supervised by different parole officers. Examining data can yield many benefits.

One of the ironies of the ATF situation was that the local police department, facing budget shortages itself, deployed three sworn officers to ATF. Despite this, local law enforcement rarely gained trace results for specific cases, and when it did obtain them it was only after physically visiting the ATF agent who worked the case. In short, the process was haphazard and lacked a systematic component. In addition, there was a general sense among local law enforcement that ATF was an agency that took information but seldom gave much back. This situation was changed with the assignment of a RAC to the St. Louis office who managed to see that information indeed flowed in two directions. In addition, ATF received more personnel, thus enabling the office to better respond to the needs of local law enforcement and the violent crime situation in St. Louis. The Chief negotiated an agreement with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) that would assign two DEA agents to work with the Crimes Against Persons division of the local police department in solving homicide cases. (A copy of the memo that initiated this cooperation is included in this report as Appendix 14). ATF also committed personnel to this initiative. The initiative itself emerged in response to the observation that so many of the homicides in the city occurred as a consequence of other open cases that created a motive of retaliation.

7. Conclusions

A full outcome analysis is well beyond the scope of the SACSI process in St. Louis for a variety of reasons. The primary goal of SACSI was to demonstrate the viability of the problem solving process in addressing gun violence in a city with high

⁸ The same cannot be said of Federal Probation that has embraced the program with a number of initiatives including home visits, spending considerable time in the field, and conducting job fairs for recent releases from federal prison.

rates of violence. In addition, there is insufficient follow-up time to the implementation of the intervention to fully assess program impact, both on account of the needed time to measure impact as well as the time allotment to SACSI. That said, the plausibility of the hypothesis that the interventions implemented as a consequence of the SACSI process can be examined.

A number of premises must be supported to be able to conclude that the SACSI project in St. Louis played a role in reducing levels of firearm violence. The first of these is that an actual decline in the target offense —homicide – be observed. This condition was met, as homicide declined dramatically following the SACSI intervention. The 10-year city wide annual homicide average was 175 homicides per year from 1992-2002. The number of homicides in 2001 was 148, declining to 113 in 2002, and 68 (as of December 30, 2003). These data are presented in Figure 3 in the Appendix. Clearly, homicide declined following the implementation of the SACSI process.

The second premise that must be met to support the hypothesis that the intervention is related to the decline in homicide is that the decline observed in St. Louis was not simply part of a national trend. After all, if crime declines nation-wide, similar declines are to be expected in St. Louis. This does not appear to be the case, however, as the nationwide decline in homicides has leveled off beginning in 2000. In addition, a recent report (Butterfield, 2003) observed that the decline in homicide from 2001 to 2002 in St. Louis exceeded that of all other US cities. Thus it appears that the second premise can be met.

A third premise that must be accounted for is that the decline in homicide be found in the areas of the intervention. Indeed, homicide could decline citywide or in

areas that were not identified by the intervention. If either of these results obtained, it would not be possible to link the declines to the intervention. The changes in homicide counts by district are shown in the table below. While every district recorded declines when the 2003 homicide counts are compared to their four year averages, districts three, five and six accounted for the largest declines, and taken together districts five and six account for nearly half of the citywide decline. Thus these data lend support for the contention that the intervention is associated with the decline in homicide.

Homicide Counts by District, 2000-2003.

District	2000	2001	2002	2003	Four Year Average	Difference
1	6	9	9	5	7.25	-2.25
2	1	1	3	1	1.4	-0.4
3	23	31	13	8	18.75	-10.75
4	5	5	5	4	4.75	-.75
5	20	25	17	10	18	-8
6	26	28	30	10	23.5	-13.5
7	17	19	17	9	15	-6
8	18	21	12	13	16	-3
9	7	9	7	8	7.75	-.025
Citywide	123	148	113	68	113	-50

It is important not to lose sight of what is perhaps the most important achievement of SACSI in St. Louis, the ability to design an intervention based on the use of data, implement that intervention and maintain it over a sustained period of time. Since the

start of the SACSI process in St. Louis a number of things have changed that are unlikely to be undone by changes in command structure, budget cuts or changing demographic characteristics of the city. These include a greater reliance on the use of data for problem identification and problem solving, greater cooperation between agencies, and the use of Internet based platforms for information exchange. These are likely to be the long lasting legacies associated with this effort.

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9. Appendices

Appendix 1. Description of the Neighborhoods of the 5th District

Jeff Vanderlou covers approximately 1.25 square miles and is located in the central east portion of St. Louis city. The resident population is predominately black with other racial groups comprising only 2.3% of the residents identifying as white, Asian, American Indian, or some combination of the above racial groups. In 1990 roughly 98 % of the resident population was black, and over the next decade this changed little as the 2000 census shows that 97.76% of the resident population remains black. The neighborhood experienced a net population loss of 3509 individuals, from 9,968 in 1990 to 6,459 in 2000. This produced a drop in population density of approximately 35.2%. The age distribution of the population in 1990 was centered in the ranges of 5-17 (approximately 24%) and 25-34 (approximately 13%) age categories, with a sizeable portion of the resident population being comprised of individuals 65 years or older (approximately 15%). The effects of maturation over the next decade are evident. In the 2000 census, 15-19 year olds were approximately 14% of the population, 25-34 year olds 11% of the population, and 35-44 year age category comprised roughly 12%. However, maturation alone does not account for the decline in population in these groups. It appears the net out migration from Jeff Vander Lou was comprised of these age groups.

Between 1990 and 2000 total households in Jeff Vander Lou decreased from 2912 to 2492, a 14 percentage point decline. Female-headed households comprised 55.9% of all households in 1990, but by the end of the next decade 58% of all families were headed by females. Twenty-three percent of housing units were vacant in 1990 while in number had risen to roughly 28 percent.

In 1990, nearly 80% of the resident reported they had less than or the equivalent of a high school education. In 1990, the median household income for Jeff Vander Lou was \$12,231 while the median family income was modestly greater at \$14,955. The per capita income during 1990 was 6,864, and approximately 8790 residents qualifying as either poor or very poor. Of the total resident population, for 1990 24.3% of the eligible population was unemployed. Of this total, 46.7% percent of those unemployed were male.

St. Louis Place covers approximately .69 square miles. The resident population is predominately black with whites comprising slightly more than 10% of the population. Other racial groups comprise approximately 1.5% of the remaining resident population, and nearly 1% of the population identifies as a combination of multiple races. In 1990, roughly 85% of the population identified as black or African American, and over the next decade, as a percentage of the total population, increased by roughly 3% to comprise approximately 88% of the population. In terms of net population, as with most other locations in the city, St. Louis Place experienced a population decline. Population density in 1990 was 5428 residents per square mile, while in 2000 this had decreased to 3992 residents per square mile. From 1990 to 2000, the total net out-migration was 994 individuals, and this translates to a percentage point change of roughly 25%.

For St. Louis Place the age distribution of the resident population is generally evenly distributed among all age categories. The largest age group in 1990 was represented by the 5-17 year olds who comprised roughly 24% of the population. The next largest age group was the 25-34 age category, comprising 18% of the overall population. A decade later, the 15-24 age group comprised 16% of the population, and

25-34 year olds comprised 13%. The 35-44 year old age category comprised nearly 15% of the population.

Between 1990 and 2000 the percent of households headed by women remained relatively stable at approximately 37%. As a percentage of the total population, family households increase by nearly 4% during the decade rising from 60.4% to 64% of the eligible population. Non-family households experienced the largest decline during the decade. In 1990, these households comprised 21% of all households but by 2000 this had dropped to 5% of the neighborhood households. The number of occupied units decreased during the decade by 21% with only 931 occupied units recorded in 2000, representing approximately 67% of all households.

Roughly 50% of the population reported having at least a high school education or higher in 1990. The median household income was \$14,756 while the median family income was only marginally greater at \$15,173. Of the resident population living in St. Louis Place, 63% qualified as either poor or very poor with very poor residents comprising 23% of the total population. The per capita income for 1990 was \$6,470. The unemployment level for 1990 was 22.4%. For the female population unemployment among the eligible workforce was 19.5% while for males the percentage was greater at 34%.

Old North St. Louis covers approximately .39 miles, and as in other city neighborhoods population density as declined over the past decade as the overall resident population has diminished. In 1990 Old North St. Louis had a registered population of 2,386 translating to a population density of 6,109 residents per square mile. By year 2000 the neighborhood experienced a 37% decrease with the number of residents falling by

nearly 900 occupants to 1,498. In 2000, the resident population was comprised of approximately 27% white and 69% black or African American. These levels reflect a 56% decline in the population of whites and 28% decline in the population of blacks between the years of 1990 and 2000. Other racial groups comprise roughly 2% of the remaining population in year 2000. The Asian population is the only group to show an increase in population for the neighborhood.

In 1990 the age distribution of the resident population was evenly distributed across all age groups. The largest age group in 1990 was represented by the 5-17 category at 24%, but the 18-24 and 25-34 age categories represented 14% and 15% of the population respectively. In 2000, the 15-19 age group comprised 7% of the population and the 20-24 age group comprised nearly 9% of the population. The 25-34 age group comprised roughly 11.5% of the population while the 35-44 age group comprised a marginally greater percentage of the population at 13% for the 2000 census.

Between 1990 and 2000 the percent of households headed by women increased from 20 to 36% of all households. However the total percentage of family households increased from nearly half of all households to approximately 55% of all households in 2000. Non-family households remained low. Only 3% of all households were non-family residences in year 2000. In 1990 there 1,300 housing units in Old North St. Louis, however, by the end of the decade the number of units declined by 20% to 1,036. In 1990 35.7% of all units were vacant while in 2000, this percentage had increased to nearly 42% of total units. In 1990 about 64% of housing units were occupied while at the decade's end this had declined to roughly 59%. Hence, though the overall number of eligible households declined, relative rates of occupancy did not remain stable over time.

In 1990, only 43% of the population had a high school education or higher. Nearly 63% of the population reported having a less than a high school education. In contrast, roughly 20% of the eligible resident population reported having some or more than a college education. The median household income was \$13,229, while the median family income was only slightly higher at \$15,850. In 1990, the per capita income for Old North St. Louis \$4,835, and 37% of the population qualified as being either poor or very poor. Of the eligible working population in 1990, nearly 20% were unemployed. Females comprised the largest portion of the workforce.

Near North Riverfront is the only neighborhood that experienced an increase in population. This neighborhood is almost exclusively an industrial area and home to several large employers. The area is also home to Riverview Park where many recreational activities are available. The majority of residential units is located at the western edge of the neighborhood and consists primarily of single-family homes. The neighborhood covers 2.16 square miles. In 1990, the population density was roughly 157 individuals per square mile; however, by year 2000 this had increased nearly 90% to 299 individuals per square mile. The population increase was due to a net in migration of residents of various racial groups. Between 1990 and 2000, the white population increased by 21%, and the Asian population by 33%. But by far, the largest increase of new residents was black, and this percentage of the resident population increased dramatically by 256% over the decade.

In 1990 the age distribution was centered in three age groups following patterns of previous neighborhoods. Twenty percent of the population fell into the 5-17 age category, 17% into the 25-34 age category, and 19% into the 65+ age category. The aging

of this demographic group is evident, and by the end of the decade. Nearly 20% of the population was comprised of the 25-29 age category a decade later while the 15-24 year olds constituted only 12% of the population. Approximately 30% of the population fell into the 35-44 age category in the 2000 Census. The remaining age groups were generally evenly dispersed among the remainder of the population.

Though the population increased, the percentage of family households remained stable throughout the decade at around 51%. Non-family household declined during the decade from approximately 11 to 5 % of the total households. Female-headed households, which constituted 28.3% of all households in 1990, constituted 35% of all households at the end of the decade. In 1990, the median housing value was \$56,850 and the median rent was \$356.

In terms of educational attainment, roughly 41% of the population reported having either a high school education or greater in 1990. Of these, roughly 20% reported having an associate's degree. A decade later, the median household income for 1990 was \$7537, and for families the median household income was slightly greater at \$8,152. The per capita income for 1990 was \$4,414. Fifty-eight percent of the population qualified as living below the poverty line. Of the resident population, 35% qualified as poor persons as compared to 24% qualifying as very poor individuals. Slightly higher that 26% of the eligible workforce population was unemployed in 1990. Of the eligible female workforce, nearly 18% were unemployed; however, in contrast nearly 51% of the eligible male workforce was unemployed in 1990.

Hyde Park

Hyde Park is registered as a National Historic District and has recently received increases in City services for beautification projects and neighborhood revitalization projects. The neighborhood covers and is of .57 square miles. The resident population is predominately black. In 1990 the total population was 5,435, the population density was 9,542 individuals per square mile. In the next decade, the population declined by roughly 31%, reducing the population density to 6,571 individuals per square mile. In 1990, 67% of the population identified as black. By 2000, 80% of the resident population was black. An opposite trend was evident for whites. In 1990, roughly 33% of the population in Hyde Park was white. However in the next decade this percentage of the population declined by 61, and by year 2000 only 18% of the resident population reported their racial group as white. Only 2% of the population reported their racial group as other than black or white. Overall, between 1990-2000 the net population loss to the neighborhood was 1,692 individuals.

As with other District 5 neighborhoods the majority the age distribution falls disproportionately on younger age categories. In 1990, 26% of the population was between 5-17 years of age. The next largest age group is the 25-34 age category that represented 18% of the population in the 1990 Census. A decade later, roughly 24% of the population was between 5-14 years of age. The next largest group in 2000 was the 15-24 age group that comprised roughly 15% of the resident population.

In 1990, women headed 45% of all households, but within the next decade this number decreased to 39% of the eligible households. The overall number for family households declined during the decade however. In contrast, in 1990, 72.5% of all households were family households but by year 2000 this number had decreased and only

65% of households in Hyde Park were family households. The largest change in household type occurred for non-family households which in 1990 comprised roughly 36% of eligible households but a decade later comprised on 6% of the all households in the neighborhood. The number of occupied units declined as well by roughly 2%. In 1990 approximately 73% of all household units were occupied, however, by year 2000 the rate of occupancy had decreased to roughly 71% of all eligible units. For the year 2000 this left nearly 30% of all household units vacant.

Roughly 57% of the population in 1990 reported having a less than a high school education. Roughly 43% of the residents reported having at least a high school education. The median household income in 1990 was \$11,652 while the median family income was slightly higher at \$14,417. Of the resident population living in Hyde Park in 1990, 46% qualified as poor and 28% qualified as being very poor. The per capita income for 1990 was \$6,170. The unemployment rate for 1990 was roughly 21% of the eligible working population. The unemployment rate among females was nearly 20% of the eligible population. For males the rate of unemployment was marginally higher at 23% of the eligible labor force.

College Hill covers approximately .39 square miles. The population in 1990 was 4,335 but by 2000 had decreased by nearly 1,400 individuals. Population density likewise decreased during the decade from nearly 11,000 residents per square mile to 7,500 residents per square mile. The neighborhood is predominately black. In 2000, nearly 94% of the population reported they were black, 4% reported they were white, and slightly under 1% identified as either American Indian or Asian. The relative percent both black and white residents decreased between 1990 and 2000 due to a net population loss during

the decade of approximately 1,200 residents accounting for an appreciable 31% decrease in the neighborhood population.

In 1990, roughly 26% of the resident population fell between the ages of 5-17. In 2000, roughly 24% of the population was between 5-14 years of age. In 1990, roughly 27% of the population was between that ages 18-34, but by a decade later this percentage of the population had decreased to approximately 21% of the total resident population. Between 1990 and 2000 the percent of households headed by women increased by nearly 13%. At the beginning of the decade only 35% percent of all households were headed by women but by 2000 this had increased to 48% of all households. As a percentage of the total population, family households in College Hill increased during the decade. In 1990 only nearly 54% of all households were categorized as familial while in 2000, 74% of all households were characterized in this manner. The number of occupied units in year 2000 was roughly 69%, representing a decline from a 73% occupancy rate of a decade earlier.

In 1990 nearly half the residents reported having less than a high school education. Nearly 30% of the population had a high school education, and slightly more than 21% of the population had greater than a high school education. The median household income was \$17,335 in 1990. For the same year, the median family income was appreciably higher at \$22,575. Of the resident population living in College Hill, fewer persons live in poverty as compared to other District 5 neighborhoods. In 1990, only 1.5% of the population qualified as either poor or very poor. The per capita income for 1990 was \$6,248. The unemployment level in the neighborhood was 24%. Of the eligible female population roughly 25% were unemployed while for males the comparable number was slightly higher at 30% of the eligible labor force.

Fairground Neighborhood covers approximately .32 square miles. The population in 1990 was 3,688. As with other District 5 neighborhoods, Fairground experienced a population loss during the decade and by year 2000 a net population loss of 33% resulted in a population of 2,472. The resulting change in population density was a drop from 11,665 to 7819 individuals per square mile. The resident population is approximately 98% black with whites comprising roughly 1% of the population. Roughly 1% of the remaining population identifies as either Asian or American Indian.

The age distribution of Fairground Neighborhood mirrors that of the other neighborhoods. Roughly 25% of the residents fall into the 5-17 age category, 12% into the 18-24 category, and 15% into the 25-34 age group. The remainder of the population is evenly distributed across the various age groups. The effects of population loss are greatest in the younger age categories by year 2000. Only 15% of the population fell into the 15-24 age group a decade later, and roughly 12% and 14% into the 35-34 and 35-44 age groups respectively.

Between 1990 and 2000 the percent of households headed by women had declined by 10 percentage points from 49% to only 39% of all households. Nearly 80% of all households were characterized as family households in 1990 but this number dropped to 68% by the end of the decade. The number of occupied housing units likewise declined from 76% to 71%. In 1990, 1,284 housing units were recorded but by decade's end this number decreased to 1,216.

Equal numbers of residents reported having either a high school education or greater than a high school education. However, greater than half of the population (52%) reported they had less than a high school education in 1990. The median household

income in 1990 was 15,763. In contrast to other neighborhoods the median family income for Fairground Neighborhood was lower. For 1990, the reported income for family households was \$13,979. Of the resident population living in the neighborhood greater than half qualify as either poor, 42%, or very poor, 23%. The per capita income for 1990 was marginally lower than the norm at \$5,117. The unemployment rate in 1990 was slightly lower than the average across neighborhoods at 18.3%. Of the eligible female labor force, 12% were unemployed. Of the eligible male labor force, 34% were unemployed.

O'Fallon neighborhood covers approximately .59 square miles. The resident population in 1990 was 8,807. As with other neighborhoods, there was a net population loss during the decade. In 2000 the population was 7,151. This translates to a change in population density of roughly 20%, from 14,937 to 12,128 individuals per square mile. The population of O'Fallon is predominately black. In 2000, nearly 98% of the population was black while slightly more than .5% was recorded as white.

The age distribution for O'Fallon neighborhood follows the same trend as other District 5 neighborhoods. In 1990, roughly 21% of the population falls into the 5-17 age category and 15% into the 25-34 age category. The next largest age group is the 65+ population that comprised 13% of the total population in 1990. In 2000 approximately 14% of the population fell into the 15-24 age category, 12% into the 25-34 age category, 14% into the 35-44 age category, and 20% of the population fell into the 65+ age category.

In 1990, women headed 34% of all households. During the next decade this percentage remained relatively stable and by decade's end 35% of all households were

headed by women. An opposite effect was observed for family households that in 1990 constituted 68% of all households but by 2000 comprised 67% of all households in O'Fallon. The total number of housing units in 1990 was 3,584 but by decade's end this had decreased to 3,269. In 1990, 85% of all eligible units were occupied. By 2000, this had declined marginally and roughly 82% of all eligible units were occupied.

Educational attainment was fairly evenly distributed across all categories. Roughly 40% of the residents had less than a high school education. Thirty percent of the resident population reported having a high school education and an equal number reported having greater than a high school education. The median household income in 1990 was \$16,501 while the median family income was higher at \$21,255. The per capita income in 1990 was \$8,471. Of the resident population living in O'Fallon, nearly 30% qualified as poor and nearly 20% as very poor. The unemployment level in 1990 was low in comparison to other neighborhoods at 15.2%. Of the eligible female labor force 12% were unemployed. Of the eligible male labor force nearly double the percentage were unemployed at 23.4%.

Appendix 2 Rochester, New York Notification of Special Enforcement (NOSE)

Program **builds on research findings** that document: (1) young minority men in Rochester's poorest neighborhoods experience high rates of victimization and participate in high levels of violence, (2) robbery and assault are common victimization experiences of these men, (3) a number of individuals have been involved in a variety of roles in multiple cases involving violence over several months (these roles include, victim, perpetrator, witness, suspect, and associate of victim or suspect), (4) many of these participants are already "on paper" in the Rochester criminal justice system.

NOSE uses a **case review process** to identify individuals likely to be involved in violence as offenders or victims, delivers a message of individual deterrence, and provides increased supervision and additional services where appropriate.

NOSE depends on a **partnership approach**, including state, federal and local law enforcement, state and federal prosecution, and probation and parole.

The program is administered through the Crime Analysis Section of the RPD.

Candidates for inclusion on the NOSE list are **identified by regular case reviews** of violent crime, during which partners make recommendations regarding which individuals have a higher probability of being involved in violence either as victims or offenders. NOSE candidates are then examined by Crime Analysis to assure de-confliction.

Individuals placed on the NOSE list are **notified** of that fact and the program is described to them. The notification indicates increased law enforcement scrutiny, surveillance and services.

Appendix 3 Most Violent Offender Criteria

<u>Criteria</u>	Rochester	KC	St. Louis	Indianapolis
Goals	Reduce violence	Reduce violence		
Targets	Victims and Perps	Perps		Perps
Criteria		Point Threshold		
Point System	NO	YES	YES	
"Linked" events	YES			
Partners	LSF LE, PP, COMM	LSF LE, PP, COMM		LSF LE, PP, COMM
Tools	PS, Partnerships	PS	CCE Invest	
Reduce violence	YES			
Geographic	YES	NO		

area				
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Kansas City, Missouri
Development of Violent Crimes Task Force
Major Vincent M. Ortega, Commander Violent Crimes Division

Limited Proactive Approach-little identification, targeting or prosecution of repeat offenders has occurred. The Violent Crimes Task Force Unit (VCTF) is **responsible** for identification, targeting and prosecuting repeat offenders.

It **partners** with federal, state and other local law enforcement agencies (including Probation and Parole) as well as community partners (Weed and Seed). Memoranda of Understanding are developed regarding information sharing.

VCTF **targets** and develops cases against: (1) violent felons in possession of firearms, (2) domestic violence offenders in possession of firearms, (3) armed drug traffickers, and (4) illegal weapons/use.

Four specific **goals** were developed: (1) increased arrest, prosecution, and incarceration of the most serious and violent offenders, (2) serious violence incidents, (3) communication of anti-violence message to potential offenders, and (4) development of community-based prevention components.

Problem solving approaches are to be used.

Points

14 Documented involvement in violent activity

8 On parole or probation for felony conviction

- 7 Documented association with known criminals with a history of criminal conduct**
- 6 Previous Arrests or convictions involving firearms violations in state or federal courts**
- 5 The potential target has at least one prior felony conviction or a reduced conviction**
- 5 Felony charges pending in State or Federal Court**
- 4 History of drug use determined by arrest or reliable source**
- 3 Unemployed or employed irregularly, lacking visible means of support**
- 2 Previous arrests or convictions involving firearms violations in municipal court**

Program Process

Establish the Violent Offenders list then an Investigations Unit of the VCTF would be formed. It would be regional and involve law enforcement partners from federal, state and local levels. Detectives in this unit would be assigned a portion of the list of violent offenders. Training on firearms law violations would be provided to all members. Communication between agencies and sharing of information is seen as a key to program success. A meeting to discuss members on the list will be held every two to three weeks.

Three components to the KCPD Violent Crime Response: (1) a Firearms License Compliance Program, (2) a Firearms Investigative Task Force Program, and (3) a Public Awareness Program.

Appendix 4 St. Louis, Missouri St. Louis Regional Most Violent Offenders Program

Developed as part of the larger St. Louis Regional Ceasefire Initiative, a coalition approach to responding to and preventing violence. **Components** of Ceasefire include: (1) cracking down on illegal gun trafficking, (2) recovering guns from youthful gang members, (3) aggressive response to violence on the part of police, prosecutors, probation and parole, and (4) focused prevention and interventions by clergy, schools, gang outreach workers, and other social service providers.

Program goals include **identifying** the 100 most violent offenders for enhanced investigation, enforcement and prosecution. Candidates are referred by law enforcement officers or by citizens through officers. A Steering Committee reviews cases on a monthly basis, assigns points based on criminal history and makes decisions regarding additions or deletions to the list.

Criteria for inclusion on the list include: (1) age 18 or older, (2) documenting of current or ongoing involvement in criminal activity, (3) criminal arrest history, and (4) community impact. **Points** are assessed for all arrests. Points are assigned based on the following Criminal Histories.

Points

- 5 Violent Felony**
- 4 Non-Violent Felony**
- 3 Gun arrest or serious misdemeanor**
- 3 Aggravated Assault**
- 2 Drug Arrest**

1 Other Misdemeanor

1-5 Community Impact

A minimum of **50 points** is required to qualify for the Most Violent Offenders Program. Subjects are removed from the MVOP when there is no documented criminal activity within a six-month period of time, death or an active prison sentence.

REJIS will develop and maintain the tracking list in coordination with the MVOP coordinator.

Appendix 5 WOW Criteria

When requesting candidate information from your department, we are suggesting they consider some criteria or guidelines for further list additions:

A criminal offender can be placed on the worst of the worst offender list if the offender has ever been arrested for homicide or if the criminal candidate possesses at least two of the following characteristics:

- a. documented gang member;
- b. six or more state level arrests within the last nine months;
- c. two or more felony convictions or pleas of guilt or multiple misdemeanor convictions or pleas of guilt;
- d. the most recent state level arrest occurred while the offender was on probation;
- e. two arrests for assault first degree and armed criminal action.

Appendix 6 WOW Update

Last evening the Gang Squad made two UUW arrests in the targeted neighborhoods. Both of the subjects were previously identified as 'targets'. They are:

XXX YYY
B/M/19, dob: 11/4/82
LKA: XXXX. Linton

YYY was arrested in the 2000 block of E. Desoto after he was observed to discard a fully loaded 9mm pistol and two additional, full magazines. He is a documented member of the Desoto Hustlers, 44 Blue Buds, and Adelaide Avenue Rollin 60 Crips. He is a close associate of deceased gang member SW, who was fatally shot (8-10 gunshot wounds) while seated in an auto in the XXXX block of E. O'Bear on February 9, 2002. YYY has a number of arrests for drug violations and is currently on probation for one of those offenses. Aside from this gun charge and about 20 bench warrants, YYY was additionally charged with 'Safe Keeping' at the request of AUSA TT MM for federal firearms violations.

The second subject who was arrested in the XXXX block of Howard is identified as:

ZZZ BBB
B/M/15, dob: 7/15/85
LKA: XXXX Magazine

BBB was in possession of a fully loaded 22 caliber automatic pistol, which he pointed at the officers during a foot pursuit. BBB is a documented member of the 26 Mad Rolling 60's street gang, (which is in opposition to YYY's gang affiliations). Though BBB is only 15 yoa, he has been arrested several times for UUW and bears the scars of a gunshot wound to his stomach. He is at the juvenile detention facility in regard to last night's arrest and a request has been made to detain him to review the possibility of certification.

He is a close associate of QQQ PPP and reportedly was with PPP when MMM NNN was fatally shot in the XXXX block of E. Grand on January 3, 2002. PPP is the suspect in the NNN homicide and at least one other recent gang related shooting. Though the Homicide Section lacks sufficient evidence at this time to charge PPP with the murder of NNN, he has been charged in a federal complaint for gun/drug related charges.

Appendix 7

Email Communication of Successful MVOP/WOW Prosecution

Subject: RE: XXX ZZZ
Date: Tue, 7 May 2002 16:24:26 -0500
From: "HH HH"
To: "MM TT"
CC: Ceasefire Working Group

TT:

Thanks for the update and for all your work in this case -- from the time you were called on March 13 and issued a complaint on ZZZ, the trial preparation, and finally -- your successful prosecution. I'm forwarding this message to the Ceasefire group and everyone involved in the 5th District Initiative since ZZZ was one of our first targets arrested in that program. Again, thanks.

HH

-----Original Message-----

From: MM, TT
Sent: Tuesday, May 07, 2002 4:29 PM
To: HH HH '
Subject: XXX ZZZ

A federal jury just convicted XXX ZZZ of being a user of a controlled substance while in possession of a firearm. One of the four firearms was used in the shooting of QQQ MMM on 1/17/2 and the homicide of HH on 1/3/2.

Testimony of the arresting Officers SS CC and TT HH combined with that of Officer DD BB and Det. DD WW, who were both notified the day of trial that they were needed, relative two prior arrest for possession of marijuana.

AUSA TT MM

Appendix 8

Subject: Submitting bullets for crime lab analysis

Each firearm leaves a unique pattern of markings on every bullet fired from that weapon. It is possible to link bullets (and in some cases, bullet fragments) recovered from different crimes to the same weapon. This can generate leads to unsolved homicides and other violent crimes. The attached procedure has been developed to facilitate submission of bullets for crime lab analysis.

Note: This procedure only applies to bullets/bullet fragments that are incidentally removed during the course of medically necessary, emergent or consensual treatment of a patient with a gunshot wound(s). Surgery for no reason other than to retrieve a bullet for forensic analysis should not be done without proper informed consent and/or a court order, attending involvement, and notification of your Hospital's attorney.

Procedure:

1. Preservation of the **chain of custody** is the most important aspect of submitting a bullet/bullet fragment to the crime lab.
2. **Special zip-lock bags** have been prepared to hold recovered bullets/bullet fragments. One side of the bag contains a label that must be signed by anyone who assumes custody of the bag.
3. The patient's **addressograph label** should be affixed to the other side of the bag. If the patient's identity has not been determined, the "Stat-Pack" number may be used.
4. Unnecessary **rough handling** of the bullet/bullet fragment (particularly clamping with metal forceps) should be avoided unless this is necessary in the course of treating the patient.
5. **Any bullet/bullet fragment** removed during the course of treatment should be submitted for analysis, regardless of the circumstances of the shooting. When a bullet/bullet fragment is removed, it should be placed in a pan of saline, rinsed, and held in the O.R. or clinic until the end of the surgical procedure.
6. Immediately following surgery, the surgeon who removed the bullet/bullet fragment should: 1) place it in a properly labeled bag, and 2) **sign the top line of the chain of custody label**.
7. The bag should be immediately placed in the **bullet recovery drop-box**, which is located in the O.R.
8. If an **individual other than the surgeon** assumes custody of the bullet before it is placed in the drop-box, he/she must also sign the chain of custody label.

9. Bullets recovered from the **same victim** should be placed in the **same bag**.
10. Bullets recovered from **different victims** of the same incident should be placed in **different bags**, even if it is believed that a single firearm was used to shoot all of the victims.
11. An authorized **law enforcement officer** will come by the O.R. periodically to empty the drop-box.
12. In the event of **death during surgery**, leave any unrecovered bullets/bullet fragments in place. If one or more bullets or bullet fragments were removed at an earlier point in the case, they should be placed in a properly labeled bag, and accompany the body to the Medical Examiner.

Appendix 9 Ceasefire Roundup

From: USA EDMO
Sent: Thursday, July 03, 2003 1:52 PM
Subject: Ceasefire Roundup 7/3/03

July 3, 2003
For Immediate Release

ST. LOUIS CIRCUIT ATTORNEY AND UNITED STATES ATTORNEY REPORT WEEKLY RESULTS OF ST. LOUIS REGIONAL CEASEFIRE INITIATIVE

St. Louis, Missouri: The following represents the prosecution activities under the St. Louis Regional Ceasefire Initiative, a component of the Bush Administration's Project Safe Neighborhoods Program, United States Attorney Ray Gruender and St. Louis Circuit Attorney Jennifer Joyce announced today.

This week's results of Project Safe Neighborhood/Ceasefire are as follows:

ST. LOUIS CIRCUIT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE:

JERMEL RUSH, 20, of the 1300 block of North 8th Street, was sentenced on June 27 to serve nineteen years in the Missouri department of corrections by Judge Robert Dierker. On May 7, 2003 he pled guilty to two counts of Robbery 1st degree, two counts of Attempted Robbery 1st degree, and four counts of Armed Criminal Action. Amy Fite prosecuted the case for the Circuit Attorney's Office.

DARIUS GUYTON, 21, of the 3100 block of Miami, was convicted by a jury on June 13, 2003 of Murder 2nd degree, Armed Criminal Action, and Escape from Custody. He faces a maximum sentence of Life imprisonment when he is sentenced by Judge Donald McCullin on July 18, 2003. The incident occurred on August 27, 2001 in the 3700 block of Minnesota in the Gravois Park neighborhood. Paula Bryant prosecuted the defendant for the Circuit Attorney's Office.

BOBBY MCCULEY, 39, of the 4600 block of San Francisco, was convicted by a jury on June 16, 2003 of Domestic Assault 1st degree, Assault 2nd degree, two counts of Armed Criminal Action, and Shooting into a dwelling for an incident that occurred on September 23, 2001 in the 6000 block of West Florissant. The defendant faces a maximum sentence of life imprisonment when he is sentenced by Judge David Mason on July 18, 2003. Kimberly Maurer-Levi prosecuted the defendant for the Circuit Attorney's Office.

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

MAURICE CANDIES, 21, of the 4600 block of St. Ferdinand, St. Louis, 63113, pled guilty to one felony count of being a previously convicted felon in possession of a firearm. Candies now faces a maximum penalty of ten years in prison and/or a fine of \$250,000. Sentencing has been set for September 17, 2003.

BRUCE MCCLEARY, 46, of the 4100 block of Page, St. Louis, 63113, pled guilty to one felony count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The charges occurred in the 8th District Weed and Seed area. McCleary now faces a maximum penalty of life in prison and/or a fines of \$250,000. Sentencing has been set for September 18, 2003.

JOHN BITTNER, 42, of Villa Ridge, Missouri, pled guilty to one felony count of possession of two machine guns. Bittner now faces a maximum penalty of ten years in prison and/or a fine of \$250,000. Sentencing has been set for September 18, 2003.

GARVIN BROWN, of the 2700 block of Glasgow, St. Louis, was sentenced to 75 months in prison, without parole, on one felony count of distribution of cocaine base (crack) and one felony count of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense.

JON R. WHITE, 35, of the 8900 block of Newby, St. Louis, was indicted by a federal grand jury on one felony count of being a previously convicted felon in possession of a firearm. If convicted, White faces a maximum penalty of ten years in prison and/or a fine of \$250,000.

The charges set forth in an indictment are merely accusations, and each defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.

Appendix 10.
College Hill Initiative Data

METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT – CITY OF
SAINT LOUIS

Intra-Department Report and Correspondence Sheet

DATE: SEPTEMBER 15, 2002

TO: MAJOR DDHH, COMANDING OFFICER
/C.P.D.

FROM: LIEUTENANT JJPP, DETECTIVE BUREAU
C.P.D.

SUBJECT: EFFECTIVENESS OF
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE
COLLEGE HILL NEIGHBORHOOD OF
THE 5TH DISTRICT

COPIES TO: CAPTAIN HHHH

Sir:

During this six month period of 09/01/2001 thru 02/28/2002, the College Hill neighborhood accounted for 6 *Homicides* and 17 *Assault 1st Degree* (shooting) incidents. A total of 23 firearms related assault incidents (39 victims or Part I Crimes), for an average

of 3.83 firearms incidents per month and 6.5 Part I crimes per month.

The following table is a chronological listing of the firearms incidents (including the number of victims, type of gunshot wounds and case disposition:

FIREARMS RELATED INCIDENTS IN THE COLLEGE HILL NEIGHBORHOOD

(September 01, 2001 thru September 15, 2002)

DATE	CRIME / CN	LOCATION	VICTIM(S)/	INJURIES
ARREST(S)/				
<u>WARRANTS</u>				
<u>SEPTEMBER 2001</u>				
09/02/01	HOMICIDE 01/118193	2060 E. DESOTO	1-Victim(s)/ 1-fatal GSW	OPEN
09/03/01 OPEN	ASSAULT 1st 01/118554	4725 N. 20 TH	2 -Victim(s)/ 1-ser GSW &1-min GSW	
09/05/01 WANTED	ASSAULT 1st 01/119205	4422 N. 20 TH	1-Victim(s)/ 1-min GSW	OPEN / B/M/28
W46652819				
09/22/01 OPEN B/M/24	ASSAULT 1st 01/127643	2001 E. OBEAR	1-Victim(s)/ No Injury	UNK
09/29/01 CLEARED by 421	HOMICIDE 01/131160	2033 E. DESOTO	1-Victim(s)/ 1-fatal GSW	1 Arrest TUA

OCTOBER 2001

10/05/01	HOMICIDE	1921 E. OBEAR	1-Victim(s)/	
CLEARED				
		01/133815	1-fatal GSW	1
Arrest by 421				
Murder I -ISS				
10/08/01	ASSAULT 1st	1526 E. DESOTO	4-Victim(s)/	
OPEN				
		01/135744	1-min GSW	
10/26/01	ASSAULT 1st	1500 E. GANO	2-Victim(s)/	
CLEARED				
		01/144135	1-ser GSW	1
Arrest by 321				
TUAs			1-min GSW	3-

NOVEMBER 2001

11/12/01	ASSAULT 1st	4101 W. FLORISSANT	1-Victim(s)/	
OPEN				
		01/151746	No Injury	
11/15/01	ASSAULT 1st	3900 W. FLORISSANT	1-Victim(s)/	
OPEN				
		01/153175	1-min GSW	UNK
B/M/25				
11/23/01	ASSAULT 1st	4336 N. 20TH	1-Victim(s)/	
CLEARED				
		01/156891	1-min GSW	1
Arrest by 321				
by 321				1-JUV

DECEMBER 2001

12/08/01	ASSAULT 1st	2008 E. OBEAR	2-Victim(s)/	
CLEARED				
		01/163634	1-min GSW	1 Arrest
by 321				

12/09/01 **ASSAULT 1st** 4125 W. FLORISSANT 4-Victim(s)/
 OPEN 01/164054 No Injuries UNK
 B/M

12/13/01 **ASSAULT 1st** 4000 N. 20TH ?-Victim(s)/
 OPEN 01/165787 No Injury??? 3
 casings recovered

12/31/01 **ASSAULT 1st** 4306 STRODTMAN 1-Victim(s)/
 OPEN 01/172635 1-min GSW

12/31/01 **ASSAULT 1st** 4420 STRODTMAN 5-Victim(s)/
 OPEN 01/172936 1-ser GSW

JANUARY 2002

01/03/02 **HOMICIDE** 2031 E. GRAND 1-Victim(s)/
CLEARED 02/001253 1-fatal GSW XX is in
 Federal custody on a weapons charge – later arrested by 421 –
 warrants issued for Murder 1st Degree & ACA

01/21/02 **ASSAULT 1st** 2100 E. GRAND 2-Victim(s)/
CLEARED 02/009395 1-min GSW (susp) arrest
 by 421 warrants issued for 2 counts of Assault 1ST LEO and 2
 counts of ACA

01/23/02 **ASSAULT 1st** 4925 N. 20TH 1-Victim(s)/
 OPEN 02/010506 Injury UNK

01/27/02 **ASSAULT 1st** 1411 E. GANO 2-Victim(s)/
CLEARED 02/012025 Injury UNK arrests
 by 305

TUAs

FEBRUARY 2002

02/09/02 **HOMICIDE** 2009 E. OBEAR 1-Victim(s)
CLEARED
02/018033 1-fatal GSW Terrell
Beasley B/M
arrested by 421 - warrants issued for Murder
1st Degree

02/23/02 **ASSAULT 1st** 4435 N. 20TH 2-Victim(s)/
CLEARED
02/024338 No Injury/ Prop Dam 1-
Arrest by 321

02/25/02 *Reclassified to a "Robbery 1st Degree" from a*
HOMICIDE 1440 E. LINTON 1-Suspect/victim
CLEARED
02/025112 1-fatal GSW

* NOTE: This incident was ruled a justifiable (non-criminal) homicide by Crime Coding.

MARCH 2002 *(No firearms incidents reported for the month of March)*

ARRIL 2002

04/15/02 **ASSAULT 1st** 20th & E. GRAND 1-Victim(s)/
OPEN
02/047017 (area north of) 1-critical GSW UNK
B/M/20-25
(victim picked up a lady
of the evening
and apparently it was a
robbery set up)

MAY 2002 *(No firearms incidents reported for the month of May)*

JUNE 2002

06/15/02 **ASSAULT 1st** 2149 E. GRAND 3-Victim(s)/
OPEN 02/075282 1-critical GSW & 2
serious GSWs UNK
B/M

06/25/02 **ASSAULT 1st** 2052 E. DeSOTO 2-Victim(s)/
OPEN 02/080046 2-minor GSWs UNK
B/Ms white Nissan
Maxima

JULY 2002

07/09/02 **ASSAULT 1st** 4418 Blair 1-Victim(s)/
OPEN 02/086651 no injury (2)
UNK B/Ms (NOTE: shooting into an
occupied dwelling)

07/11/02 **ASSAULT 1st** 5300 Conde 1-Victim(s)/
OPEN 02/087726 1-serious GSW UNK
B/Ms black
SUV

AUGUST 2002 (No firearms incidents for the month of August)

SEPTEMBER 2002

09/09/02 **ASSAULT 1st** 2000 Bissell 1-Victim(s)/
OPEN 02/117249 1 – serious GSW (2)
UNK B/Ms operating a white vehicle – possibly a Pont
Gran Am

During the week of 02/11/2002, the Central Patrol Division – Detective Bureau joined the 5th District, the 9th District, Mobile Reserve, SCAT, the Gang Squad, ATF and the FBI in a proactive initiative (Most Violent Offenders Program) to target gang members and violent criminals in the College Hill neighborhood. Since 02/11/2002, these units made over **400** arrests, including **100** hardcore gang members and violent criminals.

In the 7.00 month period (from 02/11/2002 thru 09/15/2002), the College Hill neighborhood experienced **0** Homicides * and **7** Assault 1st Degree (shooting) incidents. A total of **7** firearms related assault incidents (11 victims or Part I Crimes), for an average of **1.00** firearms incidents per month or a **73% reduction** in firearms related incidents and **1.57** Part I crimes per month for a **73% reduction** in Part I Crimes.

* NOTE: This incident was ruled a justifiable (non-criminal) homicide by Crime Coding.

The 5th District Initiative/MVOP is 7.0 months old and the statistics indicate a significant reduction in firearms incidents in the College Hill neighborhood.

Respectfully,
Lieutenant JJPP Detective Bureau
Central Patrol Division

Appendix 11
Homicide Characteristic Review, 2002

METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT – CITY OF
ST. LOUIS
Intra-Department Report and Correspondence Sheet

Date: January 6, 2003

To: *Colonel JJMM, Chief of Police*

From: Captain HHHH, Commander
Crimes Against Persons/Property Divisions

Subject: YTD Homicide Statistics – 2002 Totals

Copies Sent To: Deputy Chiefs, Area Majors, District/Division Commanders,

For the year ending December 31, 2002, we've recorded **113** criminal homicides (UCR standards) compared to **148** for the year 2001 -- a decrease of **35**. Included in the 2002 total is an incident that occurred on 7/23/86, but the victim did not die until 4/17/02. For your information, I've compiled some figures relating to the **112** actual cases occurring in 2002:

	<u>Victims</u>	<u>Suspects</u>
Felony criminal history (all):	79 %	90 %
Adults w/ felony criminal history:	81	91
Felony convictions:	43	49
Gang Affiliation:	19	36
Outstanding warrant/wanted:	33	-
Adults on parole/probation:	23	28

	<u>Victims</u>	<u>Suspects</u>
<u>Illegal Drug History:</u> ⁹		
All:	73 %	58 %
Adults only:	75	59

⁹ Drug history is defined by the presence of an illegal drug detected from the autopsy of the victim and/or the victim/suspect has a history of illegal drug violations in the past three years. These numbers do not include alcohol noted in the autopsy reports.

Autopsy findings: ¹⁰	Cocaine: 14
	Marijuana: 23
Alcohol:	12
PCP:	<u>5</u>
	54

(YTD Stats, cont.)

Victim's race and gender:	<u>Black</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
	101	10	1	96	16

Victim Age Groups:	0-16	17-20	21-24	25-30	31-35	36-40	41-49	50-59	60+
<i>Percentages:</i>	2	18	20	24	10	7	11	3	5

Suspect Age Groups:	0-16	17-20	21-24	25-30	31-35	36-40	41-49	50-59	60+
<i>Percentages:</i>	1	41	17	20	10	4	4	4	0

<u>Homicide By District</u>	<u>Homicide by Month</u>	<u>Cause of Death</u>
1. 9	January 14	Firearms: 87
2. 2	February 9	Cutting: 13
3. 14	March 5	Blunt/Beating: 12
4. 5	April 10	Arson: 0
5. 17	May 12	Automobile: 0
6. 30	June 2	
7. 16	July 14	
8. 12	August 10	<u>Multiple Homicides</u> ¹¹
9. 7	September 11	Double: 2
	October 15	Triple: 0
	November 3	
	December 8	

¹⁰ Results from 86 autopsy reports. Fifteen victims had more than one drug in their system.

¹¹ Both double homicides were by firearm.

Appendix 12
Homicide Update
**METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT – CITY OF
ST. LOUIS**

Intra-Department Report and Correspondence Sheet

Date: December 30, 2002
To: Colonel JJMM, Chief of Police
From: Captain HHHH, Commander
 Crimes Against Persons/Property Divisions
Subject: YTD Homicide Statistics - 2002
Copies Sent To: Assistant Chief, Deputy Chiefs, and Senior Command Staff

As of December 29, 2002: **112** (-34)

Homicides by Month:	<u>2002</u>	<u>2001</u>		
January	14	4		
February	9	8		
March	5	9		
April	10	24		
May	12	9		
June	2	19		
July	13	19		
August	10	15		
September	11	15		
October	15	5		
November	3	6		
December	8	15		
	112	148		
Homicides by District:	<u>2002</u>	<u>2001</u>	<u>2000</u>	
1	9	9	6	
2	2	1	1	
3	14	31	23	
4	5	5	5	
5	17	25	20	
6	30	28	26	
7	16	19	17	
8	12	21	18	
9	7	9	7	

Appendix 13 ATF Briefing Memo May 13, 2001

May 13, 2001
ATF Briefing Notes
Prepared by Scott Decker, Criminology, UM-St. Louis
SACSI Research Partner

The following are the key points that underscore the significance of active gun tracing and coordination with the USA's efforts in reducing violent crime in St. Louis. Because of the availability of the LEADS system and the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative, St. Louis can marshal considerable resources to better target illegal firearms.

1. The city of St. Louis has experienced extremely high rates of violent crime. It consistently ranks among the highest five cities in the nation with regard to its homicide and aggravated assault rates.
2. Firearms are used in a very high proportion of homicides in the city of St. Louis. While the U.S. average for use of firearms in homicide is roughly two-thirds, in the city of St. Louis it approaches 9 out of 10 (90%). Firearms are even more likely to be used in homicides among people under the age of 30, and for African-Americans between fifteen and thirty, firearms often account for the method of inflicting death in **all** homicides.
3. The St. Louis Police department seizes a large number of firearms each year. In calendar year 2000, approximately 2200 guns were seized by the department. Semi-automatic firearms accounted for nearly 1,000 of these seized guns. It is not known how many of these guns were "crime guns", that is were used in crimes.
4. Relatively few of the nearly 2200 firearms were high caliber, 57 were 7.62 x 39mm caliber. Only 1 AK, 1 AKS, 2 SKS Sporter, 1 SKS 45 and 3 Mak90's were seized in 2000. Despite this, the Gang Squad, under the direction of Sgt. Ronnie Robinson reports increasing use of such firearms in gang disputes.
5. ATF Trace data, using the LEADS system through the National Tracing Center in West Virginia can be quite useful¹². The information provided from this tracing system can be very useful to law enforcement. ATF trace data was a key foundation for the formation of the Boston Ceasefire strategy, and has been used with great

¹² Glenn L. Pierce, LeBaron Briggs and David Carlson (December, 1995). *The Identification of Patterns in Firearms Trafficking: Implications for Focused Enforcement Strategy*. A Report to the United State Department of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, Office of Enforcement, Washington, D.C.

success in Indianapolis and Los Angeles to address violence. Many municipalities (Cleveland with Interstate trafficking and corrupt FFL's, Milwaukee with guns for drugs, Philadelphia with straw purchases and trafficking by a felon, and Richmond, VA with straw purchases for gangs at gun shows)¹³ report specific success with the use of ATF Trace data from the LEADS system. ATF work enforcing Brady checks and tracing guns at gun show special promise.¹⁴

6. The St. Louis ATF office has traced guns in the past, and the results of those traces have provided a baseline of information.¹⁵ These data generally demonstrated that Missouri is the primary source state for crime guns used in St. Louis (50%), that handguns are the primary gun recovered (75%), and that individuals aged 20-25 are the primary purchasers of firearms used in crime.
7. In response to rising youth firearm violence, BATF introduced the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative in 1997.¹⁶ This initiative found receptive offices in DOJ, including BJA and the COPS office each of which sponsored and funded initiatives directed at using ATF trace data to reduce levels of firearm violence.¹⁷
8. St. Louis is part of the 17 community ATF Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative from 1997, as well as the 27 community Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative in 1999.¹⁸ The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative grew out of BATF efforts to prevent criminals from gaining access to firearms. The strategy was to be driven by research that identified patterns of acquisition, firearms of choice, motives for

¹³ Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (February, 1999). *The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative*. Performance Report for the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations Pursuant to Conference Report 105-825, October, 1998

¹⁴ Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. (January, 1999). *Gun Shows: Brady Checks and Crime Gun Traces*.

¹⁵ Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (1997). *An Analysis of Crime-Related Firearms in St. Louis, Missouri*.

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. St. Louis Field Division. (1995). *An Analysis of Firearms Involved in Crimes in the St. Louis Metropolitan Area, January 1994 through October 1995*.

¹⁶ BATF (August, 1997). *The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative: An Overview*. Washington, D.C. It is important to note for the purposes of federal prosecution that the Youth category includes individuals aged 18 to 24.

¹⁷ Bureau of Justice Assistance (November, 1997). *The Bureau of Justice Assistance Firearms Trafficking Program: Demonstrating Effective Strategies to Control Violence Crime*. Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Justice Assistance (July, 2000). *Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking: Promising Practices and Lessons Learned*. Washington, D.C.

Abt Associates (1998). Evaluation of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Youth Firearms Violence Initiative. Cambridge, MA.

¹⁸ Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (July, 1997). *Crime Gun Trace Analysis Reports: The Illegal Youth Firearms Markets in 17 Communities*. Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (February, 1999). *Crime Gun Trace Analysis Reports: The Illegal Youth Firearms Markets in 27 Communities*. Washington, D.C.

obtaining firearms, and use of firearms¹⁹, and grew from the earlier successful efforts in addressing armed career criminals.²⁰

9. St. Louis is less successful in identifying the possessor than all but one of the other 17 sites in the 1997 data. 57.64% of the possessors were identified in the St. Louis data; only Boston recorded a lower percentage. However, in only 27 cases (1.41% of the total) could the possessor's age be determined. Only four cases were for Youth, individuals aged 18-24. As a consequence these data have been of limited utility.
10. The 1998 data showed that the trace request identified the possessor in 65.4% of all cases. Eight of the 27 cities identified the possessor in a smaller percentage; meaning that in 18 cities, a higher fraction of possessors were identified. However, (p. 7, Table F1., indicates that 334 gun traces were initiated, 58% of all requests for youth. The majority of weapons that were not traced were manufactured prior to 1990, and therefore not included in the trace program.
11. The St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department details officers to ATF. This investment is an important part of cooperation between federal and local law enforcement.
12. To achieve increased public safety by targeting illegal firearms will require enhanced cooperation between ATF and its trace system and local law enforcement. Several steps are recommended. These steps include:
 1. Providing trace data to law enforcement on a priority basis for cases that demand quick action. This may include homicides, but should not be limited to such crimes. Gang offenses, drug crime and many shootings can be solved more quickly and future offenses prevented with quick action.
 2. Increased use of trace results by the Ceasefire Working Group.
 3. Sharing trace data and its results and potential with the Ceasefire Working Group.
 4. Sharing the potential of trace data with AUSA Mehan, who has specific responsibility for gun cases.
 5. Mining the potential for gun traces to "network" across criminal cases, through the use of the enhanced data capabilities now coming on line at the St. Louis Metropolitan Police department.
 6. BATF and the St. Louis Metropolitan Police department working collaboratively and jointly to problem solve issues of youth crime, gun violence and retaliatory violence.
 7. Provide BATF resources in the targeted neighborhoods selected by the Ceasefire Working Group.

¹⁹ Vince, Joseph J. (May, 1996). *Disarming the Criminal: ATF's Strategic and Scientific Approach to Focused and Targeted Enforcement*. BATF: Washington, D.C.

²⁰ BATF (March, 1992). *Protecting America: The Effectiveness of the Armed Career Criminal Statute*. Washington, D.C.

Appendix 14

DEA ATF Cooperation with the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department

METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT – CITY OF ST. LOUIS

Intra-Department Report and Correspondence Sheet

Date: November 20, 2001

To: Colonel JJMM, Chief of Police

From: Captain HHHH, Commander, Crimes Against Persons Division

Subject: Federal Agency Cooperation in Homicide Investigations

Copies Sent To:

Chief:

Earlier this month I met with JJRR, Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the St. Louis Division of the Drug Enforcement Administration and Special Agent MMVV, a Supervisor for the St. Louis Field Office of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms. As you know, their agencies offered to work in cooperation with our Homicide Section in sharing information and any other assistance they could provide to aid our investigators in criminal investigations. The primary focus would be homicide investigations. However, information regarding other crimes will be passed onto the responsible bureau/division.

On November 6, a meeting was held in the Homicide Office for purposes of introduction and discussions with ASAC RR and SSA VV, the three special agents (2-DEA, 1-ATF) assigned to this program, and the supervisors/detectives of the Homicide Section. We discussed a number of ways DEA and ATF could provide assistance – pen registers, pole cameras, Title III intercept, informant debriefings, etc. In addition, for the weaker homicide cases, (lack of witness cooperation, weak physical evidence, etc.), we intend to draw upon the resources of these federal agencies to develop weapons and/or drug cases to successfully prosecute these violent offenders in U.S. District Court and remove them from the streets.

Though we're only just into this inter-agency relationship, this cooperative program appears to be working well. Currently, several Homicide Detectives are reviewing tapes of a narcotics investigation conducted earlier this year by our Narcotics Division and the

DEA. These were intercepted Title III conversations related to several homicides in the St. Louis area and on the West Coast.

As this program develops I will advise on its progress.

Respectfully,

Captain HHHH
Commander
Seventh District

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Maps, Charts Tables.

Table 1

District	Population		%Black		Rate ¹		Risk ²	
	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000
1	64,323	62,790	2	19	10.4	13.3	1/96	1/75
2	64,152	61,307	2	5	5.1	4.4	1/196	1/229
3	81,733	73,545	28	52	28.6	25.9	1/35	1/29
4	12,044	9,373	73	76	81.4	64.5	1/12	1/16
5	26,658	17,503	84	89	62.7	48.6	1/16	1/21
6	49,130	42,630	87	94	39.8	26.7	1/25	1/38
7	48,639	36,730	87	82	50.9	26.5	1/20	1/38
8	30,202	21,223	99	98	59.6	35.0	1/17	1/29
9	28,308	23,088	58	49	51.4	27.2	1/20	1/37
TOTAL	405,189	348,189	46	51	33.8	22.8	1/30	1/44
MO	5,117,073	5,595,211	10.7	11.2	2.7	1.5	1/365	
	1/666							
U.S.	248,709,873	281,421,906	12.1	12.3	39.7	42.9 ³	1/25	1/23

¹Murders, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults per 1,000 residents

²1000/violent crime rate

³1999 rates are the most recent available data

Sources:

Flanagan, Timothy and Kathleen Maguire, eds., Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1991. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1992.

U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File. Online. <http://www.census.gov>.

U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Criminal Victimization in the United States 1999. Statistical Tables, NCJ 184938. Table 5. Online. <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cvosst.htm> (March 15, 2001)

Figures 1 and 2. Comparison of St. Louis and US Homicide and Aggravated Assault Rates: Standard Scores.





Figure 2



Tables 3-10.

Table 3. Ranks of Neighborhoods by Violent Crime.

2	Wells Goodfellow	6
3	West End	5
4	Kings Way East	5
5	Fairground	5
6	O'Fallon	5
7	Mark Twain	5
8	North Point	5
9	Gravois Park	4
10	Tower Grove East	4
10	Hyde Park	4
10	College Hill	4
Table 4.	Ranks of Neighborhoods by Murders	
Rank	Neighborhood	Murder Rate
1	Near North Riverfront	21.5
2	Fairground	16.5
3	Lafayette Square	15.3
4	North Riverfront	12.3
5	Kings Way East	9.9
6	Lasalle Park	9.9
7	Columbus Square	9.8
8	North Point	8.8
9	Hyde Park	8.1
10	The Great Ville	8.0

Table 5. Ranks of Neighborhoods by Armed Robberies

Rank	Neighborhood	Armed Robberies
1	Dutchtown	100
2	Tower Grove South	79
3	Jeff Vander Lou	75
4	Gravois Park	72
5	Central West End	68
6	Tower Grove East	67
7	Covenant/Blu/Grand Center	61
8	O'Fallon	57
9	Wells Goodfellow	56
10	Downtown	56

Table 6. Ranks of Neighborhoods by Armed Robbery Rate.

Rank	Neighborhood	Armed Robbery Rate/10,000
1	Downtown	486.11
2	Downtown East	185.40
3	Covenant/Blu/Grand Center	146.11
4	Gravois Park	138.92
5	Tiffany	132.84
6	Fairground	105.75
7	Academy	98.67
8	Columbus Square	92.82
9	Jeff Vander Lou	91.72
10	Tower Grove East	88.16

Table 7. Ranks of Neighborhoods by Armed Aggravated Assaults

Rank	Neighborhood	Armed Agg Assaults
1	Wells Goodfellow	78
2	The Great Ville	73
3	West End	63
4	Baden	63
5	Fairground	61
6	Academy	57
7	Walnut Park East	54
8	Penrose	53
9	Jeff Vander Lou	52
10	Dutchtown	51
10	Gravois Park	51

Table 8. Ranks of Neighborhoods by Armed Aggravated Assault Rate

Rank	Neighborhood	Armed Aggravated Assault Rate
1	Fairground	201.6
2	Mark Twain I-70 IND	151.8
3	Near North Riverfront	128.8
4	Fountain Park	124.3
5	Academy	110.3
6	Downtown	104.2
7	Tiffany	103.3
8	Hyde Park	99.7
9	Gravois Park	98.4
10	Benton Park West	96.1

Table 9. Ranks of Neighborhoods by Armed Aggravated Assault Rate

Rank	Neighborhood	% Robberies Armed
1	Tower Grove Park	100.0%
2	DeBaliviere Place	81.8%
3	College Hill	81.5%
4	Walnut Park West	80.0%
5	Ellendale	77.8%
6	Soulard	76.7%
7	O'Fallon	75.0%
8	Kings Way West	75.0%
9	South Hampton	75.0%
10	Wells Goodfellow	74.7%

Table 10. Ranks of Neighborhoods by Percent of Aggravated Assaults Committed with a Gun.

Rank	Neighborhood	% Agg Assaults w/Gun
1	Penrose Park	100.0%
2	Mark Twain I-70 IND	70.6%
3	Tiffany	66.7%
4	Cal-Bell Cemetery (4/6)	66.7%
5	Skinker-DeBaliviere	63.2%
6	Walnut Park West	54.5%
7	Clayton-Tamm	54.5%
8	Gate District	53.8%
9	Near North Riverfront	52.9%
10	West End	52.9%

Table 11.

Awareness of Ceasefire, Booking Interviews.

Overview of responses from Ceasefire Booking Questionnaire

Date of Report: 12/17/2002

A total of 93 questionnaires were analyzed. The dates ranged from 7/24/2002 to 10/21/2002. This allowed us to divide the sample into three groups for some of the following analysis. The three time periods are from: 7/24 – 8/23, 8/24 – 9/23, and 9/24 – 10/21. More questionnaires were collected in the second time period.

Month of booking

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	7/24 - 8/23	29	31.2	31.2	31.2
	8/24 - 9/23	41	44.1	44.1	75.3
	9/24 - 10/21	23	24.7	24.7	100.0
	Total	93	100.0	100.0	

The data was collected from three different sources: Housing Authority, Central Patrol, and Mobile Reserve. Housing Authority and Mobile Reserve each collected 31.2 percent and Central Patrol collected 37.6 percent.

Source of booking questionnaire

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Housing Authority	29	31.2	31.2	31.2
	Central Patrol	35	37.6	37.6	68.8
	Mobile Reserve	29	31.2	31.2	100.0
	Total	93	100.0	100.0	

Regarding demographics, 97.8 percent of the interviewees were black. Eighty-nine percent were male. Of the 92 respondents that had race and sex data, 87 percent were black males, 10.9 percent were black females, 2.2 percent were white males, and there were no white females. The ages ranged from 16.18 to 60.04 years old. The mean

and median was 28.4 and 26.24 years respectively with a standard deviation of 9.16. The most common offense was drug-related (22%), followed by warrant (18.7%), other (16.5%), trespassing (16.5%), weapons violation (9.9%), assault (9.9%), and tampering (6.6%).

Most respondents had never heard of Ceasefire. Almost twenty percent, however, did state that they had heard of ceasefire. *Interestingly enough, when only examining people who had been arrested for a weapons violation, one finds that none of them had heard about Ceasefire.* Most of the respondents who had heard of Ceasefire knew that it had to do something with guns. More specifically, some of them stated that it had to do with feds taking over gun cases and getting more time for weapon violations. People who stated they knew of Ceasefire heard about it through several different ways. Of the 18 people, five people read about it on a city bus or billboard; another five just heard about it on the street; and three people heard about it on the television. Other people said they heard about it at their probation office.

Have you heard of Ceasefire?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	yes	18	19.4	19.6	19.6
	no	74	79.6	80.4	100.0
	Total	92	98.9	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.1		
Total		93	100.0		

It is also important to examine whether arrestees' knowledge of Ceasefire is affected by which division gave the questionnaire and when it was taken. During time period 1, only 14.3 percent had heard of Ceasefire. This increased to 24.4 percent during time period 2, but decreased to 17.4 percent during time period 3. Using ANOVA and

eta, it was found that there is no significant variation among the time periods. Arrestees' knowledge of Ceasefire did not improve over the three time periods. However, significant variation was found among the different divisions who gave out the questionnaires. 14.3 percent of the Housing Authority's arrestees had heard of Ceasefire. And although 34.3 percent of Central Patrol's arrestees had heard of Ceasefire, only 6.9 percent of the Mobile Reserve's arrestees had heard of Ceasefire. ANOVA and eta show that these differences are significant. The significant findings for the divisions must be taken into consideration with time periods also. This is because Housing Authority only collected questionnaires in time period 1, while central patrol and the mobile reserve collected data during both time periods.

Because Mobile Reserve only collected 5 questionnaires during time period 3, let's examine central patrol who collected 17 in time period 2 and 18 in time period 3. During time period 2, 47.1 percent of the Central Patrol's arrestees had heard of Ceasefire. This decreased to 22.2 percent in time period 3. Because of the small number of cases, this finding is not significant using several different statistical measures.

When asked whether there were federal penalties for carrying an illegal gun, most of the respondents (78.9 percent) believed that there were. Sixty-nine of the seventy-one people who thought there was a federal penalty for carrying guns provided some sort of answer about what those were. Thirty of the sixty-nine provided an answer that included number of years in prison. Ten said they did not know, while the rest gave some generic answer about having to go to jail, state prison, or federal prison. The majority of the people who provided an answer that included the number of years in prison thought that the number of years would be five.