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An Assessment of the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative: Final Project Report

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An Assessment of the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative: Final Project Report

Abstract

The U.S. Department of Justice developed the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative (CAGI) to support local communities in their efforts to prevent and control gang crime. The cities involved include Cleveland, Dallas/Fort Worth, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Tampa, Indianapolis, Oklahoma City, Rochester, Raleigh/Durham, Chicago, Detroit, and a seven-city region in Eastern Pennsylvania.

Multiple methods were used to evaluate the process and impact of CAGI. These included site visits, phone interviews, mail surveys, video conference calls with project staff, and review of progress reports submitted to the Department of Justice. Local crime data were gathered from five of the CAGI cities and city level crime data were collected from all the jurisdictions as well as from comparable cities nationwide.

In terms of the implementation several key findings emerged. There was consensus across the sites that CAGI had allowed for the development of a variety of new partnerships. These relationships were most readily established among criminal justice agencies. The four most common enforcement strategies included increased federal prosecution, increased state and local prosecution, joint case prosecution screening, and directed police patrols. The most common prevention strategies included education and outreach, school-based prevention, ex-offender outreach, and substance abuse treatment. Re-entry interventions proved to be the most challenging to implement with most of the sites struggling to meet target numbers of clients.

Unfortunately, the majority of sites could not provide consistent and reliable measures of gang crime. Thus, for most of the impact analyses the focus was on violent crime. CAGI cities were compared to all other comparable U.S. cities and to a matched comparison group of cities. Additionally, within city analyses were conducted in five of the sites.

Overall, the CAGI cities experienced a larger decline in violent crime than the comparison cities but the difference was not statistically significant when controlling for concentrated disadvantage and population density. When level of implementation of enforcement was included, the high enforcement CAGI cities experienced a 15 percent decline in violent crime that was statistically significant. The comparison based on a propensity matching approach yielded similar findings. Looking only at the CAGI cities, higher levels of federal prosecution for gun crime were negatively related to violent crime.

The final analyses involved within city time series analyses of target areas compared either to other comparison areas or the remainder of the city. These results were inconclusive. Although the CAGI sites all experienced declines in violent crime, in many cases they were not statistically significant or they were similar to declines in the rest of the city or comparison area.

The findings of difficulty in implementing all components of the comprehensive strategy in a well-timed and coordinated fashion, as well as the mixed, and at best modest, impact on violent crime, are largely consistent with prior studies of large-scale, comprehensive anti-gang programs. At a minimum, much greater attention needs to be given to effective implementation. Local CAGI officials recognized these challenges and recommended a planning period to allow for the establishment of necessary partnerships before fully funding programs like CAGI. Finally, much greater attention needs to be given to developing reliable measures of gang crime at the local level. Federal funding agencies may wish to make gang crime data availability a prerequisite for the investment of federal funding for anti-gang programs.

An Assessment of the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative: Final Project Report

Executive Summary

Concerned with levels of gang-related violent crime and responding to field reports from officials involved in Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), the U.S. Department of Justice developed the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative (CAGI) to support local communities in their efforts to prevent and control gang crime. Initial CAGI awards were made to six communities in 2006, four more in 2007, and two in 2008. The cities involved include Cleveland, Dallas/Fort Worth, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Tampa, Indianapolis, Oklahoma City, Rochester, Raleigh/Durham, Chicago, Detroit, and a seven-city region in Eastern Pennsylvania. The initiative was coordinated through the U.S. Attorney's Offices in these respective jurisdictions and funding was provided based on a proposal that outlined a comprehensive approach to gang violence prevention and control. Specific elements included enforcement, prevention, and reentry.

The School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University was provided a grant from the National Institute of Justice to conduct a process and outcome evaluation of the CAGI program. The initial award was intended to support an evaluation involving the initial six CAGI sites. However, to the extent possible the evaluation has expanded to include all 12 jurisdictions but with more intensive assessments in select jurisdictions.

Multiple methods were used in the evaluation. These included site visits throughout the project, phone interviews, mail surveys, video conference calls with project staff, and review of progress reports submitted to the Department of Justice. Multiple site visits were conducted in Cleveland, Dallas and Milwaukee. Local crime data were gathered from five of the CAGI cities and city level crime data were collected from all the jurisdictions as well as from comparable cities nationwide.

Limitations

One of the major limitations in the evaluation was the lack of reliable data on gang crime. With the exception of Chicago and Los Angeles, police officials reported that they either did not capture gang crime or they did not consider their gang data to be reliable over time. A common theme was that the police department would make an effort to capture gang crime during the CAGI project (often by having a designated police official read all police reports and make such a designation), but that the gang data would be isolated to the target area and/or would not be available for the pre-intervention period thus prohibiting trend analysis of impact. Consequently, much of the outcome analysis focuses on trends in violent crime believed to be associated with gang crime.

Similar limitations arose with respect to process measures related to the implementation of CAGI. To their credit, DOJ required the CAGI task forces to submit output data on the various components of their enforcement, prevention and reentry programs. Similarly, CAGI officials made significant efforts to collect these data. However, there was significant variation across the sites and the various agencies involved in CAGI in their ability to consistently provide such data. Similarly, the sites were unable to provide comparison data for their prevention,

intervention and reentry programs.¹ Consequently, the measures of program implementation are largely based on self-reports from CAGI officials. These data were compared to data reported to DOJ (e.g., numbers of gang arrests, youth served, etc.) and seemed to have face validity as indicators across the sites but future evaluations would benefit from consistently reported output measures of implementation.

Key Findings – Development and Implementation of CAGI

- There was consensus across the sites that CAGI had allowed for the development of a variety of new partnerships focused on gang prevention and control. These included partnerships between local, state, and federal law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, with other components of local government such as city government and the schools, with social service providers, and with various community groups (e.g., weed and seed, faith-based groups, neighborhood associations). As was observed in research on PSN (McGarrell et al. 2009), these relationships were most readily established among criminal justice agencies. Relationships with non-criminal justice partners tended to be more difficult to accomplish and took more time but were considered highly valued in terms of addressing gang crime in a comprehensive fashion.
- A wide variety of enforcement strategies were implemented. Four strategies, increased federal prosecution, increased state and local prosecution, joint case prosecution screening, and directed police patrols and field interrogations, were implemented by 12 of the 13 jurisdictions.² Ten jurisdictions used probation/parole home visits to targeted gang members and comprehensive gun crime tracing. Nine utilized most violent offender lists and eight called gang members or individuals at-risk for gang activity into offender notification meetings. The majority of CAGI enforcement teams included the service of warrants on gang members, and six jurisdictions used a nuisance abatement strategy to address problem properties and businesses. The least common strategy reported by CAGI officials was gang abatement ordinances that were utilized in Dallas, Durham and Raleigh.
- As noted above, there was significant variation across the sites in terms of their collection of gang-specific information. For example, only a small number of the jurisdictions could report on the number of gang crime incidents. Similarly, even though a number of the CAGI task forces collected data on gang prosecutions, this involved special efforts for the initiative as opposed to existing and continuing information systems that track gang prosecutions. The combination of limitations on gang-specific crime and prosecution records created challenges in establishing consistent performance measures for gang enforcement.
- There was also a fair degree of consistency in terms of the types of prevention and intervention services developed in CAGI. These included new services, contracting with existing gang prevention and intervention service providers, and contracting with existing service providers who expanded their mission to include a gang focus. Several strategies were included in every site (education and outreach to youth, school-based prevention, ex-offender outreach, and substance abuse treatment). The next most common were skills

¹ Several evaluations of prevention, intervention and reentry programs, with control or comparison groups are underway but not yet available.

² The reference to 13 jurisdictions distinguishes the programs in Durham and Raleigh.

building services including employment and educational programs that were found in 11 of the 13 CAGI jurisdictions followed by vocational training programs in 10 sites. Nine jurisdictions included truancy reduction, clergy outreach, and youth street workers. Just under half the sites included neighborhood development programs and three jurisdictions developed an outreach program through the trauma center. The other category included programs such as peer mentoring, tattoo removal, and cognitive decision-making programs.

- Reentry tended to be the most difficult and challenging program component for most of the sites. It took longer to develop this component than was the case for gang enforcement and prevention. Most of the sites had not met their target for reentry clients served as of 2010, though most had reached or were approaching their targets by mid-2011.
- Focus groups and interviews conducted with CAGI reentry clients in Cleveland and Milwaukee revealed that most participants believed the reentry program was positive. Benefits of the reentry program were mentioned across both sites among participants who reported that the initiative resulted in job leads and placement and increased follow-up by a supportive network of people. However, a minority of participants were less positive and provided accounts that revealed several problems, including participants' perception that program coordinators and staff failed to keep promises, classes did not fit their needs, and the instructors spoke down to inmates and were unable to identify with them.
- Although the partnerships established was considered one of the key accomplishments of CAGI, in several jurisdictions there were problems in gaining the commitment and participation of specific organizations. In some places this involved local law enforcement, the local prosecutor, or a federal law enforcement partner. In several jurisdictions it was difficult to engage the school district.
- One recommendation from CAGI officials, with an eye toward overcoming the challenges of establishing effective partnerships and getting all three program components operating simultaneously and in a coordinated fashion, was that federal funding for a program like CAGI be provided in stages. The initial stage would be a planning phase that would allow for problem analysis, intelligence gathering, and partnership building. Given the success of this phase, stage two would then involve programmatic funding to support actual implementation. The officials believed that this type of planning stage would build the capacity for more timely and coordinated implementation of all three components (enforcement, prevention, reentry) that, in turn, would be more likely to generate gang crime reduction. Similarly, training and technical assistance to build capacity for reliable and consistent measures of gang crime and gang enforcement would likely contribute to stronger gang prevention programs and enhanced evaluations of such programs.

Key Findings – Impact on Violent Crime

- Most of the CAGI jurisdictions reported declines in crime in either their CAGI target site or for the city as a whole. The difficulty in interpreting these reports is that most U.S. cities experienced a decline in violent crime during the same period. An additional challenge is that the CAGI reports of crime decline tend to rely on different types of crime incidents.

- One of the key challenges is that most of the CAGI jurisdictions do not systematically collect gang crime data. Given the connection between gang crime and violent crime, the impact analysis focused on violent crime trends.
- For the assessment of impact a cross-city comparison of violent crime trends from 2002 to 2009 was conducted. The rationale of the analysis is that if CAGI had an impact on gang crime it should be observed in violent crime trends in these cities compared to other U.S. cities.
- The cross-city analysis compared all 18 CAGI cities with the trend in crime in 249 comparable U.S. cities (total N=267). These consisted of all cities over 100,000 population in 2000 (11 CAGI cities and 241 non-CAGI cities), seven smaller Pennsylvania cities that were CAGI sites and eight comparable smaller Pennsylvania cities that were not part of CAGI. The city data included population size, concentrated disadvantage, and population density, factors known to influence levels of violent crime.
- The analysis compared CAGI cities with non-CAGI cities taking into account the timing of the implementation of CAGI and measures of law enforcement implementation, research integration, and prevention implementation, as well as a composite measure of implementation based on these three dimensions.
- Overall, the CAGI cities experienced a larger decline in violent crime than the comparison cities after the implementation of CAGI but the difference was not statistically significant when controlling for concentrated disadvantage and population density.
- When a measure of the level of implementation of enforcement was included in the analysis, the high enforcement CAGI cities experienced a 15 percent decline in violent crime and the difference was statistically significant. The results for research integration, prevention, and the composite measure of implementation did not indicate significant impact on the trend in violent crime.
- The CAGI cities were then compared to a sub-sample of cities based on a propensity matching approach that resulted in a comparison group of cities most similar to the CAGI sites in terms of the level of violent crime in the years prior to CAGI. The results were similar, when controlling for the level of enforcement implementation, the high enforcement CAGI sites experienced a significant reduction in violent crime.
- The 18 CAGI cities were then compared based on the level of federal prosecution for gun crime. The results revealed that the cities with high levels of federal gun prosecution experienced significantly significant reductions in violent crime.
- In summary, using both the measure of enforcement implementation as well as the measure of federal gun prosecution indicated that with greater enforcement there was a statistically significant reduction in violent crime.
- The next stage of the analysis involved ARIMA time series analyses of the trend in violent crime within five of the CAGI cities. The cities included Cleveland, Dallas, Milwaukee, Oklahoma City, and Rochester.
- All of the cities experienced declines in violent crime within their CAGI target areas. In some cases these were statistically significant but in others they were not.
- Cleveland's target areas experienced a 16 percent decline, although the decline did not attain statistical significance. During this same period, the remainder of the city experienced no change in violent crime thus suggesting a possible CAGI impact.

- Dallas experienced a 25 percent in their target areas. This was a statistically significant reduction but was difficult to interpret because the city as a whole experienced a 22 percent reduction in violent crime. This could mean that Dallas's CAGI coupled with related enforcement activities (PSN and hotspot policing) had an impact in both the target area and citywide. It is also consistent with some other factor influencing both CAGI sites and the city.
- Milwaukee's target areas experienced a 21 percent decline in violent crime that was statistically significant ($p < .10$).
- Oklahoma City experienced a slight decrease in its target area (-3.5%) although it was not a statistically significant reduction.
- Rochester experienced a 13 percent decline in its target area. Similar to Milwaukee this approached statistical significance ($p = .107$). It compared to a citywide decline of seven percent that was not statistically significant.
- A relatively crude cost-benefit analysis was conducted using the homicide reduction observed in two of the high enforcement sites (Cleveland and Dallas). These two sites experienced an annual decline of 14.5 homicides (combined) in the CAGI target areas comparing pre-intervention and post-intervention years. The reduction of 14.5 homicides in the CAGI target areas of these two cities generated an estimated \$14.9 million (tangible cost savings) to \$42.6 million (total costs) in savings. This for an investment of \$5 million in these two cities. Although questions can be raised about whether CAGI produced these reductions in the target areas, the cost savings are also likely to be under-estimates because they are based on cost savings using 1990s estimates and that do not include the costs of the operation of the criminal justice system. Similarly, they do not include cost savings from potential reductions in other violent crimes or in reductions that may have occurred in other CAGI cities.
- In summary, the within city analyses of the target areas demonstrated declines in the rate of violent crime but the declines did not consistently attain statistical significance and was difficult to interpret given more modest declines in the city trend in violent crime. The findings were consistent with two competing explanations. First, CAGI had an impact and the benefits of CAGI diffused to other parts of the city. Second, some other factor was influencing crime reduction in both the target areas and the city as a whole. This second interpretation is difficult to explain given the consistently larger decrease in the target areas but must be considered, particularly when many of the declines did not attain statistical significance. The cross-city analyses indicated that CAGI resulted in a decline in violent crime when controlling for the level of enforcement. When the cross-city and within-city analyses are coupled, the overall results suggest an impact of CAGI on violent crime when taking into account the level of enforcement.

Interpretation, Policy Implications, and Recommendations

Perhaps the key overall finding is the finding that when enforcement implementation was included in the analysis, that the cities experiencing high levels of enforcement witnessed statistically significant declines in violent crime. This was true based on both the enforcement composite measure of strategies deployed and key enforcement partnerships and by the level of federal gun crime prosecution. The fact that the measure of prevention implementation did not

relate to violent crime trends likely reflects that prevention impact is measured in the long-term as opposed to the more immediate impact of enforcement.

The other key finding were the consistent reports by CAGI officials that CAGI had resulted in greatly enhanced coordination, communication, and collaboration; on comprehensive strategies that linked enforcement, prevention, and reentry; and on new partnerships and new services delivered to active gang members and those believed to at-risk for involvement in gangs. Our site visits and interviews consistently suggested that there was a high level of commitment in these sites, that new services were indeed being delivered, and that “business as usual” had changed in terms of the enforcement and prevention of gang crime.³

Given the observed implementation challenges, as well as the above-noted problem with the lack of reliable gang crime measures in most of the CAGI cities, several recommendations arise. The recommendations are reinforced by similar findings in earlier large-scale gang intervention projects funded by the Office of Justice Programs. First, funding for capacity building, including support to local police departments for the collection of reliable gang crime data, could assist overcome implementation challenges as well as provide a foundation for more systematic evaluations.⁴ Second, local sites would benefit from a planning period, particularly for partnership building between criminal justice agencies and public and private organizations and community groups involved in prevention and intervention.

Methodological Limitations

As noted above, one of the key limitations is the inability to have consistent and reliable measures of gang crime and gang enforcement activity. Among the CAGI sites only Chicago and Los Angeles, with their long history of gang activity and enforcement have consistent measures of gang crime. Several of the other cities are now collecting gang crime but could not provide pre-intervention gang data. Several of the other cities attempted to collect gang crime data as part of the CAGI initiative but informed us they did not consider the data reliable and valid indicators of gang crime (and often did not collect gang crime data outside the target area). In terms of gang crime, perhaps the availability of gang crime data for impact assessment would have yielded more evidence of an impact of CAGI on crime.

An additional limitation related to the ability to provide data on gang enforcement. To its credit, the Department of Justice asked the CAGI sites to provide performance data on a variety of indicators related to enforcement (e.g., gang arrests and prosecutions), prevention (e.g., youth served in various programs, program completions), and reentry (e.g., clients served, program completions, failures). Our sense is that the CAGI task forces placed considerable emphasis on reporting such data. Despite these efforts, data reporting was very incomplete and inconsistent. It was impossible to compare dosage levels across the sites based on these metrics. It may be that if the field reaches a stage where such data could be reliably reported that more meaningful

³ One site could stand as an exception to this pattern due to a major transformation of law enforcement services in the early years of the CAGI program but even here officials reported meaningful implementation following initial delay.

⁴ The National Gang Center and the National Youth Gang Center, both of which receive OJP funding, have developed resources to assist local communities assess their gang problem and to engage in strategic planning for comprehensive approaches to gang prevention and control. Technical assistance to local communities, particularly grant recipients, could likely address many of the implementation and evaluation issues that arose in the CAGI programs and in the research.

implementation dosage measures could be constructed that would allow for a more complete test of the impact of these initiatives on gang crime.

Similarly, we were unable to construct meaningful comparison groups to test the effect of prevention and reentry programs in any of the sites (several evaluations are underway but results are not available). Several of the sites reported low levels of recidivism for CAGI reentry clients. This is a promising finding. However, in the absence of comparison data it is impossible to discern whether this reflects a program effect or whether it indicates self-selection and more motivated clients.

Implementation Limitations

Although we noted the evidence of meaningful implementation across the sites, this does not mean that implementation was without challenge. Although most of the sites had prior relationships among the participating law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, particularly through PSN, the prevention, intervention, and reentry components often meant new collaborations and partnerships. One of the consequences is that it took quite a bit of time to get all three components operating at the same point in time. In nearly all of the sites, enforcement moved forward rapidly but it took longer to implement the prevention and reentry components. Given the long-term nature of prevention effects, and the time it took to meet targets for numbers of reentry clients (for most sites this was 100 clients), it may have simply taken most of the CAGI program period to actually have a comprehensive gang enforcement and prevention program implemented. Perhaps when viewed over a long time period the violent crime reduction impact in these cities will become more apparent.

A similar implementation challenge was noted in the one site that was able to produce risk assessment data. This analysis indicated that although the prevention programs were able to serve youths in-need, they were not serving the youths most at-risk for gang involvement. In neighborhoods where most youths are in-need, this may be a logical outcome but it may also limit the impact of gang prevention programs. The local site used these data to revise plans for identifying youth at-risk but the impact of these program revisions was impossible to measure in the current evaluation.

This point about the challenge of implementing a comprehensive strategy was reinforced by many CAGI task force officials. When asked for recommendations for improving the program many officials talked about providing a time period that would allow for planning, problem analysis, and establishing relationships among partners. Following this planning period, support for implementation of a data-driven, strategic plan would occur. Perhaps such a phased process would speed up the implementation of all three program components and increase the likelihood of measured crime reduction impact.

Related to these observations, as the CAGI initiative moved forward in time the financial crisis and recession occurred. In our last round of interviews officials talked about reductions in law enforcement and social services either occurring or being planned. This may have limited the impact of CAGI. However, these same economic pressures were apparent in other U.S. cities as well and thus were unlikely to have affected the comparative analysis of violent crime trends in U.S. cities.

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Chapter One

Overview of the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative

Research demonstrates that gangs and gang involvement create significant risks at both the individual and community levels. Young people involved in gangs are more likely to be involved in crime, more likely to be involved in violent crime, more likely to be victimized, and their increased risk for offending and victimization is highest during the period that they are actively involved in a gang (Battin et al., 1998; Browning, Thornberry, and Porter, 1999; Decker, 2007; Decker and Van Winkle, 1996; Melde, Taylor, and Esbensen, 2009; Thornberry, Huizinga, and Loeber, 2004; Thornberry, 1998). Similarly, gangs are often associated with community disorder and increased levels of a variety of crimes including drug sale and distribution and violent crime and homicide (Skogan, 1990; Kennedy, 1997). Given these patterns, as well as reports from the National Youth Gang Survey of increasing gang activity throughout the country (Egley, Howell, and Moore, 2010), the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) through its Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) program provided funding to twelve jurisdictions to develop and implement a comprehensive anti-gang initiative (CAGI) intended to prevent and reduce gang crime.

The comprehensive approach to the anti-gang initiative was based on the Comprehensive Community Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression developed by Irving Spergel and colleagues (Spergel et al., 1994) and reflected in the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention's Gang Reduction Program (Cahill and Hayeslip, 2010). The elements of the comprehensive model were incorporated in a series of programs that included Safe Futures, Comprehensive Communities, the Anti-Gang Initiative, and the Gang Free Communities and Schools programs (Decker et al. 2007). Indeed, in 2006, Klein and Maxson, identified and reviewed 59 "gang response" programs. The review indicated that the programs were fairly balanced across prevention, intervention, and suppression but few tended to be comprehensive and coordinated whereby these components would simultaneously address individual, group, and community components and thereby reinforce each other. The general findings suggested implementation had been uneven and the evidence of impact on gang involvement and gang crime was very limited (Klein and Maxson, 2006; Maxson, 2011). Cahill and Hayeslip (2010) subsequently found similar implementation challenges in the Gang Reduction Program with some, though inconsistent, indications of reductions in gang crime.

Background

PSN is a national program intended to reduce levels of gun violence through task forces coordinated by the nation's 94 U.S. Attorney's Offices. The task forces were to follow a strategic problem solving model that would increase partnerships among federal, state, and local law enforcement and prosecution agencies as well as with appropriate community institutions, agencies and groups. There was also a commitment to increased federal prosecution for illegal possession and use of firearms and funding was provided to contract with a research partner who would provide ongoing analysis and assessment and a media/outreach partner who would help communicate messages to the public and high risk populations about the initiative and the risk of violent gun victimization and prosecution. One of the findings from many of the PSN sites was that gangs were involved in much of the violent gun crime that these task forces were

confronting. Indeed, surveys of PSN coordinators indicated that gangs were rated as among the top four factors generating gun crime in the districts (the other top categories were drugs, chronic violent offenders, and felons in possession) and over 70 percent of the coordinators responded that gangs were a key element of their gun crime problem (McGarrell et.al, 2009).

Given these reports from the field, as well as the research findings indicating the link between gangs and violent crime, gang crime reduction became a priority within the PSN program. Funds were allocated to all PSN task forces and a special program known as the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative (CAGI) was developed. CAGI provided significant levels of funding to a select group of PSN districts with funding provided to support a comprehensive model of suppression (enforcement), prevention, and reentry. Initially, six awards were made in 2006, four additional awards in 2007, and two in 2008 (see Table 1).

Table 1 – Participating CAGI Sites

CAGI Original Six (2006)
Cleveland (OH-ND)
Dallas/Fort Worth (TX-ND)
Los Angeles (CA-CD)
Milwaukee (WI-ED)
Pennsylvania Corridor (PA-ED)
Tampa (FLMD)
CAGI Subsequent Four (2007)
Indianapolis (IN-SD)
Oklahoma City (OK-ED)
Rochester (NY-WD)
Raleigh/Durham (NC-ED and NC-MD)
CAGI Final Two (2008)
Chicago (IL-ND)
Detroit (MI-ED)

As is apparent, the jurisdictions were quite varied ranging from three of the nation's largest cities (Chicago, Dallas/Ft. Worth, and Los Angeles), to a number of large cities (Cleveland, Detroit, Indianapolis, Milwaukee, and Oklahoma City), to medium sized cities (Durham, Raleigh, Rochester, and Tampa⁵) and a region of Eastern and Middle Pennsylvania consisting of seven smaller cities (Allentown, Bethlehem, Easton, Harrisburg, Lancaster, Reading and York). The CAGI program in the Northern District of Texas focused on both Dallas and Ft. Worth and the program in North Carolina was divided between Durham and Raleigh and involved the U.S. Attorney's Offices from the Eastern and Middle Districts of North Carolina. Similarly, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania CAGI program evolved to include Harrisburg that falls within the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The initial ten sites were awarded \$2.5 million in funding that was to be divided between suppression (\$1 million), prevention (\$1 million) and reentry (\$500,000).

⁵ Although the city of Tampa has a relatively smaller population, the County is over 1 million population and the CAGI task force focused on several areas throughout the Tampa Bay region.

There was also quite a bit of variation in these city's crime patterns as of 2006 when CAGI was developed. For example, as displayed in Table 2 the violent crime rate ranged from lows of 223 (York) and 275 (Bethlehem) per 100,000 population to 2419 in Detroit and 1546 and 1690 in Cleveland and Harrisburg, respectively. With the exception of York and Bethlehem, most of these cities were well above the national violent crime rate of 473 per 100,000 population. Similarly, the homicide rate ranged from zero in Bethlehem and 1.7 in York to 47 in Detroit, 23 in Rochester, and 21 in Harrisburg. Three cities were below the national homicide rate but most were above with thirteen of the sites having homicide rates at least twice the national average.

Table 2 – Population and Violent Crime Rates (per 100.000) for CAGI cities

City	2006 Population	Violent Crime rate	Murder rate	Robbery rate	Aggravated Assault rate
Detroit, MI	884,462	2418.87	47.26	818.58	1485.99
Rochester, NY	211,656	1259.59	23.15	629.32	563.65
Harrisburg, PA	47,514	1690.03	21.05	970.24	591.40
Milwaukee, WI	581,005	1324.95	17.73	620.99	666.95
Indianapolis, IN	800,969	959.96	17.48	405.63	468.31
Cleveland, OH	452,759	1546.96	16.57	947.08	485.03
Chicago, IL	2,857,796	NA	16.38	555.08	610.44
Easton, PA	26,290	631.42	15.21	205.40	349.94
Dallas, TX	1,248,223	1206.35	14.98	553.91	584.19
Allentown, PA	107,087	1009.46	14.94	638.73	316.57
Lancaster, PA	54,805	970.71	12.77	445.21	432.44
Los Angeles, CA	3,879,455	786.86	12.37	369.97	377.22
Reading, PA	80,927	1236.92	12.36	574.59	595.60
Oklahoma City, OK	536,016	802.40	10.26	219.96	511.18
Fort Worth, TX	641,752	655.86	7.64	220.80	388.94
Tampa, FL	331,487	1158.11	7.54	365.32	745.13
Durham, NC	208,932	936.67	6.22	467.62	415.92
Raleigh, NC	348,345	638.16	5.45	224.49	380.37
York, PA	57,864	222.94	1.73	60.49	152.08
Bethlehem, PA	23,583	275.62	0.00	42.40	224.74
National Rates	299,398,484	473.5	5.70	149.43	287.53

Brief Description of the Twelve Jurisdictions

Northern District of Ohio

An original CAGI site, the Northern District of Ohio's (NDOH) anti-gang initiatives existed in Youngstown, Cleveland, and Akron, with a specific focus was on Cleveland because of its significant gang problems. Statewide data revealed that Cleveland accounted for a disproportionate amount of the district's gun crime. The CAGI initiative focused specifically on two areas within Cleveland with high rates of violent crime believed to be connected to gang activity.

The CAGI program involved a multitude of partners representing local and federal law enforcement, local prosecutors, the Department of Corrections, the state Crime Commission, the local school district, and research partners from Kent State University and additional collaboration with researchers from Michigan State University and Ohio State University. The working group used a strategic problem solving approach involving incident reviews and analyses to help the task force focus resources on the most serious people, places, and gun

violence contexts. The comprehensive plan to reduce gangs and gang-related violence included a simultaneous strategy of creating a sustaining law enforcement and community partnership through enforcement efforts, prevention efforts, and reentry strategies. The FBI and Cleveland Police Department teamed up on enforcement activities that included a number of significant crackdowns on gangs in the target area. A wide variety of prevention activities occurred within the target areas and the reentry component involved a partnership with the state corrections agency and a variety of service providers upon actual reentry. The City of Cleveland has rebranded this initiative as STANCE, asking the community to Stand Against Neighborhood Crime Everyday (STANCE) and some CAGI created efforts continue. Reports from the NDOH CAGI task force suggest that CAGI's focus on gun and gang crime was responsible for the decline in homicide in Cleveland.

Northern District of Texas

The Northern District of Texas (NDTX) was one of the six initial CAGI sites. In late 2006, CAGI funds were applied to the NDTX to address gangs, guns, drugs, and violent crime in Dallas and Fort Worth through enforcement, intervention and prevention, and reentry by means of building on the elements of effective, evidence based- strategies and partnerships established under PSN. Dallas is the third largest city in Texas with a total population of more than 1.2 million and Fort Worth the fifth largest city with an estimated population of 650,000 persons. CAGI efforts were focused in a total of five target areas: South Dallas Weed and Seed, Pleasant Grove Weed and Seed, North Oak Cliff in Dallas, North Fort Worth, Two-Points Ferguson Road, and a community in Arlington, Texas.

The CAGI task force had 24 partners and was synonymous with the PSN Steering Committee for a synergy of resources across PSN and CAGI. When active, CAGI's bi-monthly meetings were viewed as "invaluable" by the partners. Dallas and Fort Worth officials reported that they greatly benefited from the Dallas/Fort Worth Fugitive Apprehension Strike Team (DFW FAST), a team devoted to locating and apprehending violent gang members and gang associates. Additionally, Fort Worth officials noted success with the practice of issuing gang injunctions. State and local and federal prosecutions all increased during CAGI. The NDTX was fortunate to have an instrumental Prevention/Reentry Coordinator who collected Department of Justice (DOJ) Performance Measures from the partners on a monthly basis. The Dallas Independent School District (DISD) and Dallas Challenge taught youth life skills and job readiness. The Dallas Reentry Community Court and Texas Offender Reentry Initiative (TORI) were the primary entities that guided the anti-gang reentry efforts.

Central District of California

The Central District of California selected the largest city in the district, Los Angeles, as its CAGI site. The CAGI represented one in a long line of targeted interventions used in Los Angeles, and focused on an area with a documented gang problem in the Southeastern portion of the city referred to as Watts. Of particular interest for the intervention were three public housing developments in that area. Two subcommittees—law enforcement and prevention/reentry—supplement the CAGI Task Force.

Given the city of Los Angeles's major effort to address gangs and gang crime, CAGI sought to build on these broader efforts and use CAGI to expand on existing operations within the target areas. Law enforcement efforts included three unique components: expansion of the Community Law Enforcement and Recovery Program (CLEAR), expanded use of closed circuit

television monitoring systems, and the implementation of pro-active gang investigations. The prevention component of the CAGI focused on strengthening existing resources in the target area. Four areas of need were identified and addressed through CAGI: resources to deter gang recruitment efforts directed at students in local middle schools, funding to provide alternatives to gang involvement for area youth, targeted outreach for youth already involved in gang activities, or those most at risk for future gang involvement, and services for youth and young adults (e.g., job training, job placement) to aid in the cessation of gang involvement. The reentry component focused on 43 adult offenders returning from California state prison and the Los Angeles county jail. CAGI funding was used to support the Honor and Strength Reentry program established by the Los Angeles Police Department.

Eastern District of Wisconsin

The City of Milwaukee and specifically two Milwaukee Police Department districts (two and five), were the focus of the Eastern District of Wisconsin's CAGI efforts that began in 2006. Like a number of the CAGI task forces, Milwaukee built upon the strong partnerships and strategies developed to address gun violence in its PSN efforts. The team referred to this as the Safe Streets Initiative that represented Milwaukee's accumulation of PSN and the CAGI Gang Violence Reduction Project.

CAGI suppression efforts were carried out by Target Teams comprised of the Community Prosecutor, Probation and Parole agents, and Milwaukee Police Department Anti-Gang Unit officers. Each police district had a Community Prosecutor, a Community Prevention Coordinator, and a Reentry Coordinator. Enforcement efforts combined hot spot patrols, gang investigations, and coordinated efforts linking enforcement with community prosecution and nuisance abatement to address problem properties.

A team from the Marquette School of Law was responsible for managing and supervising these Coordinators. Building on its PSN experience, the CAGI program utilized offender notification meetings. Core prevention efforts were coordinated by a Community Prevention Coordinator and included a program known as *There is a Home Visiting Program*. The goals were to enhance family functioning for at-risk youths. Two prevention programs were focused on the schools. The first was known as the Classroom Organization and Management Program (COMP). The second was the *Truancy Plan* that utilized community engagement to reduce truancy and keep youths in school.

The reentry program includes a coalition of service providers that meet regularly. The committee reviews progress with returning former inmates who are back in the community as well as plan for inmates scheduled to return to the community. For those offenders meeting criteria for the CAGI Reentry efforts, participation was voluntary however each offender had to provide written commitment agreeing to complete the program.

Eastern District of Pennsylvania

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania was unique among the CAGI sites in that it took a regional approach that included a large geographic area and seven small sized cities (Allentown, Bethlehem, Easton, Harrisburg, Lancaster, Reading and York). The program was known as the "222 Corridor Initiative" referring to the highway that connects a number of the cities. The program was organized by a CAGI 222 Steering Committee, two law enforcement task forces, a gang prevention task force that involves the mayors of the participating cities, and two reentry case managers who each provide services in two counties.

The enforcement task forces were organized geographically. The cities in the Lehigh Valley on the eastern half, including Easton, Bethlehem and Allentown (and Phillipsburg, New Jersey), were part of the Lehigh Valley Violent Anti-Gang Task Force (LVVGTF), which was coordinated by the FBI. In the western half of the 222 Corridor, ATF coordinated a task force that included Reading, Lancaster, York, and Harrisburg. The western task force also included two separate city task forces in Lancaster and Reading. The enforcement task forces have primarily sought to conduct long-term investigations of gangs with the goal of arresting and prosecuting specific gangs involved in drug distribution and violent crime. In terms of prevention, the mayors of the five 222 Corridor cities in the Eastern District established a gang prevention task force, that included members of government, law enforcement, and community and faith-based leaders. Additionally, officials in York, in the Middle District, also established a prevention task force and began working with the other cities in the 222 Corridor. Each prevention task force developed plans for the use of grant funds and oversaw the implementation of those plans. Activities included engaging parents in gang prevention efforts, forming a mentoring partnership to help leverage funding and provide consistent recruitment, training and resources for the region. The reentry program focused on gang members inside the Berks, Lancaster, Lehigh, and Northhampton county jails. Jail officials, working with probation officers, identified gang involved inmates as candidates for the program. The reentry case managers coordinated activities within the jails and then in the community and manage caseloads targeted at 25 per county.

Middle District of Florida

CAGI efforts in the Middle District of FL (MDFL) were centralized in Hillsborough County and the city limits of Tampa. Gang intelligence indicated that there were 54 gangs active in this area. There were nine identified CAGI hot spots throughout the region: Town-n-Country, Wimauma, Riverview, Dover, Palmetto Beach, West Tampa, University Area, Sulphur Springs, and Busch and 50th.

The Hillsborough County Criminal Justice (HCCJ) Liaison monitored the law enforcement, prevention/intervention, and reentry components of CAGI. Each partnering agency had one point of contact. The partners met monthly. In addition to traditional suppression efforts, a gang prosecutor and gang analyst were hired for CAGI. Prevention efforts focused on 7 – 14 year olds with a high-risk of gang involvement to support gang membership prevention, gang intervention, and gang crime prevention. Reentry Specialists and Reentry Coordinators worked with clients to ensure compliance with supervision requirements and to prevent or reduce problems that could result in renewed gang activity and crime. The Gulf Coast Community Care (GCCC) system was instrumental in both prevention/intervention and reentry. Surveys of staff from each of the components reported the belief that CAGI had a measurable impact on outcomes across the various program components and on crime.

Southern District of Indiana

The Southern District of Indiana selected Indianapolis/Marion County as its target area for the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative (CAGI). Through collaboration between the United States Attorney's Office, City of Indianapolis/Marion County, and the Indiana Criminal Justice Institute, a Steering Committee and three subcommittees were formed to plan and execute CAGI activities in Indianapolis. In addition to the Steering Committee, there were three subcommittees that oversaw grant activities and made funding recommendations to the Steering Committee.

CAGI officials reported that the Indianapolis program was slow to evolve given the political climate. Specifically, several changes in organizational structure within the newly merged Metropolitan Police Department made it difficult for CAGI to build and maintain momentum. Despite these issues, the Southern District of Indiana used joint federal and local screening of gang cases, directed patrols and field interrogations in the CAGI target areas, most violent offender lists, probation and parole home visits and comprehensive gun tracing as part of their CAGI law enforcement strategies. Officials reported that these efforts were somewhat hindered by the lack of qualification and quantification of the gang problem in the target area. Prevention focused on community based efforts including school based programming as well as juvenile probation programs. The reentry efforts targeted adults 19-35 years old, who were formerly incarcerated individuals with ties to gangs, and who were returning to CAGI targeted high crime areas within Marion County (identified by zip code). In addition to linking clients to services, CAGI also provided an accountability component to its reentry initiative. This was achieved by requiring clients to participate in bi-weekly court appearances through the Transitions Court.

Western District of Oklahoma

The Western District is the largest of the three districts in Oklahoma, both in terms of land area and population. In total, 40 of the 77 counties and 52 percent of the State's population are serviced by the Western District (WDOK) that includes Oklahoma City with a population exceeding 536,000. From 2000 – 2005, the Oklahoma City Police Department documented a 300 percent increase in the number of drive-by shootings. The USAO and OCPD decided to use CAGI to respond to this increase in drive-by shootings that were believed to reflect gang activity. CAGI built on Weed and Seed and PSN, and became locally known as Project Grind (Gangs Removed, Isolated, Neutralized, and Dismantled). The CAGI target area was a 4.7 square mile area on the Eastside of the City.

Six law enforcement strategies (identification of gangs, intelligence gathering and increased presence, creation of an information sharing system, information entered into an accessible database, targeted prosecution, and hiring of an Assistant District Attorney) were used under CAGI. Prevention efforts on the Eastside entailed creation of a comprehensive service center, contracting with existing service providers, development and use of Memorandums of Understanding and development of a web-based information system for prevention partners. The third CAGI component, Reentry, built upon the existing infrastructure of the Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative (SVORI) to provide services such as job training, housing, family support, transportation, and mentoring to ex-offenders returning to Oklahoma City, and the target area.

Western District of New York

The Western District of New York selected the city of Rochester as its CAGI target area. Rochester is a city with a population of just over 200,000 with the second highest homicide rate among the CAGI jurisdictions. The Task Force built upon a long history of multi-agency collaboration focused on violence reduction. CAGI was coordinated by a distinct steering committee. There was also a reentry task force led by the Probation Department.

CAGI law enforcement efforts focused on case screening, target prosecution, combined probation/parole/police operations, joint patrols (state and locals) and “call-in”—face-to-face deterrent messages. The call-in meetings benefitted from extensive partnerships including the

police department, the trauma center, U.S. Attorney's Office, District Attorney's Office, county probation, and state parole. A local service organization does follow-up service provision for individuals attending the meetings. Additionally, the Rochester Police Department has dedicated part of its tactical unit to gang intelligence and enforcement. This included examining the relationship between drug markets and gangs as well as surveillance and undercover drug purchases.

Prevention goals included targeting youths who are at-risk of joining a gang or engaging in delinquent behavior. The services were coordinated by a local organization known as the Community Place of Greater Rochester. Interested service providers must apply to the sub-committee to receive CAGI funding. A significant component was a school-based prevention program known as Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS). An intervention program called Lead the Way involved the probation department and a local organization known as Pathways to Peace. It involved intensive probation supervision with identified gang youths who were also involved in a cognitive behavioral program intended to break the connection with gangs and produce behavioral change.

The reentry component built upon an existing program and focused on gang members who were incarcerated in the local jail. The program included both pre-release planning and linkage to a post-release case manager. Education, employment, housing, mentoring, sobriety support, and job preparation were all identified as key elements of the reentry efforts.

Middle/Eastern Districts of North Carolina

Unique to the Comprehensive Anti Gang Initiative (CAGI), two federal districts received one CAGI award to support initiatives in Raleigh and in Durham. The Raleigh CAGI program focused on two zip codes in the Southeast District and referred to their CAGI initiative as "*Project 110 %*". The Durham CAGI dubbed its focus area "*the Bulls Eye*."

Raleigh's law enforcement efforts originated from the Raleigh Police Department's Gang Suppression Unit (GSU) and Gang Intelligence Unit (GIU). The GSU combined suppression, prevention, and intervention efforts to foster public safety and community partnerships. The GIU used the department's record management system and open source data to monitor gang criminal activity. The intelligence information was used to track patterns and create strategic responses. In addition to utilizing intelligence software for investigations, link analyses, and structuring data, monthly Gun Review meetings were part of Durham's law enforcement/suppression activities. Raleigh prevention efforts included the utilization of 12 programs including but not limited to: community and faith leader meetings, mentoring, liaisons, youth programs, tip line, and graffiti removal. Durham used a Request for Proposal (RFP) process, to select six programs that provided anti-gang prevention and intervention.

Raleigh's reentry component was the least developed of the three CAGI components. Enhancements had been made to the current Juvenile Court Counselor reentry model and a model was being created for both juveniles and adults, including development of a list of and relationships with re-entrants in need of a holistic approach. Six service providers were enlisted to meet the needs of 30 re-entrants as well as to develop a reentry brochure, service "menu", and voucher process. Durham County Criminal Justice Resource Center (CJRC) was the primary provider of CAGI reentry efforts in that target area. Case management, mentoring, bus tickets/transportation, and basic needs such as clothing, food, and housing were provided through CJRC.

Northern District of Illinois

Along with Detroit, Chicago was one of the last two sites awarded a CAGI grant in fiscal 2008 that became operational in 2009. Chicago is the nation's third largest city with a population of over 2.8 million. Although Chicago has suffered from a large number of homicides, its homicide rate is similar to that of Cleveland and Dallas and has fallen considerably during the last decade. Chicago had a PSN program that was carefully evaluated and that resulted in reduced homicides and shootings in the PSN target areas (Papachristos et al., 2007). The PSN experience provided a foundation for CAGI and the same steering committee oversaw both PSN and CAGI.

The Chicago CAGI program focused on two areas in three police districts. One of these areas involved predominantly Hispanic gangs and the other was predominantly African-American. Similar to Los Angeles, Chicago was distinctive due to its long history of gang activity. Gangs were well-entrenched in many areas of the city.

As noted above, the CAGI program built upon the PSN initiative. In the enforcement arena this meant strong existing relationships between the U.S. Attorney's Office, the Chicago Police Department, Cook County prosecutors, and federal law enforcement agencies. A key partner was the FBI that operated three gang squads and held monthly "top 20" meeting to set enforcement priorities. The enforcement component focused on prioritizing specific gangs, conducting long-term investigations, and dismantling the gangs through prosecution. CAGI allowed this team to combine enforcement with prevention and intervention programs in the CAGI target areas. The prevention funding was geared toward youth who were considered vulnerable to becoming involved in gangs. Priority was given to after-school programs and mentoring. The CAGI reentry program focused on transition services for individuals returning to the CAGI target areas. These services were coordinated by an umbrella organization that coordinated a variety of services (e.g., housing, employment training, education, mental health, substance abuse treatment). The CAGI reentry component also built upon PSN parolee forums that communicated a deterrent message but also provided a link to these services.

Eastern District of Michigan

With a population of just under 900,000, Detroit is the fourth largest CAGI city. It has also suffered from the highest rate of homicide and violent crime. Indeed, its homicide rate is eight times the national rate and has been among the highest of U.S. cities for years.

The CAGI program focused on three areas of Detroit that fall within three police sectors (Northwest, Southeast, and Eastern). The enforcement component expanded its focus based on gang intelligence. The reentry component, however, focused on gang members returning from prison to any part of the city. Coordination of the initiative occurred through weekly meetings of the enforcement partners. A resource specialist oversaw the prevention and reentry components.

The enforcement component focused on investigation and prosecutions of gangs and involved strategies such as most violent offender targeting, directed police patrols, and joint federal/local prosecution screening. The prevention services were provided by two subgrantees operating in the different target areas. A key aspect was the GANG Awareness Prevention Project (GAPP) offered within the schools. The reentry component involved collaboration with the state Department of Corrections and included pre- and post-release programming. A variety of services were offered including transition planning, housing, job preparedness and placement, substance abuse treatment, mental health services, education and mentoring. The CAGI reentry

program coordinated with the Michigan ReEntry Initiative (MPRI) that was launched in 2005. One of the challenges for CAGI was identifying returning inmates with a gang connection.

Evaluation Plan and Methods

Originally the NIJ research award anticipated assessing CAGI in the original six jurisdictions. When the program was expanded to four additional jurisdictions it was decided to include these sites in the evaluation. Chicago and Detroit were the last two jurisdictions to be awarded CAGI funding. These two sites were not included in some of the data collection efforts that had already occurred at the time that these became CAGI sites but they were included in cross-city comparative impact analysis and for some of the data collection efforts that were conducted later in the evaluation period. Given limits in resources, the data collection efforts were not evenly distributed across all 12 jurisdictions but rather three jurisdictions were included for more intensive assessment. These were Cleveland, Dallas and Milwaukee. The rationale was that these jurisdictions were more subject to careful evaluation because they were early implementers and because each focused on defined geographic areas on the city. This was also true in Los Angeles but that jurisdiction was difficult to evaluate because CAGI was part of a much larger gang violence reduction initiative covering the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) jurisdiction. It would be very difficult to disentangle the CAGI program from the overall LAPD program and both followed a similar set of principles. Tampa was complicated from an evaluation standpoint because they took a regional approach throughout the Tampa Bay region including Hillsborough, Manatee, Pasco, Pinellas, and Polk Counties. Similarly, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was complicated because of the broad regional approach including seven cities. The initial set of jurisdictions was preferred to the second set because of the longer time period available for implementation and follow-up. As will be apparent, however, although there was a more intensive focus on three of the jurisdictions, for most of the measures the initial ten jurisdictions are included and for some measures all 12 jurisdictions are included.

The evaluation sought to assess both the implementation of CAGI (process) as well as the impact of CAGI on violent crime (outcome). Multiple methods were used. These included site visits throughout the project, phone interviews, mail surveys, video conference calls with project staff, and review of progress reports submitted by the CAGI task forces to the Department of Justice. Multiple site visits were conducted in Cleveland, Dallas and Milwaukee. Local crime data were gathered from these three cities as well as from Oklahoma City and Rochester and city level crime data were collected from all the jurisdictions as well as from comparable cities nationwide.

One of the major limitations in the evaluation was the lack of reliable data on gang crime. With the exception of Chicago and Los Angeles, police officials reported that they either did not capture gang crime or they did not consider their gang data to be reliable over time. A common theme was that the police department would make an effort to capture gang crime during the CAGI project (often by having a designated police official read all police reports and make such a designation), but that the gang data would be isolated to the target area and/or would not be available for the pre-intervention period thus prohibiting trend analysis of impact. Consequently, much of the outcome analysis focuses on trends in violent crime believed to be associated with gang crime.

Additionally, special data collection and analyses were conducted in particular jurisdictions when the opportunity arose. For example, Cleveland collected data on risk assessments used with the goal of identifying high risk youth who might benefit from CAGI prevention and intervention services. These data were analyzed with a comparative sample of risk data from Cleveland to assess the ability of CAGI to focus on a high risk population. Similarly, focus groups were conducted with CAGI reentry clients in Cleveland and Milwaukee in order to shed light on the CAGI reentry program from the client perspective.

Along with the lack of gang crime data, additional limitations in the evaluation related to the lack of comparison data for assessing prevention and reentry services. Although the sites could provide data on reentry and prevention program participants, they were unable to provide data on comparison groups and thus it became difficult to assess the impact of these specific components. These along with additional limitations are discussed in the concluding section. Steps are currently underway to address these limitations and the additional data and findings will be included in the final project report.

Organization of the Report

The CAGI evaluation findings are presented in several sections. The first involves a more detailed description of the three sites that were subject to more intensive evaluation. This is followed in Chapter Three with a summary of the key process findings on the implementation of CAGI. This comes primarily from interviews and surveys with key CAGI personnel and focuses on main accomplishments, challenges, and recommendations. The next chapter presents the findings on the risk assessment study in Cleveland and the focus group findings on reentry. The following chapter includes findings from the perception of program officials as well as the assessment of impact on violent crime. This assessment examines violent crime trends in the CAGI cities compared to a sample of U.S. cities as well as trend analyses of CAGI target areas from five of the jurisdictions.

Chapter Two

Cleveland, Dallas and Milwaukee Sites

As the brief descriptions in the prior chapter revealed, there were significant differences across the various CAGI sites. They range from large cities including Chicago and Dallas to a multi-city region in Pennsylvania including very small cities. Some of the cities have high rates of violent crime while others fall below the national average. This chapter presents descriptions of the three CAGI programs that were the subject of more intensive study during this project. These include Cleveland, Dallas/Fort Worth, and Milwaukee. As noted earlier, the selection of these three jurisdictions was based on them being in the initial group of sites, having well defined target areas, and having moved rapidly to implementation. Descriptions of all the sites are included in Appendix 1.

Northern District of Ohio - Cleveland

The state of Ohio is served by two federal judicial districts, with corresponding United States Attorney's Offices (USAOs): the Northern and Southern Districts. The Northern District of Ohio (NDOH) is one of the larger federal judicial districts in population (17th out of the 90 U.S. districts) with an aggregate of 5.9 million total inhabitants. The Northern District encompasses 40 counties. The city of Cleveland is the second largest city in the state and the largest within the Northern District with a population of just under 453,000 as of 2006.

In terms of population demographics, residents of Cleveland are mostly non-white (58.5 percent), which is much higher than the U.S. average of 25 percent.⁶ The homeownership rate is 69 percent, which is comparable to the national average of 66.2 percent. In addition, Cleveland ranks in the high range when comparing population density. Cleveland has an average ratio of 6,166.6 people per one square mile, which is substantially higher than the state of Ohio (277.3 people per square mile) and the U.S. average (79.6 people per square mile).

Within the Northern District, population concentrations are located primarily in Cuyahoga County. Home to the city of Cleveland, Cuyahoga is located on the northern side of the district, shares a border with Lake Erie, and houses nearly 1.4 million residents (just over 12 percent of the overall state population). Neighboring counties include Lake, Geauga, Summit, Medina, Lorain, and Portage, which are all found in the northern portion of Ohio.

As noted in the prior chapter, compared with other U.S. cities that are part of CAGI, Cleveland has one of the highest violent crime rates. Specifically, as of 2006 the city had an average murder rate of 16.6 and an average rape rate of 98.3 per 10,000 inhabitants. In 2006, there were 2,196 aggravated assaults, which average to a rate of 485.0 per 10,000 inhabitants. Among violent crimes, robbery occurred most frequently with a rate of 947.1 robberies per 10,000 inhabitants.

The Structure of CAGI in the Northern District of Ohio

As noted at the outset, the State of Ohio is served by the Northern and Southern Districts. Due to the large geographical area of Ohio, Cleveland was selected as the primary focus area for

⁶ All population data are based on the 2000 U.S. Census.

the district's CAGI efforts. A statewide CAGI taskforce was created as well as regional working groups in Cleveland.

CAGI Task Force in Ohio

The statewide CAGI taskforce was formed to provide input regarding strategy and funding as per the mandates of the DOJ's Bureau of Justice Assistance. The statewide task force consisted of the following agencies:

- Adcom Communications
- Adult Parole Authority Office
- Boys and Girls Club
- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
- Cleveland Metropolitan School Districts
- Cleveland Police Department
- Cleveland Police Athletic League
- Community Assessment and Treatment
- Community Reentry
- Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA)
- Cuyahoga Juvenile Court
- Division of Youth Services
- Drug Enforcement Agency
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Kent State University
- Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections
- Ohio State University
- Partnership for a Safer Cleveland
- Peace in the Hood
- United States Attorney's Office (USAO)

The statewide task force was supported by local task forces in the district's target cities of Akron/Canton, Cleveland, Elyria, Lorain, Mansfield, and Youngstown. Local law enforcement, BATF, and local and federal prosecutors focused resources on gun and gang violence. Local and federal prosecutors coordinated on smart prosecution case screening to determine cases that should be prosecuted federally and those that should be prosecuted locally. The district-wide initiative eventually resulted in the formation of the Northern Ohio Violent Crime Consortium (NOVCC).

CAGI Task Force in Cleveland

Due to the decision to focus on Cleveland, a working group developed. Much of the strengths of the working group in Cleveland came from the fact that the USAO was able to focus on already existing relationships between local and federal law enforcement and local prosecutors. Many of these relationships were established through the NDOH's PSN task force. As a result, strong federal-local partnerships in anti-gun initiatives represented a key strategic

component in reducing gun crime in the city of Cleveland. The anti-gang initiative was coordinated by the Cleveland CAGI Steering Committee that was comprised of over 40 representatives. Agencies represented included elected officials, law enforcement, juvenile justice, schools, community leaders, faith-based organizations, and the private sector.

The CAGI task force included an executive committee that set overall policy and a management committee comprised of the chairs of the subcommittees. The subcommittees focused on law enforcement, prevention, and reentry.

Community Engagement and Media Campaign

The District of Ohio chose to partner with a marketing and advertising firm with offices located in Cleveland, as their Community Engagement Partner. The media partner produced traditional print, radio, and television ads, to communicate the CAGI message to the public. They also worked to strategically place advertisements on billboards and used grassroots promotions to distribute material in targeted locations. Finally, they created the STANCE website that was considered a valuable resource for CAGI partners and the community.

Research Partners

An additional CAGI partnership involved a research team. The Northern District selected a multidisciplinary team of faculty from Kent State University and Ohio State University to be its research partner. In addition to regularly attending task force meetings, the research team began by providing a problem analysis of gang and gun crime in the district, which helped to lead the task force to focus their efforts in targeted areas. The research partners assisted in ongoing assessment, framed surveys, gathered data, conducted analyses, and provided feedback to the task force. In addition, the research team analyzed the nature and distribution of gun crime in target neighborhoods, informed the task force as to whether the CAGI strategies were targeted at the sources of the gun crime problem, and evaluated the impact of the Northern District's CAGI initiative on gun crime. The research partners and the task force were assisted in their data collection and analysis efforts by crime analysts in the CPD and in the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA). This included an analyst who focused specifically on gang activity in the schools. In addition to the local research partners, Michigan State University collaborated with the NDOH CAGI task force and the Kent State and Ohio State researchers through numerous site visits, teleconferences, and data collection, analysis, and feedback.

The Nature of the Gang and Gun Crime Problem in Cleveland

The perception of local officials was that gang crime in Cleveland largely involved serious, chronic offenders who chose to illegally carry and use guns. This was largely supported by analyses of those gun offenders prosecuted in federal court. Data from 2004 and 2005 indicated increases in violent crime in Cleveland. Although there had been aggressive enforcement activity as part of PSN, including over 4,700 firearms seizures from 2003-05, there was also a belief that there was a lack of gun crime prevention efforts to complement the enforcement component (see Figure 1 for an outline of problems and strategies).

The initial problem analysis was based on violent crime incidents in Cleveland, firearm seizure data, and street-level intelligence on gang activity. This resulted in the identification of

two neighborhoods as CAGI target sites. These were the Hough and St.Clair/Superior neighborhoods. As CAGI evolved and given observed impact in these two areas, CAGI expanded to include the additional target area known as Slavic Village.

As will be discussed, following the initial problem analysis, the research partners continued to monitor and evaluate the CAGI program. This included collecting crime incident data from target areas and comparison sites and analysis, including mapping and geocoding of crime data.

Gang and Gun Crime Reduction Strategies

On the basis of this problem analysis, the CAGI task force developed an overall strategy as well as action steps needed to effectively implement the strategy. The steps included enforcement, prevention, and reentry strategies.

Enforcement

The main focus of law enforcement was to establish a structure for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to work together and share tactical and strategic information in order to reduce gun crime. Agencies included the FBI, ATF, DEA, Cleveland Police Department, and coordinators of law enforcement, prevention, and reentry. Every month, representatives of these agencies met to discuss the status of investigations and the results of prosecutions; to evaluate and disseminate intelligence information about gangs; and to provide strategies to prosecute them. The law enforcement committee meetings generally had about 30 officials in attendance. The goal was to dismantle gang organizations through focused enforcement in the target areas. The committee used intelligence-led data to identify target areas and utilized the resources of each agency to aid in investigations, execute search warrants, confiscate firearms, and make arrests. Additionally, focused enforcement efforts attempted to integrate federal and state prosecution resources to increase prosecution of gang and gun offenders. The overall strategy of law enforcement was not only to incapacitate gang and gun offenders but also to deter potential offenders by utilizing prevention strategies, which is described below.

The specific enforcement strategy that emerged targeted specific gangs operating in the target areas. Each gang was assigned to a multi-agency team that involved local, state, and federal law enforcement and county and federal prosecutors. A total of six gangs and another six of what were described as “aspiring gangs” were subjects of these enforcement activities that sought to dismantle the gangs. This resulted in over 311 federal indictments over a four year period with 308 defendants being convicted.

Prevention

In addition to the strategies of increased enforcement and prosecution, the task force implemented prevention strategies that target youth most at-risk of becoming gang members. In an effort to target youths most at-risk for involvement in delinquent and criminal behavior, the task force implemented prevention strategies to address the full range of personal, family, and community factors that contribute to juvenile delinquency and gang activity. With the help of CAGI funding, prevention programs focused on increasing partnerships with the local community, empowering the community to resist gangs, and providing multiple services for at-

risk youths. Community wide partnerships included elected officials, educators, public safety and law enforcement, community leaders, juvenile justice officials, and the private sector. This was a main ingredient of the citywide STANCE. The City of Cleveland rebranded the CAGI initiative as STANCE, asking the community to Stand Against Neighborhood Crime Everyday (STANCE). The goals of STANCE include:

1. Reducing gangs, drugs and violence
2. Reducing gun availability
3. Encouraging children to pursue positive alternatives to gangs
4. Inspiring future role models

The CAGI prevention task force conducted significant public outreach and could point to a number of high visibility and well-attended community meetings. In addition to community meetings, CAGI officials made considerable effort to involve community members, parents, youths, school officials, and a variety of service providers in planning prevention services and activities. CAGI funding provided for local media partners to develop local strategies to communicate the CAGI/STANCE message to the general public. In addition, local celebrities teamed up with STANCE to spread the word about setting goals, self-esteem, and respecting others all in an effort to help kids resist gangs and achieve their goals in the future.

CAGI funding was used to contract with a number of service providers to offer gang prevention services in the targeted neighborhoods. The CAGI subcommittee on prevention followed the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Strategy model as it funded various programs intended to address risk factors at the individual, family, peer, school and community levels. The committee used a “request-for-proposals” process to solicit services and to review applications to provide services under the CAGI umbrella. The committee held three community meetings with over 250 individuals and organizations attending to communicate the CAGI program goals and gain community input. A risk instrument was developed (see Chapter Four) in the hope of identifying the youths most at risk and to match prevention and intervention services to risk factors.

One of the specific focal areas for prevention was with the schools. This included both targeted prevention with a high risk group and primary prevention for the broader group of youths in the target area school system.

Additional prevention components included an initiative called “Project Penalty Awareness” that borrowed from the “pulling levers” concept of communicating to at-risk individuals both the legal sanctions and the human impact associated with violent crime. Probation, the faith community, and police teamed in an Operation Nightlight intervention that involved unannounced home visits to high-risk gang-involved probationers.

Reentry

Persons sentenced to prison may be gang-involved before conviction, become gang-involved while incarcerated, or risk gang involvement upon release. To help address those risks and realities, the Northern District of Ohio mobilized corrections officials and community partners to design a pilot strategy that sought to prepare a group of these offenders for successful integration into the community. There was both an adult and youth reentry program developed

as part of CAGI. Reentry strategies focused on creating mentor-based reentry assistance programs with faith-based and other community organizations providing transitional housing, job readiness and placement assistance, and substance abuse and mental health treatment to prisoners reentering society. Pre-release case-management services, inmate motivational speakers, one-on-one service needs conferences, referral efforts into employment and housing programs, mental health and substance abuse treatment encompassed the reentry program intended to help ease offenders' transition back to the community. An innovative component of the reentry program was the utilization of "citizen circles" whereby probation and parole officers, service providers, and community members met with returning offenders to conduct a strength-based assessment and reentry plan.

The reentry program took a similar approach to the prevention subcommittee by holding a series of community meetings and developing a call-for-proposals for reentry services in the target area. Community Assessment and Treatment Services, Inc. (CATS) became a key reentry partner along with Catholic Charities that was a subcontractor to CATS. The reentry programs utilized a case management system with voucher-sponsored services for 100 former gang-involved returning inmates. CATS managed the adult program whereas Catholic Charities managed the youth program. The initiative ultimately resulted in a "Welcome Center" in one of the target neighborhoods to facilitate entrance into the case management system, collaboration with a newly developed reentry court, and call-in meetings for recently released former inmates. Indeed, both an adult and youth reentry court were developed as part of the CAGI program.

The CAGI juvenile reentry program focused on 30 youths returning from youth corrections facilities and coordinated closely with the youth reentry court to provide services and accountability. Youths were assigned to one parole officer and the program used a strength-based model with incentives and graduated sanctions to assist in the transition to the community. The program used the COMPASS risk assessment instrument to support the risk and asset based approach.

One of the changes that occurred during the program is that the criteria for inclusion in the program were expanded. Originally, the plan was to involve gang involved inmates returning to the CAGI target areas. Two problems emerged. One was that the number of gang involved inmates who reported planning to return to the target neighborhoods was too small to meet target numbers of clients. Second, the actual locations where returning inmates planned to reside and where they ended up residing often did not match and proved to be fluid once individuals returned to the community. Consequently, the program began to focus on gang-involved inmates returning to any area of Cleveland.

Characteristics of CAGI Reentry Group in Cleveland

The CAGI Task Force working with its research partners, gathered data on the initial 94 CAGI reentry participants. This provides a snapshot of the characteristics of the NDOH reentry clients. Further information was gathered from focus group sessions with reentry clients and is reported in Chapter Four.

All of the participants were male, mostly African American (85 percent), not married (86 percent), and averaged 31 years of age. Most had educational deficits and experienced joblessness, as 85 percent of the sample did not complete high school, 60 percent had failed or repeated a grade, and two-thirds were not currently employed. Within the last year, approximately 62 percent reported working less than six months full-time or part-time and 39

percent had no vocational skill or trade. The vast majority (88 percent) reported needing training skills or a job; yet, 60 percent admitted that they faced more difficulty securing a job that paid above minimum wage compared to others. More than half (57 percent) of the men in the sample worked below minimum wage and 83 percent admitted to barely having enough money within the last 12 months. Most experienced difficulty paying their bills (66 percent), worried about their finances (81 percent), and had family conflict over money (52 percent) within the year. Nearly three-quarters (72 percent) of the men in the sample worked and lived in the same area for more than one year and the vast majority (83 percent) reported having a regular living situation. Although many (42 percent) did not move within the last year, less than one-third (31 percent) reported moving once and more than one-fifth moved two or more times within the time period. The vast majority (82 percent) lived with family and few (17 percent) lived with friends or on their own (14 percent). Nevertheless, the vast majority (83 percent) reported that they did not have a verifiable residential address.

In addition, many men in the sample had family members and friends who had contact with the criminal justice system. Arrests within the family were common, as 44 percent of participants' fathers, 25 percent of their mothers, 50 percent of their sibling, and 14 percent of their partners had been arrested. Over one-third (37 percent) reported having parents who had a prior substance abuse problem and nearly one-third had a parent who had previously been incarcerated. Over 60 percent reported that half or most of their peers had been arrested in the past and a similar percentage was reported for having friends who served time in jail. Fifty-four percent of the sample reported that half or most of their friends used drugs and nearly two-thirds had friends who were gang members. Thus, not surprisingly, 60 percent of men in the sample admitted having been a part of a gang; however, very few (17 percent) reported that they were current gang members.

With regards to criminal history, the age of first arrest ranged from 10 to 28 years of age with an average of 16.5 years. Nearly half (47 percent) of the men in the sample had six or more prior arrests, averaging 7.5 total previous arrests. Nearly 60 percent of the sample had at least one prior violent felony arrest but the majority (56 percent) did not have any prior cases that led to the injury of a victim. In total, the most common offense that participants in the sample were arrested for include burglary (40 percent), robbery (36 percent), assault (30 percent), family violence (30 percent), and a weapons offense (27 percent). More than 40 percent had five or more prior convictions. Among the sample, over 80 percent had a prior probation sentence with more than half receiving a new charge while on probation. Specifically, 35 percent had one new charge while on probation, 10 percent had two new charges, and 12 percent had three or more charges. Despite these results, participants in the sample did not have their probation or parole revoked while under supervision. In terms of institutional context, 70 percent of men in the sample had been jailed three or more times in the past and nearly one-third had received misconduct violations while incarcerated.

The number and type of current charges varied among men in the sample, as one-third had one charge, one-quarter had two charges, and nearly 40 percent had three or more current charges against them. In total, the most current type of offense that men in the sample were charged with included drug trafficking (31 percent), robbery (27 percent), assault (23 percent), and drug possession (21 percent). When asked about their substance use, more than half (55 percent) blamed alcohol for their legal problems. The majority (53 percent) used drugs and nearly half (48 percent) used alcohol at the time of their last arrest. Although many of the men in

the sample had received alcohol (48 percent) and drug treatment (59 percent) in the past, only 18 percent were currently receiving substance abuse treatment.

Participants in the sample were asked a number of questions to tap into their understanding of neighborhood. Specifically, 69 percent of the sample reported that there was much crime where they resided; one-third stated that there were gangs in their neighborhood, and 83 percent admitted that it was easy to obtain drugs in their neighborhood. Given the presence of criminal activity in their communities, 54 percent reported having friends who felt a need to carry a weapon and 71 percent reported that citizens felt a need to carry a weapon for protection.

In addition, when asked about perceptual questions about themselves, approximately 40 percent agreed that they can be dangerous if angry. However, 42 percent disagreed with the statement that others view them as being cold and 46 percent disagreed that others perceive them as violent. In addition, nearly two-thirds reported having friends who enjoyed their company and 59 percent disagreed that they feel left out. Although most (64 percent) men in the sample had a best friend they could talk to and more than half (54 percent) felt very close friends to some friends, only 28 percent reported having friends who would help them.

The majority of men in the sample held conventional values that were in line with the law. For example, more than 70 percent disagreed that an individual who is hungry has the right to steal and two-thirds disagreed with the statement that they would get in trouble with the law because they do not have a decent job. Also, 53 percent disagreed that minor drug use does not hurt anyone and two-thirds disagreed with the statement that items stolen from the rich are not missed. Despite aligning themselves with conventional values, however, nearly half (48 percent) of the men in the sample reported that trouble would result if someone insulted their family or friend. Similarly, 40 percent agreed that they would hit or threaten anyone who hurt their family member compared to 33 percent who disagreed and 26 percent who were unsure.

Although not all members of the sample admitted to being gang involved, the group did appear to be at high risk of continued offending upon their return to the community. Thus, it appeared that the NDOH CAGI reentry program was focused on an appropriate group for reentry services.

Figure 1: Gang and Gun Crime Problems and CAGI Strategies

Problem	Overall Strategy	Specific Components
Chronic Offenders	Incapacitate and deter	Create partnerships among federal-local law enforcement USAO commitment to increase prosecution of gun offenders
Geographically Concentrated Gang And Gun Crimes	Use of existing relationships Increased police Operations in target Areas	Directed patrol
Lack of Gang Prevention Efforts	Prevent at-risk youths from entering gangs	Promote community-wide partnerships Empower the community to resist gang recruitment efforts and gang-related violence Provide multiple services for at-risk youths

Reported Results

Implementation of CAGI

The following section provides reports from NDOH CAGI task force members on their perceptions of the accomplishments as well as challenges of the CAGI initiative. The results come from interviews with key officials gathered through site visits and teleconferences as well as focus groups with the members of the enforcement, prevention and reentry subcommittees.

Enforcement

In terms of the enforcement component, Cleveland task force officials were consistent in reporting significant improvements in information sharing and collaboration among local, state, and federal partners. Participants mentioned that prior to CAGI the local, state and federal agencies often worked together in task forces but that these task forces usually operated as “silos” in isolation from one another. Under CAGI there was a mechanism to develop shared goals and to coordinate targets. This was believed to result in more strategic and focused enforcement as well as efficient use of resources as different agencies took the lead on different task forces but with overall coordination. Participating officials also noted the emphasis on data-driven processes to target the most active and violent gangs. This was believed to result in intelligence-led investigations and to have the parallel benefit of de-confliction among

investigations. Additionally, the CAGI structure that involved regular meetings, voting processes where all partners had a voice, and minutes and feedback, were all seen as creating a shared vision and goals as well as to develop commitment and accountability among all partnering agencies. Indeed, numerous officials reported that the monthly meetings were an essential component of the CAGI program.

Enforcement officials also reported that CAGI's comprehensive nature was very important. They believed that whereas the gang crackdowns were likely to have a short term impact on community safety, they also believed that the impact would be short-lived absent prevention programs to minimize "back-filling" by younger individuals as well as reentry efforts seeking to prevent returning inmates from re-establishing gang activity in the target areas.

One of the challenges that was reported was that while much of the gang activity was geographically focused, investigations often revealed activity that went beyond the boundaries of target areas. This was particularly true for gangs involved in drug selling. One consequence was to expand the target area, although the target areas remained well-defined throughout the initiative. Some officials also reported some skepticism from street-level officers at the beginning of the CAGI program. This seemed to be based on perceptions that CAGI reflected "one more" federal task force that would not significantly change the way business was conducted. These officials believed that this skepticism was overcome when several major gang investigations led by different federal agencies but working closely with CPD resulted in large numbers of arrests and prosecutions of key gangs and their members.

Among the suggestions for strengthening the enforcement component, officials mentioned greater attention to building gang information systems that would support targeted intelligence-led enforcement as well as prevention and reentry. Officials specifically mentioned the need for greater information about juveniles involved or at-risk for gang activity.

Prevention

Officials considered the development of new partnerships with service providers (e.g., Boys and Girls Club of Slavic Village; City of Cleveland Building and Housing) as well as actual prevention and intervention programs being offered in the target communities the major accomplishment of CAGI prevention efforts. They also considered the collaboration with the schools to be a major step forward in the delivery of prevention services.

The CAGI prevention task force was credited with significant public outreach and could point to a number of high visibility and well-attended community meetings. In addition to community meetings, CAGI officials were very positive about the efforts to involve community members, parents, youths, school officials, and a variety of service providers in planning prevention services and activities.

Among the concerns identified by CAGI officials were that some (a minority) of service providers did not deliver services as expected and that there was no long-term plan for sustaining prevention services when CAGI funding ended. However, it should be noted that CAGI officials were successful in attracting additional funding to continue CAGI as the original grant funds were exhausted.

Reentry

Several innovative components of the reentry program were highlighted. One was that CAGI worked in coordination with the new adult and youth reentry courts that were established in Cuyahoga County in response to the CAGI initiative. Another was that NDOH utilized “call-in” meetings with recently returned inmates that emphasized both a deterrence message about avoiding gangs and illegal gun possession as well as a social support message encouraging the individuals to take advantage of available resources. Relatedly, a significant focus of attention was to identify and coordinate available community services including personal identification, GED preparation, housing, mentoring, domestic violence prevention and substance abuse treatment. The emphasis of a case management model was considered another key step in linking individuals to appropriate services. This was considered critical for staff and for clients. For staff this allowed developing one-on-one relationships that and to match needs and services and adapt services over time. For clients it provided individualized services and a mentor and advocate to assist in handling transition challenges.

Officials reported that they believed a major accomplishment was the improved relationship with the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. This allowed CAGI officials to begin to work with clients while they were still incarcerated. As a result, the program attempted to work with clients for six months pre- and post-release whereas prior practice typically involved 30 days of service. Indeed, as the program evolved corrections officials began working with inmates upon entry to prison to begin the process of reentry planning (this was not limited to CAGI clients).

CAGI officials also emphasized an additional strategy that straddled reentry and prevention/intervention was collaboration with the probation department to conduct home visits of at-risk probationers. Similarly, for adult offenders efforts were made to have three specific parole officers responsible for CAGI clients. This was considered a critical accomplishment for sharing information and increasing both system and individual offender accountability. Indeed, the collaboration with probation and parole officers was reported as a key achievement of CAGI.

The officials also noted a number of challenges. Among these was the previously mentioned issue that returning offenders may not know where they are going to live or that may change upon release. Services for female returning inmates were limited (CAGI’s focus was on male gang members). Additionally, although progress was made over time, it proved more difficult than anticipated to identify gang-involved inmates while in prison and to get them involved in the CAGI pre-release program.

Some officials raised concerns about accountability and program inclusion. On the accountability side, there were concerns that parole officer caseloads were so large that it was difficult to rely on the PO to maintain accountability over the clients. This concern was mitigated when the majority of reentry clients were assigned to the three POs with CAGI caseloads. The inclusion issue reflected a concern that some program participants did not appear to be motivated to take advantage of the program services. However, all participants were volunteers so it is difficult to discern how this could be addressed from a programmatic perspective.

Overall

In addition to the specific accomplishments reported above, the CAGI task force members noted a sense of accomplishment in linking CAGI with the regional gang and violence reduction coalition of NOVCC. They also pointed to concrete signs of being able to sustain STANCE following the loss of federal CAGI funding. This included the fact that the executive committee and subcommittees continued to meet and to the success in attracting supplemental sources of funding.

Evidence of Impact – Outcome

The MSU analysis of impact is presented in subsequent chapters. In order to provide a preliminary assessment of impact on violent crime, we present the crime data from the CAGI target areas. As Table 3 indicates, the data suggest significant reductions in aggravated assaults, robberies and homicides in the target areas. Indeed, comparing pre-intervention 2005 with 2010 there was a 25 percent reduction in aggravated assaults, a 38 percent drop in robbery and over 50 percent decline in homicides. Although these trends need to be considered in light of trends in other parts of the city, they are consistent with the perceptions of Cleveland officials that violent crime was reduced in the CAGI target areas.

Table 3 Trend in Violent Crime in CAGI Target Area

CAGI TARGET AREAS	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	% Change 2005-2010
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	571	533	474	469	416	429	-24.8
ROBBERY	887	820	810	766	688	552	-37.8
HOMICIDE	26	30	23	24	18	12	-53.8

Conclusion

CAGI in the District of Ohio with its comprehensive task force, integration of research, a balance of enforcement and prevention strategies, and effective use of a media campaign is following the CAGI model as envisioned and directed by DOJ. Following assessment of the district's gun crime problem, the focus was on the City of Cleveland because it accounted for a disproportionate amount of the district's gun crime. Interviews consistently indicated that CAGI resulted in improved federal, state, and local coordination of law enforcement resources and a focused and sustained commitment to reducing gun crime. Finally, assessment of the trend in gun crime offenses in Ohio is suggestive that the CAGI effort may have had a positive impact on reducing gun crime.

Northern District of Texas – Dallas and Fort Worth

The Northern District of Texas (NDTX) was one of the six initial Comprehensive Anti Gang Initiative (CAGI) sites. In late 2006, CAGI funds were applied in the Northern District of Texas to address gangs, guns, drugs, and violent crime in Dallas and Fort Worth. Two diverse cities, Dallas, the third largest city in Texas with a total population of more than 1.2 million persons while Fort Worth, the fifth largest city has an estimated population of 650,000 persons. The Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington metropolitan region has a population of over 6.3 million.

CAGI funds in the amount of \$2.5 million allowed expansion of enforcement, intervention and prevention, and reentry addressing gang activity by means of building on the elements of evidence based- strategies and partnerships established under Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN). The initial CAGI target areas were the Weed and Seed areas of South Dallas and Pleasant Grove in Southeast Dallas. Two additional target areas, North Oak Cliff in Dallas and North Fort Worth, were added. Then, in 2007, Two-Points Ferguson Road and a community in Arlington were also included as CAGI target areas for a total of five CAGI areas.

CAGI Task Force

In Dallas-Fort Worth, the CAGI Steering Committee was synonymous with the PSN Steering Committee. The structure was designed to create a synergy of resources and to build on existing partnerships. The CAGI task force had 24 formal partners. Task force members included:

- U.S. Attorney
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Drug Enforcement Administration
- High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
- United States Marshal
- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
- Dallas County District Attorney
- Tarrant County District Attorney's Office
- Texas Department of Criminal Justice (Parole)
- Community Supervision and Corrections Department (Adult Probation)
- Juvenile Justice Services
- Arlington Police Department
- Dallas Police Department
- Dallas County Sheriff
- Fort Worth Police Department
- Dallas City Attorney's Office
- Dallas Housing Authority
- North Texas Crime Commission
- Fort Worth Safe City Commission
- University of Texas at Arlington
- Dallas Independent School District
- City of Grand Prairie Municipal Court
- Highland Park Police Department

The NDTX coordinated PSN and CAGI activities through an overlapping task force structure. This involved either quarterly or twice annual executive committee meetings as well as regular meetings of the CAGI subcommittees. The CAGI Committee met on a formal basis bi-monthly for coordination and updates of activities. Members found these meeting to be “invaluable”. In addition, the Dallas Independent School District, a PSN and CAGI partner, continued to hold weekly “intel meetings” to discuss and address any incidents or potential situations. In attendance were several representatives from Steering Committee agencies.

The Nature of the Gang Problem

The University of Texas at Arlington was the Research Partner (RP) for PSN and for CAGI. The task force was “very satisfied” with the Research Partner, and would have continued to retain their services if funds allowed. The University acted as an integral part of the CAGI efforts by providing data analysis with problem identification, program development, evaluation, program revision, and resource allocation. In coordination with the RP, law enforcement in the CAGI target areas collected overall and gang specific crime data for murder, robbery, aggravated assault, drug offenses, firearms offenses, and calls for services. The research partner’s involvement in PSN created a situation where data reports on gun-related crime for PSN provided an initial sense of hot-spot areas throughout Dallas in terms of the CAGI target areas. These incident reports were complemented with gang intelligence from DPD’s gang unit as well as federal law enforcement partners. In Fort Worth and Arlington the respective police department’s crime analysis and gang units as well as federal task forces provided an understanding of gangs and gang crime activity. The result was that the CAGI target sites represented the PSN focus areas with the highest levels of gang activity.

Those law enforcement agencies involved in the NDTX CAGI efforts adhere to the statutory definition of a gang crime:

Texas Penal Code Chapter 71.01 (d)) states: A criminal street gang is defined as three or more persons having a common identifying sign or symbol or an identifiable leadership who continuously or regularly associate in the commission of criminal activities.

Gang and Gun Crime Reduction Strategies

The CAGI task force’s “goal is to reduce gang violence in the community” through “a three-prong approach to combat gangs, guns and violent crime which includes law enforcement, schools, and the community.” As noted above, this included targeted enforcement coupled with prevention, intervention, and reentry programming modeled on the OJJDP comprehensive strategy to gang reduction.

Enforcement

CAGI law enforcement and suppression strategies were implemented in November 2006, and included:

- Allow overtime police patrols within the neighborhoods of the designated target areas to deter gun, gang and gang-related criminal activity through intensive suppression efforts in Dallas and Fort Worth.
- Expand existing federal gang task forces to include additional personnel, with prosecutorial support; and the participation of other municipalities in the target area, having significant gang activity.
- Establish a comprehensive gang intelligence network.
- Develop education and training opportunities to law enforcement.
- Build on existing law enforcement resources in communities with Weed and Seed and developing Weed and Seed sites with significant gang issues.

Within Dallas and Fort Worth enforcement efforts included both neighborhood patrols (regular and overtime) as well as each agency's gang unit. Additionally, key federal partners including the U.S. Marshal Service, the FBI, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) provided additional gang-focused investigations, arrests and prosecutions. In 2007 Fort Worth utilized a civil injunction against the Northside (sic) Four Trey Gangsta Crips that was described as one of the city's most notorious gangs. The injunction prohibited the gang from engaging in gang activities including associating with other gang members, wearing gang colors, using cell phones or beepers to conduct drug sales, possessing spray paint, loitering, etc. within a 3.6 mile safety zone.

In January 2008, at the request of the NDTX USAO, a Top 20 Gang List was devised. A subcommittee consisting of three AUSAs, local prosecutors, DPD, ATF, Marshals Service, and ATF use gang intelligence to identify targets and develop "prosecution packages." The list focused on individuals in gangs with the worst records or that posed immediate threats based on information gathered by more than 40 agencies from nine primary sources. Detailed files were developed on these high-impact gang members including their gang affiliation, associates, criminal history, picture, tattoos, and similar information. Additionally in early 2008, Gang Net, a law enforcement database became active and allowed more than 100 law enforcement agencies access to a breadth of gang intelligence information. In addition to targeting individuals, these meetings also identified specific gangs for targeted investigation and prosecution.

Again building on PSN, federal and local prosecutors worked together to screen cases and decide which cases should be prioritized for federal prosecution and which should be handled locally.

One of the strategies developed under PSN in Dallas but that included CAGI gang-involved and at-risk individuals was the use of large offender call-in meetings on a monthly basis. Parolees and probationers were ordered to attend these meetings that typically included in the vicinity of 400 probationers and parolees. Following the message developed in other jurisdictions with smaller groups of offenders (see McDevitt et al., 2006), representatives of federal and local law enforcement, corrections, social services and community representatives warned of the sanctions available for illegal gun possession by felons as well as expressing a desire for the individuals to take advantage of available social services.

Prevention and Intervention

Overall CAGI prevention and intervention components were implemented January 2007, and were modeled after the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) evidenced-based Comprehensive Gang Intervention Model: suppression, social intervention, opportunities provision, organizational change and development, and community mobilization. To address the gang issue from a prevention and intervention means, Dallas relied upon two major entities: the Dallas Independent School District (DISD) and Dallas Challenge.

Four zip codes⁷ in Dallas County, which included the areas of Pleasant Grove, South Dallas, and North Oak Cliff (all three CAGI target areas), were chosen for implementation of violence prevention/intervention programs to decrease gang activity and gang-related crimes. Programs were put in place in DISD high schools, middle schools, and elementary schools, feeder schools to one another, within the so mentioned zip codes. DISD relied heavily on the Parent Institute for Quality Education (PIQE) curriculum to decrease gang activity and related crimes. The eight week curriculum provided training, interventions, parent/community collaborations, and enforcement.

DISD also organized weekly Intelligence meeting that involved school resource officers, counselors and teachers, DPD and DISD gang officers, juvenile probation, gang intervention specialists, and officials from the reentry court and social service agencies. The committee attempted to identify gang conflict situations for which preventive intervention could occur as well as gang-involved or at-risk individuals for the above described intervention programs.

Dallas Challenge is a non-profit organization that has been providing positive support to youth and their families since 1984. A model program, *Creating Lasting Family Connections* (CLFC), was implemented in the CAGI target areas. CLFC is a structured program that uses trainings to teach positive family interactions, improve personal growth through increasing self awareness, expression of feelings, interpersonal communication and self disclosure to improve their ability to provide a nurturing environment for each other in a more effective and meaningful manner. Additionally, youth were taught communication and refusal skills (“Getting Real”), bonding skills, and how to use of community services when personal or family problems arose. The youth self-reported involvement with parents and community services.

Fort Worth’s prevention and intervention efforts relied on two entities as well: *Bright Futures* and the Boys and Girls Club of Greater Fort Worth. *Bright Futures*, one of the many Fort Worth Safe City Commission programs, provided tutoring, life skills training and mentoring for youth at-risk for gang recruitment in the Northside CAGI target area. The Boys and Girls Club *Career Launch Program* provided identified gang members with activities and services for academic assistance, work readiness training/SCANS instruction, job search assistance and job placement services using four strategies: “(1) partnerships with local employers to hire program graduates; (2) placing participants in work experience and on-the-job training slots in occupations that closely match each participant’s specific career goals and aptitudes; (3) arranging with employers to gradually increase the participant’s level of responsibility; and (4) providing social and academic instruction that assist participants with functioning on their job, when appropriate” (provided by CAGI coordinator).

Finally, CAGI included a multi-component strategy of community outreach and education. Annual Youth Violence Conferences were held with the third having over 500 attendees. CAGI community outreach was included in PSN media and outreach campaigns.

⁷ The zip codes were: 75208, 75212, 75215, and 75217

Many different forms of communication were utilized (posters, door hangers, billboards, signs on busses) and included a focus on both gun and gang crime.

Reentry

Reentry elements were implemented in May 2007 and primarily consisted of efforts with the Dallas Community Court Reentry Program within the Dallas City Reentry Court and the Texas Offender Reentry Initiative (TORI). Parolees returning to the City of Dallas from either the Texas Youth Commission (TYC) or the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) could be supervised by the court for up to 12 months. Compliance with terms was rewarded while sanctions were imposed for deviance. Parolees had to adhere to frequent visits with Parole Officers, random drug testing, and counseling. Clients 17 years of age and older, with gang-involved or gang related incidents and previous incarcerations were eligible for inclusion.

The Dallas Reentry Community Court serviced gang involved offenders returning to the targeted communities of Pleasant Grove, South Dallas, and North Oak Cliff. The pre-release service providers coordinated with the parole officer and the Dallas Reentry Community Court regarding the strengths, needs, and risks of each individual in the program. The role of the hearing officer was that of emphasizing “reintegration”.

The Texas Offender Reentry Initiative (TORI) provided pre-release and post-release services to participants such as: case management, developing transition plans, conducting intensive Intake and Program Access Assessments, job skills training, mentoring, anti-gang strategies and emergency assistance as needed. Once a needs assessment had been completed by reviewing prevalence of at-risk peer associations, anger management issues, domestic violence incidences, and socialization skills development, vouchers for wrap around services were provided. TORI was able to work with the Dallas Housing Authority (DHA) and private property owners to provide Section 8 Housing vouchers to some involved in the TORI program. TORI staff mentioned that housing and employment were the greatest needs for most clients.

These programs were intended to provide the structure for a holistic anti gang reentry approach that relied upon the faith-based and community organizations (FBCOs) with criminal justice, law enforcement, treatment, and service agencies/providers to offer pre-release and post-release services and supervision for high impact gang members returning to the community after a period of incarceration. Participating offenders came from state, local, or other correctional facilities as well as those on probation.

Figure 2: Gang Crime Problems and CAGI Strategies

Problem	Overall Strategy	Specific Components
Chronic Gang Offenders	Incapacitate and deter	Focus PSN partnerships among federal-local law enforcement on gangs
		Top 20 list
		USAO commitment to increase prosecution of gang-involved offenders
	Develop gang intelligence	Gang intelligence meetings; regional gang intelligence system
Geographically Concentrated Gang Crimes	Focused enforcement	Overtime patrol; gang unit and task force investigations
		Communicate deterrence and social support message through large call-in meetings
	Prevention and Reentry	Develop new programs in target areas; work with schools and established programs in target areas
		Provide multiple services for at-risk youths and returning gang involved inmates

Reported Results

Implementation of CAGI

Task force members consistently reported that the partnerships created through PSN and then further developed in CAGI represented a major accomplishment. For example, a task force member from the faith community stated that “we had never interacted with law enforcement and the judiciary. We learned that we share common objectives and that we could leverage resources. She added, “to have the U.S. Attorney and Mayor come to our congregation was very helpful to influence our parishioners.”

Task force members reported that the commitment of the U.S. Attorney and the AUSA’s to gang and gun enforcement as well as the overall comprehensive PSN and CAGI initiatives was a critical factor in developing and sustaining the various partnerships. Many also noted the work of the Law Enforcement Coordinator in community outreach.

The CAGI coordinator reported that the bi-monthly meetings of the CAGI subcommittee were “invaluable for coordination of services and identifying additional resources.”

Enforcement

Enforcement officials noted that the development of gang intelligence and the sharing of

information among law enforcement was a major accomplishment of CAGI. This included both the regional gang intelligence system as well as through the regular meetings. Federal, state, and local gang-related prosecutions were submitted for 2007 – 2009⁸. In 2007, there were 113 federal prosecutions, 122 in 2008, and 202 in 2009. In 2007, there were 218 state prosecutions for the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth, 97 in 2008, and 413 in 2009.

Prevention and Intervention

Major accomplishments reported included the collaboration with DISD. In Dallas, all schools in the target areas were active participants in the gang prevention efforts. Similarly Dallas Challenge and Fort Worth's Boys and Girls Clubs programs were reported to be working with large numbers of at-risk youths and their families. The CAGI program exceeded target numbers of participants in the prevention and intervention programs by over 50 percent.

Reentry

An unforeseen impediment with the reentry "client" intake occurred due to offenders not returning to the CAGI target areas. This was consistent with reports from other CAGI sites. Once the target areas were increased by including neighborhoods with a nexus to the target areas, more offenders were eligible for inclusion in CAGI reentry efforts. Eventually, 100 offenders were serviced by both Dallas and Fort Worth. Given the delayed start, by project end, 80 percent of the intended goal for clients served had been reached. TORI claimed success in five of their sites and received their own funding to continue efforts albeit at a reduced intake number.

The NDTX was fortunate to have an instrumental Prevention/Reentry Coordinator who collected Department of Justice (DOJ) Performance Measures from the partners on a monthly basis. The reports contained activity information, goals, objectives, tasks, results and successes, remaining tasks, and any changes or corrections. Additionally, each agency also provided the Coordinator with their agency's target measures. Examples of data collected/submitted included: school attendance, grades, truancy, participation in anti-gang sessions, and crime trends in school and neighborhoods close to school campuses.

Evidence of Impact – Outcome

The Research Partner for CAGI in the NDTX was involved in both PSN and CAGI. The research team focused on long-term trends in the two PSN target areas that became the initial two CAGI sites (South Dallas and Pleasant Grove). They did not focus on the new CAGI sites nor the Fort Worth sites. They reported significant declines in violent crime in the two PSN/CAGI sites since the implementation of PSN and then CAGI. Indeed, they reported that there were 1,300 fewer violent incidents in the target areas over this time period than would have been expected if rates for 2000 through October of 2002 had continued (see Research and Analysis Progress Reports provided by University of Texas at Arlington to the Northern District of Texas U.S. Attorney's Office). The homicide trend in the CAGI target areas was consistent with these reports as they dropped from an average of 21 per year from 2002-07 to 14.5 in 2008-09. Further analyses of the Dallas data are provided in Chapter Five.

⁸ December 2009 not included for 2009 totals.

Summary and Sustainability

CAGI funds were exhausted in November 30, 2009. Using PSN funds, CAGI efforts continued on a scaled down version. The CAGI task force also sought continued support through various sources and a number of the participating agencies continued their activities by absorbing CAGI efforts within their agency's budgets. Similarly, reentry efforts continued through the Texas Offender Reentry Initiative and Dallas city officials were seeking to develop a reentry court as part of its community prosecution unit.

Eastern District of Wisconsin - Milwaukee

The CAGI initiative in the Eastern District of Milwaukee focused on the city of Milwaukee. With a metropolitan population over 1.7 million, the city of Milwaukee had a population of just over 600,000 in 2007. CAGI built on Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) and became known locally as the Milwaukee Safe Streets Initiative. As noted in the first chapter, Milwaukee's homicide and violent crime rates were comparable to those of the other Midwest cities of Cleveland and Indianapolis as well as larger cities such as Chicago and Dallas. Local officials believed that a significant portion of the violent crime in Milwaukee was attributable to a combination of gangs with ties to Chicago and loosely affiliated neighborhood crews, drug crews, and groups of offenders. They viewed CAGI as an opportunity to develop a comprehensive approach to addressing gangs and gang violence with the following goals:

- “(1) To enhance the understanding of the Milwaukee gang problem through data collection and analysis and an ongoing community assessment process;
- (2) To expand partnerships and information sharing among law enforcement, probation and parole, corrections, social services, prevention, drug and alcohol treatment, medical personnel, education, housing and urban development, business, faith-based, research and media partners;
- (3) To prevent gang membership and subsequent crime by identifying and addressing the personal, family, and community factors that cause young people to choose gangs over more productive alternatives;
- (4) To reduce gang and associated violent crime by providing aggressive suppression linked with social opportunities;
- (5) To reduce gang offender recidivism by monitoring and assisting gang offenders returning to society;
- (6) To demonstrate an increase in program efficiency and effectiveness through a single point of coordination for federal, state, and local justice, education, human services, and substance abuse services project funding streams.” (provided by the PSN Coordinator, EDWI)

CAGI officials sought to ground the initiative in promising and evidence-based strategies and to link CAGI to other sources of federal funding for crime prevention and control efforts.

The Structure of CAGI in the Eastern District of Wisconsin

Who is involved?

The Eastern District of Milwaukee has established strong relationships between federal, state, and local law enforcement and prosecution agencies as well as with various community institutions and agencies. This provided the foundation upon which CAGI was structured. The U.S. Attorney's Office oversaw the project and provided coordination of the CAGI initiative. The USAO worked closely with the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) and with Community Prosecutors who helped lead the initiative. Key partnering organizations include:

- United States Attorney's Office
- Milwaukee Police Department
- Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office
- Milwaukee HIDTA Drug Gang Task Force
- FBI Safe Streets Task Force
- ATF Gun Task Force
- U.S. Marshal's Service
- Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance
- City of Milwaukee, Office of the Mayor
- Milwaukee Weed and Seed
- Milwaukee Metropolitan Drug Enforcement Group
- Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission
- Wisconsin Department of Corrections (Adult, Juvenile, and Institutional Corrections)
- Milwaukee County Juvenile Court Supervision
- Word of Hope Ministry
- Project Return
- Boys and Girls Club
- Milwaukee County Health and Human Services
- Milwaukee Public Schools
- Running Rebels Community Center
- Latino Community Center
- PIC, PAN
- Marquette University
- Duke University

How is it structured?

Overall management and oversight is provided by the Safe Streets Initiative leadership group that consists of a core group of agency leaders involved in both PSN and CAGI. The Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance served as the fiscal agent for grant funds.

As part of the anti-gang/violence strategy, law enforcement resources were managed by Community Prosecutors in each police district. Additionally, this initiative installed a Community Prevention Coordinator and a Reentry Coordinator in each district to work alongside and provide support to the Community Prosecutors. A team from the Marquette School of Law was responsible for managing and supervising these Coordinators.

As noted above, CAGI built on the structure, relationships, and strategies developed under PSN. Additionally, this Project gained momentum from the successful partnerships formed under a similar initiative that was implemented in a section of District Three in 2004. The Gang Violence Reduction Project was funded by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and partnered with the Milwaukee HIDTA Drug Gang Task Force, an FBI Safe Streets Task Force, an ATF Gun Task Force, Milwaukee Weed and Seed, and the Milwaukee Metropolitan Drug Enforcement Group.

Training

Local training provided under CAGI supported the following:

- Community Prevention/Re-entry Coordinators were trained to provide support to the Community Prosecutors.
- The Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) encouraged officers working in the Anti-Gang Unit to engage and interact with residents more efficiently.
- MPD increased its capacity to identify and track youth involved in gangs. Information about youth involved in gangs was shared among the following institutions: The MPD, the Milwaukee Public Schools, Milwaukee County Sheriff's Office, Milwaukee County Children's Court Services and Wisconsin Department of Corrections Division of Juvenile Corrections.

Research Partners

The CAGI initiative included relationships with researchers from Duke University and Marquette University as well as the Director of the Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission.

Problem Analysis:

The Nature of Gang Crime in Districts Two & Five

The Milwaukee CAGI initiative focused on two of the city's police districts. The gangs in District Five are predominantly African-American whereas gang activity in District Two involves predominantly Hispanic gangs. The predominant gang in District Five is the ViceLords that has been active in the district since the 1980s and that is believed to have strong ties to gangs in Chicago. Gangs involved in District Two included: the Latin Kings, Spanish Cobras, Manic Latino Disciplines, Mexican Posses, Clantonos (C-14s), Junior Kings (2-1s), La Familia, and the Unknowns.

The selection of these target areas was based on crime analysis and street-level intelligence that indicated that between 2004 and 2005 there was a 40 percent rise in violence and much of it could be attributed to gang activity in Districts Two and Five. These areas have the highest levels of violent crime in the city. Graffiti, a symptom of disadvantaged neighborhoods, was also more prevalent in these areas than in other parts of the city. Local officials reported that many young men and women in these districts had been lured away from legitimate, mainstream endeavors and turn to drugs, gangs and gang violence. Due to drug houses, robberies and shootings there was an atmosphere of intimidation that caused residents to be afraid of venturing out of their homes. Also, police officers reported encountering difficulties in getting residents to cooperate and even report gang violence in the neighborhoods.

Additionally, there was believed to be an escalating problem in the migration of gang crime from these districts into other parts of Milwaukee, and much of the drug related crime in these areas was linked to gang activity.

The Target Area

As noted above, Police Districts Two and Five were selected as the principal, target areas. District Two, located on the near south side of the city, is 7.2 square miles in size and comprises a population of approximately 87,000 residents and predominantly Hispanic gangs. District Five, located on the northeast side of the city, is 7.7 square miles in size and comprises a population of nearly 60,000 residents and predominantly African American gangs. These two areas were characterized by the types of neighborhood disadvantage that are often associated with violence and with gang activity. For example, over 63 percent of residents lived below the poverty level and unemployment rates reached highs of 62 percent in these two districts. The unemployment rate for young minority men in these neighborhoods was even greater. These two districts were also characterized by high rates of births to unmarried women (estimated at 80-90% of all births) and very high rates of truancy and school drop-out.

These two districts were also characterized by high rates of crime. Although MPD did not have what it considered reliable gang specific crime data, it was believed that gangs were involved in a significant portion of the crime in these districts. Violent crime rates in these two districts were higher than in the rest of the city. Similarly, drug crime, burglary and auto theft were higher in these two districts and police reported more graffiti within these two areas than in other parts of Milwaukee.

Gang and Gun Crime Reduction Strategies

The CAGI task force developed an overall strategy as well as specific strategies for the enforcement, prevention, and re-entry components. The CAGI leadership team believed that while there had previously been gang crime reduction strategies involving enforcement, prevention, and intervention, that they had not been well-coordinated in terms of a comprehensive strategy linking these components. Under PSN, a number of high profile investigations, arrests and prosecutions of key gangs involved in violence had occurred. These included 41 arrests of the Cherry Street Mob in 2004, 21 Vice Lords and 49 Latin Kings in 2005. An additional dozen Vice Lords were prosecuted federally in early 2006. The CAGI leaders believed if they could continue these types of enforcement activities and coordinate with prevention, intervention, and re-entry services throughout they could have a significant impact on gang related crime.

Enforcement

The suppression strategy sought to take gang members who were actively engaged in violence, narcotics trafficking and gang leadership off the street and put an end to their negative influence in the community. This strategy was implemented by a multi-agency team and supported by street-level intelligence generated by the team and informed by the MPD

Intelligence Unit and the Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission⁹⁹. The enforcement team was coordinated by a community prosecutor working with the district captain from MPD. The enforcement team, referred to as a *Target Team* in each district, was comprised of the Community Prosecutor, MPD Captain, Probation and Parole agents, and Milwaukee Police Department Anti-Gang Unit officers. The *Target Teams* also worked with the MPD Vice Control Division, MPD Intelligence Unit, Milwaukee County Sheriff's Office Gun Reduction and Interdiction Program Officers, Assistant United States Attorneys, City Attorneys, Community Partners and other agency personnel at biweekly and monthly meetings. During these meetings, crime problems in each district were reviewed, gang intelligence shared, and strategies developed.

The process was also supported by the Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission. There was significant overlap between CAGI officials and the Commission and information gathered through the Commission's regular reviews of homicides became an additional source of intelligence for the Target Teams. The Commission held two distinct review meetings with one focused on domestic homicides and the second on all other homicides.

As noted, the target teams used these sources of intelligence to investigate, arrest and prosecute gang members. During the first several years of CAGI a number of major investigations of key gangs in the target area were conducted resulting in over 200 federal and state indictments. Key investigations involved 45 members of the 19 Nash Boys and a RICO investigation involving over 50 members of the Latin Kings. They complemented this gang suppression with gang intervention that sought to communicate to gang members, and individuals at risk for gang involvement, a deterrent message to avoid gang activity as well as opportunities for service and support. Key elements of the CAGI enforcement strategy included:

- Lists were developed on the most violent, chronic offenders in each district.
- Targeted investigations, arrests, prosecution, and incarceration of key gangs and gang members. This included increased prosecution of gang cases at both federal and state levels.
- The Target Team would identify offenders within the target area as falling into one of three categories: C=salvageable; B=non-violent but with long criminal histories; A=serious violent offenders. "A" cases were subject to either federal or state prosecution. "C" cases were subject to offender notification (call-in) meetings. "B" cases were reviewed by the Target Team to decide whether to prosecute or to allow to participate in the call-in meeting.
- Directed police patrol in hotspot locations.
- The United States Marshal coordinated a faith-based effort that encouraged felony fugitives to voluntarily surrender, without offering amnesty.
- Law enforcement utilized call-in meetings to provide notice to the members of particular gangs and their associates that they were being monitored. These gangs were informed that they were targeted for suppression if illegal conduct continues.
- Call-in meetings were also used as a response to drug crews based on the High Point, North Carolina Drug Market Intervention (DMI) model.

⁹⁹ The Homicide Review Commission was created in 2005. It is a multi-agency working group that reviews homicide and shooting incidents to gain a better understanding of the dynamics and patterns of the incidents to inform tactical and strategic reduction and prevention strategies.. The Commission includes both an Executive and Working Group.

- When core gang members were arrested, law enforcement turned over target information on the remaining gang members and associates to the Community Prevention Coordinator.
- The Community Prevention Coordinator led an *Intervention Team* comprised of personnel from faith based and community based organizations and law enforcement to contact gang associates and their families and invite them to intervention meetings. Prosecuted gang members were used as examples and offers of support were communicated.
- E-Trace and DNA analysis was conducted on all guns recovered to support investigations and provide intelligence as part of the suppression strategy.
- Probation and parole officers conducted home visits of probationers and parolees with suspected gang ties.

The involvement and leadership of the community prosecutors also led to community development strategies including a focus on problem properties. All properties with business licenses were inspected. Nuisance property data were tracked and mapped within the target areas similar to crime incidents. The community prosecutors would initially seek cooperative support of property owners to make necessary improvements to such properties and if that failed would seek to use nuisance abatement proceedings to coerce cooperation. An innovative component of the strategy involved the use of “call-in” meetings with property owners to explain the goals of the CAGI strategy, to seek cooperation, and to put on notice uncooperative property owners who failed to address nuisance issues. The CAGI enforcement team also coordinated community clean-up activities such as graffiti removal, trash pick-up, street light repair, and removal of sneakers from power lines.

Prevention

As noted above, Districts Two and Five were characterized by a number of factors that create risks for youths to become involved in gangs. The CAGI prevention strategy sought to complement enforcement activities and to steer at-risk youth and young adults away from gang involvement and recruitment. CAGI funds were used to hire Community Prevention Coordinators in each district. In many respects, the Community Prevention Coordinator mirrored the role of the Community Prosecutor who led the enforcement team. The Community Prevention Coordinator led an *Intervention Team*.

Key elements of the prevention strategy included:

- In each district the Community Prevention Coordinator developed a database of effective services and resources for those in need.
- Primary Prevention: Run by the City of Milwaukee Public Health Department, the Home Visiting Program sought to improve birth outcomes, enhance family functioning, support child health, safety and development, and prevent child abuse and neglect through a visiting nurse program focused on young, single mothers.
- Secondary Prevention: Secondary prevention strategies were targeted at those at greatest risk of gang involvement (Usually between the ages of 7 and 14).

- A pre-existing classroom management tool, Classroom Organization and Management Program (COMP), was implemented for teachers and administrators at the middle school level as part of CAGI. It was designed to keep kids in school.
- Gang identification education was provided for children, parents, teachers, school officials and ministers.
- The truancy reduction program also built on an established program known as the Truancy and Burglary Suppression program (TABS). This involved a collaboration between MPD, the Milwaukee Sheriff's Department, the school system and the Boys and Girls Club. Law enforcement officers picking up youth during school hours without a legitimate excuse were brought to TABS centers in the Boys and Girls Club where the youth are supervised and receive counseling and mentoring. Social workers, case managers and police officers assigned to schools worked with uncooperative parents. Chronically truant youth and their parents could be referred to the Community Prosecutors for legal action.
- Violent Free Zone program utilized in high schools. Worked with most disruptive youths to reduce conflicts and keep in school.
- Intervention was coordinated with enforcement and often involved the Community Prevention Coordination being responsible for communicating and linking offenders at call-in meetings to available services.
- Community prevention Coordinators would also make contact with "influentials" of the offenders and encourage them to attend call-in meetings. Similarly they would reach out to neighborhood leaders to attend call-in meetings and to have a community voice in the meeting.
- Additional intervention services included youth athletic leagues, tattoo removal, construction trade training and employment, and fatherhood and parenting skill development.

Reentry

The re-entry program sought to provide pre- and post-release services to gang-involved inmates in the Wisconsin Department of Corrections' (DOC) facilities (adult and juvenile) as well as in the Milwaukee County Juvenile facility who would be returning to Districts Two and Five. CAGI funds were used to hire a Reentry Coordinator. The Reentry Coordinator role was similar to that of the community prosecutor and the Prevention Coordinators. The Reentry Coordinator would coordinate all program activities working with the DOC and juvenile facility, identifying service providers, recruiting mentors, and coordinating meetings where information about returning inmates as well as those currently in the community program would be shared. The program used a voucher approach for delivery of services. Program elements included:

- In each district the Community Prevention Coordinator manages case screening, selection and referral processes and compliance with grant requirements. The Reentry Coordinator works with DOC to coordinate pre- and post-release programming. Security threat group coordinator within DOC provides list of gang-involved inmates believed to be returning to the target districts.
- Continual assessments determine whether offenders fit the requirements of the reentry initiative. Pre-release assessments were available through existing programming in DOC.
- For DOC inmates with a drug or alcohol program, there were referrals to an existing program known as Wiser Choice that provided substance abuse programming for inmates as part of a pre-release transition program. There was also coordination with a Department of Labor funded

project known as World of Hope that focused on increasing job opportunities for returning offenders.

- Each eligible offender is provided with written and verbal information about the overall program, its goals, objectives, available services and expectations of the participant. Participation in the program is voluntary and each offender's commitment is confirmed in writing.
- Pre-release programming sought to provide skill development and transition planning. Juvenile programming sought to build on three existing programs: "FOCUS—a multi-phased program with a residential component for serious minority male offenders with both mental health and substance abuse issues; a Firearm Supervision model—an intense monitoring programming centered on offenders with illegal gun possession and use; and Serious Chronic Offender—a monitoring project for youth with an escalating offense pattern and multiple family issues." (source: PSN Coordinator.)
- The Wiser Choice program was also used to provide vouchers for released offenders participating in the CAGI program.
- Pre-release programming included cognitive behavioral, educational and vocational programming.
- Released offenders were supervised by special probation agents in the High Risk Unit of Community Corrections.
- Employers were brought together to provide support and jobs for returning offenders.
- Monthly offender notification meetings were used to communicate both a deterrent message focused on gang members who had been prosecuted but also an attempt to link returning offenders to services and support.
- The call-in meetings included a restorative justice component whereby offenders learned about how their behavior was affecting others, were offered opportunities to make amends, and were offered support and respect. Discussions also included issues these individuals may have with police officers.
- Monthly community resource meetings involving talks by former gang members and service providers.
- A multi-agency reentry team meets on a regular basis to review cases, identify issues, and problem solve.
- The Research Partner developed a newsletter to provide updates on the reentry program and present findings from the research.

Community Engagement

To support the above program components, the U.S. Attorney's Office working with other partners engaged in a number of activities to educate the public and the media about violent crime, gangs, and the PSN and CAGI efforts to reduce such crime. This included outreach to business and faith-based groups and with the editorial board of the major local newspaper. A town hall meeting sponsored by Marquette University had over 400 attendees and community members routinely attended call-in meetings.

Figure 3: Gang Crime Problems and CAGI Strategies

Problem	Overall Strategy	Specific Components
Chronic Gang Offenders	Incapacitate and deter	Focus PSN partnerships among federal-local law enforcement on gangs
		Identify most serious and chronic offenders within target areas
		USAO commitment to increase prosecution of gang-involved offenders
Geographically Concentrated Gang Crimes	Develop gang & violent crime intelligence	Target Teams; MPD intelligence; street-level intelligence; Homicide Review
	Focused enforcement	Hotspot directed patrol; gang investigations
	Prevention and Reentry	Communicate deterrence and social support message through call-in meetings Nuisance property enforcement Develop new programs in target areas; work with schools and established programs in target areas Provide multiple services for at-risk youths Pre- and post-release programming for returning gang involved inmates Call-in meetings coupled with restorative Restorative justice (circles)

Evidence of Impact – Outcome

Similar to reports in other CAGI sites, Milwaukee officials involved in Safe Streets pointed to the partnerships developed through CAGI as a major accomplishment. In particular, the relationships established with the Wisconsin Department of Corrections added to the collaboration that PSN had fostered between the USAO, MPD, federal law enforcement, and the Milwaukee District Attorney's Office.

The community coordinators maintained careful records on the participants in the offender notification meetings. Data collected included numbers invited to the call-in, numbers attending, arrests, absconding, reincarceration, tickets, and convictions. This provided valuable information for program tracking but was difficult to interpret from an evaluation standpoint due to a lack of a comparison group.

The research partners focused in particular on evaluating two programs. One of the evaluations focuses on the 100 offenders involved in the reentry program and compares them to 200 comparison offenders released to Milwaukee. The researchers follow the treatment and control group for twelve months following their release. Although the final results are not yet

available, preliminary results suggest some positive impact. For example, participants in the reentry program have higher rates of employment at three and six months post-release (Safe Streets Newsletter, Winter 2010-2011).

The second evaluation is of the truancy program. The focus is on twelve schools in the target areas with six randomly assigned as treatment locations and six as controls. In both cases the evaluations are underway but results are not available as of this writing.

Summary and Sustainability

As noted elsewhere, Milwaukee CAGI officials attempted to move toward a sustainable initiative by linking to other federal and state programs (e.g., Wiser; Department of Labor; Weed and Seed) and by seeking additional sources of funding for the Community Prevention Coordinators and the Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission. This has allowed many of the components developed in PSN and CAGI to continue.

Chapter Three

Implementation of CAGI

The focus of this section is the status of the CAGI initiative as of 2010. The goal is to provide a descriptive picture of the implementation of the various components of CAGI as well as to highlight accomplishments as well as challenges. As of 2010, the CAGI initiative was operational in eleven of the thirteen sites¹⁰. The two exceptions were the Dallas/Ft. Worth and the Eastern Pennsylvania program where CAGI funds had been exhausted. CAGI funding in Cleveland had also been expended as of May 2010. In Cleveland and Pennsylvania, alternative funding sources had been located to continue some program components.

Table 4 – Status of Initiative and Funding

Jurisdiction	Is CAGI still operational (as of May 2010)		Do you still have funds available from your initial CAGI award?	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Chicago (NDIL)	X		X	
Cleveland (NDOH)	X			X
Dallas/Fort Worth (NDTX)		X		X
Detroit (EDMI)	X		X	
Indianapolis (SDIN)	X		X	
Los Angeles (CDCA)	X		X	
Oklahoma City (WDOK)	X		X	
Pennsylvania Corridor (EDPA)		X		X
Raleigh (EDNC)	X		X	
Durham (MDNC)	X		X	
Milwaukee (EDWI)	X			
Rochester (WDNY)	X		X	
Tampa (MDFL)	X		X	

In 9 of the 13 jurisdictions, the CAGI task force worked with a local research partner (RP). The sites that did not made a judgment that the programmatic funds were too limited to devote to a formal RP and in some cases had unsatisfying experiences with a RP during the PSN program. In several cases, attempts were made to work with University RPs but this did not occur. These jurisdictions tended to rely on crime analysis capability provided by local, state or federal crime analysts. Of the nine jurisdictions with RPs, eight reported being satisfied with their RP, with one jurisdiction being very unsatisfied. The eight jurisdictions reported that the

¹⁰ For purposes of implementation, the award to North Carolina was implemented by two distinct task forces operating in Durham and in Raleigh consistent with the involvement of the U.S. Attorney's Offices in the Eastern and Middle Districts of North Carolina. Thus the data are presented for thirteen CAGI sites.

RP's analysis had been helpful in understanding patterns of gun violence, although in only three of the sites were the RPs able to provide clear analyses of gang violence. This appears to be related to the limited ability of existing crime information systems to capture gang crime data. The functions provided by the RPs included problem identification, program development, evaluation, program revision, and resource allocation (six of the jurisdictions noted their RP aided in all the categories).

Most of the jurisdictions were able to develop an agreed upon definition of gang crime and in most cases this was driven by statutory definition. Indianapolis and Milwaukee reported that their task forces had not reached such a definition.

Table 5 Definition of Gang Crime

	Do you and your CAGI law enforcement partners have an agreed-upon definition of what constitutes a gang crime? A gang related crime?					If yes, is it a statutory definition?		
	Yes	No				Yes	No	
Chicago (NDIL)	X						X	
Cleveland (NDOH)	X						X	
Dallas/Fort Worth (NDTX)	X					X		
Detroit (EDMI)	X						X	
Indianapolis (SDIN)		X						
Los Angeles (CDCA)	X						X	
Oklahoma City (WDOK)	X					X		
Pennsylvania Corridor (EDPA)	X						X	
Raleigh (EDNC)	X						X	
Durham (MDNC)	X						X	
Milwaukee (EDWI)		X						
Rochester (WDNY)	X						X	
Tampa (MDFL)	X					X		

Enforcement Strategies and Partnerships

There was quite a bit of consistency across the sites in terms of the types of enforcement strategies that were implemented (see Table Five). Four strategies, increased federal prosecution, increased state and local prosecution, joint case prosecution screening, and directed police patrols and field interrogations, were implemented by 12 of the 13 jurisdictions. Ten jurisdictions used probation/parole home visits to targeted gang members and comprehensive gun crime tracing. Nine utilized most violent offender lists and eight called gang members or individuals at-risk for gang activity into offender notification meetings. The majority of CAGI enforcement teams included the service of warrants on gang members, and six jurisdictions used

a nuisance abatement strategy to address problem properties and businesses. The least common strategy reported by CAGI officials was gang abatement ordinances that were utilized in Dallas, Durham and Raleigh.

Table 6 Law Enforcement Strategies

Jurisdiction	Increased federal prosecution	Increased state/local prosecution	Joint federal, state/local case screening	Directed patrols and field interrogations	Most violent offender lists	Offender notification meetings	
Chicago	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Cleveland	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Dallas/Ft Worth	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Detroit	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Indianapolis			X	X	X		
Los Angeles	X	X	X	X		X	
Oklahoma City	X	X	X	X			
Pennsylvania Corridor	X	X	X				
Raleigh	X	X	X	X	X		
Durham	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Milwaukee	X	X		X	X	X	
Rochester	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Tampa	X	X	X	X			
	Probation/parole home visits	Comprehensive gun crime tracing	Anti-gang ordinances	Nuisance abatement	Warrant service focused on gang members		
Chicago	X	X					
Cleveland	X	X			X		
Dallas/Ft Worth		X	X	X	X		
Detroit	X	X					
Indianapolis	X	X					
Los Angeles	X			X	X		
Oklahoma City				X	X		
Pennsylvania Corridor		X					
Raleigh	X	X	X		X		
Durham	X	X	X	X	X		
Milwaukee	X	X		X			
Rochester	X	X		X	X		
Tampa	X						

The CAGI task forces also relied on partnerships with local law enforcement agencies as well as enforcement task forces led by different federal law enforcement agencies. As Table 7 indicates, every CAGI site involved local law enforcement as CAGI partners. The most common federal task force partner was the FBI Safe Streets Task Force followed by the ATF Violent Crime Impact Team. Seven jurisdictions reported that the Marshals Service Fugitive Task Force was a CAGI partner whereas five jurisdictions reported the DEA Mobile Enforcement Team or the ICE Community Shield Task Force was a CAGI partner. Interviews with CAGI officials indicated that there was variation across the communities in terms of the willingness of various partners to be active partners in CAGI. For example, several officials raised concerns that the FBI Safe Streets Task Force was not an active partner but in other sites the FBI Task Force was described as having led the CAGI enforcement component. Similar issues were expressed about DEA's involvement. In some sites they were viewed as being disinterested in CAGI but in other jurisdictions they were key partners. It appeared that this variation reflected both local priorities of the respective federal partner as well as historical relationships between federal and local partners. Officials were very consistent in reporting that the local police department or sheriff's department were absolutely critical partners. Problems with local law enforcement involvement were raised in only two jurisdictions and related to a change of leadership in one instance and a major re-organization in the other.

Table 7 Law Enforcement Partners

	Law enforcement partners involved in CAGI initiative					
	ATF Violent Crime Impact	FBI Safe Street Task Forces	DEA Mobile Enforcement Teams	USMS Fugitive Task Forces	ICE Task Forces	Local Law Enforcement
Chicago		X				X
Cleveland		X	X	X		X
Dallas/Ft Worth	X	X	X	X	X	X
Detroit			X	X	X	X
Indianapolis						X
Los Angeles	X	X		X		X
Oklahoma City	X	X				X
Pennsylvania Corridor		X				X
Raleigh	X	X				X
Durham	X	X	X	X	X	X
Milwaukee	X					X
Rochester	X	X	X	X	X	X
Tampa	X	X		X	X	X

Definitional issues related to gang crime and gang prosecutions varied across the sites, and differences across the task forces made it very difficult to gather consistent data on enforcement outputs. For example, many local law enforcement agencies could not report gang arrests. Similarly, federal and local prosecution statistics varied tremendously across the 13 jurisdictions and from reporting period to reporting period. Thus, it became impossible to gather consistent and reliable measures of gang arrests and gang prosecutions. However, all the jurisdictions could report on major gang investigations and prosecutions. In terms of reported federal prosecutions of gang members there was a great deal of variation that could be identified in more general categories. Three jurisdictions reported federal gang prosecutions in the hundreds per year. Two jurisdictions fell in a range of the high teens to high 30s (with one year at 80). Five jurisdictions were either under ten or in the teens (with one year at 23) and three could not report federal gang prosecutions associated with CAGI. Only four of the jurisdictions could provide local gang prosecution data with a high of approximately 800 per year, to one jurisdiction with 150 per year, another with an average of around 80 per year and one that ranged from 15 to 29 per year. Although it was difficult to sort out the absolute level of either federal or local gang prosecution associated with CAGI, local officials in nearly all the sites pointed to CAGI assisting in targeted arrests and prosecution of key gangs within their jurisdictions.

Prevention and Intervention Strategies

There was also a fair degree of consistency in terms of the types of prevention and intervention services developed in CAGI. These included new services, contracting with existing gang prevention and intervention service providers, and contracting with existing service providers who expanded their mission to include a gang focus. Several strategies were included in every site. These included education and outreach to youth, school-based prevention, ex-offender outreach, and substance abuse treatment. The next most common were skills building services including employment and educational programs that were found in 11 of the 13 CAGI jurisdictions followed by vocational training programs in 10 sites. Nine jurisdictions included truancy reduction, clergy outreach, and youth street workers. Just under half the sites included neighborhood development programs and three jurisdictions developed an outreach program through the trauma center. The other category included programs such as peer mentoring, tattoo removal, and cognitive decision-making programs.

Table 8 Prevention Components

	Outreach and education to juvenile groups		School-based prevention	Substance abuse programs	Ex-offender outreach	Employment programs		Education programs (e.g., GED)
Chicago	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Cleveland	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Dallas/Ft Worth	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Detroit	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Indianapolis	X	X	X		X	X	X	
Los Angeles	X	X	X	X	X			
Oklahoma City	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Pennsylvania Corridor	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Raleigh	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Durham	X	X	X	X			X	
Milwaukee	X	X	X	X	X			
Rochester	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Tampa	X	X	X	X			X	
	Vocational training programs	Truancy strategies	Clergy outreach	Youth street worker programs	Neighborhood development programs	Hospital trauma center outreach	Other	
Chicago	X			X	X			
Cleveland	X	X	X	X	X			
Dallas/Ft Worth	X	X	X	X				
Detroit	X	X		X			X	
Indianapolis		X		X	X		X	
Los Angeles	X		X					
Oklahoma City		X	X					
Pennsylvania Corridor	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Raleigh	X	X	X	X	X			
Durham	X	X	X	X		X		
Milwaukee	X	X	X					
Rochester	X		X	X		X		
Tampa					X			

Reentry

The development of the reentry component tended to be the most challenging aspect of the comprehensive CAGI program. For example, three of the jurisdictions reported that their reentry program only became operational in 2010 and another three in 2009. In contrast, all but one of the jurisdiction's enforcement programs were operational before 2009. This appeared to be due to the large number of partners needed to implement a reentry program as well as the challenge of identifying incarcerated gang members returning to specific cities and neighborhoods within those cities. Typically the programs needed to identify facilities from which gang-involved inmates would be incarcerated prior to their release as well as locate pre- and post-release services and processes for linking returning inmates to these services. The programs were relatively evenly divided between those that focused exclusively on adults and those that focused on both adults and juveniles. Most followed some reentry program model in developing their programs. For most of the CAGI sites a target of 100 returning inmates was established for the reentry program and most of the sites reported difficulty in meeting the target.

Perceived Accomplishments and Challenges

Perhaps the major accomplishment of the CAGI initiative was the degree to which the initiative resulted in the establishment of new relationships and partnerships to support enforcement, prevention, and reentry program components. There was consensus across the sites that CAGI had allowed for the development of a variety of new partnerships focused on gang prevention and control. As one CAGI official reported, "our number one success is that we got everyone to play together." These included partnerships between local, state, and federal law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, with other components of local government such as city government and the schools, with social service providers, and with various community groups (e.g., weed and seed, faith-based groups, neighborhood associations). As was observed in research on PSN (McGarrell et al. 2009), these relationships were most readily established among criminal justice agencies. Relationships with non-criminal justice partners tended to be more difficult to accomplish and took more time but were considered highly valued in terms of addressing gang crime in a comprehensive fashion.

The challenges tended to vary from site to site. A number of officials in various jurisdictions described the challenge of getting the three components of enforcement, prevention, and reentry integrated into a comprehensive program. This partly reflected the challenges mentioned above whereby enforcement tended to occur earlier but the relationships and program implementation necessary for prevention and reentry tended to take longer to develop and implement. Several jurisdictions had difficulty getting the school systems involved in CAGI. This appeared to reflect several issues including capacity for the school's to take on another initiative, low prioritization among school officials, and concerns about information sharing and privacy. It should be noted, however, that several jurisdictions described the partnerships with schools as a key accomplishment of CAGI. In a small number of jurisdictions there was a lack of interest and participation among a specific criminal justice partner (e.g., the local police department, district attorney's office, or a federal law enforcement partner). These issues seemed to be the exceptions to the general report of CAGI generating new and strengthened partnerships.

In the final round of interviews with CAGI officials concerns arose about sustaining their programs. Of the three programs that had exhausted their CAGI funding, two had located additional funds to sustain their initiatives. However, officials in all of the jurisdictions expressed concern about being able to continue the anti-gang initiative given the loss of grant funding and the serious fiscal pressures affecting local and state budgets.

Table 9 Reentry Programs

	Reentry Focus			Reentry models used to build program		Target # clients		Able to meet target
	Adults	Juveniles	Both	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Chicago (NDIL)			X	X			X	NA
Cleveland (NDOH)			X	X		X		X
Dallas/Fort Worth (NDTX)	X				X	X		
Detroit (EDMI)	X			X		X		
Indianapolis (SDIN)	X			X		X		X
Los Angeles (CDCA)	X				X	X		X
Oklahoma City (WDOK)			X	X		X		
Pennsylvania Corridor (EDPA)	X				X	X		X
Raleigh (EDNC)			X	X		X		
Durham (MDNC)				X		X		
Milwaukee (EDWI)	X					X		
Rochester (WDNY)			X		X	X		
Tampa (MDFL)			X	X		X		X

NOTE – for several jurisdictions changes emerged following the submission of these data. In particular, juvenile reentry programs emerged and most sites eventually reached the target number of clients.

Chapter Four

Risk Assessment and Reentry

As noted earlier, a central limitation of the current research is the lack of outcome data and comparison groups on the prevention and reentry components. In an attempt to shed further light on these components, despite the limitations, we worked with CAGI officials in Cleveland and Milwaukee to collect and analyze data related to these components. In terms of risk assessment, the Cleveland CAGI team employed a validated risk assessment instrument that they used to attempt to link services to youths. This provided an opportunity to study how well services were being directed to at-risk youths. In terms of reentry, officials in both cities allowed us to visit and conduct focus groups with clients involved in the reentry program. In this chapter, we present the results of both studies.

Risk Assessment - Targeting High-Risk Youth for Prevention and Intervention¹¹

The United States Department of Justice has endorsed a targeted public health approach to combat problems of crime and violence under the assumption that “targeting a small, high-risk population can have significant, broader benefits” (Holder, 2009:1). Gang members, in particular, represent a group of individuals that are often involved in a disproportionate amount of crime and violence, and thus have been targeted as part of such prevention and interventions. The logic behind targeted interventions, such as those for youth most at-risk of future gang membership, is that if one can prospectively identify those youth most at-risk of high rate offending and direct prevention and intervention services at these individuals before the peak of their criminal careers, it can produce a positive impact for both the individual and society. Potential benefits to such an approach are numerous; including reduced financial costs to both individuals and society through decreased losses associated with victimization, decreased public spending on incarceration and correctional supervision, as well as increased physical and psychological well-being for members of the community.

While the logic behind targeted interventions directed at gang members appears sound, the most important policy question is whether practitioners have the ability to identify youth most at-risk of becoming gang involved both *prospectively* and *efficiently* (Smith and Aloisi, 1999). Significant advances in quantitative risk assessment have been made over the past decades, with evidence suggesting that use of such instruments can outperform subjective human risk assessment (Gavazzi, Bostic, et al., 2008; Gottfredson and Moriarty, 2006; Grove et al., 2000). The potential for human error has not been eliminated from the process of identifying youth at-risk of gang membership, however, as budgetary and staffing limitations preclude the ability for every youth to be screened for risk factors associated with gang membership or other risky behaviors and receive intervention and prevention services related to their particular needs. Thus, human error is possible at the front end of the screening process, where practitioners identify youth they believe could benefit from a formal risk assessment. Given this reliance on subjective assessment, even in light of significant progress in the development and implementation of risk screening instruments, youth most at-risk for gang membership may be systematically under-served by such programmatic efforts. Unfortunately, this link in the chain of targeted prevention and intervention services, which precedes risk assessment and prevention

¹¹ This chapter is based on research presented in Melde, Gavazzi, McGarrell, and Bynum, 2011.

programming, has not been thoroughly examined, and thus could undermine the theoretical advantages of this strategy.

Fortunately, our evaluation of the CAGI in the Northern District of Ohio was able to take advantage of a unique situation in which two samples of youth in a specific jurisdiction were identified and screened using the Global Risk Assessment Device (GRAD), a risk assessment instrument with documented reliability and validity (Gavazzi, Bostic, et al., 2008). Respondents were drawn from a non-targeted school-based sample, as well as a sample of youth screened as part of the prevention component of the targeted anti-gang initiative. This confluence of data allowed for examination of the efficacy of targeted gang intervention and prevention services through the comparison of relative risk between these two samples of youth. Specifically, one would expect that those youth identified as being especially at-risk for gang membership would be, on average, more at-risk than the general school-based sample. We proceed with a discussion of the literature on risk factors for gang membership and how these were operationalized for the evaluation.

Risk Factors for Gang Membership

Risk factors for delinquency and gang membership are typically divided into five major domains: individual, peer, family, school, and community (see e.g., Howell and Egley, 2005). At the individual level, factors such as anti-social beliefs (e.g., negative views of police; techniques of neutralization) (Esbensen, 2000; Esbensen et al., 2009; Hawkins et al., 2000), prior delinquency (Esbensen, 2000; Hill et al., 1999; Klein and Maxson, 2006), and the experience of negative and/or traumatic life events (e.g., death or loss of a loved one, illness, suspension or expulsion from school) (Klein and Maxson, 2006) have been found to increase the probability of gang membership in adolescence.

While risk factors associated with the family domain have been inconsistently associated with gang membership in the literature (Esbensen et al., 2009), issues related to poor parental management, such as poor supervision and lax disciplinary practices, have been implicated across studies (Hawkins et al., 2000; Howell, 2009; Klein and Maxson, 2006), while abusive parent child relations have been particularly salient in ethnographic accounts of gang membership among females (see, e.g., Miller, 2001). Associating with delinquent peers is one of the strongest correlates of individual involvement in delinquency and violence (see e.g., Hawkins et al., 2000; Howell and Egley, 2005; Esbensen et al., 2009), while commitment to delinquent peers has also been found to increase the probability of youth violence and gang membership (Klein and Maxson, 2006; Esbensen et al., 2009).

School risk factors can be further broken down into both individual and environmental domains. From an individual standpoint the negative effect of low bonding and attachment to school (Herrenkohl et al., 2000), little commitment to school activities (Esbensen and Deschenes, 1998; Hawkins et al., 2000), and poor academic performance (Hill et al., 1999; Maxson et al., 1998) have received some support across data sources. From an environmental standpoint, poor school climate (e.g., inconsistent discipline, inadequate administrative support, deficient teachers) and perceptions of disorder (e.g., anti-social behavior on school grounds, victimization) at school are associated with increased involvement in delinquency and gang membership (Gottfredson, 2001; Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 2001; Gottfredson et al., 2005).

Few youth have no risk factors associated with delinquency and gang membership. There also appears to be no unique predictors of gang membership that can systematically distinguish risk of gang membership from risk of involvement in delinquency and violence more

generally. This led researchers to examine the impact of accumulated risk on the probability of gang membership. According to this body of research on the cumulative effect of risk on the likelihood of gang membership, the more risk factors associated with an individual the greater the probability of gang membership (Esbensen et al., 2009; Hill et al., 1999; Thornberry et al., 2003). Further yet, it appears that the accumulation of risk factors across domains is also important, such that the risk of gang membership increases as individuals are exposed to risks in multiple domains (Esbensen et al., 2009; Thornberry et al., 2003). Overall, for those charged with identifying youth most at-risk for gang membership, it appears that the accumulation of individual risk factors, as well as the accumulation of risk factors across domains, is the best predictor of gang membership; no individual risk factor can efficiently predict gang membership (Esbensen, et al., 2009).

Method

Participants and Procedure

There were two samples that were brought together to inform the analysis. The first sample was targeted for being particularly at-risk for gang involvement as part of the CAGI and consisted of 241 youth, of which 160 were male and 81 were female. The anti-gang initiative focused on two contiguous neighborhoods in the metropolitan area that had the highest rate of violence and gang membership in the city. That is, these neighborhoods were designated as the highest risk neighborhoods in the metropolitan area, and thus most in need of service. Consistent with the racial and ethnic composition of the neighborhoods targeted by the CAGI, 93 percent (223 of 241) of the youth targeted for inclusion in the initiative were of African American descent. There were seven white non-Hispanic respondents (2.9%) and seven respondents (2.9%) who reported Hispanic heritage. No other racial or ethnic groups represented greater than one percent of the sample. At the time of assessment, which preceded their involvement in any intervention activities, youth included in the CAGI were between 14 and 17 years of age ($M = 15.9$, $SD = 0.9$). The comparison group was drawn from the general school-based population across the metropolitan area, and consisted of 1,438 African American male youth in the ninth grade during two consecutive academic years (2007-2008 and 2008-2009). The primary purpose of collecting information from this sample was to gather descriptive data on the risks and needs of the African-American male student population in this metropolitan school district as a result of pervasive problems among this demographic in making adequate yearly progress towards graduation. The school district used the GRAD instrument to create a profile of the risks and needs of this particular portion of their student body in hopes of devising plans to provide services in these areas of risk and need. Beyond being African-American and male, students were not targeted for inclusion in the comparison group, as the school district simply relied on available subjects for inclusion in the survey. At the time of assessment, these youth were between 14-17 years of age ($M = 15.5$, $SD = 0.8$).

Measures

The data collection instrument used was the Global Risk Assessment Device (GRAD version 1.0: Gavazzi et al., 2003b), an instrument designed to assesses potential threats to the numerous developmental needs of adolescents. The GRAD contains 11 domains of risk/needs: prior offenses, family/parenting issues, deviant peer relationships, substance abuse, traumatic events, mental health issues, psychopathy, sexual activity and other health-related risks, leisure activities, accountability, and education/work issues. Respondents are asked to respond to the items by indicating on a scale of 0 to 2 (where 0 indicates *No/Never*, 1 indicates *Yes/A couple of*

times, and 2 indicates *Yes/A lot*) how much each item applies to their life. Item scores are totaled to compute a risk score for each domain. The average time that it takes to complete the GRAD is about 25 minutes.

Because the comparison sample was limited to African-American males, and used a condensed version of the GRAD, all direct comparisons of males targeted by the CAGI and the non-targeted school-based sample focus on three specific domains – family concerns, mental health issues, and educational risks – and the delinquent peer sub-domain of the peer relationships domain. Hence, 17 items associated with Disrupted Family Processes (coefficient alpha = .74), 26 items associated with Mental Health issues (coefficient alpha = .86), 12 items associated with Educational Risks (coefficient alpha = .67) and 3 items associated with Delinquent Peer Associations (coefficient alpha = .65), were employed in the comparative analysis. Comparisons between the males and females included in the CAGI include all 11 domains in the GRAD version 1.0.

Analytic Procedure

Because of the distinct samples used for comparison, we proceed with a brief description of participants in the CAGI sample, including a comparison of males and females targeted by the CAGI using independent samples t-tests by GRAD domain. We then proceed with a direct comparison of African American males targeted by CAGI and the general school-based population. The analysis comparing African American males was performed in two stages. In the first stage, a series of t-test analysis procedures were performed in order to examine potential differences between the two samples of African American males in terms of risk levels in the domains utilized in the present study. Next, t-tests were used to determine whether differences existed between groups in terms of accumulated risk across domains, which has been shown to be an important determinate of future offending and gang membership. Scores on the GRAD domains were tricotomized and labeled as high, moderate, and low risk. The low, medium, and high risk groups were created by separating the respondents into equal thirds of the sample, and thus these designations represent relative risk in the sample. For these analyses, individuals classified as being high risk in a particular risk sub-domain were given a score of 1, whereas those who were not classified as being at high risk (moderate or low) were given a zero, consistent with the work of Esbensen and colleagues (2009; 2010) and Thornberry and colleagues (2003). An overall accumulated risk score was then developed by summing individual scores across all sub-domains to determine if the targeted sample had a higher average accumulated risk score than the non-targeted sample.

Results

Sex Comparison: CAGI sample

Of the 241 respondents targeted for services as part of the CAGI, 81 (34%) were female. Historically, females have not been considered at-risk for gang membership by public officials (Miller, 2001), and thus for roughly one-third of a targeted sample of this sex may be somewhat surprising based on this history; although self-report data has suggested female gang membership is not atypical (see Esbensen, et al., 2010). Interestingly, with the exception of abuse by family members (Miller, 2001), risk factors for gang membership among females and males appear to be quite similar (Esbensen, et al., 2010). We proceed, therefore, with a comparison of the risk profiles for the male and female samples targeted for services.

Table 10 displays the comparison of mean risk levels by sex for the youth targeted by the CAGI. Of the 11 risk domains included in the GRAD, significant differences between males and females were found in three domains. Specifically, while females were more likely to have reported problems in the family domain, males reported significantly higher risk in the areas of contact with law enforcement and substance use. Overall, however, males and females targeted for services had similar risk profiles with regard to eight of the 11 risk domains measured by the GRAD.

Table 10 Sex by Mean Levels of Risk

<u>Risk Domain</u>	Female (n = 81)			Male (n = 160)	
	<u>mean</u>	<u>s.d.</u>		<u>mean</u>	<u>s.d.</u>
Accountability	3.79	2.68		3.63	2.40
Education	5.21	4.08		5.79	4.27
Family	6.96	4.78	**	5.36	4.25
Health	3.02	3.21		3.69	2.29
Leisure	2.09	1.46		2.39	1.53
Peer	7.37	5.49		7.29	4.39
Behavior	12.63	7.85		11.52	7.23
Prior L.E. Contact	1.07	1.42	***	2.72	2.16
Social	4.15	2.88		4.50	2.93
Substance Use	1.68	3.04	**	2.65	3.12
Trauma	4.56	3.95		4.49	3.01

(independent samples t-test)

** = $p < .05$

*** = $p < .01$

CAGI males versus the school-based sample

Significant differences between the two samples of African American males utilized in the present study were found, although in the opposite direction as would be expected given the targeted nature of the program. That is, the non-targeted school-based sample reported significantly higher risk in three of the four domains, and seven of the 12 associated sub-domains used in the current analysis (see Table 11). More specifically, for the family risk domain significantly higher scores ($t = 4.23$, $p < .001$) were reported by the school-based sample (mean = 6.66) in comparison to the anti-gang program sample (mean = 5.12). These significant differences were located most specifically in the family conflict ($t = 3.34$, $p < .001$) and parental tiptoeing ($t = 5.81$, $p < .001$) sub-domains.

Table 11 Mean Comparison of Risk Factors Across Targeted and Non-Targeted Samples

Risk Domain	Risk Sub-domain	Targeted Gang Sample		Non-Targeted Sample	
		Mean	<i>s.d.</i>	Mean	<i>s.d.</i>
Education		5.61	4.24	5.25	3.10
	Disruption	2.23	2.00	2.39	1.78
	Learning Disability	1.01	1.43	0.82	1.21
	Threat	2.25	1.93	2.04	1.48
Mental Health		10.83	6.64	13.56	7.52
	Internalizing	3.50	2.87	5.25	3.43
	Externalizing	4.01	2.80	4.96	3.23
	ADHD	2.25	1.73	2.58	1.95
Family		5.12	4.19	6.66	4.37
	Environment	3.71	3.51	4.73	3.64
	Conflict Avoidance	.88	1.04	1.41	1.21
	Hardship	.53	.73	.51	.77
Delinquent Peer Group		2.03	1.27	2.33	1.69
	Contact with	1.09			
	Delinquent Peers		.52	1.11	.72
	Associates with	.75	.67	.89	.79
	Gang Members				
	Involvement with	.20	.49	.33	.65
	Gangs				
<i>Accumulated High Risk</i>		2.78	2.36	3.32	2.43

* = $p < .05$ (independent samples t-test)

Gang Targeted N = 146

Non-Targeted N = 1,438

For mental health, the non-targeted sample reported a mean of 13.56, while the targeted sample reported a mean score of 10.83 ($t = 4.69$, $p < .001$). These significant differences were reflected in all of the mental health sub-domains, including internalizing ($t = 6.88$, $p < .001$), externalizing ($t = 3.87$, $p < .001$), and ADHD (2.189, $p < .05$). When it came to the measure of delinquent peer associations, the non-targeted sample reported a mean of 2.32 while the targeted sample mean score was 2.03 ($t = 2.56$, $p < .01$). Of particular concern for the targeted gang intervention, there were significant differences between the two groups on both of the items pertaining to interactions with gang members. Specifically, the targeted group reported significantly ($t = 2.37$, $p < .05$) less time associating with gang members and involvement with gang members ($t = 3.05$, $p < .01$) than the non-targeted school-based group of youth.

Finally, no significant differences were found between the two groups on overall educational risk, nor on any of the three sub-domains of this factor. Given the size of the two samples used in the independent samples t-test, the failure to find a single statistically significant difference in the expected direction is noteworthy. In sum, the sample of youth targeted for inclusion in an anti-gang initiative, supposedly for being particularly at-risk for gang involvement, scored significantly lower on three of the four risk domains, and seven of the twelve sub-domains included in the study.

Next, we examined the accumulation of risk across domains for each of the samples, given evidence that accumulated risk across domains is a robust predictor of future gang involvement (Esbensen et al, 2009, Esbensen et al., 2010; Hill et al., 1999; Thornberry et al., 2003). Again, significant ($t = 2.60$, $p < .05$) differences were found between targeted and non-targeted samples, but in the opposite direction as expected. Specifically, the mean accumulated risk score for the targeted sample was 2.78, whereas the non-targeted sample had a score of 3.32.

Conclusions

Results from the current study suggest that the ability of local agencies to identify youth most at-risk for delinquency and gang membership should not be taken for granted. Officials in Cuyahoga County, Ohio contracted with numerous social service providers in their local jurisdiction to provide services to youth most at-risk for gang membership, yet such a population proved difficult to locate and include in their initiative. Indeed, a comparison group of African-American males in the general school-based population were more at-risk than the targeted group of adolescents on three of the four risk factor domains, seven of the 12 associated sub-domains, and accumulated more risk across domains, as measured by the GRAD risk assessment instrument (GRAD version 1.0: Gavazzi et al., 2003b). Thus, it is clear that those served by the initiative were not reflective of the intended target population. Unfortunately, the failure to target youth most at risk for delinquency and gang membership can lead to reduced programmatic effect (e.g., Andrews et al., 1990; Lipsey, 2009).

Although the specific reasons for this failure to involve the most at-risk youth in the community are difficult to identify, interviews with Cleveland officials highlighted some of the challenges. The original plan was to administer the GRAD risk assessment tool with all ninth graders in the Cleveland Metropolitan School District, and particularly in the high school serving the neighborhoods targeted in the anti-gang initiative. However, this proved difficult given privacy issues and questions about sharing of information that would be collected in the schools with the justice system and social service agencies. It was also difficult to systematically administer the risk assessment tool in schools that were described as stressed with the numerous demands facing urban school systems. As one respondent stated, “the school in the target area was stressed out. Principals and staff felt overwhelmed already, making it difficult at times to ask for more.” Unable to rely on a central screening process like the schools for conducting the assessment, but wanting to serve youth in-need in a high crime neighborhood, the program tended to rely on referrals from a variety of sources. The end result may indeed have been programs comprised of youth in-need who may have benefitted through participation, but it does not appear that the youth most at-risk for gang involvement were included.

Evaluations of other targeted gang interventions (The Advancement Project, 2006; Decker and Curry, 2002) and delinquency prevention programs more generally (see Larzelere, Kuhn, and Johnson, 2004; Lipsey and Wilson, 1998) have suggested that youth targeted for service were likely not those who posed the greatest risk for future gang involvement and/or

offending. A recent evaluation of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania's One Vision One Life Program found that targeting practices were anything but strategic, in that the most frequent mechanisms through which clients became involved in the program were through self-selection (33%) and referrals by family members (24%) (Wilson, Chermak, McGarrell, 2010: 39). As might be expected, self-selection or referral of individuals from family members, though likely identifying youth with needs, is not an adequate strategy for interventions targeted at the highest risk youth (Guerra, 1997).

In moving forward, the development of strategies, or best practices, for identifying youth most in need of preventative services is of utmost importance if we are to realize the potential gains associated with targeted prevention and intervention initiatives. Given the comments of Attorney General Holder (2009) and the recent history of federal efforts in this regard (for a review see Klofas, Hipple, and McGarrell, 2010), the philosophy of targeting those most at risk for continued or future offending appears to be the reigning paradigm, and thus efforts to improve practitioners' abilities to implement such strategies with fidelity must address the issue of identification. Without systematic and, perhaps most importantly, practical solutions for identifying at risk youth in a population where few youth have no risk factors for delinquency and gang membership, we are destined to repeat the same mistakes that have been documented in the current study and elsewhere. The efficiency promised through targeted prevention and intervention initiatives, after all, hinges on the ability to identify youth most at risk for serious, chronic, and violent offending.

A particular area of difficulty for those persons and agencies charged with identifying the appropriate population for targeted criminal justice interventions is the confluence of risk and need in communities chosen for interventions such as the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative. Given the focus on disadvantaged, high crime, neighborhoods, the need for social services including job training and placement, after school activities, and counseling are nearly ubiquitous. In other words, many youth in these areas are in need of services, but only select youth are at risk for serious, chronic, and violent offending. Maynard-Moody and Musheno's (2003) research on the selection of clients into social services highlights how those in need, but not necessarily at risk might come to receive a greater degree of services. As Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003: 104 emphasis added) described:

Motivation clearly makes a client, ex-offender, or kid much easier to handle, since street-level workers typically define motivation in terms of cooperation. The motivated citizen-client is nonetheless deemed morally superior to the unmotivated. Conversely, the unmotivated, *regardless of their need or circumstance*, are deemed unworthy.

Decker and Curry (2002:208) highlighted this dilemma faced by social service agents in their evaluation of a targeted intervention in St. Louis, Missouri when they described how "many of the youth failed to show up for their placements, were often late for appointments, and when they arrived were disruptive." In all, while targeted interventions can be successful when implemented correctly, full implementation of programs with high risk youth can be very difficult.

When contracting with local social service providers, whose mission often extends beyond that of crime prevention, it is important to articulate a clear plan for target selection. Research has highlighted the potential limitations associated with multiple stakeholders collaborating on such endeavors, in that even fundamental processes necessary to execute

targeted initiatives, such as defining common goals and the techniques by which these objectives should be achieved can present significant roadblocks for successful implementation (see e.g., Decker and Curry, 2002; Klofas, Hipple, and McGarrell, 2010). For instance, the social service providers included in the current study did not always specialize in serving clients particularly at-risk for crime and delinquency, but instead provided generalized services that focused on the needs of those in the local population. Consequently, standard operating procedures in these organizations were not to exclude clients with documented needs, and thus reliance on normal screening practices would cast a wider net than was required under the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative. Clearly articulated and practical methods for selecting cases must part of future targeted intervention strategies.

As was suggested by Le Blanc (1998) over a decade ago, given the low base rate of youth at risk for involvement in serious, chronic, and violent offending, and by extension gang membership (see e.g., Klein and Maxson, 2006), multiple gating is likely necessary to identify those youth best served by targeted interventions. “Multiple informants and multiple-variable domains seem preferable because of the complexity of the influences” (Le Blanc, 1998: 181) at work in leading youth down the path of gang membership. Given the noted influence of accumulated risk across domains (e.g., family, school, and neighborhood), informants from as many of these domains as possible should be included in the decision to intervene in the lives of youth. The confluence of opinions from numerous stakeholders should increase the predictive accuracy of the decision to include and exclude youth from interventions. To be sure, there is also a place for standardized risk assessment using instruments such that used in the current study (GRAD version 1.0: Gavazzi et al., 2003b).

While the current study highlights a potential problem in the successful implementation of targeted gang interventions, it is not without limitations. First and foremost, while all of the respondents in the two samples used in the current analyses are from the same metropolitan area, the data do not allow for a direct comparison of the neighborhoods or schools in which the respondents lived. Due to issues of confidentiality, all identifying neighborhood and school information was cleaned from the comparison data before analyses could be conducted. The lack of neighborhood or school identifiers introduces the possibility that sample selection procedures are responsible for our unexpected results. While this remains a slight possibility, the selection procedures purported to be used for the targeted and non-targeted samples should alleviate such concerns. That is, the gang intervention under study targeted what was deemed the most “at-risk” neighborhood in the Cleveland metropolitan area in a number of domains, including violence, gang presence, school failure, and a lack of adequate social services. From there, those chosen to participate in the initiative were supposed to be the most “at-risk” youth from this particularly distressed community. On the other hand, the non-targeted school-based sample was derived from available subjects from across the Cleveland Metropolitan School District (CMSD). Such a sampling technique is notoriously biased, but in a way that should underestimate the level of risk of the general school-based population in the CMSD. Reliance on available subjects (also referred to as convenience sampling) has been found to systematically exclude high risk individuals, as these youth are least likely to be available for, or volunteer to, participate in school-based surveys (Hindelang, et al., 1981; Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1993). In the end, while a direct comparison of the neighborhoods and schools from which the two samples were collected is impossible given data restrictions, the observed sample similarities and differences across risk domains remain substantive.

The current study highlights the need for more research on the best practices for implementing targeted interventions. Implementation of multiple gating strategies and systematic processes for assessing risk, including the use of actuarial risk assessment devices such as that used in the current study, are imperative if the benefits associated with targeted interventions are to be realized. Finally, the results of these analyses also point to the benefit of including a research partner in initiatives such as CAGI. When Cleveland CAGI officials were presented with the results of these data, they responded by posing the question to task force members, “how can we improve our processes so that we do serve those youths most at-risk.” That is, the data were used as a self-correcting mechanism to improve the delivery of prevention services.

Reentry – Focus Group Results

INTRODUCTION

The mass increase in imprisonment (Austin and Irwin, 2001) of the last two decades has led to an increasing number of adults released from prison. Each year nearly 700,000 inmates, approximately 1,900 per day, are released from state and federal prison (Harrison and Beck, 2006). The stark reality is that the vast majority of individuals sent to prison will inevitably experience reentry – the process of leaving prison and returning to society. The reentry period however, offers many pressing challenges for returning individuals to reintegrate, which include but are not limited to finding housing, securing employment, reconnecting with family, receiving mental health and/or substance abuse treatment, abstaining from substance use and crime, and avoiding a return to prison.

These obstacles make it increasingly difficult for individuals returning from prison to gain a foothold in society. Consequently, the inability of former prisoners to adjust and reintegrate successfully can increase their likelihood of recidivating. A national study of recidivism suggests that two-thirds of released inmates are rearrested, 47 percent are reconvicted, and roughly half are returned to prison within three years following release (Langan and Levin, 2002).

The rapid rise in the number of adults released from prison coupled with the majority having subsequent contact with the criminal justice system, has led scholars, practitioners, and policymakers to seek the best strategies to cope with the estimated 1,700 inmates who are released back into society every day. While no silver bullet exists to deal with the complex issues of reentry, a number of lessons have been learned. Strategies to improve reentry outcomes include:

1. *In-prison reentry programs.* It is important for individuals to prepare for their release immediately following their imprisonment. While in prison, inmates must receive support that will lead to a successful transition into society.
2. *Drug and alcohol treatment.* Approximately 75 percent of prisoners scheduled to be released from prison have a substance abuse problem (Mumola, 1999). Confronting this issue is crucial to successful reentry, as drug use is a correlate of recidivism.
3. *Employment assistance.* Approximately 60 percent of all individuals released from prison are unemployed one year after release (The Power of Work, 2006). Employment counseling can include teaching life skills, teaching a trade or other skill, and/or where to look for a job.

In an effort to reduce recidivism and violent crime post-release, the CAGI initiative included funding for reentry assistance programs to those re-entering individuals identified as gang-involved by providing transitional housing, job readiness and placement assistance, as well as substance abuse and mental health treatment. The goal of this component of the evaluation is to understand, from participants' point of view, how the CAGI violence reduction reentry programs impacted their transition back to the community. It begins with a brief description of the CAGI program in two jurisdictions: the Northern District of Ohio and the Eastern District of

Wisconsin. Next, a detailed account of the study methodology is provided. This is followed by findings on the benefits, problems, and recommendations of CAGI by respondents. Appendices include the research consent form and survey and interview guides.

Jurisdiction Descriptions

Northern District of Ohio

As noted in previous sections, the NDOH CAGI initiative focused specifically on two areas within Cleveland with high rates of violent crime believed to be connected to gang activity. Persons sentenced to prison may be gang-involved before conviction, become gang-involved while incarcerated, or risk gang involvement upon release. To help address those risks and realities, the Northern District of Ohio mobilized corrections officials and community partners to design a pilot strategy to prepare approximately 100 gang-involved offenders for successful integration into the community. Ongoing reentry strategies maintain the original focus on creating mentor-based reentry assistance programs with faith-based and other community organizations providing transitional housing, job readiness and placement assistance, and substance abuse and mental health treatment to prisoners re-entering society. To help ease incarcerated individuals' transition back to the community, the reentry program included: pre-release case-management services, inmate motivational speakers, one-on-one service needs conferences, referrals for employment and housing programs, and mental health and substance abuse treatment.

Eastern District of Wisconsin

As noted above, two police districts (i.e., districts 2 and 5) in the city of Milwaukee were the focus of the Eastern District of Wisconsin's CAGI efforts that began in 2006. Milwaukee built upon the strong partnerships and strategies developed to address gun violence through their Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) efforts. The team referred to this as the Safe Streets Initiative, which represented Milwaukee's accumulation of PSN and CAGI, and the Gang Reduction Project. The District's reentry program included a coalition of agencies and service providers designed to aid 100 gang-involved adults as they transition back to the free world. Participants received employment assistance, drug treatment, alcohol treatment, and a host of other services six months prior to their release from prison.

STUDY METHODOLOGY

Data for this investigation come from 25 qualitative in-depth interviews completed in August and December 2010. The aim of the research was to conduct a process evaluation of the CAGI reentry program from the perspective of participants in the study. Specific research questions included:

- What did participants like about the CAGI reentry program?
- What did participants dislike about the CAGI reentry program?
- Would participants recommend the program to others?
- How can the program be improved to make it more helpful?

STUDY PARTICIPANTS

In all, 25 individuals were interviewed for this study; seven were participants of the CAGI reentry program in Cleveland, Ohio, and 18 took part in the CAGI reentry program in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. All were males. Participation in the project was voluntary, and respondents were given a \$25 gift certificate and promised strict confidentiality.¹² To recruit participants in Cleveland, Ohio, Michigan State University (MSU) contacted the Community Assessment and Treatment Services Providing Life Skills for Ultimate Sufficiency (CATS Plus) Program Director. CATS Plus received funding to run the CAGI program in Cleveland from Spring 2007 to June 2009. The Director was in contact with some CAGI participants who had been identified as gang-involved upon their last imprisonment and who completed the program. To recruit participants in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, MSU contacted the Probation and Parole Agent with the Wisconsin Department of Corrections who had clients who were part of Safe Streets.¹³ Safe Streets received funding in 2006, which is still in effect, to run the CAGI program in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for gang-involved or high-risk offenders.¹⁴ All 25 participants, who were on parole, were identified for participation in the project through a convenient sampling technique. Those individuals willing to participate were given a consent form prior to initiation of the interview (see Appendix 2).

STUDY DESIGN

The project utilized qualitative in-depth interviews. These were semi-structured, with open-ended questions that allowed for considerable probing. Our goal was to gather data that could provide a relatively holistic assessment of individuals' experiences with and interpretations of the program. The use of semi-structured guides ensured that the interviews conducted were consistent in content and format, but that research participants had the opportunity to express themselves without being influenced by leading questions. After obtaining informed consent, each interview was digitally-recorded and transcribed verbatim.

Survey Interview

Each interview began with the completion of an extensive survey instrument (see Appendix 3). Questions were read to the respondents by the interviewer who recorded their responses. The instrument collected general demographic and descriptive information, including a range of questions about each respondent's physical and mental health status, victimization histories (personal victimization, own perpetration of abuse, and witnessing others' abuse), involvement in crime, substance addictions, as well as treatment, residential, and custodial experiences. The men were asked about their familial and peer relationships, as well as their involvement in criminal activity. This was followed by questions about their most recent experience with the criminal justice system, the challenges they faced upon reentry to society, and the degree of satisfaction they had with the progress they made upon their last release from

¹² Respondent's names were not collected and pseudonyms are used throughout.

¹³ CAGI was renamed Safe Streets in Milwaukee, Wisconsin

¹⁴ Individuals who committed a violent or serious crime were defined as high-risk. Thus, it was possible for individuals to commit a violent offense but not have any prior or current gang-involvement or affiliation.

prison. The survey focused on examining the impact of pre-incarceration and post-prison experiences of each respondent.

In-depth Interview

The survey provided baseline information for the data collected in the in-depth interviews. The interviewer then drew from the survey responses to guide the conversation during the in-depth interview (see Appendix 4). The men were first asked to describe their initial and subsequent participation in crime and contact with the police. Contextual information regarding these incidents was collected, including what crimes were committed, why they were committed, and who was present. Also, the respondents were asked if they had ever been involved in gang activity. If they reported involvement in a gang, they were asked to discuss when and why they got involved, what type of activities and/or crimes they committed, and whether or not they were still part of a gang.

The interviews then shifted to a discussion of immediate and long-term reentry challenges after release from prison. Respondents were asked to discuss if and how they secured employment, found housing, reunited with family and children, recovered from substance abuse, and received external resources that aided their transition process. If the respondents reported committing crimes while on parole, they were asked to describe these events, and to reflect on the reasons they engaged in criminal activities. Finally, a standard set of questions were asked to address our research questions about the benefits, problems, and recommendations of the CAGI reentry program.

Data Collection Procedures

Data were collected in August 2010 among CAGI reentry participants in Cleveland, Ohio, and in December 2010 among respondents in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The interviews lasted between forty-five minutes and two hours. Interviews with participants in Milwaukee took place at the parole office either before or after respondents had to meet with their parole officer. Interviews with respondents in Cleveland took place in a private office at the CATS Plus building. CATS Plus has received three years of funding from public and private entities and aims to reduce recidivism and improve quality of life for returning offenders by addressing barriers to success such as housing, treatment after-care, health care, employment, education and other support.

Data Analysis Procedures

The data collected were analyzed inductively for patterns regarding how participants in each group interpreted and defined their lives. The data were manually coded, which allowed for a greater degree of interaction and familiarity than computer software programs often provide. This approach facilitated the development of key concepts and themes that emerged throughout the research process. Although these findings are not generalizable, this study provides understanding as to how respondents perceive the CAGI reentry program and if and how it shaped their transition back to the community.

STUDY LIMITATIONS

A number of study limitations are notable. First, the project conclusions would have been strengthened by using a random sample instead of reliance on available subjects. Participants were only selected if our contact person was in touch with respondents and available to take part in the study. Second, interviews were not conducted in all 12 CAGI sites. Because a small number of interviews were conducted only in two cities without the use of a random sample, study findings are not generalizable. Finally, a more holistic assessment of the program would have emerged had respondents who previously participated in but dropped out or were removed from the CAGI program, were included in the study.

PERCEPTIONS OF VIOLENT REDUCTION PROGRAMS FOR FORMERLY INCARCERATED MEN

We begin our investigation with an examination of how CAGI participants perceived the program. Asked to describe what they liked about the program, respondents in the study identified advantages associated with employment assistance and follow-up services from staff. On the other hand, when asked what they disliked about the program, they reported that promises were not kept and that problematic issues arose in various types of employment, vocational, or cognitive-behavioral classes in which they were enrolled.

LIKES

Employment

Of the 25 respondents who were part of CAGI, 84 percent reported that they liked the program, as well as the various services that were offered to them. Specifically, respondents identified advantages associated with obtaining employment assistance, receiving job leads, and securing an occupation. For example, Donte explained the class he was enrolled in “taught you job readiness, how to do applications, how to interview, how to use a computer to surf for jobs, [and] how to do applications on the computer.” And Steve said, “I just went through a program at the Goodwill that was financed through CCEP (Community Corrections Employment Program). It was a three-month program. In that program I learned how to navigate the Microsoft Office program. I learned business skills, office skills, and now that’s a potential job that I can have, because of the program that they’re pushing, that CCEP offered me.”

For the respondents, receiving job assistance was often given primacy over other barriers they faced post-release. Many recognized that their past criminal history would hinder their chances of obtaining a job, as most employers are unwilling to hire ex-felons (Rodriguez & Emsellem, 2011). Donte explained:

[The program] gave me all the tools and everything to find a job [but] society wouldn’t hire me because I’m a repeat offender. It wasn’t because they didn’t help me. It wasn’t because I didn’t go out there and try. It’s just society. A lot of people won’t hire. I got a lot of violence. And then I got a lot of drugs. And then I’ve got a work history that I done beat up people. So it’s my fault. My past decisions stopped me from getting employment.

Asked how the program was beneficial, Donte replied, “what I got out of it was more important than employment ... it kept me going and focused ... I wanted to better myself And I wanted to do it right.” Thus, employment assistance was deemed necessary by some men because it motivated them to seek a conventional lifestyle.

Despite the difficulty a criminal record posed for many men returning from prison, respondents reported receiving job leads and offers as a result of being enrolled in the program. For example, Robert stated, “I liked the fact that before I got out, I had a job offer through Safe Streets.” And Charles stated that “people that’s in Safe Streets were getting priority with jobs. So I did like that.” Likewise, Ramone asserted that staff members would be “telling us the ins and outs of what to do, what not to do. What job leads to look for.”

Not only did respondents receive job leads, but their participation in the reentry program often provided job placements. Antwain admitted that “Safe Streets provided me with a job when I first came home.” Similarly, Tyler asserted that Safe Streets provided “a great opportunity to get back to the workforce,” which resulted in him working as a maintenance worker at a church. Maurice explained what he admired about the program he was enrolled in was “the help to be employed.” When asked what type of help he received, he explained:

[I]t’s a place where they, that I went to when I got out of prison. I just wrote a few things down. I wrote my resume and I was, the brother just helped me get a job. He made it, looked up, he looked at my resume and he found something that fit what I was looking for and called. And I had an interview. And I went to the interview and I was hired like that.

As a result, Maurice was hired to work as a building assistant within one month of his release from prison. Likewise, Bert acknowledged that one of the good things that came out of the program was “the job placement.” He asserted “the second job placement that they did give me was good, and that led to where I’m at now. And now I’ve got my health insurance. I’ve been working this job [doing construction work] for a little over four months.” And Malik agreed that CCEP provided “not only me [a job but] I did see them get quite a few people jobs when they got out.”

Thus, the respondent’s accounts of what they liked about the violence reduction program focused on how the services assisted them in looking for jobs, providing job leads, and actually securing employment. The respondents were cognizant of and concerned about their ability to secure employment as a result of their status as former prisoners. In addition, as Donte remarked, receiving support in locating a job was also beneficial because “it kept me focused longer.” Clearly, for those men who were enrolled in the violence reduction reentry program, receiving assistance in landing a job was beneficial post-release.

Follow-Up

In addition to receiving employment assistance, respondents liked the follow-up they received from staff once they enrolled in the program. In particular, effective follow-up was seen as the result of sincerity and concern they received from staff both in and out of prison. Lamont explained what he liked was when program coordinators and a representative from the Attorney General’s Office came to the correctional facility and encouraged inmates by stating “you can do it, I have faith in you. These people would come in and even though we were in

prison, they impressed upon me that they were really concerned.” The concern continued even after release from prison. Of one staff member, Donte stated:

He came and talked to you and spend time with you. Rode around, took you shopping. They helped you out. They really tried to help. And they will help you. But you’ve got to want it. You know what I’m saying? They’ll take you to job interviews. You know, they really helped me. I love the program. It was good for me.

It was commonly reported that having a team of specialists follow-up with parolees post-release was beneficial. Marquin asserted he liked that there were a “bunch of people involved to help me stay out. Stay free.” This included receiving follow-up care from social workers, “job coordinator, and then drug counselors.” Likewise, Antwain expressed that the program “provided me with a network, a system of good people who I can talk to and who I can use for references ... I can go to them for advice or for other information that they may have ... It’s just like a nice little support system.” And Tyler stated the benefit of the program was not just “the job [assistance]” but that his parole officer, case manager, and coordinator of the program “talk to you, they listen to your problems. You can call any one of them, they’re going to listen.” Tyler, however, also explained that he liked his parole officer’s kind but firm nature:

She’s a great PO, you know what I’m saying? She listens, she’s kind. She ain’t never, she ain’t disrespectful. You know what I’m saying? She gives you a lot of leeway. She lets, she gives you enough rope to hang yourself if that’s what you want But she’s going to tell you, you know what I’m saying? She ain’t the type of person that’s going to sit around and just beat around the bush with you. She’s going to let you know. ‘Man, this is what you’ve got to do. You got to do this or I’m going to have to do my job.’

Such experiences with parole officers and staff greatly influenced the participants’ perceptions of the program. A considerable body of research documents that community supervision is most successful when probation and parole officers balance both monitoring and sanctions with a social casework approach and treatment (Paparozzi & Gendreau, 2005; Morash, 2010). This approach was particularly important for men in the sample who committed serious and violent offenses and were attempting to successfully transition back to the community.

DISLIKES

Promises not kept

While participants in the study detailed the program provided them with employment assistance and follow-up, most (56 percent) also specified a number of problems with the program in which they participated. Specifically, a common theme throughout respondents’ accounts was that a number of promises were made that were not subsequently carried out. Several respondents asserted being promised work release jobs, which failed to transpire. Jason offered, “I thought they misled us ... because they said I’m going to get a job [in prison] ... And none of that never happened.” This proved to be problematic, as many already had work release

jobs in prison but had to transfer to another correctional facility to take part in the program. Malik explained:

[They] fed me a whole bunch of stuff that made me interested ... [They said] they're going to help us get jobs when we get down there They already got jobs lined up for us while we're locked up. And when we get out, there weren't no jobs when we got there. So we were just stuck. And a lot of us had jobs when we had left, so to take us from a job to not a job limited us a lot.

As a consequence, Ian said, "I sat there [in prison] without having a job until I was released" six months later. And Alberto claimed: "We never had no help. No work release coordinator helped us. And there was about 45 of us at STF [Sturtevant Transitional Facility]. None of us had a job. None of us got any help getting a job." According to Alberto, it was only after several complaints by the inmates did they end up "putting like 20 of us in a job, you know, that the state had a contract for," which was unaffiliated with the program he was enrolled in.

Not only were criticisms made about not having work release jobs in prison, but a few complained the program did not result in them securing a job post-release. Bert said, "They said they were supposed to be getting us good jobs, you know, career jobs, when we get out. And that didn't happen." Similarly, Juan stated he was told there were "opportunities to get us a job as soon as we get out And it didn't work out like that They didn't get us no jobs."

In addition, a few respondents complained that they were not informed of the parole conditions they had to be subject to as a result of taking part in the program. As Charles stated, "part of signing up for Safe Streets is you're placing yourself as a high-risk parolee when you get out." As a result, Charles said, "I was on house arrest for three months. And I had to see my PO once a week. They didn't tell us that until I got to [the] minimum [correctional facility] and the POs came to see us. So I felt like it was a setup." Bert stated "they didn't tell us about no bracelet, no having to do AODA [drug treatment]. No ROPE [Re-Offender Prevention Enforcement] program." Bert continued to explain the problem he faced:

[T]wo cops and a social worker come to your house whenever they want to, just pop up on you, and give you a breathalyzer and a drug test. And I don't mind doing the breathalyzer and drug test because I'm not using, but it's the point that these people are coming to my house and it seemed every time they come it was at 10:00 at night. Everybody in the, my kids are sleeping getting ready for school. I'm sleeping, getting ready for work, and here they are downstairs. Banging at my door, waking – oh I was pissed.

Overall, participant criticisms of the violence reduction program focused either on the failure of program coordinators and staff to keep promises that were made to them or not informing them of everything the program entailed. While it is common for parolees to meet conditions while on parole, the men in the study were surprised to find all the conditions that were placed upon them post-release. Consequently, many viewed staff members with skepticism and had misgivings about the ability of the program to help them successfully transition back to society.

Classes

In addition to the failure to keep promises, a few respondents complained about the classes they had to partake. Raymond attributed the problem with one of the classes he took to its short duration: “It could have been longer ... Because the short time, it wasn’t enough Once the time collapses, it’s over with. You know, the CO would come wrap it up.” In contrast, others criticized classes for being too slow. Of one class he took related to changing his criminal behavior, Calvin stated that “[t]he reason I didn’t like the class was because it was too slow ... I did the whole book in my dorm, in my unit, in my room watching TV. I did the whole workbook ... But they still want me to sit there.” Asked whether or not releasing him early would help him change his thinking, Calvin admitted, “No [but it] would have made room for another individual that needed it.”

Others had complaints about the treatment they received from specific teachers while incarcerated. Juan lamented, “they wouldn’t let none of the prisoners talk about what was going on or what we needed The way they would talk to you ... They would just talk real reckless.” Jason complained that he did not think the teachers were “fit to be inside a class full of minorities trying to understand us. Because they didn’t understand us at all.” He explained:

I thought they should have had somebody that was more in touch with us, that could understand us, period. Like you ain’t just a criminal because you did some one mistake in your life, you know what I’m saying? You should have somebody that come in there understand that people deserve second chances. Some people really do change.

Such experiences with teachers greatly influenced perceptions of the reentry program. A considerable body of research documents that cultural issues play a significant role in successful engagement and program retention (Miller, 1998; Morash & Wilkinson, 1995). Such concerns were all the more salient for African American men, like Jason, who felt his teacher did not understand him or his cultural background. Evidence speaks to the importance of taking into consideration cultural identity, which shapes both behavior and opportunity (Richie, 2001).

RECOMMENDATIONS

While varied responses were provided regarding whether or not respondents liked the violence reduction program, almost three-quarters (72 percent) of the sample stated that they would recommend the program to others. Many reported they would recommend the program *only* to those who want to change, as they are the ones who would benefit the most. Ramone said, “I would recommend it to those that’s incarcerated. To those that you see that they want it [and have] the hunger in the eyes.” The desire to change was necessary because as Donte stated, “if you ain’t trying to change your life, there ain’t nothing the program is going to do for you.” In particular, men emphasized how an individual who is unwilling to change would simply take up space. Steve noted, “if you ain’t ready to live your life right, I wouldn’t recommend you do it because you wouldn’t be doing nothing but taking opportunities away from another person that could possibly live their life right.”

The common reason reported for recommending the program to others was tied to receiving job assistance. Robert stated, “it can really help you transition to the streets. If you

want a job, or job skills, it helps you.” Many others concurred. Sam asserted, “They work with you trying to find employment.” Antwain stated, “you’ve got a lot of people that’s going to help you, you know, help yourself.” He continued:

When you’re first coming out [of prison] it gives you, I guess it gives you that repetition into having a job and keeping a job. And once you’re first coming home from that, you need that. You need to know what it feels like to work and get up and be committed to something.

And several respondents described how the services they received met their specific needs. Raymond said “[t]hey help you on all aspects of whatever you need. Whatever you need help on, they’re there to help.” Because Calvin believed the program could “help you with everything,” he admitted that he was “trying to get my brother on it. And my brother ain’t even on paper [parole].”

Even though the majority would recommend the program to others, over 28 percent reported that they would not because they did not like the services they received. As mentioned earlier, a number of men stated that promises were not kept by program administrators; thus, they would not make recommendations to others. Asked why he would not recommend the services to others, Edwardo stated, “I got lied to. I’m not going to lie to somebody else.” Likewise, Charles answered “because they aren’t going to be honest with you and they don’t do nothing for you when you’re in there [prison].” And Jason asserted “they lied to us ... about getting us that work release for our last six months of prison.” Bert expressed why he could not recommend the program in its current state:

If they were to get their stuff in order and really have these things that they’re telling people, and if they would inform them about all the other extra stuff that they’re going to have to do, it would probably work. But right now, I mean, it ain’t. I mean, this program didn’t work for nobody.

The belief that the reentry program did not provide assistance was commonly stated by respondents who would not recommend the program to others. Alberto asserted, “I wouldn’t recommend it ... [because] no assistance at all” was provided. Charles claimed that the program “don’t really do nothing.” While he admitted “it do give you a little priority when you get out” regarding a job, he also stated “if you’re just part of CCEP, they do the same thing ... [because] CCEP is for anybody who is on parole.” Implicit in Charles’ remark is that he could have received the same employment services post-release through CCEP without having to enroll and subject himself to the rules and regulations of the violence reduction program.

IMPROVEMENTS

Since respondents had positive and negative responses to the reentry program, we also solicited respondent’s opinions regarding recommended areas for improvement. Asked about how to improve the program, respondents in our study emphasized issues related to employment, honest communication, and organization and implementation.

Employment

Those who were unemployed had much to say about the need for securing a job post-release. In response as to how to make the violence reduction program more helpful, Jerrod stated “help people find jobs when they get released.” Others stated that a part-time job was not enough but full-time employment was necessary to help returning parolees get back on their feet. Maurice said, “they only give out part-time jobs, but I think full-time employment would be, you know, better for people because [of] the economy.” Likewise, Ian lamented, “instead of just saying we’re going to get you a job for \$7.25 for 90 days just to say that we did something for you” it is necessary to “at least get him [a parolee] a job that he can keep” beyond 90 days.

A number of respondents imparted advice on how exactly to help returning parolees secure jobs post-release. Jason asserted, “if they can get a job coach and get a contract with a temp service” it would be helpful. In particular, he believed that such opportunities were necessary “because a temp service will hire you on if you work good enough.” Likewise, Dwayne explained:

“I think that if you’re going to offer these kinds of programs, they should already have partnered up with some potential employer. So okay, if you complete the this program, we can offer you an entry-level position here, here, and here But at least here, not just sent you out into the world. Because if you’re sending me out, I’m still competing with Joe Blow, who’s never had a felony. Who may have the same exact skills that I do, same exact work experience but never been in trouble. But if you got, if you’re dealing with these five companies and each company has five slots that are, they’re going to give just to graduates of this program, okay, now you’re actually helping me transition back. You’re giving me opportunity. It’s still on me to maintain the employment, to excel at the job, but now it’s light at the tunnel.

Dwayne illustrates the need for greater use of a “tax break” and “all kinds of incentives for the employer” to hire formerly incarcerated prisoners. Given that most employers are unwilling to hire individuals with a criminal record (Rodriguez & Emsellem, 2011), having more agencies contract with potential employers serves as one way to increase the likelihood that parolees could land a job following their prison release.

Honest Communication

In addition to providing more employment assistance, respondents frequently discussed the need for program coordinators and staff to keep the promises that were made to them, which motivated them to enroll in the program. Asked how the program can be improved, Edwardo simply said, “follow through with their promises.” Ian articulated a similar position:

If they got jobs, give people jobs like they said they was going to do, you know? I mean, at least just stick to what you say you’re going to do. If you involve somebody in there, don’t just change it up once people sign up and then say oh, you can’t get out of this program. You know, because you signed up for it. Because I think they told, a lot of, they actually sent me a letter telling me that I

couldn't participate in the program, and then they didn't meet their quota so they called back people and told them oh, you've got to participate now. So it was pretty much a, either you're going to participate or nothing. You got to participate.

Respondents desired that coordinators would clearly inform them as to what the program entailed so they can then make the decision whether or not to enroll. Charles said, "I think they should be more honest with people before people sign the papers." He preferred to be told upfront that 'you're going to be high risk, that you're on parole, [and] on house arrest for the first three months or whatever.' As Edwardo noted, "just be upfront and tell everything [as] it is ... And then a person can make a choice for themselves. If I'm going to choose it, I know I'm choosing it because these are, everything's available to me. I'm informed." Honest communication among program staff and clients is vital to the success of any program. If clients perceive that they are not being completely informed or that those in authority are reneging on their promises, it can result in a lack of faith in formal systems of justice, which can unintentionally impede rather than help offenders transition back into the free world.

Organization and Implementation

In addition, respondents described the need for better organization and implementation of the program. Bert said, "if they're going to start this program again, they need to prepare for it better." Asked how, he explained what he perceived to be the problem:

It was really, I think, they jumped into this program too soon is what happened. They weren't ready for what it, in detail, needed them to do, and they were just trying to put it together as it was going. That's what I think happened [P]ersonally I think they're getting money for us being in this program. That's what it boils down to. They're fabricating stories to us to get us into this program, while people are getting paid for us being in this program. So much per head, or other people that are taking us in, doing these jobs, are getting their pockets hit. And then CCEP, you know, for placing us, is getting their pockets hit. It's just a big run-down in money and that's it.

Bert tied what he perceived to be a lack of preparation to agencies obtaining state funds by providing services to inmates enrolled in the violence reduction program. His focus was not on how specific agencies aimed to help him transition to the community but a perception that others were profiting by having him and others enrolled in the reentry program.

In fact, respondents described that much of the disorganization they witnessed stemmed from instructors who were supposed to lead classes in which they were enrolled. Asked how services could be improved, Robert responded, "don't be cancelling no classes ... because that can mess up your ambition. You start becoming, expecting to go to class and stuff. If you don't have class, you're like what's up with this? You know, so. Just be more consistent." Likewise, because of the inexperience he witnessed from instructors, Jason asserted that the program can be improved by having "the right people to run it People that got experience doing this type

of stuff.” Thus, men’s accounts focus on better organization and teachers as one way to further improve services.

CONCLUSION

The evaluation indicated that effort has been made to implement the CAGI and provide a number of services to aid gang-involved offenders as they transition back to society. Benefits of the reentry program were mentioned across both sites among participants who reported that the initiative resulted in job leads and placement and increased follow-up by a supportive network of people. However, accounts also revealed several problems with the program, including participants’ perception that program coordinators and staff failed to keep promises, classes did not fit their needs, and the instructors spoke down to inmates and were unable to identify with them. As a result, while the majority reported they would recommend the program to others, a small minority stated they would not. Respondents pointed to the types of changes that need to be made to ameliorate problems associated with the CAGI. This included offering remedies that attended to high rates of unemployment among returning parolees, improving honest communication between program coordinators and those who are incarcerated, and increasing the organization of the program. In general, the respondents believed that addressing these issues would contribute to the overall success of the program in assisting offenders in their transition back to the free world.

Chapter Five

CAGI Outcomes – Perceived Impact and Trend Analyses

This chapter presents data on the impact of CAGI. The first section presents perceived impacts from the perspective of officials responsible for CAGI. In addition to perceived impact, this includes assessments of the critical ingredients, lessons learned, issues and recommendations. The second section focuses on the impact on violent crime. It includes both a comparison of the trend in violent crime for CAGI cities with other U.S. cities as well as within-city analyses for selected CAGI jurisdictions.

Perceived Impact, Issues, Recommendation

During the course of the CAGI research, information was gathered from key CAGI participants from several different data collection activities. Some of these were conducted in selective jurisdictions (site visit interviews) but most were collected across all the jurisdictions. These included interviews with the CAGI coordinators at the beginning of CAGI as well as a survey in May 2010. They also included phone interviews with the key federal agency partners in fall 2010 as well as semi-annual reports submitted to the Department of Justice. The following section presents findings from these interviews and surveys. They are organized according to reported accomplishments, critical components of the CAGI initiative, lessons learned, issues and recommendations,

Accomplishments

There was near unanimity among officials in terms of two primary accomplishments for CAGI. The first was a reported decline in crime in the target area. This was reported by most, but not all, of the jurisdictions. The second was the establishment of new partnerships focused on various aspects of enforcement, prevention, intervention and/or reentry.

Although the decline in crime is ultimately an empirical question requiring trend analysis and contrasts with comparison areas (see subsequent section), in most of the sites officials were able to report witnessing declines in their target area. This included general statements such as, “we see reduced crime in target area” and “the overall level of crime has declined.” It also included very specific statements such as, “we have seen a 30-40% decline in gang crime in the target area; we saw a 37% decrease in gang crime in our target area; we had a 35% decrease in our Bulls Eye area; we had a major reduction in drive-by shootings (about a 30% decline).”

Many of the sites also reported increased gang enforcement as a central accomplishment of CAGI. Almost every site was able to report on specific crackdowns on gangs and several reported “a big increase in federal prosecution” of gang members.

Others pointed to specific accomplishments through their prevention, intervention and reentry programs. For example, one site reported that “we were able to work with 65 gang members who attained their GED.” Others noted that “our early intervention program is having impact and the schools are going to continue the program once CAGI has ended; our martial arts program involved over 2,000 youths annually with ‘tremendous’ feedback from teachers.”

As mentioned above, the unanimous message across all the sites was that CAGI had fostered new and important partnerships. There was variation across the sites in the number of

partnering agencies, in the various levels of government, and in the nature of challenges that emerged, but all mentioned the establishment of new partnerships as a central accomplishment. Many focused on the improved coordination of law enforcement partners (local, state, federal). Example comments included, “Our number one success is that we got everyone to play together; the new partnerships that were created among federal, state, and local agencies was the number one accomplishment; the funding allowed us to cultivate partnerships and we learned more about the various community programs; we have really built a strong partnership that has allowed us to better address the gang problem; four or five years since the launch of CAGI we have 40-50 people sitting at a monthly meeting.” An official from another jurisdiction made a similar point when stating, “our Executive Committee continues to meet monthly even though CAGI funding has ended.”

Other officials noted specific relationships and program components that arose through these partnerships. One official reported, “the police department now has a much closer relationship with the USAO and FBI and we believe this will continue after the grant ends.” Officials in one jurisdiction reported that they created a shared information system that included a pointer system for tracking cases across the region. In another site, officials noted that the coordination between the USAO and the county prosecutor was much improved and stated that “we had not had this type of coordination between our offices. We are following a smart prosecution model.” In another site officials noted that a local community center, the Safe Haven Center, in the target area was “an incredible partner” and provided office space for officers as well as after school and weekend activities for at-risk youths.

A number of CAGI officials commented on the partnerships established in prevention, intervention and reentry that had previously not existed. Some mentioned that the prevention and reentry programs represented new relationships for the USAO. For example, one official commented that CAGI resulted in “effective collaboration, not just law enforcement but wrap-around services” and another noted that “We had a good solid relationship with law enforcement through PSN and we were already doing aggressive enforcement. We built new relationships in the community through CAGI and we were able to fund a number of prevention and intervention programs. We really established great relationships with the service providers and community leaders.”

This appeared to be particularly true for reentry where there previously had been no real relationship with the DOC (from the perspective of the USAO and PD). The reentry program “established transition processes and a reentry court for re-entering offenders. This provided increased surveillance and services.” “A huge accomplishment was that we were able to transform our reentry program from a sole focus on adults to include a new focus on reentry for juveniles.” “We are now starting reentry centers with the Department of Corrections. These will be ‘portals’ of reentry. If we did not have CAGI we would have been ill-prepared to respond to the DOC.”

There appeared to be wide variation in terms of community engagement across the sites. In some locations, CAGI officials reported “a terrific response from the community” with strong participation in community town hall meetings and offender notification meetings. In contrast, officials in several sites reported a lack of reaction from the community to CAGI. Several sites noted concerns within the Hispanic community that cooperation with law enforcement would raise immigration enforcement issues.

In some sites the faith community was an important partner (“faith leaders were able to communicate that CAGI was more than just enforcement and prosecution”) but in others they did

not participate despite efforts of the CAGI task force to engage. One official commented, “We need to do more with the faith community. In the gang oppressed neighborhoods it is the clergy and the churches that are trying to work with the youths and their families.”

Finally, officials in several jurisdictions credited CAGI with generating a shared understanding of the gang problem. This was seen as particularly beneficial in those sites that reported that previously there had been denial of a gang problem among local leaders. One official stated, “We were able to get city leadership to recognize the problem of gangs which in turn resulted in new partnerships.”

Critical Components

CAGI officials also pointed to some common components necessary to make an initiative such as CAGI succeed. These included leadership, the involvement of the local police department and other key agencies, and regular meetings.

Leadership

Consistent with earlier findings in research on the implementation of PSN (McGarrell et al. 2010), CAGI officials acknowledged the importance of leadership from the agency heads of key partnering organizations. Many spoke about the critical role of the U.S. Attorney. The comment of one official, “The US Attorney played a critical role in bringing people to the table,” was echoed in nearly all the sites.

Having noted the importance of the U.S. Attorney, others also commented that other leaders were also critical and seemed to point to a “situational leadership” model where different leaders emerge depending on the time and the issue. For example, one official noted “the leadership of the US Attorney is critical but so is the leadership of various task force members who ‘step forward’ when appropriate and needed.” Similarly, an official in another site stated, “although the USAO can provide key leadership, ultimately local government and the police department are essential for long-term sustainability.” Another stated, “it is absolutely imperative to have local government and the police department on board. You need all the key decision-makers at the table. It can’t just be the U.S. Attorney.” Despite this importance, one distinguishing feature across the sites was the level of commitment and involvement of the police department. In some jurisdictions this differed over the course of the project depending on leadership within the police department and in several sites the commitment of the police department remained a challenging issue from the perspective of other CAGI partners.

You Must have the Police Department on Board (and other key partners)

In most sites the police department was a key lead agency. As just noted, however, in several sites other partners reported a lack of commitment on the part of the police department. One official stated that “the commitment and involvement of the police department is critical. Change in leadership or other organizational issues that emerge can either derail an initiative like CAGI or cause delay as new key partners come on board and need to learn about the goals, processes and activities of CAGI.” Another stated, “you cannot do things to the police department. You need strong commitment from the police department.” Another broadened the matter to include the local prosecutor by stating, “you must have the local police department and

the local prosecutor involved.” One of the causes for the perceived lack of police department commitment was the turnover of the chief of police that occurred in a number of sites.

Others noted that the need for commitment went beyond the police chief to include Mayors and other key agency heads. In some sites, the county district attorney did not participate. In other sites, however, cross-designating assistant district attorneys and providing funding to support the district attorney’s office created a strong partnership. Finally, in another site, turnover among school officials created problems in working with the schools.

Regular Meetings

Another source of variation across the sites was how they structured the task force and how frequently CAGI team members met. However, in virtually every site an official would talk about how important the CAGI meetings were. One official was characteristic of this point when noting that the “Monthly meetings and weekly subcommittee meetings were critical. The combination of measurable goals and monthly meetings were essential to keep us going.”

Lessons Learned

Time for Planning

One unanticipated theme emerged from the interviews conducted late in the CAGI implementation period. Several officials noted that their program would have benefitted from a planning period. The research team later posed this issue to officials in all sites and received a unanimous response that a planning period would have been beneficial. One official expressed this sentiment by stating, “We would have benefited by more time for strategic planning. We rushed to submit a proposal and then followed the model presented in the proposal. We would have benefited from initial funding to engage in strategic planning and partnership building and then implementing based on a strategic plan and additional funding.” Another noted that “you have to give it time to build the partnerships with the power structure, with local residents, and with service providers.”

One benefit predicted for a planning period was time to collect and analyze gang intelligence that would then inform strategy. For example, one official recommended to “make sure you have a handle on the nature of the gang problem before you develop strategy and begin to implement.” Another stated that “It would be interesting to consider a two stage process. The first would be a grant to do intelligence.” This would allow greater understanding of the nature of the gang problem as well as available resources. “Intelligence gathering is a critical step. Otherwise you are largely reactive and we wanted to move to proactive targeting.” The planning period was also viewed as an opportunity to engage the community and additional partners.

Although not specifically tied to a planning period, several officials suggested “it would be very helpful to have a process with the federal government that would support the integration and coordination of various funding streams into an overall strategy.”

Additional Key Players

Although it was not unanimous across sites, CAGI officials also pointed to the important role played by the project coordinator, media partner, and research partner.

Project Coordinator

Sites that had a dedicated CAGI coordinator reported that the coordinator played a critical role for strategic planning, coordination and implementation. As one official stated, “having a full-time project coordinator is critical.”

Media Partner

Most sites did not have a media partner but several built on the relationship with a media partner established in PSN. One official noted that in retrospect they would have engaged their media partner earlier in the process. “They have been extraordinarily helpful in getting information out to the community about what we are doing.” They have helped communicate to community partners and service providers and to clarify that CAGI is not just enforcement. In contrast, another CAGI site reported that their lack of funding for a media partner was a “real handicap.”

Research Partner

Similar to the media partner, those sites including a research partner tended to be quite positive toward the research partner role. Some of the representative comments included: “The research partner was able to put together a very useful analysis of the gang problem before we developed the strategy; the research partner was helpful in educating us about the nature of the gang problem; we are fortunate to have a great research partner. You need to find a research partner who will take an active role, continue to meet and get out in the community.” However, in at least one site it was reported that the “relationship with our research partner broke down.”

Additional Issues

Several additional issues were reported over at least several of the sites. Perhaps most common was the lack of gang crime data. Although police officials in Chicago and Los Angeles have a long history of identifying crime incidents involving gangs this proved to be the exception as the other sites were not able to utilize gang specific crime data for their own problem analysis, for reporting to DOJ, or for providing data to the MSU research team. The most common issue was that the police department relied on check boxes on the police incident reports to indicate a gang incident but reported that the boxes were used very sporadically and inconsistently across time and unit. Even in sites that reported gang incident data to DOJ, conversations with officials in the crime analysis unit would indicate that they did not consider the gang data to be consistently reported. In those sites that made collecting these data a CAGI priority, the data did not exist before the CAGI intervention date and/or for other parts of the city.

Indeed, data on gang homicides provided by the National Gang Center reinforce the finding about the lack of consistent and reliable measures of gang crime. As Table 12 indicates, fewer than half the CAGI jurisdictions were able to report gang homicides.¹⁵ Only Chicago, Los Angeles, Dallas, Raleigh, and Durham were able to provide any type of trend data. On a

¹⁵ This is consistent with national data that indicate that only about one- half of law enforcement agencies collect gang-crime data (National Youth Gang Center, 2009).

discouraging note, even after the significant level of funding provided by CAGI, there was no discernible improvement in these cities' ability to report gang homicides.

Table 12: Gang Homicides Reported to the National Gang Center

City	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Chicago, IL	257	246	166	190	206	169	229	266	256
Los Angeles, CA	350	259	293	260	300	228	167	157	161
Dallas, TX	14	24	35	NA	25	30	21	25	15
Raleigh, NC	0	1	0	9	6	4	14	9	3
Durham, NC	NA	11	15	10	6	12	10	3	5
Milwaukee, WI	NA	7	NA	2	3	5	NA	NA	10
Rochester, NY	NA	0	6	6	NA	NA	NA	9	12
Allentown, PA	0	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA	3	5
Oklahoma City, OK	13	20	15	NA	NA	9	NA	13	NA
Fort Worth, TX	NA	0	5	NA	8	6	NA	NA	NA
Tampa, FL	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	NA	NA	NA
Detroit, MI	NA	NA	NA	35	NA	10	NA	NA	NA
Cleveland, OH	1	NA	NA	NA	30	NA	NA	NA	NA
Bethlehem, PA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Easton, PA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Harrisburg, PA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Indianapolis, IN	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Lancaster, PA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Reading, PA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
York, PA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
# Cities Reporting	8	9	8	8	8	10	5	8	8

A similar challenge emerged in terms of identifying gang members in prison who would be returning to the target area. This related to both gang intelligence but more specifically to unreliable information about where the inmate planned to return. One official summed up these challenges by noting that “It is a real challenge to identify the gang involved returning inmates.” Many sites reported the poor quality of address information for returning inmates. They also noted the need to work with security threat analysts in prisons to identify gang members. Given these challenges, several of the sites worked with local jails as opposed to the state DOC.

Two other issues that were described in at least several sites included a perception that the prevention programs were not focused enough on the gang problem and a bureaucratic issue of getting federal funding through the local grant acceptance process. With respect to prevention, one official noted that “we spread ourselves too thin. We funded a large number of programs (16) but this made it difficult to assess impact.” In terms of the grant funding process, one official stated that “it took forever to get the grant appropriation through city council and the city government bureaucracy.”

Additional issues raised in several sites related to engaging the schools as well as community partners. In terms of the schools, although a number of sites were able to work with the schools as key partners, in many jurisdictions the schools would not participate. One official commented that “We beat on the door of the school system but they would not play.” Several reported that the school’s response was, “we don’t have gangs.”

Many of the sites reported very positive community feedback. The only negative feedback, reported in several jurisdictions, were from community leaders and institutions in areas outside the CAGI target area. They wanted CAGI in their neighborhoods. Several CAGI officials stated that they were able to at least partially address these concerns by pointing to data that suggested the high levels of gang crime and violence in the target areas.

Sustainability

In many of the sites task forces have continued to meet despite loss of funding but they raise concerns about being able to sustain their CAGI programs over time without new funding. Several officials noted that it would have been helpful to have guidance on how to sustain a program like CAGI once the grant funding ends. Officials commented, “Sustainability is going to be a disappointment. The relationships will sustain but it will be hard to retain focus and resources; we want to leverage what we have been doing but this is going to be difficult as funding dries up. This creates staffing issues and programs cut back. We have not been able to locate sufficient funding to sustain all of our efforts.” Others noted that they should have engaged the private sector and philanthropic community earlier so they would have seen program success and been more likely to provide ongoing funding.

One recommendation for sustainability related to using existing federal funding streams to fund successful pilot programs like CAGI. Specifically, a number of CAGI officials recommended that there be coordination of the various federal funding streams (justice, education, housing, labor, community development) that come into the community.

Finally, several officials felt that the engagement of many elements of the community would assist with sustainability. Several sites noted that because they were able to include critical community partners, some agencies (e.g., United Way) had adopted a gang focus that would live on after CAGI.

Recommendations

In addition to recommendations noted above, CAGI officials offered several specific suggestions for strengthening future federally-funded programs focused on preventing and reducing gang crime and violence.

Ensure all Federal Law Enforcement Partners are on the Same Page

In some sites, there were problems getting cooperation of some federal law enforcement partners. “It would be helpful if DOJ could work with the various federal law enforcement partners to ensure they are on the same page in terms of an initiative like CAGI.” In contrast, in other jurisdictions CAGI officials reported that they had excellent cooperation from federal law enforcement partners. The non-participating federal partners differed across the sites. For example, in one jurisdiction a CAGI official stated that “The FBI did not do a damn thing.” In

contrast, a CAGI official in another site stated “we have a great relationship with the FBI. This includes a monthly ‘top 20’ meeting where we identify the most chronic and violent offenders.” Similar positive and negative comments were offered about the participation of the DEA. This appeared to reflect varying priorities and perhaps demands on the local office. Another official praised several other federal agencies by stating “ATF, ICE and Marshal’s Service were our strongest federal partners.” Although there was an occasional complaint about a specific agency, all the sites were able to describe a good partnership with some federal law enforcement partners.

Similar recommendations were offered about better integrating the various DOJ initiatives occurring in a local community. For example, one official noted that “we did not do as good a job as we would have liked integrating all the various DOJ initiatives such as CAGI, PSN, Weed and Seed, and Project Safe Child” and recommended that this occur at the planning stage of initiatives like CAGI.

As noted earlier, CAGI officials reported that regular meetings and the task force structure were important for success. One official described their CAGI task force as being structured around “an executive committee that meets either quarterly or twice per year and then three subcommittees consisting of mid-level personnel that meet regularly.” Most of the sites were able to offer a similar type of structure and process for regular meetings.

CAGI officials recommended finding mechanisms to facilitate the sharing of information across sites. Several officials reported that they benefitted from learning from participants in other jurisdictions. For example, one noted that “we modeled an agreement with the school system on one that was developed in Cleveland.” At a minimum, these officials recommended regular teleconferences across the sites.

As noted above, officials considered reentry and school engagement as two major challenges. To address these issues they recommended that the reentry component have its own full-time coordinator and that school resource officers (SRO) be included in CAGI-like programs (one official noted that “SROs were very helpful in coordinating with the schools.”)

A final recommendation offered by several officials was increased flexibility in programming. One official stated, “we would benefit from greater flexibility in funding across the three program components. That would allow us to tailor CAGI to the local context.”

Impact on Violent Crime – Across City and Within City Trend Analyses

Introduction:

As noted in previous sections, one of the main challenges in the CAGI evaluation is that consistent data on gang crime are not available across cities. Thus, there is no straightforward way to measure CAGI impact on gang crime across cities. As a proxy for gang violence, we utilize citywide violent crime rates based upon prior research that has demonstrated a relationship between gang social networks and gang-driven activity with instances of homicide (Papachristos, 2009) as well as assaults and robberies (Jacobs and Wright, 1999; Topalli, Wright, and Fornango, 2002). The logic is that if CAGI is having an impact on gang crime then it should be reflected in trends in violent crime. Additionally, assessing the impact of a program such as CAGI requires a comparison group. Absent a comparison group there is no way to assess whether other factors are influencing the level of violent crime. If violent crime increases in CAGI cities, is it similar to, higher than or lower than the trend in other cities? Similarly, if violent crime decreases, is it a greater decrease than that observed in other cities?

Data and Methods

The data used to assess potential CAGI program impact were collected across multiple sources. In terms of examining changes in violent crime outcomes, we relied on Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) offense data made available by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that captured Type I violent crime incidents (i.e., homicides, rapes, robberies and aggravated assaults) between the years 2002-2009.¹⁶ We also collected citywide structural indicator data from the 2000 U.S. Census in order to capture static structural indicators measuring the demographic and population profiles for each site that may influence citywide levels of violence. Finally in order to obtain different indicators of CAGI dosage (i.e., level of implementation), we used data collected by the MSU research team as part of the CAGI evaluation. The primary data source was from survey of CAGI project coordinators conducted in June 2010. All of the site coordinators completed the survey. The results were compared with other sources of data including the sites' reports to the Department of Justice, site visits, and phone interviews that were conducted with the federal partners in each site in fall 2010. These multiple sources suggested that the coordinator responses in the June 2010 survey were consistent with other sources from the sites. These multiple data sources were culled in order to create both independent and dependent variables used in the subsequent regression-based statistical models.

Analytic Strategy

In order to assess whether the various CAGI strategies had a potential violent crime impact, we relied upon a panel-based (i.e., longitudinal) research design and applied growth

¹⁶ Given the limitation on the availability of gang data, we considered several alternative strategies. The first was to use gang homicide data. Unfortunately, as indicated in Table 12 the data were missing in well over half the cases for the CAGI cities. We did separate analyses using gun homicides as opposed to the violent crime outcome measure. Gun homicides do offer the advantage of being highly correlated with gang homicides at the city level (>.9). The results were substantively consistent with the findings presented herein.

curve models to violent crime trends using data from all U.S. cities that had a population greater than 100,000 ($n = 252$) according to the 2000 U.S. Census. Eleven large U.S. cities (pop > 100K) were the direct focus of CAGI implementation strategies. In addition, one specific site (the Pennsylvania Corridor located in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania) included seven cities whose population was less than 100,000 people. Thus, we added to our populated data all the cities in Pennsylvania whose population was greater than 50,000 people (total $n = 15$) and had comparable baseline (2000-2001) UCR violent crime rates. This approach provided violent crime data for 267 cities of which 18 sites were the direct target of CAGI. We relied upon Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (HGLM) to assess within- and between- city changes in violent crime between 2002 and 2009, using a Poisson sampling model and where the city population was treated as the exposure indicator to control for varying population sizes. In this case, the annual violent crime counts were treated as repeated measures nested within cities. Incorporating the exposure variable allowed us to interpret the outcome as a violent crime rate per 100,000 people (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).

Howell, Egley, and Gleason (2002) indicated that gangs forming after the late 1980s were substantively different from traditional gangs in areas where gang problems had been chronic and persistent. Later gang sites (see also Spergel and Curry, 1993) often involved younger networks of offenders, were linked to the rise in illicit drug trades, and were seemingly less structured than early onset gangs in chronic gang cities. However, there does not appear to be a major national shift in gang membership patterns for the longitudinal period examined here (years 2002-2009). Thus, following Allison (2009) we estimated the potential impact of CAGI on gang violence by using fixed effects estimation, which allowed us to control for unobserved heterogeneity, assuming it is constant over time, which may be correlated with unmeasured independent variables (i.e., uncontrolled time invariant influences). We also group centered the time-varying covariates at level 1 in an effort to provide an unbiased estimate of the effect of change between our independent variables and violent crimes *within* each city, which is the focus of the current study.

In addition, a series of dummy variables were included at level 1 in order to control for the annual random within-city changes in violent crime. Finally, we included two theoretically relevant and static social indicators shown to influence citywide violence rates at level 2: concentrated disadvantage and population density (Land, McCall, and Cohen, 1990). We ultimately used a two-level model that predicts *within*-city trajectories in violent crime at level 1 and *between*-city violent crime variation at level 2 using the predicted level 1 intercepts and slopes as outcomes (Hox, 2002). We used this multi-level approach to assess whether there was an observed relationship between CAGI implementation and violent crime, controlling for theoretically relevant indicators within- and between cities. Our regression-based analyses relied on both HLM computer software (version 6.02a; Raudenbush et al., 2004) as well as STATA software (version 11.0).

Dependent and Independent Variables

In order to assess the impact of the various CAGI intervention strategies, we used a composite violent crime count variable that was an aggregated measure of murder, robbery, and aggravated assault between 2002 and 2009 for the 267 cities described earlier in our sampling frame. The choice of the violent crime outcome measure reflected the fact that consistent gang crime data are not available across U.S. cities. Since Hierarchical General Linear Modeling

(HGLM) is flexible in handling missing data (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002:199-200) we did not impute missing values for missing observations. Complete data for this period of examination were available for over 98.1 percent of our observations (267 cities x 8 years = 2,136 observations).

Since this analysis was performed across multiple units of analysis (i.e., within and between cities), several independent variables were utilized across these multiple levels in the subsequent hierarchical regression models. We employed two structural measures at the city level: population density and concentrated disadvantage. Both measures are well established correlates of violent crime at the macro-level. Population density was operationalized as the number of people per square miles and was logged in order to reduce skewness. Concentrated disadvantage was a composite variable obtained from a principal components factor analysis that included the following highly inter-correlated measures: percent of families with children under 18 headed by a female, percent of persons below poverty, median family income, male unemployment rate (i.e. males 16 years old and above who are unemployed), and percent African American. The factor loadings for this measure (i.e. concentrated disadvantage) were all moderately strong ($> .65$) and 74.3 percent of the inter-correlation between these items was captured in this measure. Thus, the concentrated disadvantage measure used here is comparable to disadvantage measures that have been used in similar studies (Krivo and Peterson, 1996; Land et al., 1990).

Several time varying independent variables were used in this investigation. First, we included a measure denoting CAGI implementation *target sites* relative to all other cities. The regression models incorporated a city-specific time-varying post-intervention dummy variable that assumes value 1 from the year in which the CAGI law enforcement strategy was implemented beyond the initial “planning stages” according to survey responses from the districts (e.g., value = 0 from 2002-2006 and value = 1 for 2007-2009 for a CAGI site that started in 2007). In essence, the panel design is based upon a difference-in-difference approach where the average changes in violent crime in CAGI target cities are compared to the changes in violent crime from all remaining sites that were absent the intervention in a given year.

We also wanted to compare changes in violent crime rates across the different cities that may have corresponded with specific *components* of CAGI implementation. Based upon the multi-dimensional directives of the various programs, we used specific survey items administered to members from the different sites in order to create standardized scores for the quality and integration of *research*, the level of *law enforcement strategies* that have been implemented, and the level of *prevention* strategies that have been adopted within the different sites. The implementation categories and the specific measures were similar to the approach utilized in an assessment of the impact of Project Safe Neighborhoods (McGarrell et al. 2010). Table 13 provides specific item details for each standardized measure that comprised the different dosage elements of CAGI. We also note the reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) and principal components eigenfactor scores for each factor variable. In the case of the prevention index, we mean centered the item across all districts in order to make it a comparable standardized indicator variable. For the years of implementation within the target sites, we included the specific standardized independent variables that allowed us to compare whether violent crime changed the years when law enforcement, research, and prevention strategies were incorporated across the sites.

Table 13: Description of Specific CAGI Dosage Components

Measure	Indicator	Coding
Research Integration		
How satisfied are you with your research partner?	very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, somewhat satisfied, very satisfied	0-4
Has data analysis helped the task force focus on gang violence?	not really, somewhat, very much	0-2
To what extent is the research partner integrated into the task force?	Periphery, routine but not active, integral part of the project, active participation	0-4
<i>Cronbach's alpha (Research Integration) = .945</i>		
<i>Eigenvalue = 2.70</i>		
<i>% Variance = 90.19</i>		
Law Enforcement		
(1) Please indicate the law enforcement strategies employed as part of CAGI (summed index of all items):		
Increased federal prosecution of gang cases	no/yes	0-1
Increased state/local prosecution of gang cases	no/yes	0-1
Joint federal and state case screening of gang cases	no/yes	0-1
Directed patrols in CAGI target areas	no/yes	0-1
Most violent offender list	no/yes	0-1
Offender notification meetings	no/yes	0-1
Probation/parole home visits	no/yes	0-1
Comprehensive gun crime tracing	no/yes	0-1
Anti-gang ordinances	no/yes	0-1
Nuisance abatement	no/yes	0-1
Warrant services focused on gang members	no/yes	0-1
Potential item range		0-11
(2) Law enforcement partners involved in your CAGI initiative:		
ATF Violent Crime Impact	no/yes	0-1
FBI Safe Streets Task Forces	no/yes	0-1
DEA Mobile Enforcement Teams	no/yes	0-1
USMS Fugitive Task Forces	no/yes	0-1
ICE Community Shield Task Forces	no/yes	0-1

Local Police or Sheriff's Department	no/yes	0-1
	Potential item range	0-6

Cronbach's alpha (law enforcement) = .737

Eigenvalue = 1.59

% Variance = 79.68

Prevention Programs

(index was mean centered in order to standardize)

Please identify the prevention and intervention programs that have been employed as part of CAGI:

Outreach and education to juvenile groups	no/yes	0-1
Truancy strategies	no/yes	0-1
Clergy outreach	no/yes	0-1
Ex-offender outreach	no/yes	0-1
Employment programs	no/yes	0-1
Substance abuse programs	no/yes	0-1
Vocational training programs	no/yes	0-1
Education programs	no/yes	0-1
School-based programs	no/yes	0-1
Neighborhood development programs	no/yes	0-1
Youth street worker programs	no/yes	0-1
Hospital trauma center outreach	no/yes	0-1
Other (described)	no/yes	0-1
	Potential item range	0-13

In addition, we created a summary index measure that was designed to capture *overall dosage*, which was based upon the percentile distribution for each site across the three measures of implementation (research, law enforcement, and prevention). For each standardized measure, sites were designated as being relatively low (bottom 33%) medium (middle 33%) and high (remaining 34%). Non-targeted cities were always designated as 0 for this measure for the years 2002-2009. Each CAGI target city had the potential to range from the lowest overall dosage possible (3) to the highest overall dosage possible (9) depending on where they fell on the distribution for each measure. Finally, we added annual dummy variables to absorb year-to-year variation in violent crime rates for our period of examination (where 2002 was treated as the reference category). Table 14 provides the descriptive statistics for all measures included in our hierarchical panel-based regression models.

Table 14: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	S.D.	Minimum	Maximum
<u>Time-Varying Measures</u>				
Violent Incidents (DV)	2,401.3	5,225.2	53	62,150
Population (Exposure)	295,731	602,366	26,263	8,085,742
Target Site	0.025	0.158	0	1
Research Integration	-0.009	0.167	-1.18	1.07
Law Enforcement	-0.009	0.192	-1.53	1.58
Prevention	-0.009	0.192	-1.51	1.48
Overall Dosage	0.136	0.899	0	9
Year 2002	0.125	0.330	0	1
Year 2003	0.125	0.330	0	1
Year 2004	0.125	0.330	0	1
Year 2005	0.125	0.330	0	1
Year 2006	0.125	0.330	0	1
Year 2007	0.125	0.330	0	1
Year 2008	0.125	0.330	0	1
Year 2009	0.125	0.330	0	1
<u>Static Measures</u>				
Disadvantage	0.000	1.000	-2.463	2.843
Population Density (ln)	8.123	0.711	5.030	10.180

Results – Treatment and Multiple Dosage Measures

Figure 4 displays the average violent crime trends for the 267 cities examined, which are partitioned into CAGI (n = 18) and non-CAGI (n = 249) cities. Targeted cities averaged roughly 900 violent crimes per 100,000 population prior to the implementation of CAGI across the various implementation sites. Comparatively, non-CAGI sites seemingly experienced roughly 300 fewer violent crimes per 100,000 residents, which may have been the result of the fact that CAGI strategies were implemented in sites with a higher perceived risk of gang problems. This is suggested by the upswing in violent crime in targeted cities during the 2005-07 period. From a bivariate perspective, the ebbs and flows of violent crime appeared relatively similar between non-targeted and targeted cities.

Figure 4: Average Violent Crime Trends between 2002-2009 (Violent Crime Rate per 100,000)





Figure 5 shows the average violent crime trends for both treatment and non-treatment cities by partitioning treatment sites into three categories related to CAGI dosage: Low, Medium, and High. Interestingly, the vast majority of CAGI cities (55.5%) were self-classified as low dosage sites ($n = 10$), meaning that most locations fell in the lower percentiles for the majority (i.e., $2/3$) of the implementation measures. The small number of medium dosage CAGI sites ($n = 4$) appeared to experience the largest variability in violent crime rates, particularly for years 2004-2009. Finally, the nearly 28% of high CAGI dosage cities ($n = 5$) had the highest level of violent crimes per 100,000, indicating the highest level of dosage appeared to correspond with sites where violent crime rates were the highest prior to program implementation. The medium and high dosage CAGI target cities appeared to experience a much more significant increase and then decline in violent crime when contrasted with low dosage and non-CAGI cities.

Figure 5: Violent Crime Rates in U.S. Cities by CAGI Dosage Designation



We next used HGLM growth curve models to assess whether there was a potential CAGI intervention effect on violent crime trends, net of other theoretically and empirically relevant factors related to violent crime changes over time.

Growth Curve Models: Treatment and Multiple Component CAGI Dosage Levels

Table 15 provides the multivariate regression-based statistics for the variables included in the conditional growth curve models. This table presents a series of regression models (Models 1-5) that estimate the potential impact of the various CAGI intervention strategies on citywide violence after controlling for annual shifts in violent crime (denoted by the annual dummy variables where 2002 was the reference year) as well as citywide levels of disadvantage and population structure.


Model 1a provides the summary statistics for difference-in-difference estimates in violent crime rates comparing CAGI cities relative to the changes in violent crime rates in non-CAGI sites over the same period (2002-2009) after implementation. While the *target site* coefficient was negative indicating the violent crime rate per 100,000 people declined in CAGI cities relative to non-CAGI cities, the estimated effect did not meet a threshold of statistical significance ($B = -0.195$, $S.E. = 0.132$, $p = .140$).

In Model 2a, we substitute target city identification with the standardized measure of *research integration* in an effort to assess the relationship that higher levels of research integration with a specific focus on gang problems has with potential changes in violent crime rates. Though not statistically significant, the increased use of research integration in CAGI sites corresponded with positive shifts (i.e., increases) in violent crime rates ($B = 0.191$, $S.E. = 0.128$, $p = .137$). It seems unlikely that research integration would cause an increase in violent crime,

but it is plausible that as violent crime rates increased within CAGI cities, the reliance and usage of data corresponded with these types of peaks in violence.

Model 3a examines the relationship between both the level and diversity of *law enforcement* strategies (combined into a single factor score) that were specifically crafted as part of CAGI implementation with changes in citywide violent crime rates relative to non-CAGI cities. Model 3a indicates that there was an immediate and statistically significant reduction of roughly 15.3% in the number of violent crimes per 100,000 among CAGI sites the same year where additional law enforcement-driven approaches were implemented, and where sites had more extensive partnerships with a higher range of agencies ($B = -0.166$, S.E., 0.066, $p = .010$). Figure 6 displays the visual relationship between level of CAGI law enforcement and changes in violent crime rates comparing high enforcement sites (i.e., the 5 districts that ranked in the upper quartile of law enforcement strategies) with remaining CAGI cities, and non-CAGI sites.

Figure 6: Law Enforcement Implementation Ranking and Changes in Violent Crime Rates



Model 4a indicates that violent crime rates decreased a very modest amount (i.e., less than 1%) in sites that implemented (relatively) more prevention-based programs, though this effect did not approach statistical significance. Finally, the purpose of Model 5a was to examine whether there was a significant overall CAGI dosage effect on violent crime, and the results indicated that overall implementation did not appear to correspond with any such changes. Thus, to this point the only significant effect observed across any model was the decline in violence that correlated with the increase in law enforcement strategies and partnerships. The remaining models indicated that the other components of CAGI implementation did not correlate with any significant changes in violent crime rates across targeted areas.

Table 15: Conditional Fixed-Effects Poisson Model of Violent Crime Rates in Full Sample of U.S. Cities between 2002 and 2009(Examining Impact of CAGI Implementation Strategies)

	Model 1a		Model 2a		Model 3a		Model 4a		Model 5a	
Fixed Effects (n = 2,136)	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Time-Varying Measures (Level 1)										
Target Site	-0.195	0.132	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Research Integration	--	--	0.191	0.128	--	--	--	--	--	--
Law Enforcement	--	--	--	--	-0.166*	0.066	--	--	--	--
Prevention	--	--	--	--	--	--	-0.008	0.005	--	--
Overall Dosage	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	-0.024	0.019
Control Measures										
Year 2003	-0.048**	0.010	-0.048**	0.010	-0.048**	0.010	-0.048**	0.010	-0.048**	0.010
Year 2004	-0.076**	0.016	-0.076**	0.017	-0.076**	0.017	-0.076**	0.016	-0.076**	0.016
Year 2005	-0.055 ⁺	0.032	-0.055	0.034	-0.055	0.034	-0.055	0.033	-0.055 ⁺	0.032
Year 2006	-0.019	0.029	-0.030	0.032	-0.029	0.039	-0.029	0.037	-0.026	0.031
Year 2007	-0.036	0.030	-0.051	0.035	-0.052	0.042	-0.052	0.040	-0.055	0.032
Year 2008	-0.051 ⁺	0.030	-0.071 ⁺	0.036	-0.074 ⁺	0.043	-0.074 ⁺	0.041	-0.059 ⁺	0.032
Year 2009	-0.121**	0.031	-0.141**	0.039	-0.142**	0.046	-0.142**	0.044	-0.129**	0.035
Static Measures (Level 2)										
Disadvantage	0.501**	0.032	0.502**	0.025	0.051**	0.025	0.501	0.302	0.501	0.032
Population Density (ln)	-0.064	0.046	-0.083 ⁺	0.042	-0.083 ⁺	0.042	-0.067	0.046	-0.064	0.046

**p < .01, *p < .05, ⁺ p < .10.

2002 is reference year

267 cities x 8 years of data = 2,136 observations

Propensity Score Matching and Analysis

It is important to note that fixed effects hierarchical regression analyses that are designed to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the models also assume that the unobserved factors that might lead to program selectivity are time-invariant (i.e., static) rather than dynamic neighborhood structural and social characteristics. To minimize the concern that CAGI sites were likely inherently different than all remaining large U.S. cities that were used as a counterfactual comparison group, we used propensity score matching (nearest-neighbor analysis with replacement) to match the CAGI target cities with a more restricted and seemingly similar comparison group of non-targeted cities on important structural indicators shown to correspond with levels of citywide violence over time (Land et al., 1990). Table 16 shows the pre- and post-matching t-tests, corresponding p-values, and the standardized bias statistic which represents the mean difference as a percentage of the average standard deviation between the groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). In the matched sample, most p-values are higher than .05 (except for percentage of homeowners among selected cities), and the majority of bias statistics are less than 20.0 (i.e., a general ‘rule of thumb’ used to attain ‘balanced groups’ for comparison). Thus, this restricted comparison group gives us the opportunity to assess whether changes in the trends in violence were different between CAGI cities with those cities most compatible as a similar comparison group on the structural indicators that are most likely to influence citywide violent crime rates.

Table 16: Balancing Targeted CAGI Cities with Non-Target Cities through Nearest Neighbor Propensity Score Matching

	Unmatched sample (n = 267)				Matched sample (n = 34)			
	CAGI	Control	P	Bias	CAGI	Control	P	Bias
Pop. density	4857.6	4277.6	0.048	19.5	4857.6	5581.3	.179	14.3
Pct. non-white	41.51	35.66	<.001	37.4	41.51	37.74	.069	22.8
Median income	33594	41867	<.001	87.9	33594	34480	.185	9.4
Pct. in poverty	19.27	14.80	<.001	79.1	19.27	19.11	.772	2.8
Pct. HS grads	73.91	79.20	<.001	62.5	73.91	71.41	.021	24.7
Pct. homeowners	49.52	56.69	<.001	77.3	49.52	49.20	.734	3.5

Figure 7 indicates that the matched case-control approach provided cities that were most likely to have extremely similar violent crime rates to CAGI sites early in the past decade (i.e., 2002-2005), but also show evidence that CAGI target cities experienced a relative surge in violent crime that was not experienced in the comparison group of cities, at least in years 2006-2008. As the previous decade closed, the cities’ average violent crime rates began to more closely resemble one-another (i.e., roughly 860 violent incidents per 100,000 population).

Figure 7: Violent Crime Rate Comparison on Matched Case-Control Cities




Table 17 shows the hierarchical regression results comparing changes in violent crime rates in CAGI target cities relative to the restricted sample of matched control cities. Model 1b indicates that target cities experienced a decline after CAGI implementation relative to non-targeted control cities, but the effect was not statistically significant ($B = -0.097$, S.E., 0.126, $p = .443$). Model 2b indicates that the use of research integration in CAGI sites correlated with a moderately significant increase in violence ($B = 0.162$, S.E., 0.093, $p = .082$). Ultimately the analyses reveal that satisfaction with the research partner, data usage, and integration of the research partner significantly corresponded with the timing where increases in violent crime rates occurred after the CAGI intervention period began. Model 3b illustrates there was a statically significant reduction in violent crime rates ($B = 0.142$, S.E., 0.069, $p = .041$) in CAGI target cities relative to non-target cities that correlated with the enhanced use of law enforcement approaches (and partnerships) designed to deal specifically with gang violence, net of measures capturing annual shocks in violence, citywide levels of disadvantage and population density, and fixed effects estimates controlling for unobserved model heterogeneity. Model 4b and 5b provide little support that prevention strategies or overall CAGI dosage implementation (i.e., research, law enforcement, and prevention strategies combined) directly and significantly corresponded with changes in violent crime rates over the period examined here.

Table 17: Conditional Fixed-Effects Poisson Model of Violent Crime Rates in the Restricted Sample of U.S. Cities between 2002 and 2009(Examining Impact of CAGI Implementation Strategies)

	Model 1b		Model 2b		Model 3b		Model 4b		Model 5b	
Fixed Effects (n = 272)	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Time-Varying Measures (Level 1)										
Target Site	-0.097	0.126	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Research Integration	--	--	0.162⁺	0.093	--	--	--	--	--	--
Law Enforcement	--	--	--	--	-0.142*	0.069	--	--	--	--
Prevention	--	--	--	--	--	--	-0.040	0.069	--	--
Overall Dosage	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	-0.005	0.014
Control Measures										
Year 2003	-0.053**	0.009	-0.053**	0.009	-0.053**	0.009	-0.053**	0.009	-0.053**	0.009
Year 2004	-0.122**	0.019	-0.122**	0.019	-0.122**	0.019	-0.122**	0.019	-0.122**	0.019
Year 2005	-0.182*	0.073	-0.182*	0.073	-0.182*	0.073	-0.182*	0.073	-0.182*	0.073
Year 2006	-0.150**	0.041	-0.156**	0.041	-0.159**	0.083	-0.150**	0.083	-0.174**	0.064
Year 2007	-0.172**	0.043	-0.199**	0.043	-0.207**	0.091	-0.160 ⁺	0.092	-0.203**	0.066
Year 2008	-0.200**	0.045	-0.224**	0.045	-0.238**	0.094	-0.238*	0.094	-0.234**	0.067
Year 2009	-0.314**	0.044	-0.333**	0.044	-0.344**	0.105	-0.345**	0.105	-0.348**	0.079
Static Measures (Level 2)										
Disadvantage	0.133**	0.032	0.133**	0.041	0.134**	0.032	0.134**	0.039	0.134**	0.032
Population Density (ln)	-0.001**	0.000	-0.001**	0.000	-0.001**	0.000	-0.001**	0.000	-0.001**	0.000

**p < .01, *p < .05, ⁺ p < .10.

2002 is reference year

34 cities x 8 years of data = 272 observations

Supplemental Analyses

Federal Prosecution Analyses

Given that the hierarchical regression panel-based regression models provided evidence of a potential relationship between the utility of law enforcement strategies on reduced violent crime rates, we thought it was important to similarly examine whether a prosecution-based impact may have been evident as well. All U.S. cities (i.e., CAGI sites and non-CAGI sites) are located within larger federal districts – and thus the use of federal prosecution data to compare target area trends to non-target area trends would violate the assumption of statistical independence. Thus, we selected only the 18 CAGI cities for the prosecution-based analyses. The purpose of these analyses was to assess whether there was a relationship with violent crime trends in CAGI sites that corresponded with the changes in district-level federal prosecution rates between years 2002-2009.

Similar to the lack of gang crime incident data, there are not uniform measures of gang prosecution at either the state or federal levels. The CAGI task forces reported federal and local gang prosecutions but the data were very incomplete and inconsistently reported across the sites. Consequently, given the connection between the national CAGI and PSN initiatives, and reports from CAGI officials that federal gun prosecutions were an effective and utilized tool in CAGI gang enforcement, federal prosecution of gun crimes (section 922 and 923 prosecutions in the federal judicial system) were used as a proxy indicator of federal prosecution of gang crimes.

Federal prosecution data capturing the annual number of *defendants* as well as the number of *cases* filed at the district level were incorporated into the city level models. In order to control for the varying population sizes of the U.S. districts (which ranged from as low as 1,200,000 total population to over 17,000,000 total population among the 18 CAGI cities according to 2000 U.S. Census data), we standardized district-level prosecutions into district-based rates (i.e., the percentage of federal defendants per 100,000 district population and the percentage of cases per 100,000 total district population). We ran distinct regression models on violent crime rates for each of the 18 CAGI cities. We captured the immediate and lagged covariance structure between the percentage of federal defendants and changes in CAGI city violent crime rates, and the percentage of federal cases filed with the changes in CAGI city violent crime rates.

Fixed effects (i.e., annual dummy measures for each city as well as each year) were also estimated in all regressions again to control for unobserved heterogeneity not accounted for in the models. We also examined federal prosecution lagged effects, which measured the relationship between the previous year's prosecution numbers on the current year's violent crime rate (i.e., $Y_t = X_{t-1}$). Table 18 indicates that there was a strong significant negative correlation between the CAGI targeted cities violent crime rate and the immediate (i.e., the same year) increase in federal prosecutions over time – for both measures of percentage of cases filed ($B = -.0010$, $SE .003$, $p < .01$) and the percentage of defendants ($B = -0.008$, $SE .002$, $p < .01$) at the district-level, again controlling for unobserved heterogeneity using fixed-effects estimation. The models also independently indicate the potential lagged effect that federal prosecutions may have on the CAGI cities next year's violent crime rate average. The lagged effects for both models were strongly statistically significant ($p < .001$) indicating there was a very strong relationship between the district's rate of federal cases filed and defendants prosecuted and a reduction in the next year's violent crime rate. Thus, while the effect of federal prosecutions may have had a

strong significant influence on that year's violent crime rate, the effects appear to be stronger in the lagged models.


Table 18: The Effects of Federal Prosecution on Violent Crime Rates across CAGI Sites

Measure	B	S.E.	Z	P
Instantaneous effect				
Federal defendants	-0.008	.002	3.01	.003
Federal cases	-0.010	.003	3.02	.003
Lagged effect				
Federal defendants	-0.010	.001	6.88	<.001
Federal cases	-0.012	.001	8.03	<.001

Annual (8 years – 1) and location (18 sites – 1) fixed-effects estimated but not displayed


In order to visually display these potential bivariate federal prosecution effects, we rank ordered the 18 CAGI target sites in terms of their increase in the percentage of federal cases filed and defendants prosecuted between pre/post intervention (note: the intervention was standardized for the specific year of program onset for each site). Figure 8 shows the average violent crime change for the sites listed in the highest quartile (i.e., the greatest relative increases in the percentage of federal cases filed between pre/post intervention) for the 18 CAGI cities. Interestingly, both the highest and lowest prosecutions sites had very similar onset violent crime rates. In addition, the cities in the middle quartiles, which were located in districts that either experienced nil to minimal increases in federal prosecutions, had the lowest violent crime rates among all CAGI cities. Perhaps most importantly, it is evident that the cities with the highest increases in the percentage of federal cases filed had a substantive divergence in the average number of violent crimes per 100,000 city population, which corresponded with many of the CAGI sites onset year (i.e., in 2007). That is, though the low and high federal prosecution sites had very similar violent crime rates before CAGI, the high prosecution cities had substantial and statistically significant declines in the years following CAGI implementation.

Figure 8: Relationship between the Percentage of Federal Cases Filed and the Change in Violent Crime Rates among CAGI Cities



We also wanted to examine whether the relationship between the change in the percentage of federal defendants prosecuted corresponded with changes in violent crime rates among CAGI sites. Figure 9 shows that there was a steady linear reduction among the CAGI cities that were housed in districts that had the highest pre/post intervention rate increase in federal defendants prosecuted between 2002-2009. However, the indication that there was a linear trend in the violent crime rate among the high defendant rate prosecution sties may suggest the effects of prosecuting defendants may not have been immediate and abrupt, but rather were more likely to be gradual and permanent.

Figure 9: Relationship between the Percentage of Federal Defendants Prosecuted and the Change in Violent Crime Rates among CAGI Cities



Thus, there is suggestive evidence that increases in federal firearms prosecutions corresponds with a reduction in citywide violent crime rates in those sites that are the direct target of program implementation that focus on gang and gun violence. In addition, these results are strongly consistent with findings of the impact of PSN federal gun prosecutions on violent crime (McGarrell et al. 2010). Taken together, there appears to be continued support for the potential of a prosecution-driven program effect.

Within Select City Time Series Analyses

Several CAGI sites implemented focused gang violence reduction strategies in specified locations at discrete points in time. Specifically, Cleveland, Dallas, Milwaukee, Oklahoma City, and Rochester all had well-defined target areas that suggested analysis of the trend in crime within these target areas.¹⁷ Using the aggregated UCR Type I violent incidents outcome in a monthly format, we wanted to estimate the potential impact of the different strategic interventions on violence levels within specific areas within these cities. Table 19 displays the results of the Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) time series estimates that display the estimated change in violent crime in the post-intervention period relative to the pre-

¹⁷ Chicago and Detroit were not included because they were in the last round of CAGI funding and did not provide a comparable follow-up period. Tampa and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania employed regional and multi-city programs that precluded this type of small-area analysis. Los Angeles had a well-defined target area but it was part of a citywide gang prevention and control initiative and thus there was not a comparison area. The final two cities, Durham and Raleigh, do offer target areas. Efforts are currently underway to secure data from these two cities to allow for their inclusion in this component of the evaluation.

intervention period, controlling for potential temporal autocorrelation (McCleary and Hay, 1980). All ARIMA models displayed here met the appropriate statistical assumptions, including an examination of residuals at key lags (as evidenced by non-significant Q-statistics). Each pre/post intervention period is contingent upon the totality of the data examined as well as when the specific interventions unfolded, which are displayed for each site in the table. In addition, some violent incident outcomes are logged (Ln) when needed as a means to compress the outcome distribution's high variability in order to remain stationary (i.e., an assumption of ARIMA modeling).

Officials in Cleveland (OH) focused their specific CAGI efforts in two broad target areas: Slavic Village / Garden Valley and St. Clair / Superior areas. Using the law enforcement post-intervention date of April 2006, we found that the trends in violent crime declined by roughly 16.5% within the target areas (combined) and this decline approached (though did not reach) marginal statistical significance ($p = .13$). Comparatively, violent crime in the remainder of Cleveland was very stable between the pre- and post-intervention periods ($p = .97$). Thus, the decline in violence appeared to be confined to the specific CAGI targeted areas within Cleveland.¹⁸

In Dallas (TX), officials focused their CAGI efforts in South Dallas, Pleasant Grove, and North Oak Hill areas (i.e., prior 'weed and seed' sites in the city) beginning in November 2006 (i.e., the beginning of the post-intervention period). The time series results indicated that violent incidents in the targeted areas significantly declined ($p < .01$) by roughly 25.3% in the post-intervention period relative to the pre-intervention period, controlling for serial autocorrelation between monthly observations.¹⁹ As a comparison and as a way to control for the fact a general crime trend may have occurred in Dallas during this same period, we estimated a change in the monthly number of violent crime incidents by aggregating the monthly number of violent incidents in the remainder of Dallas (i.e., the citywide total – target area total). Similarly, violent crime incidents in the remainder of the city significantly declined ($p < .01$) by 22.2% in the post-intervention period relative to the pre-intervention period. Thus, it was possible that the entire city was experiencing an overall general violent crime decline during the period, which was observed in both the target areas as well as the remainder of the city. However, further investigation in Dallas indicated the majority of comparison sites were designated as "target area action grid" (TAAG) areas that experienced intensive police saturation as a way to control violent crime. Thus, it is plausible that there was a potential diffusion of policing benefits to a number of targeted areas (i.e., both CAGI sites and TAAG sites). Given that some prior research on gang violence reduction such as in Boston (Braga et al., 2001) and Indianapolis (McGarrell et al., 2006) indicated a potential citywide impact on violence when focusing on high-risk gang members in specific contexts, the latter explanation has precedence within the literature.

In Milwaukee (WI), the team directed their CAGI efforts in two distinct police patrol areas (i.e., D2 and D5) beginning in January 2007. We aggregated the total number of violent incidents for both beats into a single target area, and conducted pre/post time series analyses on the trend in violence within these areas. The results indicated there was an abrupt, immediate,

¹⁸ In Chapter Two we reported much larger percentage declines in homicide, aggravated assaults and robberies in the target areas. The distinction is that those declines reported the raw decline in absolute number of crime incidents. The results reported here as part of the ARIMA analyses are adjusted figures that control for factors that can influence crime trends such as pre-existing trends and seasonal patterns.

¹⁹ Since the outcome was logged, the percentage decline was calculated as follows: $\text{Exp}(B) - 1 = \text{Percentage Change}$. Thus, $\text{Exp}(-.292) - 1 = 0.746 - 1.0 = -25.3\%$.

and permanent shift that approached statistical significance ($p < .10$) showing that violence declined in the target area by roughly 21.1% after the series of CAGI strategies began in the designated high-risk gang areas.

In Oklahoma City (OK), CAGI task force members focused their efforts in a specific target zone within the city. Again, ARIMA estimates were obtained as a way to test whether the strategy had a significant influence on levels of violence within the target area. However, results indicated that while target area violent incidents did decline by roughly 3.5 between pre- and post-intervention periods, this zero-order transfer (i.e., instantaneous) effect was not statistically significant ($p = .147$). In addition, and similar to earlier approaches we also measured the same UCR violence crime incidents for the remainder of Oklahoma City to assess whether a general trend may have been responsible for shifts in violent incidents in the targeted areas, and the results indicated there was no real significant trend in violence across the remainder of the city.

Finally, we modeled within city changes in violence in Rochester (NY) to assess whether there was a local change in UCR violent incidents in the specific targeted areas. In Rochester, the targeted areas were operationalized as Core Crescent Police Service Areas (PSAs), which comprised roughly one-half of the PSAs in the city (i.e., 10/22). The non-Core Crescent areas were aggregated into a single comparison unit in order to serve as a statistical counterfactual. Core Crescent PSA violence approached a marginally significant ($p = .107$) decline of roughly 13.1% after December 2007 (i.e., the period when Rochester law enforcement began directing their efforts in the Core areas). Comparatively, the rest of the city experienced roughly half the decline in violence (i.e., roughly 7.3% in total), which did not approach statistical significance ($p = .347$). Thus, in Rochester the results appear to indicate that violence dropped in the targeted PSAs at nearly double the rate (i.e., 14% decline compared to 7% decline) of the change in the remainder of the city after the post-intervention period.

Table 19: Time Series Violent Crime Estimates across Specific CAGI Sites

	Pre- Intervention Mean	Post- Intervention Mean	Mean Difference (Post-Pre)	ARIMA Model*			Intervention Coefficient (S.E.)	p- value
				P	D	q		
(1) Cleveland, OH.[†] Data Range: 1/05 – 7/11								
Post-intervention period: 4/06 – 7/11								
T.A.								
Violent Incidents (Ln)	4.73	4.53	-0.20	1	0	0	-.180 (.119)	.132
R.C.								
Violent Incidents (Ln)	5.99	5.98	-0.01	1	0	0	-.028 (.105)	.978
(2) Dallas, TX. Data Range: 1/07 – 12/09								
Post-intervention period: 11/06 – 12/09								
T.A.								
Violent Incidents (Ln)	5.04	4.72	-0.32	1	0	0	-.292 (.072)	<.01
R.C.								
Violent Incidents (Ln)	6.15	5.88	-0.27	1	0	0	-.252 (.055)	<.01
(3) Milwaukee, WI: Data Range: 1/06 – 10/09								
Post-intervention period: 1/07 – 10/09								
T.A.								
Violent Incidents (Ln)	3.31	3.08	-0.23	2	0	0	-.238 (.145)	.098
(4) Oklahoma City, OK. Data Range: 1/07 – 12/10								
Post-intervention period: 11/08 – 12/10								
T.A.								
Violent Incidents	53.4	49.9	-3.52	0	0	0	-3.56 (2.46)	.147
R. C.								
Violent Incidents (Ln)	6.59	6.53	-0.06	1	0	0	-.041 (.053)	.446

(5) Rochester, NY. ⁺⁺ Data Range: 1/04 – 6/11

Post-intervention period: 12/07 – 6/11

T.A.

Violent Incidents (Ln)	4.72	4.55	-0.17	2	0	0	-.141 (.087)	.107
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R.C.

Violent Incidents (Ln)	4.27	4.18	-0.09	2	0	0	-.076 (.081)	.347
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* All models Q – statistics > .05 at key lags

⁺ UCR Violent Outcome = Aggravated Assaults and Robberies

⁺⁺ UCR Violent Outcome = Homicides, Assaults, and Robberies

T.A. = Target Area

R.C. = Remainder of City

Chapter Six

Conclusions

Summary

CAGI represented a significant investment by the DOJ as well as by the local, state, federal law enforcement partners, social service providers, community groups and other stakeholders involved in the local CAGI task forces. The question arises, was it a good investment?

From the perspective of CAGI task force officials, the answer was an unqualified yes. There was near unanimity among officials that the partnerships created through CAGI and the increased understanding of and focus on gangs and gang crime had increased local capacity to address the issue of gangs and gang crime and violence. These officials emphasized the convening power of the U.S. Attorney's Office as well as the resources available through CAGI funding and through the network of agencies and services involved in CAGI. Although implementation was uneven across all the sites, all reported that they were better prepared to address issues related to gangs than was the case prior to CAGI.

The findings from the impact analysis were not as consistent as the reports from CAGI officials but they tend toward a conclusion that CAGI had an impact on violent crime, at least where there was aggressive implementation of enforcement strategies focused on gangs. As noted in the prior chapter, the within city analyses pointed to violent crime reductions in the five cities for which data were available. However, these findings were the most ambiguous because they sometimes did not meet statistical significance or there were similar reductions throughout the city.

The cross-city comparisons including measures of enforcement were the most compelling. Overall, the CAGI cities experienced a greater decline than all other U.S. cities although this difference was not statistically significant and thus may have been due to chance. Once levels of enforcement implementation were considered, however, the decline was significant and suggested an approximate 15 percent decline in violent crime for those CAGI cities with high levels of enforcement. This was consistent whether using the self-reported measures of the variety of enforcement strategies and partners or the level of federal prosecution of gun crime. It was also true when comparing the CAGI cities to all U.S. cities or with a comparison group based on similar pre-intervention levels of violent crime and related characteristics (propensity).

It was beyond the scope of the analysis to conduct a full-blown cost-benefit analysis. However, a crude assessment suggested CAGI may have been a good investment of public funds. Cleveland and Dallas were two sites that were rated high on the level of enforcement measures. They also had well defined target areas and they provided trend data on homicides within their target areas. Table 20 presents the trends in homicides for their target areas.

Table 20 Estimates of Savings Related to Homicide Reduction in CAGI Target Areas, Cleveland and Dallas

	Dallas CAGI Area Homicides	Cleveland CAGI Area Homicides
2002	21	NA
2003	25	NA
2004	22	NA
2005	26	26
2006	11	30
2007	21	23
2008	14	24
2009	15	18
2010	NA	12
Estimated Annual Reduction*	-6.5	-8
Tangible Costs of Homicide**	\$1,030,000	\$1,030,000
Total Costs of Homicide**	\$2,940,000	\$2,940,000
Estimated Tangible Savings	\$6,695,000	\$8,240,000
Estimated Total Savings	\$19,110,000	\$23,520,000
Combined Tangible Savings	\$14,935,000	
Combined Total Savings	\$42,630,000	

***Simple annual average comparison of pre-intervention (2002-2007 for Dallas; 2005-2007 for Cleveland) and post-intervention (2008-09 for Dallas; 2008-2010 for Cleveland)**

**** Costs of homicide are based on research by Miller, Cohen and Wierema (1996).**

Both sites implemented the three CAGI components during 2007. Thus, 2008 represented the first year of full implementation for the full year. For Dallas we compared the average number of homicides in 2008-09 with the prior period for which data were available (2002-2007). For Cleveland the data were available only for 2005-2007 in terms of pre-intervention but they were available for an additional year (2010). The estimates of the costs of crime were based on research conducted in the 1990s (Miller, Cohen and Wiersema, 1996) and are thus underestimates of current costs. If the reduction of an average of 14.5 homicides in these two jurisdictions is considered a reasonable estimate of CAGI impact on homicide, then the programs clearly paid for themselves. Tangible cost savings, based on victim costs related to medical expenses and lost productivity, are estimated at just over \$1 million per incident. Intangible costs include pain, suffering and risk of loss of life. When added to the tangible costs these produce an estimated cost of a homicide being just under \$3 million per incident. In addition to the inflation factor, these are likely underestimates because they do not include the criminal justice system costs associated with the offenders involved in these homicides. With these considerations in mind, the reduction of 14.5 homicides in the CAGI target areas of these two cities generated an estimated \$14.9 million (tangible costs) to \$42.6 million (total costs) in savings. This for an investment of \$5 million in these two cities. If additional crime reductions

were also produced, and if these reductions were sustained over time, the savings would be even greater.

Given that Cleveland and Dallas were among the high enforcement sites, and given that not all of the other sites had as high a level of homicides, it is unlikely that all the other sites attained similar savings. However, there was no evidence of an increase in homicide and violent crime in the other sites. Thus, even if none of the other sites had the type of impact as observed in these two cities, the annual savings in these two sites likely exceeded the amount DOJ invested in all 12 CAGI sites.

Recommendations and Implications

In 1995 and again in 2006, Klein and Klein and Maxson published major books on gangs and gang crime and decried the paucity of strong evaluations of gang prevention and control programs. The CAGI program comes on the heels of several significant gang intervention programs (e.g., Gang Reduction Program, Safe Futures) yet the findings are consistent and not satisfying. Implementation challenges are significant and many jurisdictions are unable to provide consistent and reliable data on gang crime and gang enforcement. Many of these problems were noted by the practitioners involved in CAGI. They offered the recommendation that funding for programs like CAGI include a planning phase to allow for data collection and partnership building. An associated recommendation would involve training and technical assistance to support capacity building in the area of strategic planning and data collection processes and systems. The OJP-funded National Gang Center and National Youth Gang Center offer valuable resources for strategic planning in relation to the Comprehensive Gang Model and these resources would be valuable in association with the recommended planning phase. Even with better planning, improved evaluations are unlikely to occur absent improvements in data collection processes. OJP could make funding contingent on demonstrated capacity to report gang crime and gang enforcement data (e.g., perhaps demonstrated through annual reporting to the National Youth Gang Center and/or through auditing of Supplemental Homicide Reports for gang data). An alternative might be to provide funding for someone at the local level who would be responsible for reporting consistent and reliable data using common definitions and protocols.²⁰

Despite these qualifications, it is worth noting that the findings in this study are quite consistent with those observed in an earlier study of Project Safe Neighborhoods (McGarrell et al., 2010). When implemented with sufficient intensity, at least with respect to enforcement and targeted federal gun prosecution, it appears that initiatives such as CAGI can have an impact on levels of violent crime. Although there is too much “noise” and a lack of specificity in the measures of enforcement to clearly address causal mechanisms, the findings seem to be consistent with an impact based on very focused and targeted enforcement (Kennedy, 2009; Klotas, Hipple, and McGarrell, 2010). As opposed to general deterrence models that seek to increase criminal penalties for a wide variety of criminal offenses, the enforcement strategies in PSN and CAGI were much more specific in terms of gun crime (PSN) and gang crime (CAGI). This may have a greater impact on perceived deterrence (Wright et al. 2004) and the federal prosecution component may have a selective incapacitation effect on high impact individuals

²⁰ Even here challenges will emerge absence basic capacity building in information systems and processes. Our impression was that all the CAGI sites made significant efforts to provide performance measures but the problems emerged due to critical measures simply not be collected by the participating agencies.

(see the “power few” concept; Sherman, 2007). To the extent these enforcement strategies focused on high gang crime and hotspot locations, as was apparent in a number of CAGI sites, they are also consistent with place-based strategies that have shown effectiveness in reducing crime (Weisburd, 2008). To the extent that not all of the sites followed such a focused intervention strategy, the suggestion from the local CAGI officials that future funding follow a two-phased process of 1) problem analysis, intelligence gathering and planning, and 2) implementation, seems to be suggested in the varying results across the sites (see also Cahill and Hayeslip, 2010)..

The findings with respect to prevention, reentry, and the overall composite measure of implementation are not as clear-cut. The finding that the measures of prevention implementation were not related to violence reduction is probably not surprising for several reasons. First, if these prevention programs do have an impact it is likely only going to be observed in the long-term. Second, although most of the sites borrowed from the Spergel and OJJPD models of gang prevention, the programs were extremely varied and may or may not have been suggested by evidence-based practice (see, the Office of Justice Programs’ Crime Solutions resource page, <http://www.crimesolutions.gov/default.aspx>). Third, the measures utilized herein were based on whether prevention programs were offered. They do not provide measures of the integrity, intensity, and fidelity of the various programs.

Similarly, the impact of the reentry programs is unknown. Most of the sites had difficulty implementing their reentry programs and it was often not until 2010-2011 that the programs approached their target numbers of clients served. Thus, it was unlikely to relate to the trend in violence measured in the current evaluation.

Although the Spergel et al. study (1994) remains promising in terms of the impact of the comprehensive model on gang crime and violence, and a recent gang reduction study similarly offers promise as to the impact of comprehensive gang prevention, intervention and suppression (Cahill and Hayeslip, 2010), the current study does not clarify the impact of the prevention and reentry components on community-level trends in violent crime. Having said this, it was clear from the responses of CAGI officials that they supported the comprehensive CAGI model in contrast to suppression alone. This may suggest the benefits accruing to legitimacy and perceptions of justice (Tyler, 1990) when enforcement is coupled with prevention, intervention, and reentry.

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APPENDIX 1– Site Summaries

Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative – Site Summary Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Context:

The CAGI initiative in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is a regional initiative covering what is known as the “222 Corridor.” The 222 Corridor refers to Pennsylvania Route 222 that connects the cities in this region of over two million people. The initiative focuses on seven cities and six counties in the Eastern and Middle Districts of Pennsylvania. The seven cities include Easton, Bethlehem, Allentown, Reading, Lancaster, York, and Harrisburg. These cities are the smallest sized of the various CAGI jurisdictions ranging from just over 100,000 population (Allentown) to just over 20,000 (Bethlehem) with a total population of nearly 400,000 across the seven cities. As Table 2 (Chapter One) indicates, there is considerable variation across the seven cities in terms of the crime rate. For example, the violent crime rate ranges from 222.9 violent crimes per 100,000 in Bethlehem to 1,690 per 100,000 in Harrisburg. Indeed, the Harrisburg rate in 2006 was the highest among all the CAGI jurisdictions. Reading, Lancaster, and Allentown also had high violent crime rates in 2006.

Task Force:

The CAGI task force includes officials from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies throughout this region and includes the police departments of the seven cities as well as the Phillipsburg Police Department in New Jersey. In addition to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the district attorneys’ offices of Northampton, Lehigh, Berks, Lancaster, York, and Dauphin Counties are represented. Federal law enforcement agencies include ATF, DEA, FBI, and ICE.

Overall Coordination - The 222 Corridor Coordinating Committee

Overall coordination of the CAGI initiative is provided by the 222 Corridor Coordinating Committee (CCC). The 222 CCC meets every other month and oversees and coordinates the efforts of the two regional task forces. The committee includes members of each of the six police departments, the five District Attorneys’ Offices, the Pennsylvania State Police, federal law enforcement, and three analysts from the ATF, the FBI, and the Pennsylvania State Police. The analysts assess and evaluate crime information and intelligence data from the regional task forces to assist in developing strategies to attack gangs and gang members.

Problem Analysis

The CAGI task force built on insights gathered from the district’s PSN program that took a similar regional approach. In planning for CAGI, task force officials wanted to respond to a concern of law enforcement officials that reported increased gang activity

in the participating cities. The belief was that the proximity to the major urban centers of Baltimore, New York City, and Philadelphia was resulting in the emergence of gangs and gang crimes in these smaller cities. Increased enforcement in the large cities was seen as leading gangs involved in drug distribution and violent crime to locate in these smaller cities with fewer law enforcement resources and less experience in gang enforcement. The comprehensive anti-gang model was considered the most promising response to this diffusion of gangs to these smaller cities.

To support local problem analysis, the 222 CCC included crime analysts from PSP, ATF, and FBI. These analysts support the local law enforcement task forces. One of the challenges in providing a systematic analysis of gang crime throughout the district is that local law enforcement often does not capture gang-crime data and use varied definitions of gang crime. Rather than presenting trends of gang crime throughout the district, the analysts focused on supporting gang suppression activities by providing gang intelligence.

In addition to the work of the crime analysts, CAGI officials worked with state Department of Corrections and local county jail officials to develop their reentry initiative. Initial discussions with DOC revealed that it would be difficult to locate a concentrated group of gang involved inmates who would be returning to the 222 Corridor. Rather, these individuals would be scattered throughout various DOC facilities. Both state and county corrections officials believed, however, that there were sufficient numbers of gang-involved inmates serving local sentences in the county jails. Focusing on four of these jails was considered to be the most efficient approach to identifying and working with gang-involved inmates who would be returning to target cities.

Gang Reduction Strategies:

Law Enforcement

The initial main focus of law enforcement was to establish a structure for federal, state, and local law enforcement to work together efficiently and to share information effectively. To best utilize existing federal resources, the 222 Corridor was bisected. The cities in the Lehigh Valley on the eastern half, including Easton, Bethlehem and Allentown (and Phillipsburg, New Jersey), are part of the Lehigh Valley Violent Anti-Gang Task Force (LVVGTF), which is coordinated by the FBI. In the western half of the 222 Corridor, ATF coordinates a task force that includes Reading, Lancaster, York, and eventually Harrisburg. Presently, the western task force includes two separate city task forces in Lancaster and Reading.

During the course of the initiative the task force members met on a monthly basis. A major accomplishment was the development of a 222 Corridor website and server that provided a warehouse for data, crime mapping capability, and shared communication across the region.

The Lehigh Valley Anti-Gang Task Force

The law enforcement effort in the eastern half of the 222 Corridor, known as the Lehigh Valley Anti-Gang Task Force (LVAGTF), includes the Easton, Bethlehem, and Allentown Police Departments, the Northampton and Lehigh County District Attorneys' Offices, the Pennsylvania State Police, and the FBI, DEA, and ATF and other law enforcement agencies. In addition, because gang violence spills east along Route 222 over the Delaware River from Easton into Phillipsburg, New Jersey, the task force includes the Phillipsburg Police Department and the Warren County, New Jersey District Attorney's Office. The FBI is coordinating the efforts of the LVAGTF, which is located in the FBI office in Allentown. There was also coordination with DEA during CAGI and through the end of 2008, DEA had arrested more than 170 defendants in the first two years of CAGI.

The ATF Western 222 Corridor Anti-Gang Task Force

The law enforcement effort in the western half of the 222 Corridor includes the Reading, Lancaster, York, and Harrisburg Police Departments, the Berks, Lancaster, York, and Harrisburg County District Attorneys' Offices, the Pennsylvania State Police and the FBI, DEA, and ATF and other law enforcement agencies. The ATF is coordinating the efforts of the western 222 task force.

The 222 Corridor Coordinating Committee

The 222 Corridor Coordinating Committee, meets every other month, to oversee and coordinate the efforts of the two regional task forces. The committee includes members of each of the six police departments, the five District Attorneys' Offices, the Pennsylvania State Police, federal law enforcement, and three analysts from the ATF, the FBI, and the Pennsylvania State Police to evaluate crime information and intelligence data from the regional task forces to assist in developing strategies to attack gangs and gang members.

Notable Cases – Eastern District of Pennsylvania

The Lehigh Valley Anti-Gang Task Force - EDPA

Task force officials noted that while there were a number of smaller indictments returned during the CAGI initiative, there were two sets of major indictments in the Lehigh Valley. The first involved the Sean Rogers Crack Cocaine Gang. This involved a two-year investigation, including wiretaps, of crack cocaine dealers in Easton, Pennsylvania. Twenty-six defendants were indicted federally and charged with conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine with eight others charged by the Northampton County District Attorney's Office. The defendants included members of the "Bloods" gang operating in the Easton area and the charges included possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The street value of the drugs that were distributed were conservatively estimated at being worth more than a million dollars. The second

major operation resulted in indictments of twenty-three defendants in December of 2008, including ten Latin King and Blood gang members. The charges included drug trafficking and firearms offenses in and around Allentown.

The West - EDPA

Several major gang investigations also were completed in the western half of the 222 Corridor. One involved the so-called Plowden Drug Trafficking Organization that operated in the Lancaster area. This group was shown to have connections to drug trafficking organizations in Texas and was largely involved in processing cocaine and selling crack cocaine in the Lancaster area. The investigation resulted in indictments of seven defendants.

Several other gang members were convicted of serious charges including one charged with committing more than 15 armed bank and Hobbs Act robberies in the Middle and Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Another gang prosecution involved two defendants who shot and critically wounded a seven-year old girl in Lancaster during a drug turf war.

Notable Cases - The Middle District of Pennsylvania

Several cases of suspected gang members were successfully prosecuted in federal court in the middle district of Pennsylvania. Four individuals were convicted of committing several home invasions, robberies of convenience stores, and carjackings in Maryland, New York, and the York, Pennsylvania area. These cases, that seemed to reflect the regional nature of the gang problem, resulted in significant sentences.

The second case also reflected the regional nature of the gang problem in this district. In this case, five members of a Philadelphia-based heroin trafficking gang pled guilty to federal charges stemming from their involvement in a conspiracy to distribute heroin that was laced with the powerful anesthetic fentanyl. These individuals were shown to be the source of supply to various dealers in Harrisburg, and that was connected to several deaths.

Prevention

The former U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the leadership of the CAGI initiative, were committed to a comprehensive gang initiative that would combine the above-described suppression with prevention and reentry. Early on in the initiative, the U.S. Attorney requested that the mayors of the five 222 Corridor cities in the Eastern District establish a gang prevention task force, that would include members of government, law enforcement, and community and faith-based leaders. Additionally, officials in York, in the Middle District, also established a prevention task force and began working with the other cities in the 222 Corridor. Each prevention task force developed plans for the use of grant funds and oversaw the implementation of those plans. Activities have included engaging parents in gang prevention efforts, forming a mentoring partnership to help leverage funding and provide consistent recruitment, training and resources for the region. The task forces also conducted a comprehensive

school gang survey and created a resource website to provide information about all phases of the 222 Corridor initiative. The overarching goal of the Prevention Task Forces is to prevent young people from joining gangs.

Prevention Activities

Task force prevention activities have followed a “community prevention” model based on creating prevention networks involving federal, state, local government, school districts, non-profits, community residents, youth, and faith-based groups. A key focus has been increasing community awareness of gang activity in the target communities and consequently sharing information and developing prevention programs.

Task force funding for prevention was distributed across this prevention network (see Table 21). Each of the task forces made efforts to mobilize existing resources and services and to use CAGI funding to support what were believed to be effective programs, to fund new activities, and to leverage these existing resources. A regional gang prevention steering committee meets quarterly to share ideas, report on activities, and plan regional activities.

Table 21 Allocation of CAGI Prevention Funding

Prevention Task Forces	CAGI Funding
Allentown	\$200,000
Lancaster	\$200,000
Reading	\$200,000
Easton	\$140,000
Bethlehem	\$100,000
York	\$40,000
Administrative Costs*	\$120,000
Total	\$1,000,000

*Includes salary of CAGI Prevention Coordinator

The task forces operating in each city followed some common steps. All held community meetings to raise awareness, provide information about the gang problem, describe the task force, and provide information for community and individual participation in prevention activities. All included in-school, after-school, and community prevention components. Among the programs developed were mentoring, big brothers and sisters, gang resistance education (GREAT and GRIPE), athletic programs, truancy and parenting programs. Lancaster’s prevention task force coordinated with law enforcement officials to implement the High Point, North Carolina Drug Market Intervention program to provide alternatives to incarceration for lower level drug dealers. CAGI officials report that more than 140 collaborative partnerships were formed and more than 10,000 youth and adults were directly served by CAGI prevention programs.

Some of the notable prevention activities reported by the CAGI task force include:

- Community forums on gangs and gang prevention throughout the district.
- Mayor’s forum.

- The Reading Task Force implemented a risk-based pilot program in a Middle School.
- The Lancaster prevention task force sponsored GRIPE Training that was provided by the East Coast Gang Investigators Association.
- The York Task Force contracted for a county wide Gang Assessment to assess the prevalence of gang crime in York County along with an inventory of existing gang prevention and intervention programs.
- A major gang survey was conducted in Reading.
- CAGI sponsored a large group (N= 28) to travel to High Point, NC to learn about their violence and drug market reduction strategies.
- More than 50 anti-gang programs were offered throughout the 6 cities in the Corridor.
- The Regional Mentoring Partnership was created to serve as a clearinghouse for mentoring programs.

Reentry

Originally, the CAGI initiative planned to work with the Pennsylvania Department of Correction to implement a reentry program within the prison system with follow-up in the community. This was later revised when it was discovered that gang involved inmates returning to the 222 Corridor area were scattered throughout institutions across the state. Further analysis, however, revealed that gang members routinely re-entered the 222 Corridor from the four county prisons in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Jail authorities estimate that approximately 10 percent of their population, or 120 to 130 individuals in each county, are gang-affiliated with additional gang recruitment occurring within the jails.

Consequently, the 222 Corridor reentry program focused primarily on gang members inside the Berks, Lancaster, Lehigh, and Northampton county jails. Jail officials, working with probation officers, identify gang involved inmates as candidates for the program. One of the accomplishments within the jails was the development of reentry identification cards for inmates who do not have other forms of identification.

The CAGI program involves two reentry case managers who manage caseloads targeted at 25 per county. In summer 2010, CAGI officials reported a total of 94 reentry clients that were relatively evenly divided across the four counties. A key function of the reentry case managers involves outreach to various services within each county. These have included mentoring programs and work with human resource managers with the goal of developing job opportunities. Similar services include drug and alcohol treatment, housing, and cognitive decision-making. The case managers are complemented by probation officers who provide intensive supervision for CAGI clients.

One of the more innovative programs developed through CAGI is known as the “outmate” program. This program was developed to handle technical parole violations without incarcerating the violator. The client resides at a Community Corrections Center and agrees to participate in programming. The goal is to ensure accountability for the violation, provide services that may assist the gang-involved offender from re-offending, and reduce the strain on jail resources.

Outcomes:

The most consistently reported finding from CAGI officials is the development of new partnerships and relationships across the region. As one official stated, CAGI has resulted in “unprecedented collaboration among law enforcement throughout seven cities and six counties along the 222 Corridor in the Eastern and Middle Districts of Pennsylvania.” Another official stated “our number one success is that we got everyone to play together.” Task force officials report over 170 partners and over 12,000 individuals touched by CAGI services.

One of the goals of the suppression component was to increase the federal and state prosecution of gang members. The data reported by the CAGI task force indicated this goal was achieved, at least at the federal level. Federal gang prosecutions increased from 28 in 2006 to 39, 80, and 82 in 2007, 2008, and 2009 respectively. Unfortunately, local prosecutors were not able to provide gang-specific information on state prosecutions.

The CAGI task force reviews crime data from the various CAGI target cities. Specifically, the task force reviews murder, robbery, aggravated assault, drug offenses, and firearms offenses. Gang-specific data are not available from the participating jurisdictions. CAGI officials reported declines across the cities in most crime categories but did not have an evaluation strategy to assess the likelihood that the reductions were due to CAGI.

The Lancaster school district developed a truancy program through CAGI and reported a 15 percent reduction in truancy.

Challenges

CAGI officials reported several key challenges. One of the goals of CAGI was to improve information sharing about gangs and the gang problem across the region. This was addressed through regular meetings as well as the development of a CAGI website. However, the CAGI task force found that a considerable obstacle to information sharing were concerns about sharing intelligence information due to restrictions imposed by the Pennsylvania Criminal History Records Information Act.

An additional challenge, observed in all CAGI sites, was the limited opportunity for employment as well as housing for CAGI reentry clients. Finally, although CAGI officials were able to leverage some local resources to extend some anti-gang programming (e.g., weed and seed; Berks County reentry funding), the end of federal CAGI funding resulted in the end of the full initiative.

Figure 10: Gang Crime Problem and CAGI Strategies, Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Problem	Overall Strategy	Specific Components	
Serious gang members committing crime throughout region	Incapacitate & deter	Regional enforcement task forces; sharing of gang intelligence	USAO commitment to federal prosecution; joint prosecution screening
Youth becoming involved in gangs	Prevention	Prevention task forces in target cities	After-school programs; gang awareness and education
Gang involved inmates returning from jails	Reentry Services	Coordination with four county jails; case managers	Coordinate local services with case management approach; intensive probation services

Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative – Site Summary

Southern District of Indiana - Indianapolis

Context:

The Southern District of Indiana selected Indianapolis as its target area for the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative (CAGI). Indianapolis is a city with a population of about 800,000 people (FBI UCR, 2006). Indianapolis experienced major delays in implementing their CAGI initiative. In January 2007, the Marion County Sheriff's Department and the Indianapolis Police Department merged to form the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD). Control of this agency was given to the elected Sheriff. In November 2007, a political shift in the Mayor's office occurred in Marion County. The new Mayor was elected in part on a campaign promise to realign the newly merged police department under the mayor's office. The election resulted in the realignment of IMPD. These major organizational shifts created delay in implementing CAGI.

Another significant obstacle, consistent with a number of other sites, was that the City has struggled to quantify the scope of its gang-crime problem. This was the result of a dearth of accessible information and/or actionable intelligence on gangs in Indianapolis. It was recognized that IMPD did not consistently track criminal activity as gang-related or not gang-related. The police department relied on officers in the field to identify gang-related criminal activity through a check box on their incident reports. Police officials, however, reported that there was variation over time and across police districts in the use of the check box gang reports.

According to the site, gangs in Indianapolis did not appear to be as territorial as observed in other metropolitan areas. Indianapolis gangs are mobile, engaging in criminal activity throughout the city and county. This increased the difficulty of concentrating law enforcement resources in specific areas of the city to the exclusion of others. To begin identifying a target area within Indianapolis, the Crime Prevention and Reentry Subcommittees identified faith-based and community organizations and schools with whom the subcommittees could potentially partner. Juvenile Court and Department of Corrections provided assistance by identifying youth probationers or offenders who would benefit from grant-funded programs. The subcommittees also considered the existence of Weed & Seed programs to identify their target area. Both subcommittees decided to set their boundaries based on Indianapolis five area zip codes. This area has been indicated in yellow on the target area map (See Figure 11).

The Law Enforcement Subcommittee sought to identify a smaller area for their activities. They identified potential target areas based upon an analysis of crime statistics gathered by the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD), who plotted a three-year history of homicides, aggravated assaults, and burglaries in Marion County. Areas dense in these crimes were selected using police beats as boundaries. Beats selected for enforcement efforts are Northwest District 21, 24, and 33; Southwest District beats 11 and 12; and Northeast District beats 21, 22, 23, 24, and 51. These police beats are indicated on the target area map in blue; where they overlap prevention and reentry

efforts, they appear green. The target area of the Law Enforcement Subcommittee was essentially a sub-set of the larger target area used for prevention and reentry activities.

Task Force

Through collaboration between the United States Attorney's Office, City of Indianapolis / Marion County, and the Indiana Criminal Justice Institute, a Steering Committee and three subcommittees were formed to plan and execute activities in Indianapolis in line with the Attorney General's Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative. The CAGI Steering Committee is comprised of representatives from the following agencies:

1. United States Attorney's Office IN SD
2. City of Indianapolis Mayor's Office
3. Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department
4. Marion County Prosecutor's Office
5. Shrewsbury and Associates
6. Vida Nueva United Methodist Church
7. Project Safe Neighborhoods
8. Westside Community Ministries

In addition to the Steering Committee three subcommittees oversaw grant activities and made funding recommendations to the Steering Committee. The focus of the committees included Crime Prevention, Law Enforcement, and Reentry; each subcommittee was co-chaired by representatives from the United States Attorney's Office and the City of Indianapolis/Marion County.

There was some overlap between the CAGI Steering Committee and the PSN Steering Committee. The two committee co-chairs for CAGI also served on the PSN Steering Committee. Additionally, one community representative and an IMPD representative served on both steering committees. The Indiana Criminal Justice Institute served as the fiscal agent for CAGI and Indiana University/Purdue University School of Public and Environmental affairs served as the Research Partner.

Problem Analysis:

As previously mentioned, Indianapolis struggled to quantify and qualify the nature of its gang problem. Consequently, the CAGI committee relied on street intelligence as well as crime mapping focused on patterns of violent crime. For the reentry program, IDOC officials used intelligence to identify gang involved offenders.

Strategies:

Law Enforcement/Suppression

Indianapolis used joint federal and local screening of gang cases, directed patrols and field interrogations in the CAGI target areas, most violent offender lists, probation

and parole home visits and comprehensive gun tracing as part of their CAGI law enforcement strategies. Local law enforcement were the key enforcement agencies.

As part of their prevention/intervention efforts, Indianapolis employed outreach and education to juvenile groups, truancy strategies although this was not direct programming, employment, substance abuse, and education programs, school-based prevention programs, and youth street worker programs.

Prevention/Intervention

The prevention/intervention partners included community based representative such as: Forest Manor Multi-Service Center, Christamore House, and Hawthorne Community Center. These programs emphasized the problems and issues raised by juvenile gang involvement, gun violence, escalating number of juvenile homicides. They addressed these issues by stressing anti-gang solutions that included community activism and pride, life skills, college preparation and teaching employable skills for teens, developing positive social networks; connecting youth to their community through community service; and reducing the risk of recidivism

School based programming was represented by the Peace Learning Center. Its initiative provides elementary aged youth programs on Youth Education and Prevention; School Staff and Parent Outreach; and ACT Out Ensemble. Learning Program for elementary, middle and high school youth provided an intensive gang prevention effort by blending conflict resolution and diversity skills with challenge education to promote personal responsibility for success.

Juvenile Probation programs represented by the Indiana Juvenile Justice Task Force (AIM Program) and NOAH (Neighbors Organized to Assist Humanity, Inc. provide programming that are part of mandatory probation requirements from the Marion Superior Court, Juvenile Division and address issues of individualized life plans and addressing ways to avoid gang related activities and negative peer pressure.

Reentry

The Indianapolis CAGI Reentry Initiative targeted adults 19-35 years old, formerly incarcerated individuals with ties to gangs, who were returning to CAGI, targeted high crime areas (i.e. Zip code areas of 46201, 46208, 46218, 46222, and 46224) within Marion County, Indianapolis, Indiana. The program was designed to serve 100 participants (50 on each side of the city) between the ages of 19-35. Potential CAGI participants were identified based on parole and probation staff recommendations that took into account gang identifiers, age, target zip codes, and gang risk. The selection process involved CAGI staff, Marion County Superior Court Transition Court, parole and probation officers, and the targeted offender.

After being selected, the offender was immediately partnered with one of CAGI's primary providers – Forest Manor Multi-Service Center (east side of town) or Bethlehem House (west side of town) – to provide reentry services. These services included case management, one-on-one counseling, educational training, mental health counseling, job readiness services, housing, drug testing and transportation.

In addition to services, CAGI also provided an accountability component to its reentry initiative. Participants were required to participate in bi-weekly court appearance through the Transitions (reentry) Court.

The Center for Criminal Justice Research (CCJR), part of the Indiana University Public Policy Institute, was engaged to serve as the CAGI research partner. The primary objective of the reentry evaluation was to assess the effectiveness of CAGI programs to reduce recidivism among gang involved or at risk participants by examining the following:


1. Change over time within individual CAGI reentry participants in criminal/gang activity, employment, substance abuse, and housing; and
2. CAGI reentry participants compared to a relevant comparison group.

In order to conduct a program assessment, CCJR required participant-level information including demographic indicators, criminal history, program intervention, results, and new offense data. CCJR researchers have worked closely with CAGI staff to identify key variables and develop a mechanism to collect comprehensive participant-level information. The data for the analysis were currently being gathered from a number of sources, including parole and probation officers, the Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC), offender pre-sentencing investigation (PSI) reports, CAGI reentry program providers and case managers, and the court.

Outcomes:

Indianapolis officials reported several accomplishments that built capacity for addressing gangs and associated crime and violence. The first was creating greater shared understanding of the gang issue and the nature of gang crime in the city. CAGI officials reported that a major accomplishment of CAGI was the establishment of a reentry court. Relatedly, they created “one stop shops” for reentry services in two parts of the city. They are seeking sources of funding to continue these activities following the end of CAGI funding.

Figure 11: Map of target areas



Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative – Site Summary

Central District of California – Los Angeles

There are four federal judicial districts in the State of California: the Northern, Eastern, Central, and Southern Districts (see Figure 12). The Central District is the largest of the four districts in terms of population and persons per square mile. While only 7 of the 58 counties in the State of California fall under the jurisdiction of the Central District, 51 percent (18,433,324) of the total population (as of 2006) in the state (36,457,549) reside in the district. The population density is roughly 461 persons per square mile, which is roughly twice the California average of 234 persons per square mile. In terms of race and ethnicity, 48 percent of the district residents are non-Hispanic white, with roughly 52 percent of the District population reporting a minority racial or ethnic status. In order of total population size, 42 percent of the district's residents are of Hispanic or Latino origin, 11 percent are of Asian descent, and seven percent are black, while all other races and ethnicities represent less than two percent of the total population, respectively.

The largest city in the district, and location of the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative, is the city of Los Angeles. Los Angeles is the second largest city in the United States, with an estimated 2006 population of 3,749,058 residents (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Of the district, 20 percent of the population resides within the city limits of Los Angeles. Racially, Los Angeles is predominately white (49.5%), followed by 10.4 percent of the population who report being of Asian descent, 9.9 percent of black heritage, while 26.5 percent of the population reports being some other race; all other racial groups are less than 3 percent of the total population, individually (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Ethnically, 48.4 percent of the population reported Hispanic or Latino heritage.

In addition to the city of Los Angeles, there were 34 cities in the Central District with populations above 100,000 in 2006, which reflects the metropolitan nature of the district's total population. Specifically, only two of the seven counties that make up the district do not have a city with a population greater than 100,000 residents (i.e., San Luis Obispo County and Santa Barbara County). In comparison, Los Angeles County has 16 cities with populations over 100,000, while Orange County has eight, Riverside County has three, San Bernardino County has four, and Ventura County has four.

Violent crime rates in the Central District differ substantively across the cities with greater than 250,000 residents (see Table 22). Overall violent crime rates per 100,000 residents varied from a low of 455.21 in the city of Anaheim, to a high of 786.86 in the city of Los Angeles in 2006. As for murder and non-negligent manslaughter, Anaheim reported the lowest overall rate at 2.99 per 100,000 residents, while Los Angeles reported the highest overall rate at 12.37. Overall, Los Angeles recorded 85 percent (n = 480) of the total number of murders in the Central District of California (n = 568) in 2006. All cities in the Central District of California listed in Table 22 were below the national average for cities over 250,000 residents in both the total violent crime rate (936.7) and murder and non-negligent manslaughter rate (13.1).

Figure 12: Federal Districts in California



Table 21. : Violent Crime in the Central District of California by Cities Above 250,000 Residents in 2006

Cities with greater than 250,000 pop.	Population	Violent crime	Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	Forcible rape	Robbery	Aggravated assault
Los Angeles	3,879,455	30,526	480	1,059	14,353	14,634
<i>rate per 100,000</i>		<i>786.86</i>	<i>12.37</i>	<i>27.30</i>	<i>369.97</i>	<i>377.22</i>
Long Beach	478,283	3,420	41	134	1,440	1,805
<i>rate per 100,000</i>		<i>715.06</i>	<i>8.57</i>	<i>28.02</i>	<i>301.08</i>	<i>377.39</i>
Anaheim	334,792	1,524	10	107	584	823
<i>rate per 100,000</i>		<i>455.21</i>	<i>2.99</i>	<i>31.96</i>	<i>174.44</i>	<i>245.82</i>
Santa Ana	343,433	1,998	26	73	787	1,112
<i>rate per 100,000</i>		<i>581.77</i>	<i>7.57</i>	<i>21.26</i>	<i>229.16</i>	<i>323.79</i>
Riverside	292,698	2,014	11	83	814	1,106
<i>rate per 100,000</i>		<i>688.08</i>	<i>3.76</i>	<i>28.36</i>	<i>278.10</i>	<i>377.86</i>

source: Crime in the United States, 2006: Table 8, California, Offenses Known to Law Enforcement by State by City, 2006 (http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table_10_ca.html)

Nature of the Gang Problem in Los Angeles

The city of Los Angeles has a long history of documented street gang activity; easily dating back to the 1930s (Klein, 1971). Popular media images have made historical Los Angeles gang names such as bloods and crips common identifiers for gangs throughout the United States and even in Europe (see e.g., Decker and Van Winkle, 1996; Klein, Kerner, Maxson, and Weitekamp, 2001). Given the long history of street gangs in Los Angeles, many of these groups have become so entrenched in local neighborhoods that membership is intergenerational. As of 2005, the year before implementation of the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative (CAGI), there were an estimated 463 gangs and 38,974 gang members in the city of Los Angeles [see table 23] (LAPD, 2005). Of these gangs, 246 are described as “Hispanic,” while 113 were designated as “Crip” and 45 as “Blood” affiliated (LAPD, 2005).

Table 23.

Table 2: Estimated Number of Gangs and Gang Members in the City of Los Angeles, 2005

Gangs	Number	Membership
Hispanic	246	21,790
Crip	113	10,792
Blood	45	4,416
Asian	32	839
Stoner	16	537
White	11	600
Totals:	463	38,974

Table is re-created from data reported by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD, 2005).

The Los Angeles Police Department has documented gang crime in their local jurisdiction for some time, and thus one is able to examine trends in gang violence over time

using police data.²¹ Table 24 provides the number of gang crimes in the city of Los Angeles by violent crime type, as well as the total number of gang related incidents—both violent and property—in the Southeast Area of Los Angeles where the CAGI was implemented. In the five years prior to the implementation of CAGI (2001-2005), the number of gang homicides in the city of Los Angeles declined from roughly 350 in 2001 and 2002 to 244 in 2005. Similar declines can also be found for aggravated (felony) assault and rape, while there was no clear trend in robbery and carjacking over this same period of time. In the reporting area wherein the CAGI was implemented starting in 2006, the total number of gang related crimes declined from a high of 1,132 in 2002 to 532 in 2005. Overall, while gang crime was on the decline in both the city of Los Angeles and in the reporting area targeted by the CAGI prior to implementation of the program, the sheer number of gangs, gang members, and gang crimes in the city demonstrates the extent of the gang problem in Los Angeles.

Table 24.

Table 3: Trends in Violent Gang Crime in Los Angeles and the Target Area, 2001-2008

Year	Los Angeles City Totals					Southeast Area Totals
	Aggravated Homicide	Aggravated Assault	Aggravated Rape	Aggravated Robbery ¹	Aggravated Carjacking	
2001	346	3500	58	2745	143	1020
2002	350	3430	65	2808	209	1132
2003	259	3063	37	3274	211	723
2004	291	2616	36	2308	118	654
2005	244	2620	32	2015	146	532
2006	272	2877	37	2515	170	657
2007	220	3324	38	2556	163	571
2008	167	2830	40	2568	111	617

note: Numbers represent Los Angeles Police Department internal data sources yearly totals ending December 31st of each year.

¹ Excludes Carjacking

Development and Initial Implementation of CAGI

Targeted street gang interventions are not new to the city of Los Angeles, as Klein (1971) detailed such intervention strategies as far back as the 1960s. The CAGI represents one in a long line of targeted interventions used in Los Angeles, and focused on an area with a documented gang problem in the Southeastern portion of the city referred to as Watts. Of particular interest for the intervention were three public housing developments: Imperial Courts, Jordan Downs, and Nickerson Gardens. These housing complexes are home to three notorious local gangs—the Grape Street Crips in Jordan Downs, the Bounty Hunter Bloods in Nickerson Gardens, and the PJ Watts Crips in Imperial Courts—while there are a number of smaller gangs in the immediate local area. In fact, two permanent civil gang injunctions had been served in the neighborhood against the Grape Street Crips [People v. Grape Street Crips (aka Grape Street), an unincorporated association, et al., BC330087 (Los Angeles County Superior Court May 25, 2005)] and the Bounty Hunter Bloods [People v. Bounty Hunters, an unincorporated association,

²¹In the city of Los Angeles, crimes can be classified as gang related “when the suspect or victim is an active or affiliate gang member, or when circumstances indicate that the crime is consistent with gang activity” (LAPD, 2006: 1).

et al., BC301433 (Los Angeles County Superior Court October 1, 2003)] in the years immediately preceding the CAGI. In addition, the PJ Watts Crips were designated as a criminal street gang by the LAPD under California Penal Code Section 186.22.²²

In May of 2006, a steering committee for the CAGI was developed to continue the ongoing focus on the area inhabited by the Grape Street Crips, Bounty Hunter Bloods, and the PJ Watts Crips. Included on the steering committee were officials from the United States Attorney's Office; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; Los Angeles City Mayor's Office; Los Angeles City Attorney's Office; Los Angeles Police Department; Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles; Los Angeles City Human Relations Committee; Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles; Office of Los Angeles City Councilwoman Janice Hahn, Los Angeles Unified School District, and Morning Star Church. The development of an action plan was divided across two subcommittees—law enforcement and prevention/reentry—that held meetings each month, which reported back to the steering committee that met on a bi-monthly basis. Early discussions with local law enforcement officials and the analysis of crime trends in the target area led the steering committee to focus CAGI funding on the Imperial Courts section of the target area, as this housing development had recently seen an increase in robbery incidents, whereas the other two complexes had witnessed a decline in violent crime. More specifically, funds from the CAGI would allow ongoing law enforcement and community prevention and intervention efforts to expand into the Imperial Courts section of the target area, and thus increase the targeted intervention efforts.

Gang Reduction Strategy

At the direction of the steering committee, the CAGI sought to expand upon existing operations in the target area to Imperial Courts, including the expansion of ongoing collaborative efforts between law enforcement, corrections, and prevention ventures which focused on Jordan Downs and/or Nickerson Gardens public housing complexes. Given the multi-pronged focus of the CAGI, including law enforcement, prevention, and reentry, we review the action plan of each of these components individually.

1. Law Enforcement

The law enforcement component of the CAGI had three unique components, each of which built upon existing practices in the target area, including an expansion of the Community Law Enforcement and Recovery Program (CLEAR), expanded use of closed circuit television monitoring systems, and the implementation of pro-active gang investigations. Each of these efforts are described below.

²² The California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act (Penal Code 186.22) defines a gang as “any ongoing organization, association or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated, having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity (STEP Act, 1997). In addition, the STEP Act provides that: (1) Participation in a criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in criminal activity is punishable as either a misdemeanor or felony, and (2) Conviction for a crime or public offense which was committed to promote or assist in criminal conduct by gang members is punished by an additional term in county jail or state prison.

1a. Expansion of the CLEAR Program:

The CLEAR program has been in operation in Los Angeles neighborhoods since 1997, and represents a collaborative effort between the Los Angeles Mayor's Office, Los Angeles County District Attorney, Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Los Angeles County Probation Department, Los Angeles City Attorney, and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The focus of the CLEAR program is similar to the overall focus of the CAGI, in that the program uses a collaborative approach among community members, law enforcement, and reentry services to enact change in local communities. The mission of CLEAR is highlighted below.

CAGI funding was used to expand an ongoing CLEAR operation from Jordan Downs to the Imperial Courts housing complex, which are roughly 1.5 to 2.0 miles apart. The decision to focus on Imperial Courts was made for a number of reasons. First, as was discussed above, police data revealed a recent increase in robberies in the Imperial Courts area, whereas violent crime was on the decline in Jordan Downs and Nickerson Gardens. Second, the permanent civil gang injunctions imposed on the Jordan Downs and Nickerson Gardens areas aided in targeted gang enforcement in those areas, while law enforcement were unable to utilize these additional legal constraints in Imperial Courts. Third, proactive federal law enforcement activities were already in use in the Nickerson Gardens area. Lastly, local law enforcement intelligence suggested that a focus on Imperial Courts could produce the highest net reduction in crime and violence.

1b. Expansion of Closed Circuit Television Systems:

A cooperative effort between the Department of Justice and Housing and Urban Development was responsible for the installation of a wireless closed circuit television system in the Jordan Downs housing project to aid in community policing efforts by the LAPD. Funds from the CAGI were used to expand this camera system to Nickerson Gardens, Imperial Courts, and throughout the local safe passage corridors that connect these housing facilities with the local schools. The installation of the expanded camera system had three direct benefits to law enforcement and the community. First, the camera system allowed for the direct transmission of video footage into patrol cars, which was intended to help law enforcement officials overcome common methods used by gangs to avoid detection and apprehension by law enforcement officials. Second, because the camera system broadcast through a wireless network computer system, it was capable of linking up with privately owned security cameras (e.g., business security cameras) in the area for better coverage of the local area at no additional charge to law enforcement. Lastly, the wireless network system was freely accessible to local residents, providing them with free internet access.

The CLEAR Mission

The mission of Los Angeles City/County Community Law Enforcement and Recovery (CLEAR) program is to facilitate the recovery of gang-infested communities. This is accomplished by an infusion of coordinated resources into targeted areas of high gang crime in order to decrease gang violence and promote community recovery. This mission is accomplished through an effective collaboration among several city, county and state criminal justice agencies, and through partnerships between CLEAR's core collaborative and agencies, programs and individuals in the targeted communities.

1c. Proactive Gang Investigations:

Funding from the CAGI was used to support ongoing proactive investigations in the target area by the ATF, FBI, and DEA, especially in the Nickerson Gardens area where federal law enforcement involvement was ongoing. Specifically, money from the CAGI was used to purchase needed equipment and provide money for undercover drug buys in the area. Another focus of these investigations, especially by the ATF, was on the illegal use of guns in the target area, with money being used to track the guns used by gangs for possible prosecution.

2. Prevention

The prevention component of the CAGI focused on strengthening existing resources in the target area. Information on the available services in the area were gathered through collaboration with Los Angeles City Councilwoman Hahn's office, the County District Attorney's Office, and the Jordan Downs Public Safety Initiative. Particular programs were chosen by a selection committee that reviewed responses to a call for proposals, with a special focus on programs that could fill particular areas of need that were identified through community safety forums conducted by the City of Los Angeles Commission for Children, Youth and Their Families in 2005 and 2006. In particular, four areas of need were identified through public forums and a gap analysis performed by the prevention and reentry subcommittee. These areas of need, as well as examples of local programs designed to fill these needs are listed below.

1). Resources to deter gang recruitment efforts directed at students in local middle schools.

- Elementary School Gang Awareness Training
- Markham Middle School Gang Violence Prevention and Intervention Program

- Parent training in gang recognition for parents of middle school children
- “Safe Passages” for students traveling to and from school
- 2). Funding to provide alternatives to gang involvement for area youth.
- Jordan/Locke High Schools Creative Arts Program
- Catholic Big Brothers/Big Sisters Program
- 3). Targeted outreach for youth already involved in gang activities, or those most at risk for future gang involvement.
- Dedicated area probation officer to work in local schools and housing projects
- This officer was not limited to active probation cases, but also worked with at risk youth.
- 4). Services for youth and young adults (e.g., job training, job placement) to aid in the cessation of gang involvement.
- Watts Summer Job Program

In order to oversee the activities and programs used to target these issues a full time prevention coordinator was hired. This position was responsible for ongoing monitoring of all prevention activities, and also help in recruiting participants in these programs, as well as act as a coordinator and contact point for local community organizations and residents.

3. Reentry

The reentry component of the CAGI focused on 43 adult offenders returning from California state prison and the Los Angeles county jail. CAGI funding was used to support the Honor and Strength Reentry program established by the Los Angeles Police Department. To aid in the selection of candidates and the coordination of services provided, CAGI funding was used to hire a reentry coordinator, fund 50 percent of the time for a dedicated parole officer, and fund 50 percent of the time for a dedicated probation officer. These individuals also worked closely with local CLEAR personnel, who provide similar services in the area. Local service providers were chosen by the Selection Committee through a call for proposals. Particular attention was given to local agencies that could aid clients in the areas of housing, substance abuse, mental health, transportation, anger management, domestic violence counseling, education, job training and placement, and language skills. While funding was awarded in 2006, the reentry component did not begin operation until November of 2009.

Results

Evidence of Impact—Outcomes

Table 25 and Figure 13 present the trend in violent gang crime in Los Angeles as well as in the target area.²³ Both trends indicate very significant reductions in violent crime for the city as well as for the target area. Indeed, the CAGI task force reported that through 2010 the CAGI target area had experienced 30-40 percent reductions in gang-related crime. As noted in prior sections it is difficult to assess the extent to which these reductions are attributable to CAGI.

²³ UCR data for Los Angeles indicate that the violent crime rate dropped from 820.6 in 2005 to 625 in 2009. For the homicide rate, the figures were 12.6 in 2005 to 8.1 in 2009. These declines continued a significant reduction witnessed after 2002.

This is true because the trend in violent crime was already downward and because the decline was observed in both the target area and citywide. The CAGI program complemented and was consistent with the broad gang violence reduction effort in the city. It becomes impossible to disentangle the impact of the city program from the CAGI initiative. An optimist can point to the long-term reduction as evidence of a variety of initiatives in Los Angeles that include CLEAR, GRYD, PSN, CAGI, and LAPD's Compstat program, among others. A researcher trained to be skeptical in attributing causation is likely to respond that it may have been these initiatives or a variety of unmeasured influences that have generated the crime reduction. The good news for the citizens of Los Angeles is that it appears that the streets have become safer over the last decade.

Table 25.

Table 3: Trends in Violent Gang Crime in Los Angeles and the Target Area, 2001-2008

Year	Los Angeles City Totals					Southeast Area Totals
	Homicide	Assault	Rape	Robbery ¹	Carjacking	Total Crimes
2001	346	3500	58	2745	143	1020
2002	350	3430	65	2808	209	1132
2003	259	3063	37	3274	211	723
2004	291	2616	36	2308	118	654
2005	244	2620	32	2015	146	532
2006	272	2877	37	2515	170	657
2007	220	3324	38	2556	163	571
2008	167	2830	40	2568	111	617

note: Numbers represent Los Angeles Police Department internal data sources yearly totals ending December 31st of each year.

¹ Excludes Carjacking



Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative – Site Summary

Western District of Oklahoma – Oklahoma City

There are three federal judicial districts in the State of Oklahoma: the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts (see Figure 14). The Western District is the largest of the three, both in terms of land area and population. In total, 40 of the 77 counties in the State of Oklahoma are serviced by the Western District, encompassing 57 percent (39,164.41) of the total square miles in the state (68,667.06), and 52 percent (n = 1,877,000) of the total population of Oklahoma (n = 3,579,212). In terms of race and ethnicity, 73 percent of the district residents are non-Hispanic white, meaning 27 percent of the population is non-white. In order of total population size, nine percent of the residents are black, eight percent are of Hispanic or Latino origin, and five percent are American Indian or Alaska Native; other races and ethnicities represent less than two percent of the total population, respectively.

Oklahoma City, the state capitol, is situated in the district and is home to 29 percent (population = 536,016) of the district's total population. As of 2006, Oklahoma City was the 30th largest city in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007). Racially, Oklahoma City is predominately white (67.7%), followed by 14.1 percent of respondents who report being black/African American, while all other racial groups are less than five percent of the total population, individually (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Ethnically, 14.6 percent of the population reported Hispanic or Latino heritage.

Beyond Oklahoma City, there were four other cities in the Western District with populations above 50,000 in 2006: Edmond (75,542), Lawton (91,031), Midwest City (55,375), and Norman (102,617). Combined, these four cities represent 17 percent of the total district population. Overall, beyond Oklahoma City and these four smaller cities, roughly 54 percent of the population of the Western District lives in municipalities with less than 50,000 residents.

Violent crime rates in the Western District differ substantively across the cities with greater than 50,000 residents (see Table 26). Overall violent crime rates per 100,000 residents varied from a low of 120.46 in the city of Edmond, to a high of 1,020.53 in the city of Lawton in 2006. The overall violent crime rate in Oklahoma City was 802.40 per 100,000 residents in 2006. As for murder and non-negligent manslaughter, Edmond again reported the lowest overall rate at 1.32 per 100,000 residents, while Oklahoma City reported the highest overall rate at 10.26. In fact, Oklahoma City recorded 35 percent (n = 55) of the total number of murders in the state of Oklahoma (n = 159) in 2006. Oklahoma City was below the national average for cities over 250,000 residents, however, in both the total violent crime rate (936.7) and murder and non-negligent manslaughter rate (13.1).

Figure 14: Federal Districts in Oklahoma




Table 26

Table 1: Violent Crime in the Western District of Oklahoma

Cities with populations over 50,000	Population	Violent crime	Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	Forcible rape	Robbery	Aggravated assault
Edmond	75,542	91	1	30	14	46
<i>rate per 100,000</i>		<i>120.46</i>	<i>1.32</i>	<i>39.71</i>	<i>18.53</i>	<i>60.89</i>
Lawton	91,031	929	8	82	169	670
<i>rate per 100,000</i>		<i>1020.53</i>	<i>8.79</i>	<i>90.08</i>	<i>185.65</i>	<i>736.01</i>
Midwest City	55,375	266	3	25	50	188
<i>rate per 100,000</i>		<i>480.36</i>	<i>5.42</i>	<i>45.15</i>	<i>90.29</i>	<i>339.50</i>
Norman	102,617	211	5	38	50	118
<i>rate per 100,000</i>		<i>205.62</i>	<i>4.87</i>	<i>37.03</i>	<i>48.72</i>	<i>114.99</i>
Oklahoma City	536,016	4,301	55	327	1,179	2,740
<i>rate per 100,000</i>		<i>802.40</i>	<i>10.26</i>	<i>61.01</i>	<i>219.96</i>	<i>511.18</i>

Development and Initial Implementation of CAGI

In the early part of the decade (2000-2005) the Oklahoma City Police Department (OCPD) documented a disturbing trend in the rate of gang-related shootings. Specifically, the police department documented a 300 percent increase in the number of drive-by shootings between 2000 (n = 65) and 2005 (n = 260). Given the visible and dangerous nature of these incidents the United States Attorney implemented a new anti-gang initiative referred to as

Project Grind (Gangs Removed, Isolated, Neutralized, and Dismantled). To support the initiative, the U.S. Attorney established the Oklahoma City Metropolitan Gang Task Force, which represented a collaboration of both federal and local law enforcement and prosecution, as well as community outreach programs which were developed through previous collaborations established during Operation Weed and Seed and Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) initiatives. Similar to these previous initiatives, the purpose of Project Grind was to use a strategic approach to gang enforcement and eradication through coordinated enforcement, prosecution, and prevention of gang activity. The collaboration was guided by an executive steering committee that was to be composed of the U.S. Attorney, the chief of police for the OCPD, the ATF resident agent in charge, the FBI special agent in charge, and the Oklahoma County District Attorney.

Nature of the Gang Problem in Oklahoma City

The Oklahoma City Police Department (OCPD) described the gang problem as emanating from the local drug trade. That is, street gangs in Oklahoma City (OC) are heavily involved in drug dealing activities, which provides local youth with some incentive for joining a gang. According to the OCPD, there were roughly 3,500 gang members in 87 gangs in OC in 2005. At the time of the previous gang estimate in 2001, the majority of gang involved youth (59.8%) were black, which is multiple times higher than their representation in the community (14.1%). Much like street gangs throughout the country, local gangs in the OC area predominately used versions of the infamous gang names bloods and crips. In 2001, two-thirds of all gangs in OC referred to themselves as bloods (16.1%) or crips (50.6%). The remaining gangs were described more generally as Asian (5.7%), Mexican (17.2%), or other (10.3%) gangs.

While the majority of gangs and gang youth in OC are black, there is growing concern among officials in the OCPD that immigrant Hispanic/Latino and Asian groups are becoming more involved in street gang activity. Given the recent influx of these groups, however, language and cultural barriers have impeded investigations and the collection of intelligence on these groups, which is viewed as a significant hurdle among local law enforcement.

Gang Reduction Strategy

The CAGI in Oklahoma City is targeted on a 4.7 square mile area on the East side of the city where gangs have had a historical presence. According to local officials, this area of OC is particularly disadvantaged in terms of average income, population density, and unemployment. For instance, the median annual income in this area was roughly half (\$17,326) that of OC overall (\$34,947) at the outset of the initiative, with 37 percent of the local residents living below the poverty line, compared with 16 percent for the city as a whole. The number of persons per square mile in the target area (3,210) was roughly four times the city average (833), while unemployment was approximately three times that of the city more generally (16.3 versus 5.3%). The median housing values over the previous decade (1990 versus 2000) reveals the undesirable nature of the living situation in this area of the city, as housing values remained nearly unchanged on the eastside since 1990 (\$36,400 in 1990 versus \$36,700 in 2000), while the median price of homes in OC overall grew by 46 percent over this same period of time.

To combat the gang problem in this local area, the CAGI focused on law enforcement, prevention, and reentry components. We review each of these individual components separately.

1. Law Enforcement

The law enforcement component of the CAGI focused on gangs in the eastside that have been problematic for some time. In all, there were six identifiable parts to the law enforcement component, which built upon one another as the initiative progressed. Each of the six parts are outlined below.

1. The first part of the intervention was the identification of particular gang areas, gangs, and gang members that would provide the best targets for heightened law enforcement activity. This step relied upon police reports, calls for service, and street-level intelligence gathered by the OCPD.
2. After settling on the target area, the OCPD used three different groups of officers to gather in-depth information on the local gangs and their members. First, off-duty officers on an overtime basis were used to increase the visible presence of law enforcement in the area. Specialized gang unit officers were also concentrated in the area to gather intelligence, while a third group from the Criminal Intel Unit documented local gang members and tracked them using their existing resources. In all, the second part of the law enforcement component was to gather intelligence and sources of information in the local community that could be used throughout the intervention.
3. The third part of the intervention was to convert the information collected in part two into an easily accessible and timely intelligence system. The goal was to create an intelligence system that could be instantly accessed by patrol officers during routine operations. This intelligence gathering and sharing system also provided daily address and biographical information on all documented gang members for disbursement to front line officers and command staff. Included in this information were known gang members who are released from federal and state custody.
4. Information on all known gang members was entered into the NCIC Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization file so officers could be alerted to potentially dangerous gang members upon contact.
5. In the fifth step, the intelligence gathered in the previous steps was used to make an informed decision on those individuals most worthy of targeted prosecution. That is, this intelligence resource was used to find the major players in the local gangs, such that their removal from the street through targeted prosecution should disrupt the gangs' illegal operations.
6. The final part of the enforcement component of the CAGI was to hire an Assistant District Attorney that focused on gang prosecutions for Oklahoma County. In addition to prosecuting gang crimes, this position was also responsible for monitoring intelligence gathered through law enforcement officials to develop plans for prosecution at the state and federal levels. In conjunction with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, this position was responsible for tracking guns used by gang members to their source for potential prosecution for illegal distribution.

2. Prevention

The prevention component of the CAGI also targeted the aforementioned eastside neighborhood. Services provided through the intervention built upon existing relationships with community groups that were developed through Weed and Seed, and whose organizations demonstrated some level of success in service provision through the years. Like the law enforcement element, the prevention component of the CAGI was broken into parts, which are outlined below.

1. To help in the organization of services in the target area, the first part of the prevention component was to develop a comprehensive service center, which provided the space and infrastructure for service providers in the target area. In order to identify the specific needs of local residents, a survey of risk and needs was conducted in the target area. Those service providers in the OC area that offered services in these areas of need, and were deemed capable of delivering those services in the target area, were offered a spot in the service center.
2. The second part of the prevention component was to contract with existing services that could provide gang prevention services. A prominent, grassroots, program in the OC area, which was a focal point of the current intervention, was the Martial Arts Gang Prevention Program. This program operated in a handful of local middle schools, and served over 2,000 youth who had been deemed at-risk for anti-social behavior and gang involvement.
3. The next part of the CAGI prevention component was to recruit and develop memorandums of understanding with partner agencies that can support the anti-gang initiative. Examples of existing organizations and programs that serve this function include the Oklahoma City Police Athletic League, Oklahoma City Housing Authority, and Oklahoma County Workforce Development.
4. The final part of the prevention component was perhaps the most ambitious due to the originality of the operation and the level of coordination necessary to maintain such an endeavor. To facilitate the sharing of information across a number of stakeholders, those involved in the CAGI sought to develop a web-based information sharing system that would link law enforcement, public schools, municipal court, state court, and the Oklahoma juvenile corrections system in tracking juveniles involved in gangs, crime, and truancy. For instance, this system would allow for schools to work with local and state law enforcement to track at-risk youth and provide needed services.

3. Reentry

The reentry component of the CAGI focused on ex-offenders from the targeted neighborhood who were documented as gang involved either before incarceration, or who became gang involved while incarcerated. The CAGI built upon the existing infrastructure of the Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative (SVORI) to provide services to ex-offenders returning to Oklahoma City, and the target area therein. As with the other components of the CAGI, the reentry initiative was initiated through individual parts, which are outlined below.

1. The first phase of the reentry initiative was to identify those youth and adults returning to the target area that had been involved with gangs, and are thus at-risk for continued gang involvement. This process included pre-release assessment at the correctional

facility. Individuals interested in post-release services available through CAGI were recruited through marketing within the local facilities, but involvement in the program was strictly voluntary.

2. An important component of reentry is obtaining a job that provides a living wage. To assist in this endeavor, the reentry component of the CAGI contracted with the Oklahoma City Eastside Career Connections Center to provide job training and placement services. An important part of this process was finding local businesses to participate in the program.

3. Another important element to successful reentry is finding suitable housing. In building upon an existing relationship between Weed and Seed and the Oklahoma City Housing Authority, participants in the CAGI were provided with support in both finding and financing housing upon release from confinement.

4. The fourth component of the CAGI reentry plan was family support services, which focused on using community partners to assist in family reunification services. This component sought to reduce many of the common obstacles standing between ex-offenders and a successful reunification with their family. These services ranged from financial support for back child support to supervised visitation services.

5. While transportation is a common hurdle for reentry in many communities, this was identified as a particular problem in OC. Public transportation services are very limited in areas of OC, and many returning offenders do not have their own means of transportation. Funds from the CAGI were used to provide participants with the financial resources to successfully navigate the city, thereby limiting the possibility of infractions due to simple transportation issues.

6. The last part of the CAGI reentry component was the provision of faith based mentoring and support services. Members of local faith based organizations were recruited to mentor and provide basic support services to ex-offenders with the hope of integrating these youth and adults into the local faith community.

Results

CAGI officials in Oklahoma City reported a number of accomplishments associated with CAGI. As with the other sites, a major accomplishment was the development of new multi-agency partnerships. Of note was the improved relationship involving the USAO and the local district attorney's office. These two agencies jointly screened cases consistent with a smart prosecution approach. Local officials also believed the prevention programs, particularly the martial arts and FACT programs, were reaching high risk youths and their families and were having a positive effect.

Evidence of Impact—Outcomes

The most concrete evidence of a CAGI impact was the decline in drive-by shootings in the target area. This was reported to be an approximate 30 percent drop.

Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative – Site Summary

Eastern and Middle Districts of North Carolina – Raleigh and Durham

Unique to the Comprehensive Anti Gang Initiative (CAGI) sites, the Raleigh-Durham site is shared by two federal districts, the Middle District of North Carolina and Eastern District of North Carolina. The Middle District encompasses 24 counties with a total population of approximately 2.5 million. Durham, which is located in the Middle District, is the smaller of the two CAGI cities but has a higher Violent Crime Rate. Raleigh is located in Wake County, one of the 44 counties in the Eastern District. Using 2006 Census data, Table 27 offers demographic and crime data for the two cities.

Table 27: 2006 City Data

Raleigh		Durham	
Population	348,345	Population	208,932
Total Violent Crime	2,223	Total Violent Crime	1,957
Murder	19	Murder	13
Rape	97	Rape	98
Robbery	782	Robbery	977
Aggravated Assault	1,325	Aggravated Assault	869
Violent Crime Rate	638.16	Violent Crime Rate	936.67
Murder Rate	5.45	Murder Rate	6.22
Rape Rate	27.85	Rape Rate	46.91
Robbery Rate	224.29	Robbery Rate	467.62
Aggravated Assault Rate	380.37	Aggravated Assault Rate	415.92

In 2007, \$2.5 million in CAGI funding was awarded to assist these cities address gang prevention and control through enforcement, intervention and prevention, and reentry. The CAGI initiative would build on the elements of effective, evidence based- strategies and partnerships established under Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN). More than 14,500 gang members and 500 named gangs are recognized by the State of North Carolina.

Since 2005, Raleigh has 3,070 validated gang members in 56 named gangs that appear to be organized and function in a hierarchy. The three prominent gangs are: The Bloods, The Crips, and Folk Nation. Eighty-two percent of gang members are African American. Latino, Caucasian, or Asian gangs have yet to make a strong presence. Females comprise about 15 percent of gang membership and are often used as carriers or for alibis. The prominent criminal activity associated with gangs is illegal drug distribution.

In Durham in 2005, 235 gang members were responsible for 401 gang crimes. Violent crime is highly associated with Durham gangs. Twenty-nine gangs have been identified with 646 gang members. Two-thirds of the gang members come from areas outside Durham. Hispanic gangs or gang members are believed to be on the rise.

Task Force:

In Raleigh-Durham, the CAGI Steering Committee is separate from the PSN Steering Committee. While several members sit on both, which fosters collaboration and coordination, the committees are their own entity. The CAGI Committee meets on a formal basis every six months. Each CAGI program is led by a coordinator and the two coordinators regularly exchange information. The fiscal agent is the North Carolina Governor's Crime Commission.

Problem Analysis:

Analysis of gangs and gang crimes was provided by the police departments in both cities. This was enhanced by the state of North Carolina's "Gang-Net" program that provides gang intelligence on a state-wide basis. Durham also gains intelligence from monthly Gun Review Meetings developed through PSN. The meetings involve reviews of every arrest involving a gun from Durham County. The meetings are convened by a law enforcement task force comprised of members from the Durham Police Department, Durham County Sheriff's Department, ATF, Community Corrections, Durham County Prosecutor's Office, and the USAO.

In both cities, gang intelligence and crime data suggested specific focus areas. These areas were also PSN focus areas in both Raleigh and Durham. Raleigh is focusing on two zip codes in the Southeast District and refers to their CAGI initiative as "*Project 110 %*". Durham's focus area, "*the Bulls Eye*" has remained the same since the CAGI award inception and has been the focus for CAGI, PSN, and most recently the Drug Market Intervention (DMI).

Beginning in 2009 when Raleigh Police Department (RPD) started tracking and analyzing crimes associated with gangs and gang members, citywide data revealed 1,417 gang-related incidents with 56 percent of those occurring in the Southeast District. RPD has six police districts. See Table 28 below.

Table 28: 2009 RPD Gang Crimes²⁴

Incident	#
Drug Violation	358
Firearms	269
Assault	252
Vandalism	214
Robbery	121
Burglary	107
Larceny	67
Weapons Violations	66
All Other Offenses	63
Juvenile	37
Disorderly Conduct	32
Misc-No Offense	32
Motor Vehicle Theft	20
Stolen Property	13
Murder	9
Fraud	8
Traffic	5
Sex Offense	4
Arson	3
Rape	2
Total=	1,417

RPD recognizes two terms for gang activity: “*gang related (involved)*” and “*gang motivated*”. Gang related is applied to incidents where the offender or victim or both have “ties” to a gang (s). To be gang motivated, an incident had to occur on behalf of or for the “purpose” of the gang. The two definitions are **not** interchangeable.

In Durham County, law enforcement has a definition of a gang. The definitions are not statutory, but are mutually agreed upon as, “*a group or association of three or more persons who may have a common identifying sign, symbol, or name and who individually or collectively engage in, or have engaged in, criminal activity which creates an atmosphere of fear and intimidation.*” Durham County tracks gang crimes utilizing two categories:

Member-based: a crime in which a gang member or members are either the perpetrators or the victims of crime, regardless of motive.

Motive-based: a crime committed by a gang member or members in which the underlying reason is to further the interests and activities of the gang.

Law enforcement primarily relies upon the member-based definition given that the motive-based is very difficult to prove because it ultimately requires a confession that the crime was committed in the name or furtherance of the gang.

²⁴ NC 2009 Public Report.

Strategies:

Raleigh has relied upon their Gang Suppression Unit (GSU), a 12 officer, 2 Sergeant, division of RPD. The Unit combines suppression, prevention, and intervention efforts to foster public safety and community partnerships. Established in 2008, the Gang Intelligence Unit (GIU) has been instrumental as well in CAGI efforts. The three detectives and one intelligence analyst use the department's record management system and open source data to monitor gang criminal activity. The intelligence information is used to track patterns and create strategic responses. Officer training, Community Police Officers, School Resource Officers, Gang Unit Liaisons, prioritized warrant service, use of the North Carolina Street Gang Act, a 10-point strategy to reduce firearms violence, and the Career Criminal Unit are all involved in CAGI law enforcement and suppression efforts. RPD created a Gang Assessment form which officers complete when a gang related incident occurs. See Appendix 5.

In Durham, CAGI enforcement and suppression strategies are well-developed just as Raleigh's are. Notable components include:

- Utilizing intelligence software for investigative, link analysis, and structuring data.²⁵
- Continued partnership with the North Carolina Department of Community Corrections. This includes court approved searches of probationers, with a direct focus on gang members within the target area. This community policing strategy, started in 2003, was the first one of its kind in North Carolina whereby police officers assist probation officers with home visits and searches.
- Monthly Gun Review Meeting whereby all gun arrest cases from Durham County are reviewed by members of the Law Enforcement Task Force. This informs prosecution decisions and provides gang intelligence.
- Implemented the Drug Market Intervention Strategy (DMI) in the Bulls Eye area in order to address street-level drug activity and violent crime.
- Provide training for law enforcement partners in the area of gang investigation to facilitate successful gang investigations.

In Raleigh, gang prevention and intervention utilizes 12 programs including but not limited to: community and faith leader meetings, mentoring, liaisons, youth programs, tip line, and graffiti removal. Specific programs include:

- Transitional Employment Initiative: helping highly at-risk or gang-involved individuals learn of and choose paths that lead to higher literacy, employment skills and careers, and personal, social and family skills.
- S.O.A.R.: provide opportunities geared towards male adult gang members (18-31) that incorporate job-skill training, paid internships, one-to-one mentoring, and recreation.
- Literacy and GED services.
- Steppin' Up: a family-oriented intervention requiring participation by both parents and teens in skill sessions and in-home community outreach.

²⁵ Specifically i2 Analyst Notebook and i Base link the DPDs' Report Management System (RMS) and Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) and to Gang-Net, a state wide gang intelligence program. i2 Analyst Notebook is a powerful visual investigative analysis product which enables investigators to visualize large volumes of disparate data and turn it into meaningful information through link analysis. SunGard and HTE Link Analysis software also allow investigators and officers to construct intelligence diagrams of RMS data.

Every six months, youth involved in six of the prevention/intervention programs are asked to complete a survey about their experience and perceptions. See Appendix 6.

Durham's developed its prevention and intervention programs through a Request for Proposal (RFP) process. Durham selected six sub-recipient contracts to provide anti-gang prevention and intervention services in the Bulls Eye, North East Central area of Durham. Contracts were awarded to:

- Community In Schools of Durham: a parenting program administered at Eastway Elementary School in North East Central Durham and use of *The Incredible Years* an award winning, research-based program for reducing children's aggression and behavior problems and increasing social competence at home and at school.
- EDGE Training and Placement: a comprehensive model involving life transformation and acquisition of a GED.
- North Carolina Child Response Initiative: a collaborative effort of the Center for Child & Family Health (CCFH), the Durham Police Department, and Project Safe Neighborhoods to improve safety and security among children and their families who are affected by violence and trauma.
- Religious Coalition for a Non- Violent Durham: an organization that seeks to prevent and rectify violence.
- P.A.L.S. Program: a national program which fosters positive relationships between law enforcement and youth through sports.
- Project BUILD: a multitude of services including an anti-gang information line for prevention and intervention services such as education, employment, life skills, and mentoring.

Like many of the CAGI sites, Raleigh's reentry component was the most challenging and the least developed as of 2010. The reentry team had made enhancements to the current Juvenile Court Counselor reentry model and a model had been created for both juveniles and adults. This included identifying returning gang involved offenders and developing reentry contracts with six service providers. The goal was to serve 30 re-entrants through a service "menu" and voucher process.

In Durham County, the Criminal Justice Resource Center (CJRC) is the primary provider of CAGI reentry efforts. Case management, mentoring, bus tickets/transportation, and basic needs such as clothing, food, and housing are provided through CJRC. One challenge facing both cities is that approximately 75 percent of offenders leave incarceration having served their sentence with no post release supervision attached. Durham set a target population of 50 returning offenders, with priority being given to individuals on post release supervision that served at least 30 days of incarceration. As of July 2010, 29 had been served and Durham officials were confident they would meet their target goal.

Outcomes:

Officials from both cities noted that the partnerships established across the various program components were one of the major benefits of CAGI. Both police departments had new chiefs early in the CAGI project period. Although this created turnover and the need to establish new relationships, in both jurisdictions officials reported that CAGI had strengthened relationships between the USAO's, the police departments, and federal law enforcement.

The continued development of gang intelligence and crime analysis was considered a particular benefit of the CAGI initiative.

Officials in both cities noted declines in crime as a key benefit of CAGI. As reported March 1, 2010, Raleigh experienced a 49 percent decrease citywide in gang-related incidents in 2009. Drug cases decreased by 43 percent, firearms 53 percent, assaults by 67 percent, and robberies were down 56 percent²⁶. Looking specifically at the CAGI Project 110 % area, in 2006 12 federal gang prosecutions occurred, in 2007 and 2008, 17 each year, and in 2009, the number more than doubled to 40 prosecutions²⁷.

Durham officials similarly reported impressive reductions in violent crime since CAGI's inception in 2007²⁸. In a two year time frame, with an implementation date of August 2007, the Bulls Eye target area has experienced a 39 percent reduction in violent gun crime, 25 percent reduction in shots fired calls, 49 percent reduction in prostitution calls, 29 percent reduction in drug calls, and a 35 percent reduction in all violent crimes. In 2009, state and local gang prosecutions totaled 35 directly associated with activity in the Bulls Eye.

Sustainability:

As in the other CAGI sites, sustainability following the end of CAGI funding was considered a key challenge. Raleigh has received local support for prevention and intervention programs from Capital Area Workforce Development, City of Raleigh Community Development, and local businesses and is hopeful future support will exist and even grow. Durham officials are hopeful that the crime reductions that they attribute to the three pronged approach of enforcement and prosecution, prevention and intervention, and reentry will result in support from city and county sources. They believe that support is dependent on further analysis and evaluation.

²⁶ NC 2009 Public Report.

²⁷ Annual CAGI Coordinators Survey. June 2010.

²⁸ Full CAGI law enforcement implementation did not occur until January 2008. Prevention and intervention occurred in March 2008.

Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative – Site Summary

Western District of New York – Rochester

Context

The Western District of New York covers 17 counties and the cities of Buffalo and Rochester as well as the smaller cities of Canandaigua, Elmira, and Jamestown. As of 2006, the district had a population of just over 2.8 million. The CAGI project focused on the city of Rochester. With a population of just over 200,000, Rochester had suffered through high levels of violent crime. Indeed, its 2006 homicide rate of 23.1 per 100,000 residents was the highest among the initial CAGI sites and was exceeded only by Detroit. Its violent crime rate of 1,260 per 100,000 was the fifth highest exceeded by Detroit, Harrisburg, Cleveland, and Milwaukee.

The Task Force

Rochester's CAGI program benefitted from and built upon a long history of multi-agency collaboration focused on violence reduction. Rochester was a participating jurisdiction in the U.S. Department of Justice program known as Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI; Roehl et al., 2008) and had been a Project Safe Neighborhoods target city. Thus, for over a decade the Rochester Police Department (RPD), U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of New York, probation and parole, federal law enforcement partners, city officials, social services and other stakeholders had been working together to address violence problems. Additionally, the SACSI and PSN task forces had a long relationship with a team of researchers at the Rochester Institute of Technology to support data driven problem analysis, strategy development, and assessment. The research partners worked closely with the Monroe Crime Analysis Center (MCAC). MCAC is a regional crime analysis center that serves RPD and surrounding jurisdictions. The crime analysis unit included a focus on gangs and generated strategic and tactical intelligence on violence and gangs. The unit generates near real-time analyses and reports to assist with intelligence-driven proactive policing.

CAGI is coordinated by a steering committee that is distinct from the PSN steering committee although there is some overlapping membership.

Problem Analysis

The selection of the target area was based on research that identified the areas with the highest geographic concentration of homicide in Rochester. This area is known as the "crescent" based on a shape that "stretches from the Northeast corner to the Southwest corner around the core of the city". This specific area of Rochester was chosen, as homicides seemed to be concentrated in the area, making it a good-targeted region for policing. The crime analysis data include information about the prevalence of gangs, gang members, and gang activity within the targeted area. These data suggested there are 50 gangs and 750 active suspected gang members in the crescent area. It indicated around 90% of documented gang activity in the city occurs in this area.

For a number of years RPD had worked with its research partner to conduct incident reviews of homicides and shootings. The incident reviews include reviews by the Regional Trauma Center that focus on all shootings and stabbings involving youths. These multiple intelligence sources indicated that the gang-violence nexus was largely due to street level narcotics sales.

Enforcement

The enforcement component is led by RPD. RPD has employed a two-pronged approach that includes both long-term investigations and more immediate responses to problems. The long-term covert investigations are managed by the Special Investigations Section (SIS) of RPD. SIS modeled their approach on the Chicago Police Department's Street Corner Conspiracy teams. SIS targets established drug markets, associated with gang violence, in the crescent zone with narcotics investigations. The investigations are typically long-term and involve undercover operations. The investigations culminate with multiple search warrants and round-ups of suspects. The New York State Police were key partners in these investigations and devoted investigators to the initiative. Similarly, CAGI officials noted excellent cooperation with various federal law enforcement agencies.

The tactical short-term gang suppression component is directed by RPD's tactical unit. This unit represents a major commitment by RPD and includes two sergeants and fourteen officers who serve as gang enforcement specialists. The tactical unit has the flexibility to respond to the dynamic nature of gang violence. The tactical unit generates street-level gang intelligence and works closely with the MCAC to continually develop strategic and tactical gang intelligence. They utilize a variety of tactics to respond to gang problems. This includes directed police patrols, gang warrant details and police-probation-parole home visits.

The enforcement component also relies on offender notification meetings based on the Boston Ceasefire and Indianapolis pulling levers approach (Kennedy, 1997; Corsaro and McGarrell, 2010). As of summer 2010, four gang call-in meetings involving a total of 80 gang-involved individuals had occurred. All resided in the target zone, were on either probation or parole, and most were between the ages of 17-21. Presenters at the call-in meetings included representatives of RPD, the district attorney, the U.S. Attorney, probation, parole and a trauma surgeon from the University of Rochester Medical Center. The Catholic Family Center of Greater Rochester coordinated follow-up social services.

Prevention and Intervention

The CAGI prevention and intervention services are coordinated by the Community Place of Greater Rochester (CPGR). The task force built upon several existing gang prevention programs and used a proposal solicitation and review process to develop additional prevention programming. Some of the key programs include Pathways to Peace and Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS).

The prevention program seeks to target at-risk youth who are possibly at risk of joining a gang and/or engaging in delinquent behavior due to the existence of risk factors in four major areas: the individual child and peer group, the child's family, the child's school, and community and neighborhood factors. Programming is then offered based on these risk factors. PATHS is one of the risk-based programs and includes the parents in the process. PATHS is a school-

based program with a curriculum that incorporates self-control, positive self-esteem, emotional awareness and interpersonal problem-solving skills. PATHS is supported by the Family Resource Center of Crestwood Children's Center that works the Rochester City School District to deliver paths in a school serving the target area. Two intervention specialists support teachers in the implementation of PATHS. High risk youths receive home visits to reinforce the lessons learned in the curriculum.

The intervention component involves the Pathways to Peace (PTP) program working in collaboration with the Monroe County Probation Department. PTP is a street outreach program that seeks to mediate gang conflicts and link at-risk youths to community resources. Under CAGI, the PTP-Probation program developed a project known as "Lead the Way" that targets 95 probationers with a history of violent offending and gang activity. The program combines intensive supervision with cognitive behavioral therapy. This includes a specific focus on gangs and provides support for gang desistance.

Reentry

The USAO and the PSN Task Force had recognized the need to expand reentry services and to provide some coordination of these services in the Rochester Crescent area. This was then enhanced through CAGI reentry programming. The focus has been on housing, mentoring, sobriety, and job preparation. A Reentry Task Force was formed to develop a comprehensive reentry program in partnership with Rochester's Catholic Family Services, which is focusing on education, employment, sobriety support, and housing. The Catholic Family Services Center coordinates the program. Some of the key partners include the New York State Department of Correctional Services, New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, county probation and state parole, Project No Return (substance abuse services for jail and prison populations), Salvation Army, Volunteers of America, a coalition of African American Churches, Cephass Attica, a Christian Fellowship program that provides residential reentry services, and Judicial Process Commission, a faith-based mentoring and job preparedness services. A total of 48 agencies are involved in the reentry task force.

Eight-five percent of prisoners returning to Monroe County from state and federal correctional facilities return to the Rochester Crescent area. The reentry population is estimated to include between 950 and 1100 state prisoners, approximately 200 Federal prisoners and 1300 inmates sentenced to the County Jail. The CAGI program coordinates with broader reentry initiatives serving Rochester through grants from New York State for reentry planning. The CAGI reentry component focuses on gang members held in the local jail.

Monroe County Probation and RPD worked with the Monroe County correctional Facility and the Holding Center to identify gang involved offenders serving time in the local jail who will be released to the target area. The probation department uses Compass as the assessment tool and probation also supervises released offenders. The initiative includes both pre-release and post-release programming. The local research partner is tracking reentry cases to assess impact on recidivism. As of this writing the results are not yet available.

Outcomes

Officials from Rochester involved in CAGI pointed to a number of positive outcomes across the various components. As previously noted, the CAGI program built on a number of existing relationships established through SACSI and PSN. The CAGI program "allowed us to

fill in gaps” and “cultivate partnerships” in service delivery as they identified needs related to gang prevention and intervention as well as additional community resources. In terms of suppression, officials pointed to several major cases that resulted in federal and state prosecution of known gang members operating in the target area. In terms of intervention, the gang-focused call-in meetings and the Pathways to Peace and re-entry program were viewed as new gang-focused interventions. Similarly, the school-based PATHS program was seen as a highly successful prevention program and officials believed it would continue in the schools beyond the lifetime of the federally-funded CAGI program.

As noted in Chapter Five, the ARIMA impact analysis suggested that violent crime in the target area was down 14 percent during a period the remainder of the city experienced a seven percent decline.

Sustainability

Rochester officials were pleased about the new relationships with the school system and they noted private sector interest in youth development as well as discussions between CAGI officials and these local leaders. They were hopeful these relationships would help sustain the initiative. They noted, however, that they had not yet attracted sufficient funding to sustain the initiative once federal funds were exhausted.

Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative – Site Summary

Middle District of Florida – Tampa Region

The Middle District of Florida (MDFL) is one of the largest U.S. Attorney districts both geographically and in population. CAGI efforts in the Middle District initially were centralized in Hillsborough County and the city limits of Tampa. The focus was later expanded to a five-county area: Hillsborough, Manatee, Pinellas, Pasco, and Polk based on shared law enforcement intelligence that suggested all of these areas experienced significant gang problems and that gang activity was quite fluid throughout the region.

Context:

The Middle District of Florida is comprised of 35 counties with division offices in Jacksonville, Tampa, Orlando, Fort Myers and Ocala. There are approximately 9 million people in the Middle District. Hillsborough County has more than a million residents with Tampa being the largest city and county seat (population just over 340,000). The Tampa Bay area includes Tampa, St. Petersburg and Clearwater and the four-county region contains approximately 2.7 million residents. Tampa is a diverse community with its population comprised of just under half white, 26 percent African American, and 22 percent Hispanic.

Task Force:

The Hillsborough County Criminal Justice (HCCJ) Liaison monitored the law enforcement, prevention/intervention, and reentry components of CAGI. Each partnering agency had one point of contact. The partners met monthly. Prosecutors, law enforcement officers, and community stakeholders all stressed the advantages of the regular meetings of the CAGI partners. The meetings included broad discussions about the comprehensive anti-gang strategy, gang intelligence that would then be used for enforcement and intervention targeting, and prosecution priorities. The meetings also provided the opportunity for updates regarding prevention and re-entry efforts, training opportunities, reports of recent arrests and convictions (“The Turf Report”), the status of investigations (“Worst of the Worst”), and funding updates. State and federal prosecutors also discussed the merits of prosecuting different gang members in their respective judicial forums. CAGI was credited with fostering close relationships between the various law enforcement agencies and between state and federal prosecutors.

The CAGI task force also attempted to increase its impact through collaboration with other related initiatives. Specifically, there was considerable overlap with PSN as well as with the Weed and Seed initiatives in the region and with regional gang reduction task forces supported by the Florida Attorney General’s Office.

Development and Implementation of CAGI

As noted above, CAGI initially focused on Hillsborough County and Tampa specifically but expanded over time to include a regional focus. The expansion was based on gang intelligence that suggested gang activity was occurring throughout the region and was highly mobile and cross-jurisdictional.

Problem Analysis:

CAGI funds were used to hire a Gang Analyst within the Crime Analyst's office of the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office to follow and record gang activities. Gang intelligence indicated that there were 54 gangs active in this area. There were nine identified CAGI hot spots throughout the region: Town-n-Country, Wimauma, Riverview, Dover, Palmetto Beach, West Tampa, University Area, Sulphur Springs, and Busch and 50th. Seven gang "hot spots" were identified in Hillsborough County.

Strategies:

Suppression

CAGI enforcement funding was primarily used to support gang enforcement efforts in the Tampa Police Department, Hillsborough County Sheriff's Department and the State Attorney's Office. The police department and sheriff's office used the funds for overtime for gang enforcement. Suppression strategies included directed patrols and field interrogations in CAGI hotspot locations, probation/parole home visits, joint federal/state case screening, and increased federal and state gang prosecutions. In addition, a gang prosecutor and gang analyst were hired to support the CAGI program.

Key enforcement partners included the District's Organized Crime Section in Tampa that was devoted almost exclusively to gang prosecutions. The office was supported in these efforts by the ATF-sponsored Gulf Coast Investigative Strike Force. Federal prosecutors routinely collaborated with their state counterparts. Additionally, the Multi Agency Gang Task Force (MAGTF), the U.S. Marshal's Service Fugitive Task Force, and the ICE Community Shield Task Force participated in several successful gang roundups.

Law enforcement officials were able to point to a number of gang-focused enforcement operations. One example was based on a six-day street gang suppression operation that was part of the nationwide enforcement initiative on criminal street gangs called ICE Surge. The MAGTF worked with DHS special agents and numerous local law enforcement agencies from the surrounding counties to arrest street gang members. Similarly, Tampa Bay area law enforcement agencies conducted a round-up of targeted gang affiliates with outstanding warrants in what was referred to as the "Operation Boomerang-We'll Be Back." This was the first operation with the Florida Attorney General's Florida Gang Reduction Task Force. The Task force arrested numerous gang affiliates and seized considerable amounts of cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine.

Prevention

Prevention efforts focused on 7 – 14 year olds with a high-risk of gang involvement to support gang membership prevention, gang intervention, and gang crime prevention. The prevention program was run by the Hillsborough County Criminal Justice Office (HCCJO) and followed the OJJDP/Spergel model of comprehensive gang prevention and intervention. HCCJO worked with Gulf Coast Community Care (GCCC) as the primary service provider for

prevention programming. A voucher program was developed to link at-risk youth to programs. A wide variety of programs developed through CAGI. For example:

- GCCC received referrals from schools, youth and families, and the community and provided group or individualized services under the Gang Out Youth Prevention Program through primary and secondary collaborative community partners.
- At-risk youth participated in various programs in nine targeted hot spots. All fifth grade teachers and guidance counselors received training on identifying students who might need referrals to the Gang Out Program.
- GCCC, HCCJ, and community partners coordinated prevention programs including art, prevention classes for youth and families, and mentoring.
- HCCJ conducted Community Gang Awareness Trainings in targeted hot spots and in collaboration with County Parks & Recreation, the Sheriff Office (HCSO), and other partners. GCCC provided anti-gang awareness trainings at elementary schools in the hot spot areas in the county.
- GCCC and HCCJ staff participated in the "Too Good for Drugs Walk & Kidfest." Over 5,000 youth and families participated. Gang prevention materials were given out, and youth and families were educated.
- HCCJ developed and expanded the MVP male leadership program offered in several middle and two high schools. The University of South Florida Education Department hosted the second annual MVP Community Summit. Many local leaders, businesses, school faculty members, youth, and family members participated.
- A CAGI collaborative partner known as "Its All About Kids," initiated their Buzz the spelling bee / anti gang prevention play / program. Additional plays will be performed at parks, schools, and community centers. They also completed their community youth outreach program for several Bee Bully and Gang Proof Prevention sessions.
- GCCC and FBI agents established and completed a six-week "Junior Special Agent Academy" for youth ages 10 through 14. FBI agents and trainers conducted all sessions. Twenty-two youth completed the program.
- Continuous communication has occurred with community agencies and schools targeted in the "hot spots." The Schools' resource officers, counselors and principals were notified and presented with information concerning this Anti-Gang Initiative.

Reentry

The CAGI task utilized existing services and agencies to build its gang reentry program. CAGI funds were used to hire two reentry specialists who coordinated services and worked with this network of agencies. The Hillsborough County Anti-Gang Re-entry Coordinator (HCARC) and the GCCC Reentry Specialist were co-located with the HCSO Criminal Registration Unit (CRU) to provide services to the target population. The CRU unit already had responsibility for sexual predators, sexual offenders, career criminals and other convicted felons who were required to register when being released to Hillsborough County. They also worked with the

Hillsborough Ex-Offender Re-entry Network (HERN) to identify and provide access to a variety of services. The coordinator and specialist also received training on both gangs and reentry.

Gulf Coast Community Care (GCCC) was selected to coordinate the services for gang-involved offenders being released. The Reentry Coordinator worked with the Florida Department of Corrections to obtain risk/needs assessments. The Coordinator and Specialist then worked with clients to ensure compliance with supervision requirements and to link to services. A voucher system was used to provide services such as food, clothing shelter, transportation, identification, medical, employment, and similar transitional needs. The collaboration of the reentry specialists with service providers, DCF and the Sheriff's Office resulted in a joint effort called "Looking Ahead." The program provided intensive case management, treatment and ancillary social services and support to adult offenders diagnosed with a mental illness who are returning to Hillsborough County.

The reentry coordinator and specialist also worked with local employers to create job opportunities and also to monitor performance and compliance among the program participants. Indeed, the GCCC's Re-Entry Specialist was reported to make weekly visits to clients' place of employment and living quarters to ensure compliance and identify and mitigate any problems or concerns on behalf of the client, landlord, and/or employer.

Outcomes:

CAGI officials reported that the biggest impact of the Tampa CAGI was the development of close and sustainable law enforcement partnerships which cross jurisdictional and agency boundaries. Prior to CAGI, prosecutors and agents did not meet regularly to discuss their cases and investigations. Since CAGI was implemented, however, this became a routine practice in MDFL. Regardless of the funding situation, partnerships created by CAGI in MDFL were expected to continue. Indeed, CAGI officials pointed out the strong involvement of criminal justice agencies outside Hillsborough County even though they did not receive CAGI funds.

TPD and HCSO reported declines in crime and related them to major "take-downs" of key gangs.

Sustainability

As in the other sites, as the CAGI federal funding came to an end, sustainability was identified as the biggest challenge for the Tampa CAGI partners. The task force used Recovery Act funding to continue the initiative and sought other federal, state and local funding for specific program needs. They continued to have monthly meetings with 35-45 participants in attendance. There was significant promise for continuing the reentry program through collaboration with the Florida Department of Corrections' "portals of reentry" system. This was based on a pilot project that the USAO was involved with in Jacksonville that will now be expanded. Inmates spend the end of their correctional confinement in a facility serving as a portal to the county where they expect to return. This is believed to facilitate in-prison and transitional services upon reentry.

APPENDIX 2: Informed Consent Form

Understanding the Impact of the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative Reentry Program on Former Prisoners

Research Participant Information and Consent Form

I. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH

You are being asked to participate in a research study by Michigan State University that seeks to understand what, if any effect the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative (CAGI) reentry program had on you as you transitioned back to the community. The study involves one interview with myself, the lead researcher on this project. It is expected that 10-15 participants will be enrolled for participation. You have been selected as a possible participant in this study because of your involvement in the CAGI reentry program. From this study, we hope to learn more about the things that make the transition process easier as well as those things that make the process difficult.

II. WHAT YOU WILL DO

Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You do not have to participate. No one will know or be informed of your choice to participate in the study. The interview will take approximately 45-60 minutes in a private office. There are two components to the interview. In the first part of the interview I will ask you a set of questions and I want you to give me an answer. The second part of the interview will be more conversational and will be digitally recorded if you provide consent. You will have the ability to guide the discussion topics as well. **You may also refrain from discussing any issue or topic that you would not like to discuss.** You can refuse to answer any of the questions and you can stop the interview at any time. No one will know or be informed of your refusal to answer. And you will still receive a \$25 gift card for your time.

It is important to note that the interview will be conducted by me for only research purposes. **Everything that you discuss with me, the interviewer, will remain ANONYMOUS.** I will not record your name nor will I collect any identifying information from you. None of the information that you provide during the interview will be available to your parole agent or any other law enforcement and/or regulatory agency.

III. POTENTIAL BENEFITS

The potential benefits to you for taking part in this study are several. Your participation will contribute to the better understanding of the challenges faced upon reentry. Your participation will also contribute to the understanding of your unique perspective on how the CAGI reentry program can ease the transition process back to the community.

IV. POTENTIAL RISKS

There are no foreseeable risks associated with participation in this study. **In the event that some questions causes distress or discomfort, you have the ability to refrain from discussion.** Again, you can refuse to answer any of the questions and you can stop the interview at any time. I also ask that you do not tell me any crimes you plan to commit in the future; otherwise, I will have to report such matter.

V. PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY

Every effort will be made to maintain the privacy of your participation. The information exchanged and received for this project will remain anonymous, as I will not collect any identifying information from you. Only I will have access to the data, which will be kept in a secure office on a password protected computer and a locked file cabinet. The data we collect may be used for publication or presentation, but your comments and identity will remain anonymous.

VI. RIGHTS TO PARTICIPATE, SAY NO, OR WITHDRAW

Participation in this research project is completely voluntary. You have the right to say no and refuse participation. You may change your mind at any time and withdraw from participation. You may choose not to answer specific questions or to stop participation at any time. Your choice to participate, choice not to participate, or choice to withdraw from this study will have no affect on your current and future parole status.

VII. COSTS AND COMPENSATION

There are no monetary costs associated with participation. However, you will receive a \$25 gift card as compensation for participation in each interview.

VIII. CONTACT INFORMATION FOR QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS

I can answer any questions you may have before, during, or after the interview. If you have concerns or questions about this study, such as scientific issues, how to do any part of it, or to report an injury, please contact me, the researcher (Jennifer Cobbina, Michigan State University, 560 Baker Hall, East Lansing, Michigan, 48824, cobbina@msu.edu 517-353-9753). If you have any questions or concerns about your role and rights as a research participant, would like to obtain information or offer input, or would like to register a complaint about this research study, you may contact, anonymously if you wish, Michigan State University Human Research Protection Program at 517-355-2180, FAX 517-432-4503, or e-mail irb@msu.edu, or regular mail at: 207 Olds Hall, MSU, East Lansing, MI 48824.

You indicate your voluntary agreement to participate in this study by continuing this interview.

APPENDIX 3: Survey Instrument

#: _____

Date: _____

SURVEY INSTRUMENT

I appreciate your willingness to participate in this interview. I want you to feel comfortable and relaxed. Your opinion and feelings are important to me. I will be asking you some questions to guide our discussion. However, I hope you will feel free to talk about your experiences fully even if or when a question does not specifically relate to what you have to discuss. You may choose not to answer any questions that make you feel uncomfortable. There is not any right or wrong answers. Please ask me to repeat or rephrase a question if I am not making myself clear. In the first part of the interview I will ask you a set of questions and I want you to give me an answer. The second part of the interview will be more conversational and we will discuss some things in more detail. Do you have any questions before we begin? OK, let's get started.

1. What is your date of birth? ____/____/____

2. What is your race/ethnicity?

____ White (non-Hispanic) ____ Hispanic ____ Other (please describe)
____ Black ____ Asian

3. How far did you go in your schooling?

____ Some elementary school ____ Associates' Degree (2 yr degree)
____ Graduated elementary school ____ Bachelor's Degree (4 yr degree)
____ Some high school ____ Some graduate studies
____ Graduated high school ____ Obtained graduate degree
____ GED (Master's, Ph.D., J.D. M.D.)
____ Some college

4. Are you currently working? ____ Yes ____ No

a. If YES, what type of work do you do and how many hours do you work per week?

Work	Full-time	Part-time (hours per week)	Seasonal (hours per week)

5. I am also curious about your personal relationships.

Have you ever been married? ____ Yes ____ No

If YES: Are you currently married? ____ Yes ____ No

If CURRENTLY MARRIED: How long have you been married? _____

If NOT CURRENTLY MARRIED: What happened?

____ Widowed

How long ago did your spouse pass? _____

____ Separated

How long have you been separated? _____

____ Divorced

How long have you been divorced? ____
 ____ Other (please describe) ____
 IF NEVER MARRIED: Do you currently live with someone? ____ Yes ____ No
 If YES: Who? ____
 How long have you been in this living arrangement? ____

6. Are you currently involved in a (another) romantic relationship? ____ Yes ____ No
 If YES, for how long? ____

7. Do you have children? ____ Yes ____ No
 How many are your biological children? ____
 How many are your step children? ____
 How many are adopted? ____

If YES, how old are your children?

GIRLS:

Biological: ____
 Step: ____
 Adopted: ____

BOYS:

Biological: ____
 Step: ____
 Adopted: ____

Now I'm going to ask you some questions about different types of violence that you may have been exposed to and how often you have witnessed such activity. Have you ever seen a(n) ...

10.

Exposure to violence	How often?	Who committed the attack?
Child Abused		
Physical Attack (of an adult)		
Sexual assault		
Family violence		
Stabbing		
Gun shots		
Someone shot		
Drive-by shootings		
Seen someone killed		

Now I'm going to ask you some questions about whether or not you have been a victim of different types of crimes and how often you have been a victim. Have you ever been ...

11.

Exposure to violence	How often?	Who committed the attack?
Abused as a child		
Physically Attacked (as an adult)		
Sexually assaulted		
Threatened with a weapon		
Stabbed		
Shot		

I will now ask you some questions about your family members and any involvement they may have had with criminal activity.

12. Have any of your family members ever used illegal drugs? ☐ Yes ☐ No
- a. If yes, what is his/her relationship to you? _____
- b. What types of drugs did s/he use? _____
- c. Was s/he ever addicted to drugs? ☐ Yes ☐ No
- d. Has s/he ever received treatment? ☐ Yes ☐ No
13. Have any of your family members ever been addicted to alcohol? ☐ Yes ☐ No
- a. If yes, what is his/her relationship to you? _____
- b. Has s/he ever received treatment? ☐ Yes ☐ No
14. Have any of your family members ever sold illegal drugs? ☐ Yes ☐ No
- a. If yes, what is his/her relationship to you? _____
- b. What types of drugs did s/he sell? _____
15. Have any of your family members ever been arrested? ☐ Yes ☐ No
- a. If yes, what is his/her relationship to you? _____
- b. What crime(s) was the person(s) arrested for? _____

- c. Has s/he been in jail or prison? ____ Yes ____ No
d. If YES, how many times? _____

Now I'm going to ask you some questions about you and any involvement you have had with criminal activity. Please do not tell me of any criminal activities you may plan on committing.

16. Have you ever used drugs? ____ Yes ____ No

- a. If yes, how old were you when you first used drugs? _____
b. What types of drugs have you used?

- c. Have you used drugs in the last 6 months? ____ Yes ____ No
d. What type of drugs did you use?

- e. How often did you use drugs? _____

17. Have you ever sold drugs? ____ Yes ____ No

- a. If yes, how old were you when you first sold drugs? _____
b. What types of drugs have you sold?

- c. Have you sold drugs in the last 6 months? ____ Yes ____ No
d. What type of drugs did you sell?

- e. How often do you sell drugs? _____

18. Have you ever received drug treatment? ____ Yes ____ No

If YES,

- a. When? _____
b. Were you required to participate in drug treatment or did you volunteer to take part in the program?
Required _____ Volunteer _____
c. How often were the sessions?

d. How often did you go? _____
e. How long were the sessions? _____
f. How long was the whole treatment program? _____
g. Do you think the treatment was helpful? ____ Yes ____ No

If YES,

- a. Are you currently receiving treatment? ____ Yes ____ No
- b. Are you required to participate in drug treatment or did you volunteer to take part in the program?
Required ____ Volunteer ____
- c. How often are the sessions?

- d. How often do you go? _____
- e. How long are the sessions? _____
- f. How long is the whole treatment program? _____
- g. Do you think the treatment is helpful? ____ Yes ____ No

19. Have you ever gone to AA or NA meetings? ____ Yes ____ No

If YES,

- a. When? _____
- b. Were you required to participate in AA/NA meetings or did you volunteer to take part in the program?
Required ____ Volunteer ____
- c. How often were the meetings?

- d. How often did you go? _____
- e. How long were the sessions? _____
- f. How long were you required or volunteered to go to NA treatment? _____

IF YES,

- a. Are you currently going to AA/NA meetings? ____ Yes ____ No
- b. Are you required to participate in AA/NA meetings or do you volunteer to take part in the program?
Required ____ Volunteer ____
- c. How often are the meetings?

- d. How often do you go? _____
- e. How long are the sessions? _____
- f. How long are you required to or will you volunteer to go to NA treatment?

20. What offense(s) were you charged with that led to your last incarceration? If the offense was a parole violation, what was the parole violation? What was the original charge?

21. When were you released from prison? Month ____ day ____ year ____

22. How old were you when you were **first** arrested? _____

- a. (If under 18 years), have you ever been detained at a juvenile correctional facility? ____ Yes ____ No
- b. If YES, how many times? _____
- c. How old were you when you were first arrested as an adult? _____

23. How many times have you been arrested as an adult? _____

24. How many times have you been incarcerated as an adult? _____

- a. How many times were you incarcerated for parole violations? _____
- b. How many times were you incarcerated for new offenses? _____

25. Did you have any money the last time that you were released from prison?

___ Yes ___ No

If YES, how much? _____

Where did you get it? (check all that apply and give approximate amount)

___ family ___ from the correctional facility
___ friends ___ saved from prior incarceration
___ prison job ___ Other

26. Since you were released from prison, have you ever tried to ... If yes, did you find it very difficult, somewhat difficult, or very easy to accomplish this goal?

	Goal	Very difficult	Somewhat difficult	Very easy
a. restore relationships with family?				
b. restore relationships with children?				
c. regain custody of children?				
d. reestablish contact w/ old friends?				
e. be accepted socially?				
f. stay alcohol free				
g. stay drug free				
h. provide yourself with food				
i. stay away from criminal activity				
j. avoid a parole violation				
k. stay in good health				
l. make enough money to support yourself				
m. further your education				
n. provide yourself with adequate housing				
o. find a job				
p. find a job you enjoy				
q. keep a job				

27. Do you live in a safe neighborhood? ___ Yes ___ No

28. Are there people living on your street who belong to a gang?

___ Yes ___ No ___ I don't know

29. Are there any types of problems in the neighborhood that you live in? (Probe: drugs, crime) ___ Yes ___ No

If YES, what kind of problems? _____

30. Are you living in the same neighborhood you lived in before you were last incarcerated?

___ Yes ___ No

31. Have you been stopped by the police since you were released on parole?

___ Yes ___ No

a. If yes, how many times were you stopped?

b. Why were you stopped?

32. Overall, are you satisfied with your progress since your release from prison?

___ Yes ___ No ___ Maybe

a. Why or why not?

APPENDIX 4: In-Depth Interview Guide

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE

Now I would like to continue our interview, but in a different way than we have been doing. Rather than asking you questions where I want you to choose an answer, now I'd like for us to be able to have a conversation about some things in greater detail. In order for us to talk without my taking lots of notes and to be sure to get everything you say, I will be using the digital recorder during the interview. You may ask me to turn off the recorder at any time. When I write up the final report of the study I may quote certain things that you say, but I will not identify you specifically. So is it okay that we keep going with the interview?

1. Can you tell me about the first crime you ever committed?

PROMPTS:

- * What crime did you commit?
- * How old were you?
- * Why did you commit the crime? (i.e. peers, neighborhood, family prob., economic problems, boyfriend/partner, abuse)
- * Did you commit the crime alone or in a group?

2. Have you been involved in gang activity?

PROMPTS:

- * If YES, how did you get involved in gang activity?
- * How old were you?
- * Why did you get involved?
- * What kind of activities did you do?
- * What, if any, crimes did you commit while in a gang?
- * Are you still in a gang?
- * If yes, why? If no, why not? How did you get out?

3. Have you used or sold drugs?

- * If YES, can you explain why you started using and/or selling drugs?
- * How did you get involved with drug activity?
- * Can you describe the first incident when you started using drugs?

4. Can you tell me about the **first** time you were ever ...

- stopped by the police?
- arrested by the police?

PROMPTS:

- * What crime were you arrested for?
- * Why were you engaging in that criminal activity? (i.e. peers, neighborhood, family prob., economic problems, boyfriend/partner, abuse)
- * What were you thinking about prior to committing this crime?

5. Can you tell me about the **last** time that you were ...
- arrested by the police?
 - stopped by the police?

PROMPTS:

- * What crime were you arrested for?
- * Who was involved?
- * Where did the crime happen?
- * Why were you engaging in that criminal activity?
- * What were you thinking about prior to committing this crime?

Now, we're going to talk in general about what you remember when you left prison.

5. Can you describe the first 24 hours you were last out from prison?

PROMPT?

- * Who picked you up?
- * How did you get to your destination?
- * Where did you stay initially?
- * Who did you stay with?
- * What were some of your thoughts and feelings during that time?
- * Did you feel prepared upon your release?
- * What did you do in the first few hours you were out?
- * Did you celebrate after your release?
- * If YES, how did you celebrate?

6. Who did you spend the most time with when you first got out of prison?

PROMPT:

- * What was it like for you to be with her/him/them?

7. Can you explain some of the obstacles and challenges that you faced when you were released from prison?

PROMPT:

- * Can you give specific examples?
- * How did you deal with these challenges?

8. How did you first get set-up with ...

PROMPT:

- * Housing? Food? Employment? Substance abuse? Child care? Peer support? Counseling? Mental health service?
- * Were you able to support yourself when you first got out of prison?
- * If YES, how did you support yourself?
- * If NO, why weren't you able to support yourself?
- * How were you being supported?
- * Who informed you about this program?
- * What types of needs did you have?
- * How did you deal with them?

9. Are you currently supporting yourself?

PROMPT

- * If YES, how are you supporting yourself?
- * If working, can you explain how you got the job?
- * If NO, why aren't you supporting yourself?
- * What type of needs do you currently have?

Now, we're going to talk about some ways you may have broken the law since you were released from prison. Remember, everything you tell me is confidential and will not be disclosed to your parole officer or anyone else.

10. Have you committed any crimes since your release from prison?

PROMPT:

- * If YES, what crimes have you committed?
- * Why did you commit the crime(s)?
- * What do you think are the benefits of committing crime(s)?
- * What do you think are the costs (sacrifices) of committing crime(s)?
- * How often do you engage in criminal activity?
- * Do you see yourself stopping your criminal activity in the future?
- * What would stop you from committing crimes in the future?

- * If NO, why haven't you committed any crimes? (Are there other reasons besides returning to prison?)
- * What do you think are the benefits of not engaging in crime(s)?
- * What do you think are the costs (sacrifices) of not engaging in crime(s)?
- * Can you explain how you have managed to avoid engaging in criminal activity?

Now, we're going to talk about different types of agencies you may be involved with since your release back into the community. I know that you were involved in the CAGI reentry initiative.

11. How did you find out about the CAGI reentry program?

PROMPT:

- * Can you explain how you got involved?
- * Did you want to get involved? Why or why not?

12. What were the programs that you participated in?

Prompt

- * What did you actually do?
- * How often did you attend these sessions?
- * How long did each session last?
- * How many weeks or months were you in the program?

13. Did you receive any other type of services?

Prompt

*What were they?

* How long did you receive the service?

14. What did you like about the program/services that you received?

Prompt

*Why?

*How was it helpful?

*What, if anything, did you gain from participating in these programs/services?

15. What did you dislike about the program/services?

Prompt

*Why?

*How was it unhelpful?

*What, if anything, did you lose from participating in these programs/services?

16. Do you think the programs/service can be improved to make it more helpful?

Prompt

*If so, in what ways?

17. Have you taken part in other intervention programs in the past?

Prompt

*If yes, how was the CAGI initiative different than the other services that you received?

18. Would you recommend the program/service to others?

Prompt

*Why or why not?

19. Do you have anything else to add?

APPENDIX 5: Raleigh Police Department Gang Assessment Form

GANG ASSESSMENT FORM RALEIGH P.D. RESPONSES

Instructions –

The following form contains two separate sections. Front-side (**basic measures**) is incident-based and back-side (**enhanced measures**) is offender-based. Officers are to complete the **Basic Measures** section of the form for each arrest of an individual who is identified as a gang member. Determination of gang membership must be in accordance with the departmental definition of “gang” and “gang membership”. Officers should complete the **Enhanced Measures** section of the form once per offender. All forms should be completed in accordance with the protocols and standards discussed in the departmental training session.

Definitions –

1. **“Crime Beat”** - patrol beat in which the crime occurs.
2. **“Residence Beat”** - patrol beat in which the offender lives.
3. **“Gang Related Crime”** - any crime in which the offender and or the victim is identified as gang member according to the department’s gang identification criteria.
4. **“Gang Motivated”** - crime committed in the furtherance of the gang or at the behest of the gang. Motives include, but are not limited to: initiation, rank promotion, money, punishment and membership desistance.
5. **“Tattoo”** refers to whether or not the offender displayed gang tattoos at the time of arrest.
6. **“Colors”** refers to whether or not the offender displayed gang colors at the time of arrest.

GANG MEMBER SUSPECT ARREST ONLY – 16 YEARS OF AGE AND OLDER

OCA# _____

OFC. _____

Name _____

DOB ____/____/____

BASIC MEASURES

<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 10px;"> 1. Offense Type <input type="checkbox"/> Homicide <input type="checkbox"/> Aggravated Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Simple assault <input type="checkbox"/> Domestic assault <input type="checkbox"/> Burglary / BE <input type="checkbox"/> Rape <input type="checkbox"/> Armed Robbery <input type="checkbox"/> Strong armed robbery <input type="checkbox"/> Drug offense <input type="checkbox"/> Gun Crime <input type="checkbox"/> Other </div>	4. Sex: ____ 5. Age: ____ 6. Time: ____ hrs. 7. District: ____ 8. Crime Beat: ____ 9a. Directed Motive: 1- <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2- <input type="checkbox"/> No 3- <input type="checkbox"/> Undetermined	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 10px;"> 12a. Gang Name _____ b. Gang Set _____ </div> 13. Residence/Beat Area _____ (Outside City = 9999) 14. Tattoo: 1- <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No 15. Colors: 1- <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No 16. # Present at
2. Race: 1- <input type="checkbox"/> Asia 2- <input type="checkbox"/> Black 3- <input type="checkbox"/> Latino 4- <input type="checkbox"/> White 5- <input type="checkbox"/> Other	9b. Motive: _____ _____	
3. Date: ____/____/____ (mm / dd /yyyy)	10. Weapon Present: 1- <input type="checkbox"/> Handgun 2- <input type="checkbox"/> Rifle/Shotgun 3- <input type="checkbox"/> Knife (Circle of used)	4- <input type="checkbox"/> Hands/Feet 5- <input type="checkbox"/> Other 6- <input type="checkbox"/> None
11. Incident occurred: 1- <input type="checkbox"/> during School Day 2- <input type="checkbox"/> on weekend or School Holiday		
Miranda Waived: Yes No Prior Form Completed: Yes No		

*The following questions are part of an ongoing research project.
Your participation is completely voluntary.
If you choose to participate, all responses will be kept confidential.*

17. High School graduate: 1-☐ Yes 0-☐ No

18. Highest year of school completed: _____

19. Currently attending school: 1-☐ Yes 0-☐ No

20. Raised by: 1-☐ Two parents
2-☐ Single parent
3-☐ Grandparent
4-☐ Other

21. Marital status: 1-☐ Married 2-☐ Single

22. Children: 1-☐ Yes 0-☐ No

23. Ever reported for aggression? 1-☐ Yes 0-☐ No

24. Ever bullied or victim of violence in your home or school, or by peers or strangers? 1-☐ Yes 0-☐ No

25. Ever on probation: 1-☐ Yes 0-☐ No

26. If Yes, # of times: _____

27. Ever incarcerated: 1-☐ Yes 0-☐ No

28. If Yes, total # of months incarcerated: _____

29. Age at first arrest: _____

30. Total arrests: _____

31. Age at gang membership: _____

29. Age at first arrest: _____ 30: Total arrests: _____ 31. Age at gang membership: _____

<p>4 = often 3 = sometimes 2 = seldom 1 = never</p> <p>How often did a parent, stepparent or adult living in your home:</p> <p>____ 30. praise you for good grades</p> <p>____ 31. praise you for sports achievements</p> <p>____ 32. help you with homework</p> <p>____ 33. swear at you, insult you or put you down</p> <p>____ 34. threaten to hit you or throw something at you but didn't</p> <p>____ 35. push, grab, slap or throw something at you</p> <p>____ 36. hit you so hard that you had marks or were injured</p>	<p>4 = strongly agree 3 = agree 2 = disagree 1 = strongly disagree</p> <p>DII Subset</p> <p>____ 37. A person who is not willing to collect debts by force does not deserve to be repaid</p> <p>____ 38. A person who stares at you is challenging you</p> <p>____ 39. Hanging out with weak people will hurt your reputation</p> <p>____ 40. The amount of conflict you can handle shows your strength</p> <hr/>
---	--

SPECIAL NOTES TO OFFICERS

- 1) Must be voluntary. For citations, use statement at top of page in requesting participation.
- 2) If officer provides a verified response to a question, circle the answer.
- 3) Use conservative numbers if provided with a range of answers.
- 4) Leave blank if refused to answer question.
- 5) Back of form is only required for new interviewees.

- SPECIAL NOTES TO OFFICERS**
- 1) Must be voluntary. For citations, use statement at top of page in requesting participation.
 - 2) If officer provides a verified response to a question, circle the answer.
 - 3) Use conservative numbers if provided with a range of answers.
 - 4) Leave blank if refused to answer question.
 - 5) Back of form is only required for new interviewees.

APPENDIX 6: Durham and Wake County Prevention Intervention Questionnaire

PREVENTION INTERVENTION QUESTIONNAIRE

People who work with Youth in Durham and Wake Counties need your help to learn how effective our programs are. We will ask you to complete this survey every six months. It is okay to skip any question you do not want to answer. No one else will see your answers but the research team. They want to learn what the group says, not the individual, so do not write your name.

Instructions: Most questions give you a list of options; you should click or circle the best choice. There are some questions that require you to type/write in your answers.

What program are you enrolled in?

TEI _____ S.O.A.R. _____ Steppin' Up _____
C.O.R.R.A.L. _____ NC Connected _____ Other? (name) _____

What was the first day you participated in the program? _____

What is the date (today) you are completing this form? _____

1. How old are you? _____ years _____ months

2. When were you born? _____ / _____ / _____
month date year

3. Are you
a. Male
b. Female

4. What is your race?
a. White
b. Black
c. American Indian
d. Asian
e. Hispanic
f. Other _____ Specify _____

5. Do you live with any of the following persons?
- a. both parents
 - b. mother only
 - c. father only
 - d. mother and stepfather
 - e. father and stepmother
 - f. grandparent(s)
 - g. foster parent(s)
 - h. in a group home
 - i. other _____Specify _____
6. Do you have any brothers or sisters?
- a. Yes (If **Yes**, continue to question 8.)
 - b. No (If **No**, skip to question 10.)
7. How many brother and /or sisters do you have?
- a. Number of brothers _____
 - b. Number of sisters _____
8. How old are they?
- a. Your brother(s)? _____, _____, _____, _____, _____, _____, _____, _____
 - b. Your sister(s)? _____, _____, _____, _____, _____, _____, _____, _____

IF YOU CURRENTLY GO TO SCHOOL, CONTINUE. IF NOT IN SCHOOL, SKIP TO 16.

9. What grade are you in? _____
10. Do you enjoy going to school?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
11. Have you ever missed (skipped) school although your parents/guardians thought you were in class?
- a. Yes (If **Yes**, continue to question 12.)
 - b. No (If **No**, skip to question 13.)
12. During the last 6 months, how many times have you missed school for any reason, including skipping, sick or suspended?
- a. 0 times
 - b. 1-5 times
 - c. 6-10 times
 - d. 11-15 times
 - e. 16-20 times
 - f. 21-25 times
 - g. 26-30 times
 - h. 31 or more times

13. Have you ever been suspended from school?
- Yes (If **Yes**, continue to question 22.)
 - No (If **No**, skip to question 24.)
14. How many times in the past 6 months have you been suspended from school?
- 0 times
 - 1-2 times
 - 3-4 times
 - 5 times and over
15. How old were you when you first were suspended from school?
- 8 years old or younger
 - 9-10 years old
 - 11-12 years old
 - 13-14 years old
 - 15-16 years old
 - 17 years old or older
16. Have you ever smoked marijuana?
- Yes (If **Yes**, continue to question 14.)
 - No (If **No**, skip to question 18.)
17. How old were you when you tried marijuana for the first time?
- 8 years old or younger
 - 9-10 years old
 - 11-12 years old
 - 13-14 years old
 - 15-16 years old
 - 17 years old or older
18. During the past 6 months, how many times did you use marijuana?
- 0 times
 - 1-5 times
 - 6-10 times
 - 11-15 times
 - 16-20 times
 - 21-25 times
 - 26 times or more
19. Have you ever used marijuana on school property?
- Yes (If **YES**, continue to question 16.)
 - No (If **No**, skip to question 18.)

20. During the last 6 months, how many times have you used marijuana on school property?

- a. 0 times
- b. 1-5 times
- c. 6-10 times
- d. 11-15 times
- e. 16-20 times
- f. 21-25 times
- g. 26 times or more

21. During the last 6 months have you used any of these other drugs?

A. Cocaine

- a. Yes (If **Yes**, how often?)
 - i. 1-5 times
 - ii. 6-10 times
 - iii. 11-15 times
 - iv. 16-20 times
 - v. 21-25 times
 - vi. 26 times or more
- b. No

B. Heroin (also called smack, junk, or china)

- a. Yes (If **Yes**, how often?)
 - i. 1-5 times
 - ii. 6-10 times
 - iii. 11-15 times
 - iv. 16-20 times
 - v. 21-25 times
 - vi. 26 times or more
- b. No

C. Methamphetamines (also called speed, crystal, crank, or ice)

- a. Yes (If **Yes**, how often?)
 - i. 1-5 times
 - ii. 6-10 times
 - iii. 11-15 times
 - iv. 16-20 times
 - v. 21-25 times
 - vi. 26 times or more
- b. No

D. Ecstasy (also called MDMA)

- a. Yes (If **Yes**, how often?)
 - i. 1-5 times
 - ii. 6-10 times
 - iii. 11-15 times
 - iv. 16-20 times
 - v. 21-25 times
 - vi. 26 times or more
- b. No

E. Others /specify _____

- a. How often?
 - i. 1-5 times
 - ii. 6-10 times
 - iii. 11-15 times
 - iv. 16-20 times
 - v. 21-25 times
 - vi. 26 times or more

22. Have you ever sold illegal drugs?

- a. Yes (If **Yes**, continue to question 20.)
- b. No (If **No**, skip to question 21.)

23. In the past 6 months, how many times have you sold illegal drugs?

- a. 0 times
- b. 1-2 times
- c. 3-5 times
- d. 6-9 times
- e. 10-19 times
- f. 20 times or more

24. Have you ever carried a weapon, such as a gun, knife, or club?

- a. Yes
- b. No

25. Have you ever carried a weapon such as a gun, knife, or club to school?

- a. Yes (If **Yes**, continue to question 26.)
- b. No (If **No**, skip to question 27.)

26. A. During the last 6 months, how many days did you carry a gun?

- a. 0 days
- b. 1 days
- c. 2 days
- d. 3 days
- e. 4 days
- f. 5 days or more

B. During the last 6 months, how many days did you carry a knife?

- a. 0 days
- b. 1 days
- c. 2 days
- d. 3 days
- e. 4 days
- f. 5 days or more

C. During the last 6 months, how many days did you carry a club?

- a. 0 days
- b. 1 days
- c. 2 days
- d. 3 days
- e. 4 days
- f. 5 days or more

D. During the last 6 months, how many days did you carry another type of weapon? (Specify type of weapon _____.)

- a. 0 days
- b. 1 days
- c. 2 days
- d. 3 days
- e. 4 days
- f. 5 days or more

27. Have you ever drank alcohol such as beer, wine or hard liquor?

- a. Yes (If **Yes**, continue to question 28.)
- b. No (If **No**, skip to question 29.)

28. A. During the last 6 months, on how many occasions have you had beer?

- a. 0 times
- b. 1-2 times
- c. 3-5 times
- d. 6-9 times
- e. 10 times or more

B. During the last 6 months, on how many occasions have you had wine?

- a. 0 times
- b. 1-2 times
- c. 3-5 times
- d. 6-9 times
- e. 10 times or more

C. During the last 6 months, on how many occasions have you had hard liquor?

- a. 0 times
- b. 1-2 times
- c. 3-5 times
- d. 6-9 times
- e. 10 times or more

29. Have you ever stolen a motor vehicle, such as a car or motorcycle?

- a. Yes (If **Yes**, continue to question 30.)
- b. No (If **No**, skip to question 31.)

30. In the past 6 months, how many times have you stolen or tried to steal a motor vehicle, such as a car or a motorcycle?

- a. 0 times
- b. 1-2 times
- c. 3-5 times
- d. 6 times or more

31. Have you ever been arrested?

- a. Yes (If **Yes**, continue to question 32.)
- b. No (If **No**, skip to question 33.)

32. In the past 6 months, how many times have you been arrested?

- a. 0 times
- b. 1-2 times
- c. 3-5 times
- d. 6 times or more

33. Have you ever attacked someone with the intention to harm them?

- a. Yes (If **Yes**, continue to question 34.)
- b. No (If **No**, skip to question 35.)

34. In the past 6 months, how many times have you attacked someone with the idea of seriously hurting them?

- a. 0 times
- b. 1-2 times
- c. 3-5 times
- d. 6 times or more

35. Have you ever bullied, taunted, ridiculed, or teased someone?

- a. Yes (If **Yes**, continue to question 36.)
- b. No (If **No**, skip to question 37.)

36. In the past 6 months, how many times have you bullied, taunted, ridiculed, or teased someone?
- a. 0 times
 - b. 1-2 times
 - c. 3-5 times
 - d. 6-9 times
 - e. 10-19 times
 - f. 20 times or more
37. Have you ever cheated in school?
- a. Yes (If **Yes**, continue to question 38.)
 - b. No (If **No**, skip to question 39.)
38. In the last 6 months, I cheated at school
- a. All the time
 - b. Often
 - c. Sometimes
 - d. Rarely
 - e. Never
39. Have you ever done something dangerous because someone dared you to do it?
- a. Yes (If **Yes**, specify what you have done. _____)
 - b. No
40. Do you ever do "crazy"/risky things even if they are a little dangerous?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
41. Specify what risky things you have done. _____
42. You are looking at the CD's in the music store with a friend. You look up and see her slip a CD under her coat. She smiles and says "Which one do you want? Go ahead, take it while nobody's around." There is no one in sight, no employees or other customers. What would you do?
- a. Take the CD
 - b. Tell my friend its wrong to steal
 - c. Leave the store immediately
 - d. Tell my friend to steal if for me
 - e. Other / Specify
- _____
- _____

43. It is 8:00 on a weeknight and you are about to go over to a friend's house when your mother asks you where you are going. You say, "Oh, just going to go hang out with some friends." She says, "No, you'll just get into trouble if you go out. Stay home tonight." What would you do now?

- a. Stay home
 - b. Sneak out
 - c. Try to convince my mom to let me go out
 - d. Other/Specify
-
-

44. You are visiting another part of town and you do not know any of the people your age there. You are walking down the street, and some teenager you do not know is walking toward you. He is about your size, and as he is about to pass you he deliberately bumps into you and you almost lose your balance. What would you say or do?

- a. Bump back at him
 - b. Walk away
 - c. Fight him
 - d. Other/Specify
-
-

45. You are at a party at someone's house, and one of your friends offers you a drink containing alcohol. What would you say or do?

- a. Take the drink
 - b. Say no thank you
 - c. Tell my friend about the dangers of alcohol
 - d. Leave the party
 - e. Others / Specify
-
-

46. Have you ever have sexual intercourse?

- a. Yes (If **Yes**, continue to question 47.)
- b. No (If **No**, skip to question to 49.)

47. Were you physically forced to have sexual intercourse when you did not want to?

- a. Yes
- b. No

48. Were you dared to have intercourse when you did not want to?

- a. Yes
- b. No

49. In the 6 months, how many times has someone physically attacked you with the idea of seriously hurting you?
- a. 0 times
 - b. 1-2 times
 - c. 3-5 times
 - d. 6 times or more
50. Have you ever been slapped or physically hurt by your boyfriend or girlfriend?
- a. Yes (If **Yes**, continue to question 51.)
 - b. No (If **No**, skip to question 52.)
51. During the past 6 months, did your boyfriend or girlfriend ever hit, slap, or physically hurt you on purpose?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
52. Do you feel safe at school?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
53. Do you feel safe at home?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
54. Do you participate in extra-curricular activities?
- a. Yes (If **Yes**, continue to question 55.)
 - b. No (If **No**, skip to question 57.)
55. In the past 6 months, how many times have you participated in school or non-school extra-curricular activities (for example: sports, school clubs, Boys and Girls Club)?
- a. 0 times
 - b. 1 time
 - c. 2 times
 - d. 3 times
 - e. 4 times
 - f. 5 times or more
56. What type of activity(ies) did you participate in? _____
57. Do you watch television on school days?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
58. On an average school day, how many hours do you watch TV?
- a. 0-1 hour
 - b. 2-3 hours
 - c. 4 or hours

59. Do you participate in voluntary service in your community?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
60. In the last 6 months, how many times have you volunteered to do voluntary service?
- a. 0 times
 - b. 1-2 times
 - c. 3-5 times
 - d. 6-9 times
 - e. 10 times or more
61. If you volunteered in the last 6 months, what kind of service did you do?
- a. Help the elderly
 - b. Help at a shelter or group home
 - c. Help with a group in need
 - d. Help a person in need
 - e. Help on a school project
 - f. Other/specify _____
62. What type(s) of organizations have you volunteered in?
- a. Religious (church, synagogue or mosque)
 - b. School or educational
 - c. Health (hospital, urgent care center, doctor's office)
 - d. Human service
 - e. Neighborhood (civic groups, social clubs, social action group)
 - f. Youth group or clubs
 - g. Recreational
 - h. Environmental
 - i. Other/specify _____
63. Do you play sports?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
64. During the past 6 months, on how many sports teams did you play? (Include any teams run by your school, community groups, or faith-based organization.)
- a. 0 teams
 - b. 1 team
 - c. 2 teams
 - d. 3 teams
 - e. 4 teams
 - f. 5 teams or more
65. Does your school provide the opportunity for you to participate in sports?
- a. Yes
 - b. No

66. How would you answer the following statement? "There are a lot of chances for students in my school to get involved in sports, clubs, and other school activities outside of class."
- a. Strongly Agree
 - b. Slightly Agree
 - c. Neither Agree nor Disagree
 - d. Slightly Disagree
 - e. Strongly Disagree
67. Do you know of any gang members?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
68. How many of your 4 best friends have been or are members of a gang?
- a. 0
 - b. 1
 - c. 2
 - d. 3
 - e. 4
69. Do you have family members who are gang members?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
70. Are there gangs in your neighborhood?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
71. Are you a member of a gang?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
72. Have any of your brothers or sisters ever drunk beer?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
73. Have any of your brothers or sisters ever drunk wine?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
74. Have any of your brothers or sisters ever drunk hard liquor?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
75. Have any of your brothers or sisters ever smoked marijuana?
- a. Yes
 - b. No

76. Have any of your brothers or sisters ever taken a handgun to school?
- Yes
 - No
77. Have any of your brothers or sisters ever been expelled from school?
- Yes
 - No
78. Do you know of any adults who use marijuana?
- Yes
 - No
79. How many of the adults who you know personally have used marijuana, crack, cocaine, or other drugs in the last 6 months?
- 0 adults
 - 1-2 adults
 - 3-5 adults
 - 6-9 adults
 - 10-19 adults
 - 20 adults or more
80. Think of your four best friends. In the 6 last months, how many of them have
- | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. dropped out of school | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| b. used alcohol | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| c. used drugs | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| d. sold drugs | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| e. carried a gun | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| f. been arrested | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| g. stolen something | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
81. Do you know of any gangs in your community?
- Yes
 - No
82. Do you know of any gangs in your school?
- Yes
 - No
83. Have you ever belonged to a gang?
- Yes (If **Yes**, continue to question 84.)
 - No (If **No**, skip to question 86.)
84. How old were you when you first joined a gang?
- 10 years old or younger
 - 11-15 years old
 - 16 years old or older

85. Are you a member of a gang now?

- a. Yes
- b. No

86. If you have ever belonged to a gang, did the gang have a name?

- a. Yes
- b. No

87. Describe what you believe a gang is

TELL US IF YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS.

88. There are adults in my life who are proud of me when I do something well.

- a. Agree
- b. Disagree

89. There are lots of adults in my life who I could talk to about something important.

- a. Agree
- b. Disagree

90. How many times have you changed homes since kindergarten?

- a. 0 times
- b. 1-2 times
- c. 3-5 times
- d. 6-9 times
- e. 10-19 times
- f. 20 times or more

REGARDING RULES, HOW WOULD YOU RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS?

91. I ignore rules that get in my way.

- a. Yes, I ignore rules that get in my way.
- b. No, I do not ignore rules even if they get in my way.

92. I do the opposite of what people tell me just to get people angry.

- a. Yes, I do the opposite of what people tell me just to get them angry.
- b. No, I do not do the opposite of what people tell me just to get them angry.

93. It is alright to beat up people if they start the fight.

- a. Yes, it is alright to beat up people if they start the fight.
- b. No, it is not alright to beat up people even if they start the fight.

94. I think it is okay to take something without asking if you can get away with it.
- a. It is always okay.
 - b. It is often okay.
 - c. It is sometimes okay.
 - d. It is rarely okay.
 - e. It is never okay.