The Strategic Approach to Community Safety Initiative
Abstract
October 2005

In the early 1990s, the Boston police department partnered with Harvard University researchers to exhaustively analyze the soaring problem of youth homicide and firearms violence and work together with other stakeholders to implement appropriate intervention strategies. Their collaborative, data-driven, problem-solving "Operation Ceasefire" was considered highly successful – the youth homicide rate dropped from an average of around 40 annually between 1990 and 1995 to the low-teens in 1996, post-Ceasefire.

The Department of Justice launched SACSI, the Strategic Approach to Community Safety Initiative, in 1998, to see if Boston's collaborative, data-driven problem-solving *process* could be replicated by ten other cities also fighting high rates of violent crime. The final report of the national evaluation of SACSI is a cross-site comparison of the ten sites, concentrated on documenting and assessing partnership formation and dynamics, strategic planning, problem-solving activities, the integration of research, program longevity, and program impact based on local reports and UCR data.

The SACSI strategies in each city were developed and guided by multi-agency, multi-disciplinary core groups, with strong and effective leadership provided by U.S. Attorney's Offices. Each core group included research partners, and research was well integrated into strategic planning and problem-solving. The intervention strategies spanned the continuum of enforcement to prevention, and were implemented by working groups responsible for day-to-day activities.

Nine of the 10 SACSI sites targeted homicide and other serious violent crimes, with a pronounced emphasis on those involving firearms. Memphis was the exception, where the SACSI partnership focused on reducing rape and other sexual assaults. The study found that the SACSI approach, when implemented strongly, is associated with reductions in targeted violent crime in a community, sometimes as much as 50%.

Successful elements of the SACSI approach include the leadership provided by U.S. Attorney's Offices, the integration of research, collaborative strategic planning by broad-based core groups, and a range of intervention strategies implemented by working groups. Evidence of the success of "lever-pulling meetings" was mixed, but the deterrent effect of focused suppression efforts was noted. All ten SACSI programs have continued under the umbrella of Project Safe Neighborhoods, resulting in the institutionalization of USA leadership, multi-agency partnerships, and data-driven strategies.

The Strategic Approach to Community Safety Initiative
Executive Summary

ABOUT THIS REPORT

In the early 1990s, the city of Boston experienced an out-of-control level of juvenile homicide and gun-related crime. The police department partnered with Harvard University researchers to analyze the problem in-depth and work together with other stakeholders to implement appropriate intervention strategies. Their collaborative, data-driven, problem-solving "Operation Ceasefire" was considered wildly successful – the youth homicide rate dropped from an average of around 40 annually between 1990 and 1995 to the low-teens in 1996, post-Ceasefire.

The Department of Justice launched SACSI, the Strategic Approach to Community Safety Initiative, in 1998, to see if Boston's approach could be replicated by ten other cities also fighting high rates of violent crime. This report presents the main findings of a national assessment of the SACSI cities' strategies and effectiveness.

What did the researchers find?

The SACSI strategies in each city were developed and guided by multi-agency, multi-disciplinary core groups, with strong and effective leadership provided by U.S. Attorney's Offices. Each core group included research partners, and research was well integrated into strategic planning and problem-solving. The intervention strategies spanned the continuum of enforcement to prevention, and were implemented by working groups responsible for day-to-day activities.

Nine of the 10 SACSI sites targeted homicide and other serious violent crimes, with a pronounced emphasis on those involving firearms. Memphis was the exception, where the

SACSI partnership focused on reducing rape and other sexual assaults. The study found that the SACSI approach, when implemented strongly, is associated with reductions in targeted violent crime in a community, sometimes as much as 50%. Successful elements of the SACSI approach include the leadership provided by U.S. Attorney's Offices, the integration of research, collaborative strategic planning, and the range of intervention strategies.

The study's limitations

No control areas were used by the local or national researchers, and the comparison areas used are imperfect matches (as always), so it is not possible to say definitely that SACSI alone was responsible for the reductions in crime, or whether it was SACSI in combination with other anti-crime efforts, or other factors altogether. Yet while cities of similar size across the U.S. experienced decreases in violent crime in the late 1990s, the decreases were significantly greater in the SACSI cities.

Determining which factors are most closely linked to successful outcomes is also difficult. The SACSI programs faced varying local conditions, were multi-faceted, and were led by multi-disciplinary core groups. Cities with different forms of partnerships and different intervention philosophies had similar rates of success. The national process evaluation sheds light on the challenges encountered by the SACSI sites and the program elements which appeared to be keys to success.

[Sidenotes:]

This report is based on a longer research report, *Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI) in 10 U.S. Cities: The building blocks for Project Safe Neighborhoods* by Jan Roehl, Dennis P. Rosenbaum, Sandra K. Costello, James R. Coldren, Amie M. Schuck, Laura Kunard, and David R. Forde (June 2005), available from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, NCJ xxxxxx.

About the Authors

Jan Roehl is President of the Justice Research Center; Dennis Rosenbaum and Amie Schuck are Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago.

HOW THE RESEARCH WAS CONDUCTED

The National Evaluation of SACSI was a cross-site comparison of the ten sites, concentrated on documenting and assessing partnership formation and dynamics, strategic planning, problem-solving activities, the integration of research, program longevity, and program impact based on local reports and UCR data. The central methods were:

1. Multiple (2-5) visits to each site; 367 SACSI partners were interviewed regarding processes and activities.
2. Two surveys of partnership members regarding interactions, progress, satisfaction, key activities, and effectiveness.
3. Local research assistants observing and recording meetings and activities on site.
4. Attendance at cluster meetings.
5. Review of project materials, reports, etc.
6. Analysis of UCR data from SACSI and comparison cities.

The Strategic Approach to Community Safety Initiative

SACSI was a multi-pronged effort in 10 cities that aimed to bring together some of the best practices known to date for reducing and preventing violent crime, including the collaborative, data-driven problem-solving process used in Boston's Operation Ceasefire project, community policing and problem-oriented policing, practitioner-researcher partnerships, and the U.S. Attorney's Offices' leadership in strategic planning.[1] In Boston, a multi-agency planning group developed coordinated problem-solving strategies using detailed information about severe juvenile homicide and gun-related crime problems supplied by a research partner and law enforcement officers. Boston's signature strategy – the convening of "lever-pulling" meetings with high risk offenders designed to deter juvenile crime through a combination of warnings of swift and sure enforcement and prosecution for any violence and the provision of social and vocational services – was a solid success. But it was Boston's collaborative, data-driven problem-solving *process* that SACSI sought to emulate, not its central intervention strategy. While the SACSI approach has much in common with prior collaborative problem-solving efforts, the integration of a local research partner into the core planning group sets it apart from its predecessors.

The SACSI Sites

Ten cities were selected as SACSI sites. The five "Phase I sites" – Indianapolis, Memphis, New Haven, Portland, and Winston-Salem – were funded in 1998. The five "Phase II sites" – Albuquerque, Atlanta, Detroit, Rochester, and St. Louis – were funded in 2000. The 10 SACSI cities are diverse in size, region of the country,

Defining Characteristics of the SACSI problem-solving model

- U.S. Attorneys lead each local project.
- Full-time Project Coordinators coordinate day-to-day activities.
- Multi-agency, multi-disciplinary core groups plan and oversee problem-solving strategies.
- Local researchers are included in core groups and are integrally involved in problem identification and analysis, strategic planning, and assessment.
- "Street knowledge" helps analyze chronic crime problems, offender groups, and hot spots.
- A strategic plan guides enforcement, suppression, intervention, and prevention strategies.
- Working groups implement strategies.
- Evaluation data and assessment activities provide ongoing feedback to the core group for program improvement as needed.

and severity of crime. As a group, however, they represent America's mid-sized cities where, by-and-large, the twin scourges of drug trafficking and violent crime came later than they did in the larger, coastal cities such as New York and Los Angeles.

SACSI Cities: Population, Crime Rate[1], Partnership Composition and Size, Target Crimes						
SACSI Sites	2000 Census data		Violent crime/1000 in the year SACSI started	Composition of core group	Size of core group	Target crime(s)
	Population	Rank				
Albuquerque	448,607	35	11.45	LE/CJ	15	Homicide, firearms violence
Atlanta	416,474	39	27.81	LE/CJ + ER	15	Homicide, firearms violence
Detroit	951,270	10	23.24	LE/CJ	10	Firearms violence and violations
Indianapolis	781,870	12	11.35	LE/CJ	28	Homicide, firearms violence
Memphis	650,100	18	14.99	Broad-based	27	Rape, sexual assault
New Haven	123,626	175	16.84	LE/CJ[2]	27[3]	Firearms violence
Portland	529,121	28	13.72	Broad-based	25	Violent crime among 15 to 24 year olds
Rochester	219,773	79	7.43	Broad-based	8	Youth and firearms violence
St. Louis	348,189	49	22.79	Broad-based	27	Homicide, firearms violence
Winston-Salem	185,776	107	12.52	Broad-based	21	Violent crime among youth under 18
Average, cities over 100,000:		1998: 2000:	6.91 6.20		Avg: 20	

[1] Data sources: Population: U.S. Census Bureau, Summary File 1 (SF 1) and Summary File 3 (SF 3). U.S. rank: *County and City Data Book*, 2000 Ed., Revised March 16, 2004. Violent crime rates: FBI, Uniform Crime Reports..

[2] Became more broad-based over time, with addition of...

[3] As it became broad-based, it also became smaller, with 10 members in by Wave 2. [///]

Evidence of SACSI's Effectiveness

Impact findings from Phase I local researchers. Using crime data reported to local police before and after the SACSI periods and citywide figures for comparison, Phase I researchers in each site reported dramatic decreases in their target crimes, highlighted below[2]:

- *Indianapolis:* 53 percent decrease in gun assaults in target neighborhood vs. 19 percent decrease citywide, 32 percent reduction in homicide citywide during the year after interventions in the target neighborhood.
- *Memphis:* 49 percent decrease in forcible rape citywide after the introduction of SACSI.
- *New Haven:* 32 percent decrease in violent gun crimes and 45 percent decrease in calls-for-service for "shots fired" citywide after the introduction of SACSI.
- *Portland:* 42 percent decrease in homicide and 25 percent decrease in other violent crimes citywide after the introduction of SACSI.
- *Winston-Salem:* 58 percent decrease in juvenile robberies and 19 percent decrease in juvenile incidents in target neighborhoods after the introduction of SACSI.

The impact of the lever-pulling approaches was mixed. Three of four sites found that offenders had indeed "heard the message" about new violence bringing swift and certain law enforcement action. Yet there was no difference in the recidivism rates of lever-pulling attendees and those of two comparison groups of offenders. Indianapolis' researchers found a general deterrent effect due to offenders' awareness of increased police stops, probation sweeps, and the like, rather than their awareness of SACSI meetings and messages. In pre/post community surveys, New Haven researchers found residents had a decreased fear of crime, an increase in satisfaction with the quality of life, and a heightened awareness that gun-carriers will be targeted.

Impact of all 10 SACSI sites based on UCR data. The national assessment team used UCR data to address the question of whether SACSI contributed to these downward trends in violent crime found in Phase I sites, or whether these crime patterns were occurring regionally or nationally in non-SACSI cities as well. Homicide rates began to fall several years prior to SACSI in the nine cities targeting homicide and violent crime, and in six of them, continued to go down or remained steady post-SACSI. In two of the nine cities, homicides rates remained

fairly level through the 1990s and after SACSI was implemented, and in one city the homicide rate rose post-SACSI but never to the pre-SACSI level. In comparison to other cities with populations of 100,000 or more, Phase I, and particularly Phase II sites, had much higher homicide rates in the pre-SACSI years. While homicide rates continued to decrease or remain steady in the SACSI sites, homicide rates began to rise again after 2000 in cities of similar size.



Similar patterns were seen in violent crime rates (combining homicide, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault). In the majority of the nine sites targeting violent crime, violent crime began to decrease immediately prior to SACSI and continued to go down after SACSI was implemented. In one site, the violent crime rate rose to pre-SACSI levels after the start of the program. In non-SACSI cities, violent crime began increasing after 1999.



Memphis serves as a natural comparison group for the other nine SACSI sites. Memphis did *not* target homicide and other violent crime in their SACSI project. Homicide and violent crime rates in Memphis declined from the mid-1990s to 1999, then began to rise again after the implementation of SACSI. The rate of Memphis' target crime, sexual assault, as measured by UCR rape rates, peaked in 1998 and declined rapidly after the start of SACSI.

The national assessment team also compared the crime rates of each SACSI site to matched comparison cities chosen geographically and by size (Memphis, for example, was paired with southern cities with a population of 500,000-999,999). Of the nine cities targeting violent crime, six had substantially larger decreases in homicide than their comparison cities, with the Phase I sites exhibiting the largest relative declines. In two cities, comparison cities showed the larger decrease in homicides and in one SACSI site, homicides increased while remaining steady in the comparison cities.

Violent crimes rate changes were less dramatic but showed similar patterns. Of the nine SACSI sites targeting violent crime, five had substantially larger decreases than their comparison cities, two were roughly the same as their comparisons, and the violent crime rate in two SACSI

sites decreased less than it did in comparison cities. Memphis had a pre-SACSI rape rate that was twice that of its comparison cities. In the three years post-SACSI, Memphis rate went down 22 percent compared to a 21 percent decrease in comparison cities.

Institutionalization. All 10 SACSI projects have successfully morphed into Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN) sites, with firearms crimes the main target and rigorous gun prosecution the signature activity among many other enforcement, supervision, and prevention strategies. Some prevention activities have been lost, but others have been added. Core groups continue to head PSN efforts, and local researchers remain integral pieces of the program. The central SACSI concepts of USA leadership, multi-agency partnerships, data-driven strategies, and local research partners have been institutionalized in the 10 sites under PSN's umbrella.

Challenges to Success

The impact findings support the hypothesis that comprehensive partnership approaches to public safety can be effective. Process data shed light on what worked well and where difficulties were encountered.

The majority of respondents reported their partnerships did not encounter major problems. When problems were reported, they were most apt to be insufficient funding and/or staffing. Group cooperation and agreement over goals was high, although tensions between subgroups with different philosophies such as police and probation officers, law enforcement and community representatives, probation officers and social workers), and researchers and criminal justice representatives were apparent at times.

Different organizational cultures and methods among researchers and practitioners led to friction at times. Practitioners generally want actionable information immediately, while researchers need time to collect, clean, analyze and interpret data. Issues of subject protections and confidentiality had to be resolved, as did the fine line between research and investigation.

In general, the Phase II sites enjoyed smaller successes than the Phase I sites. The Phase II sites included three of the highest crime cities in the U.S., Atlanta, Detroit, and St. Louis, and several of these sites targeted areas with high levels of concentrated poverty offer more obstacles than others. While these conditions typically hinder the effectiveness of most interventions, St. Louis experienced sizable reductions in target crimes. Phase II sites also differed from Phase I sites in a significant way, in that they did not have the benefit of full-time project coordinators on board. Phase I partnership members felt full-time project coordination was a critical factor in successful implementation.

No federal funds were provided for interventions, and the in-kind contributions of the sites were enormous. Most sites, particularly those with heavy law enforcement representation on their core groups, began with and emphasized enforcement and suppression strategies. Prevention activities in most sites, were meager and implemented late in the SACSI programs. Non-law enforcement teams had more difficulties carrying out their responsibilities, and lack of resources was a central contributing factor.

Keys to Success

The SACSI program featured several central, defining structural components which appeared to be linked to success. Chief among them are the leadership provided by the U.S. Attorneys' Office; the formation of a core group of decision-makers as well as working groups to carry out program strategies; the integration of research for problem selection, analysis, strategic planning, and assessment; and the implementation of complementary strategies directed at both suppressing and preventing violent crime. These key components varied in form and structure from site to site, responding to local conditions and forces.

Leadership of the U.S. Attorney's Offices. The leadership of the U.S. Attorneys' Office was a key factor in implementation success. The U.S. Attorneys' Office, whether through the U.S. Attorney him or herself or their first assistants, was able to bring key decision-makers to the table and induce them to commit significant resources to SACSI. U.S. Attorneys were generally

quite active in partnership building and development, and their involvement was key to sustaining good working relationships among local, state, and federal law enforcement officials and prosecutors.

In the partnership survey, respondents gave high marks to the involvement of their U.S. Attorneys, second only to the full-time project coordinators. The project coordinators (usually Assistant U.S. Attorneys) were often cited as leaders of the Phase I core groups, credited with seeing that strategies were carried out and that all partnership members followed through. They were especially helpful in working with non-law enforcement members on prevention and intervention activities.

Core and working groups. Each of the SACSI sites successfully formed and maintained a core group responsible for strategic planning, reviewing research results, and coordinating intervention strategies. Half of the SACSI core groups consisted entirely of law enforcement and criminal justice representatives, while the other half were more broad-based, encompassing social service agencies, other city agencies, non-profits, schools, the faith community, and others. The majority of the sites also had non-law enforcement partners who worked extensively on SACSI activities (developing a public education campaign or conducting street outreach, for example) but were not included in the core group.

The sites with the largest decreases in target crimes, however, were more apt to have board-based core groups – these sites include Portland, Memphis, Winston-Salem, and St. Louis. In Indianapolis, where target crimes were dramatically reduced, the core group comprised solely law enforcement and criminal justice representatives, yet the SACSI program also had strong support from faith-based and social service partners in working groups.

Both types of core groups appeared to function without substantial difficulty, suggesting that "one size fits all" is not the best policy recommendation. Throughout SACSI, the satisfaction, interest, and motivation of members remained high for all groups.

All of the sites also formed working groups tasked with carrying out the daily work needed to implement the intervention strategies. With the exception of Memphis, all the sites had a working group composed of law enforcement and criminal justice representatives who concentrated on enforcement, and half of them had a second (or third) working group focused on outreach and prevention.

The combination of core and working groups appeared to be effective for planning and implementation. Working groups shouldered the lion's share of day-to-day responsibility. Law enforcement working groups were particularly active and effective. Adult probation agencies, historically marginalized in law enforcement strategies, played central roles in both enforcement and prevention activities.

The importance of prior partnerships. The SACSI projects were built on the foundations of prior collaborative efforts in each city. Prior relationships among partnership members, in both core and working groups, helped SACSI get going quickly. Most of the sites had a lengthy history of key law enforcement and criminal justice agencies working together on crime, drug, and gang problems. Some of these prior efforts simply segued into SACSI when that funding became available. Prior working relationships with and among non-law enforcement agencies were less common, but helpful as well. Cities that had developed a culture of conducting business via interagency partnerships found the SACSI approach easy to adopt.

Use and value of research. Unique to the SACSI projects were the *type of researcher-practitioner relationship* formed and the *nature of the activities* undertaken. The local researchers were primarily professors from local universities with long-established ties with the criminal justice representatives in the core groups; Detroit's research partner, for example, has worked with the Detroit Police Department for over a decade. The researchers became full partners, participating in strategic planning, development, and assessment (i.e., action research). They collected and analyzed traditional and atypical data in contextual ways to aid in designing and implementing intervention strategies. The local researchers also served as in-house evaluators, providing feedback on strategy implementation and conducting impact analyses to assess

effectiveness. Partnership members felt the integration of research was successful and useful.

The SACSI model envisioned that the selection of the target crime(s) would be part of the research-driven process, but this only occurred in Memphis and to a lesser extent, New Haven and Rochester. The other cities' targets were selected prior to the SACSI funding, due to unprecedented local homicide rates combined with public outcry and, for Phase II sites, the federal emphasis on gun violence.

Local researchers analyzed the target problems through numerous traditional methods, including examining incident, arrest, and probation records; crime mapping; analyses of victim and suspect characteristics and their relationships; and multi-year trend studies. One of the most successful problem analysis tools in SACSI was the use of homicide and incident reviews, a joint product of both researchers and practitioners in half of the SACSI sites. Street-level information from diverse sources (e.g., gang outreach workers and probation officers) and across agencies was vital to strategic planning.

Several sites developed lists of chronic and high-risk offenders based on arrest and/or probation records, and targeted these offenders with heightened enforcement, supervision, and intervention. Local researchers also interviewed target offenders and added specific questions to ADAM interviews, to gather information on firearms use and attitudes, and assess intervention messages and strategies. While such interviews are time consuming and difficult to conduct, they generated some of the most useful research findings for fine-tuning interventions.

Intervention strategies. The SACSI partnerships developed and implemented an impressive number of intervention strategies. They range from prevention to arrest and prosecution, from the traditional to the innovative. Partnership members reported their perceived effectiveness in solving the target problems as moderate, averaging 1.3 on a scale of 0 to 2.

Enforcement strategies. Each of the SACSI sites implemented both enforcement and prevention strategies, yet the emphasis in all sites, particularly at the start, was on enforcement

and prosecution. Many of the initial strategies were enforcement – targeting hotspots and repeat offenders, crackdowns, sweeps, saturation patrols, serving warrants and making unannounced visits to probationers. The SACSI sites were most skilled at implementing enforcement and suppression strategies, and law enforcement, prosecution, and probation agencies committed a high level of resources to these strategies.

Innovative arrest, enforcement, and suppression strategies

Ceasefire strategies – named after Boston's Operation Ceasefire. Generic form is based on deterrence theory, operationalized as holding "lever-pulling" meetings with high risk individuals, informing them that any violent activity judged to be within their control will be swiftly and surely sanctioned by law enforcement and prosecution. At the same time, assistance in obtaining jobs, education, etc. is offered.

Homicide and incident reviews – key agency representatives and street workers meet to review and share information on recent homicides or other incidents of violence. Grand Homicide reviews typically kick off the process, with representatives reviewing cases from recent years.

"Worst of the worst" offender lists – compiled from arrest and/or probation records, or by "nominations" from probation/parole officers, these are lists of known chronic offenders, used to focus enforcement, prosecution, and supervision efforts.

All of the sites adopted some version of Boston's Ceasefire approach based on deterrence theory. Local evaluations, however, indicated this approach did not yield very positive results, perhaps because, unlike Boston, SACSI sites were less likely to have and to focus on organized gangs. There were variations across sites in the number and emphasis placed on lever-pulling meetings. Indianapolis, for example, held dozens of meetings, ultimately meeting with several hundred chronic offenders, while Portland only held a couple of meetings and worked extensively with just over 40 individuals. There were also variations across and within sites in the extent to which "swift and certain" action was taken following violent incidents (i.e., the extent to which levers actually got pulled). Geographic enforcement – where a violent crime would be followed by sweeps and warrant serving in the area where the crime took place – were more common than a targeted crackdown on the associates of the suspects.

Several sites implemented general deterrence strategies, using media campaigns and public awareness materials to get messages of "zero tolerance plus assistance" out. In most cases**,** these citywide strategies and high-visibility enforcement were well implemented. St. Louis' core group partnered with a communications agency to develop a public awareness campaign focused on the five years of federal prison time possible if a felon carries a gun. Using segmented marketing

Innovative prosecution/court and probation/parole strategies

Project Exile – named after Richmond, Virginia's, anti-gun project, where a criminal with a gun was said to forfeit his right to remain in the community. While Project Exile was multi-faceted, its cornerstone was immediate federal prosecution, stiff mandatory federal prison sentences, and "exile" to federal prison.

Nightlight – named after Boston's Nightlight project. Generic form entails probation and police officers teaming together to conduct home visits to juveniles on probation and street patrols to see if these youth are in compliance with curfew and other probation conditions.

Project Re-Entry – a growing national program to assist new parolees in re-entering their communities and adhering to parole conditions. Probation officers (and others) begin working with prisoners in the months prior to their release to prepare for return to the community. Again warnings about swift and sure response to criminal behavior are given hand-in-hand with social and employment services.

strategies, over 10,000 posters were distributed in the target area and radio spots were aired on stations popular with the target group.

*Prosecution and probation strategies***.** Prosecution strategies focused on firearms crimes were central in the SACSI project. The major gun prosecution model was Project Exile, in Richmond, Virginia, viewed by practitioners as an "unqualified success" in removing violent criminals from the streets and changing attitudes about illegal gun possession among criminals and criminal justice system representatives alike.[3]

A key component of prosecution efforts under SACSI was the unprecedented cooperation between federal and state/local prosecutors. They reviewed cases together to determine in which system the case would be tried and shared information and resources. New Haven's TimeZup project was typical. Every gun-related crime was reviewed by the U.S. Attorneys' Office, local prosecutors, and law enforcement agencies with aims to achieve longer incarcerations, persuade defendants in state courts to plead guilty and to plead guilty earlier in the process, and get the word out about the longer sentences, thus serving a deterrent effect on gun crimes.

Probation officers were recognized as critical central partners in the SACSI approach, working the continuum from enforcement to prevention. Often paired with police officers, they were key players in lever-pulling, Nightlight, and Project Re-Entry strategies; participated in the development of worst-of-the-worst type lists; and were primary resources for referrals to jobs, job training, and other assistance.

Portland was one of the earliest cities to launch a Project Re-Entry program, in 1999. Visits were scheduled with soon-to-be-released gang members while still in prison to establish a release plan and a visit was made to the prisoner's family. A home visit was made immediately after release, by a team of probation officers, police officers, and outreach workers, each emphasizing different aspects of the release plan, expectations, and requirements. Over time, most of the work fell to the probation officers. A limited outcome evaluation conducted by the local SACSI research team suggested this re-entry program had good success in reducing the occurrence of serious offenses in the paroled group.

Prevention strategies. Community- and service-oriented prevention strategies were more prevalent and robust in sites with broad-based representation in the core group and one or more strong non-law enforcement partners. Prevention strategies were provided by probation officers, social service agencies, coalitions of churches, other faith-based organizations, and community organizations. The list of prevention/intervention services provided through SACSI is long, and includes job training, job placement (40 good-paying highway construction jobs were filled in Indianapolis), substance abuse treatment, tutoring, GED assistance, mentoring, family-based services, after-school activities, tattoo removal, driver's license replacement, and a school-based rape prevention program in Memphis.

Innovative Prevention Strategies

ER Trauma Intervention – St. Louis and Atlanta developed emergency room-based programs to gather information (for research and prosecution) and to provide police and social service interventions at a critical moment when the victim, family, and friends are available and attentive.

Faith-based coalitions – Several sites developed coalitions of churches patterned after Boston's 10 Point Coalition. Church leaders and organizations provided prevention and intervention services, especially mentoring, street outreach, and job assistance.

Winston-Salem's SACSI project was the most heavily involved in prevention and intervention, with several new initiatives launched in addition to more typical prevention activities (e.g., mentoring for youth, family-based services, job skills training and placement, and after-school activities). Teams comprising a police officer, court counselor or probation officer, minister, community representative, and street workers provided coordinated services to high-risk

individuals after lever-pulling meetings, in a new program dubbed Operation Reach. Atlanta and St. Louis created promising innovative emergency room-based projects designed to both gather useful information on gunshot victims and victims of other violent crime, and to reach out to victims and families at a time when they are most vulnerable.

Conclusion

The Strategic Approach to Community Safety Initiative has demonstrated the value of USA leadership, multi-agency partnerships, data-driven strategies, and the general deterrent effects of intense suppression activities. Other successful program elements include the use of homicide and incident reviews for problem analysis, the key involvement of probation officers, and successful firearms prosecutions. Time will tell if SACSI's principles and success can be institutionalized without federal dollars and whether violent crime will remain lower without constant suppression efforts.

1. See Kennedy, David, "Pulling levers: Chronic offenders, high-crime settings, and a theory of prevention," *Valparaiso University Law Review* 31(2)(1997): 449-484; Rosenbaum, Dennis (ed.), *The challenge of community policing: Testing the promises*, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, CA, 1994; Goldstein, Herman, *Problem-oriented Policing*, McGraw-Hill, New York (1990); Travis, Jeremy, *Keynote Address at the National Conference on Community Policing – What works: Research and practice*, Washington, D.C. (1998); and Roehl, Jan, Robert Huitt, MaryAnn Wycoff, Anthony Pate, Don Rebovich, and Ken *Coyle, National Process Evaluation of the Weed and Seed Initiative: Research in Brief*, NIJ, Washington, D.C. (1996).

2. The Phase I reports are available through the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, and citations are provided below. Phase II reports will be available in the near future.

Indianapolis: McGarrell, E. and S. Chermak, *Strategic approaches to reducing firearms violence: Final Report on the Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership*, Michigan State University, Lansing, MI (2003).

Memphis: Betts, P., K. Henning, W. Janikowski, L. Klesges, H. Scott, and A. Anderson, *Memphis Sexual Assault Project: Final Report*, University of Memphis, Memphis, TN (2003).

New Haven: Hartstone, E., and D. Richetelli, *A final assessment of the Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative in New Haven*, Spectrum Associates, New Haven, CN (2003).

Portland: Kapsch, S., L. Louis, and K. Oleson, *The dynamics of deterrence: Youth gun violence in Portland*, Reed College, Portland, OR (2003).

Winston-Salem: Easterling, D., L. Harvey, D. Mac-Thompson, and M. Allen, *Evaluation of SACSI in Winston-Salem: Engaging the community in a strategic analysis of youth violence*. University of North Carolina, Greensboro, NC (2002).

3. Comey, J. and S. Miller, "Project Exile," *Project Safe Neighborhoods: American's network against gun violence, USA Bulletin* 50 (1)(2002): 11-15.

Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI) in 10 U.S. Cities: The Building Blocks for Project Safe Neighborhoods

Final Report of the National Evaluation University of Illinois at Chicago

Prepared by

Jan Roehl, Ph.D.
Justice Research Center

Dennis P. Rosenbaum, Ph.D.
University of Illinois at Chicago

Sandra K. Costello, J.D., M.A.
University of Illinois at Chicago

James R. "Chip" Coldren, Jr., Ph.D.
John Howard Association

Amie M. Schuck, Ph.D.
University of Illinois at Chicago

Laura Kunard, M.A.
University of Illinois at Chicago

David R. Forde, Ph.D.
University of Memphis

June 2005

Contact person: Professor Dennis P. Rosenbaum, Principal Investigator and Center Director, Center for Research in Law and Justice, 1007 W. Harrison (MC 141), Chicago, IL, 60607, Ph. (312) 355-2469. Email: **dennisr@uic.edu**. The research was supported by grant #1999-IJ-CX-K013 from the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the U.S. Department of

Justice.

Acknowledgments

The National Assessment Team would like to acknowledge the generous assistance and support we received both locally and nationally to complete this national evaluation. From the Department of Justice, we want to thank the following individuals who influenced our thinking about this project and supported us in various capacities: Erin Dalton, Steve Edwards, Maggie Heisler (our final project monitor), Sally Hillsman, Frank Kalder, Nancy LaVigne, Mary Marguia, Jay Marshall, Lois Mock (our initial project monitor), Julie Samuels, Charles Simon, Amy Solomon and Laura Winters. We also wish to acknowledge the contribution of our National Advisory Board members: Michael J.P. Considine, Candice Kane, John Lenoir, Terry Madsen, Kim Nerheim, and Federico Rocha. Their input and feedback during the early phases of the project was invaluable.

At the local level, we are deeply indebted to the many researchers and criminal justice professionals in all ten cities who took time from their busy schedules to be interviewed and share their views and experiences with us. We especially want to thank the U.S. Attorneys, project coordinators, local prosecutors, local law enforcement officials, federal law enforcement officials, researchers, and representatives of other agencies who shared with us their experiences regarding SACSI and related initiatives. What became very apparent to us is that members of the SACSI partnerships were deeply committed to reducing urban violence and making American cities safer places to live, work, and play. For this, we also express our gratitude.

Table of Contents

I. Background and Description of the Strategic Approach to Community Safety Initiative and SACSI National Evaluation

A. Background

In 1998, the U.S. Department of Justice launched SACSI, the Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative. SACSI was a multi-pronged effort in 10 cities that aimed to bring together some of the best practices known to date for reducing and preventing violent crime, including Boston's Operation Ceasefire strategy of collaborative, data-driven problem-solving (Kennedy, 1997; Braga, Kennedy, and Piehl, 1999), community policing and problem-oriented policing (Rosenbaum, 1994; Goldstein, 1990), practitioner-researcher partnerships (Travis, 1998), and the U.S. Attorneys' Offices' leadership in strategic planning (Roehl, *et al.*, 1996; Dunworth, *et al.*, 1999).

In Operation Ceasefire, Boston tackled a severe juvenile homicide and gun-related crime problem with positive results. The strategies were numerous, and spanned a range of suppression and prevention activities; Boston's signature strategy was the convening of "lever-pulling" meetings, designed to deter juvenile crime through a combination of warnings, swift and sure enforcement and prosecution for any violence, and the provision of social and vocational services. At the core of the *process* was a multi-agency planning group whose function was to develop coordinated problem-solving strategies using detailed information about the crime problem supplied by a research partner and law enforcement officers. SACSI sought to emulate that process.

B. SACSI's Defining Characteristics

The development of the SACSI approach was well-informed by these prior collaborative problem-solving models, but several specific elements set SACSI apart from its predecessors. These defining characteristics of the SACSI problem-solving model are:

1. The U.S. Attorneys' Office provides project leadership and coordination. The U.S. Attorney serves a central leadership role, with day-to-day coordination efforts supported by a full-time Project Coordinator.

2. The U.S. Attorney and others form a multi-agency, multi-disciplinary core planning group to develop and implement SACSI initiatives.

3. A local research partner is selected and integrated into strategic planning, problem-solving, and local impact assessment.

4. Information and "street knowledge" from agencies and partnership members is collected to identify and analyze chronic crime problems, offender groups, and geographic hot spots.

5. The core group selects a target problem for the SACSI initiative, which is then subjected to in-depth research.

6. A strategic plan and organizational structure for suppression, intervention, and prevention activities are developed and SACSI problem-solving strategies are implemented.

7. Research and assessment of the strategies continues, with internal feedback provided constantly to the core planning group, which improves or eliminates strategies as their success becomes evident.

Throughout the SACSI initiative, the Department of Justice (DOJ) provided substantial technical assistance to the sites. The DOJ organized regular meetings for information sharing, provided access to experts, assigned a DOJ liaison to each site, and offered NIJ's Crime Mapping Resource Center to assist with computerized geographic mapping as needed.

C. The SACSI Sites.

Ten cities were selected as SACSI sites. The first five ("Phase I sites") – Indianapolis, Memphis, New Haven, Portland, and Winston-Salem – were funded in 1998. The second five cities ("Phase II sites") – Albuquerque, Atlanta, Detroit, Rochester, and St. Louis – were funded in 2000. Table 1 presents data on each city's population and violent crime rate in the year they were funded.

Table 1: Population and Crime Rate Figures[1] for the 10 SACSI Sites

SACSI Sites	SACSI Phase	2000 Census data				Violent crime/1000 in the year SACSI started[2]
		Population	U.S. rank	% Non-white	% Hispanic or Latino	
Albuquerque	II	448,607	35	28.4	39.9	11.45
Atlanta	II	416,474	39	66.8	4.5	27.81
Detroit	II	951,270	10	87.7	5.0	23.24
Indianapolis	I	781,870	12	30.9	3.9	11.35
Memphis	I	650,100	18	65.6	3.0	14.99
New Haven	I	123,626	175	56.6	21.4	16.84
Portland	I	529,121	28	22.1	6.8	13.72
Rochester	II	219,773	79	51.7	12.8	7.43
St. Louis	II	348,189	49	56.2	2.0	22.79
Winston-Salem	I	185,776	107	44.4	8.6	12.52
National average of cities over 100,000 (1998/2000):						6.91/6.2

The 10 SACSI cities are diverse in size, region of the country, and severity of crime. They range in size from the 10th largest city in the U.S. (Detroit) to the 179th largest city (New Haven). As a group, however, they represent America's mid-sized cities (the SACSI sites had an average population of 466,449 in 2000) where, by-and-large, the twin scourges of drug trafficking and violent crime came later than they did in the larger, coastal cities such as New York and Los

[1] Data sources: Population: U.S. Census Bureau, Summary File 1 (SF 1) and Summary File 3 (SF 3). U.S. rank: *County and City Data Book*, 2000 Ed., Revised March 16, 2004. Violent crime rates: FBI, Uniform Crime Repots as prepared by the National Archives of Criminal Justice and reported by the Bureau of Justice Assistance.

[2] Phase I started began in 1998; Phase II in 2000.

Angeles. In the late 1990s when SACSI was initiated, the SACSI cities were still experiencing high rates of gun-related and violent crime. Each of the Phase I sites had a violent crime rate that was twice the national average for cities of similar size when they received SACSI funds in 1998. Three of the Phase II sites, Atlanta, Detroit, and St. Louis, had violent crime rate over four times the national average for cities over 100,000 in population when they received their funds in 2000. Rochester, a Phase II site, had a substantially lower violent crime rate of 7.30 per 1,000 residents, yet still well above the national average of 5.61/1,000.

Phase I sites received $250,000, and Phase II received $230,000 from DOJ to support their local research activities, and additional monies to support a full-time project coordinator in the U.S. Attorneys' Office. DOJ did not provide SACSI funds for convening the multi-agency core groups or for implementing any strategies; thus, the SACSI sites made significant in-kind contributions. These can be seen in the next chapter, where the sites' individual goals, strategies, and outcomes are summarized.

D. Current Status of SACSI.

This report is written as the SACSI funding for the Phase II sites and the national assessment comes to a close. In most sites, SACSI has left a clear legacy, with core group meetings, the integrated research process, and many of the intervention strategies continuing, and for good reason. The SACSI program has segued into Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a U.S. Attorneys' Office program with key features much like SACSI, but more narrowly focused on gun crimes. All 10 SACSI sites have PSN funding to support federal prosecutors and state/local programs, and a majority of them have federal grants to support their research partners at 60% of the support provided under SACSI.

E. The SACSI National Assessment Methodology

In addition to funding the local research partners in each SACSI site, DOJ funded a national assessment project that involved a separate team of researchers with the specific purpose of conducting cross-site comparisons on key issues regarding SACSI's implementation. The National Assessment Team (NAT) comprised a cadre of criminologists and social science

researchers with experience evaluating other collaborative initiatives including multi-jurisdictional task forces, Weed and Seed, Comprehensive communities, community policing, and other partnership-based anti-crime programs. The goals of the SACSI national assessment were to:

1. Document the implementation of SACSI, focusing on partnership formation, change, and sustainability; implementation of strategic planning and problem-solving; and integration of research into the local initiatives. This includes how SACSI was implemented in practice, and what factors seem to account for variations in implementation processes and differences in the quality of partnerships, problem-solving, and ability to integrate research into that process.

2. Assess how and to what extent SACSI groups use data, research, information systems, and evaluation findings to inform decision-making.

3. Study how interventions are designed and implemented, and if variation in the quality of partnerships and/or the integration of research makes a difference in strategy design, implementation, and impact.

4. Determine local measurement strategies and summarize impact findings with respect to violence reduction and other outcomes.

5. Assess prospects for longevity of SACSI initiatives.

The national assessment included both qualitative and quantitative research methods. The national assessment team made multiple site visits to each of the 10 sites to interview core and working group members, observe meetings and activities, and collect materials and related information. All Phase I sites were visited at least three times to assess SACSI initiatives, and some were visited four or five times when cross-site meetings were included. All Phase II sites were visited at least twice and we attended cross-site meetings in four of the sites. Two waves of self-administered questionnaires, completed approximately one year apart, were conducted with the key partnership members in all sites. The surveys focused on the quality and quantity of partnership interactions and the respondents' views on progress, satisfaction with key SACSI components, impact, and effectiveness. In four of the five Phase I sites, the national assessment

team hired local research liaisons to conduct ongoing observations of SACSI meetings and activities. A total of 367 people were surveyed or interviewed across the 10 sites. The national assessment team members also attended all DOJ-sponsored cluster meetings for SACSI sites and interviewed DOJ officials about the initiative.

The national assessment concentrated on short-term and proximal outcomes that might be linked to the formation of SACSI partnerships, problem-solving strategies, the integration of local research, and the implementation of specific SACSI components. The local research partners assessed the longer-term outcomes related to community safety and target crime reduction; the results for the Phase I sites are reported herein. To provide a national context for assessing long-term outcomes, the national evaluation team compiled several years of citywide Part I violent crime data for all 10 SACSI cities and relevant comparison cities before and after the introduction of this initiative.

Overview of this report. The remainder of this report offers a cross-site summary and comparison of the SACSI programs and their impact. Section II describes SACSI's goals and variations in key structural components (e.g., USAO leadership, core and working groups, use of research, primary strategies, etc.). Section III focuses on member views of partnership functioning, satisfaction/cohesion, and effectiveness. Section IV describes the roles of local researchers and the extent to which criminal justice research has been integrated into the SACSI process. Section V describes the federal government's role as a technical assistance provider and local satisfaction with DOJ services. Section VI delineates the primary intervention strategies employed in SACSI, including enforcement, prosecution and probation, and prevention approaches. Data relevant to the effectiveness of SACSI are presented in Section VII, based on

the local impact evaluations conducted by the Phase I researchers and relevant UCR figures compiled by the national research team. The final section of the report (VIII) offers some conclusions and identifies factors which may account for variations in key structural components and practices, as well as differences in the quality of partnerships, problem-solving, and research integration.

II. Partnership Goals and Characteristics of the 10 SACSI Sites

The SACSI program featured several central, defining structural components. Chief among them are the leadership provided by the U.S. Attorneys' Office; the formation of a core group of decision-makers as well as working groups to carry out program strategies; the integration of research for problem selection, analysis, strategic planning, and assessment; and the implementation of complementary strategies directed at both suppressing and preventing violent crime. These key components varied in form and structure from site to site, responding to local conditions and forces.

Several sources provide details about the partnerships and strategies of the individual SACSI sites. In-depth case studies of the five Phase I sites written by the national assessment team will be available through NCJRS, as will be the final reports completed by the local researchers. Finally, current strategies to reduce and prevent firearms violence under Project Safe Neighborhoods are described at http://www.projectsafeneighborhoods.gov.

A. Program Goals and Target Crime(s)

The primary goal in each site was to reduce a target crime and (often) related crimes. Nine of the 10 sites focused on homicide and other serious violent crimes, particularly – almost solely – those involving firearms (see Table 2). Memphis was an exception, as the SACSI partnership there focused on reducing rape and other sexual assaults. The focus on homicide and other violent crimes was influenced by Boston's model experience and unparalleled murder rates in several sites in the mid to late '90s. The Phase II sites focused heavily on gun crimes and gun violence, due to the federal emphasis and funding requirements. Three sites (Rochester,

Winston-Salem, and Portland concentrated on youth, although Portland's "youth" went up to 24 years old).

Table 2: Target Crimes and Partnership History and Structure for the 10 SACSI Sites

City	Target crime(s)	Partnership Roots	Core group size (approx) and composition	Working groups	Non-LE/CJ partners
Albuquerque	Homicide, firearms violence, aggravated assault.	Mostly traditional agency-to-agency partnerships. The Metropolitan Criminal Justice Coordinating overlaps substantially with the SACSI core group. Similar past/current partnerships: Project Exile, Weed & Seed.	Mid-sized (n = 15), all law enforcement and criminal justice agencies plus researchers (Institute for Social Research at the University of New Mexico).	(1) Federal law enforcement, district attorney, and researchers.	Catholic Charities, Albuquerque Technical Vocational Institute.
Atlanta	Homicide, firearms violence (assault, shootings, robbery).	Past gun, violence, and crime prevention efforts (FACE-5, Ceasefire/Project Exile efforts, nuisance abatement, Cops 'n Docs).	Mid-sized (n = 15), law enforcement and criminal justice agencies plus researchers (Rollins School of Public Health at Emory University) and medical/emergency room personnel.	(1) Enforcement and suppression and (2) Community outreach and social services.	Emory & Grady Medical Centers, Atlanta Housing Authority, Atlanta Neighborh'd Developm't Partnership.
Detroit	Firearms violations, especially carrying a concealed weapon.	Prior violence suppression efforts in target area in which research was an integral part, Project 8-Ball. Adopted the Violent Crimes Task Force. Researcher worked with police dept. for more than a decade.	Small (n = 10), all law enforcement and criminal justice agencies plus researcher (Michigan State University)	(1)Enforcement (USAO, police dept, corrections, researchers).	Detroit Work Place (job skills training center), Weed and Seed.

Table 2: Target Crimes and Partnership History and Structure for the 10 SACSI Sites

City	Target crime(s)	Partnership Roots	Core group size (approx) and composition	Working groups	Non-LE/CJ partners
Indianapolis	Homicide, firearms violence.	The Indianapolis Violence Reduction Project (IVRP) became the SACSI core group. Similar past/current partnerships: Weed & Seed, CJS partnerships, Project Triggerlock.	Large (n = 28), all law enforcement and criminal justice agencies plus researchers (Hudson Institute and Indiana University).	(1) Law enforcement and criminal justice.	10 Point Coalition, Front Porch Alliance, social services agencies.
Memphis	Rape, sexual assault.	Few pre-existing partnerships except for relationships between the police department and key sexual assault service/advocacy organizations. Similar past/current partnerships: The Memphis Shelby County Crime Commission and the Memphis Sexual Assault Resource.	Large (n =27), broad-based, including law enforcement and other criminal justice agencies, social services, and researchers (University of Memphis, University of Tennessee).	(1) "Front-line" agency staff; includes law enforcement, criminal justice, researchers, med. experts, children's and social services, advocates, Sexual Assault Resource Ctr, schools, churches, youth orgs, media.	Non-profit community groups, social services, utility company.
New Haven	Firearms violence.	History of law enforcement, public health, and criminal justice system partnerships. Notable resident-city relationship. Similar past/current partnerships: Gang Task Force, Yale-NHPD child development-community policing partnership.	Began large (n = 27); became small (n = 6-10), all law enforcement and criminal justice agencies plus researchers (Spectrum Assoc.); Ended larger, adding full-service offender re-entry organization	(1) Front-line personnel representing the core group's agencies.	Social service partners (especially an ex-offender-based group) introduced late; city's substance abuse coordinator.

Table 2: Target Crimes and Partnership History and Structure for the 10 SACSI Sites

City	Target crime(s)	Partnership Roots	Core group size (approx) and composition	Working groups	Non-LE/CJ partners
Portland	Violence (murder, assault, sexual abuse, robbery), firearms crimes among young people aged 15 to 24.	The Local Public Safety Coordinating Council (LPSCC) overlapped substantially with the SACSI core group; long history of criminal justice-community partnerships and government-neighborhood collaboration. Similar past/current partnerships: Weed & Seed.	Large (n = 25) core group of criminal justice and non-criminal justice partners (research partners from Reed College and Portland State University).	(1) Strategy Intervention Team (law enforcement and criminal justice) and (2) Community-Based Strategies Team (social services, probation, USAO, private orgs, federal pub. defender).	Northeast Coalition of Neighborh'ds , Oregon Council for Hispanic Advancement , CBS Team members.
Rochester	Youth violence, firearms violence (assault, robbery).	Partnerships at all levels among local and federal LE/CJ agencies, plus Children & Family Services, for a number of years pre-SACSI. Similar past/current partnerships: Weed & Seed, Nightwatch, Youth Violence Initiative.	Small (n = 6-8). Local and federal LE/CJ agencies, researchers (Rochester Institute of Technology), mayor's office, Pathways to Peace, Youth Violence Initiative.	(1) LE/CJ and researcher group and (2) a community outreach group led by the USAO, mayor's office, non-LE/CJ partners.	Mayor's office, Pathways to Peace, Youth Violence Initiative, Urban League, school district, religious leaders.
St. Louis	Homicide, firearms violence.	SACSI is an extension of Operation Ceasefire, in place for two years prior to SACSI. Similar past/current partnerships: Operation Nightwatch. Gang Outreach/Safe Futures.	Large (n = 27) and inclusive; key participants were law enforcement, mayor's office, criminal justice representatives, and researchers (University of Missouri at St. Louis).	(1) Gang outreach and (2) Targeting.	City neighborh'd stabilization department, faith-based group, media firm, schools.

Table 2: Target Crimes and Partnership History and Structure for the 10 SACSI Sites

City	Target crime(s)	Partnership Roots	Core group size (approx) and composition	Working groups	Non-LE/CJ partners
Winston-Salem	Violent crime among youth under 18.	Forsyth Futures started in 1995 with 20+ agencies involved in youth development and crime prevention; includes business, law enforcement, courts, schools, and others. Similar past/current partnerships: Juveniles Repeat Offender Project, led by the police; Weed & Seed.	Large (n = 20-22) and inclusive; includes law enforcement, criminal justice, social services, city agencies, a non-profit, faith-based groups, and researchers (Winston-Salem State University, University of North Carolina-Greensboro).	(1) Community Enforcement team, (2) Prevention Team, and (3) Intervention Team.	Schools, faith community, Urban League.

Several of the SACSI sites set additional goals beyond reducing the target crime(s), and some added or modified goals over the course of the project period. New Haven aimed to improve the public's perception of safety (i.e., reduce fear of crime). Portland endorsed multiple goals, including examining the role of alcohol in youth gun violence and understanding minority over-representation in the criminal justice system.

B. Key Role of the U.S. Attorneys' Offices

By federal design, the local U.S. Attorneys' Office headed the SACSI projects in each city, based on the successful examples offered by the Weed and Seed programs (Roehl *et al.*, 1996; Dunworth *et al.*, 1999), where U.S. Attorneys played valuable roles in getting key agencies involved in the partnerships. The U.S. Attorneys were generally quite active in SACSI partnership building and development. They provided significant leadership and clout to bring diverse groups to the table, keep them working over the long-term on collaborative problem-

solving, and persuade them to continually commit significant resources to implement and maintain SACSI strategies. The U.S. Attorneys' Offices also played key roles in strategic planning, overall project coordination, and the integration of research into practical strategies.

At different times and with variations among sites, the U.S. Attorneys themselves were clearly involved in overall policy and procedural decisions. Generally, the U.S. Attorneys vested day-to-day responsibilities in the Project Coordinators (in Phase I sites), who worked full-time on SACSI. In Phase II sites and one Phase I site (New Haven), Assistant U.S. Attorneys directed SACSI activities in addition to their usual caseloads and other work.

The Project Coordinators had more time to devote to SACSI, and in several sites, played strong leadership roles. Generally, the full-time project coordinator position was viewed as very important by other partnership members (notably including those in Phase II sites that did not have them), in order to provide administrative support for the partnership, broaden community support, and keep the diverse strategies – from gun prosecution to public awareness campaigns – coordinated and on schedule. The federal funding was sufficient to bring people of high-quality and long experience to the project coordinator positions. The project coordinators were all experienced individuals with ties of longstanding to the criminal justice system and strong interpersonal relationships with key stakeholders throughout their communities. They were critical to the effective functioning of the Phase I SACSI partnerships.

When problems were encountered in leadership, it was often due to turnover and conflicts within the U.S. Attorneys' Offices (USOA). For example, turnover within the USAO and in the project coordinator's position left two sites leaderless for a significant period of time. In one site,

the research team stepped up its leadership role. In the other, the community services component was lost in the transition.

C. Partnership History

Clearly, and properly, the SACSI project was built on the foundations of prior collaborative efforts in each city. In most sites, the selected target crime was a high local priority before SACSI was created. Multi-agency partnerships to reduce or prevent crimes were also commonplace prior to SACSI and contributed to the rapid development of solid working partnerships under SACSI. As shown in Table 2, many of the cities had some form of a core policy-making group in place from the beginning. In Portland, for example, the Local Public Safety Coordinating Council (LPSCC) was the forerunner of the SACSI core group, and the Indianapolis Violence Reduction Project (IVRP) and Operation Ceasefire committees occupied the same position in Indianapolis and St. Louis, respectively. In Rochester, a history of cross-agency collaboration and youth-oriented violence prevention initiatives produced a strong partnership that was functioning at a high level prior to the introduction of SACSI. Many sites also had Weed and Seed programs that preceded SACSI, with the U.S. Attorneys' Office taking a leadership position in steering committees which function much like the SACSI core groups.

Memphis was the one SACSI site with few pre-existing community-wide partnerships related to its target crimes of rape and sexual assault, although the Memphis Police Department, mayor's office, and local sexual assault victim advocates had good working relationships prior to SACSI. This may serve as an indication that the target crimes were wisely chosen, as they were

found to be among the highest rates in the U.S. and the problem had been persistent at extremely high levels for a long period of time.

D. Structure and Composition of the Core and Working Groups

Each of the SACSI sites successfully formed and maintained a core group and at least one working group. No SACSI site encountered serious problems forming a multi-agency core group. Some operated under their "original" name (the St. Louis core group, for example, continued as the Ceasefire working group) while others adopted SACSI or some version of it (STACS in Portland, for example, stood for Strategic Approach to Community Safety). The groups ranged in size from quite large groups (25 to 30 members) to small (six to 10 core group members), as shown in Table 2. The core groups' main tasks involved reviewing research results, strategic planning, and coordinating intervention strategies.

In half of the sites, the core group was composed solely of law enforcement and criminal justice representatives (i.e., police, prosecutors, probation/parole, courts, and corrections, at the local, state, and federal levels) plus the research team (these sites were Albuquerque, Atlanta, Detroit, Indianapolis, and New Haven). The composition of the other half (Memphis, Portland, St. Louis, Rochester, and Winston-Salem) was broad-based, adding social service representatives, community organizations, medical units, and faith-based organizations to the law enforcement, criminal justice, and research representation. This emphasis made a difference in the types and priorities of interventions applied, as discussed later.

The majority of the SACSI sites had major partners who were not affiliated with law enforcement or criminal justice agencies, including sites such as Indianapolis, which had community partners who worked extensively on specific SACSI activities (such as the public

awareness campaign) but were not included in the core or working groups, and Winston-Salem, where excellent working relationships were established with street workers (see Table 2). Having non-LE/CJ partners was clearly associated with having a broad-based core group, but not exclusively. Indianapolis deliberately kept their core group composed only of LE/CJ representatives, in part because of the sensitive intelligence information often shared in core group meetings, but had strong partners in the 10-Point Coalition, Front Porch Alliance, and social service agencies active in providing outreach services, jobs, support services, etc.

All of the sites also formed subgroups, or working groups, tasked with carrying out the daily work needed to implement the intervention strategies. Three sites (Indianapolis, Detroit, and New Haven) had one working group which mirrored the composition of the core group – the working group comprised the front-line staff of the law enforcement and criminal justice agencies responsible for carrying out the strategies planned by the core group. St. Louis had two law-enforcement oriented working groups, focused on gang outreach and offender targeting. A common practice, found in four sites (Atlanta, Portland, Rochester, and St. Louis), was to have two working groups – one focused on enforcement and suppression activities (e.g. Portland's Strategies Intervention Team, SIT) and the other focused on outreach and prevention (e.g. Portland's Community-Based Strategies Team, CBS). Winston-Salem offered a similar approach but with three working groups, for enforcement, prevention, and intervention. Albuquerque had a small law enforcement and prosecution working group during its first year or so.

Only Memphis did not have an enforcement-oriented working group. Memphis' sole working group mirrored the composition of its core group; it comprised a wide range of

enforcement, criminal justice, social service, sexual assault experts, and community-based representatives working through six committees.

III. Member Views of Partnership Functioning, Satisfaction, and Effectiveness.

The national research team administered a partnership survey twice in each of the 10 SACSI cities. The surveys were administered during the first year of SACSI and then again one year later. The individual sites were at different stages of implementation at the time of the surveys; the effects of the timing is discussed where it is especially relevant to the survey results. All active members of each partnership, as defined by the site itself were surveyed. Thus, most of the key members participated in both waves of the survey, but the respondents are not identical from Wave 1 to Wave 2. Items were analyzed individually, and composite indices were also created to analyze of key partnership constructs (cohesion, satisfaction, etc.) across sites and over time members (see Table 3 for the items which make up each construct).

Table 3: Constructs developed from the SACSI Partnership Survey Items

Construct	Items Included
Partnership cohesion Four point composite index from "Strongly agree" to "Strongly disagree."	1. I am satisfied with the partnership. 2. I feel involved with the partnership. 3. In spite of individual differences, a feeling of unity exists in this partnership. 4. I want to remain a member of this group
Partnership satisfaction Four point composite index from "Strongly agree" to "Strongly disagree."	1. Compared to the groups I know, I feel this partnership is more effective than most. 2. I care about what happens in this partnership. 3. The SACSI approach was critical to the formation of our partnership. 4. The SACSI partnership should remain in place to work on other problems.
Partnership problems Three point composite index from "Big problem" to "No problem," for each listed problem.	How much have the following events and conditions <u>hindered</u> the SACSI Partnership? 1. Leadership problems 2. Turf conflicts 3. Lack of productivity within the group 4. Disagreement over goals of the project 5. Lack of clear action plan 6. Lack of commitment from some members 7. Group cooperation

Non-Law Enforcement involvement Four point composite index from non-LE partners are involved in SACSI "A great deal" to non-LE partner are involved "Not at all."	To what extent has each of the following individuals/groups been involved in the management and implementation of the SACSI partnership? 1. Local researcher(s) 2. Local city officials 3. Local social service affiliates 4. Local non-profit organizations
Problem-Solving Effectiveness Three point composite index from "Very effective" to "Not effective," for each listed area.	Think about what the local SACSI strategy has done to date. Please indicate how effective your SACSI has been in the areas listed below. 1. Fostering cooperation among organizations in the partnership 2. Generating 'buy-in' from the social service, faith, and private sectors 3. Planning new approaches or new ways of doing business 4. Implementing new approaches 5. Reducing the target problem 6. Generating additional funding beyond the grant
Researcher Effectiveness Three point composite index from "Very effective" to "Not effective," for each listed area.	Please indicate how effective the local researcher(s) has been in producing information that is useful for . . . 1. Identifying the target problem 2. Defining the target problem 3. Planning new approaches 4. Building partnerships 5. Implementing the strategy 6. Developing and implementing evaluative measures 7. Evaluating the process/partnerships 8. Assessing impact

A. Partnership Satisfaction and Cohesion

Keeping members of the partnership satisfied and connected to the group is considered essential for sustaining motivation and involvement. Satisfaction with SACSI partnerships and feelings of cohesiveness were high across all of 10 SACSI sites at the start of the project, with over 80% of all members agreeing "somewhat" or "strongly" with each item. Agreement declined slightly on six of the eight measures by Wave 2 (see Figures 1a and 1b), however. Respondents' strong desire to "remain a member" and "care about what happens in this partnership" declined nearly 10 percentage points. Still, after the honeymoon was over, the majority of members remained positive about their partnerships on most dimensions, and improvements were noted in feelings of unity and perceptions that the partnership was "more effective than most."

Figure 1a: Partnership Cohesion: Percent of Members Somewhat or Strongly Agreeing with Item



Figure 1b: Partnership Satisfaction: Percent of Members Somewhat or Strongly Agreeing with Item



Composite indexes registered some changes in group satisfaction and social cohesion among the partners. Most sites showed no real change over time, but Albuquerque, Atlanta, Portland, and Rochester participants were less satisfied at Wave 2 than at Wave 1, and had the lowest satisfaction scores overall (see Table 4). Albuquerque and Atlanta also exhibited slight decreases in cohesion over time, while Portland remained low and steady and Rochester remained high. Detroit had the highest levels of satisfaction and cohesion at both points, and Winston-Salem participants reported sizeable improvements on both dimensions, with particularly high Wave 2 satisfaction and cohesion scores.

Table 4: Cross-site Comparison of Partnership Views of Satisfaction and Cohesion at Wave 2

Site	Satisfaction	Cohesion
Albuquerque	3.13	3.11
Atlanta	3.23	3.11
Detroit	3.71	3.73
Indianapolis	3.57	3.53
Memphis	3.44	3.17
New Haven	3.45	3.31
Portland	3.25	3.20
Rochester	3.25	3.65
St. Louis	3.61	3.41
Winston-Salem	3.84	3.91
All sites Range:	3.45 1-4	3.43 1-4

B. Partnership Problems

Participants were queried about a range of potential partnership problems. The results in Figures 2a and 2b indicate that the majority of respondents did not see these issues as a "big

Figure 2a: Partnership Problems: Percent of Members Rating Particular Problems "Some" or a "Big" Problem



problem" for their partnership, although between a quarter and 60 percent (depending on the issue) saw them as "some problem." Insufficient funding and insufficient personnel topped the list of concerns, and became perceived as bigger problems over time. Group cooperation, disagreements over goals, and red tape at the federal level were rated the least problematic issues by the partnership members. The composite Problem Index showed little change over time for

Figure 2b: Partnership Problems (cont.): Percent of Members Rating Particular Problems "Some" or a "Big" Problem



most sites, although an increase in problems were reported in two sites. There was a slight tendency, on average, for partnerships to report more problems of all kinds at Wave 2 than at Wave 1. As groups became more involved in the SACSI process, they began to realize that having adequate resources (funding and personnel) is critical to achieving their goals.

Solid leadership is also important for any multi-agency partnership to function smoothly and achieve its goals. When asked directly, a third of the members reported their partnerships experienced "some" leadership problems; "big" leadership problems were rare, although the rate doubled from 5 percent to 10 percent from Wave 1 to Wave 2.

On site visits, the national research team noted several common partnership problems across sites. There were predictable tensions between police and probation officers, between

probation officers and community outreach workers, and between law enforcement/criminal justice representatives and community representatives, due primarily to their different philosophies about crime and goals. These differences were worked through in core and working group meetings, where decision-making by consensus and open communication were the norm. In Portland, retreats with working group meetings were used, in part, to resolve differences.

C. Perceived Effectiveness

Participants were asked to judge their partnership's effectiveness in the problem solving process (e.g., was the partnership successful in planning new approaches and fostering cooperation among needed partners?) and outcome (e.g., was the target problem reduced?). Six dimensions of problem solving were evaluated by the participants (see Figure 3). While a

majority of respondents judged their partnership to be partially effective, only a minority rated their group as "very effective" on most dimensions. Partnerships were considered most effective at fostering cooperation among the participating organizations, but least effective at generating additional funds and garnering "buy-in" from the social service, faith, and private sectors. In terms of reducing the target problem(s), partnership members were fairly tough on themselves. Just over half reported that their partnership was "somewhat effective" in reducing the target problem(s), while about a third said they were "very effective."

A composite Problem Solving Effectiveness Index was constructed for each site, based on the six indicators, providing an overall rating of the local program. Respondents at most sites

Figure 3: Problem Solving Effectiveness: Percent of Members Reporting Partnership was Somewhat or Very Effective in Specific Areas



judged their SACSI program to be somewhere between "somewhat effective" (score of 1) and "very effective" (score of 2), when all the dimensions of problem solving were combined (see Figure 4). Winston-Salem reported the highest views of their effectiveness, while Albuquerque, Atlanta, and Rochester reported the lowest.

D. Representation

From the beginning of SACSI, one of the debated issues was whether, when, and in what capacity to include non-law enforcement organizations in the partnership. In practice, there were substantial differences across the 10 sites in the size and inclusiveness of the groups, as previously discussed and presented in Table 2. The core groups of five of the 10 sites were comprised exclusively of representatives from law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, plus the local researchers. The other five had broad-based core groups – in addition to the law enforcement/criminal justice agencies and researchers – included representatives from social

Figure 4
Problem Solving Effectiveness Index



services, other city agencies, the medical community, victim agencies, youth and community organizations, schools, churches, and the media.

The partnership survey asked respondents about the extent to which non-law enforcement groups where involved in the management and implementation of the SACSI partnership. As shown in Figure 5, local researchers were the only non-law enforcement group that was involved "a great deal" in the partnership, and their involvement increased from 65 percent at Wave 1 to 74 percent at Wave 2. Researchers played a key role in the SACSI process, but also, they were the only group funded with SACSI monies. The participation of local city officials and non-profit organizations remained stable (and low) over time, while social service agencies became somewhat more involved by Wave 2. This may be due to increased efforts at some sites to provide a "carrot" to high-risk individuals and assist them in adopting a non-criminal lifestyle.

Of the Phase I sites, Memphis and Portland had the most non-law enforcement participation (Figure 6), perhaps due to the types of crime targeted. Of the Phase II sites, Detroit,

Figure 5
Non-Law Enforcement Involvement



St. Louis, and Rochester exhibited the most involvement for non-law enforcement organizations, as well as increases over time. Some sites had non-law enforcement participation early on, so sizeable increases over time were not expected.

The key role of the U.S. Attorneys is illustrated in the partnership members' views of the extent to which agencies have been involved in the management and implementation of the SACSI partnership. Partnership members reported that the involvement of their U.S. Attorney in the management and implementation of the local project was very high. Across all sites, U.S. Attorney involvement was rated an average of 1.94 at Wave 1 and 1.86 at Wave 2, on a scale ranging from 0 to 2 , with 2 representing "involved a great deal." Only the full-time SACSI project coordinator received a higher rating; local law enforcement and local researchers also

Figure 6
Inclusiveness of Partnerships
(Number of Non-Law Enforcement Partners)



received high marks for involvement, just below those of the U.S. Attorney. Representatives from city agencies, social services and non-profit groups were viewed as the least involved in project management and implementation; their average involvement rating hovered slightly above 1.0.

IV. Integration of Research

The in-depth integration of research in problem analysis and assessment was a key element of the SACSI model. Each site had a DOJ-funded local research partner to assist the core and working groups in this task.

A. Local Researchers' Roles and Activities

All of the sites successfully involved research partners in their local efforts, although sometimes with difficulty. Nine of the 10 sites recruited researchers from nearby universities, and it was not unusual for these researchers to have long-established ties to key players among the core group members. In Albuquerque, for example, the research team, social scientists at the University of New Mexico, had previously conducted national and local studies in cooperation with local law enforcement and criminal justice agencies. Researchers in Indianapolis from the Hudson Institute and Indiana University had also worked extensively with the Indianapolis Police Department on crime mapping and other tasks prior to their involvement in SACSI.

SACSI did produce new research-practitioner partnerships in several sites, although the relationships were different. In Atlanta, for example, the core group worked with two research teams who did not work closely with each other. One university-based team worked with the hospital emergency center, focusing on ER gunshot victims, where they came from, and forensic evidence; a second team, a private research firm added to the SACSI project in its second year, concentrated on identifying high risk offenders using DMV, corrections, and other data. New Haven, also an exception to the university-based researcher rule, worked with a private research firm that had no prior relationships with key partnership members.

Unique to the SACSI projects are the *type of researcher-practitioner relationship* formed and the *nature of the activities* undertaken. Researchers were not intended to be solely external evaluators, nor were they to be merely the number-crunchers or data collectors or methodological advisors typically found in problem-solving efforts. Rather, the local researchers were to be integral members of the core groups, instrumental in identifying target problems and thoroughly analyzing atypical data in contextual ways that would be useful in designing and implementing intervention strategies to solve the problems. Researchers were envisioned to be full partners, participating in strategic planning, strategy development, and strategy assessment (This model is what Lois Mock and others at the National Institute of Justice call "action research."). There were long discussions in Phase I of SACSI regarding whether the local researchers could fulfill this new participatory role while, at the same time, perform an "objective" evaluation of the interventions.

In the end, the local researchers performed their dual role admirably. Table 5 shows that the local researchers played significant roles in problem analysis, strategic planning, and assessment/feedback, but were less involved in problem identification. While it was planned that the selection of the target crime would be part of the research-driven process in SACSI, this aspect of the process did not occur. With the notable exception of Memphis, and to a lesser extent New Haven and Rochester, the SACSI sites selected their target problems prior to the SACSI funding. For Phase II sites, the federal emphasis on gun violence led to a uniform focus on this problem. After problem selection, however, the SACSI sites returned to the Boston model and conducted a wide variety of in-depth analyses to probe the nature of the target problem.

Problem analysis methods ranged from the traditional to the innovative. Traditional methods focused on closely examining existing records (e.g., incident, arrest, and probation

Table 5
Role of Research in the 10 SACSI Sites

City	Problem identification	Problem analysis	Strategic planning	Feedback and assessment
Albuquerque	Accepted the federal designation of firearms violence as the target problem.	In-depth analysis of 6 years of incident and arrest records to document victim-offender patterns. Grand homicide review and incident review.	Strategic and tactical planning led to committing to five initiatives: Exile, VIPER, Incident Review, Pulling Levers, and Directed Patrol.	Scheduled to assess planning and implementation, conduct a case flow analysis of homicides and aggravated assault cases through the CJ system, and assess changes in the number of homicides, aggravated assaults, and armed robberies, with and without firearms.
Atlanta	Target crime selected pre-SACSI. New crime mapping capabilities improved geographic targeting.	In-depth analysis of firearms related offenses and "shots fired" incidents from LE, ER/Medical Center, and forensic evidence. On-going incident reviews. Tracking of high risk offenders.	Targeted suppression and early intervention efforts in selected beats, with AUSA and researchers key players in planning.	Substantial quarterly reports provided to core group, using multiple measures for 15 project objectives. Process monitoring of deterrence, enforcement, tracing, incapacitation, and re-entry activities in Atlanta's gun deterrence logic model.
Detroit	Target crime selected pre-SACSI. 8th Precinct selected for intervention, building on prior violence reduction efforts.	Hot spot mapping and trend analysis of existing law enforcement data. In-depth analysis of offenders who carry concealed weapons.	Identification of repeat offenders for VIPER list, notification meetings, and enforcement in targeted area.	Presentations to core group, will assess the reduction of gun-related violence, using a comparison precinct, and assess parolee progress in target district vs. matched parolees elsewhere.

City	Problem identification	Problem analysis	Strategic planning	Feedback and assessment
Indianapolis	Problem selected pre-SACSI, in 1997, due to rapid rise in homicides.	Homicide reviews, geo-based analysis of homicide, ADAM interview addendum, review of offense histories of homicide victims and suspects, identification of serious violent offenders.	Strategic Plan developed in 1998, early in the SACSI time period, based on problem analysis; five major intervention strategies outlined.	Researcher led core group meetings; provided regular feedback; conducted interviews with arrestees, lever pulling participants, and comparison offenders; tracked outcomes of meeting participants. Outcome evaluation based on time series analyses of homicides, aggravated assaults with a gun, and armed robberies.
Memphis	Initial analysis indicated the rate of sexual assaults has been the highest in the U.S. for years, with no sign of declining. Target problems selected by consensus of working group.	In-depth assessment of all types of sexual assault using five years of offense, arrest, and victimization data,. Used crime mapping, incident analysis, and offense characteristics and case disposition analyses.	Collaboration among federal, state, and local agencies led to three-pronged (suppression, intervention, and prevention) approach.	Examined roles and relationships among key agencies, conducted focus groups and interviews with key staff, surveyed police officer attitudes toward Sex Crimes Unit, conducted pipeline study. Assessed process of key interventions. Outcome evaluation based on annual figures on reported rape.
New Haven	Target crimes were selected early, by law enforcement and city officials, using an analysis of calls-for-service, focus groups, and a baseline community survey.	Incident and offender reviews. Development of “the list” of offenders targeted for suppression or removal. Ongoing data and survey analyses.	Six strategy development sessions were conducted with government agencies and community groups. Incident reviews continued at least weekly, ongoing data and survey analyses.	Conducted partnership interviews, surveyed lever-pulling participants, and assessed individual outcomes. Conducted pre/post community surveys on fear of crime. Outcome evaluation based on number of homicides, assaults with a firearm, armed robberies, calls for service, shots fired, and firearms cases tracking.

City	Problem identification	Problem analysis	Strategic planning	Feedback and assessment
Portland	Problem selected pre-SACSI, due to unusually high youth gun-related violence in 1997.	Analyzed existing UCR data, a school survey, calls for service, ADAM interviews with gun addendum questions, and data from the county health department. SIT members conducted incident reviews and shared street-level knowledge.	Portland Plan was developed two years into SACSI funding, refined goals and strategies.	Conducted interviews with offenders, surveys of offenders, and outcome evaluations of Project Re-Entry and an African-American parole program; assessed outcomes of meeting participants and comparison offenders. Outcome evaluation based on number of homicides, other violent crime, and 911 calls.
Rochester	Built on on-going incident and arrest analyses, plus street intelligence, regarding youth violence problem.	Extensive crime analysis including mapping, trend analyses, temporal incident analyses, and regular CompStat-like meetings. Researcher conducted in-depth contextual, relational analyses using school, census, and youth program data.	Chains of dispute-related homicides and violent incidents were identified to build a predictive, actionable model for targeted suppression and comprehensive, community-based prevention.	Monthly CompStat-like reviews with local and federal LE agencies and researchers. Grand homicide and on-going incident reviews. Feedback meetings with community and religious leaders.
St. Louis	Accepted the federal designation of firearms violence as the target problem.	Analyzed existing data at the neighborhood level. Developed a “WOW” list of offenders – the worst of the worst.	Analyses led to targeting a group of violent offenders and several neighborhoods, successful prosecution of crime group.	New data center operational. Outcome evaluation to focus on homicide and gun assault figures.

City	Problem identification	Problem analysis	Strategic planning	Feedback and assessment
Winston-Salem	Identified youth violence as target based on increases in UCR data, the number of youth tried as adults, and school violence incidents.	Violent Incident Review Team reviews; focus groups with criminal justice and social service professionals; and school-age youth; analyses of police, probation, social service, mental health, and school records of 500 youth; interviews with offenders and service workers.	Problem analysis led to focus on four neighborhoods where youth violence was concentrated and 150 youth in three age groups (under 12, 12-15, 16-17).	Ties with first research team were severed, in part, because of lack of feedback; the second research team developed feedback loops. Methods included observations, surveys of participants and offenders, crime and community data collection. Outcome evaluation focused based on changes in the number of juveniles arrested for violent crimes.

reports) and included geographic mapping, analyses of victim and subject characteristics from incident and arrest records, and multi-year trend studies. In addition to law enforcement records, data from probation, parole, and district attorney's offices were used.

One relatively new problem analysis method used by half the sites was homicide and incident reviews, where representatives from many agencies meet to review and share information on particular cases. Several sites, notably Albuquerque and Indianapolis, started with a "Grand Homicide Review," a review of several years of homicide cases, and then continued the reviews beyond the problem analysis stage, using them as an ongoing intervention strategy. Another problem analysis method also evolved into an ongoing strategy in several sites, that of identifying a list of chronic offenders for targeted enforcement and supervision tactics. Indianapolis, for example, developed the Violent Impact Program Enhanced Response (VIPER) list, and St. Louis developed the WOW list, for "worst of the worst." Other innovative problem analysis methods included: (1) adding questions to ADAM interviews of arrestees and (2) interviews with targeted offenders and comparison groups. These interviews were useful for understanding how offenders

view criminal justice sanctions, guns, and other issues at stake in the SACSI interventions. Both of these techniques also became enmeshed in the whole cycle of problem analysis-strategy development-feedback and assessment. Sources of data beyond law enforcement and criminal justice agencies included the schools, census, mental health agencies, and emergency services.

Rochester is a good example of the type of multi-method approach used by the SACSI sites. The Rochester Police Department granted the local researchers full access to their sophisticated crime analysis unit, which produced in-depth mapping, trend and temporal analyses. The research team was able to focus its efforts on developing sophisticated grand homicide reviews and data-rich contextual and relational profiles of offenders and offenses. Thus, instead of consuming research resources with basic crime analyses, Rochester was able to gather a wide range of census, school, and community data that provided a rich and comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of local youth violence.

The problem analyses and ongoing information gathering and reporting by the local researchers were used extensively by the SACSI sites in strategic planning. The local researchers also played a key role in ongoing assessment and feedback processes, which enabled the core and working groups to refine and redirect their efforts over time. In several sites, the local researchers assumed primary roles beyond their normal purview of analysis and assessment. In Indianapolis, for example, the researcher was widely considered one of the central leaders of the core group and chaired the core group meetings. In other sites (e.g. Portland), the local researchers were more like advisors than key decision-makers.

Where there were problems in the research component of SACSI, they often revolved around delays in getting data, data being unavailable, and/or the research team not getting analysis

to the core and working groups in a timely manner. These problems were usually resolved, albeit by the replacement of the first research team in Winston-Salem. Other obstacles seen in integrating the research component included researchers hampered by a late start, having to address a large number of disparate studies or analyses requested by the core group, delays due to the need for institutional review of human subjects protections, the careful development of new interview and survey instruments, etc. For most sites, a solid researcher-practitioner partnership was formed, based on mutual trust, confidence, and good communication, but in some cases, cooperation was not optimal. In part, these issues stem from basic misperceptions about respective roles and responsibilities, which in turn, stem from researchers and practitioners working in entirely different organizational cultures.

B. Local Outcome Evaluations

Each Phase I site completed an outcome evaluation that is described in a final report (these results are summarized later in this report) and each of the Phase II sites has plans to do so. In addition to examining changes in the target crime(s), a number of the SACSI sites also conducted other process and impact assessments. As shown in Table 5, several sites that used the Ceasefire deterrence approach tracked and interviewed individuals who had attended lever-pulling meetings (these are described later on page 50). Several followed gun and violence cases through the system, looking closely at prosecution and court decisions. Several sites also assessed partnership dynamics through surveys or interviews of core group members. Portland's local researchers also conducted outcome evaluations of several projects related to SACSI – Project Re-Entry and a parole program for African-Americans. New Haven was unique in conducting a pre/post community survey to measure changes in perceptions of safety. The Phase I final reports are

recommended reading – the local researchers conducted extensive research studies which offer valuable information to those considering adoption of any of SACSI's key components.

C. Partnership Views of the Role of Research in SACSI

Local participants were asked how effective the local researchers had been in producing information that would be useful for a variety of tasks. SACSI participants gave the local researchers high marks on front-end tasks. Roughly seven out of 10 felt that the researchers were

Figure 7a: Effectiveness of Researchers in Different Tasks: Percent of Members Reporting Researchers are Somewhat or Very Effective



"very effective" with regard to generating information that was useful for problem identification and problem definition or refinement (Figures 7a and 7b). The local research team was viewed as moderately effective at evaluation tasks such as developing evaluation measures and evaluating the processes and effects of the partnership. They were seen as the least effective at providing information that was useful for planning new approaches, building partnerships, or implementing strategies, but slight improvements on these dimensions were observed over time. Yet even where

Figure 7b: Effectiveness of Researchers in Different Tasks (Cont.)



the researchers were seen as least effective, their overall effectiveness ratings were relatively high – around 40 percent of the partnership members, for example, viewed the researchers as "very effective" in planning and implementation tasks in the second wave of the survey, and an additional 43 percent viewed them as "somewhat effective."

The Phase I SACSI sites exhibited variation in the extent to which working group members felt that research had been effectively integrated into the group process and was producing useful results. Figure 8 shows a compilation of an index of Researcher Effectiveness for each site based on eight survey questions. Among Phase I sites, Indianapolis, Memphis, and

Figure 8
Researcher Effectiveness by Site



New Haven were judged to be between "somewhat effective" (score of 1) and "very effective" (score of 2). Portland researchers, on the other hand, were not as well integrated into the operational side of SACSI during the early phases of the project and the original research team in Winston-Salem team did not work out, which is borne out in their lower, but still positive scores. The Phase II sites all received favorable reviews. Overall, the highest researcher effectiveness

ratings were found in Indianapolis and Detroit, with many (Memphis, New Haven, St. Louis, Atlanta) a close second.

Field interviews indicate that the research teams made significant contributions in ways not reflected by the survey results, in some cases in unanticipated (or serendipitous) ways. Often research team members attained leadership status in the working groups, and as a result of this, made numerous contributions to the ongoing management, facilitation, and productivity of the working group. In addition to bringing data to bear on the target problems, researchers often brought a theoretical or comparative perspective to key deliberations about interventions and anticipated (realistic) impacts, based on their knowledge of the literature and their experiences in other jurisdictions. For these and other reasons (e.g., credibility of the researcher due to longstanding involvement in local policy research and good leadership skills), the research team made significant contributions to the overall SACSI endeavor above and beyond research and data-specific contributions.

V. Technical Assistance

The Department of Justice (DOJ) provided a range of support services to the SACSI programs aimed at facilitating cross-site dialogue and increasing the probability of successful implementation of data-driven problem solving at the local level. These services included:

1. Assigning a DOJ liaison to each site who would facilitate informal communication between DOJ and the sites, enhance federal monitoring of the sites, and assist with the coordination and provision of technical assistance to the site,

2. Convening and facilitating a series of formal meetings for key leaders from the sites in order to promote cross-site discussions, development of new ideas, and on-going self-assessment of progress,

3. Securing the contractual services of outside experts on an as needed basis, and

4. Utilizing the Crime Mapping Resource Center to conduct local site information systems assessments and fund the development of an internet-based geographic mapping capability (CSIS, see Groff, 2001).

Overall, the technical assistance program for SACSI was considered very helpful by the local participants. Most sites found something beneficial to their programs. Interviews and observations suggest that some DOJ services were highly lauded, such as the cluster meetings, which allowed the sites to share their experiences, interact with experts in the field, and learn from one another. Other DOJ services received mixed reviews, such as technical assistance to develop mapping capabilities. Some sites were not prepared to take advantage of these services, while others reported that they did not need them. For these reasons, Phase II sites were not offered mapping services.

Outside experts were utilized effectively during the first phase of the project, but this technical assistance (TA) strategy was not emphasized during the second phase. Rather than rely on experts from Boston, the Phase II projects had the benefit of visits from/to the Phase I sites and technical assistance from the national research team. The Phase II sites, however, were more likely to be staffed by veteran researchers who were less inclined to request or value technical assistance.

Members of each SACSI group were asked to evaluate the usefulness of the government's technical assistance program for completing a variety of tasks related to the problem solving process. Survey respondents were asked to assess both formal technical assistance (such as task-specific training, use of experts, and cluster meetings) and informal

Figure 9
Usefulness of Formal Technical Assistance for Specific Tasks



technical assistance (such as telephone contacts with DOJ liaisons). In terms of formal technical assistance, more than nine out of 10 respondents across all 10 sites felt that the services were either "somewhat useful" or "very useful." As shown in Figure 9, roughly four in 10 felt that the formal TA was "very effective" both in the early stages and again one year later. The findings also indicate that the perceived usefulness of formal technical assistance increased over time on most dimensions. Technical assistance that focused on collecting new data and identifying the target became especially valuable to the participants over time.

Phase I sites gave higher ratings to TA over time than did Phase II sites. Phase I sites gave the TA an average score of 2.28 at Wave 1, which increased to 2.52 in Wave 2. Phase II sites rated the TA higher at Wave 1 (2.39) than Wave 2 (2.31).

Informal technical assistance was also considered useful by roughly nine out of 10 survey respondents, but the value of this type of support declined over time. Fifty-three percent of the sample judged informal TA to be "very useful" at time 1, but only 42 percent gave this response one year later.

Formal technical assistance was considered very valuable to the success of SACSI, but a few words of caution are in order. The first five sites received heavy technical assistance from DOJ, which included close monitoring, training by experts from Boston, and cluster meetings. The success of Boston's Ceasefire project, its promotion by federal partners, and expert advice from the Boston team resulted, unintentionally, in an over-emphasis on the Ceasefire *strategy* rather than its *process*. (This occurred despite the best efforts of the TA team to emphasize process rather than wholesale adoption of programs from other jurisdictions.) As a result, homicide and violent crime, particularly youth-related (as in Boston), were the central targets.

Most sites implemented significant pieces of the Boston program – offender notification meetings offering the "carrot-and-stick" message, a focus on illegal firearms, etc. – with little thought as to whether and how it would work in their community (although over time, local researchers were instrumental in producing information that affected how and where these strategies were implemented). For most sites, the decision to follow in the programmatic and tactical footsteps of Boston has not been a misstep. But the central idea of SACSI was to promote strategic thinking that could be applied to any problem and tailored to the needs of any community.

VI. SACSI Intervention Strategies

The SACSI sites developed and implemented an impressive number of intervention strategies under the SACSI partnerships. As shown in Table 6, they span the range of interventions, from prevention through arrest and prosecution, and range from the traditional to the innovative. The cross-site summary presented below is accompanied by side boxes which briefly describe the sites' innovative strategies (which may be only in the eye of the beholder).

Table 6
Checklist[3] of Primary Strategies of the 10 SACSI Sites

Sites	Arrest, enforcement, suppression strategies						Prosecution/ court, probation/parole strategies				Preventio		
	"Ceasefire" (deterrence model w/ lever pulling mtgs)	Homicide and/or incident reviews	"VIPER" lists (former offenders targeting)	Seizures, searches, sweeps, service of warrants	Saturation patrols (geographic targeting)	Other	"Project Exile" (vigorous gun prosecution)	"Night light" (Home visits)	Project Re-Entry	Other	Jobs	Job training, educational assistance	Public awareness campaigns
Albuquerque										Project Sentry			
Atlanta										Housing court			
Detroit													
Indianapolis													
Memphis						Sexual Response Team							
New Haven													
Portland													
Rochester						Community policing				Child & Family Services			
St. Louis													
Winston-Salem													

[3] = high emphasis, = moderate emphasis), = low emphasis.

A. Enforcement Strategies

Each of the SACSI sites implemented both enforcement and prevention strategies, yet the emphasis in all sites, particularly at the start, was on enforcement and prosecution. In Albuquerque, the core group waited for the research team to provide analyses and direction before designing and implementing strategies. The others initiated new strategies or intensified ones already in place while waiting for new research to improve/refine them or suggest new avenues (i.e., they did not wait for research results to drive the strategies).

Innovative arrest, enforcement, and suppression strategies

Ceasefire strategies – named after Boston's Operation Ceasefire. Generic form is based on deterrence theory, operationalized as holding "lever-pulling" meetings with high risk individuals, informing them that any violent activity judged to be within their control will be swiftly and surely sanctioned by law enforcement and prosecution. At the same time, assistance in obtaining jobs, education, etc. is offered.

Homicide and incident reviews – consist of convening a meeting of key agency representatives to review and share information on recent homicides or other incidents of violence. Grand Homicide reviews typically kick off the process, with representatives reviewing cases from recent years.

"VIPER" targeted offender lists – compiled from arrest and/or probation records, or by "nominations" from probation/parole officers, these are lists of known chronic offenders. The lists are used to focus enforcement, prosecution, and supervision efforts on these high risk individuals.

Many of these initial strategies were traditional enforcement and prosecution practices, but with a new emphasis on "hot spots" policing and repeat offenders. Patrol operations were focused in areas of high violence. Concentrated enforcement tactics such as serving warrants, making unannounced visits to probationers to check on possible violations (particularly firearms possession), etc., were centered on individuals identified as chronic offenders.

All of the sites adopted some version of Boston's Ceasefire approach based on deterrence theory (although local names for the strategy varied; New Haven's, for example, was dubbed "TimeZup"). The Memphis approach was based on a generalized deterrence model and began with the assumption that if offenders know that rape is unacceptable behavior subject to arrest,

prosecution, and incarceration, they will not do it. In the more specific Boston model adopted by most sites, deterrence is focused on individual offenders. Chronic offenders were identified in different ways, including nominations by probation officers, "VIPER" lists based on the number and type of prior arrests or other data, and reliance on police officers' identification of known gang members.[4] These offenders were "invited" (ordered by probation officers where possible) to meetings attended by core and working group members. There, criminal justice representatives would put the offenders on notice that any violence attributable to them would result in swift and certain enforcement action on them and their known associates and neighborhoods. This message (often referred to as "the stick") was hammered home by high level representatives such as the Assistant U.S. Attorney, ATF special agent in charge, homicide commander, FBI, etc. If violence occurred, these representatives promised to "pull all the levers" available to them, meaning they would prosecute gun crimes to the full extent of applicable state or federal law, press for re-incarceration for those with probation or parole violations, serve outstanding warrants, etc. (these meetings came to be known as "lever-pulling" meetings in some sites; others referred to them as notification meetings). For those who wanted to "change their ways" and pursue a non-criminal lifestyle, the "carrot" would then be offered by social service, faith, and community representatives. Jobs, vocational training, mentoring, tutoring, and other forms of assistance (e.g., tattoo removal) were offered.

[4] In addition to specific deterrence approaches, some sites pursued general deterrence via media campaigns to increase awareness of the stiff penalties for violent crime and gun violations. (discussed under "prevention" below). Offenders targeted for lever-pulling meetings were also asked to "spread the word" among associates about the severity of federal prosecution.

The nine sites varied in the number and emphasis placed on lever-pulling meetings. Indianapolis, for example, held dozens of meetings, ultimately meeting with several hundred chronic offenders, while Portland only held a couple of meetings with just over 40 individuals. Portland, however, concentrated more on the carrot side of the equation. There were also variations across and within sites in the extent to which "swift and certain" action was taken following violent incidents (i.e., the extent to which levers actually got pulled). Geographic enforcement – where a violent crime would be followed by sweeps and warrant serving in the area where the crime took place – were more common than a targeted crackdown on the associates of the suspects.

Indianapolis initiated the earliest homicide reviews, beginning with a Grand Homicide Review covering all 1997 homicides. A second Grand Homicide Review covered 1998 homicides, followed by weekly reviews from the working group. The reviews brought street-level intelligence together with known victim and suspect characteristics data to identify homicides involving chronic serious offenders, the networks and relationships among chronic offenders and associates, and the number of homicides related to illegal drug use and distribution. Indianapolis is also credited with creating an early VIPER (Violent Impact Program Enhanced Response) program, in which serious violent offenders were identified and targeted for aggressive prosecution and supervision. In New Haven, the list was simply known as "the list."

The Memphis project, focused on sexual assault reduction, employed one central law enforcement strategy. New call-out procedures were developed for a 24-hour Sexual Assault Response Team from the Memphis police department, with advocacy services provided by the Memphis Sexual Assault Resource Center.

Innovative prosecution/court and probation/parole strategies

Project Exile – named after Richmond, Virginia's, anti-gun project, where a criminal with a gun was said to forfeit his right to remain in the community. While Project Exile was multi-faceted, its cornerstone was immediate federal prosecution, stiff mandatory federal prison sentences, and "exile" to federal prison.

Nightlight – named after Boston's Nightlight project. Generic form entails probation and police officers teaming together to conduct home visits to juveniles on probation and street patrols to see if these youth are in compliance with curfew and other probation conditions.

Project Re-Entry – a growing national program to assist new parolees in re-entering their communities and adhering to parole conditions. Probation officers (and others) begin working with prisoners in the months prior to their release, and offer various kinds of assistance and warnings once released to the community.

B. Prosecution and Probation Strategies

Prosecution strategies which focused on firearms crimes were commonplace and strongly emphasized in the SACSI project, due to the federal/USA emphasis on gun crimes, federal support for gun prosecutors, and a push for ATF/FBI/DEA involvement with local law enforcement and prosecutors. The major gun prosecution model was Project Exile, in Richmond, Virginia, viewed by practitioners as an "unqualified success" in removing violent criminals from the streets and changing attitudes about illegal gun possession among criminals and criminal justice system representatives alike (Comey & Miller, 2002). New Haven's TimeZup project is a typical prosecution approach found in SACSI. Every gun-related crime was reviewed by the U.S. Attorneys' Office with input from local prosecutors and law enforcement agencies. A decision was made to take the case if it met federal standards for prosecution and if they deemed that federal prosecution would have a greater impact than pressing state charges. Their goals were to achieve longer incarcerations, persuade defendants in state courts to plead guilty and to plead guilty earlier in the process, and get the word out about the longer sentences, thus serving a deterrent effect on gun crimes.

A key component of prosecution efforts under SACSI was the unprecedented cooperation between federal and state/local prosecutors. They reviewed cases together to determine in which system the case would be tried and shared information and resources. In Portland, the cross-designation of state prosecutors as federal Assistant U.S. Attorneys was heralded as a major achievement.

In Indianapolis, a Firearms Unit was created in the police department, staffed by two sergeants, a county prosecutor, and representatives of the Indiana State Police, ATF, and U.S. Attorneys' Office. The principal goal of the unit was to increase the successful prosecution of illegal firearms possession and firearms crimes; one approach was to train law enforcement officers to build stronger cases for prosecution.

Probation officers were recognized as critical central partners in the SACSI approach. Their special authority to search and often drug test probationers and parolees at will, and require them to attend lever-pulling meetings was used frequently. Probation officers, often paired with police officers, were key players in lever-pulling, Nightlight, and Project Re-Entry strategies, and participated in the development of VIPER type lists. In Portland, probation officers were also the primary resource for referral to jobs, job training, and other assistance.

Following the lead of pioneering programs in Portland and Boston ("Nightlight"), officers from the Tennessee Board of Probation and parole rode with Memphis police officers to check up on probationers/parolees during evening hours. Home visits by police and probation teams were a signature activity in Indianapolis. In St. Louis, Project Nightwatch was implemented as a citywide program. Police and probation officers make home visits to juvenile probationers together, often in the evening hours, to check on curfew and other probation conditions.

Portland was one of the earliest cities to launch a Project Re-Entry program, which was initiated in 1999. Visits were scheduled with soon-to-be-released gang members while still in prison to establish a release plan and a visit was made to the prisoner's family. A home visit was made immediately after release, and assistance was to be provided in establishing and working with the release plan. Probation officers, police officers, and outreach workers were to make the visits together, each emphasizing different aspects of the release plan, expectations, and requirements, but most of the work fell to the probation officers. A limited outcome evaluation conducted by the local SACSI research team suggested this re-entry program had a good success rate in terms of reducing the occurrence of serious offenses in the paroled group.

C. Prevention Strategies

As mentioned previously, prevention strategies that did not involve enforcement took a back seat in most SACSI initiatives.. Even where prevention was emphasized, the first public SACSI strategies undertaken were enforcement-oriented. Memphis tackled sexual assault problems primarily by changes in "call out" procedures, which relied on law enforcement and victim advocates, home visits to probationers, state prosecution, and a school-based prevention programs. Community- and service-oriented prevention strategies were more prevalent and robust in sites with broad-based representation in the core group and one or more strong non-law enforcement partners.

The Portland SACSI project placed substantial emphasis on the "carrot" side of the deterrence model. The core and working groups held only a few lever-pulling meetings, but concentrated on providing services to the 40 high risk offenders who attended, with the main objective to help them achieve sustained employment. Thus, mentoring, tattoo removal, clear

driving records, obtaining a GED, and other vocational services were stressed. Probation officers, social service agencies, and community organizations were most active in these efforts, although their efforts were hampered by a lack of resources.

In Indianapolis, a local 10 Point Coalition was formed among pastors and volunteers from nine churches, patterned after the Boston 10 Point Coalition. The Indianapolis 10 Point Coalition, while not a member of the core group, provided services to lever-pulling meeting attendees (and re-entry inmates later in the program) and many high risk offenders the members encountered on weekend night street outreach efforts. The local Weed and Seed program and the Westside Concerned Ministers also provided assistance. Prevention/intervention services including job training, job placement (40 good-paying highway construction jobs were filled), substance abuse treatment, tutoring, GED assistance, and mentoring individuals.

Innovative Prevention Strategies

ER Trauma Intervention – St. Louis and Atlanta developed emergency room-based programs to gather information (for research and prosecution) and to provide police and social service interventions at a critical moment when the victim, family, and friends are available and attentive.

Faith-based coalitions – Several sites developed coalitions of churches patterned after Boston's 10 Point Coalition. Church leaders and organizations provided prevention and intervention services, especially mentoring, street outreach, and job assistance.

Winston-Salem's SACSI project was also heavily involved in prevention and intervention, with services provided by probation officers and the faith community. Several new intervention/prevention initiatives were launched in addition to more typical prevention activities (e.g., mentoring for youth, family-based services, job skills training and placement, and after-school activities). A program called Operation Reach was instituted to provide services after lever-pulling meetings. These services – provided by teams composed of a police officer, court

counselor or probation officer, minister, community representative, and street workers – were an important component of the interventions.

In Memphis, a sexual assault prevention program for city schools was developed and presented as part of the SACSI project. Indianapolis formed a partnership with a top-notch innovative ad agency and launched the *You Can't Take Back the Violent Act* campaign, including hundreds of posters in key locations, 50 billboards citywide, and public service announcements. A similar partnership was formed in St. Louis, where the communications agency FUSE developed a public awareness campaign focused entirely on the five years of federal prison time possible if a felon carries a gun. Using segmented marketing strategies, over 10,000 posters were distributed in the target area and radio spots were aired on stations popular with the target group.

VII. Impact of SACSI

The impact of SACSI on crime is examined in two ways: (1) by reviewing and synthesizing the available evaluation findings produced by local researchers and (2) by compiling and comparing relevant UCR crime data for SACSI and non-SACSI sites before and after the introduction of these initiatives.

A. Impact of Phase I Reported by Local Researchers

The local SACSI researchers were full partners in the SACSI projects and were involved in research, problem analysis, strategic planning, and strategy assessment. They were also asked to conduct an outcome evaluation of their partnership's efforts. Table 7 presents a summary of each site's primary outcome measures, data sources, analyses, and results, drawn from the local researchers final reports (McGarrell & Chermak, 2003; Betts, Henning, Janikowski, Klesges, Scott, & Anderson, 2003; Hartstone & Richetelli, 2003; Kapsch, Louis, & Oleson, 2003; Easterling, Harvey, Mac-Thompson, & Allen, 2002.).

For the central impact assessment, each of the five sites relied on reported crime data obtained from their local police departments, either UCR Part I crime figures or more narrowly defined categories. Indianapolis and New Haven used virtually identical outcome data, namely reported crime figures on homicide, assaults with a firearm, and armed robbery. Winston-Salem focused exclusively on juvenile violent crime, including sexual and weapons offenses. Portland and Memphis relied on UCR Part I violent crime categories. The analyses ranged from simple graphs presenting annual figures to time series designs using weekly statistics. Memphis, New Haven, and Portland used citywide crime statistics to compare rates before and after the introduction of SACSI. Indianapolis compared pre- and post-crime rates in a specific target area

Table 7
Outcome Measures and Results
Reported in SACSI Phase I Final Reports

	Indianapolis	Memphis	New Haven	Portland	Winston-Salem
Primary outcomes measures	# of homicides reported weekly, Jan 97 to June 01. # of aggravated assaults with a gun and armed robberies reported weekly, Jan 98 to June 01.	# of forcible rapes reported annually, 1997-2001 Violent crime rate, 1997-2001.	# of homicides, assaults with a firearm, and armed robberies reported annually, 1994-2001. # of CFS for shots fired annually, 1996-2001. # and types of firearms seized by NHPD annually, 1995-01. # of federal gun prosecutions annually, 1998-2001. # of days from arrest to state court dispo, annually, 1998-01.	# of homicides, rapes, robberies, and agg. assaults reported annually, 1994-2000. # of 911 calls for shots fired, assaults, shootings, and armed robberies, monthly, 1997-2000.	# juveniles involved in any violent crime (SACSI defined as homicide, rape, agg. assault, robbery, kidnaping, sexual offenses, weapons offenses), quarterly, Jan 98 to March 01. # juveniles involved in robbery, quarterly, Jan 98 to March 01.
Data source	Indianapolis Police Department	Memphis Police Department	New Haven Police Dept. U.S.A.O. State court case files	Portland Police Bureau	Winston-Salem Police Department
Analyses	Time series, using April 99 (sig. no. of lever pulling meetings, Brightwood gang targeted) as intervention point.	X-Y graphing of five annual figures and rates.	X-Y graphing of annual crime figures and comparison of avg/year pre (1994-97) and post (1998-2001) SACSI. Prosecution data: no. per year reported in bar graphs, changes in average per year over time.	Simple bar graphs of annual figures, X-Y graphing of monthly CFS, with trend line, comparison of pre (1994-1997) to post (1998-2001) SACSI figures.	X-Y graphing of annual figures, with comparison of pre and post Sept 1999 (the implementation of Notification meetings), city-wide versus the four target neighborhoods.
Primary results	City-wide: 32% decrease in homicides between pre (n=149) and post (n=101) period. 19% decrease in gun assaults, 8% decrease in armed robberies. Target neighborhood: 53% decrease in gun assaults, 44% decrease in armed robberies.	City-wide: Forcible rape declined from 938 to 480 from 1997 to 2001. Violent crime was down in 1997-1999, up in 2000-2001.	City-wide: Violent gun crimes: averaged 719/yr, 1994-97; 487/yr, 1999-2001. 566 in 2001. CFS for shots fired: averaged 1439/yr, 1996-97; 1075 in 1998; 727/yr in 1999-2001. 750 in 2001. Number of firearms seized: 376/yr, 1995-97; 361 in 1998; 300/yr 1999-2001.	City-wide: In pre-SACSI years, person crimes decreased 11% and murders decreased 4%. In post-SACSI years, person crimes decreased 29% and murdered decreased 36%. CFS for shots fired: pre 1997, about 300/month. 155/month in 2000. CFS, 1998-2000: Assaults down 8%, shootings down 37%, armed robberies down 31%, stabbings down 15%.	In four SACSI Neighborhoods: 128 juvenile incidents pre-SACSI vs. 104 post, a decrease of 19%. Juvenile robberies alone were down 58%.

	Indianapolis	Memphis	New Haven	Portland	Winston-Salem
Other studies and results	1. Small changes in the nature of homicide noted over time – fewer with firearms, more stabbings; less gang and drug involvement; increase in DV homicides. 2. Process evaluation of the partnership – lots of Lessons Learned. 3. Effectiveness of lever pulling meetings – Attendees not less likely to recidivate than comparison group. LE believeability mixed. Little linkage to services, few lifestyle changes. 4. General deterrence (from ADAM interviews) – little awareness of IVRP, VIPER, mtgs, etc. More awareness of probation contacts/sweeps, police stops. 5. VIPER – increases in prosecution of homicide and firearms charges but not others.	1. Study of 24-hour call out – agency cooperation not great but found increase in victim cooperation, contact with advocates. 2. Survey of MPD officers to understand attitudes and competencies. 3. Survey of school counselors.	1. Pre/post fear of crime community survey, 1998 and 2001 – more positive about quality of life, less fearful of crime, more likely to believe gun-carryers will be arrested, less likely to have heard gunshots. 2. Survey of partnership members – interventions views as successful. 3. Outcome study of lever pulling meetings – perceived seriousness high, 60% no violations during supervision period. 4. Federal prosecution increased. Of 44 indictments, 40/42 guilty so far. 5. State firearms cases – 70% got jail time, threat of fed. prosecution expedited state plea bargains.	1. Outcomes of Stop the Violence meetings – message heard, few reported carrying a gun, but don't feel less likely to commit crime. Have desire for change and improvement while denying personal responsibility. 41 attendees followed up – no deaths, 8 arrested on firearms charges within a year. 2. Outcome of Project Re-Entry – 47 clients, 72% success rate excluding minor, non-violent offenses. 3. Interviews and surveys with target offenders on wide range of issues. 4. African American Parole Program Evaluation – arrests similar to comparison group but lower among those more serious about the program.	1. Partnership survey and interviews – views about process and effectiveness were positive. 2. Notification meetings – interviews with 11 attendees, they heard the message. 3. Outcome study of lever pulling and Operation Reach – 10% re-arrested, 10% identified as suspects; same rate as comparison group.

to the entire city, and Winston-Salem presented pre- and post-figures in four target neighborhoods. While both these SACSI programs were city-wide, the intervention efforts tended to be concentrated in particular neighborhoods where the violent crime was highest. The researchers chose to focus their outcome assessments in those neighborhoods, although Indianapolis conducted a city-wide and target neighborhood-specific analysis.

Indianapolis based its time series design on the impact point of April 1999, when a significant number of lever-pulling meetings had occurred and actions were taken against a .

neighborhood-based gang, and Winston-Salem used September 1999 as its impact date separating the pre- and post-periods, again because a significant number of notification (i.e., lever-pulling) meetings had occurred by that date. Other sites simply used the year SACSI started (1998) as the dividing point, comparing years before and after 1998.

Each site reported dramatic decreases in their target crimes, as highlighted below:

Indianapolis:

- 53 percent decrease in gun assaults in target neighborhood vs. 19 percent decrease citywide.
- 44 percent decrease in armed robberies in target neighborhood vs. 8 percent decrease citywide.
- Time series indicates a 32 percent reduction in homicide citywide during the year after interventions occurred in the target neighborhood

Memphis:

- 49 percent decrease in forcible rape citywide after the introduction of SACSI.

New Haven:

- 32 percent decrease in violent gun crimes citywide after the introduction of SACSI.
- 45 percent decrease in calls-for-service for "shots fired" after the introduction of SACSI.

Portland:

- 42 percent decrease in homicide citywide after the introduction of SACSI.
- 25 percent decrease in other violent crimes citywide after the introduction of SACSI.

Winston-Salem:

- 19 percent decrease in juvenile incidents in target neighborhoods after the introduction of SACSI.
- 58 percent decrease in juvenile robberies in target neighborhoods after the introduction of SACSI.

The four sites using lever-pulling approaches evaluated their impact on offenders, with mixed results. In three sites, the researchers found that the offenders who were interviewed had indeed "heard the message" about new violence bringing swift and certain law enforcement

action. Recidivism rates were more difficult to evaluate. New Haven found that 40 percent of the attendees had probation violations following the lever-pulling meetings, while Portland found that almost 20 percent were arrested on firearms charges within a year. (No comparison groups were used, and these figures should be viewed with caution as they are based on small numbers.) In Indianapolis, researchers found that offenders' reactions to the law enforcement message were mixed and they were as likely to recidivate as offenders in a comparison group. In Winston-Salem, where 10 percent of the attendees were re-arrested and 10 percent were identified as suspects in target crimes, researchers found these rates no different from a comparison group. (For more information on the attendees' reactions to lever-pulling meetings, the reader is referred to the Phase I final reports; Portland's researchers include a detailed account of open-ended interviews with attendees and other offenders).

Other notable results were reported in the Phase I reports. Indianapolis' researchers added impact questions about deterrence to the ADAM interviews of arrestees (e.g., were they aware of the lever-pulling meetings and the likely responses of law enforcement to violence?). They found evidence of a general deterrence effect, but concluded that it was due more to offenders' awareness of police stops, probation sweeps, and other law enforcement actions than to their awareness of the lever-pulling meetings and SACSI messages. New Haven was the only site to measure community-wide effects of SACSI and did so using pre and post resident surveys. Researchers found a decrease in fear of crime, an increase in satisfaction with the quality of life, and a heightened awareness that gun-carriers will be arrested. Other results are mentioned in Table 7 and can be viewed in detail in the Phase I reports.

B. Impact of all 10 SACSI Sites Based on UCR Data

We conducted an independent analysis of impact in all 10 sites, using UCR data from 1994 through 2003 and several different types of comparison groups. The intent was to place these SACSI city crime trends in the context of regional crime trends among cities of similar size. These analyses provide additional comparisons when addressing the question of whether SACSI may have contributed to these downward trends in violent crime or whether these crime patterns were occurring regionally or nationwide in non-SACSI cities as well.

The UCR analysis is more conservative than the analyses conducted by the individual sites, since the Part I crimes are proxies for the more narrowly defined target crimes in each site (e.g, several sites focused on assaults with a firearm, while the closest Part I category is aggravated assaults), some sites focused on geographic areas in addition to their citywide efforts (although prior studies show that a small number of offenders – typically the SACSI targets -- account for a majority of the crime in a city), and the degree of equivalence to the matched comparison sites can always be argued. Citywide UCR data also provide a high bar for the three cities which targeted youth violence specifically. Yet the value in this analysis is that the results will either support the local researchers large and substantial positive findings or suggest that SACSI had no effects or limited geographic effects. We recognize that this analysis cannot definitely establish that SACSI was the primary cause of any observed changes (rather than SACSI in combination with other anti-crime efforts, for example) or identify which strategies within SACSI were the most influential (e.g., lever-pulling meetings, job assistance, police/probation home visits, federal gun prosecutions, etc.). The process information, however, will be used to flesh out the analysis results. The year the SACSI projects began (1998 for Phase I sites and 2000 for Phase II sites) was selected as the intervention point between pre- and post-SACSI time periods.

Figures 11 and 12 present Part I homicide rates for the Phase I and II sites respectively (note data are missing for New Haven for 2002-2003). As shown in Figure 11, homicide rates began to fall several years prior to SACSI in the Phase I sites (and most had already been focusing on firearms violence prior to the federal funding) and continued to drop after SACSI strategies were initiated in 1998. This was true for the two sites which targeted youth violence specifically, Portland and Winston-Salem. In New Haven, a slight rise is noted after 1999, although the number of homicides is small and do not rise to the pre-SACSI level. Of interest is a similar rise in homicide in Memphis beginning in 1999 – Memphis serves as a natural control

Figure 11: Homicide Rates, 1990-2003, Phase 1 Sites



Figure 12: Homicide Rates, 1990-2003, Phase 2 Sites



group to the other Phase I sites for measuring their effectiveness in reducing homicide, as the SACSI project there was focused only on sexual assault. In Memphis, the increase in homicide post-SACSI also does not reach the pre-SACSI level. In the other three Phase I sites, homicides continued to go down or remain steady post-SACSI.

In Phase II sites (Figure 12), homicide rates in Atlanta and Detroit steadily decreased over the pre-SACSI years then remained at a lower level post-SACSI. In Rochester, where youth violence was targeted, and Albuquerque, homicide rates remained fairly level throughout the 1990s and after SACSI was implemented. In St. Louis, homicide rates fell rapidly in the mid-

1990s, then remained level until SACSI was implemented. Post-SACSI, St. Louis' homicide continued to decrease.

We also examined violent crime rates using an index that combines homicide, sexual forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Violent crime rates in the Phase I sites (Figure

13) follow a similar pattern to homicide. With the exception of New Haven (where rates started to decline in the early 1990s) rates began to drop in the years just prior to SACSI, then continued to decrease after strategies were implemented in 1998. Again, the figures for Memphis (and possibly New Haven) show violent crime going up after 1999 (rape accounts for only about 8 percent of the violent crime figure).



Figure 14 indicates that violent crime rates in the Phase II sites are also similar to homicide rates in these cities. Violent crime dropped in most sites following the beginning of SACSI efforts in 2000, particularly in Atlanta and St. Louis. Smaller declines in Detroit and Albuquerque are also noted post-SACSI after slight steady declines pre-SACSI. Rochester's violent crime rate rose to pre-SACSI levels after the start of the SACSI program.



During this same time period, how were other cities of similar size performing? To provide more comparative information, Figures 15 and 16 graph the homicide and violent crime rates of the Phase I sites, the Phase II sites, and all cities with 100,000 or more in population. The results indicate that before 1998-1999, the Phase I, and particularly Phase II sites had much higher homicide and violent crime rates than all cities with a population over 100,000.

Figure 15: Homicide Rates, 1990-2003



All cities over 100,000 began experiencing small drops in these crime categories in the early to mid-1990s. The SACSI sites continue to show declines after 1998-1999, while in cities with 100,000+ in population, homicide and violent crime rates began to rise again. By 2003, the homicide rate of Phase I sites and all cities with 100,000+ in population were similar. While violent crime rates in the SACSI sites as a whole continued to drop from 2000 through 2003, the During this same time period, how were other cities of similar size performing? To provide more comparative information, Figures 15 and 16 graph the homicide and violent crime rates of the Phase I sites, the Phase II sites, and all cities with 100,000 or more in population. The results indicate that before 1998-1999, the Phase I, and particularly Phase II sites had much higher homicide and violent crime rates than all cities with a population over 100,000. drop in Phase I

sites around the time that SACSI was introduced is more pronounced than the downward trend



shown for Phase II sites (Figure 16).

Because cities of 100,000+ provide only gross comparisons for SACSI sites, we also compared the crime rates of each SACSI site to matched comparison cities chosen geographically and by size (for example, Memphis was compared to southern cities with a population of 500,000-999,999). Six to 47 cities were included in each comparison group, with the exception of Detroit, where Chicago and Philadelphia provided the only geographic and size match. The results are presented in Tables 8 to 10.

The Phase I sites performed well in comparison to their matched cities. In terms of both homicide (Table 8) and violent crime (Table 9), four of the five cities showed larger decreases than their relevant comparison cities, with Indianapolis exhibiting the largest relative declines by far. The overall statistical tests were also significant, indicating that the average homicide and

Table 8
Pre- and Post-SACSI Homicide Rates for Phase I and II SACSI Cities and Comparison Cities

Phase I and Comparison Cities	Pre-SACSI 1994-1997	Post-SACSI 1998-2001	Rate Change[5]	Percentage Change
All Phase I sites	20.4	12.8	-7.6	-37.2
All Cities with population 100,000 or more	9.8	7.3	-2.5	-25.7
Indianapolis (population: 781,879)	29.8	15.0	-14.8	-49.9
Midwestern cities with 250,000-499,999 population	14.9	11.7	-3.2	-21.8
Memphis (population: 650,100)	25.4	21.3	-4.1	-16.2[6]
Southern cities with 500,000-999,999 population	26.1	19.0	-7.1	-27.0
New Haven (population: 123,626)	19.9	12.9	-7.0	-35.0
Northeast cities with 100,000-249,999 population	9.9	7.9	-2.0	-20.4
Portland (population: 529,121)	10.2	4.9	-5.3	-51.7
Western cities with 250,000-499,999 population	12.4	7.9	-4.5	-36.3
Winston-Salem (population: 185,776)	16.9	10.1	-6.8	-40.1
Southern cities with 100,000-249,999 population	13.7	10.1	-3.6	-25.9
Phase II and Comparison Cities	**Pre-SACSI 1996-1999**	**Post-SACSI 2000-2003**	**Rate Change**	**Percentage Change**
All Phase II sites	30.5	27.3	-3.2	-10.6
All Cities with population 100,000 or more	8.2	8.0	-0.2	-3.4

[5] A matched pairs t-test was used to compare the pooled mean differences between each SACSI city and its comparison cities during the pretest period against the pooled differences between these groups during the post-test period. The differences were statistically significant for Phase I sites (t=5.177, p = .001) and for Phase II sites (t=3.715, p = .005), indicating a larger decline in homicide rates for SACSI sites than for comparison cities.

[6] Memphis targeted sexual assault, not homicide (nationwide, sexual assault accounts for 8% of all reported violent crime), and thus is not expected to show significant differences from its comparison cities..

Albuquerque (population: 448,607)	12.0	9.3	-2.7	-22.7
Western cities with 250,000-499,999 population	9.5	8.4	-1.1	-12.3
Atlanta (population: 416,474)	38.5	33.8	-4.7	-12.2
Southern cities with 250,000-499,999 population	17.7	15.1	-2.6	-14.7
Detroit (population: 951,270)	43.6	40.7	-2.9	-6.6
Chicago and Philadelphia (1,000,000+ population)	25.4	21.3	-4.1	-16.1
Rochester (population: 219,773)	19.6	20.2	0.6	+3.5
Northeast cities with 100,000-249,999 population	8.3	8.3	0.0	.0
St. Louis (population: 348,189)	39.0	32.5	-6.5	-16.7
Midwest cities with 250,000-499,999 population	12.8	11.3	-1.5	-11.3

Table 9
Pre- and Post-SACSI Violent Crime Rates
for Phase I and II SACSI Cities and Comparison Cities

Phase I and Comparison Cities	Pre-SACSI 1994-1997	Post-SACSI 1998-2001	Rate Change[7]	Percentage Change
All Phase I sites	1801.3	1274.9	-526.4	-29.2
All Cities with population 100,000 or more	813.4	641.9	-171.5	-21.1
Indianapolis (population: 781,879)	1895.8	986.0	-909.8	-48.0
Midwestern cities with 250,000-499,999 population	1332.6	1070.1	-262.5	-19.7
	1794.7	1511.7	-283.0	-15.8[8]
Memphis (population: 650,100)	1704.1	1318.8	-385.3	-22.6
Southern cities with 500,000-999,999 population	2038.1	1540.9	-497.2	-24.4
New Haven (population: 123,626)	1013.1	860.7	-152.4	-15.0
Northeast cities with 100,000-249,999 population	1776.8	1133.5	-643.3	-36.2
Portland (population: 529,121)	1030.5	756.7	-273.8	-26.6
Western cities with 250,000-499,999 population	1501.1	1202.7	-298.4	-19.9
Winston-Salem (population: 185,776)	1028.0	841.1	-186.9	-18.2
Southern cities with 100,000-249,999 population				

[7] A matched pairs t-test was used to compare the pooled mean differences between each SACSI city and its comparison cities during the pretest period against the pooled differences between these groups during the post-test period. The differences were statistically significant for Phase I sites ($t = 5.285$, $p = .001$) and for Phase II sites ($t = 5.035$, $p = .001$), indicating a larger decline in homicide rates for SACSI sites than for comparison cities.

[8] Memphis targeted sexual assault, not all violent crime (nationwide, sexual assault accounts for 8% of all reported violent crime), and thus is not expected to show significant differences from its comparison cities..

Phase II and Comparison Cities	Pre-SACSI 1996-1999	Post-SACSI 2000-2003	Rate Change	Percentage Change
All Phase II sites	2016.3	1701.6	-314.7	-15.6
All Cities with population 100,000 or more	717.0	657.4	-59.6	-8.3
Albuquerque (population: 448,607)	1338.3	1087.4	-250.9	-18.7
Western cities with 250,000-499,999 population	882.1	719.9	-162.2	-18.4
Atlanta (population: 416,474)	3035.3	2386.2	-649.1	-21.4
Southern cities with 250,000-499,999 population	1296.6	1042.9	-253.7	-19.6
Detroit (population: 951,270)	2291.7	2133.6	-158.1	-6.9
Chicago and Philadelphia (1,000,000+ population)	1771.7	1437.8	-333.9	-18.8
Rochester (population: 219,773)	897.8	804.9	-92.9	-10.3
Northeast cities with 100,000-249,999 population	938.8	805.8	-133.0	-14.2
St. Louis (population: 348,189)	2518.6	2095.7	-422.9	-16.8
Midwest cities with 250,000-499,999 population	1213.3	1012.6	-200.7	-16.15

violence rates were dropping faster in the Phase I sites than in the relevant comparison cities. (Memphis' smaller decrease in comparison to similarly sized cities should not be interpreted as a sign of failure, since it targeted sexual assault and not homicide). It should be noted again that two cities focused on youth aged 15 to 24 (Portland) and under 18 (Winston-Salem). These results confirm those presented earlier in Figures 11 and 13.

Phase II site changes in homicide rates were smaller, on average, than those in Phase I sites. Among the Phase II sites, Albuquerque, Atlanta, and St. Louis experienced drops in homicide rates that exceeded their comparison cities, but the other two sites (Detroit and Rochester – which targeted youth violence) did not compare so favorably (Table 8). As a group, however, the statistical test indicates homicide rates declined faster in the Phase II sites than in comparison cities.

In terms of the violent crime index (Table 9), the Phase II sites, on average, also experienced significantly larger reductions than their comparison sites. Four of the five sites out-performed their comparison cities when examining violent crime rates (Rochester, the one city that did not, targeted only youth violent crime). The percentage changes do not look as favorable, but this is due, in part to the size of the original crime rates in each city. (The Phase II SACSI sites began with relatively high crime rates). St. Louis, for example, showed virtually the same percentage decline in violent crime as its comparison cities (around 16%), but in real numbers, the rate of violence dropped 422.9 points versus only 200.7 for comparison cities. Figure 17 displays the figures for Part I rape, 1994-2002, for the Phase I sites. As shown, Memphis, the only site to target sexual assault crimes, experienced a large decrease in reported rape after



SACSI was initiated in 1998. The other Phase 1 sites showed decreases also, although their rates were not as high as Memphis' at the start of SACSI.

Table 10 shows pre- and post-SACSI figures on Part I rape for Memphis and comparison southern cities. Memphis' reported rape rate both pre- and post-SACSI is twice that of the Southern comparison cities, and both reported decreases of 21-22%.

Table 10
Pre- and Post-SACSI Rape Rates

for Memphis and Comparison Cities

Comparisons	Pre-SACSI 1994-1997	Post-SACSI 1998-2001	% change
Memphis (population: 650,100)	127.1	98.6	-22.4
Southern cities with 500,000-999,999 population	63.7	50.6	-20.6

C. Institutionalization: The Transition to Project Safe Neighborhoods

Continued government support for innovative anti-crime initiatives assumes that these efforts are both effective and sustainable. Here the question is, what was the fate of the local SACSI programs? Telephone interviews were conducted with key members of the research teams in early 2004, to discuss the current status of SACSI's key components. All 10 SACSI projects have successfully morphed into Project Safe Neighborhood sites, with firearms crimes the main target and rigorous gun prosecution the signature activity among many other enforcement, supervision, and prevention strategies. Some prevention activities have been lost, but others have been added. Core groups continue to head PSN efforts, and local researchers remain integral pieces of the program. The central SACSI concepts of USA leadership, multi-agency partnerships, data-driven strategies, and local research partners have been institutionalized in the 10 sites under PSN's umbrella.

VIII. Conclusions

A. Impact

Is SACSI an effective anti-violence initiative? In the main, the impact findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the SACSI approach, when implemented strongly, can reduce the rate of targeted violent crime in a community. The impact findings produced by local researchers and reported in the five Phase I reports showed substantial decreases, in many cases exceeding 50%, in the targeted violent crimes. In the sites where comparison areas were used, either neighborhoods or the whole city, the target area decreases were much larger than decreases in the comparison areas. Phase II researchers had yet to complete their local outcomes evaluations at the time this report was written.

The UCR citywide data prepared by the national assessment team, although less precise, place these cities in a national context and confirm the decreases in homicide and violent crime for the majority of both Phase I and Phase II sites. Cities of similar size across the U.S. experienced decreases in violent crime in the late 1990s, but the decreases were significantly greater in the SACSI sites, especially the Phase I sites. In general, Phase I sites had larger decreases than Phase II sites, with Indianapolis, Memphis, Portland, New Haven, and Winston-Salem experiencing substantial reductions in crime for all analyses conducted. Among Phase II sites, St. Louis had the largest decreases in target crimes, and Albuquerque, Atlanta, Detroit, and Rochester also showed positive outcomes on targeted crimes (Rochester targeted youth violent crime, and thus the city's lack of effect on the homicide rate is not surprising).

Without additional experimental rigor, we cannot definitively ascertain whether the reductions in crime were due to SACSI alone, SACSI in combination with other anti-crime strategies, or other factors. But all the SACSI sites built or strengthened existing multi-agency partnerships which successfully launched wide-ranging intervention strategies focused on specific violent crimes, high risk individuals, and high risk neighborhoods. The characteristics which comprise the essential quality of SACSI – strong USA leadership, multi-agency and multi-disciplinary core and working groups, research integrated into planning and problem-solving, and strategies which spanned the continuum of enforcement to prevention – were ably implemented and continued into Project Safe Neighborhoods.

Determining which factors are mostly closely linked to successful outcomes can be difficult. In general, the Phase II sites enjoyed smaller successes than the Phase I sites. The Phase II sites included three of the highest crime cities in the U.S., Atlanta, Detroit, and St. Louis, and several of these sites targeted areas with high levels of concentrated poverty. These conditions would typically hinder the effectiveness of any intervention strategy, yet St. Louis experienced sizable reductions in homicide and violent crime after SACSI was implemented. In terms of the SACSI model, the Phase II sites differed from the Phase I sites in a significant way – they did *not* have full-time project coordinators, which many Phase I partnership members felt was critical to their success.

The process data complied by the national assessment team (discussed below) sheds some light on what worked well in the SACSI sites and what worked less well, but these data cannot explain everything. For example, the key components and strategies of two of the most successful sites were very different. Indianapolis and Portland exhibited especially high success

rates in reducing homicide, with rates 40 to 50 percent lower compared to pre-SACSI levels. Yet their approaches to the SACSI program were quite different. Indianapolis' large core group was comprised predominately of law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, although non-law enforcement agencies and organizations were substantially involved in operational activities. In contrast, Portland had a large, broad-based core group with many non-law enforcement representatives. Indianapolis was extremely focused on enforcement and suppression activities, and held lever-pulling meetings with a large number of potential offenders, while Portland worked with just a small number of high-risk offenders and emphasized the prevention/intervention strategies. The Indianapolis partnership had an excellent, long-standing relationship with the local researcher, who functioned as one of the key leaders during the SACSI years. The local researchers in Portland conducted a variety of studies that informed the implementation of SACSI strategies over time, but were most valued in their role as senior advisors to the partnership. Although differences are noteworthy, all SACSI initiatives exhibited the common features noted above and were committed to working within the context of an interagency partnership. The main strengths and weaknesses of the primary SACSI components are summarized below.

B. Partnership Composition, Structure, and Leadership

Half of the SACSI core groups consisted entirely of law enforcement and criminal justice agency representatives, while the other half were more broad-based, encompassing social service agencies, other city agencies, non-profit organizations, schools, the faith community, and others. The sites with the largest decreases in target crimes, however, were more apt to have board-based core groups – these sites include Portland, Memphis, Winston-Salem, and St. Louis, and while

Indianapolis' core group was comprised of law enforcement and criminal justice representatives, the SACSI program also had strong support from faith-based and social service partners in working groups.

Both types of core groups appeared to function without substantial difficulty, suggesting that "one size fits all" is not the best policy recommendation. Throughout SACSI, the satisfaction, interest, and motivation of members remained high for all groups.

Groups where law enforcement agencies were heavily represented emphasized enforcement and suppression strategies from the start. These were easier to launch quickly than intervention and prevention strategies, with or without new information from the researchers. This is partially due, of course, to differences in resources. A police department, for example, can launch directed patrols or sweeps by simply reallocating resources to the target, while it is much more difficult for a faith-based organization to staff a significant street outreach effort. But the decision to emphasize law enforcement strategies goes beyond the level of resources available. Core groups with heavy representation by law enforcement, as well as the some of the other sites, readily embarked on the enforcement and suppression strategies because they were familiar and were expected to yield immediate results. Prevention activities were planned for much later in the implementation period, and in many sites, were quite meager. When asked about problems that inhibited their SACSI projects, a lack of funding and personnel were at the top of the list, followed by a lack of commitment and productivity.

The combination of core and working groups appeared to be effective for planning and implementation. Working groups shouldered the lion's share of day-to-day responsibility. Law enforcement working groups were particularly active, and, one suspects, particularly effective.

Non-law enforcement teams had more difficulties carrying out their responsibilities. This, again, may be due to a lack of resources (how much time can agency representatives devote?) as well as less support from the core groups and more uncertainty about strategies. Non-law enforcement groups can bring new and diverse perspectives to the table, but in several of the SACSI sites, non-law enforcement partners and strategies received little attention. In particular, schools, youth organizations, the juvenile justice system, and juvenile probation were rarely included in working groups, let alone the core groups.

Adult probation agencies, historically marginalized in law enforcement strategies, played central roles in many of the SACSI strategies, including both enforcement and prevention. They were key players in Nightlight projects, Project Re-Entry, sweeps, home visits and the like, and were instrumental in providing positive services to potential offenders. Differences in philosophy between probation and police officers emerged, but were alleviated with retreats and interagency coordination at the highest levels.

The leadership of the U.S. Attorneys' Office was a key factor in implementation success. The U.S. Attorneys' Office, whether through the U.S. Attorney him or herself or their first assistants, was able to bring key decision-makers to the table and induce them to commit significant resources to SACSI (the in-kind contributions provided locally were substantial). Their involvement was key to sustaining good working relationships among local, state, and federal law enforcement (police departments, sheriffs, ATF, FBI, etc.) and prosecutors (e.g., the USAO and district attorneys). In several sites, turnover in the USAO's office slowed the SACSI project (or even brought it to a screeching halt temporarily) and tended to reduce the activities of non-law enforcement members.

The full-time project coordinators also appear to be important factors in successful implementation of SACSI efforts. They acted, and were viewed, as leaders of the core groups, often credited with seeing that strategies were carried out and that all partnership members followed through. They were especially helpful in working with non-law enforcement members on prevention and intervention activities. Phase II sites did not have the advantage of a full-time project coordinator, while four of the five Phase I sites were supported by such a position. That may have contributed to the functioning and satisfaction of the partnership.

Prior relationships among partnership members, in both core and working groups, helped SACSI get going quickly. Most of the sites had a lengthy history of key law enforcement and criminal justice agencies working together on crime, drug, and gang problems. Some of these prior efforts simply segued into SACSI when that funding became available. Prior working relationships with and among non-law enforcement agencies were less common, but helpful as well. Cities that had developed a culture of conducting business via interagency partnerships found the SACSI approach easy to adopt.

C. Integration of Research

One of the signature components of SACSI was the placement of a local researcher as a key partner in planning, implementation and evaluation of anti-violence strategies. In general, the local researchers were valuable members of the SACSI team who insured an evidence-based approach to problem solving. They were deeply involved in problem analysis using multiple and non-traditional information sources, strategic planning, and the assessment and refinement of strategies over time. Problem identification, however, was not driven by research. Rather, it was driven by local crime rates and public outcry about them, as well as funding and direction from

the federal government. In more than one site, the researchers assumed leadership positions. In the vast majority of sites, researchers appeared to be accepted as full partners, privy to all communications, data, and meetings.

The integration of research into SACSI, however, was not trouble free and provided many learning opportunities for both researchers and criminal justice practitioners. Historically, the relationship between researchers and practitioners has been marked by distrust and lack of cooperation. This is not surprising given that each group brings to the table different objectives, organizational cultures, communication mechanisms, methods for validating ideas, and values. SACSI provided unprecedented opportunities for researchers and practitioners to work together in a constructive manner and provide a learning platform for Project Safe Neighborhoods. Many issues have emerged from this type of action research, including the sharing of sensitive records and keeping separate the roles of researcher and law enforcement practitioner. Researchers must be careful not to overstep their analytic role and become criminal investigators. For example, creating a list of repeat violent offenders – individuals who will then become the target of enforcement and prosecution efforts – is beyond the usual bounds of a researcher's function and raises issues about the protection of human research subjects. Anthony Braga, a member of Boston's original research team, states the problem in these terms: "As a basic rule, none of the informational products produced by the academics should be specific enough to result in persons being arrested as a direct result of data be presenting." (2003, p. 4). More generally, the federal government has created a rigorous system of regulations and oversight to protect the welfare of all persons who are the subject of human research (Office of Human Subjects Research Protections, 2004). Thus, issues such as voluntary consent, confidentiality, and minimizing harm

to the subject can be a challenge for action researchers involved in close collaborative relationships with criminal justice agencies. Many gray areas exist and require further exploration and dialogue.

Differences in organizational cultures between researchers and practitioners were also noted in several sites, with difficulties in seeing each other's point–of-view at times. Practitioners often want actionable information immediately, while researchers need time to collect, clean, analyze, and interpret data. Also, obtaining approval from Institutional Review Boards to interview offenders and others is a time-consuming process. Yet some of the most useful research findings were generated from interviews with lever-pulling attendees and other high risk offenders. These research findings changed how lever-pulling meetings were implemented in some sites to enhance effectiveness.

Despite the many obstacles, SACSI has demonstrated that researchers and practitioners can work together to produce effective, evidence-based anti-violence interventions. Perhaps more importantly, they can learn from each other. Law enforcement can learn about new ways to conceptualize and analyze violence problems in the aggregate, design evidence-based interventions, evaluate program effectiveness, and scan the nation for best practices. Researchers, by gaining access to new types of information and confidential decision-making processes, can learn how street-level and organizational knowledge is generated and begin to appreciate the complexities of organizational and inter-organizational environments. The future success of Project Safe Neighborhoods may well depend on the continued strength of this partnership between researchers and criminal justice professionals.

One of the most successful problem analysis tools in SACSI was the use of homicide and incident reviews. These were a joint product of researchers and practitioners. The researchers often pulled together suspect and victim data, analyzed incidents for trends and patterns, mapped crime, etc, while the practitioners brought a wealth of street-level information to help ground the discussion in real cases and problems. Street-level information from diverse sources (including probation officers and gang outreach workers) and across agencies was vital to strategic planning. But again, the roles for researchers and practitioners should be clearly defined.

SACSI researchers had an impact in diverse other ways. They succeeded in getting practitioners to focus on the most serious offenses and offenders. In Detroit, for example, the practitioners were inclined to view carrying a concealed weapon as a non-serious, non-violent event, but analysis revealed that offenders are likely to have a second felony arrest within a few years. The practitioners began to take these cases more seriously. Researchers encouraged practitioners to think more deeply about their data needs. In Albuquerque, when the research team requested criminal justice data that were not readily available, practitioners were forced to think about why certain data elements were not being collected or how data systems could be structured to make the information for accessible and useful for multiple purposes. In general, SACSI researchers brought attention to the need for outcome data to evaluate the effectiveness of SACSI activities. Researchers also encouraged practitioners to think about patterns of incidents or problems rather than focusing exclusively on single incidents. This also encouraged criminal justice practitioners to think beyond arrest to prevention and proactive policing.

The provision of technical assistance from the Department of Justice and others was viewed as beneficial by most partnership members. While most sites did not take advantage of

the crime mapping assistance offered, the cluster meetings among sites and other experts were considered very valuable. Yet, ironically, this technical assistance had the effect of over-emphasizing the *strategies* of effective programs such as Operation Ceasefire and Project Exile, rather than their *processes* as originally designed. Over time and with the help of local researchers, however, the SACSI sites tailored the canned strategies to meet the needs of their own cities.

D. Problem-Solving Strategies

With the exception of Memphis, the SACSI sites were most skilled at implementing enforcement and suppression strategies. There was a high level of commitment of resources from law enforcement, prosecution, and probation. Many of these strategies were crackdowns, sweeps, and saturation patrols in hot spot areas, which proved to have short-term effects at a minimum. Generally speaking, these strategies are difficult to maintain over the long haul due to resource limitations, and as they are eased, the crime problems can reappear. Systematic re-application is essential to maintain a general deterrence effect.

The newer strategies adopted by most of the SASCI sites included the implementation of lever-pulling meetings, one of Boston's key strategies. Boston, however, had concentrated on organized gangs not found in many of SACSI sites. The local SACSI evaluations that specifically looked at lever-pulling meetings found that there may have been little impact on targeted individuals – while they heard the message, their behavior changed little and the individual/group deterrence model did not have a large effect. One site found that offenders noted the increased police/probation actions without being aware of the emphasis and message from the core group. This may indicate that general deterrence is in effect due to high-visibility

enforcement and lends credence to a hypothesis that it was the crackdowns, sweeps, searches, etc., that led to lower crime. There is also anecdotal evidence that citywide media campaigns heralding certain prosecution and lengthy incarceration, perhaps in federal prison, were also effective (again, supporting a general deterrence model).

Most of the sites implemented new prosecution policies against firearms crimes, following the lead of Boston and Project Exile in Richmond, Virginia. These are the mainstays of Project Safe Neighborhoods as well. There are many individual stories in the SACSI sites of obtaining long prison terms for some of the worst known offenders, sometimes based on minor probation and parole violations rather than new violent crimes. The success of rigorous prosecution was not specifically studied, but may have been a central contributor to reductions in crime, given the number of crimes committed by relatively few offenders.

While they were rarely key players, prevention and intervention partners did influence SACSI strategies and achieved notable success in helping some offenders obtain jobs and other services. This was especially true in Portland, Memphis, and Winston-Salem, where substantial emphasis was placed on community-based services, and where some of the largest decreases in crime occurred. Clearly, the provision of employment, housing, drug treatment, and health services are essential for breaking the cycle of offending and helping high-risk youth begin productive lives. In many American cities, policy makers are beginning to acknowledge the importance of comprehensive partnership approaches to public safety. SACSI was an important building block in this educational process.

IX. References

Betts, P., Henning, K., Janikowski, W., Klesges, L., Scott, H., & Anderson, A. (2003). *Memphis Sexual Assault Project: Final Report.* Memphis, TN: University of Memphis.

Braga, A. (2003). "The participation of academics in the Criminal Justice Working Group Process." Paper prepared for the NIJ Action Research Workshop October 15-16, Washington, DC. Cambridge, MA: Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management of the Malcolm Wiener Center for Social Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

Braga, A., Kennedy, D., & Piehl, A. (1999). *Problem-oriented policing and youth violence: An evaluation of the Boston Gun Project.* Final report submitted to the National Institute of Justice. Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Comey, J. & Miller, S. (2002). Project Exile. *Project Safe Neighborhoods: America's Network Against Gun Violence*. *USA Bulletin*, 50 (1), January 2002, pp. 11-15. Washington, D.C.: Executive Office for United States Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice.

Dunworth, T., Mills, G., Cordner, G., & Greene, J. (1999). *National Evaluation of Weed & Seed: Cross-site analysis*. Washington, D.C., National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice.

Easterling, D., Harvey, L., Mac-Thompson, D., & Allen, M. (2002). *Evaluation of SACSI in Winston-Salem: Engaging the community in a strategic analysis of youth violence.* Greensboro, NC: University of North Carolina.

Goldstein, H. (1990). *Problem-oriented policing*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Groff, E. (2001). *Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI): Enhancing the analytic capability of a local problem-solving effort*. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice.

Hartstone, E. & Richetelli, D. (2003). *A final assessment of the Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative in New Haven*. New Haven, CN: Spectrum Associates.

Kapsch, S., Louis, L., & Oleson, K. (2003). *The dynamics of deterrence: Youth gun violence in Portland.* Portland STACS Project, Research Team Final Report. Portland, OR: Reed College.

Kennedy, D. (1997). Pulling levers: Chronic offenders, high-crime settings, and a theory of prevention. *Valparaiso University Law Review*, *31* (2), 449-484.

McGarrell, E. & Chermak, S. (2003). *Strategic approaches to reducing firearms violence: Final Report on the Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership*. Lansing, MI: Michigan State University.

Office of Human Subjects Research Protections (2004). Homepage http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/.

Roehl, J., Huitt, R., Wycoff, M.A., Pate, A., Rebovich, D., & Coyle, K. (1996). *National Process Evaluation of the Weed and Seed Initiative: Research in Brief*. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice.

Rosenbaum, D. (Ed.) (1994). *The challenge of community policing: Testing the promises*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Travis, J. (1998). "Keynote Address at the National Conference on Community Policing – What Works: Research and Practice." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice Professional Conference Series.