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**Author: David Weisburd, Joshua C. Hinkle, Christine Famega, Justin Ready**

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**Legitimacy, Fear and Collective Efficacy in Crime Hot Spots: Assessing the Impacts of Broken Windows Policing Strategies on Citizen Attitudes**

**David Weisburd**

Hebrew University and George Mason University

**Joshua C. Hinkle**

Georgia State University

**Christine Famega**

California State University, San Bernardino

**Justin Ready**

Arizona State University

Prepared for the U.S. Department of Justice

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## **Abstract**

The aim of this study was to examine the impacts of broken windows policing at crime hot spots on fear of crime, ratings of police legitimacy and reports of collective efficacy among residents of targeted hot spots. A block randomized experimental design was employed to deliver a police intervention targeting disorder to 55 treatment street segments with an equal number of segments serving as controls. The main outcomes were measured using a panel telephone survey of 371 persons living or working in these street segments. Our results showed that the broken windows police intervention delivered to the crime hot spots in this study had no significant impacts on fear of crime, police legitimacy, collective efficacy, or perceptions of crime or social disorder. Perceptions of physical disorder, on the other hand, appear to have been modestly increased in the target areas. The study also did not find statistically significant changes in crime or disorder in official police data, though statistical power for these tests was low as the study was designed around the individual-level tests of the variables discussed above. As a whole, our findings suggest that recent criticisms of hot spots policing approaches which focus on possible negative “backfire” effects for residents of the targeted areas may be overstated. The study shows that residents are not aware of, or much affected by, a three hour per week dosage of aggressive order maintenance policing on their blocks (in addition to routine police responses in these areas). However, this lack of change also challenges the broken windows thesis as we did not find evidence of the reductions in fear of crime, or the increases in informal social control, that would be expected by advocates of broken windows based policing approaches. Future research needs to replicate these findings focusing on varied target populations and types of crime hot spots, while also examining different styles of hot spots policing.

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## **Executive Summary**

In recent years there has been a growing consensus that the most effective police tactics are those that focus police resources on very small areas with a high level of crime problems. These areas are commonly termed hot spots, and a number of experimental and quasi-experimental studies from the mid-1990s on have shown that police can reduce crime and disorder by focusing attention on these areas as opposed to using broader tactics such as random preventive patrol (Braga, 2001; 2005; National Research Council, 2004; Weisburd & Eck, 2004). This body of evidence led a recent National Research Council review on police policy and practice to conclude that focusing "...police resources on crime hot spots provide the strongest collective evidence of police effectiveness that is now available" (p. 250).

Despite this growing consensus over the effectiveness of hot spots policing approaches in combating crime and disorder, the tactic is still not without its critics. Much of the criticism is not focused on the efficacy of the strategy in fighting crime, but rather on the potential for increased police presence and activity in small hot spots to have collateral consequences for residents living in these areas. For instance, some have expressed concern that hot spots tactics risk increasing fear of crime and eroding police-community relations, which may subsequently threaten police legitimacy (Rosenbaum, 2006; Weisburd, 2004; Weisburd & Braga, 2003). These concerns are especially relevant for hot spots policing approaches that aim to reduce disorder and are designed around the broken windows thesis (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). This is because the broken windows thesis suggests that the real benefit of cleaning up disorder in problem areas is that residents will over time feel safer and be empowered to exercise informal social controls and thus return to playing a role in regulating behavior in their neighborhoods.

In this study we present the first experimental data on the impacts of intensive hot spots policing programs employing broken windows policing tactics on citizen attitudes toward the police. Specifically, we examine whether the tactic has an impact on fear of crime, police legitimacy, collective efficacy and perceptions of crime and disorder. The current study was designed specifically to address these issues through a block randomized experimental evaluation of a hot spots policing crackdown on disorder.

### **The Study Sites and Unit of Analysis**


The study was conducted in three suburban cities outside of Los Angeles, CA—Redlands, Ontario and Colton. While the unit of analysis for many measures in this study is the individual, the overarching unit of analysis is the street segment. Questions on the survey bound residents responses to their street segment, and the police intervention was delivered to randomly assigned target street segments. Additionally, measures of crime and disorder from official police data were aggregated to the street-segment level. A street segment (sometimes referred to as a street block in other studies) is defined as the two block faces on both sides of a street. The current study includes 110 street segments (60 in Ontario, 30 in Redlands and 20 in Colton) that were randomized within each city to treatment or control groups. As such, a total of 55 street segments received the police intervention, while 55 others served as controls.

### **The Police Intervention**

Our study examines the impact of a six-month broken windows style policing crackdown on disorder on residents of the targeted areas, in response to recent concerns that such increases in police presence and activity in hot spots may have negative consequences for the community. By design, the intervention did not involve any partnerships with the community as the aim of the study was to directly test the impact of heightened police presence and activity in microplace

hot spots on residents, and we thus did not want to bias these tests by including elements of community-oriented policing. As such, the intervention was designed as an intensive increase in police presence and activity in micro-place hot spots. Specifically, the dosage goal was to achieve an extra three hours of police presence per week in each of the 55 target street segments. While there were some hiccups, the figure below shows that this goal was met over the majority of the study period.

**Figure ES.1: Implementation of police intervention**



Before the start of the intervention police officers in all three departments attended a training session led by members of the research team which outlined the project and provided guidance on what officers were to focus on during their time on the target street segments. The intervention employed in the current study was designed to be consistent with Wilson and Kelling's (1982) suggestions. As such, officers were instructed that they were to not ignore any instances of physical or social disorder they encountered in target areas, but that they had broad discretion in deciding how to address disorder problems. We did not want to employ a zero

tolerance approach, as that is not consistent with the original broken windows model, or Kelling's later writings on the topic (e.g. Kelling and Coles, 1996). In an effort to be faithful to the original conception of broken windows policing, the intervention in the current study had three central principles. First, no discovered physical or social disorders should go ignored by the police in the target segments. Second, social disorder was to be dealt with in an escalating fashion with citations and arrests as the last resort options. Third, the key element of dealing with physical disorder was rapid repair. Police were to notify the relevant agencies for cleanup of graffiti, trash and other physical disorder issues, and then follow up with them if needed to make sure the problems were dealt with as quickly as possible.

In order to monitor the level of police activity in the target street segments, officers were given log sheets to complete after each visit to a target area. In total, these data show that police dealt with 2,025 social incidents and 1,293 physical disorder problems across the target sites over the study period. This was in addition to normal police response to such problems in the context of citizen calls to the police. As such, it is clear that the current study achieved its goal of a significant increase in police presence and activity at microplace hot spots and can thus offer a strong test of the impact of such efforts on residents living and working on street segments that are subject to focused police intervention.

## **Data and Methods**

A key benefit of the current study is the utilization of a telephone survey with a panel design in which the same respondents were interviewed before and after the police intervention to gauge their perceptions of the levels of crime and disorder on their street segment, their levels of fear of crime/perceived safety, collective efficacy and a host of questions relating to residents' opinions of the police. This design allows for an examination of whether the police crackdown



on disorder and crime in the target areas led to changes in these variables at the individual level. In particular, interviewing the same respondents allows for a test of within-individual change in the outcomes of interest from pre- to post-intervention. This is crucial as it represents the first study directly designed to test for potential backfire effects of hot spots policing efforts on residents of the targeted areas.

The pre-intervention survey design called for interviewing both residential and commercial addresses. For residential addresses the first person over 18 in a household willing to participate in the survey was interviewed, while for businesses the interviewers asked to speak with the owner/manager. If the owner/manager was never around, the interviewers asked to speak with the person on site who was in charge of day-to-day operations. The initial sample for the telephone survey was pulled from the PowerFinder software provided by InfoUSA, with additional phone numbers in study segments in Redlands and Colton obtained from the city water departments. All cases on every segment were then exported into a database with one file for each of the 110 street segments. Again, this included both residential numbers and business numbers in our sample. This file was then randomly sorted and the interviewers worked their way down the list until they obtained the desired number of responses for each segment, or ran out of sample to contact. For the post-intervention surveys, the sample was the households and businesses that completed the first survey—more specifically, our design called for interviewing the same person again if possible.

The telephone surveys were collected by a team of undergraduate and graduate students at California State University, San Bernardino. These interviewers were trained by members of the research team, and were supervised by Dr. Christine Famega, who served as Project Field Supervisor for the experiment. Following the training, all of the interviewers worked two pilot

shifts calling residents and businesses in a city removed from the study area before being allowed to call any of the actual study sample cases. The pre-intervention telephone surveys began in early March 2008, and ran through early June 2008. The surveys were completed in early June and the police intervention began on June 16, 2008. Overall a total of 836 responses were obtained on the final 110 street segments. Of these 836 completed surveys, 489 (58.5 percent) were residential surveys and 347 (41.5 percent) were business surveys. The 836 surveys accounted for a response rate of 38.4 percent for the pre-intervention surveys. The cooperation rate, which represented the ratio of completed surveys in sampled households where a member of the interview team spoke directly to a person and were refused or unable to complete the survey, was 46.1 percent.

The post-intervention survey was collected immediately following the end of the police intervention in January 2009 and ran through April. In all 496 completed post-intervention surveys were collected from the 836 household/business addresses that completed the pre-intervention surveys, representing an overall response rate of 59.3%. A total of 496 post-intervention surveys were completed, and 389 were completed with the same person who took the pre-intervention survey. We decided to not include the surveys completed with different respondents as the main advantage of our research design is being able to examine within individual changes after the police intervention by surveying the same respondents at two time points. The final N for survey analyses in the current study is 371 individuals who completed both waves of the survey, as 18 cases were lost during the missing value imputation process as they had too many missing values for the expectation maximization (EM) imputation procedures to be valid.

## Results

Our analysis strategy follows the block randomized design of the study, and is based on ANOVA models that include terms for the police intervention, city (the blocking term) and the interaction between the police intervention and city. The measures of fear of crime/perceived risk, police legitimacy, collective efficacy and perceived social and physical disorder are measured as the pre- to post-intervention changes in each of these dependent variables at the individual level. Two analyses examined change in police calls for service for crime and disorder measured at the street segment level.

### *Fear of Crime:*

A key assumption of the broken windows model is that delivering the tactic to problem areas should reduce fear of crime, and in turn bolster informal social controls. However, this assumption has not been directly tested, and a key goal of our study was to assess whether aggressive order maintenance policing at hot spots would have impacts on fear of crime. Hinkle and Weisburd (2008) have suggested, based on a non-experimental set of analyses, that such tactics may increase fear of crime because citizens may infer from heightened police presence that crime is getting worse on their street. Others such as Dennis Rosenbaum have also suggested that hot spots tactics more generally may increase fear either through the increased presence or a simple labeling affect from having one's home area targeted as a hot spot by police.

Our results do not support either position, and suggest that broken windows policing at hot spots does not strongly influence levels of fear among people who live on affected streets—at least with dosage at the level we observed in the current study. The analysis shows a modest decline in fear in the target areas that was slightly larger than the decline observed in the control

areas, but the ANOVA analysis shows the impact of the police intervention is not statistically significant.

**Table ES.1—Analysis of Fear of Crime: Perceived Risk Measure Mean Change in Perceived Risk: Pre- to Post-intervention by Area**

City	Mean Change	Std. Deviation
Target Segments (N=192)	-1.01	4.51
Control Segments (N=179)	-0.79	4.25

**ANOVA Results**

Source	Type 3 Sums of Squares	df	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	106.760	5	1.114	.352
Intercept	251.159	1	13.106	.000
Treatment	18.257	1	.953	.330
City	35.779	2	.934	.394
Treatment * City	57.650	2	1.504	.224
Error	6994.752	365		
Total	7405.385	371		
Corrected Total	7101.512	370		

R-Squared= .015 (Adjusted R Squared= .002)

*Police Legitimacy:*

Another key concern related to the impact of an aggressive police tactic like broken windows on residents of targeted hot spots is what impacts the approach has on residents’ opinions of the police. As reviewed earlier, in recent years some scholars have begun to raise concerns that hot spots policing in general may lead to dissatisfaction with the police as law-abiding residents begin to feel like targets, rather than partners of the police (Rosenbaum, 2006). Others have noted that this risks subsequently undermining the legitimacy of the police in these areas (Weisburd, 2004; Weisburd & Braga, 2003). The results of our analyses, shown in Table ES.2, suggest little to no impact of the police intervention delivered in this study on ratings of police legitimacy. Legitimacy was slightly down in both the target and control areas and the impact of the police intervention on legitimacy was not significant in the ANOVA model. However, the

decrease was greater in the control areas, which nonetheless challenges any notion of a backfire effect on police legitimacy in the current study. While police attention aimed at disorder at small hot spots in the current study did not bolster opinions of the police, it at least did not appear to undermine them as critics of hot spots policing had hypothesized.

**Table ES.2—Analysis of Police Legitimacy**

**Mean Change in Police Legitimacy Pre- to Post-intervention by Area**

City	Mean Change	Std. Deviation
Target Segments (N=192)	-0.13	2.15
Control Segments (N=179)	-0.35	2.17

**ANOVA Results**

Source	Type 3 Sums of Squares	df	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	18.300	5	.783	.562
Intercept	24.642	1	5.273	.022
Treatment	3.957	1	.847	.358
City	3.666	2	.392	.676
Treatment * City	10.223	2	1.094	.336
Error	1705.719	365		
Total	1745.068	371		
Corrected Total	1724.020	370		

R-Squared= .011 (Adjusted R Squared= -.003)

*Collective Efficacy:*

The ultimate goal of broken windows policing is not to simply clean up disorder at problem areas, nor even to simply reduce fear of crime, but rather to empower residents to engage in informal social control and begin dealing with small problems on their own. As with the other outcomes above, our results (see Table ES.3) suggest the police tactics delivered during the current study had no impact on this outcome. As with the police legitimacy analysis, the results show that collective efficacy was slightly decreased in both areas, with a larger decrease in the control segments. The impact of the intervention on collective efficacy is not statistically

significant in the ANOVA model. This finding is not surprising given the lack of a clear reduction in fear of crime in the target areas in the above analyses—which is the mechanism that the broken windows thesis expects to bolster informal social controls.

**Table ES.3—Analysis of Collective Efficacy  
Mean Change in Collective Efficacy Pre- to Post-intervention by Area**

City	Mean Change	Std. Deviation
Target Segments (N=192)	-0.23	3.39
Control Segments (N=179)	-0.45	3.25

**ANOVA Results**

Source	Type 3 Sums of Squares	df	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	34.898	5	.629	.678
Intercept	19.936	1	1.796	.181
Treatment	1.155	1	.104	.747
City	24.905	2	1.122	.327
Treatment * City	6.429	2	.290	.749
Error	4051.884	365		
Total	4127.901	371		
Corrected Total	4086.782	370		

R-Squared= .009 (Adjusted R Squared= -.005 )

*Crime and Disorder:*

While the above outcomes were the main focus of our study, we also felt it important to examine the impact on crime and disorder. We examined this both by looking at resident perceptions of crime and disorder, as well as police call for service data. For space reasons, these results are not displayed in this executive summary. For the perceptual measures, we found no significant changes in perceptions of social disorder or crime, but did find evidence of an increase in perceptions of physical disorder in the target areas relative to the controls. Perhaps this is due to the police interacting with residents and businesses by asking them to clean up physical disorder, address code violations and so forth, which could have made people more aware of physical problems on their street segments. The analyses of official measures of crime

and disorder, showed no significant changes in calls for service. However, statistical power was very low in these segment-level analyses as the study was designed around the testing the individual-level outcomes.

## **Conclusions**

Our findings provide the first experimental evidence on the effects of broken windows policing at hot spots on citizen perceptions. Our results do not support either the concerns of the critics of hot spots policing (Rosenbaum, 2006; Weisburd, 2004; Weisburd & Braga, 2003), or the hopes of the advocates of broken windows policing (e.g. Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Kelling and Coles, 1996). We do not find, on the one hand, that the level of aggressive order maintenance policing delivered in our study increased citizen fear or reduced perceptions of police legitimacy as hot spots critics have feared. On the other hand, our study also does not provide evidence of short-term effects on reducing fear or bolstering collective efficacy anticipated by the broken windows thesis. We do find a marginally significant impact on perceptions of physical disorder, with people on treatment segments perceiving a relative increase rather than decrease in physical disorder.

Our findings in the citizen survey suggest that ordinary people who live on a street segment are not very aware of the activities of the police. This is the simplest conclusion that can be reached from our data. An assumption that residents are not very much aware of police activities on an everyday basis provides an explanation for why the “negative externalities” of hot spots policing are not observed in our study. Legitimacy evaluations do not decline in this context, and fear does not increase because ordinary people do not have a good deal of interaction with the police. But an observation that ordinary people are not necessarily aware of increases in police activities on their block does not explain why fear of crime does not decline

or collective efficacy does not increase on blocks where the police have worked hard to ameliorate disorder problems.

Following the broken windows thesis, we would expect that police work directed at problem street segments would lead in the long run to improvements in disorder and then reductions in fear of crime. Our study did not have a powerful design to detect impacts on crime and disorder, but irrespective of those impacts, the reduction in fear in the broken windows model was seen to result from the presence of the police in the community and not in any specific reductions in crime. Such reductions were expected to come later in a developmental cycle. We do have measures of the activities of police, and those show that there was concentrated and consistent order maintenance policing carried out through the experimental period. One explanation for our results may simply be that we do not observe these segments long enough. Broken windows theorists argue that there is a developmental cycle (Kelling and Coles, 1996; Skogan, 1990; Wilson and Kelling, 1982), and that cycle may take a long period to reach the stage where citizen attitudes are affected. Accordingly, our study does not show that the broken windows approach “doesn’t work,” but only that the developmental cycle does not appear in the short follow-up period of our study.

Our findings regarding citizen attitudes lead to a series of straight forward policy implications of our work. First, and perhaps most important, this experiment suggests the benefits of hot spots policing are not offset by possible “negative externalities” in regard to ordinary people who live on a targeted street. It may be that we should be concerned with the impacts of hot spots policing on offenders or young people who have more contact with the police on an everyday basis, but increases in police activities at the levels implemented in our study do not lead to large decreases in perceptions of police legitimacy or increases in fear of



crime among residents in general. Hot spots policing programs should not be avoided out of fear of their negative impacts on ordinary citizens. At the same time, we did find marginal increases in evaluations of physical disorder, suggesting the importance of recognizing that citizens may equate more police with more crime and disorder. It may be important for police to deal directly with such perceptions when hot spots policing programs are developed. Perhaps, for example, by interacting with the community and noting the reasons for extra police presence and directly informing citizens when problems are addressed.

On the other hand, our findings regarding fear of crime and collective efficacy should give caution to scholars and police officials who expect that order maintenance policing will have direct and visceral impacts on people who live in affected areas. For broken windows policing to have the long-term effects that have been proposed, police practices would have to be observed and recognized by the vast majority of people who live in crime hot spots. This study suggests that that assumption is not borne out in crime hot spots of the types we have studied. Our work provides a strong challenge to the broken windows policing model. Given its wide adoption, we think it is time for the government and police to invest in critical studies that test assumptions about the impacts of police presence on citizens. We do not suggest that a single study “proves” that no investment should be made in broken windows policing. Indeed, some past studies suggest such approaches are often effective in reducing crime and disorder. However, our study is the first one we are aware of to specifically examine the underlying claims of long-term influences on crime through reduced fear and enhanced informal social control that was first proposed by Wilson and Kelling (1982). Our findings are not supportive of this model.

However, caution is needed as our results are of course based on a single study, using a specific set of strategies, in jurisdictions with only moderate levels of crime. A great deal of

further research is needed to examine whether these findings hold up in other studies that vary strategies and crime levels of jurisdictions examined. This is particularly important as the hot spots of crime in this study have much lower levels of criminal activity than crime hot spots in many other studies conducted in larger, more densely populated urban areas. Additionally, other approaches to order maintenance need tested, as it is possible that more heavy handed crackdowns on disorder may produce different results in terms of impact on crime and disorder as well as any backfire effects.

## **Chapter 1-Introduction**

In recent years there has been a growing consensus that the most effective police tactics are those which focus police resources on very small areas with a high level of crime problems. These areas are commonly termed hot spots, and a number of experimental and quasi-experimental studies from the mid-1990s on have shown that police can reduce crime and disorder by focusing attention on these areas as opposed to using broader tactics such as random preventive patrol (Braga, 2001; 2005; National Research Council, 2004; Weisburd & Eck, 2004). These studies will be reviewed below, but as a whole this body of evidence led a recent National Research Council review on police policy and practice to conclude that focusing "...police resources on crime hot spots provide the strongest collective evidence of police effectiveness that is now available" (p. 250).

Despite this growing consensus over the effectiveness of hot spots policing approaches in combating crime and disorder, the tactic is still not without its critics. Much of the criticism is not focused on the efficacy of the strategy in fighting crime, but rather on the potential for increased police presence and activity in small hot spots to have collateral consequences for residents living in these areas. For instance, some have expressed concern that hot spots tactics risk increasing fear of crime and eroding police-community relations, which may subsequently threaten police legitimacy (Rosenbaum, 2006; Weisburd, 2004; Weisburd & Braga, 2003). Thus it is argued that it is important for studies of hot spots policing to not focus only on reductions in crime and disorder, but to also examine the potential for backfire effects on other outcomes, which may create difficulties for the police or reduce citizen perceptions of legitimacy.

These concerns are especially relevant for hot spots policing approaches that aim to reduce disorder and are designed around the broken windows thesis (Wilson & Kelling, 1982).

This is because the broken windows thesis suggests that the real benefit of cleaning up disorder in problem areas is that residents will over time feel safer and be empowered to exercise informal social controls and thus return to playing a role in regulating behavior in their neighborhoods. However, if the critics of hot spots policing are correct in their hypotheses, a hot spots focused disorder crackdown (meaning an intense increase in police presence and enforcement aimed at ameliorating disorder as envisioned in broken windows policing) may increase fear of crime, rather than decrease it as the broken windows advocates would expect. As such, a central issue for any study of broken windows policing at small target locations is examining the impact the tactic itself has on residents. Indeed, one earlier study of a disorder crackdown at hot spots using non-experimental data found increased fear of crime among residents of the targeted areas, even though disorder was significantly reduced by the intervention (Hinkle & Weisburd, 2008).

In this study we present the first experimental data on the impacts of intensive hot spots policing programs employing broken windows policing tactics on citizen attitudes toward the police. Do broken windows policing tactics at hot spots increase or decrease citizen fear of crime? Do they increase or decrease legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the public? Our study answers these questions using a multisite randomized experiment. The key unit of analysis in our study is crime and disorder hot spots defined as street segments meeting specific thresholds of crime and disorder activity. A total of 110 such hot spots in three California cities, Redlands, Ontario, and Colton were randomized to a treatment condition employing broken windows policing tactics, and to a control condition receiving normal police response. Though we collect data on crime outcomes, as we detail below, our study was designed to provide a powerful test not of the crime control effectiveness of hot spots policing (which has been documented in prior studies) but rather of impacts of broken windows hot spots policing on

citizens who live in target areas. Accordingly, our main outcome measures are citizen attitudes drawn from a two-wave survey conducted on the treatment and control street segments in our study.


### **The Broken Windows Thesis**

In their seminal article published in *The Atlantic Monthly* James Q. Wilson and George Kelling (1982) argued that police could more effectively fight crime by focusing on more minor annoyances which plague communities. This encapsulated both rundown physical conditions in the form of litter, dilapidated buildings, graffiti, etc. as well as social nuisances such as panhandling, loitering and public drinking. Their idea that crime could be prevented through targeting these issues was based on the thesis that such social ills eventually lead to community decline if left untended. If these nuisances, hereafter referred to as disorder, are left untended they eventually begin to accumulate and start a process of community erosion which may eventually lead to crime.

This process begins with disorder not being dealt with in a timely manner. Trash is not picked up; loiterers are not asked to move on. In time this invites more trash being thrown in the vacant lot, more loiterers to gather, and more people to start drinking in public. As this disorder accumulates it sends a message to residents that things are getting out of control and that social controls have failed in their neighborhood. The key here is that residents *perceive* untended disorder. It will likely have little impact if residents are not aware of the disorder in the community. In turn, Wilson and Kelling (1982) suggested that residents who perceive worsening disorder problems eventually become fearful and begin to withdraw from the community. They spend less time outside, become less likely to intervene and ward off

disorderly people, and, in the extreme, “good” residents may move away. The net effect is a lowering of informal social controls, which leads to more and more disorder and minor crimes occurring as people perceive that they can get away with such behavior in these areas where they routinely see disorderly behavior going unpunished. In time, criminals also take these signs of untended disorder as a cue that such a neighborhood is a good place for them to work with relative impunity. In Wilson and Kelling’s terms such neighborhoods are vulnerable to criminal invasion. It is not inevitable, but such places are much more likely, in their view, to see an increase in crime than neighborhoods which exert control in regulating the occurrence of disorder. Once crime occurs, residents also notice this and the cycle of fear and withdrawal is likely to worsen (see also Skogan, 1990). The broken windows thesis, as outlined above, can be visualized as shown in Figure 1.1.

**Figure 1.1- The Broken Windows Thesis**



As such, a main thrust of Wilson and Kelling’s argument was that police could fight crime more effectively by dealing with disorder. If they stop disorder from accumulating and prevent neighborhoods from reaching the tipping point where they become vulnerable for criminal invasion, they can have an impact on serious crime. Wilson and Kelling do not discuss what police may do in neighborhoods already past the tipping point and fully invaded by criminal behavior, but one could infer that cleaning up disorder would still play a role in

restoring informal social control in such neighborhoods and helping residents take back the streets. In any case, their suggestion has had a wide impact on policing over the past 25 years. However, before going into the impact of the broken windows thesis on policing it is important to first examine the theoretical underpinnings of Wilson and Kelling's work.

### **Theoretical Development of the Broken Windows Thesis**

While Wilson and Kelling are credited with developing the broken windows thesis, they were not the first to examine the role disorder played in communities. In criminology, concern over disorder can partly be traced to early research on fear of crime. One issue that drove interest in the topic was a body of research that consistently found that fear of crime had seemingly little to do with crime. For instance, most studies found that females and the elderly reported the highest levels of fear of crime<sup>1</sup> (see Ferraro, 1995 chapters six and seven for a review of studies on these topics), yet the National Crime Surveys conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics consistently showed young males to have the highest rates of victimization. Thus fear of crime did not appear to be driven by actual victimization risk. This notion was furthered by studies finding that fear of crime was not clearly correlated with neighborhood crime rates (Lewis & Salem, 1986) and that while fear increased with increases in crime it did not fall as rapidly when crime declined (Taylor & Hale, 1986). These findings naturally led criminologists to question what was driving fear of crime if it was not crime itself.

A number of studies subsequently turned to disorder to explain fear of crime. For example, James Q. Wilson first noted in 1975 that people were troubled not only by crime but also by “(t)he daily hassles they are confronted with on the street—street people, panhandlers,

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<sup>1</sup> However, Ferraro (1995) notes later that the effects of age on fear disappear when controlling for other factors (p. 70-71).

rowdy youths, or ‘hey honey’ hassles—and the deteriorated conditions that surround them—trash strewn alleys and vacant lots, graffiti, and deteriorated or abandoned housing—inspire concern” (p. 66). Similarly, Garofalo and Laub (1978) stated that “...what has been measured in research as the ‘fear of crime’ is not simply fear of crime” (p. 245) and tied fear to quality of life and concern for the community. Ideas closely related to the broken windows thesis are most clearly seen in work by Hunter (1978) presented at the Annual Conference of the American Society of Criminology. Hunter’s work suggested that disorder affected both fear of crime and actual crime through a process in which disorder signaled to residents that local controls had failed and caused them to become personally at risk of victimization. He suggested that this would increase crime and further increase fear. His work can easily be seen as an early version of the broken windows thesis.

Finally, Wilson and Kelling’s ideas were greatly influenced by a social-psychological study conducted by Stanford psychologist Philip Zimbardo in 1969, as indicated by the detailed discussion of the study in their broken windows article. Zimbardo abandoned a car with its hood up in two places—the Bronx in New York City and on the Stanford Campus in Palo Alto, California. The car in the Bronx was vandalized within 10 minutes, and within 24 hours everything of value was removed. The car in Palo Alto, however, was not touched for more than a week. Zimbardo then smashed the windshield with a sledgehammer, and from that point on people passing by saw the activity and the damaged car and joined in the destruction. This is where the broken windows metaphor came from for Wilson and Kelling and, along with the above work on fear of crime and disorder, formed the basis for their idea that untended disorder is what eventually leads to a neighborhood becoming crime plagued. Just like the broken



window on the car in Palo Alto invited more vandalism, untended disorder is a visual cue in a community which invites more disorder and eventually more serious crime.

While the theoretical underpinnings of the broken windows thesis can clearly be seen in this early work on fear of crime and the Zimbardo study, the law enforcement portion of Wilson and Kelling's ideas were directly influenced by earlier work they had done on policing. Most notably, this is seen in the work of Wilson and Boland (1978) who noted that aggressive policing can reduce crime. Their main point was that police officers may reduce crime not by how many are on patrol, but rather by *what* they do while on patrol. They suggest that if police are aggressive in arresting criminals they can have more of an impact on crime. This idea can be seen as a response to the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, which found that routine patrol had no effect on crime (Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, & Brown, 1974). They used traffic citations as a proxy for aggressive policing<sup>2</sup> and found a negative relationship between police aggressiveness and crime rates.

George Kelling was also greatly influenced by his own earlier work on policing. In particular, the broken windows article (Wilson & Kelling, 1982) repeatedly makes reference to his experience working on an evaluation of foot patrol in Newark, New Jersey (Kelling, Pate, Ferrara, Utne & Brown, 1981). Kelling elaborates on how his experiences on that study showed him that by being active in the community the police could maintain order and make residents feel safer, which could have positive impacts even if the police strategy was not directly reducing crime.

The above discussion lays out the theoretical foundation for Wilson and Kelling's broken windows thesis. It is clear how work both on causes of fear of crime, the Zimbardo study, and

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<sup>2</sup> It is important to note that this method and other parts of their study were critiqued by Jacob and Rich (1980; 1981; see Wilson and Boland, 1981 for response).

studies of specific police practices laid the groundwork for their ideas that police could fight crime by tackling smaller problems—the disorder in a community that made residents fearful and uneasy.

### **Broken Windows Policing-What do we know?**

While the broken windows idea certainly is relevant to the development of communities irrespective of policing approaches (see Skogan, 1990), from the outset Wilson and Kelling (1982) saw the police as a central part of community efforts to prevent the cycle of fear and crime by targeting disorder. For example, they stated that “(t)hough citizens can do a great deal, the police are clearly the key to order maintenance (p. 36)” and that “we must return to our long abandoned view that the police ought to protect communities as well as individuals (p. 38).”

In the two plus decades since its inception, the broken windows perspective has had a significant impact on police strategies. Police agencies throughout the world have adopted the underlying premise of broken windows policing, and it has had a strong impact upon popular police innovations like community policing and Compstat (Committee to Review Research, 2004). A large part of this impact is due to the highly publicized use of broken windows policing in New York City in the 1990s. Broken windows-based policing was a central focus of the efforts of police commissioner William Bratton and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani to clean up the city. Crime decreased dramatically during this period and as such broken windows policing was widely touted as an effective way for police to fight crime (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; DiIulio, 1995; Giuliani & Kurson, 2002; Karmon, 2000; Kelling & Sousa, 2001; Maple & Mitchell, 1999; Silverman, 1999). Nonetheless, more careful reviews of the crime statistics in New York have questioned the assumption of a strong crime control impact. Eck and Maguire (2000), for

example, show that the crime decline in New York started before innovations were introduced by Bratton and Giuliani and that other urban areas experienced similar crime declines. Weisburd, Mastrofski, Willis and Greenspan (2006) show that declines before the implementation of Compstat were found in other cities as well. Bowling (1999) suggested that the decline of the crack cocaine epidemic likely played more of a role in reducing the murder rate in New York than any specific police tactics introduced in the mid 1990s such as zero tolerance policing.

Empirical studies of the New York experience are rare, and the methodological quality is often weak. For example, there is not a single carefully designed field study of order maintenance policing in New York. In this context, studies are generally forced to use existing data and proxy measures for broken windows policing. For example, Kelling and Sousa (2001) found a relationship between misdemeanor arrests and crime in 76 precincts in New York between 1989-1998. They use a multivariate multi-level modeling approach in which the precincts are nested in city boroughs. Based on their findings, they estimated that for every 28 disorder arrests in New York City, one violent crime was prevented. This would account for 60,000 violent crimes prevented in New York City from 1989-1998. These findings have been challenged in a series of papers which have raised questions about the data and statistical approaches used (e.g. Harcourt; 2001; Harcourt & Ludwig, 2006; Taylor, 2006). For example, Harcourt and Ludwig (2006) re-analyzed data from NYC and showed that the reduction in crime was likely due to simple mean reversion—what goes up must come down. However, a study of arrestees in New York found that they were aware of the crackdown on disorder and reported having scaled back their activity as a result, suggesting a deterrent impact of the broken windows policing program (Golub, Johnson, Taylor, & Eterno, 2003).

Other studies have found that broken windows policing tactics likely had an effect on crime in NYC, but that its reach may be more limited than suggested by Kelling and Sousa (2001). Rosenfeld, Fornango and Rengifo (2007), for example, found that broken windows policing was significantly related to declines in homicide and robbery rates, but the magnitude of the impact was relatively modest. Another study found impacts for homicides involving firearms, but not for non-gun homicides (Messner, Galea, Tardiff, Tracy, Bucciarelli, Piper, Frye, & Vlahov, 2007). Finally, Corman and Mocan (2005) found that misdemeanor arrests in NYC from 1974-1999 were significantly, negatively related to robbery, motor vehicle theft and grand larceny after controlling for economic conditions and deterrence, but were not significantly related to the other four index crimes.

Studies outside New York City that examined broken windows policing as a general strategy have produced similarly mixed results. Sherman (1990) found that stepped up enforcement of public drinking laws and parking regulations had no impact on serious crimes, while another study found that increased patrols for disorderly behavior did not reduce robbery or burglary rates (Novak, Hartman, Holsinger, & Turner, 1999). Katz, Webb and Shaefer (2001) found that broken windows policing reduced disorder and public morals offenses such as prostitution but had no impact on serious crimes. Worrall (2002), on the other hand, found misdemeanor arrests and filings to be significantly and negatively related to property crime rates in California.

In one area, the application of disorder policing at crime hot spots, studies give indications of larger and more consistent crime control effects. Below we begin by reviewing the hot spots policing literature more generally, and then focus specifically on disorder policing in hot spots.

## **Hot Spots Policing**

The notion that police can have a larger impact on crime by focusing on small locations that have a large amount of crime problems is a relatively recent idea. While police and scholars have always known that certain areas had more problems than others, it was not until the emergence of theoretical innovations that focused on situational and contextual responses to crime (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984; Cohen & Felson, 1979; Clarke & Cornish, 1985) and technological advances in the form of computerized crime mapping (Weisburd & Lum, 2005; Weisburd & McEwen, 1997) that scholars began to focus on the concentration of crime in very small geographic areas called “crime hot spots” (e.g. see Brantingham & Brantingham, 1999; Crow & Bull, 1975; Pierce, Spaar, & Briggs, 1986; Roncek, 2000; Sherman et al., 1989; Weisburd, Bushway, Lum, & Yang, 2004; Weisburd & Green, 1994; Weisburd, Maher, & Sherman, 1992, Weisburd, Morris, & Groff, 2009). One influential early study, for example, found that only 3 percent of the addresses in Minneapolis, Minnesota accounted for 50 percent of the crime calls for service (Sherman et al., 1989). Weisburd et al. (2004) found not only that there were similar levels of crime concentrations at hot spots in Seattle, Washington (defined as high crime street segments), but also that such hot spots were relatively stable across time.

Sherman and Weisburd (1995) developed the first hot spots patrol experiment in Minneapolis, Minnesota, arguing that focusing police on crime hot spots provided strong potential for developing more effective police practices. The Minneapolis Hot Spots Experiment found that crime and disorder were significantly reduced in 55 target hot spots (generally street segments including adjoining intersections) randomly assigned to receive extra patrols, relative to 55 control areas which received their normal level of police presence (Sherman & Weisburd, 1995). Such a finding was good news for police who had suffered through two decades of belief

that nothing they could do worked in preventing crime after a number of studies found that key police tactics such as random patrol (Kelling et al., 1974), expanding the size of the police force (Levine, 1975), rapid response to calls for service (Spelman & Brown, 1984) and police investigations (Greenwood & Petersilia, 1975) had little to no impact on preventing or solving crimes.

Hot spots policing, and the early studies showing it could reduce crime, were thus welcome news in policing circles, and tactics based on the idea diffused rapidly through the field (see Weisburd & Lum, 2005). Importantly, as the tactic spread it quickly advanced to using more tactics beyond simple directed patrol to fight crime in hot spots. For instance, several studies examined the impact of problem-oriented policing at crime hot spots (see for example, Braga, Weisburd, Waring, Green Mazerolle, Spelman, & Gajewski, 1999; Hope, 1994; Sherman, Buerger & Gartin, 1989; Weisburd & Green, 1995). Others focused on cracking down on particular types of crime in hot spots such as crack houses (Sherman & Rogan, 1995a) and gun crimes (Sherman & Rogan, 1995b).

A systematic review of hot spots policing by Anthony Braga (2001; 2005) identified five randomized experimental and four quasi-experimental studies testing the strategy. Braga found noteworthy reductions of crime and/or disorder in seven of these nine studies, which suggests the efficacy of focusing police resources on small hot spots of crime and disorder. Recent reviews of police effectiveness more generally have also emphasized the promise of hot spots policing, concluding that the most effective strategies are those that focus on small areas with a large number of problems, and employ a wide array of tactics beyond simple law enforcement to combat these problems (see Committee to Review Research, 2004; Weisburd & Eck, 2004).

## **Broken Windows Policing at Crime Hot Spots**

Perhaps not surprisingly given the evidence for the effectiveness of hot spots policing more generally, broken windows policing at crime hot spots has yielded similarly strong results. While the earlier evidence on broken windows policing was very mixed, the small body of research that has examined the impacts of disorder focused policing at crime hot spots has produced promising results. A number of these studies have focused on drug-related crime and related disorder issues. For instance, in the Jersey City Drug Market Experiment Weisburd and Green (1995) examined the impact of a police crackdown on drug activity and related disorder and crime across 56 hot spots. Their results showed significant reductions in disorder calls for service. Drug-related calls were also down, while no significant impacts were found for crime calls (which were not a focus of the intervention).

A study of the SMART program in Oakland, California produced similar results (Green, 1995; 1996). This study involved a police intervention heavily focused on disorder abatement using such tactics as enforcing housing code violations, dealing with abandoned cars, evicting squatters and dealing with various other disorder issues to help fight drug-related crime. Green's study found significant reductions of disorder as well as drug-related problems in the targeted areas. Similarly, the Police Foundation Displacement and Diffusion Study involved intensive crackdowns on prostitution and drugs in two hot spots, paired with a strong crackdown on social and physical disorder. Loiterers were dealt with to keep potential clients away from prostitutes and drug dealers, and physical disorder was eradicated in many cases. For instance abandoned lots were turned into basketball courts and neighborhood gardens in the targeted areas. The results of this study showed significant reductions in not only disorder, but also drug-related crime and prostitution.

Other studies sought to examine the impact of problem-oriented policing (POP) at crime hot spots on disorder and crime. For instance, an experimental study by Braga and colleagues (1999) examined the impact of POP at violent crime hot spots in Jersey City, New Jersey. While reducing violent crime was the goal of the project, many of the problems tackled by police in the hot spots were disorder related issues. Specifically the authors noted that throughout the intervention period officers working in the 28 target hot spots "...generally attempted to control their places by cleaning up the environment through aggressive order maintenance and making physical improvements, such as securing vacant lots or removing trash from the street" (Braga et al., 1999, p. 553). The study found that not only were these efforts successful in reducing disorder, but also in reducing incidents of serious crimes such as robbery.

Finally, another recent randomized experimental sought specifically to examine the impact of disorder-focused POP policing at hot spots of disorder and crime in Lowell, Massachusetts (Braga & Bond, 2008). Specifically, the study examined the impact of three different types of police tactics aimed at disorder in the target hot spots—misdemeanor arrests, situational prevention strategies aimed at physical disorder issues and social service efforts. The main analysis found that as a whole the disorder crackdown significantly reduced disorder calls for service in the target areas and, more importantly, reduced serious crime calls—including robbery, assault and burglary calls for service.

Moreover, Braga and Bond (2008) noted that the strongest crime reduction benefits were produced by the situational crime prevention efforts delivered in the targeted areas. These efforts focused on reducing physical disorder problems which generate opportunities for crime. This strategy very clearly fits with the suggestions of Wilson and Kelling (1982) in their original proposal of broken windows policing that the police can best fight crime by helping clean up



communities. Braga and Bond also found that misdemeanor arrests were associated with declines in crime calls, though the effect was not as great as that seen for the situational prevention efforts targeted at physical disorder problems. As such, they suggest that a pure zero tolerance approach is not the ideal form of broken windows policing.

### **Potential Negative Impacts of Broken Windows Policing at Hot Spots for Residents of Affected Areas**

As the review above makes clear, the application of broken windows strategies to crime hot spots has been found to have strong crime prevention outcomes. Nonetheless, the application of intensive police interventions at crime hot spots raises a series of questions regarding potential citizen responses. Such responses are particularly important for broken windows approaches at hot spots because a key element of the long-term impacts of this approach revolves around its effects on the people who live in targeted places. Wilson and Kelling (1982) did not suggest that police should clean up disorder simply for the sake of having some direct impact on more serious crime. Their hypothesis clearly stated that police efforts in cleaning up disorder should reduce fear of crime among residents. Subsequently, residents who feel safer should be more empowered to exert informal social controls in their communities, and thus play an active role in maintaining order. As such, the key for broken windows policing is not to merely see reductions in disorder, nor even reductions in more serious crime—though that is the ultimate goal. If the broken windows thesis is correct, the real key is that by cleaning up disorder, police will enhance feelings of safety among residents and empower them to exert informal social controls on their own.

The evidence of the impacts of broken windows approaches more generally on citizen fear of crime is mixed. Following the logic proposed by Wilson and Kelling, some studies have

















































































































































































































































































































































Ok, now I'm going to ask you some questions about personal experiences you have may had with the [CITY] police in the past 6 months.

**STOPS**

16. Have you been stopped or questioned by the [CITY] police during the past 6 months?

YES.....1

NO.....0 (**SKIP to Q.21**)

**DON'T KNOW**.....-8 (**SKIP to Q.21**)

**REFUSED**.....-9 (**SKIP to Q.21**)

17. How many times have you been stopped or questioned by [CITY] police during the past 6 months?

\_\_\_\_\_

18. Were you stopped by [CITY] police on your block?

YES.....1

NO.....0

**DON'T KNOW**.....-8

**REFUSED**.....-9

**N/A**.....-99



19. Overall, how satisfied are you with the way in which the [CITY] police handled the situation [DURING THE MOST RECENT ENCOUNTER] Were you...

- Very satisfied .....1
- Somewhat satisfied .....2
- Somewhat dissatisfied or .....3
- Very dissatisfied?.....4
- DON'T KNOW**.....-8
- REFUSED**.....-9
- N/A**.....-99

20. I would also like to ask you about the way you were treated by the [CITY] police officers who stopped you [DURING YOUR MOST RECENT ENCOUNTER]. Please answer yes or no to the following questions.

	YES	NO	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED	N/A
20a. Were the [CITY] police polite to you?	1	2	-8	-9	-99
20b. Did they show a concern for your rights?	1	2	-8	-9	-99
20c. Did they listen to your side of the story?	1	2	-8	-9	-99
20d. Did they ask for all the necessary information?	1	2	-8	-9	-99
20e. Were the police honest with you?	1	2	-8	-9	-99
20f. Did the police do anything that you thought was improper?	1	2	-8	-9	-99
20g. When you think about your experience, do you feel frustrated with the police?	1	2	-8	-9	-99

Ok, now I am going finish up with some questions about yourself.

21. In what year were you born? \_\_\_\_\_

22. **[DO NOT ASK, BUT IS THE RESPONDENT.....]**

FEMALE.....1  
MALE .....0  
DON'T KNOW.....-8

23. Are you currently?

Married.....5  
Single (never married) .....4  
Divorced.....3  
Widowed .....2  
Or Separated .....1  
**DON'T KNOW**.....-8  
**REFUSED** .....-9

24. How much school have you completed?

Some High School .....1  
High School Diploma .....2  
Some College .....3  
College Degree.....4  
Masters/Graduate or Professional  
Degree .....5  
**DON'T KNOW**.....-8  
**REFUSED** .....-9

25. How would you best describe your work situation?

- Working full-time .....1
- Working part-time.....2
- Not working .....3
- Retired.....4
- or some other arrangement .....6
- DON'T KNOW**.....-8
- REFUSED**.....-9

26. Are you currently a full time or part time student?

- Full time .....1
- Part time .....2
- No.....0
- DON'T KNOW**.....-8
- REFUSED**.....-9

27. Including all adults and children, how many people live in your home? \_\_\_\_\_

**(IF 0, MARK Q. 28 AS "NO/0" AND SKIP TO Q. 29)**

28. Do you have children under 18 living with you?

- Yes .....1
- No.....0
- DON'T KNOW**.....-8
- REFUSED**.....-9

29. In the past 6 months, about how often did you read the local newspaper?

Everyday .....	1
Several days a week .....	2
Once or twice a week .....	3
Almost never .....	4
Or not at all .....	5
<b>DON'T KNOW</b> .....	-8
<b>REFUSED</b> .....	-9

30. In the past 6 months, about how often how often did you watch the news on TV?

Everyday .....	1
Several days a week .....	2
Once or twice a week .....	3
Almost never .....	4
Or not at all .....	5
<b>DON'T KNOW</b> .....	-8
<b>REFUSED</b> .....	-9

31. Have you or any member of your household been a victim of a crime in the past 6 months?

Yes.....	1
No.....	0
<b>DON'T KNOW</b> .....	-8
<b>REFUSED</b> .....	-9

32. Do you know anyone else who lives on your block who has been a victim of a crime in the past 6 months?

Yes.....1  
No.....0  
**DON'T KNOW**.....8  
**REFUSED**.....9

33. Would you best describe yourself as.....

White.....0  
African American.....1  
Asian .....2  
Hispanic .....3  
Or some other group\_\_\_\_\_

**DON'T KNOW**.....-8  
**REFUSED**.....-9

34. What is your current annual household income from all sources before taxes.....

Less than \$10,000 .....1  
Between \$10,000 and \$25,000.....2  
Between \$25,000 and \$40,000.....3  
Between \$40,000 and \$60,000.....4  
Between \$60,000 and \$80,000.....5  
More than \$80,000 .....6  
**DON'T KNOW**.....-8  
**REFUSED**.....-9

**END**

Thank you very much for your time and cooperation. Your participation is really appreciated.

As I mentioned before, we would like to contact you in 6 months for a follow up interview. May I please have your first name so that I may ask for you specifically when I call back in 6 months?

**First Name:** \_\_\_\_\_

## **Appendix B: Missing Value Imputation—Comparison of Descriptive Statistics**

This appendix compares the means and standard deviations for pertinent survey items (i.e. those used to create the variables in this study as outlined in Chapter 3) for the imputed data analyzed in this study versus data using listwise deletion of missing values. The left sides of Tables C.1 and C.2 present the statistics with data using listwise deletion, while the right sides of the tables show the statistics for the imputed data. The item names refer to the question numbers in the survey instrument (See Appendix A). Items tagged with “\_recoded” or “\_recode” simply indicate these statistics are on data that were recoded from the numerical values listed in the survey instrument (see Appendix A) as outlined in Chapter 3. The data here show that the imputed dataset is nearly identical to the listwise deletion data in terms of means and standard deviations. Additionally, the valid N listwise vs. imputed presented at the end of the tables show the power benefits gained by maintaining sample size through imputation of missing values rather using listwise deletion. The data analyzed here include every completed survey—including those post-intervention surveys completed with respondents different than those who completed the pre-intervention survey at that address/telephone number. These cases were not used in the analyses in this report, but were included during the missing value imputation process to use the maximum amount of data available to add accuracy and stability to the imputations

**Table C.1—Pre-Intervention Survey Data-Descriptive Statistics for Listwise Deletion vs. Imputed Data**

Descriptive Statistics Listwise Deletion				Descriptive Statistics Imputed Data		
Item	Listwise N	Listwise Mean	Listwise Std. Deviation	Imputed N	Imputed Mean	Imputed Std. Deviation
Q3A_recoded	468	2.869658	0.649574	486	2.867048	0.645569
Q3B_recoded	459	2.932462	0.577803	486	2.9201	0.573555
Q3C_recoded	450	2.793333	0.670372	486	2.802055	0.652941
Q3D	445	2.822472	0.513281	486	2.812955	0.500253
Q4A_recoded	454	2.662996	0.920023	486	2.660318	0.901735
Q4B_recoded	467	3.214133	0.803141	486	3.210361	0.792284
Q4D_recoded	463	3.095032	0.844922	486	3.09269	0.831044
Q5A	468	0.102564	0.303713	486	0.099663	0.299665
Q5B	468	0.166667	0.373077	486	0.165765	0.368253
Q5C	474	0.099156	0.299187	486	0.101068	0.297269
Q5D	468	0.051282	0.220808	486	0.053419	0.21815
Q5E	472	0.173729	0.379278	486	0.174122	0.375207
Q6	467	2.012848	0.96719	486	2.02165	0.953929
Q8	475	1.972632	0.563751	486	1.970695	0.558147
Q9A_recoded	485	2.346392	1.310957	486	2.345938	1.309643
Q9B_recoded	473	2.112051	0.690525	486	2.132022	0.696113
Q9C_recoded	477	2.140461	0.672992	486	2.146169	0.670109
Q9D_recoded	478	2.217573	0.720139	486	2.221468	0.71717
Q9E_recoded	480	2.297917	0.725897	486	2.300196	0.723228
Q9F_recoded	477	2.45283	0.750614	486	2.453584	0.744305
Q9G_recoded	472	1.879237	0.583052	486	1.893157	0.587314
Q9H_recoded	469	1.886994	0.645515	486	1.896895	0.639532
Q10A_recoded	479	0.551148	0.885136	486	0.551232	0.88322
Q10B_recoded	483	0.958592	1.289256	486	0.968576	1.294134
Q10C_recoded	482	0.925311	1.287483	486	0.927877	1.286308
Q10D_recoded	480	1.014583	1.37446	486	1.012877	1.369182
Q10E_recoded	485	1.171134	1.501236	486	1.167607	1.501703
Q10F_recoded	483	0.668737	1.015439	486	0.670735	1.013591
Q10G_recoded	448	0.745536	1.176761	486	0.782216	1.163934
Q10H_recoded	475	0.084211	0.432419	486	0.087962	0.432214
Q10I_recoded	475	0.477895	0.801525	486	0.482928	0.798182
Q10J_recoded	465	0.604301	1.188297	486	0.629214	1.184094
Q10K_recoded	463	0.302376	0.901739	486	0.32806	0.9
Q10L_recoded	468	0.269231	0.614035	486	0.286609	0.630133



Q10M_recoded	464	0.258621	0.638853	486	0.273315	0.642422
Q10N_recoded	480	0.122917	0.413115	486	0.123757	0.411505
Q10O_recoded	474	0.084388	0.320625	486	0.089243	0.319683
Q10P_recoded	470	0.059574	0.236949	486	0.065675	0.238988
Q11A_recoded	481	0.151767	0.392431	486	0.152963	0.390902
Q11B_recoded	483	0.440994	0.595746	486	0.440085	0.594192
Q11C_recoded	482	0.201245	0.440844	486	0.201708	0.439555
Q11D_recoded	479	0.375783	0.534107	486	0.37635	0.530729
Q11E_recoded	481	0.093555	0.31882	486	0.093316	0.317726
Q11F_recoded	483	0.318841	0.588441	486	0.320171	0.589639
Q11G_recoded	477	0.436059	0.666264	486	0.435032	0.661572
Q11H_recoded	472	0.552966	0.72369	486	0.557435	0.71768
Q12A_recoded	485	2.657732	1.265551	486	2.656625	1.264481
Q12B_recoded	474	1.204641	1.344592	486	1.205675	1.332625
Q12C_recoded	473	0.687104	1.045259	486	0.693151	1.038441
Q12D_recoded	472	0.595339	0.914277	486	0.598301	0.907151
Q13_recoded	474	3.92616	0.94948	486	3.925147	0.93971
Q14A_recoded	472	3.260593	0.605963	486	3.25016	0.603288
Q14C_recoded	454	3.156388	0.637144	486	3.137581	0.628332
Q14D_recoded	471	3.218684	0.587956	486	3.207433	0.584945
Q14E_recoded	435	3.114943	0.672455	486	3.092999	0.646449
Q15A_recoded	480	3.202083	0.738726	486	3.199996	0.737092
Q15B_recoded	484	3.721074	0.453523	486	3.720392	0.452783
Q15C_recoded	479	3.394572	0.660331	486	3.392307	0.659362
<b>Valid N (listwise)</b>	<b>228</b>			<b>486</b>		

**Table C.2—Post-Intervention Survey Data-Descriptive Statistics for Listwise Deletion vs. Imputed Data**

Descriptive Statistics Listwise Deletion				Descriptive Statistics Imputed Data		
Item	Listwise N	Listwise Mean	Listwise Std. Deviation	Imputed N	Imputed Mean	Imputed Std. Deviation
Q3A_recode	454	2.735683	0.613105	467	2.733666	0.607146
Q3B_recode	436	2.857798	0.544953	467	2.849542	0.532091
Q3C_recode	434	2.728111	0.615273	467	2.733287	0.598274
Q3D	440	2.915909	0.495742	467	2.912427	0.486432
Q4A_recode	444	2.603604	0.936149	467	2.59798	0.917569
Q4B_recode	454	3.202643	0.834357	467	3.199503	0.824361

Q4D_recode	444	2.997748	0.882483	467	2.992903	0.869226
Q6	458	2.017467	0.909301	467	2.013451	0.903886
Q8	461	1.960954	0.521905	467	1.959479	0.520004
Q9A_recode	458	1.978166	0.748129	467	1.983823	0.747746
Q9B_recode	458	1.984716	0.726029	467	1.99228	0.72707
Q9C_recode	458	2.010917	0.704697	467	2.014324	0.703238
Q9D_recode	459	2.217865	0.776586	467	2.219331	0.772078
Q9E_recode	462	2.251082	0.794332	467	2.250183	0.790407
Q9F_recode	463	2.414687	0.811684	467	2.413081	0.808907
Q9G_recode	457	1.752735	0.616048	467	1.75503	0.611264
Q9H_recode	447	1.749441	0.656013	467	1.762669	0.657892
Q10A_recode	461	0.503254	0.801147	467	0.505986	0.798267
Q10B_recode	464	0.99569	1.170176	467	0.995176	1.169076
Q10C_recode	464	1.165948	1.364643	467	1.166612	1.362335
Q10D_recode	463	1.220302	1.415383	467	1.230114	1.416348
Q10E_recode	465	1.324731	1.497099	467	1.328258	1.495653
Q10F_recode	463	0.794816	1.025125	467	0.806258	1.029577
Q10G_recode	421	0.87886	1.177995	467	0.903638	1.15267
Q10H_recode	457	0.142232	0.529305	467	0.152435	0.531583
Q10I_recode	457	0.54267	0.81032	467	0.550401	0.80592
Q10J_recode	430	0.744186	1.279077	467	0.748418	1.244296
Q10K_recode	436	0.362385	0.942902	467	0.393788	0.938083
Q10L_recode	447	0.400447	0.723283	467	0.415613	0.72476
Q10M_recode	444	0.333333	0.66967	467	0.351713	0.673882
Q10N_recode	462	0.186147	0.461045	467	0.193057	0.465251
Q10O_recode	454	0.110132	0.353142	467	0.122962	0.361871
Q10P_recode	446	0.116592	0.373075	467	0.130974	0.381426
Q11A_recode	462	0.170996	0.430636	467	0.174245	0.430209
Q11B_recode	465	0.513978	0.619648	467	0.5144	0.618454
Q11C_recode	465	0.305376	0.522421	467	0.305898	0.521399
Q11D_recode	466	0.405579	0.561	467	0.405004	0.560536
Q11E_recode	464	0.094828	0.31461	467	0.095524	0.314852
Q11F_recode	467	0.396146	0.603482	467	0.396146	0.603482
Q11G_recode	463	0.464363	0.653267	467	0.464311	0.650878
Q11H_recode	463	0.634989	0.719718	467	0.634427	0.717116
Q12A_recode	465	2.690323	1.168375	467	2.687908	1.166601
Q12B_recode	462	1.294372	1.205524	467	1.293718	1.200735
Q12C_recode	464	0.728448	1.011579	467	0.728745	1.009205
Q12D_recode	464	0.5625	0.841919	467	0.566534	0.840891
Q13_recode	463	3.950324	0.892316	467	3.946425	0.890721
Q14A_recode	462	3.19697	0.612728	467	3.194751	0.610401

Q14C_recode	447	3.071588	0.613212	467	3.059684	0.604772
Q14D_recode	458	3.148472	0.557236	467	3.141238	0.556294
Q14E_recode	420	2.995238	0.6444	467	2.978175	0.622333
Q15A_recode	466	3.150215	0.924557	467	3.149959	0.923581
Q15B_recode	466	3.688841	0.575264	467	3.688499	0.574694
Q15C_recode	465	3.35914	0.735527	467	3.358824	0.734114
<b>Valid N (listwise)</b>	<b>240</b>			<b>467</b>		

## **Appendix C: Police Intervention Protocol**

# **SAN BERNARDINO VALLEY BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING EXPERIMENT: POLICE INTERVENTION PROTOCOL**

**MAY 15, 2008**

**PARTICIPATING POLICE DEPARTMENTS:  
COLTON, ONTARIO AND REDLANDS**

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In practice, broken windows policing is designed to prevent serious crime through the police paying attention to, and consistently addressing, public disorder problems. The idea behind this model of policing is that when disorder and nuisance crimes are allowed to flourish in a particular neighborhood, law-abiding residents may withdraw from involvement in the community and spend less time using public areas for legitimate purposes as their fear and frustration increase. With this increase in fear and withdrawal, disorder problems in the neighborhood are likely to grow in frequency and severity because fewer residents are available to discourage, report, or keep an eye on disruptive behavior. Eventually, the neighborhood may acquire a reputation as being vulnerable – a place where the community is less likely to “do something” about crime. With this knowledge, felony offenders may begin to target the neighborhood for serious criminal activities. As such, broken windows policing is designed to “preempt” the development of serious crime and community decline by targeting public social and physical disorder problems. By not allowing disorder to go untended, the police can prevent residents from withdrawing from the community and in turn prevent criminals from becoming emboldened and moving their activities into these neighborhoods.

During the current study this idea is being put to the test by delivering an intervention designed around the broken windows model to randomly selected target street blocks in your city. An equal number of blocks were randomly assigned to the control group. These control blocks must not receive any broken windows policing practices during the sixth month study period. This is a “gold standard” design for evaluation and will provide the most valid test of the effectiveness of broken windows policing to date. As such, this study is of national importance. During the intervention you will focus on reducing disorder in the target street blocks in your city. The goal is to do everything possible to eradicate disorder in these areas. This means not allowing loitering or public drinking, attending to people who litter and organizing litter clean ups, promptly arranging for graffiti to be removed and so forth. This intervention handbook outlines a “step up” approach for dealing with specific social disorders such as public drinking or loitering. The goal is not to issue citations or arrests for every case, as in many cases a verbal warning will suffice. The step up approach of the intervention means that citations or arrests will be relevant for repeat offenders or in cases in which aggravating factors warrant citation or arrest on first offense. For physical disorders such as graffiti or litter, your role will be to make note of such problems in target blocks and notify the designated supervising officer in your department who will then contact the relevant agency to rapidly clean up or repair the reported physical disorder problem. You should also monitor the status of reported problems to ensure they are dealt with in timely manner by the relevant agency.

This handbook provides selected examples of how specific disorder problems may be dealt with. It also concludes with an explanation of why such a strategy is expected to work according to the broken windows model. The final section of this document will outline why such a focus on disorder and nuisance crimes is said to improve quality of life and community safety.

## **BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING IN PRACTICE**

In practice, broken windows policing is designed to prevent serious crime through the police paying attention to, and consistently addressing, public disorder problems involving citizens disturbing the peace, public drunkenness, loitering after dark, noise complaints, vandalism, destruction of property, and minor drug-related offenses. The idea behind this model of policing is that when quality of life and nuisance crimes are allowed to flourish in a particular neighborhood, law-abiding residents may withdraw or spend less time using those public areas for legitimate purposes as their fear and frustration increase. With this increase in fear and withdrawal, disorder problems in the neighborhood are likely to grow in frequency and severity because fewer residents are available to discourage, report, or keep an eye on disruptive behavior. Eventually, the neighborhood may acquire a reputation as being vulnerable – a place where the community is less likely to “do something” about crime. With this knowledge, felony offenders may begin to target the neighborhood for serious criminal activities.

Therefore, the emphasis on street-level disorder is intended to pull the neighborhood away from the tipping point by consistently attending to public nuisances that make the neighborhood less attractive to law-abiding residents and more attractive to criminal offenders. In their influential article in the *Atlantic Monthly*, James Q. Wilson and George Kelling proposed that police could most effectively prevent crime by focusing on the minor problems that initiate this cycle of decline. The key is to never ignore the small violations – to respond every time with some type of police action. However, it is worth noting that broken windows policing is not the same as a zero tolerance strategy in that formal action (i.e., arrest or citation) is not always expected or required. While persistent or defiant conduct, or a preexisting arrest warrant, may justify an arrest, an informal response may be sufficiently effective. The key is that police habitually take action to prevent these issues culminating over time and leading to a decline in control over the neighborhood. Regardless of whether informal police action involves a warning, a polite reminder, or a firm “knock it off,” the broken windows model requires that officers actively engage individuals involved in disruptive, fear-provoking, or suspicious conduct with the goal of negotiating a consensus with citizens about what is and what is not acceptable behavior within a specific neighborhood.

Residents living in neighborhoods that experience broken windows policing should be made aware that something has changed with the regard to how officers are responding to street-level annoyances and nuisance behaviors. From an onlooker’s perspective, what has changed is that officers on the street are working hard to close the social distance between themselves and disorderly individuals by routinely engaging them in dialogue so that there is no ambiguity about which behaviors are not permissible in specific public areas. Another priority - which was the hallmark of the New York City Police Department’s broken windows initiative - is that police notify and work with city agencies and property owners to repair or clean up damaged property that may blemish a neighborhood and give residents the impression that the neighborhood is becoming untenable. Although “rapid repair” depends on police leadership to collaborate with city agencies, it is the line officer who is most capable of routinely surveying neighborhoods to identifying signs of physical disorder that are problematic and require attention.

## **OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT STUDY**

You are currently participating in a study designed to examine the effectiveness of broken windows policing in three cities in the San Bernardino Valley area of California. Because broken windows policing has never been studied prospectively, this is the first study of its kind. Broken windows policing will be put into practice on a number of randomly selected street blocks in each city, with an equal number of blocks to serve as control areas. The control areas will not receive broken windows policing, but will continue to receive ordinary levels of patrol and attention to calls for service. The study is designed to compare changes in crime, fear of crime, and residents' perceptions of crime and disorder in the treatment and control areas after the six-month intervention period. During the intervention, your role as part of your department's Broken Windows Unit will be to routinely patrol all of the targeted street blocks in your city, assess disorder and minor crime problems and address them on a case by case basis. As noted earlier, the key to the intervention strategy is that no public disorder violations are overlooked by police, but rather are dealt with in an appropriate manner to prevent them from accumulating over time, thus discouraging further problems from developing. The next section of this document is an intervention protocol or handbook. It will discuss various types of disorder, and outline suggested approaches that may be used for dealing with each problem under the framework of broken windows policing.

## **POLICING DISORDER- AN INTERVENTION PROTOCOL**

As noted above, broken windows policing does not prescribe a one size fits all approach in which every incident is dealt with in the same manner. As you are aware, certain forms of disorder warrant specific types of police responses; however, different incidents involving the same type of disorder may require different responses depending on the circumstances.

The purpose of this handbook is to provide a number of practical examples of social and physical disorders that you may target during the intervention period. The handbook is not meant to be an exhaustive list of all the disorder problems you may encounter during the program, but rather to just provide some examples of the most common problems and how they may be dealt with. Some of these order maintenance problems will be issues your department is already focusing on, while others may seem somewhat trivial and unworthy of police attention. During the intervention period, it is important to keep in mind that the significance of these minor events is not the isolated impact of each individual event. Rather, the concern is the cumulative impact that these events have over time when they are ignored and allowed to continue unabated. In short, isolated acts of disorder may be compounded over time and, as a result, the damage to the quality of life in a specific neighborhood can be exponential.

The order maintenance approach suggested in this intervention protocol is only intended for the target areas of the study. Before the intervention begins, you will be provided with a map of the city with the targeted blocks highlighted. An equal number of control blocks will be highlighted in a different color. For the purpose of study, it is important that broken windows strategies are not routinely practiced in these control areas. Moreover, the amount of time spent driving

through the control areas during a typical shift should be held to a minimum, unless a service call or pursuit requires your presence in these areas. This study involves a randomized experimental design which provides the most credible test of a program's effectiveness. However, a randomized experiment depends largely on the treatment only being delivered in the randomly chosen target areas. Your commanding officer will discuss this issue with you in greater detail before the beginning of intervention period.

Below, the intervention protocol is divided into two sections. The first section provides a selection of social disorders (i.e., disorderly behaviors) and suggests approaches for responding to each type of disorder. The second part provides a list of physical disorders (i.e., physical conditions in the neighborhood) and suggested strategies for how they might be dealt with. Again, these lists are not meant to include all the problems you will address during the study, but rather to just provide some examples of how common disorder problems may be treated. At the outset, it is worth noting that the suggestions offered here are basic steps that could be taken in the typical case for each type of disorder. In practice aggravating circumstances may require skipping to a more intensive response, such as citation or arrest, rather than just giving a verbal warning. Conversely, mitigating factors may justify issuing a less severe response than what is suggested in the handbook.

## **SOCIAL DISORDERS**

### *Aggressive Panhandling/Soliciting for Money*

Some public areas are negatively impacted by individuals soliciting aggressively for money or panhandling in way that blocks the flow of pedestrian traffic or obstructs public passageways. At times, residents and pedestrians may perceive this behavior to be threatening or frightening, particularly when the disorderly individual makes physical contact or demonstrates signs of intoxication. One consequence is that citizens may go out of their way to avoid certain public areas out of fear or simply to avoid being harassed.

As such, aggressive panhandling or soliciting in an intimidating manner is a behavior that deserves increased police attention during the broken windows intervention. The suggested approach is to talk with panhandlers and explain that soliciting for money will not be tolerated in the target area, especially when this behavior involves physical contact, blocks the flow of pedestrian traffic, or is perceived by citizens as threatening. If the same panhandlers are repeatedly found in a particular areas after receiving a warning, further action, such as citation or arrest, should be taken as seen fit.

Additionally, aggravating factors such as intoxication or deliberate attempts to threaten or intimidate pedestrians may warrant more than a verbal warning during a first incident.



### *Drug Activity*

The public use of marijuana or the possession of small quantities of marijuana typically calls for an arrest in any situations where there is sufficient evidence. The use of stop and frisk tactics is strongly encouraged for public order problems on the targeted blocks known to have a history of drug activity, particularly at night.

### *Fights and Altercations in Public Areas*

As you are aware, the appropriate response to fights and altercations in public areas depends largely on the nature of the incident. If there is evidence of a physical assault (i.e., bodily injury) or if a suspect is found to be in possession of an illegal weapon or small amounts of narcotics, or if intoxication is apparent, then an arrest is justified. If the incident involves a hostile or disruptive verbal argument, the suggested approach is to intervene and separate the parties if necessary. Firmly ask the parties to leave the public area and follow up before the end your shift. The key is not to let them sort out the disagreement on their own. Although the subjects may contend that the dispute is a “personal matter,” no matter is personal when it takes place in a public area under the watchful eyes of nearby residents and children.

### *Littering*

If you observe an individual discarding fast-food packaging, a paper bag, a cigarette box or other small items of trash on the street or sidewalk of one of the target blocks, an appropriate initial response is to remind the person that throwing away garbage in public is a violation, they could be fined, and then firmly asked to pick up their trash. If the individual refuses to pick up their trash, promptly issue a citation.

Because some people consider litter or noise violations trivial, they may occasionally be noncompliant or confrontational when confronted with a formal police response. In dealing with such individuals, explain to them that if their violation is so trivial, then they should not mind the simple courtesy of picking up their trash or turning down their music.

### *Loitering*

As you are aware, loitering is a social disorder that is difficult to address because police responses vary depending on the situation. It is important to distinguish between loitering that is temporary and not bothersome to area residents or businesses as opposed to loitering that is disruptive and a nuisance to the community. Loitering may be disruptive for a number of different reasons: 1) it may block a pathway or the flow of pedestrian traffic; 2) it may involve a group that is behaving in a rowdy, boisterous, aggressive or fear-provoking manner; 3) it may involve individuals who are excessively loud based on the community standards or the time of day; 4) it may involve public drunkenness, harassment or other misdemeanor offenses; or 5) it may violate a curfew or a “no loitering” sign posted in a specific location (i.e., in a playground after dark or in front of an apartment complex). In such instances, the suggested approach is to politely but firmly ask the individuals to leave the area and then follow-up shortly thereafter. Take necessary action if the individuals remain noncompliant.

### *Noise Complaints*

Noise complaints should be taken seriously and consistently addressed in an appropriate manner. A candid talk explaining that unreasonable noise levels are disruptive to public order and residential life may be the best approach during the first contact. If an individual is heard playing loud music in a vehicle parked on one of the targeted blocks, consider approaching vehicle, explaining that the volume is a problem for area residents and business owners, and firmly requesting that they lower the volume. If the same individual is found playing loud music in the target area later during your shift, a citation is appropriate.

### *Public Drinking*

Public drinking is a concern for a variety of reasons, ranging from the linkage between intoxication and more serious offending, to broken bottles strewn upon streets and sidewalk. As such, this is an obvious target for increased attention within the framework of broken windows policing.

The suggested approach for handling public drinking is to firmly explain to the subject that consuming alcohol in public areas is not permissible and then to confiscate the alcohol. Take note of the individual and follow up before the end of your shift. If the behavior persists after a first warning, formal action is reasonable. Aggravating circumstances such as aggressive or defiant behavior, or a preexisting arrest warrant, will justify more than just a warning during the initial contact with the subject.

### *Public Intoxication*

If you have reasonable suspicion that a person loitering in a public location is under the influence of drugs, a search is appropriate. If drug paraphernalia is found, an arrest is justified. If not, a firm warning to leave the target area may be appropriate, accompanied by a follow up shortly thereafter. If the individual continues to loiter and is disturbing the peace or exhibiting signs of public intoxication, an arrest or citation is appropriate. Official police actions should always be taken in response to underage persons exhibiting signs of intoxication on the targeted street blocks. An effective response to underage drinking may be to call the minor's parents and straightforwardly advise them that the police are cracking down on illegal behavior in public areas, and that status offenses such as underage drinking will be taken seriously.

Aggravating circumstances may justify taking further action during the initial contact, proceeding directly to citation or arrest.

### *Soliciting for the Sale of Drugs and Prostitution*

Street-level prostitution and drug activity may not occur on many of the targeted street blocks. Nonetheless, minor drug and prostitution offenses are vice crimes your department may already be devoting attention to. These are relatively serious offenses compared to many of the public disorders discussed in this handbook. As such, all transactions and solicitations involving prostitution and the possession or sale of drugs in the target areas typically warrant an arrest.

### *Theft from Vehicles*

As expected, breaking into and theft from a motor vehicle necessitates an arrest.

### *Unattended Dogs*

Unattended dogs, particularly those exhibiting unusual behavior or not wearing a collar should be noted and reported to Animal Control or a similar agency in your jurisdiction.

### *Vandalism*


Within the context of this program, vandalism refers to the act of damaging or defacing municipal or privately-owned property. This is a serious offense and calls for a misdemeanor arrest in most instances. The physical appearance of mailboxes, building facades, walls, street signs and storefronts influences the general perception of a neighborhood. Regardless of whether serious crime problems exist in a neighborhood, rampant signs of decay can ultimately stigmatize the area. From a law enforcement perspective, vandalizing a stop sign or a school building is similar to vandalizing other municipal property, such as a police cruiser.







**Figure 1. The Broken Windows Hypothesis**



This discussion suggests that focusing on disorder is the key to preventing crime under the broken windows framework. If disorder is dealt with promptly and consistently, citizens are less likely to witness signs of decay, become worried and withdraw. Moreover, in the process of cracking down on incivilities, police officers may come in contact with felony offenders in possession of drugs and weapons, and those with preexisting arrest warrants. The overall impact is that informal control networks within the community will continue to function effectively. People will go about their daily lives frequenting public areas, and children will play under the watchful eyes of their parents. Neighbors will keep an eye on each other's children and the goings on in the community in general. Many problems will be dealt with informally, and the police will be called when needed. In short, the community will retain the ability to regulate itself rather than spiraling into a cycle of decline that ends with the area being overrun by opportunistic offenders. This is the theoretical backdrop of broken windows policing. It is a useful frame of reference as you implement the tactics outlined in the intervention protocol and strategies developed by your unit. So, in the end, individual events *are* paramount – dealing with each one is the most efficient way to prevent larger problems from developing over time in neighborhoods on the brink of decline.

## **Appendix D—Police Activity Log Sheet**

The following page provides the one page log sheet all project officers used to record the activities they took to address social and physical disorder at the 55 target street blocks. Project officers were to complete one log sheet each time visited any of the target street blocks during the intervention period.



UID: \_\_\_\_\_

**Broken Windows Policing Experiment:**  
Complete one of these forms every time you visit a NEW treatment street segment during your shift

Date MM/DD/YY		Street Segment (no suffix):						City: (Circle): ONT    RED    COL									
Officer 1 ID#:				Officer 2 ID#:													
First Arrived at Seg. (Circle):				Time Arrived (24 HR):				Time Departed (24 HR):									
		SI	DISP	BACK-													
Once at segment Officer Initiated/ Observed "SI" or Dispatch "DI" or Back up "BU" or Citizen Flag- Down "FD"	Social	Specific Address number, or "STR" / or "ALLEY"	# Sus. (social)	Indicate # (Number) of Actions Taken For Each Option										Other Actions taken (Specify what - e.g. "Contact parent" "72 hr tag", etc.)	Referral Made to handle problem (Specify to who - e.g. Mgr., CE, AEC, Graffiti Removal, Tow Co. etc.)	Follow-up on prior problem/action taken	
				Citizen (s) or Victims talked to	Offender(s) Subject (s) talked to	Mediated/ Counselled	Field Interviewed	Stop & Frisks	Warned/Advised	Arrested	Cited	# and Specify	Specify				
	1	Destruction of Property															
	2	Drinking in Public															
	3	Drug Activity															
	4	Fist Fight															
	5	Littering															
	6	Loitering															
	7	Noise															
	8	Pedestrian Check															
	9	Prostitution															
	10	Public Urination															
	11	Soliciting for Money															
	12	Suspicious/Erratic Beh.															
	13	Theft from Vehicle															
	14	Traffic Stop															
	15	Vandalism															
	16	Verbal Dispute															
	17	Other (Specify):															
		<b>Physical (no suspects present)</b>	*	# Occ. (physical)		X	X	X	X	X	X						
	18	Abandoned Vehicle															
	19	Broken Glass															
	20	Bldg. Code Violation															
	21	Graffiti															
	22	Inadequate Lighting															
	23	Litter/Trash															
	24	Illegal Dumping															
	25	Parking															
	26	Shopping Cart															
	27	Unattended Dogs															
	28	Vehicle Other															
	29	Other (Specify):															
Provide a brief description of the time spent on segment (e.g. if drove segment, walked segment etc.) and/or problems Specify name of apartment complex or business where applicable.																	