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# **Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative**

**(SACSI)**

**Detroit, Michigan**

**Final Report**

**By**

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The Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative, in Detroit, Michigan, involved a team of Federal, State, and Local agencies that worked together on systematically addressing gun violence in that city (see Appendix 1). The MSU research partnership began work in October 2000 in collaboration with that team. Below we document the process by which the working group chose to focus on a single precinct and the interventions that were undertaken at the working group's direction. Examples of research and analyses that guided this work are presented as accompanying figures.

### ***The SACSI Model***

The Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative rests to a large degree upon the foundation created through the Boston Gun Project. The key components of the approach established in Boston were incorporated into the SACSI approach. Critical to this strategy, and an aspect that is distinctly different from other approaches, is that the process is emphasized rather than focusing exclusively upon implementing specific programs.

The SACSI model is a problem solving process that is based upon crafting data based interventions to address local gun problems. One of the major principals of this approach is that in order to design effective interventions an understanding of the dynamics of gun crime must be obtained prior to program implementation. Traditionally the operation of the criminal justice system has been based upon the processing of individual cases. The SACSI model suggests that although cases will continue to be the "currency" of criminal justice, there should also be an emphasis upon solving problems and not just moving cases to the next stage of criminal justice processing. In this process cases are analyzed to discover patterns and trends that may exist across cases that will reveal the "underlying problem" that can be addressed through

interventions. It is also important that such analysis be conducted within the jurisdiction in which interventions are to be implemented. While in some regards there are similarities across sites in the descriptions of gun violence, upon closer examination, dramatic differences are often discovered. Thus interventions should not just be “imported” from other jurisdictions and grafted on to the local criminal justice system.

Another important characteristic of the SASCI model was the creation of a task force to work together in a collaborative process in the problem analysis and the design and implementation of interventions. While the research partner was responsible for conducting the data collection and problem analysis, this work was to be informed and guided by the task force. In an NIJ assessment of another initiative to establish collaborative teams working on criminal justice system improvement issues, it was noted that a key to the success of these teams was to “teach and help team members to ask the right questions, collect and interpret data, and use data to drive better policymaking and decisionmaking” (Policy Studies Inc., 11, 2004). In addition, the SASCI model also calls for a greater interaction among task force members and consequently an increased sharing of information across traditional criminal justice boundaries.

While this model implies a direct linear flow from problem identification to analysis to intervention, it is rare that the development follows such a straightforward path. The typical process involves many starts and stops as resource issues, personnel changes, and other challenges to implementation are common. This was certainly the case in Detroit as well as other SACS I sites. The following sections chronicle the development and implementation of SACS I in Detroit.

### *Initial Steps: Collecting and Understanding Data*

Data collection, which was facilitated by the FBI liaison to the SACSI working group, involved active collaboration between the Detroit Police Department, Wayne County Community Justice, the Michigan Department of Corrections, and ATF. Michigan State University researchers used these data sources and the advantages of mapping to allow for overlays of corrections data, gun tracing data, and local crime data as well as other sources for a visual representation of the problem of gun violence in Detroit. The working group used this research as a launching point for selecting an area for a focused intervention.

As with any effort of technical assistance, reliance on official data sources presented some problems that should be cautions for similarly situated researchers. Arrests, for example, included no linkage with offense reports in the Detroit police department databases. Thus, there was no way to tie offenders with the locations of specific offenses. Although there was a flag regarding gun involvement in one of the databases on reported incidents, in many cases certainty of gun involvement could only be attained through a review of case files by research assistants or local agencies (for example, the Michigan Department of Corrections personnel hand sorted case files in one office to build a data base for paroled gun offenders, which could be shared with Detroit's police officers involved in the initiative).

**Figure 1** illustrates the degree of gun involvement in various crime types as reflected in official crime reports recorded by the Detroit Police Department for the year 1999. These data were then used to focus on crimes of Carrying Concealed Weapons (CCW), Robbery, and Homicide as offenses in which guns were more likely to be involved. Like many major urban centers, guns and gun-related violence play an important role in the dynamics of violence in

Detroit. A large percentage of Detroit's violent crime involves the use of firearms. For example, slightly more than 80 percent of homicides, 75 percent of robberies, and 35 percent of serious assaults in Detroit involve firearms. These patterns remain consistent across domestic and non-domestic crime situations.

***Models for Intervention: How do we know what levers to pull?***

The toll of gun violence in the 1990's was remarkable in its magnitude and its concentration among youthful minority males (Blumstein, 1995; Cook and Laub, 2002; Zimring & Hawkins, 1997). Public health researchers and social scientists have converged on the issue of illegal guns and gun violence due to its prominence as a national problem and the enormity of the health and social consequences (e.g., Dahlberg, 1998; Wintemute, 2000; Lizotte, Bonsell, McDowall, Krohn, Thornberry, 2002; Braga, 2003). Criminal justice interventions that focused on persons at high-risk for gun violence, such as the Boston Gun Project appear to have had wide-ranging impacts on homicide levels (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, and Piehl, 2001). The precise knowledge about what "levers" (in the parlance of Kennedy, 1997) produce the greatest effects in reducing violence is an area that would yield important research results for policy and practice in criminal justice. In addition, knowledge about the relative effectiveness of specific strategies targeting known offenders would provide insight for strategic police partnerships.

Offender-centered efforts in criminal justice hinge upon the seminal work of Wolfgang, Sellin, and Figlio (1972) that indicated high rate offenders are a relatively rare phenomenon comprising perhaps five percent of the population but accounting for a large proportion of criminal activity. Wright and Rossi (1994) support the notion that gun offending is similarly restricted among serious offenders. Their research indicated that while half of the incarcerated

offenders they interviewed would be considered “gun offenders,” predatory gun offenders are a relatively small subgroup (22%) of all offenders. Lizotte and Sheppard (2001), Tesoriero (1998), and Lizotte, Tesoriero, Thornberry, and Krohn (1994) have done extensive research on gun carrying of city youths in Rochester, New York. Overall that research indicates that a small proportion of the total pool of offenders is at risk for carrying weapons for both defensive (protection) and offensive (committing crimes) purposes. However, according to surveys of youthful offenders from Detroit, who were committed to Michigan prisons, more than 50% reported carrying a gun everyday regardless of the type of conviction offense (Huebner, Bynum, and Hinduja, 2001).

Whether incapacitation strategies focused on such offenders can work is an open question (Blumstein, Cohen, Roth, & Visher, 1986) and whether effects can be detected from efforts at apprehending known offenders is also a testable hypothesis. That police can actively target serious offenders, especially those with a warrant status is not an open question. Martin and Sherman (1986) examined the Repeat Offender Program in Washington, D.C. and found the squad to be quite effective in taking known offenders out of circulation. The effects of such a program on crime are, however, unclear. Sherman’s (1990) own work on police crackdowns indicates that, if a concerted effort were undertaken to maintain surveillance on and apprehend known offenders it would be possible to a.) Incapacitate those that are being held on warrants b.) Communicate to those offenders that the risk of being caught for involvement in criminal activities is raised or at least not calculable as a minimal risk. The former point rests soundly in the ambit of incapacitation, which notes that offenders with high lambdas (i.e., high rates of offending) are likely to have a disproportionate effect on local crime, if they are taken off of the street for a period of time. The latter point rests in the theory of specific deterrence, or rather

Sherman's artful restatement of it: Criminals tend to develop an idea that they are certain that risk of apprehension is low (reversing the use of certainty in Bentham's formulation of deterrence theory).

One could argue that introducing a stimulus into the environment, such as a sustained targeting of known gun offenders, will have an incapacitation effect on those apprehended. It may, however, also have a deterrent effect on offenders, once knowledge of the intervention is communicated. Kennedy (1997), for example, has argued persuasively that the targeting of known offenders is an area where law enforcement efforts can have demonstrable impacts on violence. Rather than adopting a general deterrence strategy that widely distributes scarce resources across a wide area, this approach targets these resources on individuals most in need of police attention.

With respect to the effectiveness of programs that target offenders, the Boston Gun Project (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, & Piehl, 2001; Piehl, Kennedy, & Braga, 2000) illustrates that offender-centered efforts can be extremely effective. Operation Ceasefire, as the Boston Project is also known, focused an enforcement and lever-pulling message to gang-involved youths, with particular focus on gangs involved in violent behavior. The research of Braga, Kennedy, Waring, and Piehl (2001) indicates that Ceasefire yielded a 63% reduction in monthly youth homicides after the program was implemented.

McGarrell, Chermak, Weiss, and Wilson (2002) similarly illustrated that police focused on suspicious offenders in one Indianapolis police beat, that adopted specific deterrence enforcement strategies, produced a measurable decrease in gun crimes. Similarly, Sherman and Rogan's (1995) research in Kansas City also demonstrated the effectiveness of programs focused

on removing illegal guns from the street (and likely those offenders that carry them) in terms of subsequent reductions in gun crimes in target neighborhoods.

This strand of problem-focused research, targeting gun violence, is a departure from prior research that debated the effectiveness of police in controlling serious crime (e.g., Jacobs & Rich, 1981; cf. Wilson & Boland, 1978; Sampson & Cohen, 1988). These three instances noted above, however, illustrate demonstrable impact on serious gun crime using law enforcement intelligence to focus scarce resources on problem individuals.

Another innovation that is important for understanding the changes that accompanied the Detroit SACSI effort is the interlinkage between the police department and other criminal justice agencies, particularly the Department of Corrections. This was informed by other police-corrections efforts that unfortunately remain largely unstudied with respect to effectiveness. Operation Night Light in Boston, the Minneapolis Anti-Violence Initiative, and the Anchorage Coordinated Agency Network (CAN) all represent implemented partnerships. Giblin's (2002) evaluation of CAN, which focused on juveniles, indicated that enhanced supervision was of questionable value, which has been the case of larger evaluations by Petersilia and Turner (1992). No research had been produced with respect to the effectiveness of the surveillance of serious adult gun offenders in conjunction with police assistance. Thus, the evidence of gun violence reductions in Boston that is contemporaneous with the implementation of Operation Night Light (e.g. Kennedy, Braga, & Piehl, 2001) offer possibility that such programs can effectively curtail serious adult crime.

Taken together, these streams of research suggested two avenues of action for the SACSI participants, once problem analysis had been completed. First, spending resources across the entire city or, for that matter, across all offenders, would be unlikely to yield a discernible

change in gun violence. Thus, concentrating geographically as well as on “high-value” individuals appears to be a strategy under which a measurable crime reduction might occur. Second, the compartmentalization of criminal justice, popularized by the diagram of criminal justice case flow can no longer represent reality (Challenge of Crime in A Free Society, 1968: 72-73). Instead, one must expect feedback loops and collaboration between agencies such as police, probation, and parole. The SACSI working group efforts constitutes a demonstration of these two points in action, as resources were targeted and normal criminal justice routines were supplanted with collaboration.

### ***Problem Analysis: The Geography of Gun Violence in Detroit, MI***

Moving beyond simply analyzing trends for major crimes in Detroit, the second level of analysis sought to discern the geographic distribution of crime in the City. There was agreement among the task force that a specific area of the city should be selected in which to focus interventions. Attempting to implement strategies city wide would have diluted the intensity of these efforts and would not have produced sufficient dosage to expect positive results. Thus an initial task was to select an area that was suitable for these gun violence strategies and interventions. Resources could then be focused on one or two precincts with the greatest need and areas within those precincts could likewise be targeted as well.

As illustrated by **Figure 2**, the Detroit Police Department deploys personnel and resources to 13 separate precincts. Precincts are subdivided into 133 Scout Car Areas, which are approximately 1 square mile. Odd numbered precincts are on the east side of the City and even numbered precincts are on the west side. The smaller geographic areas depicted on this map within each precinct represent scout car areas. The City of Detroit also surrounds two cities,

Highland Park and Hamtramck, on all sides (the areas of this map that do not have numbers or grids).

A first step in understanding the gun violence dimensions in Detroit involved the search for spatial patterns and persistence of areas as gun violence “hotspots” over time. These analyses were in response to questions from the task force regarding skepticism regarding the degree to which locations of crime could be “predicted”. These issues arose from police administrators who were primarily concerned with a tactical approach that would focus upon individual incidents. The perception was that robbery was quite mobile and that there was no telling where the next rash of robberies would break out. These analyses demonstrated that although the location of the next armed robbery could not be accurately predicted there were areas of the city that had persistent armed robbery problems. Across the almost two year period there were areas of the city that, in each quarter, were consistently high in the numbers of armed robberies that took place. Thus adopting a strategic approach to addressing robbery in these areas may be productive. This was an important development in the evolution of the task force and the establishment of a strategic approach.

Plotting armed robberies and ranking the scout car areas in terms of their relative quarterly rank in armed robberies helped to determine the extent and persistence of the gun violence problems. The map in **Figure 3** includes reported armed robberies for the period January 2000 – September 2001. Based on a review of the data, scout car areas were defined as “problems” if they averaged one per week during a quarter. Subsequently, this map then presents the total number of quarters each area was considered to be a problem out of the seven quarters of this time period. Dark shades of red indicate chronic problem areas. Several areas of concentration are evident in the 8<sup>th</sup>, 9<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup>, and 12<sup>th</sup> precincts.

Other indicators of violence were similarly calculated across scout car areas within the city of Detroit from sources such as Michigan Department of Corrections records, as well as Court records maintained by Wayne County. A focus on the location of violent incidents such as stranger gun assaults, homicides, and non-fatal shootings during 2000 represented one component of the SACSI group's decision-making. A second component focused upon concentrations of known offenders who had engaged in gun violence. One indicator of such concentrations focused upon scout car areas that had high levels of individuals imprisoned for homicide or armed robbery between 1998-2000. Scout car areas that produced high levels of juvenile referrals for aggravated assault and robbery between 1995-2000 were also considered. In addition, scout car areas with large numbers of probationers serving sentences for assault or CCW were also included as criteria for selecting an intervention precinct. Consonant with the findings shown in Figure 3, precincts 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 had substantial numbers of scout car areas that scored high on indicators of violent incidents and violent individuals.

The SACSI working group convened a selection meeting on March 1, 2001 to determine what precinct would be chosen for the intervention effort. Based on the aforementioned research several precincts had substantial indications of the presence of violent events as well as violent individuals, therefore, a decision was made to look at community characteristics beyond gun violence. Feedback from the initial five SAsCI sites indicated that the selection of the target area should not be based upon crime factors alone. Factors of community organization and support were also critical in building a viable intervention in these cities. Thus, the discussions in Detroit expanded to consider community characteristics in the selection of an area for project focus.

Formally, the working group chose abandoned buildings as a proxy for concentrated community disorganization (80 buildings or more in a scout car area) which existed to some extent across all precincts. **Figure 4** illustrates that the 9<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> precincts both contained areas with more than 150 abandoned buildings, and the 10<sup>th</sup> precinct had moderately high levels across most of its area. The 8<sup>th</sup> precinct, also had areas of high concentration, but it shared an equally large number of scout car areas that did not have extensive abandoned building problems. Informally, the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct was mentioned as having dynamic community meetings at the precinct and was considered as being the area in which community influences might be harnessed to affect violence. The presence of a strong Weed & Seed program shared between the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct and the 12<sup>th</sup> precinct supported that notion as well. At the conclusion of this meeting the working group concluded that they would focus on the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct and include the command staff from that area in future planning meetings to sharpen the problem analysis. Learning from the first round of SACSI sites was important in the selection of an area with viable community groups as well as strong police leadership.

### ***Focusing Analysis on the Eighth Precinct Target Area***

Detroit's Eighth precinct had a population of approximately 106,000 according to the 2000 Census (see **Table 1**). It comprises 14 scout car areas and has an area approximately 15 square miles. The population consists of nearly 90 percent African Americans and 30 percent of the population was at or under the age of 17. Unemployment, though not as high as city-wide statistics, was above 10% and 8% of the households reported receiving public assistance. The table below presents the precinct as an area with poverty as a clear issue, but not necessarily as

distressed as the larger city as a whole, consonant with the criteria for selection as an intervention site.

**Table 1:** Census 2000 Data for the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct and City of Detroit

	<b>8<sup>th</sup> Precinct</b>	<b>City</b>
<b>Total Population</b>	106,330	951,270
<b>Percent Male</b>	45.7	47.1
<b>Percent White</b>	8.1	12.4
<b>Percent African American</b>	89.4	81.4
<b>Percent 17 or under</b>	30.0	31.1
<b>Percent Unemployed</b> (16 and older in the labor force)	10.5	13.8
<b>Percent Households Receiving Public Assistance</b>	8.3	11.4
<b>Percent Household Density</b> (more than 1.51 residents/room)	2.6	3.0
<b>Percent Female Headed Families</b>	43.7	47.5
<b>Percent Families Below Poverty</b>	14.4	21.7
<b>Percent Vacant Units</b>	5.0	10.3
<b>Percent Renter Occupied Units</b>	29.7	40.5

***Crime Patterns in the 8<sup>th</sup> Precinct***

In addition, this precinct had large numbers of non-family gun homicides and gun robberies in the period of 1999-2000 recorded in the official crime reports (see **Table 2**).

Understanding the dimensions of gun violence and its correlates in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct became the first step in providing technical assistance to the working group to assist in formulating an intervention.

**Table 2.** Non-Family Gun Crimes 1999-2001, Detroit's 8<sup>th</sup> Precinct

Year	Homicides	Robberies	Assaults
1999	33	598	341
2000	47	697	346
2001	37	622	370

Data Source: Detroit Police Department Official Crime Reports

Police data were the first source consulted in attempting to sharpen the focus of the extent and nature of gun violence in the Eighth Precinct. This included computerized data files containing arrests, incidents, and calls for service which were used to identify areas with particular problems in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct. Due to data limitations, however, more effective understanding of the crime problem in the precinct was obtained by having researchers code police homicide files for motives, track CCW case processing through the court files maintained by the Wayne County Prosecutor's office, and code the needs present in case histories of probationers and parolees that were 8<sup>th</sup> precinct residents and "gun-involved," and to perform interviews with a small group of gun offenders.

A chart presenting homicide motives for 48 homicides committed in the Eighth precinct between 2000-2001 can be found in **Figure 5**.<sup>1</sup> Homicide analyses confirmed that domestic homicides presented only a small portion of the violence. Not surprisingly, drug involvement, as indicated in **Figure 6**, was present in about two-thirds of the homicides. As a motivating factor it appeared to be present in only 25 percent of the non-family cases. Gang motivation was also absent as a motivating violent factor in Eighth precinct homicides. Prior offending by victims and offenders, as illustrated in 37 homicide cases presented in **Figure 7** indicate that less than half the offenders and victims had prior official records for violent crimes in Detroit. Thus gangs and drugs appeared to contribute somewhat to homicides but a larger overall proportion were

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<sup>1</sup> Incomplete files, files in prosecution, and files not processed from late 2001 limit this to slightly more than half of all homicides committed in that period.

linked to known violent offenders. At the initiation of discussion among task force members there was a view shared by a number of individuals that drugs was at the root of most gun violence in the city. As the above analysis demonstrates although gun offenders may often be associated with drugs, the motivating factor for the incident in most cases was not about drugs or drug territory. This finding appeared to sensitize the task force to a broader range of interventions than may have previously been considered.

A large number of homicides appeared to be a function of the confluence of guns and grievances. Disputes that erupted into lethal violence appeared to be a large problem in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct. The 2002 case of Ajanee Pollard, an 8 year old precinct resident, illustrates a common type of homicide motivation. As reported in the local newspapers, the 8-year old was killed in a drive by shooting (she was not the intended target) over a dispute about a radio sale that allegedly involved counterfeit money. Other cases read by researchers included an instance of an unintentional “bump” in a party store that turned into a fatal shooting. The motives in these events can be best understood in light of comments by a small group of “gun-involved” probationers who were interviewed about the nature of gun violence in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct during the spring of 2002. The insights of the small group of gun offenders who lived in the Eighth precinct and were on probation for gun offenses are summarized below:

- A general agreement that people mostly carry a gun for protection, but separated out those who “are not so smart” from the rest of the population – these are the folks that get into trouble, because they don’t know what a gun can do – they view it as a toy.
- Some carry guns to get back at somebody or get their point across.
- People carry guns because “something is happening every day” but they don’t realize that “bullets have no names and no eyes”
- One participant thought that arguments go bad and guns make them lethal. His knowledge of the dispute in the newspaper is that the two men were acquaintances and that the shooter felt that his “friends had played him.” So he used a gun to prove he was

tough and not a “punk”. The concern with being “punked” was constant across the probationers. No one wants to be disrespected, though they argued that fists (the “ones”) ought to settle the situation.

- The group concurred that consequences were not something you think about on the street. “People have nothing to lose” and they are “trying to get out of THIS situation.”
- One respondent summarized the use of guns: Guns are used to “get out of situations.” “[People] Don’t want to be no punk” but they “Don’t know the consequences.” Younger kids get offended easily and use guns to get respect on the street.

The insight that homicides were often a product of an offender motivated by saving face and having a gun as a tool to ensure that respect was maintained (e.g. Fagan and Wilkinson, 1998) generated several more questions from the working group and inspired the first SACSI intervention effort.

The first intervention effort agreed upon by the working group was “Operation 8-ball” which was planned during the summer of 2001. The operation used a Warrant Enforcement Team approach to warrant violators in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct who were likely to be gun involved based on the types of crime they had committed. Other serious offenders who were wanted on warrants were also included in the grouping for a total of over 200 warrants. The effort was unique because it focused efforts on one area and those offenders that were likely to be gun carriers, which is consistent with the finding that carrying guns was a necessary component for much of the lethal violence in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct. The outcome of Operation 8-ball is detailed in the intervention section below.

The following three questions appeared to be most pressing for the working group: What kinds of crimes do youthful gun carriers get involved in subsequent to gun arrests? What happens to gun offenders caught in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct in terms of criminal justice processing? And

what are the numbers and needs of youthful gun probationers in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct? To be more precise, the working group had asked the first two questions early on in the analysis process. The answers, however, which were being investigated by the research team, were much more germane in crafting an intervention that might affect homicide and gun violence in light of the central role the mere presence of guns played in lethal violence.

Data on 111 youthful (ages 17 to 25) offenders identified as residents of the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct, who were arrested for CCW in 1997, were followed-up through electronic arrest records in 2000 by using a police-generated identification number. The data collection yielded strong links between those offenders caught carrying guns and future offenses (see **Figure 8**). A quarter of the youths caught carrying weapons were arrested for a serious offense (homicide, robbery, assault) likely to involve a gun. Additionally, sixty percent of the offenders had future involvement in serious crimes (as indicated by arrest) if one includes burglary, drug offenses, carrying a weapon, and auto theft in that definition. These findings appeared to coalesce the working group's view that the system response to CCW was not appropriate. Typically in this jurisdiction, CCW offenses were not viewed as being serious crimes since no one was injured. However, given these findings the task force concluded that in many cases involvement in CCW cases served as an indicator of potential involvement in other more violent gun crimes, or at least indicating participation in a gun carrying culture in which the individual may become a victim as well as an offender.

The working group's concerns about the processing of cases through the courts were addressed by an examination of CCW cases that were processed through the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct. Hand searching of paper records in the precinct as well as computer searches of court databases was required to assess the outcome of 122 cases that were initiated by patrol officers in the 8<sup>th</sup>

precinct. **Figure 9** indicates that a significant drop off between arrest and processing through prosecution occurred for these cases. Analysis of sanctions applied to the guilty offenders indicated that probation was the modal sentence and that incarceration only sometimes occurred when the offender had prior felony records. This case tracking effort was a genesis for two working group decisions. First, as noted above, to continue examining the youthful gun probationers as possible candidates for a specialized intensive program and to ensure tighter local and federal prosecution routines through cooperative case processing of felons with firearms. These emphases are similar to what was emerging in other SASCI sites, with one group of interventions focused upon high rate gun offenders or locations and the other emphasizing focusing attention on modifications of the criminal justice system and its processing of gun violence cases.

The former program required the examination of probationer records for offenders identified as living in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct. Michigan Department of Corrections provided addresses of gun-involved probationers which were then plotted by the research team to determine whether they lived within the boundaries of the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct. Needs assessments with regards to drug use, employment and education were conducted by examining the Pre-Sentence Investigation files for 50 of the individuals (see **Figure 10**). The data indicated that while drug use was an issue for one-third of the probationers, 75% had unstable employment and 75% had failed to graduate from high school. Using these data the working group convened meetings with Wayne County Community Justice (the agency that was responsible for community correctional programs), treatment providers, and Work Training programs to create a comprehensive program that would offer services to youthful probationers. In addition, the probationers would also receive visits by police/probation teams in an effort to increase accountability while on probation.

There was a considerable consensus among the working group that creating a specialized gun court for the handling of CCW cases from the Eighth Precinct would constitute a viable and promising intervention. Meetings were held with the relevant decision makers in the judiciary and with other parties to discuss the creation of this specialized court with increased supervision and intervention services for young gun offenders. During the Spring of 2002, it appeared that the creation of this gun court was imminent. While there was a consensus that this was desirable and the court was quite supportive, it ultimately was not implemented. Two principle difficulties arose during this process that doomed this initiative. First, it was imperative that a single judge supervise all the individuals in this caseload in order to insure consistency in response to violations and imposing of consistent supervision and probation conditions. This proved difficult to do due to the complexity of the random case assignment process in the court. Second, there were considerable concerns from the defense bar regarding their perception of increased jeopardy for their clients given the higher level of supervision being imposed. The defense bar wanted some considerations in the form of an expunged charge at the completion of the term of probation similar to the practice in drug court. However, such a proposal for expunging of a gun offense was not acceptable to either the state or federal prosecutors. This was quite frustrating to the working group as considerable time and effort had been devoted to the design and creation of this intervention. This experience certainly points to the difficulty of implementing innovative strategies in a large and complex criminal justice system.

The difficulties of implementing the program with probationers were not present with parolees in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct so the Michigan Department of Corrections and the Detroit Police Department, along with other members of the working group chose to identify gun involved

parolees for a “lever pulling” strategy in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct. This component of the program has been implemented and is detailed below.

### ***SACSI Gun Violence Interventions in the Eighth Precinct***

Two gun violence reduction efforts were undertaken under the umbrella of the SACSI working group. Each was based on the collaborative research between the research partner and the working group. The first, is the aforementioned, “Operation 8-ball,” which was a warrant sweep aimed at gun-involved offenders with outstanding warrants residing in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct. That component of the project was planned during the summer of 2001 and conducted during the last week of September 2001.

The second effort grew out of the intensive supervision, lever pulling meetings, and service enhancement for drug treatment, employment, and training that was proposed for probationers. Since programming for gun involved probationers was not feasible, the working group instead turned to “gun-involved” parolees residing in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct as an intervention group.

### **Operation 8-Ball**

During the summer of 2001 a multi-agency task force including Wayne County Sheriffs and their Warrant Enforcement Bureau, Detroit Police Department, Federal Marshalls, the Drug Enforcement Agency, Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, and the Michigan State Police, among others agreed to target the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct of Detroit for a sweep focusing on known offenders with active warrants. The target offenders were restricted to those that had non-serviced warrants, absconded parole or probation violators, or individuals with *capias* status. The group was further restricted to offenders with “10 year felonies” and gun offenders to ensure that the most serious

group could be the focus of apprehension. The group identified by this process exceeded 200 offenders believed to be active in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct. During a three day period in late September 2001 multi-agency units attempted to serve the warrants during day-light and apprehended 71 individuals from the list of eligible offenders. Verbal communication with the commander of the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct indicated that at least one other known offender on the list turned himself in the following week; for fear that the police were still looking for him.

Records compiled by the agencies indicate that the 71 offenders had the characteristics reported in Table 3: The mean age of the offenders was nearly 32, but 14% were juvenile offenders. Black offenders (89%) and males (79%) made up the majority of the apprehended offenders but the distributions are consistent with general arrest patterns found in the larger city in the period from 2000 through 2002. In terms of status at the time of arrest 39% had a non-serviced warrant (essentially wanted on an offense), 23% were parole violators, and 14% were probation violators. With respect to the most current charge carried by the offender, 20% were wanted for assaults (only 2 were recorded as domestic cases), 9% for robbery, 10% for gun offenses. The prevalence of serious prior offenses lends credence to the assertion that these offenders represented a particularly serious subset of all possible arrestees. In the same month (September 2001), arrestees with charges for either serious assault or robbery made up approximately 7% of the total arrestees booked in Detroit lock-ups city-wide.

**Table 3: Characteristics of Apprehended Offenders**

	<b>Mean</b>
<b>Offender Characteristics</b>	
Age	31.6
Race (1=Black, 0=White)	0.89
Gender (1=Male, 0=Female)	0.79
Juvenile Status (1=Yes, 0=No)	0.14
<b>Arrest Status</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Parolee Violation	23%
Probation Violation	14%
Non-Serviced Warrant	39%
Other Arrest Type	24%
<b>Current Offense</b>	
Current Robbery	9%
Current Assault	20%
Gun Offense	10%
Drug Offense	14%
Burglary Offense	15%
Other Offense	32%

***Assessing the Impact of 8-ball on Armed Robbery***

The research team has conducted analysis on the suppression of gun robberies in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct and several control precincts (see Bynum and McCluskey, 2003 for more details). Data were collected from official crime reports between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2003. Trend data were compiled to represent monthly totals of non-family, armed robberies involving guns in each precinct. Gun robbery was chosen since it represented a gun victimization that typically involves strangers that might be most likely affected by focusing on incapacitating known serious offenders. Large changes in homicides were unlikely to be observed since the number is fairly small and assaults are especially reliant on classification of victim-offender

relationships by the police. Thus robbery represented a crime where victim-offender relationship was least likely to be an issue and produced a count that was sufficient to discern changes between pre and post intervention periods. Single series can be analyzed using an intervention analysis approach, but to strengthen the quasi-experimental design we also included control series from an adjacent precinct (6<sup>th</sup>) and a non-adjacent precinct (10<sup>th</sup>). This strengthens inferences as to whether the observed effects are genuine impacts of the operation and subsequent SACSI efforts or whether a decline or increase was experienced in contiguous or non-contiguous places, which might suggest a diffusion of benefits or displacement effect (Braga, et. al. 1999).

With respect to mean level changes, T-tests of the pre and post intervention monthly mean levels of robbery indicate that there was a significant decline in robbery in the 8<sup>th</sup> (11.2 fewer per month) and 10<sup>th</sup> (5 fewer per month) precincts. A decline in the 6<sup>th</sup> precinct of 2.5 robberies per month occurred but was not statistically significant. **Figure 11** presents the monthly trends for each of the three precincts gun robberies for a visual representation.

**Table 4: The Distribution of Robbery in 3 Precincts, 60 monthly observations recorded Jan 1999 – Dec 2003**

	<b>Overall</b>			<b>Pre- Intervention</b>	<b>Post Intervention</b>
	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Mean</b>
Eighth Precinct Robbery	47.9	17	81	52.9	41.7*
Sixth Precinct Robbery	27.0	14	52	28.1	25.7
Tenth Precinct Robbery	21.6	9	41	23.8	18.8*

\*T-test of the mean difference between pre and post intervention observations is significant.

Time-series techniques are more appropriate for modeling the effects of the interventions (McDowall, 1980) since trends in the data may over or understate the differences in the preintervention and post intervention means. Following McCleary and Hay's (1980) Diagnosis, Identification, and Estimation steps as outlined in traditional ARIMA intervention analysis we estimated separate models for each of the three precincts. Auto correlation functions (ACF) for the pre-whitened and whitened series are presented in Figures 12-16. Results from the analysis are in Table 5 along with Box-Ljung Q-statistics, which indicate that the series had been reduced to the requisite white noise prior to the estimation of the models.

**Table 5: A Monthly Intervention Analysis for the 8-ball Initiative in Three Precincts**

	8 <sup>th</sup> Precinct		6 <sup>th</sup> Precinct		10 <sup>th</sup> Precinct <sup>a</sup>	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	52.04*	2.57	28.06*	1.64	23.82*	1.13
phi-1	0.11	0.13	0.22*	0.12	-	
phi-2	0.24*	0.13	-		-	
8-ball	-9.27*	3.74	-2.10	2.43	-5.00*	1.68
Box-Ljung(12 lags)	15.1 <sup>b</sup>		9.96 <sup>b</sup>		12.6 <sup>b</sup>	
Box-Ljung (24 lags)	34.0 <sup>b</sup>		23.66 <sup>b</sup>		24.24 <sup>b</sup>	

a. 10<sup>th</sup> Precinct analysis did not require ARIMA, Ordinary Least Squares results are presented

\* p < .05, one tail test

b. Box-Ljung statistic is non-significant, indicating intervention analysis could be performed on the diagnosed series (note, in the case of the 10<sup>th</sup> precinct, the series had no evidence of autocorrelation)

Overall, with respect to the impact of 8-ball across the three precincts, it appears to have had a significant and negative impact on (reduction of) robbery in the 8th precinct but the 10<sup>th</sup> precinct, which is not contiguous, also experienced a significant decline in gun robberies. The 6<sup>th</sup> precinct (a bordering precinct) showed no significant change in robberies after the intervention. Three explanations seem possible. First, those responsible for robbery in the 8th may also have been active in the 10<sup>th</sup> precinct, and to a lesser extent in the 6<sup>th</sup> precinct. The non-

significant results for the 6<sup>th</sup> precinct, however, indicate that a geographically closer precinct had no discernible change in robbery, which makes this explanation questionable. Second, it is possible that other interventions in Detroit have affected robbery in the 10<sup>th</sup> precinct, but they are unknown to us. Finally, it is plausible that there is a general trend towards less robbery across all precincts, or at least the three included here. Nevertheless, the extent of the decline appears greatest in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct where a 21% decline was recorded compared to 18% and 11% declines in the 10<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> precincts, respectively. Thus, one could argue that, at the very least, the slope of the decline in robbery was increased by the initiation of operation 8-ball and other SACSI initiatives in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct. The measurement of the enhanced parolee supervision that commenced the summer of 2002, while not necessarily being directly attributable to the decline in gun robberies, was focused on “gun involved” parolees residing in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct. Thus, the SACSI working group did continue to focus on likely gun offenders within this geographic area. Next we will explore the nature and extent of enhanced supervision in the context of the Detroit, MI SACSI program and generate some measures of program inputs and outputs for individuals in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct from the summer of 2002 through December 2003.

### **Gun-Involved Parolee Supervision Component**

The second strategy for addressing gun violence adopted by the working group was the Detroit SACSI Parolee initiative. Prior to the commencement of this initiative the pre-sentence investigation (PSIs) reports of active parolees who had evidence of current or prior gun offenses and resided within precinct boundaries were examined by the research team. A total of 42 offenders convicted of gun crimes were initially placed in this program that combined the efforts of Michigan Department of Corrections (DOC) and the Detroit Police Department. At the

conclusion of the SASCI project there were approximately 70 individuals on this specialized caseload.

The enhanced parole supervision was initiated on July 11, 2002 when two groups of gun involved parolees, those over and those under age 30, were convened in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct's meeting room. Additional meetings were held approximately every 5-6 months for new parolees. Speakers delivered a message of accountability and support. The meeting was chaired by the Weed and Seed Coordinator in this precinct who set the tone for this meeting by indicating that the community did not want these individuals to either again be a perpetrator of gun crimes nor did they want them to be a victim of gun violence, either of which was quite likely to happen if they adopted their previous lifestyle. This theme was reinforced by other speakers including the U.S. Attorney, executives from Michigan's Department of Corrections, the Weed & Seed Coordinator, the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct Commander, and a reformed offender. Each of the sessions lasted approximately one hour and served both as notification that the precinct police and parole office would be visiting each offender more intensively and an opportunity for offenders to avail themselves of community resources. The following items capture the core of the message delivered:

- Parolees have done their time for their offenses;
- It is time for the parolees to rejoin the community as members;
- The community does not want to see the parolee as a victim or offender in the future;
- If parolees persisted in committing future gun crimes, they will be subject to enhanced federal penalties.

It should be noted that the opportunity to engage enhanced services for parolees was curtailed by the changes in the local economy. Access to extensive employment assistance and treatment programs were to be a significant aspect of this component of SACSII. However, services beyond those generally available to the entire pool of parolees in Detroit, did not materialize. Thus, it was decided not to focus data collection on any services that these parolees might have received, since only those typically available to parolees, contrary to the program's intent, were available.

After collecting baseline data on the parolees assigned to this caseload, a matching procedure was used to identify appropriate parolees similar to those individuals assigned to the SACSII caseload. A data file containing information on all active Parolees in Detroit was provided by the Michigan Department of Corrections. Individuals were matched on race, sex, offense type, and age, and approximately 5-6 potential matches were initially selected and then grouped with each of their respective SACSII parolees. At this point, a specific individual was randomly selected from the grouping of 5-6 potentials. In order to obtain the salient information required for scientific comparison and analysis, the pre-sentence investigation (PSI) reports of the SACSII parolees and each of their matches was coded. Some examples of pertinent quantitative information culled from the PSIs included: demographics, current offense data, juvenile and adult criminal history, use of alcohol and illegal drugs, education, work experience, family characteristics data, and physical and mental health background. PSIs were coded by a group of researchers from Michigan State University (MSU) in a manner that sought to eliminate variability through standardization of the interpreting and recording of data. The vast majority of these PSIs were available from the agents at the Outer Drive Parole Office in Detroit. A contingency plan for coding also existed, so if the case file of the matched parolee was

unavailable, the next person in their respective grouping was selected. To note, a small proportion of case files had to be obtained from the Central Records office in Lansing because the parolee had either been sent back to prison for a violation or new crime, absconded, or was discharged.

This coding process was repeated at three other intervals to ensure that the records collected by MSU were up-to-date and corresponded with those in the Outer Drive Parole Office throughout the duration of this project. As mentioned, the coding of the first group of SACSI and matched parolees took place in July 2002. MSU records were updated with new SACSI parolees and new matched parolees in September 2002. In April 2003, the SACSI caseload was shifted to another Outer Drive parole agent and the list was updated the third time. Finally, the list was updated in February 2004 with new SACSI additions and matched parolees.

An enumeration of specific data collected by MSU is warranted. Drug test dates and results were gathered for both SACSI and matched parolees to compare frequency of testing, positive results, and the type of drug identified. With regard to services and counseling provided to parolees, the specific program name, the start date, dates missed, whether the parolee successfully completed the program, and the frequency of his/her attendance were sought. Unfortunately, the services and counseling component of the SACSI initiative fell short of initial expectations due to resource constraints and did not provide an acceptable number of measurable instances. Non-drug violations were also compiled and compared between the SAsCI and match group, as well as the resultant disposition and whether parole was revoked. Various types of contact data were also collected. Efforts sought to differentiate among contacts that happened at home from those that happened in the parole office, as well as whether contacts were made via the telephone. Other contact verifications were made at the parolee's residence, employment

location, and assigned treatment center or program. Cumulatively, these data provided a substantive picture of the extent that SACSI programming truly differed from the programming received by non-SACSI parolees, and whether the targeted effort actually resulted in fewer instances of recidivism (whether through new technical violations or new crimes).

During the course of the program the supervision was extended to all gun parolees in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct regardless of age (this occurred in September 2002) and a “rolling” admission and graduation from the program generated changing numbers of program participants. The size of the monthly comparisons ranges from 46 to 71 parolees on enhanced supervision from the July 2002-December 2003 period. The research team documented both the intensity of supervision and several official outcomes for parolees in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct as compared to their city wide control group on a case by case basis with the assistance of the Michigan Department of Corrections. This has been aggregated to a monthly caseload level for comparisons between the control group and the enhanced supervision group for purposes of this report. Monthly data were collected from January 2002 through December 2003 for both the control and enhanced supervision groups. The four important questions we can address with these data include: Did the parolees in the enhanced supervision group actually receive more intensive supervision after the program started in July 2002? If so, how much and what types of contact did they receive? Was the change in supervision levels significantly different from similarly situated offenders drawn from other areas of the city? Did the enhanced supervision group have a significantly different level of violations compared to the control group? The first three focus on the process of the enhanced supervision and the last addresses whether the program had any effects in terms of substantive case outcomes.

The first comparison made was the level of home contacts that the enhanced supervision group involved parolees in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct received before and after the implementation of the program. Six months of contact data were available for the group initially assigned to enhanced supervision. By way of comparison to the caseload, once enhanced supervision began a statistically significant difference in home visits (a more than 5 fold increase) but a significant and perhaps expected decline in the level of phone contact with parolees was apparent. The level of home contacts with parolees approached one visit face-to-face per month subsequent to the program’s implementation. Little change in office contact levels indicates that this added effort was not supplanted with reduced contact in that area.

**Table 6: Levels of Monthly Contact for Parolees Pre and Post Supervision Enhancement**

	Overall				Pre	Post
	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Enhanced	Enhanced
Home	0.06	1.82	0.63	0.48	0.15	0.79*
Office	2.03	3.21	2.72	0.28	2.83	2.69
Phone	0.19	1.05	0.55	0.23	0.79	0.47*
Collateral	0.63	1.80	1.16	0.28	1.26	1.13

\* p < .05 two tailed t-test

The question remains, however, whether the group was treated differently in terms of levels of contacts that were received by other parolees in different parts of the city. The short six-month pre-observation period was thus augmented by following a cohort of matched parolees for month-by-month comparisons to determine whether the difference in supervision was significant. The 18 months for which we have aggregate data on contacts compiled across the groups we found the enhanced supervision levels, in particular home visits, were exceptionally high compared to the control group parolees.

The graphs in **Figure 17** and **18** illustrate the comparison of contacts between the two groups at home and in terms of office visits. Over the 18 months of enhanced supervision the 8<sup>th</sup>

precinct gun involved parolees did receive a higher level of supervision than the cases assigned as matched controls. This is confirmed by t-tests presented in Table 7. The mean level of home contacts per month was .79 for the enhanced supervision group and .13 for the corresponding controls. This is consistent with the five-fold increase for the pre and post enhanced surveillance comparison between the 6 months prior to the establishment of enhanced parole. Similarly, the enhanced group had 2.69 contacts per month in the office compared to 1.88 for the monthly level of the control group. Consistent with increased supervision in all areas the gun parolees in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct also received significantly higher levels of phone and collateral contacts than the match group. This furthers the argument that, at least with respect to surveillance, there was a significant increase in the level of contact between parole officers and gun offenders in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct when compared with city-wide matches. As noted previously, the resources upon which those parolees might have drawn upon were likely very similar to those in the remainder of the city.

**Table 7: Control and Matched Monthly Supervision Levels July 2002-December 2003**

Monthly Level per Parolee	Group	Mean	Std. Deviation
Home Contacts	Control	0.13	0.14
	Enhanced	0.79*	0.46
Office Contacts	Control	1.88	0.23
	Enhanced	2.69*	0.32
Phone Contacts	Control	0.25	0.17
	Enhanced	0.47*	0.19
Collateral Contacts	Control	0.75	0.19
	Enhanced	1.13*	0.30

\* p < .05 two-tail test

One theme that consistently appears in the literature on enhanced supervision (e.g., Turner & Petersilia, 1992) is that the programs often have the adverse or unintended effect of creating more recidivism due to the enhanced supervision. Though this program is aimed

ultimately at community safety, it is important to likewise measure whether the parolees in the enhanced supervision group had higher levels of violations per offender than the match group of parolees. We conducted similar analyses on the pre and post 8<sup>th</sup> precinct group as well as comparisons between the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct and match parolees. Data were collected on substance abuse violations of urine screens, which we argue might measure proactive observation of the enhanced program and a total measure, inclusive of Substance Abuse Testing (SAT) results, which measures parole violations. Contrasts are listed in tables 8 and 9 below.

**Table 8: Monthly Violation Levels for Enhanced Parole Pre and Post Program Implementation**

Violation Type	Program	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
SAT	Pre	6	0.05	0.03
	Post	18	0.09 <sup>a</sup>	0.09
OTHER	Pre	6	0.03	0.02
	Post	18	0.03	0.04

a. Significant contrast at  $p < .05$ , one tail test

**Table 9: Enhanced Supervision Parolee vs. Matches: A Comparison of Violations**

Violation Type	Group	Months Compared	Mean Level per Parolee	Std. Deviation
SAT	Control	18	0.03	0.03
	Enhanced	18	0.09*	0.09
OTHER	Control	18	0.05	0.04
	Enhanced	18	0.03	0.04

\*  $p < .05$  two tailed test

It appears that the enhanced supervision did uncover more substance abuse issues among the parolees, however, other types of violations were not as high for that group. Thus, contacting the gun offenders at home, on a monthly basis, did not appear to increase the levels of violations beyond positive SATs, which is contrary to expectations derived from literature on intensive correctional programming which indicates that as supervision levels increase so do the number

of violations detected. The visits with police, coupled with the group offender meetings, may, however, have reinforced positive behaviors. This is, however; conjecture, since the measures analyzed here are at the aggregate level comparing matches with controls. Further examination of individual offenders' trajectories over the life of the program, and intensity of supervision, would be necessary to understand whether this initiative had more positive effects for certain types of parolees under differing conditions of supervision.

## **Conclusion**

The SACSI effort with regard to enhanced supervision coalesced around identifying a small area where local stakeholders in the precinct and parole office would be willing to cooperate together at the line level. Had the focus of the effort been city-wide it is unlikely that it would have been able to sustain itself for a long period. The partnership between the Department of Corrections and the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct, however, is ongoing and continues to operate beyond the project period.

Similarly, the 8-ball effort also focused on offenders in a small geographic area and galvanized the efforts of local, county, state, and federal agencies to enforce active warrants against 72 offenders within the precinct over the course of three days. This short term enforcement effort represented a concentrated dose (e.g. Sherman, 1990) and appears to have contributed to a significant decline in subsequent robberies in that area.

Both efforts commenced with a problem solving process that involved asking questions such as:

- To what extent are guns, gangs, or drugs associated with violent crime in Detroit?
- Where is gun violence occurring most frequently in Detroit?
- Who is most likely to be involved in that violence?

- How can criminal justice agencies cooperate to address the violence?
- Where might that cooperation be most successful in reducing violence?
- What “levers” are available to criminal justice agencies to reduce individuals’ involvement in violence?

Given these facts and the changes made to routine criminal justice processing in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct under the SACSI initiative, it is apparent that modest and focused change can be obtained through the strategic approach. The interaction between the experience of the SACSI working group and the data analysis that grew out of the discussions of this group produced several dynamic interventions. However, the lasting lessons that emerged from the SACSI in Detroit have implications for this approach in this and other jurisdictions.

The working group was guided by several viewpoints that framed much of the early discussion, data analysis, and direction of the interventions. First, much of the early discussion was concerned with the focus upon enhanced federal penalties for felons in possession of a firearm and how this new “tool” could be used. At one point an experienced police commander stated, “We can get tough all we want but who is going to believe us?” He went on to note that this would be the latest in a long line of talking tough but not being able to deliver on the message. This discussion led to a focus upon what has been termed in other SACSI sites as “system fixes”; ways in which the processing of cases could be enhanced to reduce the “slippage” in the system. Through this discussion enhanced attention was focused upon greater coordination of case processing across the criminal justice system particularly in the Eighth Precinct. Although no data were available regarding this aspect of the initiative, it is likely that these efforts to make sanctions more certain can have a significant impact in improving the response to gun crime.

A second common thread in the discussions among the working group was that, to a large degree, gun offenders operate as if they are invisible to the criminal justice system and in many instances they are correct. Thus additional efforts were discussed regarding how to increase awareness of those individuals potentially involved in gun violence in the target area. Certainly one of these efforts was through expanded knowledge of gun offense parolees in the 8<sup>th</sup> Precinct. The conducting of home visits with the parole officer and precinct special operations officers served not only a deterrence function but also increased the awareness by the officers of the identities of these individuals having a history of gun violence. In addition, toward the conclusion of the SACSI initiative efforts were begun to establish a most violent gun offender program similar to the WOW initiative in St. Louis.


While these were important achievements for SACSI, it is also important to acknowledge a series of challenges that presented difficulties for this initiative. First, the size of this jurisdiction and the complexity of its criminal justice system make changes and system modifications quite difficult. A prime example of this difficulty was the previously discussed initiative to create a gun violence court. A considerable effort was expended by the working group and the research team on program design and significant support and commitments were obtained from other agencies to participate in this component. However given the size of the court and the complexity of its case assignment process (the early identification of 8<sup>th</sup> precinct cases and the subsequent assignment to one judge presented insurmountable obstacles) as well as the entrenchment of the defense bar rendered this considerable effort futile.

Another particular challenge in the SAsCI initiative was the difficulty in maintaining momentum within the working group over the life of the project. During the life of this initiative there were three police chiefs in the City of Detroit. During each of these administrations there


was considerable transfer of personnel across the department and consequently new representation in the working group from DPD. Relationships had to be rebuilt as the new personnel were introduced to the strategic problem solving process of SACSI and new data sharing agreements had to be reached. In addition, with each new administration came personnel changes at the precinct level and new officers and supervisors had to be brought on board and educated regarding the goals, objectives, and operation of the various SACSI components. In addition to the personnel changes within the police department, there were personnel changes regarding the representatives to the SACSI working group from other agencies as well over this life of this initiative. In any organization changes in personnel can bring about variation in the level of commitment to various initiatives.

Regardless of these impediments, the significant achievements of the SACSI initiative in Detroit should not be underestimated. The working group along with the research team conducted a careful examination of the dynamics of gun violence and the manner in which such cases are processed within the criminal justice system. Perhaps for the first time in this jurisdiction, a data driven strategy was put in place to address gun violence in a selected target area. In addition, the working group continues to exist and meets to work on these interventions. Further, relationships have been enhanced across agency lines and a stronger working relationship has been established between agencies, particularly the Detroit Police Department and the Michigan Department of Corrections. These achievements are likely to constitute lasting positive effects of the SACSI initiative in Detroit.


**Figure 1.** Official Crime Reports and Gun Involvement, Detroit Police Department OCR data 1999



**Figure 2:** Detroit Police Department Geographic Deployment Grid




**Figure 3:** Persistent Quarterly Armed Robbery (>15) January 2000-September 2001.




**Figure 4:** Indicators of community stability across precincts


## Quality of Life Indicators Basemap: Abandoned Buildings Overlay: High Felony Drug Incidents (2000)



**Figure 5: Homicide Motives (n=48)**




**Figure 6:** Drug Involvement and Drug Motivation in 37 Non-Family 8<sup>th</sup> Precinct Homicides (2000-2001)




**Figure 7:** Arrest Histories of Victims and Offenders for 37 Non-Family 8<sup>th</sup> Precinct Non-Family Homicides (2000)

**Arrest History of Victims and Offenders:  
Eighth Precinct Non-Family Homicides 2000  
N = 37**




**Figure 8:** Prevalence of Future Arrests for Youthful 8<sup>th</sup> precinct CCW offenders in 1997, 1998-2000 follow-up




**\*Youthful=under 25 years old**

**Serious Gun**= Homicide, Armed Robbery, Gun Assaults; **Serious Personal**=Serious Gun & Any Assaults; **Serious+Drug**=Serious Personal & Burglaries, Auto-theft, CCW, & Drugs; **Any Future**=Any future arrest


**Figure 9:** Case processing of 122 Patrol-initiated CCW cases in Eighth Precinct during 2000




**Figure 10:** Needs Coded from Pre Sentence Investigations of 50 Gun Involved Probationers, ages 17-24 Under Supervision in the 8<sup>th</sup> precinct in 2002




**Figure 11:** Monthly Gun Robbery Totals Jan 1999 – Dec 2003 for Detroit's 6<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup>, and 10<sup>th</sup> precincts, with 8-ball Intervention




**Figure 12:** 8<sup>th</sup> precinct Autocorrelation Function for Gun Robberies




**Figure 13:** 8<sup>th</sup> precinct Autocorrelation Functions for Diagnosed Gun Robbery Series




**Figure 14:** 6<sup>th</sup> Precinct Pre-whitened Series for Gun Robberies



**Figure 15:** 6<sup>th</sup> precinct Autocorrelation Functions for Diagnosed Gun Robbery Series




**Figure 16:** 10<sup>th</sup> precinct Autocorrelation Function for Gun Robberies<sup>a</sup>




a. ARIMA modeling not required since there is no evidence of significant autocorrelation across observations

**Figure 17: Enhanced Parole vs. Matches: Monthly Home Contacts per Parolee**



**Figure 18: Enhanced Parole vs. Matches: Monthly Office Contacts per Parolee**



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## **Appendix 1:**

### **Alphabetical List Agencies Participating in Detroit S.A.C.S.I.**

Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (A.T. F.)

Drug Enforcement Agency (D.E.A.)

Detroit Police Department

Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.)

Michigan Department of Corrections

Michigan State Police

Southeast Michigan High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA)

U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan

Wayne County Office of Community Justice

Wayne County Prosecutor's Office

Wayne County Sheriff's Office