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**Developing the Capacity to Understand and Prevent Homicide: An Evaluation of  
the Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission**

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## Abstract

The Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission (MHRC) was established in May 2004 to address the city's persistent lethal violence problem. The MHRC is a multi-tiered intervention with four levels, each of which involves participation by a different set of agencies and stakeholders. A key assumption underlying the four levels of MHRC review, and driving its decision to include stakeholders outside of the traditional criminal justice arena, was that the development and implementation of homicide prevention strategies is a complex and multi-faceted process that can be strengthened by input and buy-in from stakeholders throughout the community. The goal of the MHRC was to foster and support innovative homicide prevention and intervention strategies using the emerging tool of strategic problem analysis.

In February 2005, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) funded the Harvard School of Public Health to evaluate the MHRC. The evaluation, which utilized a randomized matched pair design, consisted of three principal components: 1) a formative evaluation, 2) a process evaluation, and 3) an impact evaluation. More specifically, through semi-structured interviews and analysis of homicide data collected as part of the project, the evaluation examined whether homicide reviews provide additional insights into the nature of homicide problems relative to traditional methods; whether these insights lead to the development of new strategic responses to homicide problems; whether law enforcement agencies, social service providers, and the community feel that sharing information improves their ability to work together; and whether these responses seem to have short-term homicide reduction impacts.

The NIJ-sponsored evaluation closely examined MHRC work from January 2005 through December 2007. During this time period, the MHRC conducted thirty criminal justice reviews, fifteen community service provider reviews and two community reviews, covering cases from January 2005 through November 2007. Overall, the homicide review process revealed that homicides in the City's intervention districts were largely clustered in very specific places, such as in and around taverns, and among active offenders who were very well known to the criminal justice system. Homicides were often the outcome of an ongoing dispute between individuals and/or groups (usually gangs) and involved respect, status, and retribution as motives.

The MHRC process yielded a comprehensive set of *actionable* policy and program development recommendations. These recommendations were ratified by and the implementation was continuously monitored by the MHRC Working and Executive Committees. In general, the MHRC recommendations better positioned criminal justice, social service, and community-based organizations to address high-risk places and high-risk people central to recurring homicide problems. MHRC participants credited the implementation of the recommendations with improving both criminal justice and community provider capacity to prevent violence. A key to this increased capacity was the improved communication, information sharing and cooperation both within and between criminal justice agencies, community service providers and community members.

The impact evaluation used statistical models to analyze a time series of monthly counts of homicides in the control and treatment districts (January 1999 – December 2006). The impact evaluation revealed that the implementation of the MHRC

interventions was associated with a statistically significant 52% decrease in the monthly count of homicide in the treatment districts. The control districts experienced a non-significant 9.2% decrease in homicide, controlling for the other covariates. While these analyses can't be used to specify the exact effect of the MHRC interventions, the empirical evidence suggests that the MHRC interventions were associated with a noteworthy decrease in homicide. As such, the MHRC homicide review process seems to add considerable value to understanding the nature of urban homicide problems, crafting appropriate interventions to address underlying risks associated with homicides, implementing innovative strategies to address these risks, and assessing the impacts of these strategies.

**Table of Contents**

*Executive Summary* ..... *i*  
*Introduction*..... - 1 -  
*Background*..... - 3 -  
*The Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission: The Review Structure*..... - 9 -  
*The Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission: Evaluation Methods*..... - 15 -  
*Findings*..... - 20 -  
*Conclusion*..... - 54 -  
*Bibliography/References*..... - 60 -  
*Appendix 1: Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission Participating Agencies*..... - 63 -  
*Appendix 2: Interview Protocol*..... - 1 -  
*Appendix 3: MHRC Actionable Recommendations* ..... - 1 -  
*Appendix 4: Timeline*..... - 12 -

## **Executive Summary**

In May 2004, the City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin assembled a working team of professionals charged with developing a multi-level, multi-agency homicide review process (the Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission – MHRC) to address the City’s ongoing problem with lethal violence. The goal of the Commission – then as now – was to foster and support innovative homicide prevention and intervention strategies using the emerging tool of strategic problem analysis. During the project period, funding for the initiative came from the Wisconsin Partnership Fund for a Healthy Future, administered through the University of Wisconsin School of Medicine and Public Health, Project Safe Neighborhoods, administered through the U.S. Attorneys Office, and Violence Against Women Act monies administered through the Wisconsin Office of Justice Statistics.

While an increasing number of police agencies have adopted the use of crime incident reviews to develop criminal justice prevention strategies as a result of the U.S. Department of Justice-sponsored Project Safe Neighborhoods initiative (Klofas and Hipple, 2006; Braga, 2005), the homicide review process remains largely unevaluated. In February 2005, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) funded the Harvard School of Public Health to evaluate the MHRC and to answer the broad question: what does the homicide review process add to the City of Milwaukee’s capacity to respond to the problem of lethal violence?

The evaluation, which utilized a randomized matched pair design, consisted of three principal components: 1) a formative evaluation, 2) a process evaluation, and 3) an impact evaluation. More specifically, through semi-structured interviews and analysis of homicide data collected as part of the project, the evaluation examined whether homicide

reviews provide additional insights into the nature of homicide problems relative to traditional methods; whether these insights lead to the development of new strategic responses to homicide problems; whether law enforcement agencies, social service providers, and the community feel that sharing information improves their ability to work together; and whether these responses seem to have short-term homicide reduction impacts.

From January 2005 through December 2007, the period of time covered by this evaluation, the MHRC conducted thirty criminal justice reviews, fifteen community service provider reviews and two community reviews, covering cases from January 2005 through November 2007. Reviews at all levels were coordinated by MHRC staff who managed the MHRCs' data collection efforts and analyzed aggregate data to help the MHRC frame prevention strategies. As described below (see Impact Evaluation), the data developed through the MHRC were far more comprehensive and accurate than data previously available.

Overall, the homicide review process revealed that homicides in the City's intervention districts were largely clustered in very specific places, such as in and around taverns, and among active offenders who were very well known to the criminal justice system. Homicides were often the outcome of an ongoing dispute between individuals and/or groups (usually gangs) and involved respect, status, and retribution as motives.

The principal "product" of the MHRC has been a comprehensive set of *actionable* recommendations (see Appendix 3) developed by the review teams and ratified by the Working and Executive Committees of the MHRC, implementation of which was continually monitored by the Commission. In general, the MHRC recommendations


better positioned criminal justice, social service, and community-based organizations to address high-risk places and high-risk people central to recurring homicide problems. These recommendations have led to significant changes in the policies and procedures of the MPD and other agencies and are credited by participants for improving both criminal justice and community provider capacity to prevent violence. A key to this increased capacity has been improved communication, information sharing and cooperation both within and between criminal justice agencies, community service providers and community members.

Using a time series of monthly counts of homicides in the control and treatment districts (January 1999 – December 2006), our impact evaluation revealed that the implementation of the MHRC interventions was associated with a statistically significant 52% decrease in the monthly count of homicide in the treatment districts. The control districts experienced a non-significant 9.2% decrease in homicide, controlling for the other covariates. While these analyses can't be used to specify the exact effect of the MHRC interventions, they do make a solid case that the MHRC interventions were associated with a noteworthy decrease in homicide. As such, we conclude that the homicide review process adds considerable value to understanding the nature of urban homicide problems, crafting appropriate interventions to address underlying risks associated with homicides, implementing innovative strategies to address these risks, and assessing the impacts of these strategies.

## Introduction

In 2005, following a long decline in homicide that culminated in 2004 with a historic low of 88 homicides, homicide rates in Milwaukee, Wisconsin increased (see Figure 1). In that year there were 122 homicides, 2067 aggravated assaults and 241 rapes (Milwaukee Police Department, 2007). In 2006, there were 103 homicide victims in Milwaukee. Among 23 U.S. cities with populations sizes between 500,000 and 1,000,000 residents in 2006, Milwaukee had the fifth highest homicide rate (17.7 per 100,000 residents) and the sixth highest violent crime rate (1,324.9) (Table 1).

**Figure 1.**



Responsive to the first signs of Milwaukee's homicide increase, and in keeping with emerging best practices in criminal justice homicide prevention strategies (Kennedy et al., 1996; Braga et al., 2001; McGarrell et al., 2006), in July 2004 Mayor Tom Barrett, Police Chief Nannette Hegerty and the District Attorney E. Michael McCann assembled a working team of professionals charged with developing a multi-

level, multi-disciplinary, and multi-agency homicide review process-- the Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission (MHRC). The MHRC from its inception had three overarching goals: to better understand the nature of homicide through strategic problem analysis, to develop innovative responses to the problem of homicide, and to strategically focus limited enforcement and intervention activities on identifiable risks such as violent crime hot spot areas, highly active violent offenders, and repeat victims.

Table 1. Violent Crime Rates and Homicide Rates per 100,000 Residents in 2006, U.S. Cities with Populations Sizes between 500,000 and 1,000,000

<b>Jurisdiction</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Homicide Rate</b>	<b>Violent Crime Rate</b>
Austin, TX	709,813	2.8	515.3
Baltimore, MD	637,556	43.3	1,696.5
Boston, MA	562,393	13.3	1,335.9
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, NC	699,398	11.9	1,076.9
Columbus, OH	731,547	11.6	811.2
Denver, CO	568,465	9.0	760.6
Detroit, MI	884,462	47.5	2,419.2
El Paso, TX	615,553	2.1	393.5
Fort Worth, TX	641,752	7.6	656.3
Honolulu, HI	912,693	1.9	300.8
Indianapolis, IN	800,969	17.5	960.0
Jacksonville, FL	795,822	13.8	837.2
Louisville, KY	626,018	8.0	612.8
Memphis, TN	680,828	21.9	1,991.0
<b>Milwaukee, WI</b>	<b>581,005</b>	<b>17.7</b>	<b>1,324.9</b>
Nashville-Davidson, TN	560,813	14.3	1,527.2
Oklahoma City, OK	536,016	10.3	802.4
Portland, OR	542,174	3.7	714.2
San Francisco, CA	746,085	11.5	875.6
San Jose, CA	920,548	3.2	386.8
Seattle, WA	583,772	5.1	711.2
Tucson, AZ	535,232	9.5	855.7
Washington, DC	581,530	29.1	1,445.8

Source: <http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/Local/RunCrimeOneYearofDataLarge.cfm>

From May 2005 through December 2007, the period of time covered by this evaluation, the MHRC reviewed 173 homicides and 99 non-fatal shootings. During this time, the National Institute of Justice funded one on-site (Dr. Mallory O'Brien) and two off-site (Dr. Deborah Azrael and Dr. Anthony Braga) evaluators to conduct a pre-post, intervention-control evaluation of the Milwaukee MHRC. As described below, the MHRC consists of one service-provision and three information gathering/data analytic components (called "levels" by participants). The evaluation focused almost exclusively on the latter three activities of the MHRC.

This report summarizes the results of the evaluation. We first lay out a brief description of the origin and development of homicide incident reviews. We then describe the structure of the MHRC, summarize its activities, and discuss factors that have facilitated and impeded its implementation. We then focus on the violence prevention initiatives developed by the MHRC and their impact on the City's capacity to respond to lethal violence and conclude with presentation of a rigorous statistical analysis of reductions in homicides in the treatment districts that were associated with the implementation of the violence prevention strategies.

## **Background**

Over the past decade, homicide reviews have generated substantial interest in both the criminal justice and public health arenas as a way to better understand the nature of homicide and focus scarce resources on recurring problems and identifiable risk factors. The City of Milwaukee established its homicide incident review commission in early 2005. The goal of the Commission – then as now – was to foster and support innovative homicide prevention and intervention strategies using the emerging tool of strategic

problem analysis as part of an over-all “problem-oriented policing” approach to homicide in the City.

Criminal justice approaches to homicide problems have traditionally been reactive, focusing on resolving individual homicides as they occur. These traditional strategies, primarily comprised of follow-up police investigations, rarely address the underlying conditions that produce recurring homicide problems.

In contrast, problem-oriented policing works to identify *why* a problem exists and to frame responses using a wide variety of innovative approaches (Goldstein, 1979). Using a basic, iterative approach of problem identification, analysis, response, assessment, and adjustment of the response, this adaptable and dynamic analytic approach provides an appropriate framework to explore the complex mechanisms at play in recurring problems and to develop tailor-made interventions to address the underlying conditions that cause them (Goldstein, 1990; Eck and Spelman, 1987). The National Academy of Sciences’ *Panel on the Understanding and Control of Violent Behavior* observed that sustained research on problem-oriented initiatives that modify places, routine activities, and situations that promote violence could contribute much to the understanding and control of violence (Reiss and Roth, 1993). Problem-oriented interventions arise from diagnoses of problems and – depending on the nuances of particular problems – the responses that are developed, even for seemingly similar problems, can be very diverse. Strategic problem analysis, a tool of problem-oriented policing, involves collecting and dissecting a wide array of data on the nature of homicide and other public safety problems in order to identify and understand events and

conditions that precede and accompany these problems and to identify interventions that are responsive to them (Clarke and Eck, 2005).

The analysis of crime problems in the problem-oriented policing process is rooted in a long-standing tradition of the “action-oriented” research model to improve policy and practice (see, e.g. Lewin, 1946). Indeed, criminal justice agencies and researchers have collaborated on action research projects for many years (Gottfredson, 1996; McEwen, 2003). The public health approach to violence prevention is also based in action-oriented epidemiology intent on locating and reducing risks and identifiable problems (Moore, Prothrow-Stith, Guyer, and Spivak, 1994). Action research is an iterative inquiry process that balances problem-solving actions implemented in a collaborative context with data-driven collaborative analysis or research to understand underlying causes enabling future predictions about personal and organizational change (Reason and Bradbury, 2001). Action research can be undertaken by larger organizations or institutions, assisted or guided by professional researchers, with the aim of improving their strategies, practices, and knowledge of the environments within which they practice (Reason and Bradbury, 2001). The strategic analysis of relevant data is a critical step in improving the way issues and problems are addressed.

In criminal justice settings, homicide reviews were developed because official police data systems contained very limited information on the nature of homicide in particular jurisdictions. While the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) are a widely used source of data on murder and non-negligent manslaughter, and many researchers use these data to explore historical, theoretical, and policy questions, there are well known sources of error in SHR data. In particular,

numerous reviews have criticized the validity of the homicide circumstances coded in these data (Braga et al., 1999; Loftin, 1986; Loftin et al., 1987; Maxfield, 1989; Riedel, 1989; Williams and Flewelling, 1987). Certain complications, such as incomplete data on offenders, arise from the submission of data during the early stages of homicide investigation (Riedel, 1989); other problems arise from variation in decision rules used by reporting agencies to classify the circumstances of homicides (Loftin, 1986; Maxfield, 1989). Given these important shortcomings, it is generally recognized that descriptive as well as policy-oriented and theory-oriented research on the circumstances of homicide is difficult with existing official police data systems.

Beginning in the 1990s, homicide incident reviews have been used increasingly by criminal justice agencies to develop more effective violence prevention plans. For instance, the Boston Gun Project's Operation Ceasefire intervention, designed to reduce gun violence among violent gangs, was crafted based on insights from a careful review of youth homicide incidents (Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga, 1996). This intervention was associated with a 63% reduction in youth homicide (Braga et al., 2001),<sup>1</sup> a decline that generated interest in other jurisdictions struggling with serious violence problems. Drawing upon the Boston experience, officials in Indianapolis used the incident review process to develop a comprehensive violence prevention strategy. This strategy was found to be associated with a 40% reduction in total homicide (McGarrell and Chermak,

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<sup>1</sup> The National Academies' *Panel on Improving Information and Data on Firearms* concluded that the National Institute of Justice-sponsored Ceasefire evaluation was compelling in associating the intervention with the subsequent decline in youth homicide (Wellford, Pepper, and Petrie, 2005). However, the Panel also suggested that many complex factors affect youth homicide trends and it was difficult to specify the exact relationship between the Ceasefire intervention and subsequent changes in youth offending behaviors. While the NIJ-sponsored evaluation controlled for existing violence trends and certain rival causal factors such as changes in the youth population, drug markets, and employment in Boston, there could be complex interaction effects among these factors not measured by the evaluation that could account for some meaningful portion of the decrease. Interested readers should also review Berk (2005), Fagan (2002), Morgan and Winship (2007), and Rosenfeld et al. (2005).

2003; McGarrell et al., 2006). A number of other cities, including Baltimore, Minneapolis, and Stockton (CA) also replicated the Boston experience by using homicide incident reviews to inform the development of their violence prevention plans; in each of these cities, clear descriptions of homicide problems led to the implementation of strategies that appear to have generated violent crime reductions (Braga, 2008; Braga et al., 2002, 2008). All these initiatives were facilitated by a close, more or less real-time, partnership between researchers and practitioners. Solid problem analyses were the foundations upon which the interventions implemented by the interagency collaborations were built.

These problem-oriented violence prevention projects suggest that line-level practitioners who work in high-crime areas and have regular contact with high-risk individuals often have detailed working knowledge of homicide events (Kennedy et al., 1997; Braga et al., 1999). Bringing together a diverse group of informed individuals to share their knowledge about the nature of homicide events and collecting and analyzing the resulting data can lead to important insights regarding both targeted and system-level ways to prevent homicide. Working under this assumption, U.S. Department of Justice-sponsored initiatives, such as the Strategic Alternatives to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI) and Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), have made a concerted effort to encourage local law enforcement officials to partner with academic researchers and engage in multi-agency homicide incident review exercises to better inform their violence prevention plans. As part of these initiatives, incident reviews have been used to understand local violent crime problems by interagency working groups in

California, Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, and Wisconsin (Klofas and Hipple, 2006; Braga, 2005).

In general, homicide incident reviews provide one way of sharing detailed information about homicide among local criminal justice agencies and using that information to develop strategic approaches to reduce future killings. There is, of course, tremendous variety across jurisdictions that use the approach.

Locations that have adopted incident reviews have developed programs that meet their own particular goals and needs. The programs have also grown and changed over time. While there is no standard approach, common features can be seen. The programs rely on input from front-line staff with street-level knowledge of the crimes being discussed. Representatives from across the criminal justice system— including law enforcement, prosecutors, probation and parole officers, and often others—participate in the process. Finally, the process involves researchers whose task it is to analyze the information presented to identify patterns or other issues that may be useful in responding strategically to the crime problem (Klofas and Hipple, 2006: 1).

Despite the increasing prevalence of homicide incident reviews and growing awareness of the benefits of using strategic problem analysis to understand homicide, homicide incident review initiatives remain largely unevaluated.

The evaluation of the MHRC, conducted by researchers at the Harvard School of Public Health (Drs. O'Brien and Azrael) and the Harvard Kennedy School of Government (Dr. Braga), sought to answer the broad question: what does the homicide incident review process add to the City of Milwaukee's capacity to respond to the problem of lethal violence? More specifically, the evaluation examined whether homicide incident reviews provided additional insights into the nature of homicide problems relative to traditional methods; whether these insights led to the development of new strategic responses to homicide problems; whether law enforcement agencies, social

service providers, and the community felt that the sharing of information improved their ability to work together; and whether these responses seem to have had short-term violence reduction impacts. The evaluation was approved by both the Harvard School of Public Health and Harvard University Faculty of Arts and Sciences Human Subjects Committees.

### **The Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission: The Review Structure**

The MHRC is a multi-tiered intervention with four levels, each of which involves participation by a different set of agencies and stakeholders (see Appendix 1). A key assumption underlying the four levels of MHRC review, and driving its decision to include stakeholders outside of the traditional criminal justice arena, was that the development and implementation of homicide prevention strategies is a complex and multi-faceted process that can be strengthened by input and buy-in from stakeholders throughout the community.

Staffing for the MHRC consisted of a police officer assigned to the MHRC, a full-time office assistant, a part-time project coordinator, and a consultant. From the inception of the MHRC, the City of Milwaukee was committed to careful evaluation of the enterprise, allowing the on-site evaluator (Dr. O'Brien) full access to all project materials and agreeing to implement the project in three intervention police districts, reserving four police districts as control areas.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The MPD and its partners were concerned that community members and legislators in control districts would object to being excluded, even in the short term, from participating in the MHRC initiative. Through a series of meetings with community stakeholders, supporters of the MHRC process were able to convince concerned residents, politicians, and others that it was critical to determine the value associated with the homicide review process (i.e., to evaluate it in a rigorous, way with intervention and control groups) and, as a practical matter, that the capacity did not yet exist to carefully review all homicides and other serious violent incidents on a citywide basis. While these actions tempered political and community

The MHRCs' activities can be conceived as layered, with a substrate layer of front-line response to the homicide or shooting (consisting of standard, real-time law enforcement response coupled with provision of services to victim's families provided by an innovative social service program, Project Ujima), often referred to by participants as "Level 1," and three structural layers that provide for ongoing, coordinated information gathering and analysis ("Levels 2-4") of homicide-related data. Level 2, the criminal justice review (CJR), at which each month's homicides are reviewed, constitutes the analytic core of the homicide incident review process. Summary information from Level 2 is brought to Level 3, the community service provider review (CSPR). At the CSPR a broad array of public health and social service agencies provide additional information both about specific homicides and about the community contexts in which they occur. Information from Level 3, the CSPR, in turn, is provided to community members at Level 4, community meetings held semi-annually to inform the local community about the "shape" of MPD District-level homicide and to solicit buy-in for community-based homicide reduction initiatives.

The section that follows describes the four review levels and the various agencies and programs engaged in each level of review.

Level 1 (Real Time): In real time, MPD responds to homicides that occur in intervention districts as usual: immediate response to the location is followed by investigation, increased patrols, and attempted apprehension of any identified suspects, etc. In addition in intervention districts, Project Ujima, a social service agency, is notified of the homicide and provided with information about the victim within 48 hours. Project

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objections, the lack of focused intervention in the four control districts generated minimal ongoing citywide tension over the course of the project.

Ujima provides crisis intervention and case management services, mentoring and emotional support, mental health and home-based health care to victims' families.

Level 2, Criminal Justice Review (CJR): The second level of the review process consists of a monthly review of each homicide by criminal justice professionals primarily at the local, but also at the state, and federal levels. Review participants include the Community Police Liaison, district officers and members of the Violent Crimes, Gang Crimes, Homicide and Vice units as well as representatives from the offices of the District Attorney, City Attorney, US Attorney, Milwaukee Public Schools, Milwaukee Housing Authority, Medical Examiner, Department of Corrections (probation and parole, state and county), Wisconsin Department of Justice Division of Criminal Investigation, US Marshals, Milwaukee High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA), Drug Enforcement Agency, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

The CJR focuses on developing a detailed description of homicide in each of the three treatment police districts. Two weeks prior to the reviews, participants are sent the list of cases that will be discussed at the meeting (homicides that occurred in the preceding month). Based on the case list, participants are asked to do their "homework" and come prepared to discuss any information they may have on the individuals or locations involved.

At the reviews, a PowerPoint presentation, created by MHRC staff for each review, is presented that details all relevant information about each incident available at the time of the review. A Homicide lieutenant and Violent Crimes lieutenant lead reviews, one incident at a time, while MHRC staff act as recorders. Standard data

presented include the dates, times, and locations of the incidents; the age, sex, and race of the victims and offenders; the weapons used in the incidents; and the criminal histories of the individuals involved in the incidents. These data are supplemented by the line-level law enforcement involved in the investigation who often have a detailed understanding of violence and criminal networks in the police district and share their knowledge about the circumstances of the homicide and relationships among victims and offenders

Beginning with January 2005 incidents, each review has covered all homicide cases, both open and closed, that occurred in the previous month in the intervention districts. Shooting incidents with an injured person from these districts were added to the review process beginning with January 2006 cases, and domestic homicides in all treatment districts were added, as part of a supplemental review, in August 2006.

Level 3, Community Service Provider Review: The MHRC Coordinator and a police officer lead the CSPR. At the CSPR reviews, *closed*<sup>3</sup> cases are discussed by a wide range of professionals to broaden understanding of the homicide beyond the facts identified in the Level 2 review and to identify community-level factors that may have contributed to it (e.g., gangs in schools) The professionals assembled for the community review consist of representatives from the Level 2 (CJR) review (Community Liaison Officers, Community Prosecutors), as well as representatives of Project Ujima, the Mayor's Office, City of Milwaukee Health Department, Bureau of Milwaukee Child Welfare, Milwaukee Public Schools, Department of Neighborhood Services, and representatives of community based organizations such as block watches and churches as well as community organizers.

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<sup>3</sup> Closed cases are generally those in which a suspect has been arrested or an arrest warrant has been issued.

The CSPR goals are to expand the Level 2 incident descriptions with information from Level 3 agencies and to review interventions developed by law enforcement as part of the CJR process. During the Level 3 review, participants determine how Level 2 interventions can be supplemented by community level interventions (such as job programs) by social service and other agencies.

As with the Level 2 review, two weeks prior to the reviews participants are sent an invitation to attend with an attached list of the cases that will be discussed as well as a request to do their “homework.” All participants at every CSPR sign a confidentiality agreement stipulating that in no case will information shared at the meeting be disclosed to anyone other than members of the MHRC.

In August 2006, the MHRC added a new level of review, Level 3A, Domestic Violence Homicide, to review all domestic homicides in the City (regardless of district). Domestic violence (DV) homicide reviews are held separately due to confidentiality concerns raised by DV and child protection groups, but otherwise use the same format as other MHRC reviews. Initially, for 2005 cases, a strict statutory definition of DV was used for inclusion in the reviews. This limited cases to those in which the victim and suspect had a domestic relationship.<sup>4</sup> Beginning with 2006 cases, the participants modified the case definition to include all intimate partner homicides and pediatric deaths.

Level 4, Community Review: The Level 4 Community Review is open to all interested members of the community. The MHRC coordinates the meeting, which is

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<sup>4</sup> According to the statute a domestic relationship can include married and unmarried couples living together, ex-spouses who ever resided together, roommates and ex-roommates who lived together, parents or their grown children who reside together and are adults, or any adults who share children in common, whether they have ever resided together or not

hosted by a community group participating in the CSPR, and also attended by members of the Level 2 and 3 Reviews. The meetings are designed to educate the community about the nature of homicides and shootings occurring in intervention neighborhoods and to inform interested community members about the work of the MHRC. At the community review meetings, MHRC staff present aggregate, district-level information on victims and suspects, their probation and parole status, the known circumstances of the incidents, and the locations of the incidents. Community members are also briefed on progress of specific violence prevention interventions implemented as a result of the review process. After the MHRC staff concludes their presentation, community members are given the opportunity to provide feedback and assist with the development of specific interventions and policy recommendations affecting their neighborhoods.

The work of the MHRC is directed by two committees, a “Working Group” and an “Executive Committee,” that oversee and monitor the work of the MHRC. The Working Group meets monthly and is charged with guiding the review process and with initial review of any policy and programmatic recommendations developed by the CJR, DVR or CSPR. The Working Group consists of mid-level personnel, primarily managers and supervisors, who already participate in the CJR, CSPR or DVR. The Working Group brings feasible process changes and recommendations for approval and implementation to the Executive Committee for review and approval. The Executive Committee, which consists of high-level representatives of City and State agencies, Project Safe Neighborhoods Research Partners and others, meets monthly to plan and monitor the implementation of recommendations which emerge from the CJR, CSPR and DVR.

Members of the Executive Committee tend to be in key positions and have decision-making authority within their organizations.

### **The Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission: Evaluation Methods**

The evaluation of the MHRC consisted of three principal parts: 1) a formative evaluation, 2) a process evaluation, and 3) an impact evaluation. The quasi-experimental evaluation design involved the matching of MPD districts into like pairs based on homicide counts, non-fatal shooting counts, and socio-demographic characteristics of the populations in the districts. The following table shows the relevant crime and demographic statistics for the seven districts for January through August 15, 2004 (prior to implementation of the MHRC). Intervention districts are highlighted in gray.

Table 2: District Profiles 2004 (gray denotes MHRC intervention district)<sup>5</sup>

	District 1	District 2	District 3	District 4	District 5	District 6	District 7	Intervention	Control	Total
<b>Aggravated Assault</b>	60	425	687	431	678	354	892	1466	2075	3541
<b>Homicide</b>	0	17	14	7	16	7	27	40	48	88
<b>Robbery</b>	40	160	294	212	306	124	456	590	1002	1592
<b>Population</b>	8024	97579	83889	94118	84613	96007	132744	278199	318775	596974
<b>% White</b>	72	75	39	43	48	76	31	67	38	51
<b>% Black</b>	22	4	52	52	47	4	65	17	57	38
<b>% Other</b>	6	21	9	5	5	20	4	16	5	11
<b>% Below Poverty</b>	21	18	33	19	29	14	19	20	23	21

As Table 2 reveals, District 1 experienced no homicides or non-fatal shootings. As such, this district was excluded from consideration for the MHRC intervention and was designated part of the control group. After the districts were matched based both on their demographic and crime profiles and on the expert opinion of police personnel, including Deputy Chief Brian O’Keefe and others, one district from each pair was randomly allocated to the MHRC treatment group. This process resulted in the selection of District 2 and 6 on the south side of the city and District 5 on the north side as the treatment districts, with districts 1, 3, 4 and 7 serving as controls (see map, below, for Milwaukee Police Department districts).

<sup>5</sup> Source: Milwaukee Police Department



O'Brien met regularly, via telephone, with Drs. Azrael and Braga, and provided them with regular updates on program structure; the recommendations developed by the CJR and CSPR, and data developed for the project.

*Formative Evaluation:*

In its early stages, the formative evaluation monitored the implementation and conduct of the MHRC process through pre, midterm and post interviews with key staff and collaborators as well as regular debriefings following meetings and reviews. Forty-eight (48) people were interviewed using the semi-structured interview protocol in Appendix 2.

In this stage of the evaluation, the structure of the MHRC model was documented as implemented and the level of involvement by each collaborating agency determined by tracking agencies' attendance at and participation in each level of the review process. In addition, the formative evaluation documented structures, policies and strategies that either promoted or impeded adoption of the review process. Important tasks associated with the formative evaluation included: observation of the training event, feedback on the developed data collection instrument, and monitoring and documenting the developing policies and procedures of each MHRC group (e.g., the Working Group, the CJR). As in all stages of the evaluation, the on-site evaluator provided the two off-site evaluators with regular updates on project implementation and project activities as well as with copies of all pertinent data.

*Process Evaluation:*

The principal objective of the process evaluation was to determine, through interviews with key personnel in both intervention and control districts and through

systematic assessment and analysis of MHRC recommendations, whether the homicide review process generated a better description of homicides than that could be obtained using standard MPD and UCR data and, whether participation in the MHRC facilitated MPD and the City's capacity to use strategic problem analysis techniques to assess local homicide problems and to develop innovative violence prevention plans in the MHRC districts and in other Milwaukee agencies.

*Impact Evaluation:*

The impact evaluation consisted of two principal components: 1) a comparison of the quality of information collected about homicides using existing data as compared to MHCR data, and 2) a statistical analysis of the crime reduction impact of implemented violence prevention strategies in the treatment districts relative to control districts.

Data Quality: To determine the value added by the homicide review process, the quality of information available to practitioners using MHRC data collection tools relative to standard MPD data was assessed. In this comparison, data collected through MHRC were compared to Supplementary Homicide Review files and internal MPD homicide data to determine the extent to which MHRC data improved on these historically available data sources and aided MHRCs' efforts to address the problem of homicide in Milwaukee strategically. To do this a Harvard School of Public Health summer intern, Glaister Leslie, in conjunction with Dr. Azrael, conducted a complete record review for the first fifty homicides reviewed by the MHRC. In this comparison, the three data sources were compared on all variables for which they have comparable data.

Homicide Reduction: A key impact evaluation goal was to assess whether the MHRC had a measurable short-term impact on homicides in the treatment districts relative to control districts. MHRC interventions were first implemented in August 2005.<sup>6</sup> Time series of monthly counts of homicides in the treatment and control districts between January 1999 and December 2006 were examined to determine whether the implemented MHRC interventions were associated with any reductions in homicides. Regression analyses, controlling for secular trends, seasonal variations, population changes, and violent crime rate trends, were used to estimate changes in the monthly counts of homicide events in the treatment districts and control districts after MHRC interventions were implemented.

Because the process evaluation was focused on understanding and documenting the workings of the MHRC and not the specifics of the implemented programs, it was not possible to collect the necessary pre-test and post-test process data to shed light on the specific mechanisms responsible for any observed reductions in homicide associated with the MHRC interventions. The impact evaluation was designed to measure the value added by the MHRC process in understanding and responding to homicide problems and did not attempt to parse out the varying effects of the specific initiatives that were implemented, although this would be very useful to do in future evaluations.

## **Findings**

To orient the reader, the following section first provides a summary of the nature of homicide in the intervention districts over the study period. It then moves on to the

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<sup>6</sup> Review of the 2005 cases by both the CJR and CSPR occurred in June 2005. The formulation of recommendations took place in June and July with the Working Group and Executive Committee meeting in early August, beginning the implementation of interventions.

heart of the evaluation, with 1) an assessment of MHRC implementation, and 2) the MHRCs' impact on a) data quality and b) homicide rates in the City.

### *Homicide in Intervention Districts*

Over the evaluation period, the MHRC reviewed 173 homicides and 99 shootings. MHRC data provide a rich picture of these events, particularly in contrast to data available prior to implementation of the MHRC, which were little more than simple incident counts, tabulated by hand, and maintained in a Word document for internal use only. Homicides in Milwaukee, almost 80% of which were committed with firearms, were highly concentrated, and were highest in areas with high overall violent crime rates.

The large majority of victims were black males (65% of all victims), as were the large majority of suspects (80%). Over 60 percent of homicides occurred in the course of an argument, either part of an ongoing dispute or a sudden dispute typically involving disrespect or status concerns as a motivating factor in the use of extreme violence to settle the dispute; 39 percent were precipitated by another crime (e.g., took place during the course of commission of a crime or in retaliation for a crime), with 23% associated with a robbery incident. Further, 18.6% involved a known gang member and 10.2% involved a known drug dealer. The most common location for homicides was in a house or apartment (42%, approximately 20% of which took place in a known drug house), but street violence, both planned and unplanned, was also common (36%). Ten percent (10%) of homicides took place either in or immediately outside of taverns.

In the large majority of cases, both the victim and the suspect in homicides were known to the police, with 77% of victims and a full 90% of suspects having been previously arrested and charged, often for relatively minor crimes (though more than 5%

of both victims and suspects had been previously charged with murder). Further, more than a quarter (26%) of suspects (and 15% of victims) were under the active supervision of the Department of Corrections at the time of the homicide.

*Development of the MHRC over Time (Appendix 4 Project Timeline)*

While the general structure of the MHRC was developed prior to the start of the initiative and formation of the Executive Committee, the first task of the newly formed Commission was to solicit participants for the Working Group and reviews. To do this, MHRC representatives made multiple presentations to Milwaukee-area criminal justice and social service agencies. These presentations included an overview of the MHRC and its key goals. In addition, national experts, in crime incident reviews, Dr. John Klofas, Rochester Institute of Technology,<sup>7</sup> and child death reviews, Theresa Covington, National Center for Child Death Review, were retained to conduct trainings for the criminal justice agencies and community service providers on conducting incident reviews. The trainings provided the participants with an overview of the incident review process and an understanding of the roles that each participant would play in it, as well as a set of expectations about the level of information sharing that would be required (or at least desirable) among partnering agencies. Importantly, Dr. Klofas also briefed participants on the tools of strategic problem analysis, and provided examples of the sorts of interventions that might emerge as part of such analyses.

In preparation for the initial review, and to structure and expedite future reviews, a standardized data collection tool and database were developed to capture information from all agencies at all levels of the review process. Data collection instruments were

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<sup>7</sup> Dr. Klofas was available to the MHRC to provide ongoing technical assistance throughout the project through Project Safe Neighborhoods.

tailored to each specific agency and modeled on data collection instruments developed for the National Violent Death Reporting System (National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 2004). In May 2005, a retrospective review of 2004 cases was conducted by the CJR and C SPR to assess the feasibility of the MHRC process as planned, allowing for necessary changes to the review process and data collection system.<sup>8</sup> Dr. Klofas and Ms. Covington were present for the retrospective reviews and provided useful feedback in a debriefing following the reviews, establishing a practice that has been maintained by the MHRC. Indeed, according to participants, routine debriefings after all MHRC reviews continue to serve as an invaluable tool for MHRC staff and participants in refining and supporting the process.

As noted, the scope of the MHRC expanded over the project period, first, in January 2006, to include non-fatal shootings in the intervention districts, and then, in August 2006, to include domestic homicides throughout the City, and finally, in January 2007, to include District 3.<sup>9</sup> From January 2005, when the process was first implemented, through the end of 2007 (the dates used for the quantitative evaluation as a result of expansion of the project into a control district), the MHRC reviewed 140 homicides, 99 shooting cases and 33 DV homicides.

In addition to the changes in its scope, described above, the structure and functions of the MHRC also evolved considerably over the project period. In the early implementation phases of the MHRC, much of this change had to do with where day to

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<sup>8</sup> For example, to improve the review process, maps identifying the location of incidents were added to the standard PowerPoint presentation as was information on victim and suspect criminal history. Structural changes included the addition of Milwaukee Public Schools (CJR and C SPR) and the Bureau of Milwaukee Child Welfare (C SPR).

<sup>9</sup> This expansion of the MHRC process into a control district ended the evaluation team's ability to assess the violence reduction impact of MHRC interventions in the treatment areas relative to control areas.

day responsibility for the MHRC would best reside. Initially the MHRC was guided by a large group of agency heads who met quarterly. After several meetings, however, it became apparent that while their support and guidance would be crucial to the credibility and effectiveness of the MHRC, a smaller working group of mid-level management personnel from these agencies would be not only far easier to convene, but also more effective in reviewing and working to implement the recommendations of the MHRC's review committees. As the MHRC gained experience over time, primary responsibility for the content of the reviews shifted from central MHRC staff to the district level both to increase the utility of the reviews for the districts and – as a consequence – to increase district-level buy in to the MHRC process. For reviews of non-fatal shootings, for example, while case selection was initially the responsibility of the MHRC staff, responsibility for selection quickly shifted first to district-level MPD Violent Crime lieutenants and finally to district commanders who were able to select those shootings of most interest either specifically or generically to the district.

Over this time, the MHRC faced a number of challenges. The most important of the initial challenges revolved around fostering greater participation in the reviews, particularly among community service providers who were not comfortable collaborating with the MPD. The MHRC undertook several initiatives to increase participation. For example, MHRC staff and high-level representatives of participating agencies conducted one-on-one informational sessions with organizations that were reluctant to attend the reviews or, even if they were attending, were reluctant to share information. In addition, slides were added to each case in the PowerPoint presentations that listed each agency by name, allowing the review leader (a Homicide Unit lieutenant in Level 2 reviews and an

Officer in Level 3 reviews) to ask each agency in turn, for any information they could contribute regarding the case, or the issues, at hand.

A more complicated, but related, challenge was lack of commitment or defensiveness on the part of participating agencies regarding agency protocols that were targeted in MHRC recommendations for improvement or change. For example, following the deaths of several children, the MHRC identified that the Bureau of Milwaukee Child Services (BMCS – the City’s child welfare agency) had had several opportunities to remove the children from the homes in which they died but had not, at least in part because BMCS’ poor record management system had not cued them to recurrent problems in the children’s homes. Because BMCS did not see resolution of this problem as a high priority, MHRC staff went “over the head” of the regional office to the State Children and Family Services Division, which is now working to improve state-wide record-keeping.

### *The Work of the MHRC*

The key product of the MHRC over the evaluation period was a set of over 100 recommendations developed by the CJR and C SPR teams and ratified by the Working and Executive Committees (see Appendix 3). These recommendations varied widely in scope and complexity as well as did the agency that was their primary focus.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>For example, some recommendations addressed standard operating procedures (e.g., the Department of Corrections should routinely provide MPD with a list of juveniles released from DOC custody; all officers should be notified of the schedule of the bus to Mexico on which some suspects attempt to leave the City) while others identified a need for planning (e.g., assessment regarding the feasibility of electronic information-sharing between City and state agencies) and others specific crime-prevention strategies (e.g., a recommendation to develop community contacts in high crime areas was developed from the observation that mapping revealed a low density of community contacts in high crime areas). Internally, the MHRC created a spreadsheet to track these recommendations, noting the date of the recommendation, the agency primarily responsible for implementation, and the recommendation’s status.

Collectively, however, they represent the MHRCs' vision of how to reduce homicide in the City of Milwaukee, and thus were an important source of data for the evaluation.

In order to determine the degree to which the MHRCs' recommendations were successful in establishing the MHRC as a mechanism for achieving the goal of homicide reduction, the evaluators undertook a systematic review of the MHRC recommendations, assessing the MHRCs developing capacity to 1) create new, and strengthen existing, partnerships among MHRC participants and increase information sharing among them, 2) increase the analytic capacity of the MHRC and participating agencies, 3) develop and institutionalize policies and procedures, 4) identify and develop crime reduction strategies, and 5) establish processes to assure accountability and performance measurement.

#### *Strengthening Partnerships and Improving Information Sharing*

According to 96 % of those interviewed (See Table 2, Interview Responses) as part of the evaluation, an important outcome of interagency participation in the reviews, as well as of interagency collaboration on the development and implementation of the MHRC recommendations themselves, has been the building and strengthening of partnerships both within the criminal justice community and between the criminal justice community and community service providers. Further, 60% of those interviewed indicated they now communicate with more agencies and with greater frequency regarding homicide and shooting investigations (58% law enforcement personnel indicated an increase while 40% of community service providers indicated an increase, the remainder felt their communication was unchanged. For instance, according to Assistant United States Attorney John Manning, "the MHRC has absolutely increased

contact among federal, state and local law enforcement agents. In fact it has become the 'go to' forum for sharing information about violent crime investigations in the city."

The MHRC process has, by virtue of the inter- and intra-agency partnerships it has fostered, resulted in historically unprecedented information sharing among participating agencies. Reflecting this, 100% of interview respondents indicated they have benefited from an increase in information sharing. MPD provides a good example of the impact of increased communication. Early in the development of the MHRC, MPD did not have a culture that supported inter-agency communication. In particular, MPD Homicide Unit was reluctant to share information about ongoing homicide investigations. As noted by the Captain David Zibolski of the Homicide Unit in his response to a question in the Assessment Survey regarding importance of information-sharing with other agencies, "Information sharing is a very important component that was lacking prior to the advent of the MHRC." Collaboration on the MHRC, however, has built trust among agencies, and MPD shares information routinely during CJR meetings. MPD officials cite important advantages to both intra- and inter-agency communication, especially improved information flow between specialty units and District officers. According to Lt. William Jessup of the Homicide Unit at MPD, for example: "Through the two-way information sharing now occurring between the Homicide Unit and the Districts at the MHRC meetings, we have been able to develop new leads and apprehend homicide and shooting suspects resulting in more clearances." A particularly striking example of the benefits of improved information flow occurred in May 2007 when a district officer, who had attended the CJR review in the morning and been alerted there

that the suspect was wanted in connection with the homicide, apprehended him later in the day.

In some cases, interagency collaboration on the MHRC has made it possible to overcome long-time structural impediments to sharing information. For example, the Milwaukee Public School's (MPS) traditional interpretation of privacy statutes largely precluded the MPS and MPD from sharing information on at-risk or criminally-involved youth. Joint participation in the MHRC, however, made the potential utility of such information-sharing clear and led to development of a Memorandum of Understanding between the departments that has allowed them to share information when relevant in ongoing investigations. While this capacity had not yet resulted in specific MHRC recommendations or initiatives, it has increased MPD and MPS's knowledge of each other's youth-related activities, specifically gang involved and is credited by participants as having greatly increased trust between the organizations. Although the MOU is in place, for purposes of the reviews, MPS is limited to sharing information in aggregate format. In an effort to provide individual level information, they have requested a legal opinion from the Attorney General of Wisconsin as well as begun conversations with the top ranking administrators with Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) on the release of the information to the MHRC.

Indeed, information sharing has been important enough that many of the MHRCs' recommendations have focused on new protocols or procedures to promote timely sharing of information. Another good example is, a "Most Violent Person" list, previously available at the citywide level, is now being generated at the district level and by the Department of Corrections to document and disseminate information on violent

offenders not currently covered by the citywide list. These lists are posted at roll call and sent to criminal justice agencies, such as the U.S. Marshal's office, that would not historically have received them. These MVP lists provide a wealth of information including: photo, description, gang affiliation, address, community supervision status, providing a very useful information tool to enforcement personnel.

Many of the partnerships forged by participation in the MHRC were between organizations with some history of collaboration (e.g., the MOU between MPD and MPS). Others, however, did not exist prior to implementation of the MHRC, and can be credited to participation in the MHRC process. For example, MPD and the Department of Neighborhood Services now communicate regularly as a result of the MHRCs' focus on taverns and nuisance properties. Respondents also suggest that the MHRC has created a valuable conduit between community members and MPD for information about neighborhood crime problems. For example, when a community organizer reported increased crime in a two-block area of his neighborhood at an MHRC review, MPD was able to respond quickly. According to MHRC participants, while the results of such communication and response are not easy to measure, they are certainly foster improved MPD-community relations, a City-wide priority.

Sharing information electronically between criminal justice agencies has posed a challenge to police jurisdictions across the country – in Milwaukee no less than elsewhere. The MHRC has sought to lay the groundwork for electronic information sharing in the future. To do so, MHRC marshaled resources from the Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance to fund the Center of Urban Population Health to conduct an electronic information needs assessment for the City. The recommendations from this study,

currently underway, are expected to inform future MHRC efforts with regard to information-sharing and will be incorporated into future proposals to the Office of Justice Assistance.

### *Increasing Analytic Capacity*

The keystones of effective strategic problem analysis are rich, high quality data, institutional capacity to analyze and present data effectively, and an explicit commitment to data-driven decision making at the Departmental level. As described in the section that follows, the MHRC has been clearly successful in improving the quality of data available to the City on homicides and shootings and in broadening access to these data. Analyzing the data and using them routinely to support intervention development and evaluation has proved more challenging. Nonetheless, according to participants, MHRC staff are increasingly asked to respond to data requests, and within MPD in particular, analyses of MHRC data are increasingly being used to support development of innovative strategies to respond to and prevent homicides and shootings. According to Lt. Scott La Fleur of the Intelligence Division at MPD: “During the Neighborhood Safety Initiative, a targeted violence reduction strategy, we utilized the MHRC’s timely, accurate information on homicides and shootings on a daily basis to develop a strategic response to violence, to assess our progress; and to refine our efforts.”

Data quality: Historically, the MPD records management system has included limited data on homicides.<sup>11</sup> In contrast, few data have been available on non-fatal shootings, despite the similarity of these events to most fatal shootings. According to informants, moreover, while records management data were routinely used by MPD, they

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<sup>11</sup> Variables include: date and time, incident location, primary and secondary circumstances, victim and suspect demographics and victim-suspect relationships.

were generally not available on a timely basis, greatly limiting their usefulness. Further, the MPD Homicide Unit maintained annual data in a simple Microsoft Word table that was updated regularly. This Word table was an internal document, not designed for statistical purposes. Not surprisingly, then, the MHRC quickly became the source of the best homicide and shooting data in the City, used preferentially by MPD and others needing complete and/or up-to-date homicide and shooting-related data. In fact, due to demand for the data, since the inception of the MHRC, staff have generated a weekly homicide and shooting report to command staff.<sup>12</sup> The interview respondents were again unanimous (100%) in their response that they themselves and/or their agencies have benefited from the increase in analytic capacity provided by the Commission.

As the project continues to unfold, the MHRC continually adds more information to its data system. For instance, while in its early stages, MHRC data were largely focused on homicide events. The initiative now tracks non-fatal shootings and maintains detailed data on nuisance properties and taverns at which shootings and homicides have occurred.

Analysis and dissemination of data: The enriched homicide and non-fatal shooting data support more relevant and sophisticated data analyses. Prior to the MHRC, the available data were used to support traditional analytic strategies such as determining officer deployments based on the identification of places and times where violence is likely to happen. The additional data available through the MHRC, such as detailed information on the circumstances of the homicide, relationships between victims and offenders, criminal justice involvement of victims and offenders, and place characteristics

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<sup>12</sup> Prior to the MHRC, no information on suspects under 18 years of age was provided in summary reports. Due to discussions within the MHRC, this prohibition has been lifted, and District command staff now have full access to suspect information, regardless of age.

(presence of a problem tavern or a nuisance property, permit new insights on the nature of homicide. As cases are discussed in the MHRC reviews, participants suggest analytic work to MHRC staff who then use strategic analysis to answer policy-relevant questions. This real-time collection and discussion of detailed data on violent events greatly enhances the quality and relevance of problem analysis to the development of violence prevention plans.

MHRC staff have developed expertise in presenting its homicide and shooting data to different constituencies, across its levels (e.g., criminal justice personnel, community members), and greatly increased the availability of data on homicides to the general public by posting data in the form of an MHRC report on the MPD's web page, as well as holding its bi-annual community meetings. Data and analytic information products are shared across participating agencies. For instance, data on homicides and shootings at taverns and nuisance addresses are not only used by officers in MPD districts but also by the Department of Neighborhood Services, which uses the data internally as well as in its partnerships with MPD.

Commitment to data-driven decision-making: In essence, the MHRC follows an action-research model that systematically identifies and examines problems, develops solutions, and evaluates results. This commitment to the action research model directly links data to decision-making in MHRC settings. According to Joe Kubisiak, a community outreach worker with Community Partners, "With the MHRC, we are able to move away from common beliefs towards data-driven assertions."

After a violent crime problem has been clearly defined and analyzed, MHRC participants confront the challenge of developing a plausibly effective response. The

development of appropriate responses is closely linked with the analysis that is performed. The analysis reveals the potential targets for an intervention, and in turn, ideas about the type of intervention may suggest important lines of analysis. Assessment is important for at least two different reasons (Braga, 2002). The first is to ensure that participating agencies remain *accountable* for their performance and for their use of resources. A second reason assessment is important is to allow the participating agencies to *learn* about what methods are effective in dealing with particular problems. Unless the MHRC agencies check to see whether their efforts produced a result, it will be hard for them to improve their practices.

As described in fuller detail below (under identifying and developing homicide reduction strategies), the MHRC have used the data they collect to describe emerging homicide problems and target intervention activities in ways that would not have been possible before MHRC implementation.

Table 3: Interview Responses to Selected Questions, N = 48.

	Experienced an Increase in Communication with at least two agencies	Experienced an Increase in Information Sharing	Strengthen Relationships with Other Agencies	Agency Benefited from an Increase in Analytical Capacity
Yes	100%	96%	100%	96%
No	0%	4%	0%	4%

### *Improving Policies and Procedures*

Recommendations on improving policies and procedures at the MPD and other participating agencies have been the main product of the MHRC review process. The adoption of these recommendations has been regarded by a number of informants as the

key to institutionalizing the MHRC in the City. The recommendations are wide-ranging, and presented in full in Appendix 3.

Most often, the need for change in policy and procedures was identified when, during the reviews, the MHRC uncovered problems – sometimes substantial -- in current practice. For example, in reviewing criminal histories of suspects and victims, the MHRC noted that judges on their own motion or on the motion of the District Attorneys were ordering Pre-Sentence Investigations (PSI) on only a small portion of felony cases (18% in 2005 and 25% in 2006; PSIs provide information on the defendant’s criminal history and performance history while on supervision with DOC). Based on the information developed by the MHRC, and presented by members of the Executive Committee to the Governor Jim Doyle, a \$750,000 allocation was added to Milwaukee’s 2009 budget to increase the amount of information provided to judges prior to sentencing.

Another gap in policy was identified when the MHRC began to include shooting cases in their reviews. MHRC staff realized, when compiling information on shootings, that a very high percentage had too little information on the victim(s), suspect(s) and circumstances of shootings. In an effort to ensure better follow-up resulting in charges issued in such cases, a new follow-up protocol was implemented. To expedite follow-up, a worksheet was developed by the DA’s Office to document the work required by law enforcement for the state to issue charges. The new procedure has been successful in increasing the frequency with which the DA’s office is provided with timely and complete information on shootings.

### *Identifying and Developing of Homicide Reduction Strategies*

As described above, the MHRC enterprise has been an evolving process of data collection, problem analysis, response development, and assessment. By the end of the evaluation period, MHRC had developed a working protocol for identifying emerging problems (e.g., active groups of high risk offenders), and developed a discussion format that fostered not only traditional policing solutions (e.g., targeted patrols of locations frequented by these offenders), but increasingly creative and strategic ones (e.g., opportunities to interrupt criminal activities through targeted arrests for probation/parole violations).<sup>13</sup>

Many of the MHRCs' efforts attempted to improve, expand, or enhance current practices related to managing and controlling high-risk places and high-risk people. Three examples of MHRC interventions that can be characterized as problem-oriented policing strategies are presented below.<sup>14</sup>

1) *Dealing with Violence at Disorderly Taverns.* Research has long documented that violent crime often clusters around bars, pubs, and clubs (Block and Block, 1995; Roncek and Meier, 1991). However, most bars experience little crime, while a few may be hot spots of violent crime (Homel and Clark, 1994; Sherman et al., 1992). As Eck

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<sup>13</sup> The Project Safe Neighborhoods research partner for the project, the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee Department of Criminal Justice, was charged with undertaking strategic analyses of district-level homicide problems and the subsequent development of prevention strategies for the MHRC. Due principally to insufficient funding, the research partner did not, in fact, serve in this role which was, instead, taken on by MHRC staff, who were generally able to fill this role.

<sup>14</sup> Certain MHRC recommendations were considered and adopted at the citywide level. However, in practice, the MHRC enterprise served as an important performance measurement and accountability mechanism, assuring full implementation of the MHRCs' recommendations in the treatment districts. Because, in the absence of relevant measurement systems, police executives experience difficulty motivating their managers and line-level officers to change their approach towards policing (Moore and Braga, 2003), and MPD Captains and other mid-level criminal justice and social service managers were not held accountable in the control districts for implementing any citywide MHRC recommendations, even those MHRC recommendations that were technically city-wide in scope, there was little contamination of control conditions in districts 1, 3, 4 and 7. It should be noted, moreover that the effect of any "leakage" there was would lead to underestimates, not overestimates, of MHRCs' effectiveness.

(1997:7-10) observes, “the behavior of bartenders and bouncers may contribute to violence in these places and changes in bar management practices (from server training and changes in legal liability of bartenders) may reduce assaults, drunk driving, and traffic accidents.”

During the MHRC review process, analysis revealed that many Milwaukee homicides and non-fatal shootings were concentrated in and around tavern. Between January and May 2006, for example, 18.4 percent of homicides (7 of 38) and 15.4 percent of non-fatal shootings (26 of 169) occurred in or around one of Milwaukee’s taverns. These serious violent events all occurred between 11 pm and 3 am, and primarily on Friday and Saturday nights (70%). Many of the homicides and shootings were generated by arguments among intoxicated patrons who either had a sudden conflict with each other or renewed some previous ongoing dispute (80%). As these incidents were reviewed, MPD officers and detectives often shared qualitative insights on poor management practices (such as over-serving intoxicated patrons and not properly regulating access to the tavern) that generated the disorderly conditions associated with these conflicts.

Prior to the MHRC review process, MPD routinely identified problem taverns that generated a disproportionate amount of crime and disorder incidents. Unfortunately, these problem taverns did not receive a coordinated and focused response. The MPD used a District “tavern car” to monitor and address disorderly activity in and around taverns. The tavern car was deployed to monitor all taverns in a district and did not focus on the specific taverns that generated violent crime problems. Further, District Captains used the tavern car to answer 911 emergency calls for service when staffing levels were low and/or call volume was high. The MHRC concluded that this practice was ineffective

and, pursuant to its recommendations, Chief Hegerty issued a directive on June 23, 2006 that required the Intelligence Division's involvement in tavern checks on Friday and Saturday evenings. With the assistance of the Intelligence Division, MPD District Captains selected problem taverns for a focused deployment of a team comprised of some 20 officers in each district. On Friday and Saturday evenings, the targeted problem taverns were visited by the team of officers. These officers arrested known offenders with outstanding warrants and seized firearms and drugs from disorderly patrons.<sup>15</sup> All city code violations were noted and, if warranted, liquor licenses in the problem taverns were recommended for revocation.

In November 2007, at the suggestion of the MHRC, the City Attorney, Grant Langley, targeted seven problem taverns in the treatment districts for more rigorous enforcement of health department, building code, and revenue ordinances. By January 2008, three targeted taverns voluntarily surrendered their liquor licenses and the other four were involuntarily closed down as result of these actions.

Simultaneously, in December 2007, the MHRC established a working group comprised of City aldermen and attorneys, district attorneys, MPD, tavern league representatives, community groups, and others to develop more rigorous criteria for tavern licensure and less stringent criteria for tavern license revocation. This group is also attempting to educate tavern owners to ensure that they are operating their businesses in an orderly manner to reduce the likelihood of serious violence among patrons and employees. Finally, as a result of MHRC recommendations, the MPD partnered with Milwaukee Alderman Robert Bauman in the Common Council to file new legislation that

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<sup>15</sup> This initiative is illustrative of "citywide" interventions that were mostly implemented in treatment districts. Between July 2006 and April 2007, 84 percent of the targeted taverns (79 of 94) were in treatment districts.

requires all taverns to install interior and exterior digital surveillance cameras. These cameras, it is hoped, will serve both as a deterrent and as a record to aid in police investigation in the event of an incident. As of January 2008, the proposed legislation was being reviewed in a special legislative committee.

It is noteworthy, though not conclusive, that treatment districts experienced *no* tavern-related homicides in the treatment districts between July 2006 and December 2006 during which time there were three tavern-related homicides in control districts.

2) *Preventing Violence at Nuisance Properties.* MHRC analyses also revealed that nuisance rental properties in Milwaukee were associated with elevated levels of serious violence. In dealing with problem properties, the police often use a range of civil, criminal, and regulatory rules and laws to engage or force owners into taking some crime control responsibility. Civil remedies are procedures and sanctions specified by civil statutes and regulations that can be used to prevent crime and disorder problems. As Green Mazerolle and Roehl (1998) describe, civil remedies generally aim to persuade or coerce non-offending third parties to take responsibility and action to prevent or end criminal or nuisance behavior. Also known as “third party” policing, such approaches can include using nuisance and drug abatement statutes to require landlords and property owners to maintain drug- and nuisance-free properties through repair requirements, fines, padlocks, securing entries/exits, and property forfeiture (Green Mazerolle and Roehl, 1998). Research has revealed that third-party policing is an effective mechanism to control drug problems and is promising in controlling violent crime, disorderly youth, and property crime problems (Mazerolle and Ransley, 2006).

Review of 2006 homicide incidents in treatment districts revealed that 29% of homicides occurred at rental properties that had been previously identified by the district officers as “nuisance” properties. A property is designated a nuisance when it experiences three substantiated citizen complaints for criminal and/or disorderly activity within a 30 day period. Problem tenants and disorderly conditions at these nuisance properties created conditions and situations that generated violent disputes. Qualitative insights provided by officers at the MHRC meetings also revealed that the MPD could not adequately address the problems at the identified nuisance properties in a timely or focused manner.

In response to these findings, the MHRC called for the MPD and City Attorney to reinvigorate and expand prior efforts to ameliorate disorderly conditions and remove problem tenants at identified problem rental properties. Since August 2007, as soon as a property is designated a nuisance, the City Attorney takes civil action against the landlord, who, in addition, receives a notification letter from the District Captain informing the property owner that he/she must meet personally with the District Captain and provide a plan for abatement. In 2007, the City Attorney’s Office opened cases on 120 nuisance properties. If property owners fail to abate the nuisance and remain in nuisance status, they accumulate citations as well as fees for police calls to the property.

3) *Enhanced Community Supervision of High-Risk Offenders.* Consistent with the findings of many homicide review initiatives (e.g. Braga et al., 2002), the MHRC found that many homicide victims and offenders were under some form of community supervision at the time they were killed or committed a killing. In 2005 and 2006, for example, 15% of homicide victims and 26% of homicide suspects were being supervised

in the community by the Wisconsin Department of Corrections *at the time of the homicide event*, while a full 40% of the homicide victims and 45% of homicide suspects had *ever* been on supervision.<sup>16</sup>

The high-prevalence of DOC-involved suspects provided an opportunity for the MHRC to develop an interagency approach to prevent these high-risk criminals from committing serious violent crimes or being the victim of a serious violent crime. While the capacity of the MHRC partnership was not developed enough to implement a full-fledged pulling levers strategy<sup>17</sup>, the MHRC made several violence prevention recommendations related to DOC supervisees that were rooted in the approach.

In the treatment districts, high-intensity DOC community supervision agents were housed in police districts with a team of community prosecutors, district officers, a city attorney, and anti-gang unit officers (called “Target Teams”).<sup>18</sup> All newly released high-intensity DOC clients (violent felons, gang members, felons in possession) are now required to meet with their supervisory DOC agents at the district station and, when first released to the community, are introduced at roll call to officers. This process helps the

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<sup>16</sup> Many of those under supervision had been previously convicted of violent acts. Among all homicide victims and offenders, 15% had been convicted of a weapons offense, homicide or assault.

<sup>17</sup> A number of jurisdictions have been experimenting with new problem-oriented frameworks to prevent gun violence among highly-active serious violent offenders. In its simplest form, the “pulling levers” approach consists of selecting a particular crime problem, such as youth homicide; convening an interagency working group of law enforcement practitioners; conducting research to identify key offenders, groups, and behavior patterns; framing a response to offenders and groups of offenders that uses a varied menu of sanctions (“pulling levers”) to stop them from continuing their violent behavior; focusing social services and community resources on targeted offenders and groups to match law enforcement prevention efforts; and directly and repeatedly communicating with offenders to make them understand why they are receiving this special attention (Braga et al., 2001; Kennedy, 1997; Kennedy, 2006).

<sup>18</sup> “Target Teams” came about based another of the MHRC recommendations of the co-location of the community prosecutor, DOC agents and District officers. These “Target Teams” can focus each agencies intelligence and resources on individuals (MVPs) and properties. The concept of “High Intensity DOC agents” was generated by a MHRC recommendation. At the request of the MHRC, Wisconsin Governor James Doyle provided funding for 13 new DOC agents to supervise violent offenders. These agents were assigned to MPD districts and required to have increase the number of and intensity of their contacts with the offenders on their caseload.

officers know the high-risk offenders released to the community and informs them of the conditions of their supervised release. It also sends a clear message to the offenders that they are not anonymous to law enforcement agencies while serving their sentence in the community. When violence erupts in specific neighborhoods in the treatment districts, the Target Teams can increase pressure on these individuals by intensifying police scrutiny and the requirements of their community supervision (modify conditions, increase contacts, home visits) to limit the ability of these risky offenders to commit a shooting or be the victim of a shooting. For example, in one of the treatment districts, the Target Team focused resources and intelligence on a specified geographic area that had experienced a recent increase in violence (identified using MHRC on shootings and homicides). The Target Team worked with community organizers, as well as with ATF and the FBI, to address the problem. These efforts culminated with a take down of several major drug operations in the area, and a subsequent decrease in violence.

Accountability and Performance Measurement:

An intrinsic strength of the MHRC structure of monthly meetings and layered oversight is its capacity to measure the performance of implemented strategies and to hold partnering agencies accountable for delivering the required resources necessary to implement these strategies fully. The CJR, CSPR and Working and Executive Committees regularly review ongoing initiatives of the MHRC, routinely calling upon participating agencies to provide updates on implementation. This oversight greatly increases the timely and successful implementation of MHRCs' recommendations, and,

because it creates built-in accountability at the various levels, has contributed to the success of the MHRC.<sup>19</sup>

## **Impact Evaluation**

The MHRC initiative changed the way the City of Milwaukee addresses issues of homicide, increasing intra- and interagency collaboration in identifying and assessing homicide-related problems, and created a structure within which the City could move from addressing homicide using traditional policing methods to one employing an iterative, problem-oriented approach. These changes, of themselves, have been valued by MHRC participants and credited with a number of positive outcomes, including improved policies and procedures in agencies throughout the City.

In addition to documenting the process-related impact of the MHRC, however, the evaluation also sought to determine whether or not the intervention as associated with any short-term changes in homicide rates in the City. Because the fundamental input to problem-oriented policing is high quality data available in a timely way, the evaluation first sought to quantify whether or not data available to the MHRC was significantly better than those data that had been available to MPD and others previously. We then examined whether implementation of the MHRC was associated with changes in homicide numbers in the intervention as compared to the control districts. To the extent that a) the MHRC has been associated with adoption of a problem-oriented approach to policing (discussed above) and b) improved data, any c) changes in homicide rates in

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<sup>19</sup> Indeed, a lesson to be learned from implementation of the MHRC is that *without* this accountability and oversight, initiatives will not be implemented. As noted, for example, MHRC initiatives that were nominally city-wide in scope, were only in fact implemented in the intervention districts, where oversight occurred.

Milwaukee can be plausible associated with the intervention. In keeping with this line of argument, the following section summarizes results of the two components of the evaluation of the MHRCs' impact: 1) a comparison of the quality of information collected about homicides using existing data as compared to MHCR data, and 2) a statistical analysis of the crime reduction impact of implemented violence prevention strategies in the treatment districts relative to control districts.

*Data Quality:* The Milwaukee Police Department contributes data to the UCR Supplementary Homicide reporting system and also maintains internal data pertaining to its homicide investigations. As noted, a primary aim of the MHRC was to increase the amount and quality of data available to its members for analysis. In order to capture the wide range of data being collected as part of the reviews, as part of the MHRC process, MPD MHRC staff began maintaining homicide data using a data collection instrument modified from the Wisconsin Violent Death Reporting System (Wisconsin is one of 17 states participating in the CDC's National Violent Death Reporting System; see example data collection forms, attached).

In order to assess the quality of data available to the MHRC to understand homicide problems before and after implementation of the MHRC, the evaluation team compared data available from each of the three data systems in which data on homicides that occurred in the intervention districts over the study period were collected on a case by case basis. Based on the findings of earlier work (e.g., Braga et al., 1999), we anticipated that MHRC data would be consistent with SHR and MPD data on objective variables such as incident time and numbers of victims and suspects, but would differ –

and improve on these sources – for variables that focused on circumstantial aspects of the homicides, as these were a specific focus of the work of the reviews.

To conduct the analysis, the evaluation team reviewed data collected on the first 50 homicides that occurred in the intervention districts in 2005 and 2006. A simple comparison of the number of variables recorded in each of the three data collection systems suggests that the amount of analyzable data available on homicides (and non-fatal shootings) increased substantially following implementation of the MHRC. For example, in contrast to UCR and MPD data, MHRC data incorporate detailed information on the weapon(s) involved in the homicide (e.g., for guns, make, model, caliber); toxicology data, when available; and relationship data on each victim-suspect pair (see [http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/profiles/nvdrs/data\\_collection\\_access.htm](http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/profiles/nvdrs/data_collection_access.htm)). Our quantitative comparison of data sources was limited to those variables collected across all three sources (e.g., incident date and time; incident location, homicide circumstance(s); victim-suspect relationship(s) and; victim and suspect demographics).

A key finding was that both MPD homicide data and MHRC homicide data represent a clear and substantial improvement over UCR data for Milwaukee for several reasons. First, Milwaukee UCR data include as suspects everyone arrested as part of the homicide investigation, *whether or not they were arrested for the homicide*. As a result, in a large number of cases the number of UCR suspects for a homicide is greater than the number of suspects in either MPD and MHRC data (which agree >98% of the time on this information), making analysis of suspect information using UCR data problematic.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Use of these data are suspect not only internally, but more generally; the inclusion of non-related suspects in addition to other limitations lead the evaluators to believe that Milwaukee data should be excluded from any analysis of aggregate UCR data if those analyses are to include information on suspects or circumstances.

Second, for reasons that remain unclear, UCR appears often to miscode the primary circumstance for homicides (in approximately 20% of cases, using agreement between MPD and MHCR on circumstance as a “gold standard.”). In typical examples, UCR records the circumstances of a homicide as unknown for a case in which both MPD and MHRC record the homicide as having taken place due to an argument, and as “other non-felony” in a case in which the homicide was precipitated by a robbery.

In the large majority of cases, MPD and MHRC data agreed on both “objective” (e.g., incident time, victim demographics) and circumstance and relationship data for which they have common variables. Nonetheless, MHRC data have considerable advantages over traditional MPD data. First, MPD data are generally collected within several weeks of a homicide incident and are rarely updated. Because MHRC data are collected at least one month after a homicide (following the CJR review) and incorporate information from later in – or at the conclusion of – homicide investigations, they are generally more complete (with fewer “unknowns”). In addition, by design, MHRC data (based on the NVDRS data system on which its modeled) allow for multiple coding of circumstance, incident location and relationship data. As a result, homicide circumstances are more nuanced. For example, in a case in which a convenience store clerk shot a robber, while MPD codes the case simply as “self defense,” MHRC codes it as both “self-defense” and “robbery in progress,” providing the analyst with important additional information. Similarly, in a gang-related killing in which two young men flashed gang signs at one another, MPD codes the victim’s relationship to the suspect as “stranger,” while MHRC codes the relationship as both “stranger” and “rival gang

member.” Finally, MPD data are coded numerically rather than as free text, greatly increasing the ease with which they can be analyzed and presented quantitatively.

*Changes in Homicide:* Like most evaluations of crime prevention programs (Ekblom and Pease, 1995), our evaluation design departs from the desirable randomized controlled experimental approach. While MPD districts were matched and randomly allocated to treatment and control conditions, the number of cases was not large enough to have sufficient statistical power to detect treatment effects using a standard “differences-in-differences” estimator for experimental analyses (see Lipsey, 1990). As such, our analysis of impacts within the treatment districts associated with MHRC interventions follows a quasi-experimental, two-group time series design to compare homicide trends in the treatment districts relative to homicide trends in the control districts (Rossi and Freeman, 1993; Cook and Campbell, 1979; Campbell and Stanley, 1966).

The key outcome variable in our assessment of the impact of the MHRC interventions was the monthly number of homicide counts in the treatment and control districts between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2006. These homicide data were provided by the MPD.<sup>21</sup>


### *Simple Pre/Post Comparisons*

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<sup>21</sup> Although it is well known that police homicide data, such as the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports, have shortcomings, homicide data generally do not suffer from the same reporting limitations as other police incident data. Careful analyses of police homicide data can yield reliable and valid insights on objective characteristics of homicide incidents such as victim sex, victim age, and weapons used (Maxfield, 1989; Reidel, 1989). Police homicide data are also widely used for assessing trends and patterns in violent offending (Blumstein, 1995; Cook and Laub, 2002) and the evaluation of violence reduction programs (see, e.g., McGarrell et al., 2006; Rosenfeld et al., 2005).

Figure 2 presents the yearly counts of homicides in the treatment and control districts between 1999 and 2006.

**Figure 2**



The control districts typically experienced higher numbers of homicides when compared to the treatment districts. During this time period, the control districts averaged 67 homicides per year and the treatment districts averaged 45 homicides per year.

As described earlier in this report, August 2005 was identified as the official start date of the MHRC interventions. Table 4 presents a simple comparison of the pre-test and post-test mean monthly counts of homicides in the treatment and control districts. After the implementation of the MHRC interventions, the treatment districts experienced a 28.6 percent decrease in the monthly mean number of homicides while the control districts experienced a 5.6 percent increase in the monthly mean number of homicides. This

simple analysis suggests that the MHRC intervention was associated with a noteworthy reduction in homicide in the treatment districts relative to the control districts.

Table 4. Pre-Test and Post Test Mean Monthly Counts of Homicides in Treatment and Control Districts<sup>22</sup>

	Pre-test	Post-test	Difference	% Change
Control	5.51	5.82	+0.31	+5.6%
Treatment	3.95	2.82	-1.13	-28.6%

### *Multivariate Analyses*

As Table 4 suggests, monthly counts of homicide incidents in the treatment and control districts were distributed in the form of rare event counts. There are well-documented problems associated with treating event count variables, which are discrete, as continuous realizations of a normal data generating process (King, 1989). As such, methods such as standard mean difference tests and ordinary least squares regression that assume population normality of the dependent variable should not be used to analyze count data (Gardner, Mulvey, and Shaw, 1995). Rather, Poisson regression is generally used to estimate models of the event counts (Long, 1997).

The Poisson regression model has the defining characteristic that the conditional mean of the outcome is equal to the conditional variance. However, in practice, the conditional variance often exceeds the conditional mean (Long, 1997). When a sample count distribution exhibits this “overdispersion,” it is unlikely that a Poisson process

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<sup>22</sup> There were 79 months in the pre-intervention time series and 17 months in the post-intervention time series.

generated it. Assuming a Poisson process, when the true process generates overdispersed data, results in the same coefficient estimates but underestimates coefficient variances. This results in spuriously large test statistics on the hypothesis that the true coefficient is equal to zero in the population (Gardner et al., 1995).

When count data are overdispersed, it is appropriate to use a negative binomial generalization of the Poisson regression model. The negative binomial regression model is an extension of the Poisson regression model that allows the conditional variance of the dependent variable to exceed the conditional mean through the estimation of a dispersion parameter (Long, 1997). Using the fully-specified models described below, we ran chi-square goodness-of-fit tests after the Poisson regressions to determine the nature of the count distributions. The tests revealed that the control time series was best modeled by a Poisson regression (chi-square = 67.29881, df = 79, P = .8232) while the treatment time series was best modeled by a negative binomial regression (chi-square = 104.9987, df = 79, P = .0269).

In addition to determining the nature of the outcome variable distribution, there are three sources of noise in any time series which could obscure intervention effects: *trend*- the series could drift upwards or downwards, *seasonality*- the series could spike at different times (e.g. gun violence increases in summer months), and *random error*- even if the series was de-trended and de-seasonalized, observations would fluctuate randomly around some mean level (McDowall, McCleary, Meidinger, and Hay, 1980). If a time series model does not account for these sources of error, the intervention analysis will be confounded. To account for trends in the treatment and control time series, we included a simple trend variable for linear trends and a trend-squared variable for curvilinear

trends.<sup>23</sup> In order to account for seasonal effects in our models, we included dummy variables for each month. We also used exploratory maximum-likelihood regression models to detect whether the monthly counts of homicide events were serially autocorrelated in the treatment and control time series (i.e. if the number of homicides in January 1999 was significantly correlated with the number of homicides in February 1999, and so on) (McDowall et al., 1980).<sup>24</sup> The time series data did not show significant serial autocorrelation in either the treatment or control districts; therefore we did not estimate an AR(1) autoregressive component in our final models.<sup>25</sup>

We also included covariates to control for any changes in the monthly counts of homicide that could be associated with changes in Milwaukee's population size as measured by the US Census Bureau or existing secular violent crime rate trends as measured by the FBI Uniform Crime Reports. A binary dummy variable indicating whether MHRC interventions were or were not in effect in the relevant month was constructed to estimate the effects of the MHRC strategies on the monthly counts of homicide in the treatment and control time series.

The parameters for the independent variables were expressed as incidence rate ratios (i.e., exponentiated coefficients). Incidence rate ratios are interpreted as the rate at which things occur; for example, an incidence rate ratio of 0.90 would suggest that, controlling for other independent variables, the selected independent variable was associated with a 10 percent decrease in the rate at which the dependent variable occurs

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<sup>23</sup> The trend variable was simply the month number from the start to the end of the time series (i.e., for the January 1999 through December 2006 series, the trend variable ranged from 1 to 96). The trend-squared variable was calculated by taking the square of the trend variable.

<sup>24</sup> Maximum likelihood estimation regression models can be used to estimate coefficients when time series data have first order autocorrelated errors (Ostrom, 1990)

<sup>25</sup> Using the fully specified models identified below, maximum likelihood regression revealed no significant serial autocorrelation in the control time series ( $AR(1) = -.164$ ,  $t = -1.456$ ,  $P = .149$ ) and the treatment time series ( $AR(1) = .118$ ,  $t = 1.063$ ,  $P = .291$ ).

(i.e., the independent variable in the intervention condition has a rate 90% of that in the control condition). Following social science convention, the two-tailed .05 level of significance was selected as the benchmark to reject the null hypothesis of “no difference.” STATA 8.2 statistical software was used to analyze the data.

The final model for the treatment and control time series was as follows:

$$\text{Monthly Count of Homicide} = \text{Intercept} + \text{Intervention} + \text{Violent Crime Rate} + \text{Population} + \text{Trend} + \text{Trend}^2 + \text{Month Dummy Variables} + \text{Error}$$

Controlling for the other predictor variables, the MHRC intervention was associated with a statistically significant decrease in the monthly number of homicides (Table 5); according to the incidence rate ratio, the MHRC interventions were associated with a 52 percent decrease in the monthly number of homicide events in the treatment districts ( $P=.046$ ). Controlling for the other covariates, the trend, curvilinear trend, population, violent crime rate, and month dummy predictor variables were not statistically significant. Table 6 presents the results of the Poisson regression model estimating the effects of the MHRC interventions on homicides in the control districts. This effect was not seen in the control districts, where the MHRC interventions were associated with a not statistically significant 9.2 percent decrease in the monthly number of homicide events in these areas ( $P=.733$ ).<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> In both regression models, the Pseudo  $R^2$  statistic suggested that a low percentage of variation in the dependent variable was explained by the included covariates. This would be a concern if the goal of the analysis was to produce a model that explained the total variation in the monthly number of homicides in the treatment and control districts. However, the goal of this analysis was to generate an unbiased estimate of the effect of the MHRC intervention on the number of homicides in the treatment districts (and, obviously, to examine similar trends in the control districts). We included covariates that would allow us isolate the effect of the intervention from existing seasonal, population, and violent crime trends in the treatment districts rather than developing a model to explain levels of homicides based on factors not directly related to the presence or absence of the intervention. As such, the low Pseudo  $R^2$  values were not a substantive concern in this impact evaluation.

Table 5. Negative Binomial Regression of Monthly Counts of Homicides in Treatment Districts

Variable	IRR	Std. Error.	Z	P> Z	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower	Upper
MHRC	.4806*	.1764	-2.00	0.046	.2340	.9868
Violent rate	1.0005	.0008	0.70	0.487	.9989	1.0021
Population	1.0001	.0001	1.87	0.062	.9999	1.0001
Trend	.9719	.0204	-1.35	0.176	.9326	1.0128
Trend squared	1.0003	.0002	1.34	0.180	.9998	1.0008
January	.9107	.2350	-0.36	0.717	.5491	1.5102
February	.9741	.2472	-0.10	0.917	.5922	1.6018
March	.7318	.2001	-1.14	0.254	.4281	1.2507
April	.6408	.1820	-1.57	0.117	.3672	1.1183
May	.7017	.1941	-1.28	0.200	.4080	1.2069
June	.8228	.2178	-0.74	0.461	.4896	1.3825
July	1.4595	.3389	1.63	0.103	.9258	2.3010
August	1.0156	.2587	0.06	0.952	.6163	1.6734
September	1.0131	.2578	0.05	0.959	.6151	1.6684
October	1.0748	.2691	0.29	0.773	.6579	1.7558
November	.9404	.2430	-0.24	0.812	.5667	1.5606

N = 96

Likelihood Ratio  $X^2$  with 16 degrees of freedom = 31.42

Probability of  $X^2 = 0.0789$

Pseudo  $R^2 = 0.0591$

Log likelihood = -195.1329

Natural log of Alpha = -14.8790

Standard Error of the natural log of Alpha = 484.5715

Note: The reference category for the month dummy variable was December.

\* P = <.05

Although the control districts experienced a non-statistically significant decrease in homicide, the treatment districts experienced a much larger, statistically significant decrease in homicide after the MHRC interventions were implemented in August 2005. This quasi-experimental regression analysis suggests that the impact associated with the MHRC interventions in the treatment districts was distinct relative to homicide trends in the control districts.

Table 6. Poisson Regression of Monthly Counts of Homicides in Control Districts

Variable	IRR	Std. Error.	Z	P> Z	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower	Upper
MHRC	.9088	.2544	-0.34	0.733	.5250	1.5732
Violent rate	1.0001	.0006	0.28	0.779	.9989	1.0014
Population	1.0001	.0001	0.35	0.725	.9999	1.0001
Trend	.9827	.0169	-1.01	0.313	.9500	1.0165
Trend squared	1.0002	.0002	0.88	0.379	.9997	1.0005
January	1.4042	.3483	1.37	0.171	.8635	2.2835
February	1.1617	.3003	0.58	0.562	.6999	1.9281
March	1.1996	.3080	0.71	0.478	.7252	1.9842
April	1.8734*	.4408	2.67	0.008	1.1812	2.9710
May	1.9113*	.4482	2.76	0.006	1.2070	3.0266
June	1.9839*	.4624	2.94	0.003	1.2563	3.1328
July	2.0202*	.4695	3.03	0.002	1.2810	3.1859
August	1.6496*	.3966	2.08	0.037	1.0296	2.6429
September	1.7207*	.4100	2.28	0.023	1.0786	2.7451
October	1.3611	.3393	1.24	0.216	.83507	2.2188
November	1.6814*	.4015	2.18	0.030	1.0529	2.6850

N = 96

Likelihood Ratio  $X^2$  with 16 degrees of freedom = 30.00

Probability of  $X^2$  = 0.0180

Pseudo  $R^2$  = 0.0693

Log likelihood = -201.4350

Note: The reference category for the month dummy variable was December.

\* P < .05

## **Conclusion**

Our research suggests that the homicide incident review process improves the capacity of cities to understand the nature of urban homicide problems and adds considerable value to the development of appropriate violence prevention strategies.

Since it was inaugurated in January 2005, the MHRC has made significant steps towards achieving the goal of institutionalizing a strategic, data-driven response to homicide and firearms violence in the City. While the MHRC has only begun to realize the potential of this system, it has identified and implemented several strategic responses to homicide in the intervention districts (e.g., policies to control disorderly taverns, nuisance properties, and high-risk probationers and parolees) that seem to be generating significant homicide prevention benefits when compared to homicide trends in the control districts.

While the results of our impact evaluation cannot be used to demonstrate causation, the apparent effectiveness of the MHRC strategies in reducing homicides in the treatment districts is well supported by the existing research literature on effective crime prevention practices. Many scholars have argued that, to be more effective in controlling crime, criminal justice agencies need to focus their scarce resources on the small number of risky people and risky places that generate the bulk of urban crime problems (e.g., Braga, 2002; Sherman, 2002; Weisburd, 1997). The National Research Council's Committee to Review Police Policy and Practices reported that there was strong evidence that hot spots policing was effective in preventing crime and the available research evidence suggested that the problem-oriented policing approach was promising in preventing crime (Skogan and Frydl, 2004). Other reviews have suggested that the pulling-levers strategy was also promising in preventing homicide and gun

violence (Wellford et al., 2005; Braga et al., 2002). The MHRC strategies rooted in these approaches seem likely to have generated the observed homicide prevention gains in the treatment districts.

In addition to any associated quantitative homicide reduction benefits, the MHRC has been embraced by Milwaukee as a very productive enterprise for understanding and responding to serious violent crime problems. The MHRC has provided much-needed opportunities for collaboration among by City and state agencies, and by Milwaukee's community service providers, all of whom appear to value their participation highly. The MHRC is perceived by members of the CJR and C SPR as an entity that can identify issues and facilitate the development and implementation of a response to reduce homicide and gun violence in the City. Important constituents of that perception are the MHRCs' ability to foster collaboration among agencies, many of which did not previously have experience working together; its effectiveness in developing an accurate and timely data source for homicide and shooting data.

The qualitative success of the MHRC process is evident by the expansion of the review process into a fourth district in 2007. The practical value of the process to Milwaukee practitioners is also strongly supported by the combined efforts made by key agencies to secure funding to continue the work of the MHRC. The MHRC has built a solid foundation for reducing homicide and gun violence in the City, continuing to bring both criminal justice and social service providers together to identify and create appropriate problem-oriented violence prevention strategies, strengthening partnerships, and improving analytic capacity and information sharing between agencies.

The MHRC experience suggests, at least, two key lessons for other jurisdictions interested in developing a more effective response to highly-complex urban homicide problems: the need to create an effective “network of capacity” to prevent violence and the importance of problem analysis research in driving effective violence prevention.

### *Creating an Effective “Network of Capacity”*

The formation of the MHRC was an exercise in building much-needed violence prevention capacity in one city. Prior to MHRC implementation, Milwaukee was not well positioned to be strategic in its efforts to prevent crime. In order for the City of Milwaukee to develop innovative homicide prevention strategies involving a variety of partners, it was essential to establish a network of capacity consisting of dense and productive relationships that partners could be drawn from (Moore, 2002). In essence, through the MHRC process, Milwaukee created a very powerful network of capacity to prevent homicide. The resulting network was well positioned to launch an effective response to homicide because criminal justice agencies, community groups, and social service agencies coordinated and combined their efforts in ways that could magnify their separate effects.

Effective collaborations and the trust and accountability that they entail are essential in launching a meaningful response to complex homicide problems. However, the fact that such collaborations are needed does not guarantee that they inevitably rise or, once developed, that they are sustained. There are many significant obstacles to their development and maintenance such as giving up control over scarce resources that could compromise agencies’ traditional missions, aligning agencies’ individual work efforts into a functional enterprise, and developing a collective leadership among a group of

individuals aligned with the needs of their individual organizations (Bardach, 1998). A significant amount of effort by MHRC staff and partnering agencies was necessary to create and sustain the network. Important activities included: identifying key players from relevant organizations, training participants on the review process, and facilitating ongoing meetings to seek input on strategy development and share information on implementation progress.

*The Importance of Problem Analysis Research in Driving Effective Violence Prevention*

Another broad lesson to be learned from this research is the considerable value added to the development of violence prevention strategies by in-depth problem analysis. For complex problems such as homicide, a deep understanding of the nature of the problem is crucial in framing appropriate responses. Prior to the establishment of the MHRC, the City of Milwaukee did not have high-quality data and adequate analytic capacity to frame innovative violence prevention strategies. Solid working relationships between academics and practitioners were central to improving the ability of partnering agencies to understand the nature of homicide in Milwaukee and engage effective violence prevention practices

Problem analysis is the process of conducting in-depth, systematic analysis and assessment of crime problems at the local level (Goldstein, 1990). The role of problem analysis in strategic crime prevention is vital because it involves the in-depth examination of underlying factors that leading to crime and disorder problems for which effective responses can be developed and through which assessment can be conducted to determine the relevance and success of the responses. Problem analysis is action-oriented research that not only supports police interventions, but drives them as well. Unfortunately, as

Boba (2003) observes, while problem-oriented policing has blossomed in both concept and practice, problem analysis has been the slowest part of the process to develop. In his twenty-year review of problem-oriented policing, Michael Scott (2000) concludes that problem analysis remains the aspect of problem-oriented policing that is most in need of improvement. The Police Executive Research Forum's national assessment of the U.S. Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)-sponsored "Problem Solving Partnerships" program also found that problem analysis was the weakest phase of the problem-oriented policing process (PERF, 2000).

There are many ways through which the practice of problem analysis can be enriched including the hiring and training of problem analysts within police departments, federal funding for problem-oriented projects and the publication and dissemination of problem-analysis activities, the participation of other city agencies in data sharing and analysis, and the encouragement and promotion of problem analysis by nonprofit and membership institutions such as the Police Foundation, Police Executive Research Forum, Vera Institute of Justice, and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (Boba, 2003; Scott, 2000). Academics also have much to offer in the advancement of problem analysis (Braga et al., 2006; Braga, 2004). In addition to providing training in analytic methods and concepts and developing a body of problem-analysis literature, academics can conduct problem analyses and high-quality action research evaluations in partnership with criminal justice agencies. The homicide incident review process serves as an important example of the potency of academic-practitioner partnerships in understanding and responding to violent crime (Klofas and Hipple, 2006).

The MHRC was designed and implemented by practitioners and academics based on their joint recognition that ongoing data collection, analysis, and performance measurement are key elements in dealing with urban homicide problems. Homicide problems evolve over time and cities must be positioned to identify new and understand new trends, implement appropriate strategies, and adjust strategies as necessary. Dynamic and adaptable processes, rather than tactics and specific programs, are needed to manage and control urban violence. The MHRC provided a forum for the ongoing analysis of homicide problems. Through regular meetings, quantitative and qualitative data on the nature of homicide were collected, analytic findings were presented and discussed, and the performance of implemented strategies was scrutinized. Clearly, practitioner-academic partnerships add much value to the understanding of violent crime problems and the development of appropriate responses. While such partnerships are becoming more commonplace (see e.g., McEwen, 2003), the challenge remains to encourage these collaborations through the education of practitioners and researchers in the principles and methods of problem analysis and the benefits of working together.

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#### Appendix 1: Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission Participating Agencies

##### **Criminal Justice agencies include:**

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program, officers/agent  
 Milwaukee City Attorney's Office, Assistant City Attorney  
 Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office, ADA Homicide Unit, Community Prosecutor, Victim/Witness Coordinator  
 Milwaukee County Medical Examiner's Office, Medical Examiner/investigator  
 Milwaukee Housing Authority, Chief of Public Safety  
 Milwaukee Police Department, Community Liaison, Homicide Detectives, Gang Crimes Officers, Vice Detectives and Violent Crime Detectives  
 Milwaukee Public Schools Public Safety Division, Director of Security  
 Office of the District One Chief Judge, Assistance Court Administrator  
 US Attorney's Office, Assistant US Attorney

US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, ATF agent/analyst  
US Drug Enforcement Administration, agent  
US Federal Bureau of Investigation, agent  
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, agent  
US Marshals Service, agent  
Wisconsin Department of Corrections, Probation/Parole Agents Officers  
Wisconsin Department of Justice, Division of Criminal Investigation  
Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance, Executive Director

**Community Service Provider agencies include:**

The Alma Center, Outreach worker  
Asha Family Services, Outreach worker  
Aurora Sinai Medical Center, Abuse Response Service, Sensitive Crimes Victim Services  
Bayview Neighborhood Association\*, Outreach worker  
Benedict Center\*, Outreach worker  
Bureau of Milwaukee Child Welfare, Community liaison  
Children's Hospital of Wisconsin, Project Ujima, Staff/Liaison  
City of Milwaukee Health Department, Violence Prevention Specialist  
Community Development Block Grant Coordinating Agencies, Outreach worker  
The Counseling Center of Milwaukee, Street Outreach Specialist  
Harambee Ombudsman Project, Inc., Outreach worker  
Hillside Family Resource Center\*, Outreach worker  
Hope House, Outreach worker  
Incarnation Lutheran Church\*, Church leaders  
Latina Resource Center, Outreach worker  
Lisbon Avenue Neighborhood Association\*, Outreach worker  
Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc., Senior Staff Attorney  
The Milwaukee Christian Center\*, Outreach worker  
Medical College of Wisconsin, Emergency Medicine Department, Professor of Pediatrics, Outreach workers  
Milwaukee Commission on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, Outreach worker  
Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office, Community Prosecutors and Crisis Response Unit, Assistant District Attorneys  
Milwaukee Department of Neighborhood Services, Outreach worker  
Milwaukee Housing Authority, Community Partnership Coordinator  
Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barrett, Chief of Staff, Intergovernmental Relations Staff  
Milwaukee Police Department, Community Liaison Officers  
Milwaukee Public Schools, Director of Security and School Psychologist – Violence Prevention Program  
Private Industry Council, Community Coordinator  
Running Rebels, Outreach worker  
Saint Adalbert's Church\*, Outreach worker  
Social Development Commission, Community Partners, Outreach worker  
Sojourner Truth House, Outreach worker  
Southside Organizing Committee, Outreach worker

Task Force on Family Violence, Inc., Executive Director, Assistant Director, Outreach workers  
Urban Underground, Outreach worker  
Various Faith-Based Agencies, Church leaders  
Wisconsin Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Sensitive Crimes Victim Services Staff  
Wisconsin Community Services, Outreach worker  
\* Agencies that have recently been invited and have committed to joining the Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission

**Domestic Violence agencies include:**

The Alma Center, Outreach worker  
Aurora Sinai Medical Center, Abuse Response Service, Sensitive Crimes Victim Services Staff  
Bureau of Milwaukee Child Welfare, Community liaison  
City of Milwaukee Health Department, Violence Prevention Specialist  
Latina Resource Center, Outreach worker  
Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc., Senior Staff Attorney  
Milwaukee Commission on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, Sensitive Crimes Victim Services Staff  
Milwaukee County District Attorney’s Office, Assistant District Attorney  
Milwaukee Police Department, Sensitive Crimes Detective  
Milwaukee Public Schools, School Psychologist – Violence Prevention Program  
Office of the District One Chief Judge, Assistance Court Administrator  
Sojourner Truth House, Outreach worker  
Task Force on Family Violence, Inc., Executive Director, Assistant Director, Outreach workers  
Wisconsin Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Sensitive Crimes Victim Services Staff

**Executive Committee Members:**

Jeffrey Altenburg	District Attorney’s Office
Bevan Baker	Milwaukee Health Department
Beth Ballo	Task Force on Family Violence
Vincent Bobot	City Attorney’s Office
Steven Brandl	University of Wisconsin Milwaukee
Arthur Chavarria	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
John Chisholm	District Attorney’s Office
Ron Cisler	Center for Urban Population Health
Jan Cummings	Wisconsin Department of Justice
Jeffrey Davis	Department of Corrections
Linda Davis	Donors Forum
Steve Fronk	Fire and Police Commission

Janine Geske	Marquette University Law School
Jeffrey Greipp	District Attorney's Office
Tracy Hefley	Milwaukee Health Department
William Jessup	Milwaukee Police Department
Joseph Kubisiak	Community Partners – Safe and Sound
Marlene Melzer-Lange	Medical College of Wisconsin – Project UJIMA
Edward Liebrecht	Milwaukee Police Department
William Lipscomb	US Attorney's Office
Lawrence Mahoney	Department of Corrections
Glen Mattison	Community Development Block Grant Administration
Lorraine Mc Cade	Milwaukee County Sheriff's Office
LaTunya Meredith	Milwaukee Police Dept./Homicide Review Commission
Barb Notestein	Safe and Sound
Mallory O'Brien	Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission
Brian O'Keefe	Milwaukee Police Department
Beth Bishop-Perrigo	Office of the Chief Judge
Terry Perry	City of Milwaukee Mayor's Office
Carmen Pitre	Task Force on Family Violence
Peter Pochowski	Milwaukee Public Schools
Denise Revels-Robinson	Bureau of Milwaukee's Child Welfare
Dale Schunk	Milwaukee Police Department
David Steingraber	Office of Justice Assistance
Adam Stephens	City Attorney's Office
Laurie Woods	Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission
Craig Wroten	Harambee Ombudsman Project, Inc.
David Zibolski	Milwaukee Police Department

**Working Group Members:**

Beth Ballo	Task Force on Family Violence
John Chisholm	District Attorney's Office
Ron Cisler	Center for Urban Population Health
Jacob Corr	District Attorney's Office
Michael Gollinger	Department of Corrections
Tracy Hefley	Milwaukee Health Department
Joseph Kubisiak	Community Partners – Safe and Sound
Edward Liebrecht	Milwaukee Police Department
John Manning	US Attorney's Office
Glen Mattison	Community Development Block Grant Administration
Valerie Nash	Task Force on Family Violence
Mallory O'Brien	Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission
Brian O'Keefe	Milwaukee Police Department
Adrian Thomas	SDC Youth Development Program
Craig Wroten	Harambee Ombudsman Project, Inc.

## Appendix 2: Interview Protocol

Beginning in May 2005, and continuing approximately every six months, MHRC participants were asked a series of questions, documented on the assessment instrument below on the use of homicide investigation information, information sharing and changes resulting from participation in the MHRC. The responses were coded and entered into an Excel spreadsheet and tracked over time.

### Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission (MHRC)

#### Assessment Instrument

Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

**Organization:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Title:** \_\_\_\_\_

Currently involved with MHRC:     Yes         No

Please briefly describe your role in a homicide investigation.

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**Which individuals/agencies do you communicate with regarding a homicide investigation?**

	6 months ago				Currently			
	Never	Sometimes	A Great Deal	Don't Know/ Not Applicable	Never	Sometimes	A Great Deal	Don't Know/ Not Applicable
a. U.S. Attorney's Office	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. District Attorney's Office	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. US Marshal	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. FBI	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. ATF	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Department of Corrections	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
g. DEA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
h. MPD – Homicide Unit	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
i. MPD- Vice Control	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
j. MPD - Intel	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
k. MPD- CLO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
l. MPD - AGU	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
m. MPD- Patrol Person	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
n. HIDTA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
o. Sheriff	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
p. Medical Examiner	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
q. Milwaukee Health Department	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
r. MPS School Safety and Security	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
s. Housing Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
t. Milwaukee Child Welfare	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
u. Project UJIMA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
v. Other (SPECIFY) _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please indicate how often you communicate with agencies regarding a homicide investigation.

	6 months ago					Currently				
	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Every few months	Never	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Every few months	Never
a. U.S. Attorney's Office	<input type="checkbox"/>									
b. District Attorney's Office	<input type="checkbox"/>									
c. US Marshal's	<input type="checkbox"/>									
d. FBI	<input type="checkbox"/>									
e. ATF	<input type="checkbox"/>									
f. Department of Corrections	<input type="checkbox"/>									
g. DEA	<input type="checkbox"/>									
h. MPD – Homicide Unit	<input type="checkbox"/>									
i. MPD- Vice Control	<input type="checkbox"/>									
j. MPD - Intel	<input type="checkbox"/>									
k. MPD- CLO	<input type="checkbox"/>									
l. MPD - AGU	<input type="checkbox"/>									
m. MPD- Patrol Person	<input type="checkbox"/>									
n. HIDTA	<input type="checkbox"/>									
o. Sheriff	<input type="checkbox"/>									
p. Medical Examiner	<input type="checkbox"/>									
q. Milwaukee Health Department	<input type="checkbox"/>									
r. MPS School Safety and Security	<input type="checkbox"/>									
s. Housing Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>									
t. Milwaukee Child Welfare	<input type="checkbox"/>									
u. Project UJIMA	<input type="checkbox"/>									
v. Other (SPECIFY) _____	<input type="checkbox"/>									

**What is your regular method of communication?**

	6 months ago				Currently			
	Verbal Face to Face	Verbal Phone	Written Reports	Not applicable	Verbal Face to Face	Verbal Phone	Written Reports	Not applicable
a. U.S. Attorney's Office	<input type="checkbox"/>							
b. District Attorney's Office	<input type="checkbox"/>							
c. US Marshal's	<input type="checkbox"/>							
d. FBI	<input type="checkbox"/>							
e. ATF	<input type="checkbox"/>							
f. Department of Corrections	<input type="checkbox"/>							
g. DEA	<input type="checkbox"/>							
h. MPD – Homicide Unit	<input type="checkbox"/>							
i. MPD- Vice Control	<input type="checkbox"/>							
j. MPD - Intel	<input type="checkbox"/>							
k. MPD- CLO	<input type="checkbox"/>							
l. MPD - AGU	<input type="checkbox"/>							
m. MPD- Patrol Person	<input type="checkbox"/>							
n. HIDTA	<input type="checkbox"/>							
o. Sheriff	<input type="checkbox"/>							
p. Medical Examiner	<input type="checkbox"/>							
q. Milwaukee Health Department	<input type="checkbox"/>							
r. MPS School Safety and Security	<input type="checkbox"/>							
s. Housing Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>							
t. Milwaukee Child Welfare	<input type="checkbox"/>							
u. Project UJIMA	<input type="checkbox"/>							
v. Other (SPECIFY) _____	<input type="checkbox"/>							

**For each of these agencies, how is the information you share used?** *(repeat for each agency as necessary)*

Agency:	6 months ago				Currently			
	Always	Sometimes	Never	Don't Know/ Not Applicable	Always	Sometimes	Never	Don't Know/ Not Applicable
a. As an aid to the investigation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. As an aid to apprehension of suspect	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. For strategic problem solving	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. For planning and development of prevention/deterrent strategy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. As an aid to implementing strategy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. For developing evaluative measures	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
g. For implementing evaluative measures	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
h. To develop partnerships	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
i. Other (SPECIFY) _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**To what extent are you involved in any of the following areas regarding homicides?**

	6 months ago				Currently			
	Very Involved	Somewhat Involved	Not Involved	Don't Know/ Not Applicable	Very Involved	Somewhat Involved	Not Involved	Don't Know/ Not Applicable
a. Collecting new information	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Identifying target problem	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<b>c. Building partnerships</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>							
<b>d. Planning and development of prevention/deterrent strategy</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>							
<b>e. Implementing strategy</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>							
<b>f. Developing evaluative measures</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>							
<b>g. Implementing evaluative measures</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>							
<b>h. Development of partnerships</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>							
<b>i. Other (SPECIFY) _____</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>							

**What are the most important components of the HRC for your agency?**

Is this different from 6 months ago?

**How would you describe the role of your agency in preventing/deterring homicides?**

**Of these roles (if multiple), which are the most important for your agency and why?**

Is this different from 6 months ago?

**How important to your agency is information-sharing with other agencies?**

Is this different from 6 months ago?

**If you are involved with the Homicide Review Commission, please describe any changes in policies, procedures or practice in your agency as a result of the agency's participation.**

**If you are involved with the Homicide Review Commission, would you say you and/or your agency has benefited from an increase in information sharing regarding homicide and shooting cases?**

Yes  No

**Comments:**

**If you are involved with the Homicide Review Commission, would you say you and/or your agency has strengthened your relationships with other agencies?**

Yes  No

**Comments:**

**If you are involved with the Homicide Review Commission, would you say you and/or your agency has benefited from the increase in analytical capacity provided by the Commission (like weekly reports, maps, interim report)?**

Yes  No

**Comments:**

**If you are involved with the Homicide Review Commission, would you say the information you and/or your agency has gained through the review process has assisted you in your work (like work on recommendations, information obtained at the reviews)?**

Yes  No

**Comments:**

Appendix 3: MHRC Actionable Recommendations

<b>Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission Recommendations-- Working Document 1/23/08</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Implemented Agency, District or City Wide</b>	<b>Date Recommended</b>	<b>Agency Responsible</b>
* Highlight indicates still needs to be addressed				
** Be sure to check the Cross Agency section				
<b><i>Case-specific recommendations</i></b>				
Suspects added to Major Violators Program (MVP) list (list of the most problematic individuals and properties/locations identified by police)	completed	District	Dec-05	
Locations of homicides added to Nuisance Property List	completed	District	Jun-06	
Multiple suspects and properties added to District Level Major Violators Program (DMVP)	completed	District		
US Marshals alerted other criminal justice agencies that they were closing in on a suspect, reducing the duplication of effort	completed	District	Apr-06	
Federal charges brought against a homicide suspect	completed	Agency	Jun-07	
Federal charges brought against suspect for firearm offenses in several shootings	completed	Agency	May-07	
Information sharing between FBI and MPD Homicide, leads provided to MPD	completed	District	Aug-05	
<b><i>General recommendations</i></b>				
<b><i>City of Milwaukee Common Council</i></b>				
Restrict sale of drug paraphernalia ** City Attorney's Office, DA's office, citizen met with legislators on taxing these items	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide	Jan-08	City Attorney, DA's Office

<b>City of Milwaukee Department of Neighborhood Services</b>				
Examine policies for nuisance properties, criteria, follow-up, resolutions	completed	City Wide	Aug-08	DA's Office, DNS, MPD
Timely removal of graffiti * Not enough money to keep up with removal	<i>on hold</i>	District	Jun-06	MHRC
Department of Neighborhood Services provide information at MPD in-service on criteria for nuisance properties. Create brochure. **11/15: on hold until code is amended in April, would be easier on a roll call tape	<i>on hold</i>	City Wide		DNS
Modify new ordinance requiring digital video cameras installed at all mini-marts, convenience stores, gas stations, should be expanded to include all businesses, Class B licenses and half-way houses - ** October 2006 - a committee has been formed to determine criteria	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide	Sep-05	DNS, MPD
Reduce number of licensed premises located in residential areas - zoning within a square mile ** MHRC expand extended hours gas station map to include all extended hour license locations		City Wide	Jun-06	DNS, City of Milwaukee, MHRC
<b>City of Milwaukee Health Department</b>				
Identify all areas of city where the homeless congregate and see what is currently in place to prevent victimization	<i>on hold</i>	District	Aug-05	
Examine violence component of Public Health Nurse visit. Target new moms with kids <3 yrs, Ask Masterlock to donate trigger locks	<i>on hold</i>	City Wide	Aug-05	
<b>(City of) Milwaukee Police Department</b>				
Develop district level MVP list	completed	District	Aug-05	MPD
Send US Marshal MVP, DMVP list- sent weekly	completed	District		MPD
Advise law enforcement of bus leaving from 16th and Greenfield that goes directly to Mexico	completed	District	Jul-05	MPD
MPD directed patrol missions developed	completed	District	Aug-05	MPD
Develop city statute for removal of shrines, allow only for a short period of time	completed	City Wide	Aug-05	MPD, City Attorney's Office
Need MPD personnel who are familiar with Asian gangs, customs and language	completed	District	Sep-05	MPD
Examine tavern check frequency * starting 6/25/06, tavern patrol started hitting many taverns each weekend	completed	District	Dec-05	MPD

Add "Who raised you?" to pedigree	in progress	City Wide	Sep-05	MHRC
Implement more park and walk activities	in progress	District	Aug-05	MPD
Develop means/protocol for district level gang information to be shared between the Intel/AGU and patrol officers Outcome: Weekly Anti Gang Unit (AGU) Bulletin developed in Districts 6 & 3 and shared daily at roll call - Will ask for directive to have in all districts	completed	District	Sep-05	MPD, DA's Office
Educate dispatch on sending squads to incident location, not to location of caller	completed	City Wide	Feb-06	MHRC
Train MPD personnel in ArcReader so they can generate their own maps and use for planning and evaluation	completed	City Wide	Mar-06	MPD, DA's Office
Improve district officer communication with DOC through use of F.I. cards - leave card in a designated place for agent to pick up. **Update: 6/20/07 MPD memo notifies of FI card change and addition of PROPAR field to FI Card Data Entry Screen	in progress	City Wide	Sep-05	MPD, Adult DOC
Create map of gang territories, could be used by Intel, MPS, AGU, Safe Streets Initiative	completed	District		MPD
Develop tavern MVP list	completed	District	Mar-06	MPD
Notify the City Attorney's Office of taverns where violence is occurring	completed	City Wide	Nov-07	MHRC, City Attorney's Office
Work with City Attorney and District Attorney to address nuisance properties	completed	District	Oct-08	MPD, DA, City Attorney
Booking process needs to be examined to identify areas to streamline * On hold until RMS is running efficiently	<i>on hold</i>	City Wide		MPD
Make GRIPS database accessible to the districts on the intranet, would fulfill request for "family tree" of gang members * Migrating files into ACIS, avail in all districts, using HIDTA dollars 11/15: Training Intell and others next week	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide	Nov-05	MPD
Educate tenants to notify the landlord if the police are called to their property.	completed	District	May-06	
Make shorter version of PA33 for officers, add section to indicate positive action by tavern owner, officer education on importance of completing form, tavern owner education on purpose of form	<i>on hold</i>	Agency	Apr-06	MPD

CLO should call Homicide Lt. when a homicide happens and let them know about properties and people in that area *Per Capt. Meyer, Homi Captain should call Dist. Capt. regularly for briefings and Dist. Capt. can hook them up with the right district officers to talk to.	<i>in progress</i>	District	Jul-07	MPD
MPD inform City Attorney of known drug houses in a timely manner, officers need to be trained on using City Attorney's Frequenter of a Drug House citation - can be issued to everyone on scene when doing a search warrant	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide, focused in intervention disitricts		City Attorney's Office, MPD
Review selection process for CLOs - need people who are very engaged in the community, need qualifications detailed in protocol	<i>on hold</i>	City Wide	Jun-07	
Provide internet access to AGU	<i>on hold</i>	City Wide	Jun-07	
<b>(City of) Milwaukee Public Schools</b>				
Require MPS Administrators to participate in COMP *Update: It is now mandatory	completed	Agency	Sep-06	
More education for MPS parents, school administration and kids on gang signs and gun safety *Update: Gang prevention brochure created for teachers and parents, gang prevention presentation made by Chief and Superintendant, MPS sharing gang info with MPD Intel	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide	Sep-05	USAO, MPS, Center for Urban Population Health, CDBG
Revisit anger management/conflict resolution in schools, cbo, churches. Anger mgmt as early as kindergarten	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide	Nov-06	USAO, Center for Urban Population Health, CDBG
Provide student data on victims and suspects to MHRC **Met with City Attorney, there is no agreement for data sharing as of 1/23/08	<i>stalled</i>	district		MPS, City of Milwaukee
Re-establish in-school suspension		City Wide	Sep-06	
<b>Community Groups</b>				
Develop Train-the-Trainer for anger and conflict resolution for use by community-based organizations	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide		USAO, Safe and Sound
Assess community impact of homicide, provide information to judges	<i>in progress</i>	District	Jan-06	MHRC, Community Partners
Develop Court Watch program through Block Watches, possible mini-grant through MHRC	<i>in progress</i>	District	Oct-06	Community Partners

Need more community contacts in high crime areas		District		
<b>Milwaukee County Children's Court</b>				
Milwaukee County Juvenile Probation and Parole agents should be working in police districts, participating with Community Prosecution Target Teams		District	Jan-07	
Children's Court Center should have access to municipal juvenile data		Agency		Juvenile Justice Working Group
Need to add juvenile CCAP terminals		Agency	Jan-07	Juvenile Justice Working Group
<b>Milwaukee County Courts (Adult)</b>				
Sentences should include submission to search by any police agency while on supervision	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide		
Develop District Courts, charge cases right out of districts		City Wide	Jul-06	DA's Office
Judges need to be ordering PSI's prior to sentencing *Governor set aside money for 2009, none available for 2008. Follow up with Jan Cummings on mini PSI	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide		Milwaukee County Office of the Chief Judge, State of Wisconsin
<b>Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office</b>				
Juveniles or felons responsible for supplying gun(s) to suspects in a homicide are sent to the Gun Unit for review by DA and US Attorney to determine charges	already being done	Agency	Aug-05	DA's office
Source of bail hearing on domestic violence cases	<i>on hold</i>	Agency	Aug-05	DA's Office
Tie in Community Prosecution Unit to implement suggestions at district level	completed	District		DA's Office
Develop policy for prosecuting intimidation cases. Review what has been done in other states		Agency	May-06	
<b>Milwaukee County Sheriff's Office</b>				
Additional patrols in the parks.	completed	City Wide	Jan-06	MCSO

Revive witness protection program, MPD looking into feasibility *\$.5 million state emergency funds could be used	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide	Aug-05	MPD, DA's Office
Sheriff Office block prisoners ability to call specific phone numbers out of the CJF, especially in DV cases *Update: DA's office working on JOI grant with MCSO to fund this	<i>in progress</i>	Agency	Aug-05	DA's Office, MCSO
Develop procedure for documenting phone numbers from outgoing calls at CJF	???	Agency	Aug-05	MCSO
Increase awareness of witness intimidation in the courtroom		Agency	Nov-06	
Need MCSO participation in MHRC	???	Agency	Dec-06	
<b><i>Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission</i></b>				
Gather data on associates - seem to be core groups of people who are present at homicides	completed	District		
Implemented information sharing protocol for Crisis Response Team, District Captains and Community Liaison Officers	completed	District		
Get # of police calls for service to location and to victim and suspect residences	completed	District	Mar-06	
Send follow-up thank you letter to community members and update on recommendation progress	completed	Agency	Jun-06	MHRC
Assist Mayor's initiative with development of violence prevention resource book	completed	City Wide	May-06	MHRC, DA's Office
Create juvenile justice working group to address inadequacies in system	completed	Agency	Apr-07	
Meet with MCSO to increase participation **Will not be participating	completed			
Conduct needs assessment for shared data between agencies	completed	City Wide		OJA, Center for Urban Population Health
Brief Chief Judges in both Adult and Children's Court on findings/recommendations of Commission, Look at sentencing inconsistency between judges ** Met with Chief Judge at Children's Court. Children's Court representative now attending Level 2, DV reviews, and Exec. Comm. meetings	<i>in progress</i>		Aug-05	MHRC, Office of the Chief Judge
Educate Tavern League on MHRC findings	<i>in progress</i>	District	May-06	UWM

Examine WI law on juvenile information availability	<i>in progress</i>	Agency	Aug-05	MHRC
Educate community about MHRC (information on MPD website, monthly press releases, pamphlet), inform about recommendations (media packets on state of juvenile justice system, domestic violence, etc.) <b>**Progress report released and made available on City and MPD websites</b>	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide	Jun-06	MHRC
Analyze costs of high-crime family to the criminal justice system, look at all family members, create timeline for crimes	<i>in progress</i>	Agency	Jan-06	MHRC
Analyze sentencing consistency between judges	<i>in progress</i>	District	Oct-05	MHRC, Office of the Chief Judge
Engage the community for input (e.g., provide website for community feedback and interaction on MPD website, also look up Chicago plan), community meeting once a month		District	Jun-06	
Analyze juvenile criminal history and consequences for offense types		Agency	Oct-05	
Create focus group of officers to discuss their information needs on the streets and preferred method of information access (one option is to give a few people on each shift data access to other agency systems such as juvenile CCAP) <b>** Dale Steber presented findings of his information sharing needs assessment</b>		District		
<b>U.S. Attorney's Office</b>				
<b>U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives</b>				
Need access to mental health records. If gun applicant has been mandated by the court as "mentally defective", they should not be able to purchase weapon. Revised form 4473, better clarification to buyer that you can't purchase if adjudicated. <b>** Robreta Darling working on this. State DOJ working with DHS on mental health commitments, a judge would have to determine if person is able to possess a gun.</b>	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide		ATF
<b>(Wisconsin) Bureau of Milwaukee Child Welfare</b>				

Need a federal mandate for BMCW to provide juvenile child welfare history to law enforcement		Agency		
Review cases within 40 days since there would be no HIPAA restrictions within that time frame		City Wide		
<b>Wisconsin Crime Lab, Milwaukee Office</b>				
Review NIBIN protocol. Speed up process. ** 6 month backlog on ballistics. IS crime lab starting with new guns or backlog?	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide	Sep-06	ATF
<b>Wisconsin Department of Corrections</b>				
Add juvenile info to DOC locator and merge with County and State CCAP ** Do-able in future, no progress as of yet. Already available for DA's on WILENET	<i>on hold</i>	City Wide	Aug-05	DA's Office
Provide list of juvenile releases to MPD	completed	City Wide		Juvenile DOC
Provide detailed criminal history, prior probation/parole performance to judges prior to sentencing (include in PSI) **Also now doing this for resentencing in revocations	completed	City Wide	Aug-05	Adult DOC
Assign probation/parole agent to each police district station, attend daily roll call, work with High Risk Unit ** 11/15: Intensive Supervision Unit created, 8 agents 1 supervisor, starts 1/28/07	completed	District	Jan-06	DA's Office, DOC
Examine absconder and revocation policies and procedures in DOC, provide weekly absconder list to MPD * Juvi probation/parole list already provided	completed	City Wide	Aug-05	MHRC, Adult and Juvenile DOC
Automate adult DOC release notification process ** Tied into ICS project with Wes. 11/15: Set up on DOC end, now waiting for confirmation from MPD.	completed	City Wide		Adult DOC, MPD
Develop process for DOC client names to be released to Housing Authority. Persons on probation/parole are prohibited from living in Section 8 housing.	completed	City Wide	Sep-05	Housing Authority, Adult DOC
Provide MPD access to State juvenile parole records ** Juvenile Justice Working Group convened	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide	Jan-07	Juvenile Justice Working Group
Examine possibility of adding conditions restrictions to probation and parole banning persons from identified areas with specific illegal activity **MPD is working on taking this on, works in other states	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide	Aug-05	MPD, DA's Office

<b>Wisconsin Legislature</b>				
Need legislative change to allow law enforcement access to juvenile criminal history information, get county juvenile supervision on TIME system	<i>in process</i>	City Wide	Dec-05	Juvenile Justice Working Group
Need legislative change making 2nd CCW a felony		City Wide	Jan-07	City of Milwaukee
<b>Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance</b>				
Need to find funding for services for shooting victims		City Wide	Aug-06	Deb Lieber
<b>Cross Agency</b>				
City Attorney provide MPD with nuisance properties (e.g., bar at 6th and Becher)	completed	City Wide		City Attorney's Office
Develop process of checking shotgun purchases and monitor gun shows (MPD, HIDTA, Sheriff, ATF)	already being done	City Wide	Aug-05	
DOC do in-service with MPD officers about searches, adding condition of probation/parole	completed	City Wide	Jul-06	MPD, Adult DOC
DOC DMVP list developed with DOC, AGU, Community Prosecutors, post on MPD intranet	list completed, working on getting on intranet	District		Adult DOC, CPU, MPD
Develop means to facilitate electronic information sharing between criminal justice agencies. ** As of 10/25 in all districts but District 2, single terminal with capability of accessing DOC, DA, MPD, CCAP electronic databases	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide		DA's Office, Center for Urban Population Health, Adult DOC, DOJ
Develop means to identify gun libraries - WE TIP (MPD, ATF)	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide	Aug-05	MPD
Pursue Amy's Law in Wisconsin (Did Doyle already sign?)	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide	Aug-05	MHRC
Educate public about federal prosecution and 15 years in prison if felon caught with gun, present in schools *Federal funds for VCIT (Violent Crime Impact Tea, run by ATF). Targeting District 7.	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide		MPD, ATF, USAO, MPD, DA's Office

Improve follow-up on shooting cases. MPD needs to present shooting cases even if victim is uncooperative. DA's data discovery sheet to include emails of lead officer/detective & their supervisor and list of work to be done, supervisor makes sure it gets done. Holds detectives accountable and provides documentation of follow-ups. Attach follow up sheet to email, modify witness sheet to include email <i>**DA Office working on follow-up database and on a triage list of violent crimes - Violent Crimes will now get shootings, MPD now briefing on robberies/violent crimes. MPD can train officers on its use. Contact Steve Basing for training starting in February. DA's Office is making final changes</i>	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide	Aug-06	DA's Office, MPD
DA and MPD provide addresses of top two nuisance properties to City Attorney's Office <i>** MPD and Community Prosecutors providing names of nuisance properties to CA's Office</i>	<i>in progress</i>	District		DA's Office, City Attorney's Office, MPD
Establish Tavern Committee. Goals to strengthen criteria for obtaining tavern license, improve communication between MPD and other agencies regarding nuisance taverns, identify criteria needed to trigger action by the agencies involved, develop new licensed premise code. <i>** MHRC faxing MOS for tavern-related homicides and shootings for City Attorney's office for review. CA's Office have looked into 9 and closed 4 or 5. Committee created and has met 2x</i>	<i>in progress</i>	City Wide		Tavern Committee
Risk assessment in target areas (MPD, UWM, City Health Dept.)		District	Sep-05	
Look at County Jail space issues - Establish criteria for who gets jail time vs. those who can be diverted. Establish criteria for who gets jail time vs. those who can be diverted. Need Chief Judge's Office, DA's Office, DOC, Sheriff's Office to talk <i>**DOC trying to get 100-200 more beds, but there are cost issues.</i>		City Wide	Jun-06	
Change statutes to allow for gang injunctions, safe zones		City Wide	Sep-06	
DOC create abbreviated PSI - have judges input, create condensed version about performance on P/P		City Wide	Jun-07	
Remove food delivery signs from vehicles		City Wide	Nov-06	
Create bridge between Tiburon and DCI		City Wide		Brian O'Keefe

<p>Create Center for Community and Public Safety as a multidisciplinary resource for community - provide guidance on grant writing, best practices, program evaluation. Keep it in academic setting due to easily tapped resources. Prioritize 5-6 issues initially, pull in foundations interested in funding those issues. CCPS buy percentage of professional's time. MHRC reports to CCPS. Set up data repository through data sharing agreements with partners.</p>	City Wide	May-06	
<b>Other</b>			
Federal probation/parole status needs to be included in NCIC check		Agency	Jan-06

## **Appendix 4: Timeline**

# PROJECT TIMELINE

