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CROSS-SITE ANALYSIS OF THE BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM

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BOTEC Analysis

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Introduction

The Comprehensive Communities Program in Context

The Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP) was initiated during a period of extraordinary ferment in American criminal justice policy and practice. The decade of the 1990s began in the midst of the "crack" epidemic. In many of America's cities, murder and violence reached very high, levels. With employment conditions for inner city youth bleak, the economic gap between rich and poor growing, urban conditions deteriorating, and a surge in the youth population looming, it was not unduly alarmist to believe that the worst was yet to come. Many believed that by the millennium "all hell" would break loose with "super predators" roaming American cities. Yet by the year 1997, perspectives were radically altered.

Spectacular, in some cities historic, drops in crime have been recorded in many, if not most, American cities. New York City is especially noteworthy because it is America's largest city and it is the media capital of the world. The drops in crime there are unprecedented: crime is no longer a problem in the subway; the reductions followed specific crime-control and managerial innovations; and both Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and former Police Commissioner William Bratton were quick to claim that declining crime rates were a consequence of their innovations. Although most of the discussion of these changes has been in the popular media, the claims of Bratton were taken seriously enough that they were debated at a plenary session of the 1995 meeting of the American Society of Criminology. Those skeptical of claims that crime reductions were police- or criminal justice-related raised a variety of issues: improved economic conditions; the end of the crack epidemic; the stabilization of drug markets; and examples of cities with similar criminal justice innovations in which crime rates either did or did not fall.

It is not the purpose here to either summarize or take sides in this dispute.[1] It is merely to note the change in the crime control landscape that has occurred during the life span of the Comprehensive Communities Program. In many professional and academic quarters, a new optimism about society's ability to control crime has emerged. It is supported by considerable data and is linked to a variety of programmatic innovations that have been developed over the past two decades and include new forms of involvement by criminal justice agencies, especially police, prosecution, probation, and parole. These innovations deal with neighborhood problems; situational crime prevention; crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED); police problem solving; aggressive community organization and involve-

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[1] See Volume 88, Number 4, Summer 1999 edition of *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,* which is entirely devoted to this issue.

ment; new forms of private sector involvement, such as business improvement districts (BIDs); police order maintenance activities; the use of civil law and initiatives; and the restoration of the role of churches in community life. Running through virtually all of these movements is a developing confidence that there are solutions that can work and, that through careful planning, execution, and feedback, problems can be managed or solved that a decade ago would have been thought of as beyond the reach of our capacities.

Although conceived during the inchoate stages of this era, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) Comprehensive Communities Program fostered these beliefs in many communities. In a sense, CCP was the right program at the right time. Since at least the 1960s, comprehensive community initiatives (CCIs) have been launched to foster economic development, serve youth, and improve the delivery of social services and medical care in central city neighborhoods. Such initiatives are *comprehensive* because they aim for a synergistic effect by improving the delivery of multiple services simultaneously. They emphasize *community* by devolving some degree of program control and responsibility to residents of the target neighborhoods. These two features distinguish them from "top-down" programs operated entirely by government agencies or those that focus on one social problem at a time.

Until the 1990s, CCIs rarely targeted crime. Anticrime programs were generally operated by government agencies, focused on individuals, and carried out with little community involvement. There are many reasons for the resurgence of CCIs in the1990s. Public and private agencies alike began recognizing several trends: that people in trouble tend to have multiple problems; that fragmented services waste resources; that prevention may be a cost-effective alternative to punishment; and that bricks and mortar, whether used for urban renewal or prison construction, are insufficient to solve social problems. Meanwhile, government officials began to view public-private partnerships as preferable to "big government" solutions, both because they leverage resources and because they encourage tailoring the program to local conditions.[2] Out of such dire circumstances created and fueled by the crack epidemic and generally deteriorating urban conditions came a pressing need to attempt new initiatives. Thus, a half dozen national programs were created that introduced degrees of comprehensiveness and community involvement into crime reduction, such as Operation Weed and Seed, Pulling America's Communities Together (PACT), and SafeFutures. This is the final cross-site analysis report on one of these programs—Comprehensive Communities Program.

The Bureau of Justice Assistance initiated CCP in 1994. Its purpose was to integrate criminal and juvenile justice, social programs, and public agencies with non-governmental organizations and individuals, in order to control crime and improve

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[2] These issues are explored in detail by Connell, J.P., A.C. Kubisch, L.B. Schorr, and C.H. Weiss, eds., New Approaches to Evaluating Community Initiatives: Concepts, Methods, and Concepts, Washington, D.C.: The Aspen Institute (1995).

the quality of community life with special attention to gangs and youth violence. BJA's *Fact Sheet on the Comprehensive Communities Program* specifies the two defining principles of CCP:

- Communities must take a leadership role in developing partnerships to combat crime and violence; and,
- State and local jurisdictions must establish truly coordinated and multi-disciplinary approaches to address crime- and violence-related problems, as well as the conditions that foster them.

The core programmatic elements were community policing and community mobilization. Additional program options included: youth and gang programs; community prosecution and diversion; drug courts with diversion to treatment; conflict resolution; and community-based alternatives to incarceration.

Knowledge about the effectiveness of CCIs is extremely limited,[3] in part because CCIs pose special difficulties for measuring impacts.[4] CCI's are complex, so it is difficult to establish causality; experiments are difficult to conduct because finding comparison sites is troublesome and randomization often is not feasible; and, finally, it may be impossible to persuade community-based program leaders that impact evaluation is even desirable. Consequently, this evaluation of CCP is a process evaluation intended to develop insights into how community approaches evolved; to track how sites implemented their comprehensive strategies; to explore what impact pre-existing ecological, social, economic, and political factors had on implementation; and to monitor the evolution of strategies and projects over time.

Key Findings:

- CCP's funding mechanism allowed for the fast start-up of programs, so enthusiasm generated during the planning process remained high and established CCP as a program of action.
- Federally funded comprehensive strategies to combat crime and violence were successfully implemented, but adaptation to specific local circumstances was essential.
- In many sites, the process was a catalyst for establishing new anti-crime community leadership, while being inclusive of long-standing, active community leaders.

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[3] Sherman, Lawrence W., Denise Gottfredson, Doris MacKenzie, John Eck, Peter Reuter, and Shawn Bushway, <u>Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising</u>, College Park, Maryland: University of Maryland. (1997)

[4] See Connell, J.P., et al., (1995)

- The partnerships that developed in some sites among citizens, criminal justice agencies, social service and other government agencies, and private sector institutions, were unexpectedly robust and persistent.
- Powerful partnerships developed, in a variety of ways, from diverse origins—community organizations and organizers, mayors' and city managers' offices, and police departments and other governmental agencies (e.g., housing).
- BJA's mandated framework of community representation and coordinated, multi-disciplinary approaches to crime was instrumental in ensuring that, in most sites, community policing and community mobilization did not function merely in parallel to each other but as integral partners.
- CCP funds were utilized at many different levels and for varying activities in the implementation of community policing, depending on the characteristics of the police department.
- Police departments consistently pursued department-wide community policing (and not just individual programs), with the key elements including collaborative problem solving, organizational and geographical decentralization, and devolution of authority.
- Program participants in virtually all sites report that synergy, working together, has a multiplier effect—it both enhances the services of each agency and organization and it creates new problem-solving capacities through partnerships and/or collaboratives. Data from field observations do not cast doubt on these beliefs.
- While no site has sustained all CCP program elements beyond CCP funding, all sites have maintained significant portions of their total CCP efforts/programs. All sites, moreover, have sustained organizational and neighborhood networks that were either non-existent or at inchoate stages of development at the initiation of CCP. There was no evidence that sites have weakened their organizational and neighborhood networks as a consequence of CCP.

A Brief Description of the Comprehensive Communities Program

CCP is an effort to integrate law enforcement with social programs, and public agencies with non-governmental organizations and individuals, to control crime and improve the quality of life. BJA funded sixteen sites to implement the Comprehensive Communities Program. Each site was required to include community policing and community mobilization, and was urged to include one or more of four optional elements: youth and gangs programs; community prosecution and diversion; drug courts with diversion to treatment; and community-based alternatives to incarceration. As stated in BJA's Fact Sheet on the Comprehensive Communities Program, "(t)he two defining principles of the CCP are (1) that communities must take a leadership role in developing partnerships to combat crime and violence, and (2) that State and local jurisdictions must establish truly coordinated and multi-disciplinary

approaches to address crime- and violence-related problems, as well as the conditions which foster them."[5]

The Comprehensive Communities Program was implemented in two phases. Under Phase I, the invited jurisdictions were asked to submit an application for approximately $50,000 of planning funds to support the design and development of a comprehensive strategy. All proposals for Phase I funding were due April 29, 1994. Most of the sites were notified within a month that they were awarded funding for Phase I. During this planning phase, technical assistance in the form of workshops and meetings was offered to the sites. During July 1994, representatives from each site were mandated to attend a two-day Phase II (Implementation Phase) Application Development Workshop. All Phase II applications were due to BJA on August 15, 1994.

Applicants were notified during February and March 1995, that they would receive CCP funding, however, most sites were mandated to submit a Revised Implementation Plan before their receipt of funding. This resulted in sites receiving their funding and beginning their initiatives at varying times, between February 1995, and September 1996. Most of the sites required no-cost extensions because of the late start. Almost all of the sites subsequently applied for and received second-year implementation funding. Most of the sites had expended their CCP funding by the end of 1998, with the remaining sites finishing by the end of 1999.

Research Team and Goals

BOTEC Analysis Corporation conducted the process evaluation of the Comprehensive Communities Program at fifteen of the sites with funding from the National Institute of Justice. The Principal Investigator for this project was George L. Kelling (Rutgers University). Ann Marie Rocheleau (BOTEC Analysis Corporation) served as the project director. Other members of the research team included Wesley G. Skogan (Northwestern University), Dennis P. Rosenbaum (University at Albany), Jeffrey A. Roth (The Urban Institute), Mona R. Hochberg (BOTEC Analysis Corporation), Sandra L. Kaminska Costello (University of Illinois at Chicago) and William H. Sousa (Rutgers University).

Originally, BOTEC was contracted to evaluate six of the sixteen CCP sites, but was then invited to add six additional sites to the evaluation. As a result, the methodology was conducted on two levels—information was gathered on all twelve sites, however, six of the sites were evaluated more extensively, resulting in individual case studies. Subsequently, BOTEC was invited to conduct similar extensive evaluations in six more sites, including three of the original twelve sites and three sites not previously part of the evaluation (Metro Omaha, Phoenix, and Wilmington). Thus the twelve intensive sites included Baltimore, Maryland; Boston, Massachusetts; Columbia, South Carolina; the East Bay are of California; Fort Worth, Texas; Hartford, Connect-

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[5] Bureau of Justice Assistance, *Fact Sheet Comprehensive Communities Program*, U.S. Department of Justice, 1994.

icut; the Metro Denver area; the Metro Omaha area; Phoenix, Arizona; Salt Lake City, Utah; Seattle, Washington; and Wilmington, Delaware. The other sites in the evaluation include Gary, Indiana; the Metro Atlanta area; and Wichita, Kansas. Three of the sites were multi-jurisdictional, that is, their initiatives covered entire metropolitan areas: the metropolitan Denver area (Metro Denver), the East Bay area of Northern California (East Bay), and the metropolitan Atlanta area (Metro Atlanta).

The goals of this research endeavor have remained consistent throughout the project. Below are listed the goals that were outlined in the initial research proposal.

1. To provide the evaluation sites, other communities engaged in similar efforts, BJA, NIJ, and the research community, insights into the development of comprehensive community approaches to crime control and drug abuse prevention. Prior research and evaluations have highlighted certain patterns of evolution, barriers to implementation, and areas that require further study;

2. To track how, specifically, each site implemented its comprehensive strategy. The focus was on how the program components fit into the comprehensive strategy at each site, what sorts of networks were used, developed, or changed, what managerial processes were used or changed, what information and resource sharing practices were used or changed;

3. To determine how differences in pre-existing external and internal environments (ecological, social, economic and political) and structures affected the evolution of a comprehensive community-wide drug abuse and crime control program;

4. To track how closely the programs that evolved adhered either to their original plans as stated in their applications to BJA or to modified plans developed between grant award and implementation. This part of the process evaluation is particularly important, because a variety of evaluations of previous crime and drug abuse control efforts such as intensive supervision for probationers and parolees (Petersilia and Turner, 1990; Turner and Petersilia, 1992), and of community policing (Rosenbaum, 1994) found failures of implementation so severe as to make the question of whether the program would have worked, if implemented as designed, substantially unanswerable;

5. To identify sources for, and assess the quality of, data that could be used in a future impact evaluation of this program. Data that can be used for cross-site analysis will be identified as well as data that is tailored to the comprehensive strategies of each individual site;

6. To lay the groundwork for assessing whether individual elements, operating together in a comprehensive program, had synergistic effects on one other's performance.

Methodology

Coalition Survey

One important source of data for this evaluation was a self-administered survey of key participants in the CCP programs at each of the initial twelve sites.[6] BOTEC surveyed key stakeholders from the first twelve sites both at the beginning of data collection and approximately a year later. Conducting the survey at each site twice allowed us to track changes and progress in sites over time. However, ensuring that there was exactly a one-year lapse between surveys turned out to be an unrealistic goal due to the different levels of progress at each of the twelve sites.

During July 1995, each site was requested to provide BOTEC with a list of active participants in CCP. Each site was to include those individuals who were involved with the planning and implementation of CCP as well as residents involved in the community mobilization segment and those individuals/agencies who would be receiving CCP funding. Over the next three to four months participant lists were received from most of the sites.[7]

In the meantime, the CCP research team had developed the Coalition Survey (Appendix C). The survey was developed from the expertise of the research team and from prior work in the field (Cook and Roehl, 1993). Since the survey included questions that were site specific—one set of questions allowed us to conduct a network analysis of the individuals involved in CCP at each site—BOTEC staff began tailoring the Coalition Survey for each site as the sites' participant lists were received. Three of the CCP sites (Metro Atlanta, Metro Denver, and the East Bay area) were multi-jurisdictional sites and therefore the survey had to be changed somewhat for these sites.

Surveys were sent to seven of the CCP sites during the fall of 1995. Due to sites' varying stages of implementation (some were still in the planning stage) and some

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[6] The Coalition Survey was not distributed to CCP participants in the three sites that were added in the subsequent phase, namely, Omaha, Phoenix, and Wilmington due to time, financial, and site constraints.

[7] There were, however, events that delayed some of the sites sending in their participant lists. In the East Bay area, a change in CCP leadership resulted in BOTEC not receiving their list until January 1996. Similarly, after receiving Fort Worth's list in the fall, BOTEC staff was cautioned not to utilize it for surveys until it was updated and augmented. An updated list was received in June 1996 and that participant list was revised again based on a site visit to Fort Worth during the same month. Finally, BOTEC staff was also cautioned about utilizing the Gary list received in late fall because of November's election that resulted in a change of administrations. A revised Gary participant list was received in April 1996.

sites' need for more time to identify their participants, surveys were sent to sites between September 1995 and July 1996.

In August 1996 site coordinators were asked to update, if necessary, their list of CCP participants. There was a great deal more turnover in staff than anticipated. This will be discussed in greater detail in the report. The original plan was to send each site's participants the Follow-Up Coalition Survey about one year later. While an eight to twelve month interval between surveys was achieved for the majority of the sites, this was not possible for Fort Worth and Gary, the two sites whose participants received their initial surveys during the summer of 1996. Follow-up surveys were sent to all sites between October 1996 and January 1997.

Response Rate

The overall response rate was 56 percent after completing an extensive follow-up process (Table 1). The number of Potential Respondents was calculated by taking the list of initially identified participants (# Initial Participants), subtracting those whom either the site or the researchers found to have ceased participation before receipt of the survey (# Dropped), and adding those who began participation during that time period (# Added). Response rates were calculated by dividing the number of participants who responded by the number of potential respondents. The response rate varied by site, from 37 percent in Boston to 85 percent in Wichita. Utilizing a custom-designed computer tracking system, the follow-up process entailed two additional phone calls to non-respondents, re-faxing of surveys to those who discarded or lost the original copy, and re-mailing the complete hard-copy in a second wave. Site directors were then asked to make another follow-up attempt. For the most part, site directors were very cooperative in this process but also found it difficult to prod their CCP participants to take time from their busy schedules to fill out the survey.

Table 1: Disposition of Sample for First Coalition Survey

	# Initial Participants	# Dropped	# Added	# Potential Respondents	# Who Responded	Percent Who Responded
Baltimore	45	15	16	46	29	63 percent
Boston	206	0	0	206	77	37 percent
Columbia	41	7	0	34	27	79 percent
East Bay	29	0	0	29	18	62 percent
Fort Worth	23	0	0	23	16	70 percent
Hartford	71	15	0	56	33	59 percent
Gary	22	0	0	22	10	45 percent
Metro Atlanta	68	0	0	68	40	59 percent
Metro Denver	60	0	0	60	33	55 percent
Salt Lake	114	13	2	103	66	64 percent
Seattle	76	7	1	70	45	64 percent
Wichita	39	0	0	39	33	85 percent
Total	**794**	**57**	**19**	**756**	**427**	**56 percent**

In addition to encountering the usual resistance found among survey recipients, there were a few circumstances unique to this project that may have contributed to a response rate lower than anticipated. The first involved the make-up of the sample at each of the sites. Site directors were asked to submit a list of those who had planned or were implementing the project, as well as those community people involved and those receiving CCP funding. These were the people that BOTEC believed would make up each site's coalition. As a result of contact with several non-respondents, BOTEC staff learned that many were not aware that they were involved in the Comprehensive Communities Program. This was either because it was called something different at their site (although that possibility was explained in each of the sites' cover letters) or more often, because they only knew they were receiving federal funding for their project and were not aware that they were part of a larger initiative. CCP research team members view this information as more than a methodological footnote. It provides us with a better understanding of how the coalitions were defined and viewed by local participants.

Language was also somewhat of a problem. Several site directors mentioned that using the word *coalition* could be confusing to their site participants, since they were not using that word locally. With this potential problem in mind, BOTEC developed an explanation of what *coalition* meant and how the survey used it. Finally, some respondents found one of the last questions on the survey (the network analysis question), which listed all of the other participants and requested that the respondent comment on the frequency of contact with each, both long and troubling. Some people felt that admitting to little contact with certain persons

would reflect poorly on their site's progress, while others found it too cumbersome or politically sensitive to fill out. Nevertheless, a substantial amount of information from most respondents about their level of interaction with other coalition members was obtained.[8]

Table 2: Disposition of Sample for Follow-Up Coalition Survey

	# Potential Respondents From 1st Survey	# Dropped	# Added	# Potential Respondents For Follow-up Survey	# Who Responded	Percent Who Responded
Baltimore	46	12	22	56	39	70 percent
Boston	206	61	13	158	55	35 percent
Columbia	34	7	16	43	29	67 percent
East Bay	29	0	3	32	11	34 percent
Fort Worth	23	0	0	23	18	78 percent
Hartford	56	5	10	61	35	57 percent
Gary	22	14	9	17	9	53 percent
Metro Atlanta	68	18	0	50	36	72 percent
Metro Denver	60	11	15	64	40	62 percent
Salt Lake	103	10	8	101	48	48 percent
Seattle	70	1	0	69	41	59 percent
Wichita	39	4	4	39	27	69 percent
Total	**756**	**143**	**100**	**713**	**388**	**54 percent**

Table 2 presents the response rates from the Follow-Up Coalition Survey. The first column represents the number of Potential Respondents from the first Coalition Survey. Each site director was sent this list of participants during the summer of 1996 and was asked to update it. The number of Potential Respondents for the Follow-Up Survey was calculated by taking the list of Potential Respondents from the First Survey, subtracting those whom either the site or the researchers found to have since ceased participation (# Dropped), and adding in those who began participation since that time period (# Added). Again, response rates were calculated by dividing the number of participants who responded by the number of potential respondents for this survey. The overall response rate was 54 percent, down 2 percent from the initial Coalition Survey. The response rate varied by site, from 34 percent in East Bay to 78 percent in Fort Worth.

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[8]A reasonable response rate was achieved on the initial Coalition Survey in all of the intensive sites with the exception of Boston.

Data Entry and Analysis

The coalition survey contains four types of responses: standard organizational multiple-choice questions, a limited number of free response alternatives, the networking (individual communication) multiple-choice analysis, and the organizational multiple-choice analysis. Each pre-coded, multiple choice section was double-entered by separate individuals into a custom-designed database. This method of double entry greatly reduced error. Because the two databases were compared to identify differences, discrepancies were then corrected. Upon compilation of the survey data, analyses were conducted using SPSS for Windows (Version 7.5). In cases where aggregate statistics were presented, the data has been weighted by site so sites with higher numbers of responses did not exert a greater influence over findings as compared to sites with fewer responses.

A description of the methodology utilized to conduct the network analysis can be found in the section entitled "Network Analysis."

Community Policing Survey

To capture the level of involvement in community policing at each site, a decision was made to administer a questionnaire at each police department. This survey was based, in part, on an earlier, national survey on community policing conducted by the Police Foundation during 1993. Working with Mary Ann Wycoff, the Police Foundation Community Policing Survey was amended for this evaluation (see Appendix C). The initial methodology called for it to be administered twice to each of the police departments involved in CCP, at the beginning of the project and again a year later. The intention was to compare the two waves of data received with the Police Foundation data collected previously.

On October 19, 1995, the Community Policing Survey was sent out to the police chiefs in the nine individual sites (Boston, Baltimore, Hartford, Wichita, Gary, Salt Lake City, Fort Worth, Columbia, and Seattle) as well as to all of the participating law enforcement jurisdictions in two of the multi-jurisdictional sites (Metro Denver and Metro Atlanta). It was subsequently sent out to the appropriate law enforcement officials in the East Bay area on March 1, 1996, once those persons were identified by the site.

BOTEC staff conducted the same type of follow-up on the Community Policing Survey as with the Coalition Survey discussed previously. The response rate for the police chief survey was 70 percent. The police chief from one of the single sites did not respond and about one-third of the chiefs in the three multi-jurisdictional sites failed to do so also. Specifically, 73 of 109 (70 percent) surveys sent to police chiefs and sheriffs in Metro Denver, Metro Atlanta, and East Bay were returned.

There had been discussion about the efficacy of sending out another wave of the Community Policing Survey. There had been a good amount of feedback, both over the phone during follow-up calls and written on surveys, that as of late, police chiefs have been in receipt of an extraordinary number of surveys. Many felt that they had been over-surveyed, especially about community policing. Some refused to complete our initial survey, and others indicated that they would not fill out a second wave. Nevertheless, it was decided that an attempt would be made to conduct a second wave because of the importance of the information to the project.

Thus, the second wave of the Community Policing Survey was sent to the first nine single jurisdiction sites and the multi-jurisdictional sites during the beginning of 1997. This follow-up survey was identical to the first one with the exception that the "Executive Views" section (whose questions focused on the philosophy of the police chief toward community policing) from the first survey was eliminated. Once BJA staff requested the addition of three new sites in the study, (Phoenix, Metro Omaha, and Wilmington) the Community Policing Survey was sent to the appropriate chiefs. However, since they were surveyed only once in April 1998, no time comparisons are possible for these three sites.

Site Visits

Initial Site Visits

George Kelling completed all of the twelve initial site visits. These preliminary site visits included interviews with a few key individuals and heads of a few key organizations. Through these interviews, Dr. Kelling identified the informal relationships among individuals and organizations that affected the CCP program's operation and researchers' attempts to evaluate the CCP programs at each site. Additionally, these site visits were useful in that they allowed Dr. Kelling to walk through affected neighborhoods, visit some local service organizations, and establish ties with law enforcement agencies. Dr. Kelling collected preliminary descriptive information on CCP implementation and networking activities through interviews and observations. Information gathered during these initial site visits was instrumental in determining, with NIJ and BJA staff, which sites would be most appropriate to evaluate in a more intensive manner.

Main Site Visits

The initial six sites undergoing intensive evaluation each received three site visits in addition to Dr. Kelling's first visit. The teams visiting each site were as follows: Seattle: Wes Skogan and Jeff Roth; Baltimore: Jeff Roth and George Kelling; Boston: George Kelling and Ann Marie Rocheleau; Columbia: George Kelling; Fort Worth: Wes Skogan and Dennis Rosenbaum; and Salt Lake City: Dennis Rosen-

baum and Sandra Kaminska Costello. The subsequent phase of the research found the following teams visiting each site at least twice: Hartford, East Bay, Wilmington, and Metro Denver: Mona Hochberg, William Sousa, and George Kelling; Phoenix: Dennis Rosenbaum and Mona Hochberg; and Metro Omaha: Sandra Kaminska Costello and George Kelling. The research activities of these teams included: interviewing significant actors in the effort; attending staff and community meetings; observing project activities; and collecting relevant documents.

The level of cooperation with the evaluators in all twelve sites was high. Relationships developed among evaluators and project participants that allowed for forthright discussion of project problems as well as successes. Many examples could be given of program adjustments that were made as a consequence of project staff/evaluators discussions. Project leaders, despite their expertise and experience in the field, understood that they could improve their activities by learning from the literature, the experiences of other CCP sites, and from their own experiences— partly as seen through the eyes of the evaluators.

Other Data Collection

Evaluators also used Lexis/Nexis on the Internet to conduct media searches on the sites. The searches yielded summaries of site-specific articles written about CCP, and gave the researchers yet another perspective on CCP and the context within which it was implemented.

Toward the end of the data collection period, CCP site directors were contacted by telephone and asked to participate in a survey regarding the technical assistance they received from BJA subcontractors. In addition, they were asked to share any survey results they might have had regarding citizen satisfaction with crime prevention and policing efforts as well as citizens' perceptions of safety.

Brief Site Summaries

Below are brief site summaries of the twelve intensive sites. Although there is a comprehensive case study for each of the twelve sites, these brief summaries will give the reader a sense of the uniqueness of each site's CCP program as implemented.

Baltimore

Baltimore's CCP, administered through the mayor's office, originated in attempts by community organizers to interrupt the spiral of urban decay associated with Baltimore's housing stock of aging row houses. As the city's population declined (about 25 percent since the 1950s), the excess housing stock created a spawning ground for disorder, fear, crime, and associated urban problems in older neighborhoods. Two seasoned non-profit associations, the Community Law Center (CLC) and the Citizens Planning and Housing Association (CPHA), developed a comprehensive strategy of community organization and legal action that became the centerpiece, first, of *core communities* (three initial target neighborhoods like Boyd Booth) and, later, for *apprentice communities* (neighborhoods that would be subsequently targeted).

Discernible shifts in the approach to community policing were apparent during the period of observation in Baltimore. During the early visits, most of the community policing in the core communities was provided by off-duty officers working overtime, making officer continuity in neighborhoods impossible. Later, after requests from core communities and the CCP leadership, neighborhood officers were assigned to beats on a regular basis. The thirteen community officers now have complete flexibility regarding their schedule and activities, allowing them to respond to problems as they arise. Moreover, Baltimore community officers have specific tools available to solve problems: specifically, skilled community organizers and responsive community groups, good legal support from housing lawyers, and neighborhood networks of service agencies. While in respects Baltimore officers behave similarly to Columbia's community mobilizers, they perceive their job as much more akin to traditional foot patrol—in its best sense. By this is meant that, while they have no qualms about being or being perceived as problem solvers, they still tend to view their core capacity as patrolling. Finally, the overall impression gained by evaluators is that as the new chief gained control over the police department's two most pressing problems—community violence and organizational lack of integrity—he also began to shift towards a comprehensive community policing strategy.

Boston

The reinvigoration of the Boston Police Department (BPD) is one of the most impressive public sector organizational turnarounds on record. Boston's CCP efforts were mounted by the BPD in the context of decades of struggle with competing models of policing, spates of corruption and abuse, flawed leadership, and the persistence of governmental, community, and service sector "fiefdoms" that were, if not outright hostile, indifferent to each other. Confronted with soaring youth gang violence, and constrained by extraordinarily troubled relationships with the African American community, the Boston Police Department channeled CCP funds into a complicated decentralized/neighborhood planning process.

The Strategic Planning Process, which began with problem identification and was followed by problem solving, was carried out in Boston's eleven districts as well as in headquarters, and involved community leaders, residents, criminal justice agencies, churches, and social service providers. While this joint community policing/community mobilization effort had been on the board, the discretionary resources to conduct the planning were not available prior to the availability of CCP funds.

Boston's CCP initiative also included a drug court, a community prosecution program, and two service provider networks that were created to change the way services were delivered to youth and offenders in certain areas of Boston. One network, the Alternatives to Incarceration Network, is a loose network of agencies that provides services to juvenile and young adult offenders. The other, the Youth Service Providers Network evolved into a strong partnership between the Boston Police Department and the local Boys & Girls Clubs, whereby a Club social workers have an offices in the district police substations to identify and refer troubled youths for needed services at the Boys & Girls Clubs or another appropriate agency.

Columbia

Three things stand out about Columbia for those visiting it professionally for the first time. First, Columbia's neighborhood organizations are well organized and mature, have a long-standing record of achievement, and closely collaborate with each other. Second, although Columbia, like virtually any city of appreciable size, has had an exodus of middle class citizens, its original neighborhood churches thrive in Columbia's inner city neighborhoods. Third, those responsible for implementing CCP are experienced in government, tied into local affairs, have a keen sense of past failures and a strong conviction about what now *works*, and are intimately linked to citizen groups.

Central to the CCP effort are three elements of community policing. First, through a home loan program (Police Homeowner Loan Program), officers are encouraged to live in transitional neighborhoods. This is a model program of which Columbia is

proud and which is being emulated nationally. Second, three community mobilizers have been assigned to CCP—each having been given a broad mandate and discretion to work with neighborhood organizations, to identify problems, and to create bridges between neighborhood organizations, police, and public and private institutions. Third, these mobilizers are overlaid on a community-policing program that has been developed by Chief Charles Austin.

The strength of the CCP effort to date seems to be its integration into the highest levels of local government, the managerial abilities of the senior people running CCP and integrating it into the city's overall approach to solve problems, the maturity of the community groups, and the integration of the police into government at all levels.

East Bay

The East Bay refers to a 75 mile corridor along the San Francisco Bay of California that is comprised of Alameda and Contra Costa Counties. About 1.5 million people live in diverse towns and cities that historically have had little motivation for common political or social action. Although aborted attempts had been made to develop collaborations around some of the jurisdictions' problems, it was not until the violence associated with drug related gang activities broke out during the late 1980s and early 1990s that political leaders developed the will to undertake common concerted action. The crisis peaked in 1993 when in a matter of several days 23 shootings were recorded throughout the East Bay area.

The response of the three largest cities—Berkeley, Oakland, and Richmond—resulted in a CCP program that was unique among CCP sites. Other towns and cities in the two counties later joined (these three cities.) Its uniqueness resulted from the fact that, more than anything else, CCP represented a *political* accord among governmental units to collaborate across jurisdictional lines in ways that had been precluded earlier. Although the initial efforts focused on cooperation among police agencies, the Partnership (as this regional collaboration came to be known) has since implemented a comprehensive strategy toward crime and violence reduction. While regional policing efforts remain a focal point of the Partnership, participation from youth, school districts, social services, and many other constituencies are now an essential part of the East Bay strategy. The Partnership, perhaps more than any other CCP site, has been able to integrate schools and youths into an overall approach to crime and violence prevention.

Initially brought and held together by a charismatic politician to whom leaders in the initial three communities turned to for help, the communities are now represented by a Corridor Council, comprised of community, school, police, and governmental officials who represent state, county, and local jurisdictions. The Council oversees police collaboration along with efforts to develop common ap-

proaches to problems (e.g., domestic violence), efforts to support the implementation of community policing (e.g., a resource center), and efforts to mobilize youth and schools.

Fort Worth

The Fort Worth CCP program is a comprehensive effort involving a variety of criminal justice agencies, not-for-profit groups, and volunteer citizens in special target communities. The program was built upon a successful predecessor initiative, the Weed & Seed program. Because of the Weed & Seed program, a substantial amount of the planning process and the creation of partnerships was already in place for Fort Worth to use as a base for CCP. The city also enjoys the proceeds of a special sales tax increment supporting crime prevention. Funding from Weed & Seed, the special tax district, and CCP enabled the city to decentralize the police department to twelve geographical districts. Lieutenants command them with 24-hour responsibility for their district, and who have considerable control over officer's assignments and duty times. Each commander meets with a civilian advisory committee, and in addition many areas of the city have active neighborhood citizen patrol groups. Each of the city's 75 policing beats is staffed by a *neighborhood police officer* (NPO). They are responsible for local problem identification and problem solving, and for working in support of the citizen patrol groups and other police units.

County agencies and non-profit organizations are managing other components of Fort Worth's programs. The Tarrant County Citizens' Crime Commission directs a community mobilization project. It is conducting a leadership development seminar for community activists and a few police officers. The commission also developed resource materials for the police district's citizen advisory committees, and coordinates the citywide distribution of a community-policing newsletter. It also coordinates AmeriCorps volunteers who work in support of the police department and non-profit agencies. Fort Worth's batterer treatment program is conducted by the Women's Haven, which has been dealing with domestic violence issues for three decades. The Boys' & Girls' Clubs' project is aimed at reducing gang violence by establishing truces between gangs, reducing the level of random violence, mediating disputes, and diverting the energies of gang members into other activities. Tarrant County's drug diversion program involves both misdemeanor and felony offenses. Program staff review incoming cases and recommend those that meet their guidelines for diversion to treatment. The program subcontracts for the components of an 18-month treatment program. A youth advocacy program (TCAP) provides an alternative to secured detention for charged but not-yet-convicted young offenders. Youths diverted to the program are released to the community and placed in the charge of advocates who make frequent home visits and build linkages between the offenders, their families, and the community of residence.

Fort Worth's CCP is coordinated by the police department, with close support by an assistant city manager. The CCP administrator negotiated the participation of the non-profit groups. There were relatively few pre-existing links between the police and the county agencies that administer several components of the program, so the program has helped develop a new network where one did not previously exist.

Hartford

Hartford, the capital of Connecticut, is an old New England city that has a rich history of strong, well-structured neighborhoods. Nevertheless, the 1980s and early 1990s found many of these areas in states of instability and transition as a result of increasing economic hardship, crime, disorder and violence. In some sections of Hartford, gang and drug-related shootings were considered common occurrences, and gang members routinely engaged in intimidating and terrorizing behavior. Although Hartford had several experiences involving police-community-social service partnerships in the past, there was no mechanism for sustaining such efforts. Therefore, Hartford CCP utilized a three-pronged strategy—community policing, community mobilization, and community-oriented government—to build permanent mechanisms in support of collaborative efforts.

The relationship between the police and the community on CCP-related matters is an interesting one in Hartford. Initially, the police department was the key agency in the administration of the grant. However, a decision was made early in Phase II to transfer operation of CCP to the city manager's office. This achieved the effect of refocusing the grant so that the community became equal partners with the police and city agencies in matters pertaining to crime prevention. Indeed, the essence of Hartford's CCP program resulted from the recognition that effective community policing and problem solving required organized community input. With the police already dedicated to the development of community policing prior to CCP funding, site representatives ultimately chose to construct a CCP plan that would emphasize the building and strengthening of community groups. Citizen initiatives could then supplement and complement the police, allowing the department to more effectively implement its own community-oriented objectives. Thus, the true importance of CCP lies in the fact that it enhanced the role of the community in crime control and prevention.

In designing their strategies, Hartford was able to take advantage of its rich tradition of neighborhood organization and its previous experiences with police-community collaborations. As a result, there are many examples of successful Hartford initiatives that originated from the CCP process. Some, like the community court, remain extremely important to community growth and crime prevention. The Hartford CCP "story," however, is really one of community empowerment. Arguably the most impressive outcome of the process was the development of neighborhood-based Problem Solving Committees (PSCs). These committees, com-

posed of community stakeholders, are designed to partner residents with city agents to proactively address problems in Hartford neighborhoods. In doing so, PSCs have given residents a strong voice, considerable responsibility, and significant decision-making power in nearly all matters pertaining to community affairs.

Metro Denver

The Metro Denver CCP had its origins in Pulling America's Communities Together (PACT) in 1993 after the area's "Summer of Violence," so-named because of a large number of shootings—one of which seriously wounded a two year old at the zoo. Federal, state, and local political leaders (Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder, Governor Roy Romer, and Denver's Mayor Wellington Webb), sponsored the 1994 "Summer of Safety" program in Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Denver, and Jefferson Counties—known as the Metro Denver area. Forty-five agencies and grass roots organizations created a collaborative to reduce fear and restore safety.

Metro Denver's PACT emphasized grass-roots involvement and planning, and operated out of the belief that no crime prevention strategy can succeed unless it is based upon maximum citizen involvement. The program's underlying and explicit assumptions were based on a "risk focused prevention model." In this model, akin to both medical and fire service prevention models, crime is seen as occurring when victims and perpetrators converge in specific environments. Crime prevention then focuses on keeping victims and perpetrators from converging and/or, if they do, in a changed non-criminogenic environment.[9]

The keystone of Metro Denver's CCP was the establishment of the Colorado Consortium for Community Policing in 1995. Originally targeted at the five counties identified above plus Douglas County, the Consortium began statewide operations in 1996. One of its elements, a singularly creative and replicated CCP-funded program, was the Line Officers Grants Program. It combined community policing and neighborhood action by providing funds up to $2000 to line officers who have created partnerships with citizens to solve problems. This too, is now a statewide and state-funded program.

Metro Omaha

The programs which collectively constitute Metro Omaha's Comprehensive Communities Program were designed to provide a balanced approach of prevention, intervention, and law enforcement and control; a focus on youth and the younger offender; and an emphasis on community mobilization and community policing. Building upon a solid history of collaboration between state and local agencies, the

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[9] In criminology, this is referred to a "routine activities" theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979).

public and the private sector, law enforcement, the academic community, and neighborhood residents, Metro Omaha's CCP strategy has moved the area's efforts against violence—particularly youth violence—forward in several key areas including:

- dramatic enhancement of the capacity to communicate, plan, and coordinate across group and agency boundaries; resulting in more efficient and effective resource allocation, and less overlap, between programs

- identification of gaps in both individual agency and collective CCP capacity to address specific needs and issues; resulting in efforts to fill those gaps

- institutionalization of active, direct resident involvement in violence prevention and intervention; resulting in improvements in police-community relations and broader support for community policing

- strengthening of a commitment to early intervention and long-range prevention planning; resulting in a more comprehensive approach to in-school and alternative programs for youth, as well as programs that address broader family, social, and cultural issues

Omaha has displayed a unique historical sense of where its various partnerships had come from, where they were now, and where they would like them to go. Thus Metro Omaha consciously built upon the foundations laid by these previous federal initiatives by expanding successful youth-oriented programs as well as establishing new "gap-filling" ones. The genius of the Metro Omaha CCP may lie, however, in their commitment to planning and investing in the skill-building and cultivation of resources needed to strengthen their partnership structure and expand their project capacity for the future. Metro Omaha's tradition of collaboration and communication with the community, and its attention to the planning and skill-building processes, may well have institutionalized the capacity of CCP/Safe Futures to respond swiftly and flexibly to the needs of the Omaha area's youth.

Phoenix

Phoenix is the epitome of the shift in our nation's population from the rustbelt to the sunbelt. Phoenix' population has grown 25 percent in the last ten years, and encompasses 470 square miles, now one of the ten largest cities in the country. And like all major cities, in the midst of the shiny skyscrapers and expensive retail stores and resort hotels can be found deteriorating and dangerous neighborhoods with high crime rates.

The physical size and major population growth has influenced city services in a way that facilitated the implementation of CCP. To keep pace with the burgeoning population, 700 police officers were hired in the last five years, giving Phoenix a young

force, hired primarily after the department began implementing community policing in 1990. Many city services had already been organized to provide neighborhood-level planning and service delivery. Thus, CCP was not a catalyst for beginning decentralized services and community policing, but rather fit into and enhanced the prevailing philosophy of municipal government. Phoenix' CCP initiative was managed out of the police department by the lieutenant who also coordinated the city's Weed and Seed Project.

Some CCP funds were used to enhance community policing citywide through the hiring of lieutenants and neighborhood officers. However, most of the CCP grant was targeted to one neighborhood, Coronado, with the assumption that it would serve as a model that could be expanded as needed to other areas of the city. Coronado was chosen, in part, because of its location next to a Weed and Seed neighborhood. Officials were afraid that criminal activity would be displaced from the Weed and Seed area to Coronado. Second, Coronado had experienced moderate levels of crime and poverty, but not to the extent that would make it impossible to introduce effective interventions. Finally, its proximity to downtown and its historic houses made it an attractive area to middle-income residents; and it had a well organized, active neighborhood association, the Greater Coronado Neighborhood Association. (GNCA). GNCA took the lead in a variety of community crime prevention programs, including the creation of a community center to provide neighborhood-based services to youth and families.

Salt Lake City

Given a growing crime problem, Salt Lake City decided to focus on youth problems in the family/neighborhood context. The City's Comprehensive Communities Program was designed to create "a neighborhood based model for the prevention, intervention, and suppression of crime." The primary mission of this project was to "restructure our law enforcement and social services systems so they can effectively reduce violent youth crime in today's environment in a comprehensive way" (Salt Lake City proposal).

At the core of Salt Lake City's CCP is an innovative attempt to "reinvent" government at the neighborhood level by establishing a new organizational entity called a Community Action Team (CAT). This group is a neighborhood-based team comprised of representatives from different agencies who work together to address neighborhood problems. The geographic boundaries for the five CATs overlap those of the seven city council districts (with two CAT units each having responsibility for two lower-crime districts). These interagency units meet on a weekly basis to identify local problems, fashion solutions, coordinate resources, implement responses, and evaluate their own effectiveness. Members of the CAT unit include a police officer, a probation officer, a city prosecutor, a community mobilization specialist, a youth/family specialist, and a community relations coordinator. Community repre-

sentatives are invited to participate in the CAT on an ad hoc basis to help with specific problems.

Community Action Teams provide a new organizational structure for addressing neighborhood problems, enhancing community involvement in public safety, and for delivering government services. The alternatives to incarceration provided by the CAT teams are especially noteworthy as new models, as is the comprehensive problem solving approach to the case management of juvenile offenders and their families. However, any new approach is bound to experience problems when created in the context of conventional government structures and policies. During the first year, members of each CAT unit worked hard to define roles and relationships among themselves, with their parent agencies, with city council, and with the communities they serve. They also worked hard to resolve predictable obstacles associated with traditional government organizations, such as rigid hierarchies of communication and authority, political turf and distrust, accountability, and levels of commitment from parent agencies. Because of these efforts and a strong commitment to the CAT model, CCP in Salt Lake City has managed to move forward, solving neighborhood problems on a daily basis, and at the same time, creating and implementing new violence prevention programs.

In addition to creating new organizational structures, CCP in Salt Lake City also represents a comprehensive approach to programming. In the areas of community mobilization and law enforcement, for example, the police and local residents have created a well-organized, 600-member citizen patrol called Mobile Neighborhood Watch. In addition, Salt Lake City is attempting to link resources and to provide alternatives to youths who are at risk of gang involvement, e.g. an employment/mentoring program, better case management, and various alternative education programs. To address problems of domestic violence, a Family Peace Center has been created. Finally, through the offices of the city prosecutor and the juvenile court, in cooperation with the CATs, officials are pursuing alternatives to prosecution and incarceration.

Seattle

In Seattle, CCP is one of several federal, state, and local funding streams being used to implement components of a comprehensive plan for the city. Although the mayor's office is the grantee, the Community Policing Bureau of the Seattle Police Department authored the proposal and manages the grant. Initially, half of the CCP grant was to be used by the Seattle Police Department itself as part of its transition to community policing. CCP funds were originally budgeted to support training curriculum development and overtime salaries for training officers for community policing. Remaining CCP funds were budgeted for other police units as well as city and county agencies such as the Department of Neighborhoods, Department of Housing and Human Services, the Parks Department, the Superior

Court's Drug Court, Seattle Center (a city department), community organizations, and contractors and subgrantees. The latter include non-profit service providers (e.g., YMCA), community organizations (e.g., Refugee Women's Alliance), and individual adult and youth recipients of "Small and Simple" grants for anti-violence projects. Many participants noted the importance of the CCP planning grant that Seattle was awarded. It sped the planning process, supported community forums and other outreach efforts, and facilitated the participation of a special mayoral advisory committee in the planning effort.

Later, a change was made in the police-training plan. It was shortened to a one-day session, and was made a "routine" part of the department's educational program by being conducted during the officers' regular tours of duty. The CCP coordinator negotiated rebudgeting of more than one half of the police department's original funding to support the activities of other agencies. From the perspective of sub-grantees, most CCP funds are being used for short-term or one-time expenditures (such as small grants to individuals, purchases of additional services for a specific population, or training), not to develop or institutionalize programs, or to support new staff positions. This distribution reflects the city's general concern about its ability to sustain programs that are initiated with short-term or even "one time" federal funding.

The city's CCP coordinator is a full-time grant administrator housed in the police department. Relations with sub-grantees were negotiated shortly after the CCP grant award notice. The CCP coordinator manages all coordinated efforts, assembles quarterly progress reports, makes site visits, and holds meetings to resolve problems that arise. CCP's components operate with varying but substantial degrees of autonomy. This coordination is intended to keep all grantees generally informed about all components of the program.

Wilmington

Wilmington, Delaware is an old industrial city situated at a critical "crossroads" in the northeast, i.e. midway between New York and Washington, and near to both Baltimore and Philadelphia. Although a prosperous city, Wilmington suffers from the social ills that are faced in many urban areas. Some sections of the city are consistently marked by high levels of crime and are among the more economically and socially depressed areas in the state. During the 1980s and early 1990s, increases in crime, drug activity, and violence seriously threatened the stability of Wilmington neighborhoods. Public outcry over these conditions prompted the local government effort that led to CCP.

The Wilmington CCP story is an interesting one because of the crisis that developed after the implementation of the program. A rash of shootings in 1996, linked primarily to youth violence and the drug trade, hit Wilmington at a very vulnerable

time. Cutbacks in the police department, friction between the police and the mayor's office, and a controversial resignation of a police chief accompanied this increase in violence. These events deflated police morale, created tension between the police and the community, and ultimately caused Wilmington to rethink its CCP efforts. The site was able to rebound admirably from this crisis, and thus was able to build a CCP program that bridged city government, the community, and private organizations into an overall crime control strategy. The Wilmington site, therefore, should be understood not only as a success in implementing its CCP initiatives, but as a success in overcoming adversity in order to realize its goals.

In its version of CCP managed out of the city planning department, Wilmington developed a comprehensive strategy toward crime and violence reduction that emphasized police-community partnerships and youth-related issues. Like other sites, community policing and community mobilization were the two main areas of focus. However, while several of Wilmington's CCP efforts centered around activities involving the police, including community policing training, specialized community policing officers (known as sector specialists), and citizen police academies, some of the more interesting initiatives involved organizations other than the police. For example, Neighborhood Planning Councils (NPCs), which are umbrella groups for local community and neighborhood organizations, played an important role in empowering citizens in the CCP process. Likewise, SODAT, a local organization that specializes in drug abuse treatment and counseling, was integral in establishing what is perhaps Wilmington's most interesting and successful CCP initiative: the juvenile drug court—one of the first of such institutions in the country.

Comprehensive Communities Program Participation

Determining who participated in CCP planning, development, and implementation at each site was important, not only to ascertain who BOTEC would survey and interview, but to help the research team ascertain the priorities of each site in building a multi-agency coalition with partners that addressed each of the six program components. Since each site varied by size, geographic location, problem areas, and pre-existing agenda, the BOTEC team determined that the best way to identify participants was for each site's director to self-identify their participants under a set of guidelines. As mentioned previously, each site was to include those individuals who were involved with the planning and implementation of CCP as well as residents involved in the community mobilization segment and those individuals/agencies who would be receiving CCP funding.

Table 3 breaks down all of the identified participants in the nine single-city sites into those from the police department, those working in other local and state agencies, those who represent community and or neighborhood associations, and those who come from private social service agencies, businesses, colleges, and private citizens. Although the last category includes several diverse populations, not all of these populations were evident in each site. In fact, most of the sites included only those who were providing services for youth and gangs, alternatives to incarceration, community prosecution and diversion, and drug courts.

As can be seen, the total number of CCP participants varied greatly by site. By far, the greatest number of participants was in Boston where the implementation of a strategic planning process created a planning team made up of police, business representatives, citizens, community representatives, and city workers in each of eleven police districts and in five internal areas of the police department. In addition, there were participants in two program-oriented networks, the Alternatives to Incarceration Network and the Youth Services Providers Network. Because of the decentralized nature of the strategic planning process, the number of identified participants (386) was large but inexact. In fact, it was not even possible for site directors to ascertain who the participants were in year two.

The task of initially identifying CCP participants and then ascertaining their continued participation proved to be a challenging, yet manageable task for many site directors. After Boston, Salt Lake City had the greatest number of participants, exceeding 100 in both years one and two. Hartford and Seattle had 60 to 70 participants, Baltimore and Columbia had 40 to 50, and Gary and Wichita both had under 40 participants.

Overall, there was a 9 percent decrease in the number of participants in the seven single cities for which there are two years of data.[10] In four of the sites there was a decrease in the number of participants from year one to year two. The decline was greatest in Gary (23 percent) where the number of participants was smallest to begin with. The decreases were more modest in Hartford (14 percent), Seattle (9 percent), and Salt Lake (11 percent). There was no change in the overall number of participants in Wichita, and Columbia experienced a slight increase in participation (5 percent). Baltimore's greater increase (24 percent) can be attributed to the police department staff who came to the CCP table during year two.

As mentioned previously, there was quite a lot of changeover among CCP participants at most of the sites. However, most of the changes were due to people leaving their jobs or positions in community groups and being replaced by others. As can be seen by Table 3, the numbers within each of the categories remained relatively stable between years one and two for most sites. Overall, there was a good mix of police, government agency staff, community representatives, and private agency/business representatives. Government agency personnel and community representatives each made up almost a third of the total number of participants.

Altogether, from year one to year two there were slight increases in the percentages of police personnel and community representatives, and slight decreases in the percentages in staff from government and private agencies. Police participation remained relatively stable in all of the sites, except Baltimore where it increased from one to 16 people by year two. The number of local or state government staff either remained the same or decreased slightly, with the greatest decreases occurring in Hartford and Salt Lake City. Most of the decreases in this category can be attributed to high-level government officials or politicians who were involved in the CCP planning process and the initial stages of implementation, but who became less involved or uninvolved once CCP was well underway. Community representation remained relatively constant in most sites, except Gary where it increased and Baltimore, where it decreased. The slight decreases found in the private agency/business/citizens category can also be attributed to the change from a planning and early implementation process in year one to full implementation in year two. This category included a number of agencies and individuals that served as consultants, trainers, and facilitators for CCP initiatives. Also, businesses that might have been active participants in the beginning stages where problems and potential solutions were identified were less likely to be involved by year two of implementation.

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[10] As mentioned previously, Boston site managers were not able to ascertain the members in its decentralized CCP initiative during the second year. In addition, the researchers, not the site director, had to determine what participants would be interviewed in Fort Worth, thus rendering that sample as incomparable to the other sites where site CCP directors made the determination.

Table 3: Number and Type of CCP Participants by Year in Single-City Sites

Site	CCP Year	Total	Police	Government Agency	Community Represent-atives	Private Agencies/ Business /Citizens
Baltimore	1	45	1	6	28	10
	2	56	16	6	22	12
Boston*	1	386	135	51	20	180
Columbia	1	41	5	13	11	12
	2	43	6	14	11	12
Gary	1	22	2	5	2	13
	2	17	2	3	10	2
Hartford	1	71	6	20	39	6
	2	61	6	15	38	2
Salt Lake	1	114	27	40	28	19
	2	101	26	33	27	15
Seattle	1	76	15	24	16	21
	2	69	13	22	16	18
Wichita	1	39	6	14	4	15
	2	39	5	14	5	15

*Boston was not able to provide information about CCP participation during year two due to the decentralized nature of their initiative.

Participants from the multi-jurisdictional sites were similarly identified and tracked, however, community representatives were combined with private agencies, citizens, and businesses since numbers in both categories were very low. Obviously, in the multi-jurisdictional sites, there were more participants from state, municipal, and county governments than in the single city sites. In both years, they made up around 70 percent of the participants. Private agencies, citizens, businesses, and community representatives made up 16 percent of the total for both years. Police participants made up the remainder. The number of participants in East Bay for both years was close to 30, while in Metro Denver and Metro Atlanta, the number was double that. There was a slight increase in participants from year one to year two in East Bay and Metro Denver. In Metro Atlanta, participation decreased overall by 26 percent with decreases in each of the three categories.

Table 4: Number and Type of CCP Participants by Year in Multi-jurisdictional Sites

Site	CCP Year	Total	Police	Government Agency	Private Agencies/Community Grps.
East Bay	1	29	3	24	2
	2	32	3	25	4
Metro Denver	1	60	9	42	9
	2	64	7	48	9
Metro At-lanta	1	68	10	44	14
	2	50	7	33	10

Coalition Building

This section reviews the gathered data from both the survey and site visit components of the research. It attempts to construct a picture of whether or not each site selected to participate in the Comprehensive Communities Program actually constructed a comprehensive community. That is, did the site create a partnership or coalition—an alliance of groups and/or individuals that came together for the common purpose of bettering the city's public safety and living environment?

There is an important distinction between the formation of a coalition and the beneficial use of CCP funding. No doubt even the cities with the weakest coalitions funded programs that appeared to be beneficial to the local community. There was no attempt to determine whether the formation of a coalition best and most effectively uses the limited resources at hand (although the logic of producing better public services through cooperation between local groups appears promising). Instead, the attempt was to divine whether or not a fairly complete group of service providers, city officials, and community representatives in a city had begun interacting and aiding one another as a coalition. This concept was the backbone of the Comprehensive Communities Program grants. Thus, the research examined the construction of coalitions in the CCP cities: the successes, obstacles, and methods by which coalitions can be erected.

The discussion of coalition building in this section was derived from two sources of information: the first from the initial CCP Coalition and Follow-Up Surveys, and the second from on-site observations.

Context for Coalition building

Each site selected for the Comprehensive Communities Program funding had its own context in which to construct a coalition. But general trends do emerge across the varied sites. Utilizing data from the first wave of the CCP Coalition Survey, this section explores the ground on which each of the sites built their coalition from a collective perspective. Looking at the problems perceived to exist in the cities helps to identify where funds and responses might have been allocated. Reviewing the leading agencies and the types of activities planned and underway in each city creates a framework with which the programs can be constructively examined. Finally, the hindrances and slowdowns in the process highlight areas where an expanded CCP might focus attention.

Perceived Problems at CCP Sites

The twin concerns of youth violence and drugs ranked as the most commonly-cited perceived problems by respondents affiliated with their city's CCP initiative at the beginning of the effort. The combined response from the nationwide survey indicated youth violence (72 percent) and gangs (61 percent), as well as school drop-out rates and truancy (50 percent), were perceived as big problems in the targeted cities (Table 5). A look at the sites individually confirmed this perception: nine out of the twelve sites listed violence by youths as one of their top three problems (Table A-1)[11].

Similarly, the two sides of the illegal drug market, drug dealing (64 percent) and drug abuse (63 percent), ranked as the second and third most commonly-cited perceived problems in CCP sites. The agreement reached its zenith in Boston, where a near consensus of 96 percent of respondents noted illicit drug dealing as a big problem in the city; 93 percent of Boston respondents also categorized drug abuse as a major problem (Table A-1).

While youth violence and illegal drugs stood out as the top concerns overall, individual sites had unique concerns. For instance, while only one-third of all respondents thought that physical decay (trash, abandoned cars and buildings, and graffiti) was a large problem, 83 percent of Baltimore respondents viewed physical decay as a big problem in their city. That perception fits with corroborating knowledge of the decreasing population of Baltimore and its consequentially large number of abandoned houses. And while domestic violence finished at number six as a perceived problem in CCP sites in general, it was the number one concern of Metro Denver respondents (75 percent) and the third most pressing problem perceived in Wichita (68 percent). For more localized problem identification, please see Appendix A, Table 1. Whether these differences between sites reflect real differences in the magnitude of these problems or the different perceptions and priorities of persons affiliated with the CCP is unknown. Nevertheless, these judgments served as the foundation for planning the CCP components at each site.

For the most part, respondents to the survey believed the CCP effort at their own site was addressing the previously identified "most important issues." At least 73 percent of all respondents believed that the CCP program (Table A-2) was addressing their sites' major issues. This relative concurrence at sites about what problems they faced certainly allowed organizations from a number of perspectives and approaches to concentrate on similar and pressing, issues.

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[11] In addition to the tables in the text, referrals are made to the tables in Appendix A, for example, as in "Table A-1."

Table 5: Perceived Problems Facing CCP Sites

	All CCP Sites*
Rated as a Big Problem in the community	
Violence by youths	**72%** (417)
Illicit drug-dealing	**64%** (419)
Illicit drug abuse	**63%** (416)
Gangs	**61%** (417)
Widespread use of guns	**52%** (419)
Domestic violence	**51%** (416)
School drop-out rate/Truancy	**50%** (417)
Teen pregnancy	**44%** (415)
Violence by adults	**43%** (418)
Unemployment	**42%** (416)
Property crime	**42%** (416)
Trash/abandoned cars and buildings/physical decay/graffiti	**33%** (417)
Homelessness	**30%** (416)
Crime in and around schools	**28%** (413)
Public drunkenness/underage drinking	**27%** (414)
AIDS	**21%** (409)
Prostitution	**20%** (414)
Traffic/accidents	**11%** (412)
Police misconduct	**4%** (401)

Data has been weighted by CCP Site

Lead CCP Agencies

For sites operating within a single jurisdiction, either the mayor's office or the po-
lice department received funding as the grantee from the Bureau of Justice
Assistance. The mayor's offices and police departments operated as the grant recip-
ient and lead agency with roughly equal frequency across the sites. In Seattle,
while the grantee was the mayor's office, the Seattle Police Department was desig-
nated as the lead agency. In contrast, the multi-jurisdictional sites formed
organizations to administer the CCP funding. Both Metro Atlanta and Metro Den-

ver had already begun formulating such entities under the Pulling American Communities Together project (Project PACT), and therefore had considerably longer planning phases than any of the other sites. Some Weed and Seed sites also utilized existing networks to get a running start on CCP. The table below outlines the lead agencies for each CCP site:

Table 6: Lead CCP Agencies

Site	Lead CCP Agency
Baltimore, Maryland	Mayor's Office
Boston, Massachusetts	Boston Police Department
Columbia, South Carolina	Mayor's Office
East Bay, California (Multi-Jurisdictional)	East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership
Fort Worth, Texas	Fort Worth Police Department
Gary, Indiana	Mayor's Office
Hartford, Connecticut	City Manager's Office
Metro Atlanta, Georgia (Multi-Jurisdictional)	Metro Atlanta Project PACT, Colorado Department of Public Safety, Division of Criminal Justice
Metro Denver, Colorado (Multi-Jurisdictional)	Metro Denver Project PACT, Governor's Community Partnership Office
Metro Omaha, Nebraska (Multi-Jurisdictional)	Department of Public Administration at University of Nebraska at Omaha
Phoenix, Arizona	Phoenix Police Department
Salt Lake City, Utah	Mayor's Office
Seattle, Washington	Seattle Police Department
Wichita, Kansas	Mayor's Office
Wilmington, Delaware	Wilmington Planning Department

Activities Undertaken

Most respondents from each of the Comprehensive Communities Program sites indicated that their own coalition was actively undertaking or had completed a wide range of CCP activities. All sites developed communication networks and identified resources and most also conducted needs assessments, enhanced public relations, developed and implemented specific programming, changed internal policies, and held training exercises of some sort (Table A-3).

Two potential activities in the CCP coalitions that did not receive as much attention, according to the CCP members, were analyzing cultural barriers and setting up a system of self-evaluation. However, many respondents indicated their sites planned to carry out these two activities in the future (Table A-4).

Hindrances to Planning and Implementation

No program, no matter how well run, can avoid a few pitfalls along the way, whether they come in the planning phase or during the actual implementation. The survey gave CCP participants a list of potentially problematic events and conditions and asked them to gauge whether those events hindered the CCP effort both in the planning stage and in the first and second year of implementation. The hindrances have been broken down into categories: personnel issues, insufficient resources, planning differences, and bureaucratic issues.

The problems linked to funding, "insufficient funding" and "lack of a clear action plan," predictably declined from the planning stage to year one and two of implementation. This decline, of course, makes sense: if you don't have enough money, then getting some helps remove that problem; if you have no action plan, then receiving planning money helps to create one. Furthermore, a shift of hindrances from federal level red tape in the planning stage to local level red tape during implementation follows what might be expected as the programs shift their emphasis from planning to implementation. During the implementation phase of the CCP, local groups are presumably more active than the federal organizations and therefore find points of contention and bureaucratic troubles.

Two trends emerge from a review of the aggregated responses from the CCP participants nationwide as shown in Table 7. Foremost, the change in frequency in reported hindrances during *the planning stage* and *year one of the implementation stage* is in most cases relatively small. However, the problems that hindered the coalition appeared to have increased from year one to *year two of implementation*. Problems with personnel turnover increased from 41 percent in year one to 65 percent in year two. Factions within the coalition increased markedly from 54 percent to 75 percent. Leadership problems (from 49 percent to 72 percent) and turf conflicts (63 percent to 74 percent) increased over time. Also, problems with red tape at both the federal and local level had increased in frequency.

Second, the CCP participants seemed to agree that time constraints (83 percent before funding, 81 percent in year one and 82 percent in year two) were the most common problems faced in their efforts to develop coalitions and programming. This viewpoint translated into a perception shared by many of the respondents that the coalitions did not very effectively develop programs in a timely fashion (Table A-17)

Table 7: Events and Conditions Hindering the Coalition

Hindered the Coalition (some problem/big problem)		All Sites*		
		Before receipt of funding**	Implementation Year One**	Implementation Year Two***
Personnel Issues	Staff and/or member turnover	**41%** (192)	**41%** (248)	**65%** (221)
	Leadership problems	**53%** (234)	**49%** (284)	**72%** (160)
	Turf conflicts	**65%** (226)	**63%** (270)	**74%** (193)
	Ego/personality differences	**63%** (221)	**64%** (272)	**73%** (193)
	Lack of commitment from some members	**54%** (227)	**58%** (278)	**81%** (203)
	Factions within the coalition	**52%** (198)	**54%** (242)	**75%** (161)
Insufficient Resources	Insufficient funding	**80%** (214)	**69%** (244)	**80%** (178)
	Time constraints	**83%** (224)	**81%** (277)	**82%** (199)
Planning Differences	Lack of clear action plan	**65%** (247)	**57%** (295)	**73%** (161)
	Disagreement over goals of the project	**52%** (218)	**51%** (265)	**63%** (151)
Bureaucratic Issues	Red tape at Federal level	**73%** (165)	**63%** (189)	**80%** (138)
	Red tape at local level	**68%** (191)	**65%** (224)	**83%** (175)

* Data has been weighted by CCP Site
**From Coalition Survey
***From Follow-Up Survey

Beyond those aggregate numbers, a few site-specific phenomenons appear in this data (Tables A-5, A-6, and A-7). Looking first at personnel issues, a few of the cities reported either little trouble or mixed results regarding staff and member turnover. Seattle, after some reported difficulties with staff turnover in the planning stage (30 percent), dropped to very few problems during year one of implementation (8 percent) but then saw a dramatic rise (70 percent) in its perception as a problem in year two. Columbia experienced extremely few snags as a result of turnover: only 5 percent of respondents listed it as a problem during the planning stage, 6 percent during year one, and 9 percent in year two of implementation. This low number stands out in comparison to the aggregate percentages outlined above.

Another interesting result is the increased reporting of leadership hindrances in the multi-jurisdictional sites in comparison to the other sites. The average percentage of individuals reporting hindrances from leadership problems in multi-jurisdictional sites in the planning stage was 91 percent, during the first year of implementation 70 percent, and during the second year of implementation 56 percent. The contrast

with the other sites was vast, which had average hindrance reports in the planning stage at 44 percent, year one of implementation at 40 percent, and year two of implementation at 36 percent. Clearly, the multi-jurisdictional structure of Metro Atlanta, Metro Denver, and East Bay added another hurdle to their effort.

The other issues that focused on the interrelationship of the individuals involved, showed wide variation among sites and between time frames. These issues included leadership problems, turf conflicts, ego/personality differences, lack of commitment from members, and factions within the coalition. Fewer Baltimore, Columbia, and Seattle participants reported these as problems both during planning and during implementation than the participants at the other sites. Over half of the participants in Metro Atlanta viewed each of the five areas as problematic in their site. However, there was an appreciable decline from the planning phase to the first year of the implementation phase. Metro Atlanta also suffered from more trouble from uncommitted membership (96 percent during planning, 86 percent in year one and 77 percent in year two of implementation). More than 50 percent of the participants in the other two multi-jurisdictional sites, East Bay and Metro Denver, viewed four of these five areas as problematic in year one of implementation, but they too found them less of a problem over time. Only in Hartford, Salt Lake City, and Wichita did the percentage of participants viewing these issues as problems increase from the planning phase to year one of the implementation phase. These numbers remained relatively the same for these three sites from year one to year two of implementation. Fort Worth respondents reported greater difficulties arising from factions within the coalition than the other sites, with 89 percent of Fort Worth respondents reporting problems during planning, 70 percent in the first year and 50 percent in the second year of implementation, well above the aggregate norm.

Red tape, both at a local (95 percent during planning and 78 percent in year one of implementation) and federal level (94 percent during planning and 78 percent in year one of implementation), plagued Metro Atlanta worse than most other CCP sites. East Bay also struggled with federal red tape (94 percent in the planning stage and over 86 percent in years one and two of implementation), but saw an unusually dramatic rise, from 40 percent to 86 percent, in troubles stemming from local red tape during the first year of implementation. In both sites, CCP staff had to work with local government bureaucracies and agencies in multiple counties and over a dozen cities and towns. Conversely, few Gary, Indiana, respondents believed they grappled with trouble deriving from federal red tape (20 percent in the planning stage and 33 and percent during year one of implementation). This number, however, increased dramatically from year one to year two of implementation. Problems stemming from red tape at the local and federal level rose an average of 50 percent from year one to year two (from 42 percent in year one to 93 percent in year two). Gary also contended with significant troubles arising from disagreement over project goals in the first year of implementation (29 percent during planning versus 82 percent in year one and 100 percent in year two of implementation).

Perceptions of Progress

Most of the sites were behind in their initial timetables and milestones for a variety of reasons, many of which stemmed from the slower than anticipated turnaround of the administrative process. At most sites, the delayed disbursement of federal funding held up some of the CCP programming. Many of the sites had to create a revised schedule of events and program start-dates. The extent to which respondents took these administrative delays in the CCP process into account colored their response to the survey query about the coalition's progress relative to schedule.

Few respondents at the sites, except for those in Columbia, thought the implementation of the coalition "far behind schedule" (Table A-8). Instead, most opted for the "somewhat behind schedule" option, with a couple of notable exceptions. Still, the responses did reconfirm corroborating information from a few sites. Fort Worth participants seemed to agree they were proceeding "right on schedule (43 percent)" or "ahead of schedule (29 percent)." Undoubtedly, this site's more timely implementation of coalition building and CCP programming hinged mainly on Fort Worth's financial situation and the fact that it had implemented community policing in other areas of the city. Fort Worth was fortunate enough to have had money available within its own budget to begin the CCP process without waiting for the federal money to arrive. Fort Worth therefore dodged some of the funding delays that other sites had to grapple with in order to begin the implementation of CCP coalition building. Seattle, where 59 percent of respondents believed that CCP was "right on schedule" and another 14 percent thought it was "ahead of schedule," was the first site to receive the federal money and was therefore able to move ahead more quickly than other sites. Finally, the large number of individuals in Metro Denver who believed that they were moving "ahead of schedule" (25 percent) might reflect the fact that the Metro Denver organization flowed out of Project PACT.

Indicators of Coalition building

Limitation and Cautions

To properly interpret the findings reported below, one must be aware of the timing of the first wave of the CCP Coalition Survey. Most of the sites started planning their CCP strategies at the beginning of 1994, a few months before their Phase I Applications (for planning money) were due (April 1994). While the first wave of the survey was sent to site participants at the beginning of their implementation period (Phase II), this was often eighteen to twenty-four months after they began the CCP planning process. That is, even though sites had not had time to fully implement their strategies and programs, they had been given ample opportunity to be planning and developing coalitions. The second wave of the survey, the CCP Follow-Up Survey, was sent roughly a year following the initial survey. The Follow-Up

Survey allows us to compare many of the indicators of coalition building between the two time periods. In addition, the Follow-Up Survey elicits information about program implementation, and perceived successes and weaknesses of each site's CCP initiatives.

There are two limitations of the data that should be mentioned. The first resulted from the nature of the original sample. As mentioned previously, each site was asked to provide a list of participants who had either taken part in the planning process and/or who were involved in implementation in some way. Each site may have varied in their definition as to whom was "participating in CCP." This probably led to under-representation in some sites and over-representation in other sites, especially with regard to whether people on the periphery were deemed to be participants. As a result, participants could have varying levels of connection with their CCP program that would color their responses to the Coalition Survey, especially to those questions about coalition building. The second limitation resulted from the response rate. Ideally every CCP participant would have responded to the survey, however, the response rate varied, as mentioned previously from 37 percent to 82 percent. There could be a number of explanations for the response rates, but one must be cautious overall that those who responded might be more apt to be positive about the program, or on the other hand, critical of the program. Therefore it is conceivable that in a site where program implementation proceeded smoothly, the response rate over-represents those who view the program positively, whereas in sites where problems arose, the response rate over-represents those who were most critical of the program.

Another caveat about our survey is the focus on the coalition building, as opposed to community mobilization or community organizing. While successful coalition building *can* certainly include networking and building coalitions with residents, community activists, and neighborhood organizations, it does not necessarily guarantee that a site *did* mobilize the community. That is, some sites that may not have focused on coalition building (despite BJA's mandate to do so), might have focused and excelled at community mobilization. Alternately, sites where city agencies successfully built coalitions among themselves and with social service agencies might have been less successful in developing input and participation from the community. However, independent observations were made during site visits that are relevant to these questions. An examination of the extent and nature of community mobilization can be found in another section of this report.

Finally, building coalitions or mobilizing communities are not only distinct from one another (and central to CCP), but they are very distinct from service delivery to at-risk populations (also important to the CCP effort). A number of sites focused more on service delivery, developing innovative programs for youths and other at-risk populations, and less on ensuring that the city, county, state, and private agencies coalesced as a working group, developing long-term relationships. The fact is that service delivery was one of the primary expected outcomes of partnership formation.

This raises the questions of how far cities need to go beyond a mere financial arrangement to provide social services in a coordinated and efficient manner. This issue of social service delivery, as well as its relationship to coalition building, is also discussed in this report.

This section examines data from the initial Coalition Survey and the Follow-Up Survey to determine the extent to which the Comprehensive Communities Program sites had developed coalitions. This section is neither attempting to determine whether a given site has created programs for the betterment of the local community nor if the formation of a coalition truly benefits the local community. It focuses keenly on whether or not, as the Comprehensive Communities Program advocates, a network of service providers, government organizations, and community groups has formed and allowed interaction and communication to begin between groups. Additional data on this issue is presented as part of the formal network analysis.

Most of the following discussion deals with the perceptions of participants about the CCP coalition in their city. These survey questions help illuminate just how effective a sense of "coalition" has grown within each site. And while our case studies show more precisely what various agencies did and did not do in their respective cities, the functioning of a coalition can be a much more slippery item to grasp. Is there truly a coalition if each agency in a city is participating in some crime-reducing activity funded by CCP? Not necessarily. On some level, a coalition is only as strong as participants' *perceptions* of the existence of a coalition. These perceptions may, in turn, be indicative of the actual level of interaction and cooperation on a regular basis.

Organizations Involved in CCP Planning and Implementation

The Comprehensive Communities Program intended to create coalitions that included as many key stakeholders as possible. The ideal situation would include all community groups and agencies. More realistic though, the question can be framed as follows: were the major players within the community included—that is, government agencies from city, county, and state levels, social service providers addressing the concerns of pertinent ethnic groups, juveniles and adults, and individuals with a variety of needs, as well as a cross-section of community leaders and individuals who were representative of the community? Ideally, all agencies would be involved in both the planning and implementation stages of the CCP effort. However, in practice the distribution of participation would be more varied.

Level of Involvement

The survey asked CCP participants to evaluate the level of involvement of individuals/groups in their city's coalition. These included the lead agency, the CCP director, the CCP staff, the police department, and the business community. Their

responses suggest where participants believe the coalition is strong and where it is weak.

In terms of "balanced participation" in the planning process, these data on involvement should be read with caution: at first glance, Boston, for example, looks like a city where varying agencies were "greatly involved" in the planning process. However, the CCP director and his coalition staff worked for the Boston Police Department, which was also the grantee.

East Bay respondents reported that six groups of players were "greatly involved" in planning (Table A-9). Columbia's respondents reported four groups, and Boston, Metro Denver, and Hartford reported three each. At the other end of the spectrum, respondents from Metro Atlanta and Gary could not agree upon a single agency that was "greatly involved" in the planning of the CCP coalition.

At least 75 percent of survey respondents saw a "great deal of involvement" by the CCP project directors, the lead grant organizations, and the police departments during the planning stage of the CCP effort. In cities where the police department was the lead agency, the data show a relatively greater perception of involvement by the police department. Respondents from Boston, Fort Worth, Hartford, and Seattle, all sites with the police department as the lead agency, believed overwhelmingly that the police were heavily involved in the planning. Of the cities where the mayor's office was the lead agency, only Columbia and Salt Lake City reported a great level of participation by the police department. None of the multi-jurisdictional sites reported a great deal of involvement during planning from local police departments.

A slightly different picture of involvement developed during CCP's first year of implementation (Table A-10). Columbia had the largest number of entities involved (four), followed by East Bay, Boston, Seattle, and Wichita (three each). Respondents in Columbia were virtually unanimous that four groups, the police department, the CCP director, CCP staff, and the lead agency remained active after the switch to implementation. East Bay participants reported that city and county agencies, as well as the Executive Board, became less involved in the implementation of the East Bay CCP. Again, both Metro Atlanta and Gary participants again could not agree upon any single agency or group that was greatly involved in the first year of CCP implementation.

In the end, the general trend of involvement seen in the planning stage continued during the two years of implementation and management of the initiative. CCP project directors, police departments, lead grantees, and CCP coalition staffs remained greatly involved in year one implementation (75 percent) and year two (80 percent) according to survey respondents (Table A-19). In fact, the number of sites where the lead agency and the police department were greatly involved increased from year one to year two.

Virtually all respondents from the sites believed that business leaders had little involvement in the planning of the CCP effort. Boston's 49 percent business leader participation rating stands alone, a full 17 percentage points above the next highest site. Respondents from Metro, Salt Lake City, Baltimore, and Fort Worth believed business leaders were not heavily involved. In the second year of implementation, the numbers of respondents from these and other sites that believed business leaders were "greatly involved" increased dramatically. Overall, twenty percent of survey respondents saw a "great deal of involvement" by the business leaders and at least 50 percent of survey respondents believed that business leaders were "somewhat involved" in year two of implementation.

Organizations Not Involved

In general, about half of the respondents could think of additional organizations that would be good to include in the coalition (Table A-11). These organizations varied greatly from site to site, although a pattern of sorts does emerge from the free-responses on the surveys. Participants at several sites mentioned their concern with the non-involvement of youths in the coalitions. Some individuals advocated getting youths themselves involved, while others thought it better to integrate the local school district, while still others wished for greater involvement of grass-roots youth groups. Another group that appeared on the "wish list" of involvement in the free responses from several sites was business leaders. As noted earlier, few cities reported much involvement by the business community at the beginning stages of CCP. Even participants from Boston, which had the highest reported rates of business leaders, longed for increased private sector involvement in the coalition.

The other side of involvement is the list of agencies and actors that had dropped out of the coalition. Here again, most cities were fairly similar in reporting that very few organizations had ended their interaction with the coalition either by the initial Coalition Survey (Table A-12) or by the Follow-Up Survey (Table A-20). During the first year of implementation, Gary stood out with 44 percent reporting that they knew of organizations that had ended their interaction with the coalition[12]. In the second year of implementation, it was Metro Atlanta that stood out with 39 percent of respondents who knew of organizations that had dropped out. Free responses in terms of naming the organizations and participants that respondents knew had dropped out of the coalition were relatively limited. However, many of those who did respond believed that although individuals had left the coalition, the agencies and organizations themselves continued to remain active and involved in the CCP

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[12] This high rate may in fact reflect the small size of the Gary coalition rather than any great disaffection with the Gary CCP. In a small group like Gary's, many individuals will know about the same group dropping out, and may therefore all be reporting the same one or two organizations. Alternatively, this may reflect the city's difficulty in implementing CCP during year one.

efforts. Other individuals responded that some organizations had not completely discontinued their efforts but rather decreased their level of involvement.

Meetings and Committees

Whether or not a given site had large, general meetings sheds some light on the level of integration between the various facets of the CCP coalition. Almost as important is whether or not participants knew about the meetings, as it indicates the kind of communication within the coalition and the number of individuals who might be able to attend.

Large Meetings

In the initial Coalition Survey, over 75 percent of the Hartford, Columbia, Boston, Baltimore, Salt Lake City, and Fort Worth respondents reported large, general meetings representing all participants in the CCP coalition (Table A-13). Respondents in Gary, Wichita, and Seattle did not report the existence of large, general meetings in their sites. In these cities, either the meetings did not take place or the communication networks to get the word out about the meetings did not work as well as in other cities. High response rates of the existence of meetings do not guarantee attendance by all members, but the awareness of such meetings speaks to the communication network within the coalitions.

On average, Follow-Up Survey respondents in the single city sites indicated a small increase in the use of large general meetings, however, respondents in three sites (Baltimore, Columbia, and Hartford) indicated a decrease in the use of large meetings (Table A-21).

Respondents in the multi-jurisdictional sites were not asked this question in the first wave of surveys because at the time it was believed that the size of the coalition prohibited large, all-inclusive meetings. In the Follow-Up Survey, respondents in all three sites responded that the CCP effort had used large general meetings—Metro Atlanta (35 percent), Metro Denver (100 percent), and East Bay (100 percent) (Table A-21).

Smaller Meetings

Smaller, separate committees were also a part of many of the Comprehensive Communities Program coalitions. These committees might be assigned to specific problems in the community or to CCP components. In theory, they might include a single member from a handful of representative groups, thereby increasing multi-group solutions to community problems and issues.

In the first survey, East Bay participants unanimously agreed that smaller committees were a part of the CCP effort (Table A-13). Many Metro Atlanta, Hartford, Boston, Salt Lake City, and Baltimore respondents also acknowledged the role of committees in their CCP coalitions. The types of committees varied immensely by site: East Bay had committees on law enforcement, juvenile justice, outreach, and domestic violence; Metro Atlanta had committees on substance abuse and teen pregnancy; and Boston had committees on alternatives to incarceration and youth service providers.

Attendance at these CCP meetings (either small separate committee meetings or large meetings) varied greatly across the individual sites (Table A-21). Respondents from Hartford attended the highest average number of meetings during the second year of implementation (7.1 meetings) followed by Fort Worth (6.0 meetings), Metro Denver (5.5 meetings), and Salt Lake City (5.0 meetings). The remainder of the cities averaged under 4.5 meetings during year two of implementation. Metro Atlanta respondents averaged the lowest number of meetings attended by CCP participants (1.3 meetings). While other factors can be used as measures for CCP coalition strength, one would expect that more participation in CCP meetings would reflect a higher level of communication among the members of the coalition.

Level of Conflict

Respondents were asked to rate their site in terms of the level and outcome of conflict. The choices were "little or no conflict," "conflict that improves decision-making," and "conflict that impedes decision-making." In most of the sites, year one responses were split somewhat evenly among the three choices (Chart A-14). It is interesting to note that the site where respondents reported the least amount of conflict (Columbia) was one where the most players were involved a great deal in planning. More Boston respondents (76 percent) reported conflict that led to improved decision-making than respondents in other sites. Other cities in which at least a third of respondents reported conflict leading to a positive outcome were East Bay, Baltimore, Columbia, Metro Atlanta, Hartford, Fort Worth, and Salt Lake City.

It is no wonder that conflict was present in multi-jurisdictional sites, where leaders from more than a dozen communities with varying philosophies and needs interacted. In a comparison of the three multi-jurisdictional sites, East Bay respondents reported the most conflict in the initial Coalition Survey: one-third reported conflict that impeded decision-making and nearly two-thirds reported conflict that improved it. Metro Denver had the highest percentage of respondents (38 percent) who reported conflict which impeded decision-making. In the third multi-jurisdictional site, Metro Atlanta, the conflict perceived by more than a third of that site's respondents was conflict that improved decision-making.

Finally, one of the most interesting findings in the year one data had to do with a lack of response to the question regarding conflict in decision-making. Over 75 percent of the respondents in most of the sites answered this question. In contrast, it was answered by only 27 percent of the participants in Seattle.

Respondents to the Follow-Up Survey were again asked to rate their site in terms of the level and outcome of conflict in decision-making (Chart A-22). This time Baltimore respondents reported the least amount of conflict in decision-making, 50 percent of respondents reported "little or no conflict." Columbia, whose respondents reported the least amount of conflict in year one of implementation, followed closely behind with 38 percent of respondents reporting "little or no conflict." Respondents were more likely to respond that conflict improved decision-making in the coalition during the second year. During year one of implementation, 50 percent of respondents in only three sites reported that conflict improved decision-making. When asked the same question at the end of the second year of implementation, 50 percent of respondents in ten of the twelve sites reported conflict that improved decision-making. East Bay and Boston respondents were the most likely to report conflict that improved decision making (80 percent and 78 percent, respectively). In contrast, Salt Lake City had the highest percentage of respondents (37 percent) reporting conflict that impeded decision-making. Hartford followed with 21 percent of respondents reporting conflict that impeded decision making for the coalition.

Perceptions of Fellow Coalition Members

Members were asked to look at the membership as a whole and rate it on its cooperation, friendliness, productivity, and powerfulness. In almost all of the sites, year-one respondents rated their membership as more friendly and productive than cooperative and powerful (Table A-15). Specifically, over 50 percent of all the respondents (except in Gary, Fort Worth, and Wichita) viewed their membership as friendly and productive. In only five sites (Metro Atlanta, Boston, East Bay, Forth Worth, and Seattle) was the membership seen as cooperative by a majority of respondents, and only in East Bay were they viewed as powerful. The latter is probably due to the fact that the majority of CCP members in East Bay are leaders (mayors, police chiefs, etc.) in their own cities and towns. Boston respondents rated themselves to be highest in overall cooperation, friendliness, and productivity, whereas Gary respondents rated themselves lowest in those categories during year one.

Coalition members were again asked the same question in the Follow-Up Survey (Table A-23). In year one of implementation, almost all of the site respondents rated their membership as more friendly and productive than cooperative and powerful. By year two of implementation, the perception had changed slightly. In ten of the twelve sites, respondents rated their membership in the coalition as more cooperative and friendly than productive and powerful. In only two sites (Baltimore

and East Bay) was the membership seen as productive by a majority of respondents. This represents a dramatic shift from the perceptions held in year one of implementation where a majority of respondents viewed the membership as productive in nine of the twelve sites. While it is unclear whether productivity of the coalitions had actually decreased at the cost of improving cooperation, based upon the survey, it does appear coalition members believed there was a slight increase in cooperation from year one to year two of implementation. Boston respondents, as they did in the year one survey, rated themselves highest in overall friendliness and productivity whereas Gary respondents, as they had in year one, again rated themselves the lowest in those categories.

Perceptions of Coalition Building

A number of questions within the survey addressed the perceptions of activities and practices associated with coalition building. Others directly inquired about the strength of the respondent's coalition.

As mentioned previously, several site directors believed respondents would not understand the word "coalition" used throughout the survey. However, since the word described the goal of CCP, that is, developing a coalition among private citizens, government agencies, and social service programs, it was retained and explained in the cover letter to the survey participants, as well as within the survey itself. This strategy seems to have been effective since most of the respondents answered the questions specifically asked about their attitudes and feelings toward their coalition.

Perceived Effectiveness of Coalition

Two questions dealt with the effectiveness of the CCP coalition: one in fostering cooperation among organizations; and the other in fostering networking and the exchange of information among coalition members. At least three-fourths of the year-one respondents at each site agreed the coalitions did so either "somewhat effectively" or "very effectively." This percentage increased to 80 percent in year two. Two multi-jurisdictional sites, Metro Denver and East Bay, received the most positive agreement about development of cooperation and networking in year one. In year two, it was Baltimore and again East Bay with 100 percent of respondents reporting that their coalitions were either "somewhat effectively" or "very effectively" developing cooperation and networking.

Looking at just those respondents reporting their coalitions fostered cooperation and networking "very effectively" (as opposed to "somewhat effectively") creates greater variation between the sites (Tables A-16 and A-24). Boston respondents (55 percent) believed their coalition fostered cooperation "very effectively"—more than respondents at any other site for year one. East Bay (56 percent) and Boston (53

percent) participants believed their coalition "very effectively" fostered networking and the exchange of information. No other sites had more than half of the respondents reply so positively. This perhaps is because the leading agencies in each site put an emphasis on the process of coalition building (the Partnership in East Bay and the Boston Police Department's Strategic Planning Process) and thus, the networking, the exchange of information, and the cooperation that goes along with that.

In year two, respondents from East Bay believed that their coalition fostered cooperation and networking "very effectively"—more than any other site (over 70 percent for both). Seattle respondents, however, were the least likely to respond that their coalition was "very effective" in fostering cooperation and networking (14 percent and 11 percent respectfully).

Coalition Membership

Other questions delved into the membership of the coalitions. The survey asked about the recruiting of new members, whether the members were representative of the community, and whether citizen and community involvement was generated.

Year-one respondents from half of the sites believed their coalition "somewhat" or "very effectively" recruited new members. The highest number of responses came from participants in Columbia, Baltimore, , and Hartford. Seattle respondents also believed they recruited well, perhaps even more emphatically since 50 percent of Seattle respondents thought the CCP effort there "very effectively" added new members. The fewest number of individuals who thought their CCP coalition recruited new members well were in Wichita.

More respondents to the Follow-Up Survey believed that their coalition "somewhat" or "very effectively" recruited members. The highest number of responses came again from participants in Baltimore and Columbia, but also included East Bay.

Over half of the year-one respondents in five of the sites rated the coalition as "very effective" in including members who were representative of their community. Over half in only three sites thought that their coalition was "very effective" in generating citizen or community involvement. Columbia, Fort Worth, and Seattle participants believed that their sites did an especially good job of enmeshing themselves with the local community, as reflected by these two questions (Table A-16). As one might expect of multi-jurisdictional sites, East Bay and Metro Denver were least likely to have a membership representative of the community and to generate citizen involvement.

During year two, respondents in five sites increasingly rated their coalition as "very effective" in both the representativeness of its membership and its ability to generate citizen involvement. These included Columbia (the highest from year one) as

well as Baltimore, Boston, Gary, and Hartford. Fort Worth respondents reported an increase in the representativeness of its membership, but a decrease in its ability to generate citizen involvement; while Seattle respondents also reported a decrease in the latter. East Bay respondents reported an even lower rating for year two on both measures as compared to year one (Table A-24).

Rating the Coalitions

An important indicator of the level of coalition building at a site is the extent to which potential players feel involved in the process and the degree to which a feeling of unity exists within the coalition itself. The response to these questions was linked: at sites where participants generally felt involved, they also agreed a feeling of unity existed within the coalition; at sites where individuals did not feel involved, they similarly did not think a feeling of unity pervaded the CCP coalition.

Year-one respondents at eight of the sites felt involved and believed there was a sense of unity in their coalition (Table A-18). Boston led the way with the highest number of respondents feeling this way, followed in rough order by East Bay, Baltimore, Columbia, Hartford, Metro Denver, Salt Lake City, and Fort Worth. The majority of CCP members at the remaining four sites, Gary, Seattle, Wichita, and Metro Atlanta, did not feel involved or that a sense of unity existed in their coalition.

Chart 1: Involvement and Unity Within the Coalitions At Year One

In year two, over 70 percent of the respondents at ten of the twelve sites felt either "strongly" or "somewhat strongly" that they were involved in the coalition and at all twelve of the sites, that there was a sense of unity in their coalition (Table A-25). The respondents that felt the least involved, Seattle, Metro Atlanta, and Fort Worth, also had the three lowest percentages for believing a feeling of unity existed.

CCP participants were also asked about their desire to remain a member of the coalition and whether they cared about what happened in the coalition. The responses to these two questions were overwhelmingly positive in years one and two. Over 70 percent of the respondents in all twelve sites felt that they wanted to remain a member of the coalition. Over 88 percent of the respondents in all the sites "strongly" or "somewhat strongly" believed that they cared about what happened in the coalition. There were only minor increases or decreases from year one to year two (Tables A-18 and A-25).

Finally, respondents were asked to give an overall rating of their site's "coalition-building effort." During year one, the majority of respondents in all of the sites answered positively to this question. In fact, responses were for the most part divided between those who were "somewhat satisfied" and those who were "very" or "extremely" satisfied. Columbia and East Bay respondents seemed to be the most satisfied with their coalition building (70 percent and 67 percent respectively were either "very" or "extremely" satisfied). Seattle and Gary respondents, and to a certain extent, Metro Atlanta and Wichita respondents, were slightly less likely to be satisfied than their counterparts in the other sites.

Respondents were asked in the Follow-Up Survey to again give an overall rating of their site's "coalition-building effort" at the end of the second year of implementation. As in the previous year's overall rating, responses were largely divided between those who were "somewhat satisfied" and those who were "very" or "extremely" satisfied. Again, East Bay respondents seemed to be the most satisfied with their coalition-building efforts. Boston and Baltimore also seemed to be largely satisfied with their coalition-building efforts. Metro Atlanta and Seattle respondents, however, were less likely to be satisfied than other sites. Wichita and Gary respondents also continued to be less satisfied with the coalition-building efforts of their sites.

Chart 2: Overall Rating of Coalition Building Effort

Finally, in the Follow-Up Survey, CCP participants were asked to describe the level of progress achieved in the coordination among program components by the second year of implementation. The majority of the respondents in each site believed that they had made either "moderate" or "a lot of progress" in the coordination among program components. The most positive responses came from Fort Worth (100 percent), Wichita and Columbia (96 percent), and Baltimore (94 percent). Further, over 50 percent of the respondents at half the sites felt that "a lot of progress" had been made in the coordination among program components.

Table 8: Level of Progress Achieved by Year Two- Coordination Among Program Components

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Coordination Among Program Components												
Very little progress	16%	6%	9%	4%	16%	22%	-	13%	20%	8%	15%	4%
Moderate Progress	40%	37%	24%	35%	55%	-	27%	44%	33%	40%	59%	63%
A lot of progress	44%	57%	67%	61%	29%	78%	73%	44%	47%	52%	26%	33%
Number of Responses	(25)	(35)	(46)	(26)	(38)	(9)	(11)	(16)	(30)	(38)	(27)	(27)

On-Site Observations about Coalition Building

Histories of Coalition Building

Progress towards building coalitions was also a concern of evaluators during site visits. The shape and history of coalitions varied by site. For example, in Baltimore coalitions had their origins in the alliance between neighborhood groups and community lawyers provided by the Community Law Center (of which community police officers are now starting to become an integral part). Second, the inter-organizational alliance among Boston's police, prosecutors, and probation officers gave rise to a promising criminal justice and social service agency alliance. Third, the networks of service agencies, governmental department heads, and citizen groups were linked to community mobilizers in Columbia. Finally, Community Action Teams (CATs) in Salt Lake City represented a new approach to urban service delivery. Each of these sites represents a significant expansion of earlier organizational/community collaboration or an innovation specifically linked to CCP. The interesting and hopeful element of interest is that each of these coalitions had a different place of origin, or start-up, in each community.

The origins of the Baltimore coalition were found in the legal and community organization efforts of the Community Law Center (CLC) and the Citizens Planning and Housing Association (CPHA), especially in the leadership of Michael Sarbanes (now head of the Governor's Commission on Crime, where he is developing the ideas funded by CCP on a statewide basis). By developing relationships with existing community organizations, or by its own community organizing activities, the Citizens Planning and Housing Association developed a powerful alliance that gave community residents the tools they needed to arrest the neighborhood deterioration that was the result of an abandoned and neglected housing stock (and the drug dealing, disorder, and crime that attended the deterioration). Through CCP, these organizing and legal strategies were absorbed into Mayor Schmoke's Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice (MCCCJ) and began to include the police department. This model was successfully implemented in one trial neighborhood and is being replicated with CCP funds in other neighborhoods.

In Boston, the origins of its powerful agency coalition were multiple: former District Attorney and Attorney General Scott Harshbarger (a Democrat) initiated the Safe Neighborhood Initiative (a community prosecution program) which was adopted by District Attorney Ralph Martin (a Republican) in a different neighborhood and subsequently chosen by the Boston Police Department as a model for replication in yet another area, Grove Hall in Roxbury. Similarly, a Massachusetts probation officer and a Boston police officer started to work together in the evenings to ensure that probationers were where they were supposed to be—an effort that was recognized and incorporated by the BPD and the Commissioner of Probation and became Operation Nite Lite. This interagency cooperation spun out and now includes federal prosecutors, the DEA, and ATF agents and has spawned the now-widely recognized

work with gangs (in which Harvard researchers are also involved).[13] Perhaps emboldened by the success that resulted from these collaborations, the Boston Police Department used both the CCP funding and proper mandates as an impetus to reach out to the community on a citywide basis and to the social service sector in particularly needy neighborhoods.

In Columbia, the origins of the current coalition among community groups, police, churches, and other governmental agencies appear to have been found in the realization that governmental and political focus solely on downtown Columbia was at the cost of quality neighborhood living. This concern, in turn, gave rise to neighborhood leadership that, at first confronted the political leadership but later, as their concerns were heard and acted on, began to move into a collaborative relationship with city government. Political leadership moved to shift its focus, if not away from the downtown area, at least to include neighborhood concerns. Congruent with this trend, which had its origins in the mid-1980s, police and other governmental leadership emerged that shared the neighborhood and social service values, especially in the city manager's, Planning, Police, and Housing Departments.

Salt Lake City has a long history of structured community involvement in public affairs outside of law enforcement. The original CCP coordinator was an active community organizer who, because of her success in fighting back against gangs and drugs in her own neighborhood, was tapped by city hall to help write and later manage the CCP grant. Salt Lake City's Community Action Teams (CATs) are a significant experiment in reinventing government and service delivery at the neighborhood level. Involved in this coalition are police, community mobilization specialists, youth and family specialists, probation officers, representatives of the mayor's office, city prosecutors, and community residents.

At least two sites, Fort Worth and Seattle, report that their earlier experiences with Weed and Seed were important in their ability to maintain partnerships and build coalitions, although their experiences were different. In Seattle, Weed and Seed provided a model for what not to do; in Fort Worth, it created a model for going citywide.

In Seattle, most city leaders and civilian agency representatives described a highly inclusive CCP planning process. By contrast, when Weed and Seed was implemented, it was reported to have relatively little community involvement. Community groups resented the implications of the very name "weeding" and were dubious that officials would ever get around to funding and "seeding" once the enforcement parts of the project were underway. In fact, some neighborhoods organized in opposition

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[13] The drop from 17 to 0 gang-related murders between 1996 and 1997 is widely cited as one of the policy successes in recent history. For a detailed description of this project see, David M. Kennedy, "Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention" *Valparaiso University Law Review*, Vol. 31, 1997.

to Weed and Seed, a bitter lesson for many local politicians. Thus it was reported that Seattle very consciously used its CCP planning grant to obtain community involvement and input, rather than just write the grant. A panel of community activists was involved in planning the grant, and hearings were held in selected neighborhoods to test-run the proposal.

In Fort Worth, community input, at least into policing matters, was relatively limited prior to Weed and Seed. Chief Thomas Windham began holding community forums shortly after his appointment in 1985. These were popular in the community and gained considerable attention, but they were not structured to involve representative citizen participation in policy-making or problem solving. Under the aegis of Weed and Seed, Community Advisory Councils were formed, but were limited to Weed and Seed areas. With the advent of CCP, these councils were adopted citywide. Currently, each of the city's police districts has its own advisory council. The other source of community input in Fort Worth is its Citizen on Patrol program which involves some 2900 citizens who are active in community and police issues far beyond just patrolling. In fact, these citizens generally appear to be unusually active both broadly in community affairs and more particularly, in dealing with the FWPD.

The East Bay coalition was one of the most dramatic *political* achievements of CCP. Community leaders in at least three East Bay communities—Oakland, Berkeley, and Richmond—turned to a trusted state legislator and to a local foundation to provide leadership to bring them together in the face of violent gang activity that crossed traditional jurisdictional boundaries. This was despite the reality that all attempts to deal with problems in a unified fashion in the past had failed. Yet the crime crisis was such that it drove formerly disparate communities to heretofore-unachievable levels of cooperation and achievement.

In Hartford, a city noted for considerable division among neighborhoods, creating a coalition among neighborhood-based Problem Solving Committees was a considerable achievement.

In Metro Denver, the origins of the coalition were to be found in the highest levels of government: the governor, federal politicians, the mayor of Denver, and others. But, from the very beginning, these political leaders linked their activities to local neighborhood and community organizations. As such, the move to stem the crisis of violence gained legitimacy both from political and neighborhood sources.

Metro Omaha focused less on coalition building than it did on neighborhood and organizational capacity building and on developing a framework for planning and implementation. This is not to say that coalitions were not formed there, however. Indeed, a powerful coalition developed among staff of the University of Nebraska at Omaha, the Omaha housing authority, and the police department that resulted in the creation of a model for community policing in public housing areas.

The origins of Phoenix's coalition were to be found in the city's attempt to provide "seamless services" to achieve high degrees of consumer satisfaction—an emphasis that grew out of the city manager's office. Committed to neighborhood government, the city manager has been an advocate of restructuring government to serve neighborhood needs. In a sense, these ideas were tested in a "model neighborhood" (Coronado). In this experiment, a coalition was formed among police, community groups, juvenile probation, recreation and others to provide services both to juveniles and to the community.

Wilmington's CCP effort had its origins in the mayor's office and the planning department and concentrated on creating Neighborhood Planning Councils, the purpose of which was to provide an umbrella organization for each neighborhood that would unite community groups and provide access to community services. As such, in some neighborhoods, these NPCs represented coalitions in themselves. While these neighborhood councils represent an important organizational and political development within Wilmington, and do bring neighborhood groups together, the extent to which they will be able to form coalitions with governmental agencies remains unclear.

Origins of Coalition Building

Another point to be made, and this seems to be good news indeed, is that coalition building can start in a variety of places: a legal/community action agency, a mayor's office, a city manager's office, an organized community, a police department, or elsewhere. This means that while there are no guarantees, the impetus to form alliances, coalitions, or collaborations is less important than that some group or agency starts the process and is prepared to persevere through the initial difficulties. The question remains, however, whether or not these coalitions could be formed without the resources provided by CCP. In several sites, it is fairly clear that the process has been enhanced, expanded, or expedited because of CCP funding. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that many, if not most, of these coalitions will survive the end of funding.

Strengthening of Collaborations

There is considerable evidence from field observations that the alliances, coalitions, and collaborations are growing. In Fort Worth, CCP helped to bridge the gap between the city and county governments, especially as it pertained to the Drug Court. Before CCP, there was little cooperation between city and county government agencies around crime control issues. In Salt Lake City and in Columbia, again while not technically involved in CCP, churches have moved into active collaboration in the former's CATs and in the latter's housing and youth programs. In Boston, collaborations and programs have grown by accretion—slowly, agency after agency gets on board (a formerly distant relationship gets closer and closer) as suc-

cesses are achieved. The example here is the Boys & Girls Club, which formerly kept a polite distance from the BPD and now touts their relationship. More examples could be given from both within the above sites and in other sites as well. To the extent that this was true, CCP was really a program without organizational boundaries: that is, the focus on coalition building and involvement really did become part of the values of those leading and participating in the overall program. This was more than just grant-related expediency. In community after community one could sense what program leaders in Boston, for example, described as "a sense of grief, despair, and failure" over what was happening in neighborhoods during the late 1980s and early 1990s. This grief, in turn, led to a re-examination of organizational and agency functioning.

Conclusion: CCP's Impact on Coalition Building

Refocusing on trends between the sites themselves, a picture of coalition building emerges. Most sites had mixed responses when queried about their level of involvement in the CCP, in both the planning and beginning implementation stages, as well as in the perceived frequency of meetings and conflict. However, a few sites stand out with consistently positive or negative responses in both years' surveys.

East Bay, Columbia, and Boston participants reported generally balanced participation in both the planning stage and two years of implementation. Respondents in these three sites also indicated relatively strong awareness of CCP meetings—an important indicator of the effectiveness of communication networks developed in the CCP sites. Columbia participants replied that large meetings were held in their city; and East Bay and Boston CCP members were aware of meetings both large and small. The three cities also all reported positively to questions regarding the presence of conflict in their networks. Columbia respondents, on the one hand, reported the least amount of conflict of all the CCP sites. Members of the Boston and East Bay CCPs, while reporting more conflict, were more likely to believe the conflict was constructive and improved decision-making than other CCP sites. With regard to perceptions of the CCP membership, Boston members believed their fellow participants in the CCP to be cooperative, friendly, and productive more than any other site. Only in East Bay did over 60 percent of survey respondents believe their networks' membership consisted of powerful individuals. In contrast, Gary and Metro Atlanta did not receive promising reports from their CCP members regarding involvement in the planning and implementation processes.

Switching to indicators of coalition building at the various sites, again most sites' respondents answered with mixed reviews. Importantly, participants who rated their site's indicators of involvement as positive were also very likely to rate their indicators of coalition building as positive. Conversely, negative ratings of involvement seemed to coincide with negative ratings of coalition building.

In both years, survey respondents from Metro Atlanta, Seattle, and Wichita reported less frequently than other sites that a feeling of unity existed in their network. Metro Atlanta CCP members were also the least likely to report satisfaction with coalition-building efforts in both years.

Again in contrast, more Boston, Columbia, and East Bay respondents as well as those from Baltimore and Metro Denver reported a feeling of unity within their site for both years one and two. During year one, Boston respondents also believed their CCP coalition fostered cooperation "very effectively." In year two, respondents from East Bay, Columbia, Baltimore, and Hartford believed similarly. Columbia CCP participants consistently rated their coalition as "very effective" in representing the community and generating citizen involvement. Interestingly, while the few Gary respondents had rated their site low on most of these indicators during the first year, they rated them much higher in the second year. However changes over time must be interpreted with extreme caution because of the differences in the samples.

The pattern of indicators of involvement and coalition building exposed by the two rounds of survey responses, at least on the positive and negative extremes, is fairly clear. Gary and, particularly, Metro Atlanta do not appear to have involved groups and stakeholders in the CCP effectively nor appear to have created a working coalition. Of the sites in the middle ground, Fort Worth, Seattle, and Wichita also appear to have been less successful in the creation of a CCP coalition. Salt Lake City and Metro Denver appeared slightly more successful. The survey data also indicate that the CCP in Baltimore and Hartford involved groups fairly effectively and developed a coalition slightly better than other sites. But the data from both surveys strongly suggest that East Bay, Boston, and Columbia did an excellent job in fostering involvement, communication, and satisfaction in and with their network. Indeed, responses to surveys in those three sites indicate that a comprehensive community coalition emerged.

Basically, strong agreement exists between the data gathered during fieldwork and the Coalition Survey. Indicators that strong coalitions were developed in Boston, East Bay, and Columbia were found in both the cases and the survey. The development of strong coalitions in Columbia, as reflected in the survey data, was certainly confirmed by impressions gained from field visits. Similarly, the development of coalitions reflected in the Boston and East Bay survey data was also found in site visits. The relatively low ratings given Seattle on a sense of unity might be linked to the earlier problems Seattle had with Weed and Seed. Another explanation could be that its program was not as centrally focused on coalition building as other sites, focusing as it did on internal administrative processes, especially training. Fort Worth survey responses generally placed it into a middle category in terms of coalition building. Fort Worth, like Seattle, did not focus as heavily as other sites on coalition building so their overall ratings are not terribly surprising. Although the Baltimore year one survey data do not reflect the overall strength of coalition building that Boston and Columbia achieved, they nonetheless did reveal

considerable coalition development as can be seen by their year two data and by fieldwork. Salt Lake City's coalition, albeit contentious, appeared stronger during site visits than what was revealed in both surveys. Generally, however, the overall trends of the survey are congruent with the on-site observations.

Network Analysis

Theory and Application

Network analysis has emerged as a popular analytic strategy for understanding social relations, and is an appropriate tool for shedding light on CCP partnerships. Network analysis has a long history of use in the fields of anthropology, sociology, and psychology (see Scott, 1991), and has now seen widespread use in other fields such as political science and education. The network approach assumes that: 1) individuals are not isolated but rather function as part of a social system whereby their behavior is influenced by others; and, 2) these social systems are structured and organized, and therefore, can be analyzed as predictable patterns of interaction. Thus, network analysis allows us to examine the structural properties of social relations by examining the interactions between individual actors in a social network. Knoke & Kuklinski, (1982, p. 10) describe the two essential qualities of network analysis as "its capacity to illuminate entire social structures and to comprehend particular elements within the structure."

Recent advances in the theory and techniques of network analysis have been substantial (see Wasserman & Galaskiewicz, 1993; 1994 for reviews). Despite these advances, the utilization of these techniques and models for the study of community action and public elites has been limited (see Knoke, 1993).

The Comprehensive Communities Program was designed primarily as a vehicle to facilitate the development of citywide networks and partnerships—collective entities that were hypothesized to improve the odds of preventing urban violence and disorder *above and beyond* what could be expected from individuals and agencies working independently. In the context of the present study, network analysis is an important strategy for identifying patterns of interaction among those who play key roles in each CCP coalition. The Wave One network data from the CCP Coalition Survey provide an early empirical look at the relationships and social networks that were taking shape in eight CCP cities. The Wave Two follow-up data afford BOTEC researchers the opportunity to determine whether the level and nature of interaction between individuals and between organizations within the coalition changed after CCP implementation.

Boundary Specification

Specifying the boundaries of the network in advance of data collection is an important part of network analysis. Unlike typical random sampling approaches, limits on the population or the sample must be carefully imposed. As mentioned previously, BOTEC adopted a *realist* approach to boundary specification by allowing

each CCP site to define its own network.[14]   Sampling was not necessary in this study because the network populations were relatively small. Hence, all identified members of each network (with the exception of Boston) were included in the data collection effort.

Data Collection Methods and Procedures

The network data were collected as part of our CCP Coalition Survey (Wave One) and the Follow-Up Survey (Wave Two). (The methodology and response rates associated with the Coalition and Follow-Up Surveys were described earlier in this report.) The Wave One network analysis was limited to eight intensive sites where extensive field data were available to help interpret the network results.[15]   These sites are Baltimore, Columbia, East Bay, Fort Worth, Hartford, Metro Denver, Salt Lake, and Seattle. The average response rate per site was 68 percent. The network analysis was repeated in four of the CCP sites—Baltimore, Columbia, Salt Lake City, and Seattle—to explore changes in communication and affiliation patterns over time. The time lag in data collection between Waves 1 and 2 was approximately twelve months. An attempt was made to include as many of the Wave One organizations and individuals as possible, but in the final analysis, some differences in the samples were inevitable due to attrition and other factors. The percentage of Wave One respondents who also responded to Wave Two varied from lows in Salt Lake (63 percent) and Baltimore (65 percent) to 77 percent in Seattle and a high of 85 percent in Columbia.

To measure CCP-related networks, respondents were given a list of individuals whom the sites' CCP coordinators had identified as being affiliated with the CCP coalition in their respective cities, and then asked how often they have contact with each individual on the list. Possible response options were "daily, weekly, monthly, every few months, never."

To enhance the network analysis, individual cases were dropped when they did not have sufficient contact with other members of the network. Including persons with rare or occasional contacts in the network will distort the results by causing more dense (and therefore less interpretable) clustering of the remaining actors. Hence, after examining the frequency distributions, a decision was made to include only respondents who have had contact with at least 10 percent of the total network "at

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[14] A description of how this approach was carried out in this study can be found in the CCP Coalition Survey sub-section under Methodology.

[15] Network data were not analyzed in Boston because of the low response rate, relative to the network boundaries. CCP Coalition Surveys were not given to participants in the three sites intensively studied during the second phase of this research because comparable time frames between Waves 1 and 2 would have been impossible.

least every few months." The results of applying this inclusion criterion are described separately for each site.

Analysis Strategy

Distances among the targets were measured using a structural equivalence approach (cf. Lorrain & White, 1971), which overcomes some of the shortcomings of the conventional graph theory. Following the lead of Heinz and Manikas (1992), distances among the targets were measured by determining the overlap of acquaintances for any two actors—i.e. "the degree to which the persons who are in contact with each of them are the same people (p. 840)." The main benefit of this structural equivalence approach is that it circumvents the problem of missing data and allows us to compare patterns of contact for individuals who are *not* interviewed. This is only possible because our sample includes a sufficient number of respondents who know both individual targets. The alternative approach (i.e. the graphic theoretic approach, which measures similarity by counting the number of links in the communication network to get from person A to X) would require the collection of data from *all* persons in the chain.

Multidimensional scaling (MDS) was used to analyze our network data. As Scott (1991, p. 151) observes, "The mathematical approach termed 'multidimensional scaling' embodies all the advantages of the conventional sociogram and its extensions (such as circle diagrams), but results in something much closer to a 'map' of the space in which the network is embedded. This is a very important advance." For the present analysis, researchers used the non-metric multidimensional scaling technique called "smallest space analysis," which uses a symmetrical adjacency matrix of similarities and dissimilarities among the targets. (See Kruskal & Wish, 1978; Scott, 1991 for a discussion of advantages over metric MDS). The data have been recoded to binary form, so that zero indicates person X has had no prior contact with person Y and one indicates that X and Y have had some contact, i.e. at least "every few months." The non-metric MDS program is able to produce a matrix of Euclidean distances (based on rank orders) which is used to create a metric scatter plot. These plots are displayed as the two-dimensional charts below.

The output of MDS is a spatial display of points, where each point represents a target person in the network. The configuration of points should inform us about the pattern of affiliations and contacts in the network. The smaller the distance between two points, the greater the similarity between these two individuals with respect to their social contacts. The location of person X in multidimensional space is determined both by X's own social connections and by the connections of those who have chosen X as an affiliate. The MDS analyses were performed using SPSS Windows 6.1.

Technically, the data could be analyzed at either the individual or organizational level and each approach has some advantages. The results have been analyzed at the individual level, primarily because of some highly visible individuals who played central roles in the conceptualization and implementation of CCP programs. Still, individuals can be connected to organizations, and can be viewed as representatives of the organizations with which they are affiliated.

To determine the appropriate number of dimensions for the data, a series of analyses were performed and a *stress* statistic was calculated for each solution. In MDS, stress is the most widely used goodness-of-fit measure for dimensionality, with smaller values indicating that the solution is a better fit to the data (Kruskal & Wish, 1978).[16] By plotting the stress values for solutions with up to four dimensions, it became apparent that the *elbow* point (i.e. where any additional increase in the number of dimensions fails to yield sizable reductions in stress) occurs at two dimensions. This pattern was evident at all five sites, and hence, a two-dimensional solution was used across the board. Beyond relative stress levels there is the issue of absolute stress values. Stress values ranged from 7 to 17 percent, with an average of 13 percent. Most of the values are considered satisfactory, although figures above 20 percent suggest a weak fit (see Kruskal, 1964; Scott, 1991).

The data were analyzed, presented, and interpreted separately for each CCP site. Statistics reported include stress values (defined earlier) calculated from Kruskal's Stress Formula one and the squared correlation (R^2). The R^2 value indicates the proportion of variance of the disparity matrix data that is accounted for by their corresponding distances.

After the scientific process of calculating the solution and mapping a multidimensional configuration, the final step is interpretation. This involves assigning meaning to the dimensions and providing some explanation for arrangement of points in space. In other words, what do the clusters of points mean and how should they be interpreted? As Scott notes (1991, p. 166), "...this process of interpretation is a creative and imaginative act on the part of the researcher. It is not something that can be produced by a computer alone."

Limitations and Cautions

We should be cautious not to over-interpret or draw causal inferences about the observed networks for several reasons. First, Wave One analyses and graphic presentations provide a one-time snapshot of interactions between individuals early in the CCP project. Consequently, these data will not allow us to tease out any pre-

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[16]Technically, stress is defined as "the square root of a normalized 'residual sum of squares.'" Dimensionality is defined as "the number of coordinate axes, that is, the number of coordinate values used to locate a point in the space." (Kruskal & Wish, 1978, p. 48-49).

existing relationships and networks that may be operating. Thus, whether these networks were created during CCP planning or reflect pre-existing relationships is unknown. (Wave Two data, when compared to Wave One, provide a longitudinal look at these networks and how they change during the course of the CCP funding. Combined with careful fieldwork, this should give us a stronger assessment of CCP's contribution.) Second, these analyses are limited to interactions between individuals, which may or may not reflect the nature and extent of partnerships between agencies. Finally, the present analysis is limited by the nature of the original sample. Who ends up in the sample can have a large influence on the outcome of network analysis. While researchers are satisfied that this problem has been minimized by allowing sites to self-define a comprehensive list of CCP participants, nevertheless, some individuals and groups may have been overlooked at each site. Generally speaking, one might characterize this network analysis as a study of "elites"—in this case, community, city and agency leaders. Networks that may exist among street-level employees and community volunteers are under-represented (although not completely absent) from this analysis.

Despite these limitations, network analysis provides an important empirical tool for examining the nature and extent of community-based partnerships and coalitions. While it is easy to talk about "interagency cooperation" in grant proposals or in personal interviews, it is not so easy to create the illusion of a network (for the benefit of researchers and others) when members of that network are asked, individually, about their level of interaction with one another. The results here suggest that the number and density of networks varies by site and that resultant patterns of contact are generally consistent with our field observations.

The network analysis results are presented first for the sites which only had Wave One data, followed by those four sites with Waves 1 and 2 data. Some general conclusions about the nature of relationships in the CCP sites are then presented.

East Bay Network Analysis

Twenty-nine individuals who were part of the Partnership during its formation were included in the East Bay network sample. The frequency of interaction was very high for all individuals in the network. Respondents reported having contact with 31 percent to 62 percent of the total network (with a median of 52 percent). Therefore, all 29 respondents met the minimum criterion for inclusion in the network analysis. The six most frequently contacted persons (all having had contact with 62 percent of the total network) included: the State Assembly person responsible for bringing together the original cities in the Partnership; a member of the Corridor Council's Executive Committee and co-chair of the Education sub-committee; the acting executive director of the Partnership during the initial stages of CCP; chief of the Union City Police Department and member of the Law Enforcement Committee; a member of Congressperson George Miller's office who was

highly influential in juvenile justice matters for the Partnership; and an individual who was instrumental in structuring the CCP application to allow for a regional, rather than local, focus. Others in the top ten included: an Assembly Person (59 percent); a City of Freemont staff person (59 percent); Chief of the Oakland Police Department (59 percent); and Superintendent of Alameda County (59 percent).

A two-dimensional smallest-space analysis was used to depict the observed relationships. Kruskal's stress statistic is satisfactory at .18 and the R^2 value is .89. Perhaps due to the high involvement of so many of the participants (the average person having contact with more than half the membership), the figure that was generated is somewhat difficult to interpret. In the network configuration shown on the graph, there appears to be only one cluster of participants. This grouping is located to the left of the Y-axis, overlapping both the upper left and lower left quadrants. Individuals who appear to have been most influential in either creating the Partnership or serving on its committees during the formative months are located within this vicinity. Indeed, all of the individuals mentioned above are to the left of the Y-axis, and all but three are located within the cluster. Participants who appear to be outliers on the chart (particularly those located to the far right in the upper right and lower right quadrants) were generally less influential in the administration of the Partnership and/or served an indirect role on CCP-related activities. It should be noted that the clustering shown in the figure is not unusual given that the individuals chosen as participants for the survey were mostly Corridor Council members. Since most of these individuals had direct involvement in the affairs of the developing Partnership, they would have had considerable contact with each other. It should therefore come as no surprise that these individuals group together in a network analysis of this nature.

PUT IN EAST BAY NETWORK CHART – WAVE TWO HERE

Fort Worth Network Analysis

Our fieldwork in Fort Worth indicates that CCP did not lead to an extensive network of partnerships between agencies for the purpose of improving and coordinating service delivery. Rather, the Fort Worth Police Department served as the financial manager of the CCP funds. Specifically, the project director (also the police department's planner) established and maintained contractual relationships with a number of Tarrant County agencies/organizations that promised to provide services under the CCP grant, including the Citizens Crime Commission, Boys & Girls Clubs, drug court, juvenile services, and the corrections department. The mere creation of these financial arrangements does, however, indicate unprecedented cooperation between the City of Fort Worth and Tarrant County.

Although the Fort Worth model did not require extensive interagency cooperation at the level of service delivery, nevertheless, this network analysis provides an inside look at how these groups elected to interact with one another during the first year of CCP implementation.

Only 23 persons in Fort Worth were identified in the original network survey, and all were included in the network analysis. Individuals in the network reported having contact with at least 17 percent and as many as 65 percent of the total network sample (median equals 35 percent of the network). Respondents reported having the most contact with the chief of police (65 percent of the network) and the CCP project director (65 percent), who was also located in the police department. Rounding out the top five were the director of the crime commission, her assistant, and the deputy city manager (each with 52 percent). Others with frequent network interaction include the three police commanders responsible for the CCP neighborhood policing districts (48 percent to 52 percent).

A two-dimensional smallest-space analysis provided the best depiction of the observed relationships. Kruskal's stress statistic is .18, and the R^2 value is .82. The horizontal dimension (x axis) seems to distinguish between police operations on the left side (negative values) and non-police activities on the right (positive values). The vertical dimension (y axis) appears to capture community-based field operations at the top (positive values) and agency-based administration at the bottom (negative values).

Four loose clusters are identified in the chart, but each represents a relatively low-density group. In the lower left quadrant is the "Community Mobilization and Publicity" cluster. This group includes the police chief and the director of CCP who worked with the Tarrant County Crime Commission to publicize CCP and various community policing initiatives. The Crime Commission is responsible for the community mobilization component of CCP, which includes publishing a citywide newsletter, *Safe City*. This newsletter contains police and community news generated by each of Fort Worth's twelve neighborhood policing districts, as well as a regular letter from the police chief. Hence, there is a need for personnel from the

police department and Fort Worth's Crime Commission to communicate on a regular basis to produce the newsletter.

In the upper left quadrant is another small cluster labeled "Neighborhood Policing Operations." This group is defined largely by the presence of three Commanders (Lieutenants) who manage the three Neighborhood Policing Districts created through CCP. It also includes the director of the Boys & Girls Clubs, who runs several drop-in centers (under the "Comin' Up" program) to help prevent gang violence. The frequency of contact between the director of Boys & Girls Clubs and the police commanders may reflect negotiations over patrols and security for the evening programs and/or a desire to reach common ground about the handling of police-gang contacts.

The two clusters on the upper and lower left side (described above) are closely linked by their relationships with the deputy city manager (to whom the chief reports) and the executive deputy police chief. These two individuals are positioned directly between these two clusters and are deeply involved with both the chief of police and the Commanders. Indeed, the entire left side of the chart could be viewed, alternatively, as one large cluster concerned with law enforcement and community policing.

In the upper right quadrant, a small cluster is defined as "Community-Based Action and Support." This group includes three community leaders who served as chairs of their local Community Action Committees (CAC). CACs were created by the police department to enhance citizen participation in neighborhood anti-crime activities and keep the police informed about citizens' concerns. But near these CAC chairs are two members of the Tarrant County Juvenile Services Department, who work for the Tarrant County Advocate Program (TCAP). This program seeks to divert "charged-but-not-yet-convicted" youth from jail to the community, working with families and agencies to provide "community anchors" that will help prevent recidivism. In their attempt to build linkages between young offenders and the community, TCAP staff interacts with CAC leaders. Both are experts on community resources.

In the lower right quadrant are individuals who work primarily on diverting offenders from traditional court sentencing to treatment alternatives (hence, the label "Diversion"), although this is the least coherent cluster. Two of these individuals work for the drug court (DIRECT) within the Tarrant County Corrections Department, seeking to divert drug offenders to an 18-month treatment program. (The director of the program is nearby to the southwest.) Another is the director of the agency that runs the MENS Batterer program, which has an arrangement with the courts to divert abusive partners to a 24-week treatment intervention.

In sum, the findings suggests that the relationship between the City of Fort Worth and Tarrant County involves more than mere contractual and financial arrange-

ments managed by the CCP project director. There is some evidence of networking between the Crime Commission and police administrators in Fort Worth to enhance citizen and police awareness of neighborhood policing activities. Also, district commanders appear to work closely with each other and with the Boys & Girls Club to address operational issues at the community level. And the deputy city manager is communicating with all neighborhood policing players who participated in this study. (The city manager is outside any cluster, at the bottom of the network, but this is expected at the program level.) There is some limited evidence of communication and interaction among the service/treatment components of CCP and between them and the Community Advisory Committees. The CAC Chairs, however, are not close in multi-dimensional space to either the police department (who created these positions) or the Crime Commission (whose job it is to facilitate CAC meetings). This may indicate that the CACs were not being utilized fully during the first year or that they function in ways not described to us during our site visits.

PUT FORT WORTH WAVE ONE CHART HERE

Hartford Network Analysis

Sixty-nine individuals were included in the Hartford network sample. The frequency of interaction between individuals in the network varied considerably. Respondents reported having contact with anywhere from 10 percent to 43 percent of the total network resulting in a median of 22 percent. All 69 respondents met the minimum criterion for inclusion in the network analysis—i.e., having contact with at least 10 percent of the total network "at least every few months."

The top five most frequently contacted persons were: the two directors of UCAN (43 percent and 38 percent), the organization funded to provide technical assistance to the problem-solving committees; the chief of staff/deputy city manager, who was the person in the city manager's office most involved in overseeing CCP (38 percent); the police chief (36 percent); and the mayor (35 percent). The others in the top ten were two deputy chiefs (35 percent and 32 percent); the former director of public works (35 percent); the CCP director (33 percent); and the assistant chief of police (33 percent).

A two-dimensional, smallest-space analysis was used to depict the observed relationships in Hartford. Kruskal's stress statistic is .21 and the R^2 value is .78. In this two-dimensional space, the horizontal (x) axis seems to be defined by neighborhood and municipal entities on the bottom and state, federal, and private entities on the top. The problem-solving committees are generally below the x axis; only a few are above. State entities, such as agencies and the state attorney's office are in the upper-left quadrant, and federal agencies and public entities such as Hartford Hospital are on the right (positive values). The vertical axis reflects the problem-solving committees and federal/private entities on the positive side and the municipal and state entities on the negative side.

The network configuration shown in the figure contains three clusters. The largest cluster includes the Problem-Solving Committees, most of which lies in the lower right quadrant. The municipal agency cluster to the left of the y axis spans both sides of the x axis. The cluster at the top center of the graph contains mostly state entities, but also the Greater Hartford Chamber of Commerce and the U.S. Attorney's Office. With the exception of one location at 0.5 of the y axis, individuals associated with the Hartford Police Department are found in the municipal cluster on the left of the y axis.

It is interesting to note the cluster of problem-solving committees. One of the goals of the community mobilization effort was to end the isolation of the various Hartford neighborhoods from each other and set up opportunities for them to interact. The appearance of this cluster would be evidence that this interaction is occurring.

PUT HARTFORD WAVE ONE CHART HERE

Metro Denver Network Analysis

At the core of the Metro Denver CCP was the creation of the Colorado Consortium for Community Policing (the Consortium), comprised originally of six counties, and now a statewide effort to advance community policing training. While the nature of this broad multi-jurisdictional initiative is difficult to capture in a network analysis, nevertheless, the evaluation team has attempted to define the levels of contact using the available network data.

Sixty persons were evaluated in the original network matrix. Substantial variation was observed in the level of interaction among members of the network, ranging from contact with 3 percent to 47 percent of the total network (with a median of 23 percent). Five respondents did not meet the minimum criterion for inclusion in the network analysis, i.e., having contact with at least 10 percent of the total network "at least every few months." Thus, a final sample of 55 cases was used in the network analysis.

Respondents in the sample reported having the most contact with those most involved in the planning and monitoring the implementation of CCP. These include administrators from the Colorado Division of Criminal Justice and the Colorado Department of Public Safety as well as the U.S. Attorney's Office. The level of activity around the Sheriff of Arapahoe County was not surprising given his leadership role in the development and expansion of the Consortium statewide. Finally, the director of both CCP and PACT had, as one might expect, frequent interactions with other members of the network.

A two-dimensional smallest-space analysis was used to depict the observed relationships. Kruskal's stress statistic is marginally satisfactory (stress value = .21), and the R^2 value is .78.

Four clusters and two dimensions emerged from the Metro Denver network analysis. The vertical (Y) axis seems to be defined primarily by the concentration on police activities at one end (positive values) and community activities at the other (negative values). The horizontal axis (X) is less clear, although many of the key actors in the CCP initiative (i.e. those who were identified for the CCP evaluators as key site contacts) are on the right side (positive values).

Our fieldwork provides some guidance for interpreting the four emergent clusters. In the upper right quadrant is the community policing cluster, where members of the network apparently interact regarding Consortium training issues and the Line Officer Grant Program. This cluster includes the director of the Policing Consortium as well as those responsible for coordinating the Line Officer Grant Program. Although less clear, the upper left quadrant represents another community policing cluster, with the Boulder chief of police serving as the link between the two policing clusters. The Boulder Chief played a key role in the development of the Consortium and the Line Officer Grant Program.

In the lower right quadrant is the community mobilization cluster. This group includes the director of the Neighborhood Resource Center, the NRC's program director, the mapping project director and their respective staffs.

The lower left quadrant cluster includes the Undersheriff of Arapahoe County who was involved in the CCP process from the start. The four clusters are linked, to some extent, by interaction between key members. Despite these connections, the total network is characterized by a "hollow core" (doughnut-shaped) pattern that is familiar to many CCP partnerships. This is especially true for the larger networks.

The emergent network pattern in the Metro Denver CCP is partially explained by geographic proximity. In large multi-jurisdictional networks that extend over hundreds of miles, people are likely to interact most frequently with those who are nearby. Social science research indicates that residential proximity is one of the strongest predictors of friendship patterns. The same phenomenon may occur in business relationships, although moderated by the recent effects of advanced technology on ease of travel, communication, and information sharing.

PUT METRO DENVER WAVE ONE CHART HERE

Baltimore Network Analysis

Baltimore's CCP initiative involves a wide range of not-for-profit neighborhood organizations, social service agencies, and city departments working together to improve conditions in specific target neighborhoods. This network analysis attempts to capture some of the dynamics that define these relationships.

Baltimore: Wave One

A total of 50 persons were evaluated in the original network matrix, but four were dropped because of insufficient network data. The level of interaction within the network varied considerably from one individual to the next. Persons in the network had contact with anywhere from 4 percent to 52 percent of the total network, with a median of 26 percent. Only two respondents did not meet the minimum criterion for inclusion in the network analysis (i.e., having contact with at least 10 percent of the total network "at least every few months.") Thus, a final sample of 44 cases was used in the network analysis.

As might be expected, people reported the most contact with the key community leaders and managers of the CCP initiative in Baltimore. Two of the five most frequently contacted persons were the director (52 percent) and assistant director (46 percent) of the mayor's Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice—both individuals who played central roles in writing the CCP proposal and overseeing CCP program activities citywide. Also among the top five: representatives from the Community Law Center (48 percent)— another pivotal group that provides legal services to community organizations; Save a Neighborhood, Inc. (44 percent) — a receivership created for successful actions against vacant houses; and the Citizens Planning and Housing Association (42 percent) — the prime mover behind the CCP community organizing effort.

A two-dimensional smallest-space analysis was used to depict the observed relationships. Kruskal's stress statistic (used to measure the goodness of "fit" of the solution) was satisfactory. The stress value is .25 and the R^2 value is .65.

Four clusters emerged from the Baltimore network analysis. Moving clockwise from the left, the clusters have been designated "Leaders," "Core Community Leaders," "Rim Participants," and "Core Community Organizers." As the names suggest, the horizontal axis clearly measures proximity to leadership, with the CCP director at the extreme left and, with rare exceptions, progressively less engaged participants as one moves to the right. The vertical axis appears to provide a slightly less precise measure of proximity to neighborhood residents. Persons who are located higher on the diagram either are neighborhood residents or spend more of their time communicating with residents than do persons who appear lower in the diagram.

The "Leaders" cluster contains the "originators" who began developing the comprehensive strategy before the advent of CCP, as staff of the Neighborhood Law Center (NLC) or the Citizens Planning and Housing Association (CPHA). Other organizations represented include the mayor's Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice (CCCJ—the CCP grantee), Save A Neighborhood (which works very closely with CLC), the Baltimore Police Department, and other organizations to which originators later moved while remaining engaged with CCP initiatives.

Two clusters of "core" participants were identified ("leaders" and "organizers") and they include individuals associated with the core and apprentice neighborhoods in which CCP was most active: Boyd Booth, Franklin Square, Carrollton Ridge, Harlem Park, and New Southwest. Members of the "Core Community Leaders" cluster include the resident leaders of neighborhood-based associations and organizations, and the assistant state's attorney who prosecutes housing code violations. Members of the "Core Community Organizers" cluster include the community organizers in those neighborhoods who are employed by CPHA or Community Building in Partnership. This cluster also includes an Alternative Sentencing staff member responsible for enforcing community service requirements. This member rarely communicates with neighborhood association members but communicates daily with sentenced members of the community service crews assigned to those neighborhoods.

"Rim Participants" cluster includes two categories of members. First are leaders and staff of organizations that serve as resources for the CCP neighborhoods, providing technical assistance and services in such fields as dispute resolution training, law-related education, youth programs, and substance abuse treatment and prevention. The second are residents and community-based organizations associated with two neighborhoods that participated less actively in CCP at the time of the survey; Middle East, which later "graduated" to Baltimore's Empowerment Zone and Fayette Street Outreach, an apprentice community that became a core neighborhood some months after the first survey.

While the four clusters are linked by communication and interaction between their members and the members of adjacent groups, a look at the bigger picture (i.e. the total set of CCP participants) suggests that Baltimore has a doughnut-shaped network with a hollow core. This is a common pattern among CCP networks in other cities.

PUT BALTIMORE WAVE ONE CHART HERE

Baltimore: Wave Two

At Wave Two, data were collected from 56 persons in the Baltimore network. The level of interpersonal contact varies dramatically from 2 percent to 66 percent of the total sample. The median level of contact decreased slightly over time (from 26 percent at Wave One to 23 percent at Wave Two). Seven (7) respondents were excluded from the Wave-2 analysis because they did not meet the minimum criterion for inclusion, thus yielding a final sample of 49 cases.

The pattern of contacts with specific individuals at Wave Two is quite similar to the pattern described at Wave One. Again, the most frequently contacted persons are the director (66 percent) and assistant director (55 percent) of the mayor's Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice. Also among the "top five" are two community organizers from the Citizens Planning and Housing Association. Hence, there is some consistency of leadership and flow of communication over time in the Baltimore CCP network.

A two-dimensional smallest-space analysis was used to describe the observed relationships. Kruskal's stress statistic is .23 and the R^2 value is .71. As shown in Figure X, two large clusters are apparent at Wave Two that replicate the original Wave One network, i.e. the group designated "Leaders" and the "Rim Participants." The other clusters have dissipated. The doughnut-shaped pattern that characterized the Wave One network is also less visible, although the overall pattern continues to show a hallow core at the communication center.

PUT IN BALTIMORE WAVE TWO CHART

Columbia Network Analysis

Columbia: Wave One

The original network sample in Columbia contained 39 target individuals. The level of contact between these individuals was relatively high compared to other sites[17]. Individual respondents reported having contact with anywhere from 28 percent to 64 percent of the total network (with a median of 46 percent). Thus, all 39 targets met the minimum criterion for inclusion in the network analysis, i.e., having contact with at least 10 percent of the total network "at least every few months." Two of the five most frequently contacted persons were from the planning division of the city's community services department—the planning director (64 percent), and the grants coordinator (59 percent). Of the other three, two were from the Boys & Girls Clubs (64 percent) and the Urban League (59 percent) and the third was the chief of police (59 percent).

A two-dimensional smallest-space analysis was used as the best way to depict the observed relationships. Kruskal's stress statistic was very satisfactory. The stress value is .20 and the R^2 value is .81. The two dimensions are not easily interpretable, perhaps because the data tended to cluster around one major network. The horizontal axis seems to be partially definable by municipally-driven, neighborhood-focused programs on the right side (e.g. youth-oriented prevention and community policing activities organized primarily by city departments and other agencies), in contrast to judicially-driven diversion and juvenile justice interventions on the left side. The vertical axis may reflect a distinction between politicians/senior executives on the top and operational managers below the horizontal axis.

Less ambiguous is the interpretation of key clusters in the network. The analysis in Columbia yielded one large high-density cluster and two small, low-density clusters. The major cluster, labeled "Key Agency Partners," covers both the upper right and lower right quadrants, spreading across the horizontal (x) axis. This group of individuals illustrates a true multi-agency partnership at the management level, as the key actors in the primary agencies report having regular contact and communication with one another for both planning and implementation functions. The City of Columbia's Police Department Planning Division is at the hub of the planning and implementation process. City agencies represented in this primary cluster include the police, the community development and planning divisions of the community services department, parks and recreation, the city manager's office, and the mayor's office. The police chief, mayor, city manager, and assistant city manager are all involved in the CCP network, as well as the directors of community devel-

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[17]Sites with smaller networks (or at least fewer survey respondents) generally have network members who interact more frequently. Thus, as might be expected, these differences between sites in the amount of contact are partially attributable to the size of the network.

opment, police planning, and community policing. Equally noteworthy is the involvement of non-municipal agencies, including the school district, Boys & Girls Clubs, the Urban League, the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Council, the housing authority, and the Council of Neighborhoods. The latter is a mature and influential organization that interacts with top city officials on a regular basis. Also, the Columbia Housing Authority is centrally located in the primary cluster and plays a key role in this initiative. The community mobilizers from the police department, who are the centerpiece of CCP in Columbia, are based in public housing sites. Field interviews inform us that interagency partnerships were functioning at the street level as community mobilizers crossed numerous bureaucratic boundaries to solve family and neighborhood problems. What this network analysis confirms is that similar partnerships were occurring at the upper levels of management.

The remaining two groups are almost too small to be called clusters. In the lower left quadrant, there is a small cluster that is labeled "Alternatives to Incarceration." The group is defined by personnel from the department of juvenile justice who divert young offenders from the juvenile justice system to programs such as Operation Success (also in the cluster). The other small group is in the upper left quadrant and is labeled "Drug Court/Diversion." This cluster appears to be built around the drug court and includes staff from the drug court, the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Council, and the U. S. Attorney's office. (Nearby is the judge who started this program). These two small mini-clusters are distant from the primary cluster of key partners in multi-dimensional space.

This network analysis is limited by the data it contains. As with other sites, some networks in Columbia are known to exist at the level of field operations, but are not captured here because their members are not sufficiently represented in the present database. For example, this survey cannot be used to characterize or map the extensive contacts made by the police department's community mobilizers or contacts between diverse members of Columbia's Council of Neighborhoods. They were simply not listed on the questionnaire.

PUT IN COLUMBIA WAVE ONE CHART

Columbia: Wave Two

The Wave Two network sample in Columbia includes 43 target individuals. The level of contact between network members continues to be relatively high. Individuals report having contact with anywhere from 33 percent to 67 percent of the total network. The median level of contact increased over time from 46 percent at Wave One to 51 percent at Wave Two. All 43 targets met the minimum criterion for inclusion in the network analysis. Similar to Wave One, the Columbia Police Department remains at the hub of the communication network. Four of the five most frequently contacted persons are from the police department—the grants coordinator (67 percent), the chief of police (67 percent) the planning director (65 percent), the community policing coordinator (65 percent). The mayor (58 percent) took the fifth spot.

A two-dimensional smallest-space analysis was employed to depict the observed relationships. Kruskal's stress statistic is .22 and the R^2 value is .78. Similar to Wave One, the Wave Two results show a major cluster of "Key Agency Partners" on the right side of the graph, focusing on the management of city services. Judicial services appear on the left side (e.g. drug court) as a loose cluster.

Overall, the Columbia network at Wave Two continues to look like a strong multi-agency partnership at the management level, with key actors in the primary agencies having regular communication. The City of Columbia's Police Department continues to be at the center of the planning and implementation process. However, the network is becoming more integrated, as indicated by the changing location of the city manager, who appears to interact regularly with the Council of Neighborhoods and drug court, for example, independent of the police-based CCP operation. (As in Wave One, the police department's community mobilizers are not included in this data set.)

PUT COLUMBIA WAVE TWO CHART HERE

Salt Lake City Network Analysis

Fieldwork in Salt Lake City suggests that a true network of partnerships was created as a result of the CCP initiative and was sustained as an integral feature of the daily operations of this venture. The network analysis confirms this conclusion and helps to clarify the nature and frequency of these contacts.

Salt Lake City: Wave One

A total of 116 persons were evaluated in the original network matrix. Persons in the network had contact with anywhere from 4 percent to 46 percent of the total network(with a median of 16 percent). Because the network is relatively large, 15 percent of the total network (18 people) did not meet the minimum criterion for inclusion in the analysis, i.e., having contact with at least 10 percent of the total network "at least every few months." At the other extreme, approximately 14 percent (16 people) had this minimum contact with at least one-third of the total network. As might be expected, people reported the most contact with the CCP coordinator (46 percent of the network), and the second most contact with the mayor (42 percent). However, frequently-contacted persons were not all located in the mayor's office. They included several individuals from the police department and the prosecutor's office, suggesting that key persons in the network worked outside the mayor's office.

A two-dimensional smallest-space analysis was used as the best way to depict the observed relationships. Kruskal's stress statistic is .19 and the R^2 value is .81. The dimensions can be interpreted as a reflection of different approaches to public safety as reflected by different types of organizations. The vertical dimension (y axis) seems to distinguish between groups that focus on neighborhood improvement activities, with special attention to victim-oriented crime prevention (positive scores near the top), versus those who focus on offender-oriented crime prevention, especially alternatives to incarceration for at-risk youth and known offenders (negative scores near the bottom). This dimension may also reflect a philosophical or ideological difference about how to solve the crime problem in Salt Lake City. At one end (positive scores) are the citizen patrols and community groups who believe that neighborhood surveillance and enforcement play an important role in preventing crime and disorder. At the other end of this continuum are staff from the Boys & Girls Club, Juvenile Court, and Probation whose main objective is to prevent recidivism and help young offenders (and their families) avoid further contact with the criminal justice system.

The horizontal dimension (x axis) seems to distinguish between those who provide municipal government services (negative scores to the left) and those who provide community-based or school-based services (positive scores to the right). At the extreme left are activities emanating from the mayor's office and the police

department, while at the extreme right are activities supported by the School District and by grassroots neighborhood organizations.

While these interpretations may offer a partial explanation for the observed patterns, what is also clear from the two-dimensional configuration is that distinct clusters can be identified in the different quadrants, typically emerging around key actors. (To some extent, these clusters help to refine, or establish limitations on, the above general conclusions.) In the upper left quadrant, the chief of police and the city prosecutor provide the focal point of this cluster, which is labeled "Citizen Patrols." This cluster is defined by an army of citizen patrols who serve as the "eyes and ears" of the police department and who have regular interaction with both police and prosecution units. In the upper right quadrant, there is a cluster of community council leaders who interact primarily with each other (labeled "Community Council"). These community councils provide a unique form of community-based government in Salt Lake and the level of interaction in the councils is enhanced by regular monthly meetings with the mayor.

To the far right is a cluster labeled "School-Based Services." Members of this cluster are employed almost exclusively by the school district and participate in the Alternative Dispute Resolution group. Leading the charge is a district employee in charge of community education and a member of the CCP Management Team.

At the bottom of the network is a cluster labeled "Youth Offender Services." This group is defined almost equally by representatives of the Boys & Girls Club and the Probation Department. However, it also includes key people from the school district, the juvenile court, and the city council. In essence, this cluster reflects a diverse, working partnership whose members share a common goal of helping young offenders and their families stay out of trouble.

Finally, to the far left is a cluster labeled "Mayor and Community Policing." The Mayor and the Commander of the police department's Community Services Division were the anchors for this cluster during the first year. The plot indicates that they are surrounded by Community Policing Officers involved in the original Community Action Teams (CAT),and by a few members of the mayor's staff. This configuration seems to reflect the mayor's "open-door policy" and her centrality to the CCP initiative, as CAT teams represented the most visible component of CCP in Salt Lake City and had direct links to the her office.

Several general observations about the network results in Salt Lake City are in order. First, the CCP coordinator is not at the core of any cluster or the entire network—she appears somewhat isolated in the lower left quadrant. This outcome probably reflects her equal involvement with two clusters during the first year—the mayor/Community Policing group and Youth Offender Services. Second, the pattern of results that emerged from Salt Lake City is consistent with the "hollow core" phenomenon described by Heinz and Manikas (1992). That is, the network is not

centrally controlled or managed (like a wheel with a hub and spokes), but rather is shaped like a doughnut with a hollow center. Third, the wheel is held together, and the clusters are linked, by administrators and managers who appear to be on the margins of the five sub-networks. In reality, they are deeply involved in multiple clusters, so they appear marginal in multi-dimensional space. For example, administrators from the Boys & Girls Club and Probation provide the nexus between the Schools and the Youth Offender clusters. Similarly, administrators from the mayor's office and Prosecution serve as the linkage between the mayor/Community Policing cluster and the Youth Offender group. Fourth, while adjacent clusters have some common members, clusters opposite each other on the circular network are likely to have limited contact. Fifth, while some clusters are fairly homogeneous (e.g. especially Community Councils and Schools-Dispute Resolution), at least one shows strong interagency cooperation (Youth Offender Services). Also, the mayor's staff members are clearly represented in three of the five clusters, thus demonstrating her desire to oversee and link the major components of the CCP initiative. This helped to improve communication in the network.

Put Saltk Lake Wave One Chart Here

Salt Lake City: Wave Two

In Salt Lake City a total of 101 persons were studied at Wave Two. Levels of contact ranges from 3 percent to 35 percent of the total network. The median level of contact decreased slightly from 16 percent at Wave One to 13 percent at Wave Two. Twenty nine respondents did not meet the minimum criterion for inclusion in the network analysis, i.e., having contact with at least 10 percent of the total network "at least every few months." Hence, the final Wave Two sample was reduced to 72 individuals.

At Wave Two, respondents continue to report the most contact with the CCP coordinator (35 percent of the network). The mayor's office continues to hold the top three rankings, but the city prosecutor (30 percent) and command personnel in the police department (29 to 30 percent) occupy the next three positions.

Using a two-dimensional smallest-space analysis, the Kruskal's stress statistic is .20 and the R^2 value is .79. The pattern of results at Wave Two has many similarities to that observed at Wave One. First, the dimensions can be interpreted in a similar fashion. The vertical dimension (y axis) continues to separate clusters that focus on neighborhood improvement and neighborhood defense activities (positive scores) from groups that offer offender-oriented crime prevention services (negative scores). The horizontal dimension (x axis) continues to discriminate between those who provide municipal government services (negative scores), especially the police, from those who provide community-based or school-based services (positive scores). The only difference from Wave One is that the scores have been reversed.

Most noteworthy are the similarities (and differences) over time in the observed clusters. Three clusters from Wave One were replicated definitively at Wave Two. Specifically, the following groups re-emerged at Wave Two: "Citizen Patrols," "Community Councils," and "Community Policing." The chief of police continues to serve as the focal point of the Citizen Patrol cluster, but the city prosecutor (also very active in CCP) has left this group and emerged at the center of the Community Policing group, which includes key people from the police department, Mayor's Office, and prosecutor's office. (Previously, the mayor was at the core of the Community Policing group, but she was not included on the Wave Two survey instrument because CCP site staff said her role had decreased once implementation was underway. The CCP coordinator, who was somewhat isolated at Wave One, is more involved in the Community Policing group at Wave Two, which includes leaders from the CAT teams).

One key difference between the pattern of results at Wave One and Wave Two is the convergence of the "Youth Offender Service" and "School-based Service" clusters at Wave Two. Arguably, they could have been defined again as distinct groups (as was done at Wave One). But at Wave Two, there appeared to be more overlap between the two groups, with probation officers and Boys & Girls Club personnel

interacting more frequently with school personnel (e.g. the Alternative Dispute Resolution program). Also it should be noted that the Juvenile Court Judge is involved with both groups. Hence, they have been combined into one large cluster called "Youth-At-Risk Services." This larger cluster has in common the goal of helping young people, both offenders and youth at risk, as well as their families, stay out of trouble.

Despite some minor changes in cluster leadership, the overall CCP network in Salt Lake City remains remarkably similar between Wave One and Wave Two. The clusters are quite comparable over time, with some evidence that the two youth-oriented subgroups are working together more closely. At Wave Two, the Salt Lake City network continues to exhibit the "hollow core" phenomenon, defined by no central control or management.

Put Salt Lake Wave Two Chart Here

Seattle Network Analysis

Fieldwork in Seattle indicates that the CCP program was coordinated by the Seattle Police Department and did not require a close-working network of organizations or individuals to carry out the day-to-day operations of this initiative. The Seattle Police Department managed the distribution of funds (grants and contracts) to social service agencies, community organizations and the drug court. The network analysis provides an opportunity to examine the frequency and similarity of contacts between persons associated with the CCP effort.

Seattle: Wave One

A total of 75 persons were evaluated in the original network matrix. Generally, the level of interaction between these individuals was moderately low in comparison to other sites. Persons in the network had contact with anywhere from 3 percent to 39 percent of the total network (with a median of 12 percent). More than *one-third* of the total network (37 percent or 28 people) did not meet the minimum criterion for inclusion in the network analysis, i.e., having contact with at least 10 percent of the total network "at least every few months." At the other extreme, only 5 percent of the sample (four people) had this minimum contact with at least one-third of the total network. The demonstrably low level of contact between network members (forcing the loss of one-third of the sample) is instructive by itself, suggesting that the relations between CCP partners are relatively weak.

As might be expected with a police-based program, network members reported the most contact with the director of the Community Policing Bureau and the Project Administrator (39 percent of the network each), followed closely by the chief of police (36 percent) and the grant coordinator (35 percent). Thus, the most frequently-contacted persons were all located within the police department.

A two-dimensional smallest-space analysis was used as the best way to depict the observed relationships. Kruskal's stress statistic is .20 and the R² value is .81. The horizontal axis, moving from left to right, is clearly differentiating between Seattle Police Department (SPD) representatives to the left of the vertical axis and the remainder of the city to the right. The interpretation of the vertical axis is less clear, but may reflect an organizational hierarchy. Clearly, at the top of vertical axis is the citywide leadership tier. Moving from left to right across the top is the chief of police, a venerable community activist, a city council member concerned with criminal justice issues, and a representative of the mayor's office. With the exception of the police chief, the leadership is not closely linked to a single cluster and therefore, may be involved with both identifiable groups as defined below.

The Seattle network, as depicted in the figure, reflects the relatively "corporate" management style of CCP in the city, in which CCP managers are quite distant from both the providers and the recipients of services. Two clusters emerged from

this analysis, which have been termed "Police Department" on the left side and "Neighborhoods and Service Providers" on the right. Of the twelve persons in the "Police Department" cluster, eleven are civilian and sworn personnel of the Seattle Police Department, engaged primarily in community policing, but also including staff from records and information systems functions. The one member of the cluster who is not a SPD employee is the CCP-funded liaison to the SPD's citizens' committee, the Community Policing Action Council (CPAC).

The second cluster, "Neighborhoods and Service Providers," includes community residents and community-based organizations, along with the second tier of subgrantees that received CCP funds to provide services directly to the community. Included in the cluster are: staff of city departments such as Parks, Housing and Human Services, and Neighborhoods; and community-based organizations such as the Refugee Women's Alliance and the Pioneer Square Community Council. These are all organizations that received CCP funds but communicated with CCP leadership primarily through quarterly progress reports. Interestingly, this cluster, which is more close-knit than the police department group, contains four CPAC members, indicating that their ties to the service providers and community-based organizations are closer than their ties to the SPD.

Put Seattle Wave One Chart Here

Seattle: Wave Two

The Wave Two sample in Seattle included 69 respondents, with interpersonal contact levels ranging from 0 percent to 41 percent of the total network. The median level of contact increased slightly over time from 12 percent at Wave One to 14 percent at Wave Two. Fifteen individuals did not meet the minimum criterion for inclusion in the network analysis, thus reducing the final Wave Two sample to 54 respondents.

At Wave Two, respondents continue to report the most contact with leaders of the CCP initiative within the Seattle Police Department. The most frequently contacted individual is the director of the Community Policing Bureau (41 percent of the network), where the CCP grant is housed. Also among the top five are the chief of police (38 percent), the grant coordinator (35 percent), and the director of the Crime Prevention Bureau (30 percent).

A two-dimensional smallest-space analysis was performed, yielding a Kruskal's stress statistic of .18 and an R^2 value of .84. The pattern of contacts at Wave Two reveals both similarities and differences relative to Wave One. Loosely speaking the interpretation of the x and y axes remains similar. The left side of the horizontal axis captures the activity based in the Seattle Police Department, while the right side reflects the other agencies and organizations within the city. The vertical axis continues to suggest the organizational distinction between managers and planners (this time at the bottom) and "doers" (at the top).

The important difference between the Wave One and Wave Two networks is the greater interaction that is occurring between the Seattle Police Department and community leaders at Wave Two. At Wave One, the police department was communicating with itself, but was relatively isolated from the other CCP actors. At Wave Two, most members of the Community Policing Action Council (represented as AC) have moved into the "Police" cluster. This group, which serves as the police department's citizens' committee, is more actively engaged with the director of the Crime Prevention Bureau and the community outreach coordinator, as would be expected.

In sum, the CCP managers at Wave Two are not as removed from the action as they were at Wave One, although the neighborhood social service agencies continue to define their own distinct cluster in multidimensional space. At Wave Two members of the Community Policing Action Council are more closely linked to the police department, whereas they reported much more contact with service providers and community-based organizations at Wave One. This represents a dramatic shift in affiliation patterns over time.

Put Seattle Wave Two Chart Here

Conclusions from Network Analyses

In most sites, researchers were able to identify a small cluster of key individuals who provided the planning, implementation plans, and (sometimes) administrative oversight for the CCP initiatives. This group typically included planners and senior administrators rather than street-level service providers. Many of the other clusters appear to reflect frequent interaction between agency representatives (both municipal and not-for-profit groups) who provided various types of services to the target neighborhoods, but occasionally, the observed clusters seemed to reflect political or power connections within the city that, in all likelihood, existed prior to CCP. In cities where CCP was not operationally defined in terms of working interagency partnerships (e.g. Seattle and Fort Worth), the absence of such networks is readily apparent. In cities where interagency partnerships were encouraged, the network analysis generally confirms their presence.

General Patterns

This analysis yielded both high- and low-density clusters, as well as both homogenous and heterogeneous groups within and across sites. An example of a homogenous cluster is the citizen's Mobile Watch in Salt Lake City—a group of citizen patrols that works closely with police administrators. Examples of high-density heterogeneous clusters are the groupings that occurred around the police chief in Seattle and the mayor in Salt Lake City. In Salt Lake, the mayor's cluster (which includes street-level workers and community organizations) is believed to be involved directly in CCP business. In Seattle, the partnerships and frequent contacts between agency heads is best construed as part of a larger citywide effort to improve government, which may have indirect benefits for CCP. More typical across sites are heterogeneous groupings of representatives from different agencies and community groups that are working on CCP planning and program implementation (e.g. Baltimore and Columbia).

Another interesting pattern is the presence of key CCP staff *outside* the boundaries of the clusters. In some cases these unexpected outcomes reflect the individual's contact with more than one cluster. If, for example, an individual has roughly equal contact with two separate clusters, he/she would appear (in multidimensional space) halfway between the two groups, and therefore, would not be depicted as a central member of either group. Indeed, our fieldwork revealed that some individuals are very active at a citywide level and this activity precludes them from being at the hub of a communication wheel or cluster. In other cases, certain high-visibility individuals seemed to play important planning and management roles *behind the scenes,* but are not intimately involved in the day-to-day activities of CCP or related anti-crime initiatives.

Finally, when one looks at the *total* data picture for each site, there is some evidence to confirm what Heinz and Manikas (1992) call the "hollow core," i.e.,

doughnut-shaped clusters with no one individual or group at the center of the communication network. For most CCP sites, if one ignores the few high-density clusters and view the network data as one large cluster, one can find evidence of a hollow-core pattern. This effect may be the result of CCP's most distinguishing characteristic—namely, interagency, inter-organizational partnerships that occur presumably on the basis of equal status. When community organizations, social service agencies, city departments, and politicians become involved in coalition building, there is considerable sensitivity about who is in charge, who controls the agenda, who gets the money, etc. On the surface, everyone makes an effort to avoid the appearance of "stepping on toes" and of controlling the decision-making process, but at the same time, leaders make sure that their authority or base of support is not undermined. One could argue that interagency partnerships and coalitions in the public arena, by their very nature, result in a power vacuum, where no one person is able/willing to take charge, either because of political or bureaucratic constraints. If this is true, then one would expect to find evidence of cooperation and networking at some levels, but would also find a lack of *central* leadership and hence the "hollow core" cluster.

Comparison of Wave One with Wave Two Data

To a surprising degree, the pattern of communication among members of the CCP network remained relatively constant over time. Both the median levels of contact and the rank ordering of contacts by frequency were fairly stable. That is, with the exception of rare individuals who dropped out the CCP program, the most frequently contacted individuals remained the same at both waves of data collection. Furthermore, the overall pattern of interaction was similar over time. That is, the shape of the overall network (e.g. doughnut) and the number and type of clusters within each network were fairly constant from Wave One to Wave Two. The doughnut shape appears to be a distinguishing characteristic of many citywide partnerships that include multiple programs run by both governmental and non-governmental bodies. In this arrangement, the key linkages or communication nodes that link the entire network can be individuals on the periphery who identify with multiple clusters.

Exceptions to the general conclusion that patterns of contact did not change over time should be noted. There was some evidence of increased contact between individuals who had previously limited their communication to narrower, more homogeneous clusters. Marginal, small clusters began to merge with larger clusters (e.g. Baltimore) or subgroups migrated from one cluster to another (e.g. Seattle). The merging of previously distinct clusters is consistent with the hypothesis that CCP will enhance communication and linkages between individuals and organizations with common goals and objectives.

These findings and conclusions should be used with caution because of possible artifacts in the data. The presence of some attrition in the sample makes it difficult to draw inferences about changes in relationships that may occur over time. The loss of individuals in the data matrix can influence the results in unpredictable ways. Fortunately, sample attrition was limited and repeated measurement was obtained on a high percentage of the sample.

The Fulfillment of CCP Objectives

All the intensively studied sites achieved substantial progress toward the objectives they had developed during their planning period and specified in their grant applications. It was obvious that all had created new initiatives and had expanded community policing and community mobilization. Since there were no sites that failed to reach the majority of their objectives, the research focused on the various ways the different sites met them. Considering that the objectives included tackling such difficult tasks as reorganizing traditional, hierarchical organizations, stemming the tide of urban deterioration, and getting dozens of agencies and institutions to sit down together and act in a coordinated fashion—that all the sites met most of their objectives was truly amazing.

However, because these initiatives took place in communities rather than laboratories, the CCP programs evolved over time—as local conditions changed or other unforeseen events occurred, some programs diverged from what was originally planned. The capability of a site to be flexible, to recognize a problem, and devise a solution, was at the crux of fulfilling CCP objectives. Nearly every site changed at least one aspect of its program during the grant period, even though objectives remained constant. Examples of how community policing, community mobilization, and social service delivery programs and activities were redirected and fine-tuned are described in this section as are survey data on participants' perceptions of program effectiveness and the level of progress achieved in each of CCP's components.

Progress and Effectiveness in Overall CCP Program

Respondents from each site were asked to rate their sites' effectiveness in CCP program implementation in year two. This included the site staff ability to plan specific programs, implement specific programs, tailor services to needs, and develop programs on schedule. Overall, respondents perceived the implementation of specific programs as the most effective piece of the CCP process (Table 9). On average, forty-four percent of respondents believed the implementation of specific programs was "very effective." Of the four tasks (planning specific programs, implementing specific programs, tailoring services to needs, and developing programs on schedule), it appears that the sites found it more difficult to keep to their intended schedules. On average, only 27 percent of respondents believed that their coalitions were "very effective" in developing programs on schedule.

Table 9: Perceptions of Effectiveness in Program Implementation in Year Two – Wave Two

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Rated Coalition Activities as VERY EFFECTIVE:												
Planning specific programs	**21%**	**47%**	**58%**	**48%**	**39%**	**40%**	**39%**	**33%**	**19%**	**21%**	**46%**	**39%**
	(29)	(36)	(52)	(29)	(36)	(10)	(18)	(9)	(31)	(39)	(28)	(26)
Implementing specific programs	**29%**	**64%**	**53%**	**54%**	**40%**	**50%**	**59%**	**33%**	**20%**	**32%**	**50%**	**42%**
	(28)	(36)	(51)	(26)	(35)	(10)	(17)	(9)	(30)	(38)	(28)	(26)
Tailoring services to needs	**15%**	**49%**	**35%**	**64%**	**18%**	**50%**	**50%**	-	**21%**	**24%**	**30%**	**54%**
	(26)	(34)	(51)	(26)	(34)	(10)	(16)	-	(29)	(34)	(27)	(26)
Developing programs on schedule	**15%**	**39%**	**19%**	**46%**	**9%**	**44%**	**22%**	**33%**	**31%**	**18%**	**22%**	**28%**
	(27)	(35)	(46)	(25)	(34)	(10)	(16)	(4)	(28)	(37)	(23)	(24)

Analyzing the issue of developing programs on schedule more in depth, respondents were asked to rate their coalition progress relative to their intended schedule. East Bay respondents perceived their progress to be the most successful of the sites—80 percent of East Bay respondents believed that the coalition was either "right on schedule" or "ahead of schedule" (Table 10). Seattle respondents also believed their coalition's progress was largely successful relative to their intended schedule. Seventy-three percent of respondents in Seattle stated that the coalition was either "right on schedule" or "ahead of schedule." In contrast, all of the Gary respondents believed their coalition's progress was either "somewhat behind schedule" or "far behind schedule." Three other cities also had a similar opinion of their coalition's progress (Salt Lake City, Metro Atlanta, and Wichita.

Table 10: Perception of Coalition Progress – Wave Two

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Coalition progress relative to schedule												
Far behind schedule	7%	3%	6%	7%	8%	10%	6%	11%	13%	10%	-	4%
Somewhat behind schedule	48%	35%	24%	29%	26%	10%	35%	89%	34%	46%	27%	48%
Right on Schedule	35%	43%	30%	50%	50%	10%	35%	-	44%	29%	50%	28%
Ahead of Schedule	10%	19%	36%	14%	16%	70%	24%	-	9%	15%	23%	20%
Number of Responses	(29)	(37)	(50)	(28)	(38)	(10)	(17)	(9)	(32)	(41)	(30)	(25)

Respondents were then asked to give their perceptions of the level of progress in implementing several CCP components by the second year. These included: com-

munity policing; community mobilization; youth and gang programs; community prosecution and diversion; drug courts, and; community-based alternatives to incarceration (Table 11). Overall, the sites believed that they made the most progress in community policing in the second year of implementation. Site respondents also believed they made "a lot of progress" or "moderate progress" in community mobilization and youth and gang programs. While almost 75 percent of respondents believed they made either "a lot of progress" or "moderate progress" in each of the six components queried, some respondents believed they achieved a lower level of progress in other programs. Nearly a quarter of respondents believed that they made very little progress in the drug court component and community-based alternatives to incarceration. Overall, however, the progress of the components were characterized by positive responses.

Table 11: Level of Progress Achieved by Year Two – All Sites

	All CCP Sites			
	A lot of Progress	**Moderate Progress**	**Very Little Progress**	**Number of Responses**
Community Policing	76%	19%	5%	(344)
Community Mobilization	53%	41%	6%	(345)
Youth and Gangs Programs	41%	49%	10%	(316)
Community Prosecution and Diversion	32%	50%	18%	(263)
Drug Courts	39%	38%	23%	(258)
Community-based Alternatives to Incarceration	25%	49%	26%	(268)

Community Policing

While the experience of making the transition to community policing varied from site to site, once implemented, it was among the most successful components undertaken under the CCP initiative. Overall, 76 percent of respondents believed that they made "a lot of progress" in community policing in the second year of implementation. Over 75 percent of the respondents in eight of the twelve sites believed that they had made "a lot of progress" in community policing (Table 12). Survey participants from Wichita and Columbia were the most likely to believe they had made "a lot of progress" in community policing. Although the transition to community policing faced numerous obstacles in the planning and first year of implementation, the sites appeared (both from the surveys and from observations) to have had tremendous success implementing community policing during the second year of implementation.

Table 12: Level of Progress Achieved by Year Two- Community Policing

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Community Policing												
Very little progress	8%	-	-	3%	5%	-	-	11%	24%	5%	-	-
Moderate Progress	29%	37%	14%	3%	18%	22%	11%	11%	35%	35%	20%	4%
A lot of progress	63%	63%	86%	94%	77%	78%	89%	78%	41%	60%	80%	96%
Number of Responses	(24)	(35)	(52)	(28)	(39)	(9)	(18)	(9)	(34)	(37)	(30)	(26)

Examples to changes to original CCP plans included both Seattle and Columbia where planners rethought their initial ideas of how to train officers for community policing and both formally requested making these changes to BJA. Seattle reallocated half its grant to training the entire Seattle Police Department in community policing. While training remained the central objective of Seattle's CCP, both the content and form of the training changed twice during the grant period.

Shortly after the arrival of a new chief, the focus of the training was to be team building, with training conducted by the Community Policing Bureau. Most of the training funds had been allocated to pay for overtime so that 800 sworn officers could attend a two-day course and one-day refresher. By the time CCP was launched, the vision of the chief and the director of community policing had shifted. First, the curriculum was expanded to include problem solving and diversity training as well as team building for officers and supervision for mid-level managers. Second, emphasis was placed on training a corps of officer-trainers (to improve rank-and-file acceptance and to leave within the department a permanent post-grant training capacity). Third, the training period was rescheduled to regular shifts instead of overtime, ostensibly to communicate that community policing as taught in the sessions was to become the regular way of doing business, rather than an add-on.

As the curriculum was being developed, opposition to the diversity training grew within the ranks. At the same time, the Community Policing Bureau director came to adopt a different training strategy. The first round of training would be a general introduction to team building and problem solving (with a smattering of diversity sensitivity sprinkled in), to be followed by more specialized "in-service, tool box" training on particular topics. For both reasons, the training plan was modified again, this time to a one-day training during regular hours, covering a variety of topics, none in depth. Some of the money saved was held for the "tool box" training. The rest was shifted, with formal BJA permission, to selected successful subgrantees outside the police department. The training that actually happened was a downsized version of the original vision, as the training was reconceptualized and the some of the funding given for other, non-police activities.

Columbia also had trouble implementing its initial concept of training for community policing and had to apply to BJA for permission to restructure it. The primary motive behind this request was the Columbia Police Department's belief that structural changes in the organization were more pressing needs than training. Consequently, funds were shifted to allow for several promotions, including the promotion of an officer to the rank of inspector in charge of all community policing. While consideration was given to the trade-offs, the Columbia Police Department staff believed that the intensive direction and on-going field training the community policing inspector could provide for community officers was a wiser investment than the specific training.

Obviously, the transition to community policing can conflict with tradition and union rules in police departments. In Baltimore, the community policing monies were used to pay for overtime foot patrols in the CCP neighborhoods. Union rules required that overtime be awarded by seniority on a rotating basis. The result was too many officers rotating through, when the goal was to have specific officers assigned to neighborhoods so that residents and officers would have time to get to know each other. When CCP leadership pointed this out to the police commissioner, it was arranged that CCP community policing funds be used to pay for new junior officers who were hand-picked for the foot patrols on a permanent basis.

Community Mobilization

Overall, 53 percent of respondents believed that their site had made "a lot of progress" in community mobilization during the second year of implementation. The progress made in community mobilization was second only to the progress made in the community-policing component of the CCP initiative. Over 75 percent of the respondents in eight of the twelve sites believed that they had made "a lot of progress" in community mobilization (Table 13). Of the remaining four sites, respondents in Hartford and Gary were the most likely to report that their sites had made very little progress in community mobilization.

Table 13: Level of Progress Achieved by Year Two - Community Mobilization

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Community Mobilizing												
Very little progress	4%	6%	4%	4%	15%	-	-	11%	-	7%	4%	-
Moderate Progress	61%	28%	38%	15%	62%	36%	28%	22%	41%	37%	55%	54%
A lot of progress	35%	67%	58%	81%	23%	64%	72%	67%	59%	56%	41%	46%
Number of Responses	(28)	(36)	(48)	(26)	(39)	(11)	(18)	(9)	(34)	(41)	(29)	(26)

One overarching objective of the CCP project is evident from the name itself. In a true *comprehensive community*, the programmatic borders and categories that are delineated in a more traditional community are harder to detect because they are less relevant. None of the broad objectives can be reached if efforts are concentrated in a narrow range of activities. Significant accomplishments are possible only through a diverse grouping of activities and efforts. In the Boston CCP initiative, planners felt that the activities defined under "community mobilization" were just as much a part of their "community policing" agenda. In Columbia, the evaluator wrote: "...it is particularly difficult to demarcate which program components are community policing, which are community mobilization, and which affect social service delivery. Indeed, the community mobilizers...are police officers involved in a community policing initiative and yet are obviously involved in mobilizing the community. The lines become more blurred when CCP service delivery is added."

Fort Worth was a pioneer in community policing nationwide, with reorganization to local police divisions in the mid-1980s and its emphasis on neighborhood policing and community participation, such as the Citizens on Patrol, started in the early 1990s. By the time the CCP project was soliciting sites, Fort Worth had a solid vision of how to improve and expand their community policing. Even with this history, the expansion did not go as smoothly as planned. The Citizen's Crime Commission had to be revamped when participation from all involved sectors was less than expected. The Community Leadership Development Seminar was the key to fostering local leadership and it was not working. One major problem was that the Neighborhood Police Officers did not participate and too many of the speakers were from out of town and not relevant to the local residents. Much effort was made to strengthen the Citizen's Crime Commission after this disappointing start. The Neighborhood Police Officers did become active participants as did members of the advisory councils for the public housing developments. The Commission started to reach out to the business community for additional financial support. But the most distinctive sign of success of community mobilization in Fort Worth was its citizen patrols.

Empowering neighborhoods was the primary objective of Baltimore's CCP, and the program began with five core neighborhoods (in which fairly strong community organizations already existed) and twelve apprentice neighborhoods (in which advanced community organization and training were seen as needed). The objective was clearly met in three of the five core neighborhoods: Boyd Booth, Harlem Park, and Franklin Square. It was probably also fully met in Sandtown-Winchester, though it is harder to isolate the CCP contribution because that neighborhood was simultaneously the focus of multiple programs, some on a much larger scale than CCP.

The effort met with more mixed success in the fifth core neighborhood, Middle East. The Community Service Crews, whose priorities were set by neighborhood organizations, were very effective in getting the sentenced participants to show up. But

neighborhood mobilization proceeded less swiftly there than elsewhere, for at least two reasons. First, residents' fear levels were especially high because of substantial gun violence in the area. Second, the Middle East neighborhood was a relatively small piece of the geographic area in which the subgrantee for community organization, the Historic East Baltimore Community Action Coalition (HEBCAC), was working. HEBCAC was pursuing a very broad agenda that only partially overlapped with CCP objectives.

Coincidentally, during the CCP grant period, Baltimore was designated an Empowerment Zone, and the zone included three of the CCP core neighborhoods: Harlem Park, Sandtown-Winchester, and Middle East. When these three neighborhoods "graduated" from CCP to the Empowerment Zone, the CCP leadership continued pursuing the neighborhood empowerment objective with three of the apprentice neighborhoods. This again is an example of where CCP administrators showed flexibility and ingenuity in their implementation of CCP amid constant changes in their city.

Social Service Delivery

Participants from each of the CCP sites were questioned about their perception of the level of progress made by the social service components during the second year of implementation. These components included: youth and gangs, community prosecution and diversion, drug courts, and community-based alternatives to incarceration. Overall, respondents believed that the sites had made the most progress in youth and gang programs. Only 8 percent of respondents believed that they had made "very little progress" in that area (Table 14). The remainder of the respondents believed they either made "a lot of progress" or "moderate progress" in the youth and gang component of CCP. Specifically, respondents from Boston, Forth Worth, and Gary believed they made the most progress involving youth and gangs.

The least amount of progress appears to have been made in creating community-based alternatives to incarceration. Overall, 28 percent of respondents believed that they made "very little progress" in this component. The other two components (drug courts and community prosecution and diversion) faired somewhat better. Twenty-four percent of respondents believed they made "very little progress" in drug courts in year two and 17 percent of respondents believed they made "very little progress" in the community prosecution and diversion component. Interestingly, Hartford and Baltimore respondents believed their sites had made the most amount of progress in youth and gangs, however, they reported the least amount of progress in the other social service components when compared to the other sites. Respondents from Metro Atlanta, Metro Denver, and a few other sites consistently believed they made little progress in all four social service components. Finally, Gary re-

spondents perceived their site as achieving the most amount of progress involving the four social service components.

Table 14: Level of Progress Achieved by Year Two- Social Services Component

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Youth and Gangs												
Very little progress	16%	7%	2%	19%	24%	9%	-	-	3%	5%	4%	8%
Moderate Progress	48%	67%	24%	33%	59%	64%	28%	33%	55%	64%	48%	60%
A lot of progress	36%	26%	74%	48%	17%	27%	72%	67%	42%	31%	48%	32%
Number of Responses	(25)	(27)	(51)	(21)	(34)	(11)	(18)	(9)	(31)	(39)	(25)	(25)
Community Prosecution and Diversion												
Very little progress	19%	25%	5%	13%	36%	-	8%	-	33%	11%	18%	14%
Moderate Progress	44%	61%	52%	44%	43%	63%	75%	25%	48%	54%	71%	45%
A lot of progress	37%	14%	43%	44%	21%	37%	17%	75%	19%	35%	12%	41%
Number of Responses	(16)	(28)	(37)	(23)	(28)	(8)	(12)	(8)	(27)	(37)	(17)	(22)
Drug Courts												
Very little progress	43%	30%	28%	7%	19%	25%	17%	-	68%	25%	-	9%
Moderate Progress	36%	48%	36%	32%	32%	38%	66%	22%	28%	44%	39%	36%
A lot of progress	21%	22%	36%	61%	49%	37%	17%	78%	4%	31%	61%	55%
Number of Responses	(14)	(27)	(33)	(28)	(31)	(8)	(12)	(9)	(25)	(36)	(13)	(22)
Community Based Alternatives to Incarceration												
Very little progress	24%	36%	14%	20%	33%	20%	13%	12%	44%	37%	31%	30%
Moderate Progress	59%	32%	47%	60%	53%	50%	56%	12%	48%	46%	46%	50%
A lot of progress	17%	32%	39%	20%	14%	30%	31%	75%	8%	17%	23%	20%
Number of Responses	(17)	(31)	(36)	(25)	(30)	(10)	(16)	(8)	(27)	(35)	(13)	(20)

Although changes occurred both in community policing and community prosecution, the greatest number of changes was in the social service components. The reasons for change varied and included a change in scope or location, unforeseen difficulties in implementing the initiative as planned, as well as a change in priorities. Below are two examples of changes that occurred for the first two reasons.

During the planning period, Salt Lake City planners designed the Community Action Teams as a comprehensive method of conducting neighborhood-based problem solving. The original plan called for seven CATs to be created, but finances ended up limiting it to five. Another new entity, the Management Team, was designed to oversee implementation of CCP, guide the CATs, and help foster interagency agreements. The CAT members include police officers, assistant city prosecutors, youth and family specialists, and staff from other agencies that work directly with the communities and families. The Management Team includes higher level staff from each of the agencies that receive CCP funds, plus a few other government agencies.

As one might have expected, creating a new government structure was both complicated and challenging. Both the CATs and the Management Team had internal issues that took time to work out. For instance, the assistant city prosecutors were too overburdened in court to give sufficient attention to the CATs and eventually the city prosecutor assigned two additional assistant city prosecutors to the CATs to ease the workload. In addition, the Youth and Family Specialists on the CAT teams received very low pay and no benefits which resulted in a high rate of turnover. Also, the Management Team members did not have enough influence and capability to respond to interagency matters. The relationships between the CATs and the Management Team was thus conflicted, with the CAT members feeling that the Management Team did not give them enough support and direction.

Despite these issues, the CAT teams still persisted. These neighborhood-based teams resolved many issues regarding crime and disorder for neighborhood residents. It is this community satisfaction with the CATs that led to the City Council's vote to establish CATs throughout the entire city, paid for with public funds.

Boston initially planned to address youth crime throughout the entire city. The planning sessions for the Youth Services Providers Network included representatives from many citywide programs. The initial enthusiasm was soon tempered by the realization that available resources and logistics rendered this plan as unrealistic. Plans were changed to pilot the program only in Districts 2 and 3, the Roxbury, Dorchester, and Mattapan neighborhoods, where gangs and youth violence were concentrated. Because some of the programs initially brought to the table were citywide, many of these agencies altered their services and activities to fit into the affected areas (e.g. a mobile health van). However, during the first year it became apparent that the most significant change in service delivery was the relationship developed between the Boys & Girls Clubs in the area and the local police district. When applying for second year funding, the Boston Police Department redefined this network more as a "partnership" between them and the Boys & Girls Club and pointed to it as a successful neighborhood model that was eventually implemented citywide. In effect, an unrealistic citywide plan was retooled into a model neighborhood program, which in turn, could realistically be implemented citywide, but on a district by district basis.

Perceived Accomplishments

In a series of open-ended questions, CCP participants were asked about what they thought were the most important accomplishments of CCP and what they thought were the effects most likely to be remembered in two years following CCP. Overall, 36 percent of respondents stated that the most important accomplishment was the interagency cooperation/networking/partnership/communication element of the CCP program (Table 15). Of the sites, East Bay and Boston respondents were the most likely to state that this coalition building was their most important accomplish-

ment. Respondents listed community policing (19 percent) as the most important accomplishment of all of the CCP components. Following closely behind community policing, CCP respondents rated community mobilization/involving the community/neighborhood watch (14 percent) as the most important accomplishment of the CCP program. Of the twelve sites, respondents in Hartford were most likely to view community mobilization as the most important accomplishment of their CCP initiative.

Table 15: Most Important Accomplishment of CCP

	All Sites*	
	%	Count
Interagency cooperation-networking-partnership-communication	36	(129)
Community policing	19	(53)
Community mobilization-involving the community-neighborhood watch	14	(50)
Youth programs	6	(23)
Reduced crime-improved safety	4	(16)
NA/don't know	3	(16)
Drug Court	2	(6)
Funding-sustained funding	2	(4)
Community prosecution	0**	(1)
Alternatives to incarceration	0**	(2)
Other***	13	(40)
No accomplishments	0**	(5)

* Weighted by site.
** Less than 1 percent.
*** Cumulation of Other, Police Department Training, BJA Management-COPS Management-Technical Assistance, CAT Teams (Salt Lake) and Domestic Violence Programs.

Finally, as mentioned above, CCP participants from all sites were asked which of CCP's effects would be most likely to be remembered in two years (Table 16). The top three answers listed as the most important accomplishments of the CCP initiative were also listed as the top three that would most likely be remembered in two years, although in a varied order. Overall, 30 percent of respondents believed that community policing was the element of CCP that would most likely be remembered in two years. Of the sites, Metro Denver respondents were the most likely to believe

that community policing was the effect most likely to be remembered. Respondents from the CCP sites listed interagency cooperation/networking/partnership-communication (18 percent) as an effect that would most likely be remembered in two years. Following closely behind interagency cooperation, 15 percent of CCP participants viewed community mobilization/involving the community/neighborhood watch as an effect that would most likely to be remembered in two years. Clearly, participants believed that the coalition building, community policing, and community mobilization were the three elements of the CCP initiative that have had the most prominent effect upon the twelve individual sites.

Table 16: CCP Effects Most Likely to be Remembered in Two Years

	All Sites*	
	%	Count
Community policing	30	(95)
Interagency cooperation-networking-partnership-communication	18	(65)
Community mobilization-involving the community-neighborhood watch	15	(41)
NA/don't know	7	(31)
Reduced crime-improved safety	7	(25)
Youth programs	6	(19)
Drug Court	4	(11)
Alternatives to incarceration	1	(3)
Other**	11	(44)
No accomplishments	1	(11)

* Weighted by site.
** Cumulation of Other, Police Department Training, BJA Management-COPS Management-Technical Assistance, CAT Teams (Salt Lake), Mapping and Domestic Violence Programs.

The Implementation of Community Policing

This section of the report examines the evolution of community policing as practiced in most of the cities involved in the CCP evaluation. Based on surveys conducted in 1993, 1995 and 1997, it examines the extent to which important elements of community policing have been implemented in the CCP single cities and in the multi-jurisdictional sites of Metro Atlanta, East Bay, and Metro Denver. In addition, there is a section that delves more in-depth into the aspects of community policing as observed during the researchers' series of site visits.

Results of Community Policing Survey

The Data

The data were collected in several waves. First, BOTEC made use of the Community Policing Survey that was conducted in 1993 by the Police Foundation for the National Institute of Justice. The Police Foundation's sample included all large departments, as well as a sampling of smaller communities, and the responding cities included every CCP evaluation site except Gary. BOTEC's own 1995 survey duplicated and extended questions that were asked in 1993. It was distributed to the twelve single city evaluation sites and to multi-jurisdictional communities in Metro Atlanta, East Bay and Metro Denver. The cities of Atlanta, Denver, and Oakland were included as both single sites (as they represented the largest city in their respective sites) and as one of the communities in the multi-jurisdictional sites.

Atlanta and Wichita were unable to respond to the 1995 survey, but the 1993 study provided data for them both. Finally, in 1997 BOTEC re-surveyed all of these sites. Among the single cities involved in the evaluation, only Gary did not respond to the survey. The 1997 survey also included three additional cities for the first time: Phoenix, Omaha and Wilmington; they are not considered in detail in this report. The 1995 and 1997 respondents to the multi-jurisdictional survey were essentially the same, except that there were five fewer respondents (29 rather than 34) to the 1997 survey around Metro Denver.

The analysis presented here examines both of the pre-CCP surveys (1993 and 1995) in order to classify the organizational strategies of the twelve single cities. If sites indicated that they had adopted a strategy in either survey, they were classified accordingly. This yielded data on all twelve sites. Because less populous jurisdictions were contacted for the 1993 national survey on a sample basis, many of the smaller communities in the multi-jurisdictional CCP sites were not included in that round of surveys. As a result, analyses of smaller communities in the multi-jurisdictional

areas are based only on BOTEC's 1995 and 1997 evaluation surveys. Analysis of the single city sites was separate from that of the multi-jurisdictional sites.

This section of the report focuses on program implementation. While the survey frequently enabled responding agencies to indicate that they were "planning" to initiate various program elements or organizational innovations, only reports that they were indeed in place are examined here. If the question asked how many officers were involved in an activity, only those in which "most" officers were involved are counted. After a review of the dimensions of community policing examined by the surveys, the sub-sections below classify each city and metropolitan area in terms of the extent to which it had established community policing during the years before CCP began. The report also examines changes in organizational strategies between the earlier surveys and the 1997 study.

Strategic Clusters of Community Policing

This report divides the many specific tactics and organizational arrangements reported in the surveys into several "strategic" clusters that characterize the departments and their community policing programs. They include:

Public Outreach: the extent to which departments make efforts to inform the public about their efforts and publicize the opportunities that community policing creates for resident involvement.

Citizen Activism: the extent to which departments create mechanisms to involve the community in partnerships with police in the field.

Citizen Involvement in Policy-Making: the extent to which departments involve the public in shaping or reviewing operational procedures, and in oversight over department policies.

Department Partnerships: the extent to which departments involve other municipal, county and state agencies, and even private service providers, in their program.

Devolution of Authority: the extent to which departments push authority and responsibility down in the organization, empowering mid-level managers to make decisions, allocate resources and assess their own efforts.

Neighborhood Orientation: the extent to which policing efforts are organized around small geographical areas.

Community Policing in Single Cities

The discussion and tables in this section focus on what the cities were doing in 1997, and on substantial changes over time in the adoption of various community

policing tactics and organizational arrangements. This section of the report tabulates responses by the CCP single cities to the 1993/95 and 1997 surveys. Because it focuses on changes over that period, it excludes Gary (which was not able to reply to the 1997 survey) and the cities that were new to the study in 1997, Phoenix, Omaha and Wilmington. Each table presents the percentage of cities that report that they were actually doing a project, had implemented a program, or that most of their officers were involved in an activity. Tables in Appendix B break the responses down by site.

Near the beginning of the survey, the cities were asked if they had implemented community policing. They were asked to describe their department's "current situation with respect to the adoption of a community policing approach." In the 1993 survey, all of the agencies except Fort Worth and Seattle indicated that they were planning a program; those two cities claimed to have already implemented the concept in target areas. By 1995, only Boston stated that it was still planning. A few reported they had implemented community policing in targeted areas, but half had by then implemented it citywide. By 1997, only Atlanta and Denver were targeting specific areas only; all of the others reported adopting citywide programs.

Public Outreach

One lesson of evaluations of community policing is that departments cannot take community support for granted. Too often the public fails to "step forward" when called upon, and organizing and sustaining citizen involvement in community policing is a difficult task. Police and citizens may have a history of not getting along with each other, rather than one of productive partnership. High crime areas tend to be less organized around crime issues, and people there can fear retaliation by drug dealers or neighborhood toughs if they take the lead. Because it is a new concept, citizens are also not likely to understand what community policing is, or why they *should* get involved. Finally, community policing represents a fundamental and sometimes expensive change in a city's policing strategy, and it is one that taxpayers need to be informed about and must support if it is going to be sustained. The support of the public thus must be won, not assumed. This calls for vigorous outreach efforts by the police to inform the public about their plans, and about the opportunities that community policing creates for meaningful involvement.

The survey included eight items dealing with public outreach. (The question numbers correspond to those in the BOTEC survey questionnaires—see Appendix B.) Table 17 below indicates the percentage of single cities who were involved in each during 1993-95 and in 1997. During the first wave of surveys, 36 percent of these cities were involved in five or more of these projects; by 1997 that figure had risen to 55 percent, and the average number of program elements in which the cities were involved went up fractionally (this is presented in the last row of each table.). The

highest-ranking city by 1997 was Salt Lake City, followed by Fort Worth, Oakland, Boston, Wichita and Columbia.

Table 17: Measures of Public Outreach

	1993/95	1997
Residents attend citizen police academy (19c)	64	64
Mid-level managers maintain regular contact with community leaders (18b)	91	82
Officers expected to develop familiarity with community leaders (17b)	73	46
Officers expected to assist in organizing community (17d)	9	18
Has implemented training for citizens in problem identification or resolution (15r)	36	64
Officers expected to meet regularly with community groups (17h)	18	27
Has implemented citizen surveys to determine community needs and priorities (15c)	73	82
Has implemented citizen surveys to evaluate police service (15d)	64	73
Summary Score	4.3	4.6

The adoption of some of these outreach projects has proceeded slowly. When asked in 1993/95 about the responsibilities assigned to "most" patrol officers, only two cities (Boston and Fort Worth) indicated that they were to meet regularly with community groups; only Salt Lake City added this by 1997. Even by 1997, just two cities (Fort Worth and Salt Lake City) expected officers to assist in organizing communities. The number of cities in which officers had responsibility for developing familiarity with community leaders dropped from eight (73 percent) to five (46 percent). On the other hand, only three cities initially reported a program for training residents how to address community problems; this grew to seven cities (64 percent) by 1997. By 1997, about 80 percent of the cities were using citizen surveys to determine community needs, and more than 70 percent to understand the public's view of the quality of police service.

Citizen Activism

One of the singular features of community policing is that it involves vigorous citizen participation in a broad variety of problem-solving activities. Many take the "co-production" viewpoint, arguing that the police cannot alone produce neighborhood safety. Rather, it requires the formation of partnerships between the police and the public that coordinate the exercise of both formal and informal social control. In this view, successful community policing programs need to develop formal and informal mechanisms that facilitate the formation of these partnerships.

Table 18: Measures of Citizen Activism

	1993/95	**1997**
Residents participate in neighborhood watch program (19a)	100	73
Residents serve as volunteers within the police agency (19b)	73	54
Residents serve in citizen patrols coordinated by your agency (19d)	46	36
Residents participants in court watch program (19g)	46	36
Residents work with police to identify and resolve community or neighborhood problems (19j)	91	73
Officers expected to work with citizens to identify and resolve area problems (17c)	73	64
Summary Score	4.3	3.4

The 1993/95 department surveys indicated that there was a great deal of citizen involvement in anti-crime efforts everywhere. At that time, 63 percent of these cities had initiated at least five of the six projects listed in Table 18. Citizens were involved in neighborhood watch programs in all twelve cities, and they served on neighborhood or citywide advisory councils in nine cities. Eight cities (72 percent) used volunteers within the police department. And out in the neighborhoods of these cities, it appears that significant police-community partnerships were being formed around problem solving. The departments in eleven cities reported that citizens worked with police to identify and resolve local problems. However, by 1997, the surveys indicate that the cities were involved in significantly fewer of these projects—only 37 percent were involved in at least five of them. Police department involvement in neighborhood watch programs had dropped off, as had provision for volunteers within departments and joint police-resident problem-solving projects. Overall, the survey indicates there was less citizen activism associated with community policing in these cities over time. By 1997, the top-ranked city was Salt Lake City (which was still involved in all six of these projects), followed by Oakland, Wichita and Fort Worth.

Citizen Involvement in Policy-Making

A step beyond involving the general public in the practice of community policing is involving them in shaping the department's operational policies and organizational practices. This cluster of policies is perhaps an example of early experimentation by departments followed by a retrenchment in practice. As Table 19 below indicates, there was a notable decline in avenues for citizen involvement reported by these departments over time.

Table 19: Measures of Citizen Involvement in Policy-Making

	1993/95	1997
19e. Residents serve on citizen advisory councils at neighborhood level	82	46
19f. Residents serve on citizen advisory councils at citywide level	73	64
19h. Residents serve on advisory group for chief or agency managers	64	36
19k. Residents help develop policing policies	54	36
19l. Residents help evaluate officer performance	9	0
19m. Residents help review complaints against police	73	36
19n. Residents participate in selection process for new officers	9	18
19o. Residents participate in promotional process	9	27
Summary Score	3.7	2.6

The most popular avenues for citizen involvement in policy making were via advisory committees formed to counsel police at various levels within the organization. During 1993/95, large percentages of these cities reported that residents were involved in neighborhood and citywide advisory councils, but then these numbers dropped off considerably. Surprisingly, the number of cities involving citizens at the neighborhood level dropped from nine (82 percent) to five (46 percent). Citywide citizen representation declined as well, by two measures. At the outset, half of the agencies indicated that citizens help develop policing policies, but that number declined as well. Only Oakland indicated that the public was involved in evaluating officer performance, and they had apparently dropped that experiment by 1997. A surprising number—eight cities—reported during 1993/95 that the public helped review complaints against police, another innovative arrangement, but by 1997 that had dropped to four cities (Hartford, Oakland, Salt Lake City and Wichita). On the other hand, in 1993/95 only Hartford indicated that citizens participated in the selection of new officers, and only Salt Lake City that the public participates in the promotional process, but both percentages rose by 1997. But in the end, the number of agencies reporting being involved in five or six of these six projects dropped by half (from 36 percent to 18 percent) over time. By 1997, the top-ranked city in terms of citizen involvement in police policy making was Oakland, followed by Salt Lake City.

Police Department Partnerships for Problem Solving

A key to community policing is a shift in orientation from crime fighting to problem solving. Community policing inevitably involves expanding the police mandate to encompass a broad range of concerns, and to being responsive to priorities set by the public when responding to those concerns. But the police cannot do this on their own. When those priorities include quality of life issues, physical decay of the neighborhood, mental health needs, substance abuse, or just simple refuse collection, they will need service-delivery partners. They need partners when it comes to

help implement youth programs and youth education projects, and the most obvious of them is local schools.

Table 20 summarizes the survey data on these partnerships. Even before CCP, almost all police departments reported being in partnership with other agencies to identify and resolve problems. The exceptions before CCP were Atlanta and after CCP Denver. All of the departments reported that they were working with schools to deliver educational and youth programs. About half of the cities indicated that they had the capability of sharing data with other agencies concerning neighborhood conditions, and this fraction did not change significantly over time.

Table 20: Measures of Agency Partnerships

	1993/95	**1997**
Has implemented police/youth programs (e.g., PAL program, school liaison, mentoring program (15i)	100	100
Has implemented drug education program in schools (15j)	100	100
Has implemented means of accessing other city or county databases to analyze community conditions (16e)	55	46
Has implemented landlord/manager training programs for order maintenance & drug reduction (15t)	55	46
Has implemented interagency involvement in problem identification and resolution (15x)	91	91
Summary Score	4.8	5.0

Neighborhood Orientation

Community policing almost inevitably calls for a renewed commitment to organizing police efforts around relatively small areas. Officers need to be assigned to those areas for relatively long periods of time, so that they can learn about neighborhood problems, community resources that can be brought to bear on problems, and residents that they can depend on. A neighborhood orientation is also critical if the police are to help set in motion voluntary local efforts to prevent crime and disorder. They need to support community crime prevention programs, and neighborhood watches and patrols.

Table 21 reports the results of seven questions about neighborhood orientation. The average number of projects that these cities were involved in went up very modestly over time, but the fraction that were heavily involved (identifying at least five of the seven projects) went up from 64 percent to 82 percent.

The Community Policing Survey found that most departments had begun to adopt a neighborhood orientation even before their CCP programs were underway. In more than 80 percent of cities, beat or patrol boundaries coincided with neighborhood boundaries. Seven cities reported that they could make geographically based crime

analysis available to their beat officers. All twelve cities indicated that they operated out of permanent neighborhood-based offices or stations, and nine of the eleven—all but Atlanta and Denver—assigned patrol officers to specific beats or areas. Eight cities had designated special community officers, who were responsible for working in special areas, one of the two community policing projects that went up in frequency between 1993/95 and 1997. By 1997, only Atlanta and Denver were not involved in a majority of these projects.

Table 21: Measures of Neighborhood Orientation

	1993/95	1997
Has implemented fixed assignment of patrol officers to specific beats or areas (15l)	82	91
Has implemented designation of officers as community officers responsible for working in areas with special problems or needs (15m)	73	100
Has implemented permanent neighborhood-based offices or stations (15f)	100	91
Has implemented mobile neighborhood-based offices or stations (15g)	64	55
Has implemented geographically based crime analysis for officers at the beat level (15w)	64	55
Has implemented beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood boundaries (16b)	82	82
Most local officers act like "chief of the beat" (17l)	18	27
Summary Score	4.8	5.0

Devolution of Authority

The surveys also examined the extent to which CCP agencies have begun to push down authority and responsibility, empowering mid-level managers to make decisions and allocate resources. Police departments have been almost uniformly hierarchical, command-and-control organizations that allowed little flexibility in decision-making at the level at which the real work of the department is done. However, community policing requires creative responses to varying local conditions and problems, and to function effectively line managers need to be able to discover and set their own goals and allocate and manage their own resources.

Table 22 examines responses to 13 questions about the devolution of authority in these agencies. It appears that the devolution of authority to the level of captains and lieutenants was fairly advanced in these cities by 1993/95. In the early surveys it was reported that in over 80 percent of these cities mid-level managers made final decisions about priority problems and about how to handle most community problems. In three-quarters of the CCP cities they would make final decisions about how police department resources would be used to solve problems. In all but one they could on their own establish working relationships with other city agencies and a similar fraction were responsible for remaining in regular contact with local activists. However, almost every one of these projects declined in frequency between 1993/95 and 1997. Based on the surveys, fewer mid-level managers were responsi-

ble for coordinating with other city agencies, making local decisions about how to handle problems, and making resource allocation decisions. Of these 13 projects, during 1993/95, the percentage involved in at least ten of them remained constant over time, so the bulk of the decline was among agencies that were not fully committed to the concept before CCP began. In 1997, the highest-ranked cities were Salt Lake City, followed by Fort Worth, Wichita, Boston, and Baltimore.

Table 22: Measures of Devolution of Authority

	1993/95	1997
Mid-level managers redesign organization to support problem-solving efforts (18a)	55	46
Mid-level managers maintain regular contact with community leaders (18b)	91	82
Mid-level managers establish interagency relationships (18c)	91	77
Mid-level managers make final decisions about which problems are to be addressed in area (18d)	82	73
Mid-level managers make final decisions about how to handle most community problems (18e)	82	64
Mid-level managers make final decisions about application of agency resources to solve problems in area (18f)	73	36
Mid-level managers elicit input from officers about solutions to community problems (18g)	82	73
Mid-level managers evaluate performance for the area (18i)	27	64
Agency command or decision-making responsibility tied to neighborhoods (16a)	91	82
Agency has physical decentralization of field services (16c)	73	73
Agency has physical decentralization of investigations (16d)	54	46
16h. Agency has decentralized crime analysis unit/function (16h)	36	27
Mid-level managers manage crime analysis for the area (18h)	27	46
Summary Score	4.8	5.0

Ranking the Cities

Based on responses to the Community Policing Survey, it is possible to score each of the 14 CCP cities on the dimensions of community policing described above. To do so, the responses of each city were examined to determine if they had adopted the organizational strategies described above. The cities were scored on each dimension by summing responses to the items that made up a conceptual cluster. This is the same score presented at the bottom of each of the tables presented above, except that the cities that were first surveyed in 1997—Wilmington, Phoenix and Omaha—are also included. An examination of the relationship between the five dimensions revealed that there was also consistency across clusters—for example, cities that had adopted a strong neighborhood orientation also fostered the coordination of services by other agencies in support of problem solving. As a result of this consistency, it was useful to create a summary measure of the extent to which each city had adopted community policing.

The conceptual dimensions along which agencies were scored were described above: public outreach, citizen activism, public involvement in policy-making, police department partnerships, devolution of authority in the organization, and the adoption of a neighborhood orientation. The following table describes how strongly many of these elements go together, evidence that community policing is indeed a broad "package" of organizational arrangements and policing tactics. It presents the correlation between each pair of measures, for the 14 cities that were able to respond to the 1997 survey.

Table 23: Correlation between 1997 Community Policing Dimensions

	Public Outreach	Citizen Activism	Policy Making	Agency Partners	Devolve Authority
Activism	.7169				
Involvement	.6966	.8426			
Partners	.7565	.8006	.8535		
Authority	.6408	.5739	.4254	.5913	
Orientation	.5402	.5676	.5742	.5908	.6165

The high consistency between measures of these aspects of community policing for the 14 CCP cities recommended a summary measure that gave each of them equal weight, in order to assign an over-all ranking to each of the agencies. Table 24 presents a ranking—from low to high— of the extent to which the CCP single cities had adopted these community-policing strategies by 1997. In addition to the summary measure, it also presents the ranking of each police department on each of the component indices. Ties in scoring are represented by identical rankings.

Table 24: Rankings of CCP Single Cities

	Summary	Public Outreach	Citizen Activism	Make Policy	Agency Partnerships	Devolve Authority	Neighborhood Orientation
Atlanta	1	5	1	2	4	1	3
Denver	2	5	3	2	1	2	1
Hartford	3	1	6	5	4	4	8
Baltimore	5	3	3	2	4	10	8
Wilmington	5	3	6	7	4	4	8
Omaha	6	7	11	7	8	4	2
Columbia	7	9	6	5	4	8	8
Seattle	8	7	6	10	8	7	8
Boston	9	11	9	7	12	12	8
Wichita	11	9	11	10	12	12	8
Phoenix	11	11	9	13	12	9	8
Oakland	12	11	14	14	12	6	13
Ft. Worth	13	13	11	10	8	14	13
Salt Lake	14	14	14	12	12	14	14

Based on these rankings, police departments in Salt Lake City, Fort Worth, Oakland, Phoenix and Wichita reported having adopted the most aspects of community policing by 1997. The cities of Atlanta, Denver and Hartford reported adopting the least number of community policing aspects.

Some notable exceptions were apparent in the relative extent to which individual components of the community-policing package were adopted. Omaha scored relatively high on citizen activism and Seattle on public involvement in police policy-making, despite their generally middling rankings. Baltimore stood in the bottom quartile on many measures, but was relatively high in the extent to which it had devolved authority down in the police organizational structure. On the other hand, Phoenix and Oakland stood relatively low on that dimension of community policing, despite their relatively high overall ranking. Fort Worth had not gotten very far along in involving other city agencies in their program, a factor that was also apparent in our site visits there; otherwise, it was near the top on every measure. The large number of tied ranks on the neighborhood orientation measures reflects the fact that over-all levels of adoption of this organizational stance were high, as depicted in Table 24 above. Finally, the cities that were new to the program in 1997 all stood in the middle or high ranks.

Multi-jurisdictional CCP Sites

In this section, the results from the Community Policing Survey are presented for the multi-jurisdictional sites, those CCP sites where many jurisdictions were involved. The 1995 evaluation survey was sent to each participating jurisdiction, along with the follow-ups as described above. A total of 24 cities were surveyed from Metro Atlanta in 1995, and 25 in 1997; 19 East Bay sites were surveyed in 1995, and 18 in 1997; 34 agencies were surveyed from Metro Denver in 1995, and 29 in 1997. Because larger cities were sampled for the 1993 national survey, it was impossible to match the 1995 responses of the small CCP jurisdictions to the earlier survey, and therefore only the results of the 1995 survey are reported here. A series of tables presented below describe the pattern of responses for the multi-jurisdictional sites. As above, the tables present the percentage of agencies in the area that had adopted various elements of community policing in 1995 and 1997. As before, only reports that various program elements or organizational innovations actually were in place are examined here.

Table 25 presents the results of a single question about the status of community policing in each of the multi-jurisdictional sites. The departments were asked to describe their department's "current situation with respect to the adoption of a community policing approach." In 1995, East Bay cities were the furthest along in adopting community policing followed by cities in the Metro Denver program. Those around Metro Atlanta had adopted the fewest organizational strategies associated with community policing. Asked the extent to which they had implemented community policing, 58 percent reported having done so in East Bay, 41 percent in the Metro Denver area, and 25 percent around Metro Atlanta. Of course, none of the chiefs professed to be ignoring the imperative of the CCP program—virtually all the others reported that they were "in the process" of implementing community policing, or had done so in specific target areas. Between the surveys, Metro Atlanta-

area agencies generally moved from "planning" or a "targeted areas" approach to a full implementation of community policing citywide. In East Bay, there was little change between 1995 and 1997, but there was some turnover among the "planning" and 'targeted areas" levels of implementation. There was not much change at all among communities around Metro Denver.

Table 25: Agency Adoption of Community Policing

Current agency situation with respect to adoption of a community policing approach	Metro Atlanta		East Bay		Metro Denver	
	1995	1997	1995	1997	1995	1997
"We considered adopting a community policing approach, but rejected the idea because it was not the appropriate policy for this agency."	8	8	0	6	3	0
"We considered adopting a community policing approach, and liked the idea, but it is not practical here at this time."	4	4	5	0	6	3
"We are in the process of planning or implementing a community policing approach."	29	20	16	22	26	21
"We have implemented community policing in specific target areas."	33	28	21	11	24	28
"We have implemented community policing citywide."	25	40	58	61	41	48
Total (number of cases)	99% (24)	100% (25)	100% (19)	100% (18)	100% (34)	100% (29)

Public Outreach

The survey items in Table 26 assess the extent to which the departments engaged in outreach efforts to inform the public about their plans, and about the opportunities that community policing creates for meaningful involvement. The results mirror those of Table 25. East Bay agencies were doing the most and Metro Atlanta-area agencies the least. Based on the summary score presented at the bottom of Table 9, there was a substantial increase in public outreach on the part of Metro Denver-area agencies between 1995 and 1997. These were, most notably, increases in citizen training in problem solving (from 18 to 41 percent of agencies) and citizen police academies (from 32 to 55 percent of agencies).

Table 26: Measures of Community Outreach

	Metro Atlanta	East Bay	Metro Denver
Residents attend citizen police academy (19c) 1995 1997	12 20	42 56	32 55
Mid-level managers maintain regular contact with community leaders (18b) 1995 1997	54 48	68 83	74 62
Officers expected to develop familiarity with community leaders (17b) 1995 1997	50 40	74 50	50 55
Officers expected to assist in organizing community (17d) 1995 1997	8 12	32 33	35 28
Has implemented training for citizens in problem identification or resolution (15r) 1995 1997	21 24	26 50	18 41
Officers expected to meet regularly with community groups (17h) 1995 1997	8 0	42 22	29 31
Has implemented citizen surveys to determine community needs and priorities (15c) 1995 1997	38 44	68 67	68 69
Has implemented citizen surveys to evaluate police service (15d) 1995 1997	42 32	63 67	65 79
Summary Score 1995 1997	2.3 2.2	4.2 4.3	3.7 4.2

Citizen Activism

Table 27 examines the formation of partnerships between the police and the public that coordinate the exercise of both formal and informal social control. It is generally agreed that successful community-policing programs need to develop these kinds of formal and informal mechanisms to facilitate the formation of partnerships.

Table 27: Measures of Citizen Activism

	Metro Atlanta	East Bay	Metro Denver
Residents participate in neighborhood watch program (19a)			
1995	75	79	97
1997	60	80	86
Residents serve as volunteers within the police agency (19b)			
1995	33	42	71
1997	28	56	60
Residents serve in citizen patrols coordinated by your agency (19d)			
1995	8	32	12
1997	12	22	21
Residents participants in court watch program (19g)			
1995	4	5	9
1997	4	11	10
Residents work with police to identify and resolve community or neighborhood problems (19j)			
1995	58	58	85
1997	56	78	79
Officers expected to work with citizens to identify and resolve area problems (17c)			
1995	50	68	74
1997	32	67	76
Summary Score			
1995	2.3	2.8	3.5
1997	1.9	3.2	3.4

In both the 1995 and 1997 surveys, departments in the Metro Denver-area program were more likely than others to be involved in stimulating citizen activism and co-ordinating their problem-solving efforts with those of community members. East Bay police departments were the next most likely to do so. Opportunities for citizen activism went up over time in East Bay, and down around Metro Atlanta. The biggest increases in East Bay were among the use of civilian volunteers within departments and residents working with police on problem-solving projects. Court watch programs were not frequent anywhere, and many departments seemed wary of getting involved in citizen patrols, but otherwise almost all of the elements of community policing assessed in Table 27 were fairly popular even before the program began.

Citizen Involvement in Policy Making

Perhaps the most controversial of all within police agencies is the practice of admitting community members into the process of shaping the departments' operational policies and organizational practices. Table 28 summarizes the extent to which residents could be involved in this way in the three multi-jurisdictional sites.

As around the single cities, there was a marked *decrease* in citizen involvement in policy making over time in these jurisdictions. The practice was less advanced in Metro Atlanta than elsewhere, but it declined in East Bay and Metro Denver by 1997. The most common roles for citizens were to serve on citywide advisory boards

or committees advising the chiefs, and in selecting new officers. The latter was about the only practice that went up in frequency over this time period. The biggest declines were in helping evaluate officer performance and reviewing complaints about police (but those both went up around Metro Atlanta).

Table 28: Measures of Citizen Involvement in Policy-Making

	Metro Atlanta	East Bay	Metro Denver
Residents serve on citizen advisory councils at neighborhood level (19e) 1995 1997	21 28	32 50	29 17
Residents serve on citizen advisory councils at citywide level (19f) 1995 1997	17 16	47 39	44 38
Residents serve on advisory group for chief or agency managers (19h) 1995 1997	17 28	47 56	29 34
Residents help develop policing policies (19k) 1995 1997	12 12	47 22	24 17
Residents help evaluate officer performance (19l) 1995 1997	4 20	32 6	21 6
Residents help review complaints against police (19m) 1995 1997	4 16	42 11	15 3
Residents participate in selection process for new officers (19n) 1995 1997	4 20	42 44	24 38
Residents participate in promotional process (19o) 1995 1997	8 12	42 28	29 38
Summary Score 1995 1997	0.9 1.5	3.3 2.6	2.8 2.0

Agency Partnerships for Problem-Solving

Police cannot conduct an effective community-policing program on their own. As mentioned previously, they need to form partnerships with service-delivery partners. Table 29 summarizes the frequency of some of these activities. Based on the 1995 and 1997 surveys, police department partnerships grew much more common in East Bay and around Metro Denver. The biggest increases were in the adoption of partnerships with code enforcement bureaus to tackle building code problems, and a list of police-youth activities. Interagency involvement in problem identification and resolution went up around both Metro Denver and Oakland, but declined in the Metro Atlanta area. Sharing database access with city or county agencies was common, and on the increase between 1995 and 1997, only in East Bay.

Table 29:Measures of Agency Partnerships

	Metro At-lanta	East Bay	Metro Denver
Has implemented police/youth programs (e.g., PAL program, school liaison, mentoring program (15r) 1995 1997	54 56	63 78	74 90
Has implemented drug education program in schools (15j) 1995 1997	71 64	63 83	88 93
Has implemented means of accessing other city or county databases to analyze community conditions (16e) 1995 1997	21 20	42 61	35 28
Has implemented landlord-manager training programs for order maintenance & drug reduction (15t) 1995 1997	25 12	32 56	32 59
Has implemented interagency involvement in problem identification and resolution (15x) 1995 1997	67 44	68 83	59 69
Summary Score 1995 1997	2.4 2.0	2.7 3.6	2.9 3.4

Neighborhood Orientation

Community policing usually requires a renewed commitment to organizing police efforts around relatively small areas. Officers need to learn about neighborhood problems and the residents that they can depend on. They need to support community crime prevention programs, and (perhaps) neighborhood watches and patrols. Among the organizational arrangements that support this are decentralized district stations (the lynchpin of Fort Worth's program) and permanently assigned community officers.

As documented in Table 30, in the 1995 survey there were only small and inconsistent differences between the three multi-jurisdictional sites in terms of organizing the delivery of police service at the neighborhood level, and few differences across the areas. But by 1997, East Bay sites reported opening neighborhood offices, redrawing beat boundaries to match those of neighborhoods, and designating officers to work in particular areas, at the same time that these measures of neighborhood orientation actually went down somewhat in the Metro Atlanta-area jurisdictions.

Table 30: Measures of Neighborhood Orientation

	Metro Atlanta	East Bay	Metro Denver
Has implemented fixed assignment of patrol officers to specific beats or areas (15l) 1995 1997	58 44	63 67	56 52
Has implemented designation of officers as community officers responsible for working in areas with special problems or needs (15m) 1995 1997	62 56	42 50	47 72
Has implemented permanent neighborhood-based offices or stations (15f) 1995 1997	29 20	21 50	24 34
Has implemented mobile neighborhood-based offices or stations (15g) 1995 1997	0 20	37 28	15 7
Has implemented geographically based crime analysis for officers at the beat level (15w) 1995 1997	58 36	53 56	47 45
Has implemented beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood boundaries (16b) 1995 1997	38 36	47 61	38 59
Most local officers act like "chief of the beat" (17l) 1995 1997	8 16	21 33	29 14
Summary Score 1995 1997	2.5 2.3	2.8 3.4	2.6 2.8

Devolution of Authority

As part of adopting community policing, agencies have begun to devolve authority and responsibility to mid-level managers, to make decisions and allocate resources. This organizational arrangement enables police to formulate more creative responses to varying local conditions and problems, and to set their own goals and allocate and manage their own resources. The results of the surveys are summarized in Table 31.

Table 31: Measures of Devolution of Authority

	Metro Atlanta	East Bay	Metro Denver
Mid-level managers redesign organization to support problem solving efforts (18a)			
1995	38	53	50
1997	32	72	59
Mid-level managers maintain regular contact with community leaders (18b)			
1995	54	68	74
1997	48	83	62
Mid-level managers establish interagency relationships (18c)			
1995	62	79	88
1997	52	78	76
Mid-level managers make final decisions about which problems are to be addressed in area (18d)			
1995	50	63	65
1997	36	67	59
Mid-level managers make final decisions about how to handle most community problems (18e)			
1995	46	58	65
1997	40	61	55
Mid-level managers make final decisions about application of agency resources to solve problems in area (18f)			
1995	33	53	50
1997	36	56	62
Mid-level managers elicit input from officers about solutions to community problems (18g)			
1995	92	79	85
1997	68	83	86
Mid-level managers evaluate performance for the area (18i)			
1995	33	47	47
1997	40	39	45
Agency command or decision-making responsibility tied to neighborhoods (16a)			
1995	38	42	29
1997	32	50	38
Agency has physical decentralization of field services (16c)			
1995	29	27	21
1997	24	17	28
Agency has physical decentralization of investigations (16d)			
1995	21	21	12
1997	20	17	7
Agency has decentralized crime analysis unit/function (16h)			
1995	4	26	0
1997	12	0	14
Mid-level managers manage crime analysis for the area (18h)			
1995	21	42	41
1997	32	44	31
Summary Score			
1995	5.2	6.6	6.3
1997	4.7	6.7	6.2

Table 31 presents a long list of indicators of the extent to which these police departments have decentralized responsibility and authority. Both in 1995 and 1997, this was most common in East Bay, followed by Metro Denver and Metro Atlanta. Devolution actually decreased in the Metro Atlanta sites over this time period, while it remained the same in the other two metropolitan areas. The most notable decreases were in the role of mid-level managers and in making final decisions

about problem priorities. In East Bay there was an increase in mid-level manager contact with community leaders, and reorganizations of police department structures to support problem solving.

Ranking the Multi-jurisdictional Sites

As before, the conceptual dimensions along which agencies were scored were described above: public outreach, citizen activism, public involvement in policy-making, police department partnership, devolution of authority in the organization, and the adoption of a neighborhood orientation. Table 32 describes how strongly many of these elements go together, further evidence that community policing is indeed a broad "package" of organizational arrangements and policing tactics. It presents the correlation between each pair of measures, for the 72 departments that were able to respond to the 1997 survey.

Table 32: Correlation between 1997 Community Policing Dimensions

	Public Outreach	Citizen Activism	Policy Making	Agency Partners	Devolve Authority
Activism	.6514				
Involvement	.4082	.6010			
Partners	.5081	.6230	.4499		
Authority	.5057	.4638	.3094	.5041	
Orientation	.5004	.5227	.4387	.5540	.4499

The high consistency between measures of these aspects of community policing for the 72 multi-jurisdictional cities recommended a summary measure that gave each of them equal weight, in order to assign an over-all ranking to each of the sites. Table 17 presents a ranking—from low to high—of the extent to which the multi-jurisdictional sites had adopted these community-policing strategies. In addition to the summary measure, it also presents the ranking area on each of the component indicators. The rankings were extremely consistent, and placed the East Bay site at the top and Metro Atlanta at the bottom of virtually every dimension. Metro Denver ranked at the top in citizen activism as reflected in the details presented above in Table 33. It is interesting to note that Oakland, the major city in the East Bay area, ranked among the highest among the single cities in its implementation of community policing. Indeed, observations did confirm the fact that Oakland was one of the cities that was instrumental in helping the Easy Bay communities move toward community policing. By contrast, Denver was lagging behind some of the smaller cities in the Metro Denver area, like Boulder, which, along with state government, was most responsible for leading the way into community policing.

Table 33: Rankings of CCP Multi-jurisdictional Sites

	Summary	Public Outreach	Citizen Activism	Make Policy	Agency Partnerships	Devolve Authority	Neighborhood Orientation
Metro Atlanta	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Metro Denver	2	2	3	2	2	2	2
East Bay	3	3	2	3	3	3	3

Conclusions from the Survey

Issues in Assessing Change

A careful examination of the results of the three Community Policing Surveys revealed complexities in these measures that shaped our view of how they should be interpreted, especially with regard to changes over time. These observations may also provide a general lesson in interpreting other similar police department surveys.

Observation One   Many CCP grantees were already moving in the direction of community policing *before* the program began, and had already inaugurated many of the tactics and organizational arrangements that were to be examined over time. This should not be surprising. CCP grantees were by-and-large selected because they were forward-looking, innovative, well-led departments hooked into national policing circles. In particular, among the twelve single-city sites, Boston, Fort Worth, Hartford, Baltimore, and Salt Lake City had adopted many aspects of community policing before the launch of CCP. Many program elements were already popular. For example, when asked if they participated in neighborhood watch programs, all of the twelve single cities were doing so before CCP began, along with 97 percent of the multi-jurisdictional sites around Metro Denver, 79 percent in East Bay, and 75 percent in Metro Atlanta. This creates what is called a "ceiling effect." When it came to measuring change, many specific program elements and several of the cities simply could not improve much on these measures. The lesson: do not expect agencies that were already doing well to improve much over time.

Observation Two Expect agencies to *stop* doing things; do not expect them to adopt an ever-increasing number of program elements over time. Community policing is a new idea, and police departments were doing a lot of experimenting with different policies and practices during the early to mid-1990s. Some doubtless worked for them, while others did not, and some of the practices examined in the survey grew less common over time. For example, two of the most innovative agencies—Baltimore and Hartford—stopped conducting citizen surveys to determine community needs and priorities. In the surveys a decline in the adoption of many specific tactics between 1993/95 and 1997 was noted. Innovative progress is not something that happens overnight, but must instead, proceed through several stages, includ-

ing assessment, planning, implementation, reassessment, and readjustment—the last two stages of which should be on-going.

<u>Observation Three</u> Agencies may not do one thing because they have done another; they are not less innovative because they are not doing them both. Many specific tactics and organizational arrangements may substitute for one another. Agencies may drop one in order to try the other (Lesson Two), or adopt one but not the other (Lesson Three). For example, the Community Policing Survey asked if departments were sponsoring neighborhood watch programs *and* if they were coordinating citizen patrols. In addition to any ambiguity over which is which, it is likely that some agencies would decide how they want to handle citizen involvement and make a choice from among these options. Strategically, departments might not devolve authority and responsibility on mid-level managers because they choose to by-pass them, to more directly empower line officers serving small geographical areas.

<u>Observation Four</u> Outside of large cities, it is not always clear that departments *need* to adopt many of the formal arrangements that have come to be associated with community policing. Small agencies may not need to devolve authority to mid-level managers; those serving small communities may not need to conduct sample surveys to gauge public opinion, or to reorganize themselves to better serve or secure citizen representation from even smaller geographical units. The size of some of the agencies involved presented a set of limits on how much "fundamental change" one could expect to observe among many of the small communities in the multi-jurisdictional sites.

<u>Observation Five</u> It is hard to know what policies or practices are appropriate for a community's policing program. The extent to which foot patrol, mobile stations, prioritization of calls or alternative responses to calls—all topics of the survey—are required is highly variable from community to community, depending on their density and physical layout, the nature of existing facilities and call volume and character. From the survey, it is hard to discern what *not* adopting these and many other specific policies means.

Summary of Surveys

This section of the report examined changes over time to the extent to which elements of community policing programs were implemented in the CCP single cities and multi-jurisdictional sites. The data were presented with a broad brush, for—as detailed above—there are many complexities in interpreting survey data like these. In particular, many cities were already heavily invested in community policing before they received funding.

The devolution of authority and responsibility to mid-level managers seemed to decline over time in the single cities, and in Metro Atlanta. There was evidence of decreasing roles for citizen activists in the single cities. Police and residents work-

ing together on problem-solving projects, places for volunteers within agencies and support for neighborhood watch all declined between 1995 and 1997. Roles for activists also declined in the Metro Atlanta site, but went up a bit in East Bay. However, the citizen activism cluster was one where levels of implementation were already high at the time these jurisdictions were first surveyed. More noticeable, therefore, was the decline in roles for citizens in police policy-making. In both the single cities and the multi-jurisdictional sites, there were declines in the role of citizens on advisory boards, and in reviewing police department policies and personnel practices.

The decline in roles for citizen activists is puzzling but very important. One can only speculate about the forces at work and leave this open for future research. This disengagement is occurring at a time when police departments have had considerable experience (during the early 1990s) working with community leaders within the community-policing framework. It is probable, based on observations in various cities nationwide, that law enforcement agencies have found the road to full and equal partnership rocky and cluttered with real obstacles. Consequently, in some areas, researchers and policymakers are witnessing retreat and withdrawal from police-community partnerships. Police officers, like all human beings, need reinforcement and positive experiences to continue engaging in specific behaviors.

On the more positive side, the surveys did document increases in public outreach programs between 1995 and 1997, in both the single cities and the multi-jurisdictional sites. There were noticeable increases in the role of citizen police academies, civilian training in problem solving, and the use of surveys to gauge public opinion. The formation of partnerships between police and other agencies remained stable in the single cities, and increased somewhat in frequency in two of the three multi-jurisdictional sites. There were reports of increased use of inter-agency databases and cooperation between agencies in problem solving. There were also increases in the neighborhood orientation of multi-jurisdictional sites, especially in East Bay. More neighborhood officers were opened, and police boundaries were redrawn to better match neighborhood distinctions. The neighborhood orientation of single city departments remained unchanged, but high, over time.

On-Site Observations of Community Policing

The sample of police departments in the CCP evaluation may, or may not be representative of American police departments. Probably all, given CCP requirements, needed to have a minimal, or nominal, commitment to community policing. Boston, Baltimore, Hartford, and Wilmington are old eastern departments; Columbia is a relatively small southern department; Fort Worth and Phoenix are southwestern departments; Salt Lake City, Denver, and East Bay Region police are western departments; Metro Omaha is a Midwest department; and Seattle is a northwestern department. In each case, the region brings with it certain connotations: eastern, of

politics and ethnic communities; southern, of civility and deliberate pacing; western, of independence and self-sufficiency; Midwest, of reticence and propriety; southwest, of conservatism and freedom; and northwestern, as laid back and progressive. Missing in this sample, of course, are some of the other unique regions that bring to mind other characteristics: notably, southern California, the Great Lakes region, and the Deep South.

Nonetheless, each department has its own story, which can be found in the separate case studies of the twelve intensively studied sites. Baltimore is a story of a department that was afflicted with petty corruption, racial antagonism among staff, and a troubled relationship with the African-American community. Chief Thomas Frazier was recruited both to gain control over the department's problems and to shift to a community approach. Boston, in respects had a similar history—a department that, in the view of a blue ribbon community panel, had been grossly mismanaged, was antagonistic to the minority community, and unable to make significant gains in its attempts to shift to community policing. Commissioner Paul Evans, First Deputy Superintendent under the brief leadership of William Bratton, was appointed to reinvigorate and shift the department's strategy. Wilmington had to overcome severe antagonism between the mayor and a chief, with the chief finally quitting at a time when the city was being overwhelmed with youth violence. Hartford, too, had to reorient its program in mid-stream, finally seeming to find itself when program control was shifted from the police department to the city manager's office. Columbia's story was different. There, Charles Austin, a chief deeply respected in the community and respected within the department, systematically moved the police department towards a new model of policing with a broadly expanded role for police. Fort Worth's story is similar: Chief Thomas Windham, had a clear vision of where he wanted to take the department—and many observers of police believe that the Fort Worth Police Department is an exemplar of a shift to community policing. Salt Lake City, despite its highly innovative and risky attempt to create a new neighborhood-level service delivery system, was more cautious, yet steadfast, in its approach to community policing. Phoenix placed its focus on improved governance in all sectors of government with strong support from police. The Metro Denver and East Bay CCPs are regional efforts with Metro Denver attempting to improve policing through a statewide training infrastructure and East Bay through political and departmental collaborations that, while sought for decades, were only now achievable. Metro Omaha, also a regional project, is a story about a collaboration between a housing authority and a community policing unit that was viewed as so successful, both effective and organizationally edifying, that it became a model for future police innovation. Finally, the story in Seattle is about a Chief, Norman Stamper, who was recruited to reorient a department that was remote from the community and neighborhoods and managed autocratically. Unlike Baltimore and Boston where a sense of organizational crisis and urgency drove reform, no sense of crisis existed inside the Seattle department. Within the department, considerable support existed for the strongly pro-police and conservative stance of the former chief.

Probably one of our key findings regarding the role of CCP is the extent to which cities and police departments both felt they were given the latitude by BJA authorities to tailor their programs to their communities' agendas for change. In virtually every site, a change process can be identified that was in place prior to CCP funding. This is important. It meant that local nuances, values, budgets, and priorities dominated, suggesting the likelihood that efforts would have continuity. In Fort Worth, for example, community policing was started in about a third of the city with Weed and Seed funds. Special tax funds were used in another third of the city. Finally, CCP funds were used to implement community policing citywide. In Boston, a blue ribbon committee developed a strategic plan in response to severe criticisms of the police department. It envisioned the implementation of a complicated planning and implementation process, which CCP subsequently funded. In Metro Omaha, a model of community policing and collaboration that had been jointly developed by the Omaha Police Department and the Omaha Housing Authority became the model for CCP. Thus, the attempts to implement community policing varied considerably by city—no specific CCP *package* can be identified. Strategies to implement community policing in the twelve sites included a redefinition of the police function, training, organizational *flattening*, decentralization of authority, foot patrols, the creation of computerized and accessible databases for neighborhood police; call management systems, civilianization, problem solving, officer residence programs, new accountability structures that include accountability to the community, volunteer civilian patrols, and community organization.

For the purposes of this discussion, attempts to shift departments' strategies to community policing are broken down into three categories: entrepreneurial, administrative, and tactical. Entrepreneurial refers to a redefinition and marketing of core services; administrative, to the organizational structure and managerial processes required to develop, maintain, and monitor the organization's activities; and tactical, to the methods used to provide these services.[18]

Entrepreneurial Strategies

That each department had some commitment to community policing is obvious: it was one of the basic requirements of the Comprehensive Communities Program. Without exception, departments had explicit plans to shift to community policing, although sites varied considerably in the depth and comprehensiveness of those plans. For the most part, community policing meant providing community service, solving problems, responding to citizen priorities, preventing crime, maintaining order, and improving the quality of urban life. How this played out in real life var-

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[18] See Raymond E. Miles and Charles C. Snow, *Organizational Strategy, Structure, and Process*, New York, McGraw Hill, 1978 and George L. Kelling and William J. Bratton, "Implementing Community Policing: The Administrative Problem," *Perspectives on Policing* 17, National Institute of Justice and Harvard University, July 1993.

ied substantially across departments, however, most departments struggled with a split-force concept with the long-term goal of shifting to total community policing over time. Some officers saw themselves in quite traditional terms. For example in Baltimore, a foot patrol officer with over 20 years of experience viewed himself as primarily a law enforcement officer, whose job was to patrol his beat. He was not averse to becoming involved in a wide variety of community issues, but nonetheless in his view his core competence was patrolling and managing his beat. His only reservations about his job as a community officer were that too many activities might interfere with his functioning as a patrolling officer. He was a very good patrol officer and loved his work. On the other hand, community officers in Columbia saw themselves in much broader terms. They were community mobilizers whose core competence was to mobilize the community and resources and, in collaboration with service agencies, link troubled and trouble-making persons and families to appropriate services. They, in turn were backed up by neighborhood officers who both patrolled and provided community services. These mobilizers were very good police officers, as well. Oakland (East Bay) shifted from community policing as a special unit and function to citywide community policing involving the entire department. Due to the popularity of community officers, both politicians and community representatives saw such a shift as a retreat from community policing. In Fort Worth, the department pursued the split force concept, with community policing officers in every district on call 24 hours per day to solve any and all neighborhood problems. In Salt Lake City, community policing officers were assigned to the multi-agency problem-solving teams, where each member of the group is assumed to have unique skills/expertise (i.e., community policing officers on the team are told they are not probation officers, prosecutors, truant officers, social workers, teachers, etc.).

In other words, considerable experimentation is still going on regarding the role of neighborhood or community officers and the research team saw a considerable range of functions. Most departments have long range goals of having all officers be problem-solvers and community officers, but are a long way from that goal at present.

Administrative Strategies

A variety of organizational and administrative changes were made to facilitate the shift to community policing. The clearest examples of devolution of authority are to be found in Baltimore, Boston, Phoenix, and Fort Worth. In Baltimore and Boston, district captains have been given extensive geographical authority, including over special units and criminal investigation. In Baltimore, Fort Worth, and Phoenix, lieutenants have been given geographical responsibility, experimentally in one district in Baltimore and department-wide in Fort Worth and Phoenix. The guiding principle in all four of these departments has been a shift from a functional to a geographical organization. In Boston, this shift has been so profound and the linkages

to communities so tight, that common wisdom has it that decentralization could not be reversed even by a new administration.

Planning was widely used as a means of strategically shifting police departments. It played a special role in three sites. While not funded by CCP, the Design Coaching Team is carefully planning Seattle's shift to community policing. Essentially, its responsibilities included developing a strategic plan that evokes new values and goals for the department, as well as a realistic plan for achieving them. This plan was then taken to the community in a series of approximately 25 community roundtables. This process is still underway in Seattle. Internal roundtables among police staff are on the drawing board.

A second interesting use of planning as a means of change was in Boston. An intensive, decentralized planning process was implemented in all eleven of Boston's districts. This planning process was used to facilitate decentralization (by holding districts accountable for developing and maintaining the planning process), to structure a new relationship with the community (by involving the community in planning and goal setting), to establish priorities in each district, and to establish accountability to the community (by publishing the goals in each district and reporting to community members about the achievement of those goals).

The third site in which strategic planning played a special role was in Phoenix where conscious efforts were made to understand and apply private sector principles of long range strategic planning. Chief Garrett established a strategic planning team to design the future direction of the department, to unify programmatic efforts, and to establish benchmarks to measure departmental progress.

While training of some kind was planned for most of the CCP sites, it went beyond routine in Metro Denver and Seattle. In Seattle, a sophisticated training effort that included training senior executives, mid-level supervisors, officer-trainers, field training officers, and line staff was mounted by the Community Policing Bureau (as against the Seattle Police Department's Training Bureau). Civilian participation included staff from other city agencies, as well as police department non-sworn personnel. This training was explicitly intended to change the departmental culture.

In Metro Denver, training was seen as a vehicle for improving policing, first, in the Metro Denver region and, later, for policing across the state. There, influential police leaders had sought means to influence colleagues who were either uninformed about community policing or, for some reason, reluctant to implement it. Those same leaders saw CCP funds as a means of indirectly shaping policing throughout the state. Subsequently the Colorado Consortium for Community Policing received COPS funding to create the statewide Colorado Regional Community Policing Institute

In Fort Worth, training focused on civilians, especially a civilian police academy and civilians in their elaborate Citizens on Patrol program—a core portion of Fort Worth's community policing effort. Likewise, Salt Lake City invested considerable effort training citizens for Mobile Watch—also a citizen patrol effort.

Such investment in training, as it was argued in Seattle, can be a wise use of one-time funding, especially if used to *train the trainers*, as well as current operational personnel. In such circumstances, training can develop an administrative capacity that can influence generations of police. There are other points of view about training, however. It can be argued that training is a relatively weak means of confronting culture, especially deeply seeded police culture. Arguably, as well, ill-timed and diffuse training can mobilize resistance and worsen conditions for change, especially if the training conflicts with officers' basic values and worldviews.

Four police departments (Columbia, Metro Omaha, Salt Lake, and Boston) used their CCP funds to initiate the reformation of their formal and informal accountability structures. Columbia's formal review of its accountability structure was linked to an external conduct of a task analysis and then, a review of the police department's mechanisms of accountability in light of the former. Metro Omaha conducted task analyses as well, which resulted in 135 new job descriptions, mostly developed by personnel in those positions. Performance evaluations are linked to these task analyses and training was developed to teach staff how to make use of the new performance evaluation methods. Also, in Salt Lake City, officers were assigned to decentralized Community Action Teams and reported to the Community Service Bureau. While this was a limited restructuring, the impact was to force the various police bureaus to begin being more responsive and accountable to the expressed concerns of neighborhood residents. The extent of accountability and change in Salt Lake City's bureaus has yet to be determined.

The Boston Police Department's change in its accountability structure grew out of its planning process—again an elaborate and decentralized process that included police, citizens, and other neighborhood representatives. The important innovation here is the development of formal plans for each district and the public review of the progress towards its goals. In a sense, this is mutual accountability in that other groups and citizens are as obliged to note their progress as are police.

The shift to geographical, as opposed to functional, organizations is furthered through the creation of district facilities or substations for neighborhood officers. Virtually every police department either had or was in the process of creating either district facilities or substations. Some departments, especially Fort Worth, Boston, and Omaha, have been in the process of opening or reopening district stations for some time. While Seattle is divided into four large districts, with each district having three sectors, it is in the process of creating community storefront offices or, where possible, joining neighborhood offices set up by other city agencies.

While *flattening* the organization was not an explicit aspect of its CCP efforts, the Baltimore Police Department significantly reduced its rank structure by eliminating three ranks: captains, colonels, and lieutenant colonels.

Civilianization and use of volunteers were methods used by, or planned for, in all CCP sites. The most highly developed was in Fort Worth where a "Code Blue" program was introduced in 1991. It included the civilianization of desk positions, with rehired retired police officers, and an expanded Citizens on Patrol program—the latter a centerpiece of the Fort Worth's program. Patrol volunteers are trained at the police academy and by a field-training officer, and are issued a cap, tee shirt, and windbreaker with the program's logo. Personal radios connect patrolling teams with base stations in the police districts, where they can communicate with the 911 center and with the neighborhood patrol officer. Currently, approximately 2900 citizens participate in the program.

Work-time flexibility is the rule in police departments that have designated certain officers as neighborhood officers, community officers, foot patrol officers, or community mobilizers. Most often, officers have considerable discretion about their hours and inform or consult with their sergeants. It is generally agreed that community officers work more, rather than fewer hours as a consequence of this flexibility.

Tactical Strategies

The idea that problem solving is a means for achieving the goals of community policing was built into every program. From the work of officers on Salt Lake City's Community Action Teams to officers patrolling in Baltimore, it is understood that problem solving is an important core activity of police. Organizationally, the most extensive and formal commitment to problem solving is in Seattle, where both the police chief and the director of the Community Policing Bureau are from San Diego, California, probably the department most thoroughly committed to a problem-solving orientation.

A focus on order maintenance activities, as well, seemed nearly universal in sample cities—not surprising given community policing's concern for quality of life. Depending on the city or neighborhood, problems of disorderly behaviors or conditions of special concern included prostitution, abandoned houses, behaviors associated with drug dealing, and drug or alcohol induced behavior.

Not surprisingly, two of the northeastern cities, Baltimore and Boston, were most thoroughly committed to using foot patrol. City layout and housing design—multiple dwellings and row houses—make sections of the city congenial to full-time patrol by foot officers. Other cities, such as Fort Worth and Seattle, make regular use of bicycle patrol, especially in downtown areas.

Some of the sites were moving beyond traditional use of *pin maps* and getting into rather sophisticated computer mapping and *hot spot* identification and programmatic planning. Probably Boston's combined mapping and chronic offender approach to dealing with gang violence has been most noteworthy—having achieved considerable national attention. Gang-related murders dropped from 17 in 1995 to none in 1996, an outcome that many have suggested is directly related to the coordinated efforts of police, prosecutors, and probation officers. Other mapping efforts, such as those in Baltimore, go beyond crime and call data and include social and demographic data. The purpose of mapping in Baltimore was to develop a block-by-block triage to assist in the allocation of sparse police resources. Some neighborhoods required relatively little help and could be patrolled in a routine fashion, while other neighborhoods required more help and yet had some strengths that suggested that community policing, coupled with concentrated service delivery from other city and governmental agencies, could make a substantial difference. Still others needed help, some quite desperately, but given sparse resources could only be policed in a routine fashion until blocks in the second category could become self-sustaining. For Baltimore's foot patrol officers, the functional equivalent of pin maps are lot-by-lot color-coded inventories of abandoned buildings, drug houses, illegal dumping sites, and other problems. These are prepared and updated by neighborhood associations trained by neighborhood organizers from a reputable housing advocacy association.

The most ambitious—perhaps too ambitious—mapping effort was in Metro Denver. Data were to be used by police and community partners to monitor crime trends and community problems. Although the project demonstrated the feasibility of such efforts—that is, police and neighborhood residents could improve their understanding of community problems—a series of problems limited its success and usefulness. First, many agencies, especially schools, remained reluctant to share data, even once issues of confidentiality could be resolved. Second, timeliness remained a problem, since some agencies could not make contemporaneous data available. Third, maintaining mapping personnel proved almost impossible. Such skills are in very high demand, that once staff gained competence in complex mapping, they were offered much higher paying positions in other sectors.

It is in the area of inter-departmental partnerships, especially among criminal justice agencies, but not limited to them, that some of the most exciting work associated with CCP funding is to be seen. Moreover, these efforts were expanding and gaining momentum during the life of the programs. Columbia, Baltimore, Boston, and Salt Lake City are especially interesting in this regard. Columbia's community mobilizers are at the hub of a service delivery system that includes traditional agencies and the religious community. The power of the Columbia approach is that it gives officers powerful tools to bring to bear both on neighborhood problems and on troublemakers. Moreover, the collaboration among agencies, especially between police and public housing authorities, can ensure that families or individuals that are upsetting neighborhoods accept help under the threat of losing

their public housing. Likewise, churches have become major players in the improvement of urban life. Disappointing, however, is the lack of the presence of probation, parole, and prosecutors in neighborhood activities.

Boston, Salt Lake City, and Phoenix are exemplars of broadly based collaborations. What is heartening in these sites is the active involvement of prosecutors (their participation in Boston under the aegis of the Safe Neighborhood Initiatives), and probation officers. Likewise, Salt Lake City's Community Action Teams bring together police, government and social service agencies, resident leaders, prosecutors, and probation officers. Phoenix has pioneered its concept of *seamless service delivery*—that is, the coordination of service delivery at the neighborhood level to ensure that all relevant government services are provided.

Such attempts, however, are not without their pitfalls. For example, in Boston, one of the Safe Neighborhood Initiatives, Grove Hall in Roxbury, has been very troublesome—the struggles reminiscent of the inter- and intra-community conflicts that typified many 1960s efforts at community participation. The problem appears to have its origin in who was brought to the table for the first meeting. Only one community group was represented and they lay claim to sole representation of (and subsequently control over funding for) the entire community. Throughout these early efforts, the group threatened a political and media blitz if their demands were not met. Most observers believe that the relative inexperience in community matters and neighborhood politics of the prosecutor's office is what led to the conflict getting out of control. Regardless, the message is clear: community involvement still can be a risky business.

The Salt Lake City story is quite different. It is a story of highly motivated police officers getting *burned out* as a consequence of being caught between the demands of a very innovative neighborhood collaboration and the demands of their organization. When involved in neighborhood problem solving, police can find themselves squeezed between neighborhood priorities on the one hand and traditional police department priorities and ways of conducting business on the other. Such *squeezes* are enormously troublesome both to police, who are delegated to become involved in neighborhood problem solving and who are highly motivated, as well as to other individuals, groups, and organizations who are positioned to move quickly to solve neighborhood problems. In other words, neighborhood problem solving can send ripples back into police departments that have not made the required managerial changes needed to have police officers sit at the neighborhood *table* as full partners. Officers can be seen as obstructionists, or at best ineffective, in neighborhood problem solving if they are required to go through traditional channels for authorization to commit themselves, or they can be seen as disloyal to their parent organizations if they move swiftly outside of routine ways of doing business. The organizational issues raised included police officer discretion, the proper organizational locus of decision-making, the kinds of things officers can *bring to the table,* as well as patterns of supervision and direction.

Police-community partnerships were somewhat narrower in focus than the collaborations identified above. Fort Worth's Citizen on Patrol is an example of such a partnership, as is Salt Lake City's Mobile Neighborhood Watch (which was also supported by AT&T). Other examples could be found in the working partnerships between the Business Improvement Districts and police in Baltimore, Fort Worth, and Wilmington.

Finally, community organizing by the police departments themselves varied widely. In Columbia, a well-organized city with a history of strong neighborhood associations, CCP planners hoped that the activities of the community mobilizers would both mobilize and empower the affected communities. Likewise, in Salt Lake City and Fort Worth, citizen patrols were mobilized by the police departments. Finally, in Boston, police personnel directing the strategic planning teams were expected to recruit citizens and develop long-term relationships with existing and newly-created neighborhood organizations.

Conclusion: CCP's Impact on the Implementation of Community Policing

The impact of CCP directly on the implementation of community policing can be discerned most clearly in Boston, Columbia, Phoenix, and Fort Worth. When becoming involved in the CCP planning process and, ultimately, its program, each of these four departments had a clear sense of what it wanted to do. In Boston, CCP funds were utilized to complete a long-range Strategic Planning Process. The planning process itself, with its geographical base, range of participants, and its focus on substantive problems was a precursor of Boston's new police strategy. Working their way through this process, and experiencing the gratification it gave to everybody involved, gave participants not only new confidence in themselves, but in their partners as well.

Columbia, as well, had been implementing its model of community policing since the late 1980s. It too was geographically based, but envisioned a new role for police as agents to mobilize the community in a variety of dimensions: its citizens, volunteers, and governmental and service agencies. Specifically CCP funds allowed for full experimentation with Chief Charles Austin's model, both in creating community mobilizers, and in giving those mobilizers the resources to deal with both troubled and trouble-making citizens.

Phoenix developed community policing somewhat later—during the early 1990s. Then an under-funded and understaffed department, the Phoenix Police Department developed an extensive community education, or marketing, effort to convince Phoenix residents of the need both for more officers and for improved, more responsive, policing. Convinced of the need, neighborhood associations mounted a dedicated sales tax initiative. It passed by a four-to-one margin enabling the police department to expand its services and move towards community policing. CCP con-

tributed directly by allowing the department to recruit lieutenants and devolve authority to them.

In Fort Worth, Chief Thomas Windham had been implementing community policing since the mid-1980s. He tested his ideas in the Weed and Seed area, developed local tax funds to further implement community policing to a second area of the city, and used CCP funds to complete his vision of community policing in Fort Worth. The impact of the CCP effort in Fort Worth was tangible, especially the strong move toward decentralization and the many ramifications of this change on street level policing.

The impact of CCP on the Baltimore Police Department and on East Bay police departments was more indirect than direct. The central focus of Baltimore's CCP was on organizing community associations to become sophisticated consumers of community policing and co-producers of community safety. In effect, CCP helped to create a demand for and receptivity to community policing. Likewise, the impact of CCP on East Bay police departments was largely indirect, the result of the creation of a resource center and of political agreements to collaborate on common problems, like domestic violence. In the East Bay CCP, the major focus was not on the reform of any particular department but rather on improving the interaction of police departments across jurisdictions.

In Seattle, Metro Denver, and Metro Omaha CCP efforts concentrated on creating an infrastructure in which community policing could develop (e.g., training facilities and programs) and the impact will be long-range and determined in the future. Seattle is a department in the middle of a major strategic shift—the department claims to be moving into a "second generation" of community policing. CCP funds for community policing were used exclusively for training. The impact of this training, both on the process of strategically moving the police department toward community policing and on how police services are delivered, will only be determined in the future. The impact of CCP on the Metro Denver and Metro Omaha departments is unclear as well. Both of these sites were regional sites and focused on building a supportive infrastructure rather than on changes inside the departments themselves.

Finally, the impact of CCP on Salt Lake City, Hartford, and Wilmington remains unclear. During the period of evaluation, the Salt Lake City Police Department reoriented its policing efforts as a consequence of the identification of programmatic difficulties; however, questions remain about the extent to which the police department is integrated into the mayor's vision of neighborhood governance. The Wilmington Police Department experienced considerable conflict as it faced a crisis of violence, a crisis in its relationship with minority communities, and conflict between the former chief and the mayor. The short tenure of the current chief has given some hope that these crises can be managed, however, the full impact of these crises on Wilmington's evolution to community policing has yet to be determined.

While Hartford has made progress in directing itself towards community policing, it is unclear what impact CCP has had on this process. It does seem apparent, however, that CCP has helped to create a community context (with its neighborhood Problem Solving Committees) in which community policing could thrive. In no cities did CCP appear to hinder the implementation of community policing.

Finally, it is interesting to note that in the four sites that CCP had the most impact (Boston, Phoenix, Columbia, and Fort Worth), there was close congruence between the views of political and police leaders. In three sites, Wilmington, Hartford, and Salt Lake City, conflicts between political and police leaders appear to limit the impact of CCP on the police departments (although other programs—such as Community Action Teams in Salt Lake City—thrived).

Citizen Involvement

Community Mobilization

Community mobilization—in particular, the sustainment of citizen involvement—for collaborative community-wide efforts is almost always a substantial challenge. Nevertheless, most of the CCP sites were successful in achieving community participation, using existing neighborhood groups and models, reaching out to disenfranchised populations, and facilitating communication at the neighborhood level.

Achieving Community Participation in the CCP Program

Not surprisingly, the nature and extent of pre-CCP relationships between CCP participants were reported to have varied significantly. In Salt Lake City, for example, many partners either worked together regularly or had worked together before; moreover, the ideological and social structure provided by the Church of Latter Day Saints created a relatively high degree of community cohesion. In other sites, such as Boston, Hartford, and Seattle, the contentious nature of pre-CCP police-community and interagency relations appeared to have been more pronounced. No matter what a site's pre-CCP relationship was said to have been, however, each and every site agreed that CCP had been instrumental in opening the partnerships to a broader range of citizen input during the planning process.

Some sites drew upon a range of existing conduits to community input and/or built upon relationships initiated during other recent planning efforts. Metro Omaha, for example, utilized information gleaned from an impressive array of community surveys and minutes of *town hall* meetings, while Columbia built upon the outreach efforts and relationships that had initially been developed when the community applied to HUD's Enterprise Community program in 1993.

In a few circumstances, pre-CCP experiences indicated how *not* to approach the CCP planning process. In Seattle, citizens and police had become divided during planning for a prior Weed and Seed grant when citizens who had had little input into the process began to fear that more resources were going to be invested in *weeding* than *seeding*. Hartford had watched commitment to prior efforts fizzle due, at least in part, to an organizational culture in local government that was perceived as un-responsive to citizens' needs coupled with a history of community organizing that focused on *fighting city hall*. Boston, too, had to address a legacy of distrust and conflict between the police and citizens that had tended to limit collaboration on previous projects.

Utilization of Existing Neighborhood Groups and Models

Citizen input into the CCP planning process also appeared to lay the groundwork for re-thinking local government and police service delivery in the sites in two key ways. First, citizens knew neighborhood needs and priorities, and had insights into how (for example) the Boston Police Department could re-structure its organization to best address those needs. Second, the planning process seemed to make local governments and police departments more comfortable with the notion of pushing decision-making and implementation responsibility down to the neighborhood level. Thus, after having proven themselves to be effective mechanisms for citizen input and community mobilization during the CCP planning process, the Greater Coronado Neighborhood Association in Phoenix and neighborhood planning councils (NPCs) in Wilmington became key to providing linkages between local government and neighborhood efforts for long-term development and economic planning.

Many CCP jurisdictions did, in fact, take successful neighborhood-based organizations that they had worked with during the planning process as models for establishing mechanisms for community mobilization and local government service delivery in other parts of the community. Three such successful NPCs in Wilmington thus became models for NPCs throughout the city. Local government provides the Wilmington NPCs with technical assistance and mini-grants and the NPCs, acting as the umbrellas for other citizen and neighborhood organizations, in turn, have become powerful voices for the community in local government and in collaborative problem solving with the police. Similarly, in Baltimore, CCP funds were used to replicate the partnership between community organizers, the Community Law Center, police, and local government that had successfully utilized a combination of criminal and civil remedies to dramatically reduce abandoned and drug-infested properties in the Boyd Booth neighborhood. Such community organizer/community law center-based partnerships are now established in neighborhoods throughout the City of Baltimore.

In other jurisdictions, successful community-based organizations did not provide models to replicate, but foundations upon which neighborhoods could build more comprehensive efforts to strengthen the community. For example, the Columbia Council of Neighborhoods, which represented a broad range of neighborhoods with a broad range of needs, resources, and problem-solving skills in Columbia, SC, was in place long before CCP. During the CCP planning process, input from Council neighborhoods provided a framework for reaching out to, and coordinating, resources—from agencies such as Planned Parenthood, the Boys & Girls Clubs, youth programs, and drug- and alcohol-abuse facilities—that could help further empower residents and address the needs of the neighborhoods. Likewise, Metro Denver has built upon the Neighborhood Resource Center, once a relatively small organization whose expansion was funded by CCP, to provide *hands on* assistance in community organizing and mobilization to neighborhoods across the Metro Denver area. The Neighborhood Resource Center is the hub of an extensive local government-

community communications network and hosts a wide range of meetings and work-shops focusing on such topics as community policing, youth, and conflict mediation. Perhaps most importantly, the Center trains and supports a cadre of community consultants who work directly with citizens and neighborhood organizations.

In another variation on the theme of building on existing models or foundations, CCP enabled Salt Lake City to introduce a new mechanism—the Community Action Teams—that built on the strong community cohesion present in Salt Lake City and established an agency-based counterpart to the community-based Mobile Neighbor-hood Watch. Most importantly, the Community Action Teams, comprised of street-level agency representatives and service providers working directly in the neigh-borhoods, helped to bridge the communications and service delivery gap between neighborhoods and local government. In a somewhat more revolutionary way, Bos-ton's Neighborhood Advisory Councils played a pivotal role in the re-orientation of local government (particularly the police department) toward better service delivery to Boston's neighborhoods. Moreover, the Neighborhood Advisory Councils helped to ensure that residents of Boston neighborhoods had a voice in planning and shap-ing responses to neighborhood problems, as well as the service delivery mechanisms via which those responses were implemented. Hartford's Problem Solving Commit-tees, which also helped to ground that city's re-invention of itself as a community-oriented local government, likewise served as a bridge between neighborhood needs and local government and agency responses.

Outreach to Previously Unsolicited Populations

Whether sites built on prior strengths or had learned from challenges previously faced, partners in the sites credited CCP with providing the framework for bringing a broader range of citizen input into the planning process. During the CCP plan-ning process, most sites made substantial strides in reaching beyond their partnership *comfort zones* to segments of the community—primarily youth, and ethnic and racial minorities—that had not previously been heard. Ample evidence that these previously unheard voices had, in fact, been heard during the CCP plan-ning process is scattered throughout the CCP programs as implemented. When CCP was implemented in East Bay and Hartford, for example, youth input helped to shape several unique youth programs. In many of the sites, such as Metro Oma-ha, Hartford, Metro Denver, and Seattle, community groups that had been acting independently of (if not in spite of) the police and local government, were brought into the process and became hubs of constructive police-community activity.

Perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of community mobilization lies in reaching out to and engaging those segments of the community that are, at best, overlooked and, at worst, considered by some to be part of the problem. Youth often fall into this category, as do ethnic, racial or religious minorities in the community. Every CCP site studied sought to address this challenge, and to include those previ-

ously under-represented segments of the community, in a number of ways. Bilingual community outreach staff and other police and local government personnel, bilingual informational brochures regarding community resources, and strong linkages with church-based groups and the faith community were in evidence in all of the CCP sites (but most particularly in Boston, Columbia, and Salt Lake City). Significantly, the sites also appeared to be sensitive to how well CCP-related personnel actually interacted with hard-to-reach segments of the community; were aware of fluctuations in community relations with the police, local government, and other service providers; and did attempt to respond to community-based feedback regarding those CCP personnel.

Although almost every CCP site showed a strong interest in outreach to youth, perhaps the Hartford and East Bay CCP sites offer us the best examples of youth-oriented efforts that were truly planned and shaped by youth themselves. In Hartford, award-winning youth-based projects such as Our Piece of the Pie—a youth-oriented employment and business incubator—and the Junior Art Makers provided youth with meaningful opportunities through which they could build both practical career-oriented experience and self-esteem. When such programs in Hartford were coupled with more traditional service provision programs, such as the conflict resolution provided by Project Respect, they reportedly generated a synergy that truly empowered local youth. In a somewhat different way, the East Bay Youth Council empowered youth vis-à-vis the planning and facilitation skills they were trained in, and the direct voice in local decision-making processes they were accorded.

Facilitating Communication

Finally, none of the above would have been possible but for the careful construction and maintenance of effective communications across organizational and community-agency boundaries. The need for open and frequent communications between citizens and the other agencies and organizations involved in CCP efforts—including police, units of local, state, and federal government, business, service agencies, school districts, faith communities, and non-profit organizations—would seem to be obvious. It is often assumed, however, that communications will take place either as a natural consequence of organizing the effort, within the natural course of the planning process, or as a natural outgrowth of other project activities. In short, communication is sometimes assumed to be everyone's job and, in practice, end up being no one's job. Thus the same misunderstandings and miscommunications that existed prior to a given community-wide project can persist, and perhaps even be exacerbated, if considerable attention is not paid to establishing and maintaining both internal (within the project) and external (out to the greater community), multi-level communications networks.

CCP sites approached the challenge of communication in a number of ways. In each site, either the CCP coordinator or another key CCP partner was charged with

maintaining some sort of contact list and making sure that CCP partners were kept current on project efforts. In many sites, such as Metro Omaha and Salt Lake City, the CCP coordinators appeared to spend a significant portion of their time simply maintaining communications: making phone calls, arranging meetings and issuing meeting notices, documenting project activities, contributing to project brochures and press releases, and explaining the project to everyone from local citizens to the national program evaluators. In general, CCP sites put a premium on face-to-face communication. CCP partners organized at a variety of levels—from community-wide administrative bodies to neighborhood-based action teams—in order to maximize direct communication and minimize misunderstandings. Some CCP sites utilized formal agreements to help insure that all parties would attend meetings and otherwise engage in regular interactions, while others relied upon long-standing relationships and more informal day-to-day contact. And, perhaps most significantly, CCP facilitated citizen engagement and community outreach activities by street-level police officers in virtually every site.

CCP sites also relied heavily upon written communications. Sites often used news-letters as a means of communication: some sites, like Wilmington issued a CCP newsletter; other CCP sites, like Phoenix and Metro Denver, supported neighborhood-based newsletters; still others, like Hartford, utilized computers in neighborhood centers to keep a broad range of citizens and others up-to-date on CCP activities. Every CCP site supported the production and distribution of a number of informational flyers issued by the police, local government, service providers, and neighborhood resource centers. The Wilmington CCP invested in report analyses, mapping, and evaluations that were made available to the public, while the Salt Lake City CCP made crime statistics available through its citizen-based, citizen-run Mobile Neighborhood Watch. CCP sites also made extensive use of local media. In Seattle, for example, the Community Policing Action Council created a Media Subcommittee charged with disseminating information regarding CCP and other related projects. Boston's coordinated anti-violence efforts (including CCP), in particular, garnered nation-wide attention through both government-funded criminal justice publications and the popular press; attention that, in turn, helped to heighten local awareness.

In whatever form that communications took in the various CCP sites, the quality and quantity of those communications almost invariably seemed to be an accurate reflection of the quality of the overall CCP effort and impact. Indeed, without a good deal of quality communication, it is difficult for citizens to feel that they are playing a meaningful role in the life of their community; difficult to keep citizens involved in community-based efforts; difficult for the community to learn from and/or build upon previous efforts; and difficult to stimulate previously overlooked segments of the community—such as youth—to engage in the future of that community. Although communication is not always positive and enjoyable, without the development of a healthy communication network, a thriving CCP effort would be well nigh impossible.

In summary, community mobilization was one of the most difficult challenges sites faced in their implementation of CCP. Experiences in the CCP sites, however, suggest that there are a number of key strategies that can facilitate both citizen input and citizen action. First, citizens must play a meaningful role in planning and shaping the agenda. Second, mechanisms for continued citizen involvement should be established in the early stages of the effort. Third, new efforts should recognize and celebrate the achievements of those successful community groups that have preceded them, learn from their experiences, and use them as models. Fourth, special consideration should be given to youth and other ethnic, racial, or religious populations who have not traditionally had a voice in community affairs. Finally, but most importantly, communications between citizens and the other agencies and organizations involved in the effort should be as open and frequent as possible.

Citizen Feedback

Bureau of Justice Assistance administrators were interested in learning how satisfied citizens were with their sites' crime-prevention and policing efforts, as well as their perceptions of whether there have been increases or decreases in crime. In an attempt to address this interest, BOTEC researchers asked staff at each of the twelve intensive sites if they had data or knew of any surveys that polled citizens regarding these questions both pre- and post-CCP. Of the twelve sites that were intensively assessed in this study, pre- and/or post-implementation data were not available for release from five sites (Baltimore, Columbia, Metro Omaha, East Bay, Metro Denver, and Wilmington). Data was available for Boston, Fort Worth, Hartford, Phoenix, Salt Lake City, and Seattle.[19]

The data that is presented for the six sites must be interpreted with caution because of incongruencies between sample distributions and sample sizes. These data were collected by different agencies using different data collection techniques and variables across years, also making observation of any trends difficult. Caution should be used in ascribing positive changes to the implementation of CCP, in that many other factors and initiatives are just as likely to have affected the observed changes. They could be due to other initiatives, demographic changes, and changes in legislation or criminal justice policy. These data are presented below and can be used to observe possible trends that can be useful for outlining areas of future, more intensive, investigation.

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[19] All of the reports and data sources for this type of information can be found in this report's References section.

Table 34: Citizen Survey Descriptionss

City	Sample Size	Type	Method	Margin of Error
Seattle, WA				
1997	1,215	Telephone	Random	+/- 2.8%
1996	1,201	Telephone	Random	+/- 3.0%
Boston, MA				
1995	1,003	Telephone	Random	Not available
1997	3,046	Telephone	Random	+/- 0.6%
Fort Worth, TX				
1998	800	Telephone	Random	+/- 3.53%
1996	859	Telephone	Random	=/- 3.0%
Salt Lake City, UT				
1998	703	Telephone	Random	+/- 3.70%
1996	702	Telephone	Random	+/- 3.70%
1994	710	Telephone	Random	+/- 3.68%
Phoenix, AZ				
1998	707	Telephone	Random	+/- 3.7%
1996	703	Telephone	Random	Not available

Boston

In the 1995 and 1997 samples surveyed, crime was a primary concern of Boston residents. There was a positive trend from 1995 to 1997 in residents' perceptions of neighborhood safety both during the day and at night. In 1997, there was an increase in residents' comprehension of the concepts behind community policing (72 percent of sample) as compared to the 1995 sample (58 percent).

Fort Worth

The 1996 and 1998 Fort Worth community surveys each had a very different focus that provided very little data for comparison. The 1998 survey did not directly focus on issues of safety as did the 1996 survey. Approximately one-third of the surveyed residents felt positive about their quality of life or safety in the neighborhood, and this general attitude was consistent for both surveys. In the 1998 survey, 42 percent of respondents felt that crime and drugs were the most important concerns their neighborhoods faced.

Phoenix

Crime was the highest neighborhood concern of Phoenix residents (41 percent, 1998). Basic attitudes on crime levels and neighborhood problems showed minor change between 1996 and 1998, with a slight increase in residents' concerns about traffic problems and random gun shootings. In 1996 and 1998, attitudes toward

community policing tended to be positive with 58 percent and 64 percent (respectively) rating the Phoenix PD as "Excellent/Good." Interestingly, compared with the 1996 sample, in 1998 a lower percentage of residents were willing to pay more for improving crime prevention programs (88 percent vs. 71 percent).

Salt Lake City

Although crime held the most concern for residents in the 1996 and 1998 samples surveyed, the percent rating crime as their highest concern was lower in the 1998 sample (11 percent) as compared to those residents surveyed in 1996 (27 percent). Concern about gangs and youth violence/graffiti was also lower for the 1998 sample (6 percent) as compared with the 1996 sample (22 percent). Between 1996 and 1998 samples, there was an increased tendency for residents to feel safe in their neighborhoods (day and night), in downtown Salt Lake City, and in a city park near their home. Three quarters of both samples surveyed felt that citizens should take an active part with the police in solving community problems, but only about half (55 percent 1996, 48 percent 1998) of the residents surveyed showed a strong willingness to get involved.

Seattle

In, 1997 and 1999 half of the respondents surveyed were satisfied with the quality of life in the Seattle area and over one-third felt very safe at Seattle Center. Compared with the 1997 sample, the 1999 sample was less concerned about crime (18 percent vs. 30 percent), more concerned about affordable housing (45 percent vs. 23 percent), and shared high concern about traffic and overcrowding. Attitudes about public safety (both day and night) were comparable between 1997 and 1999 with approximately three quarters of those residents surveyed stating they feel very safe during the day and one-quarter stating they feel safe at night.

Social Service Delivery

A major objective of the CCP grant was to coordinate public resources to maximize their impact on reducing crime and stabilizing neighborhoods. Consistent with the *comprehensive* approach of the grant, CCP was often used as a catalyst to move away from the tradition of delivering services via narrow, categorical programs.

In many sites, the CCP grant was preceded by a surge in violence (usually gang- or youth-related) that frightened the city stakeholders into trying new approaches that could help stem the violence. As mentioned previously, the immediacy of this violence and the desperation that ensued helped break down walls between agencies and professions. Sites were encouraged to develop and implement youth and gangs programs, alternatives to incarceration, community prosecution and diversion programs, and drug courts with substance abuse treatment.

Changing the Social Service Delivery System

A number of initiatives were developed and implemented in CCP sites that truly changed the social service delivery system for various population segments. In Salt Lake City, Seattle, Metro Omaha, and Phoenix, police were vital members of the CCP-created efforts to decentralize city government and service delivery. For example, in Metro Omaha, the police joined with the Nebraska Department of Social Services, and medical personnel to better provide services to victims of child abuse and their families. Called Project Harmony, its clinic offers integrated child abuse/neglect assessment and investigation in a compassionate and comprehensive manner.

One of the most original initiatives was devised and implemented in Salt Lake City. Through the CCP grant, Salt Lake City accomplished far-reaching initiatives to reconceptualize the service delivery system. Two totally new structures were created to meet the challenge: Community Action Teams (CATs) and a Management Team. There are five CATs, each working in a targeted geographic area. Each CAT consists of a core group of service professionals from different agencies who meet weekly to address crime and disorder problems in their targeted neighborhood. Each CAT member brings to the team their professional expertise and the resources of their agency to tackle problems in a creative and efficient manner. CAT members include a police officer from the community support services division, a community mobilization specialist (also a police officer), a youth and family specialist (funded by CCP and employed by the Boys & Girls Club), a probation officer, a staff member from the mayor's office of community affairs, and an assistant city prosecutor.

Overseeing the work of the CATs is the Management Team consisting of middle management and supervisory people from each of the agencies that received CCP

funds plus a few other individuals involved in relevant programs. While the first year or so of these initiatives were spent smoothing out the rough edges and dealing with conflicts over roles and strategies, the municipal government has shown its commitment to the concept by agreeing to fund the CATs in the city budget after CCP ended. Salt Lake's initiative not only changed social service delivery for at-risk and delinquent youth, but is neighborhood-oriented, original, and has been sustained.

Another initiative that showed similar results was Boston Youth Services Providers Network (YSPN). In this initiative, the police department found itself involved with youth, neighborhoods, and social services in heretofore untried ways. The Youth Services Providers Network is a vehicle for front-line officers to refer at-risk youth from targeted neighborhoods to needed services. It is now institutionalized as a partnership between the Boston Boys & Girls Club and the Boston Police Department. In the beginning of the program, police officers would refer a youth or family to the district community service officer who would in turn make a referral to one of the appropriate service agencies. It soon became clear that the complex problems facing these youth and their families called for a social worker to be involved in the program. The police department now funds the Boys & Girls Club to place social workers right in the district police precincts so that police officers can become familiar with and can refer an at-risk child to the social worker. Once the community got wind of the concept that police officers could refer a family to a social worker who would link the family to needed services, families started showing up at the district police station, asking for police to refer their child to the social worker. Having family members voluntarily seek help for their children in the environment of a police station would have been unheard of just a few years before in Boston. One Boston provider credits the Youth Service Providers Network with helping to humanize the police force.

Hartford's two-pronged approach to changing service delivery was quite ambitious. First, there was a progression toward community-oriented government. CCP planners and others in Hartford understood that the city's entrenched bureaucracy and unresponsiveness to resident concerns needed to drastically change if communities were to be revived. With the urging of the CCP director and with CCP funds, Hartford hired David Osborne (known nationally for his book, *Reinventing Government*) and his consulting firm, Public Strategies Group, Inc. to make city agencies more customer-driven. Customer-service training has been given to every city employee. In addition, the city has instituted financial incentives to encourage agencies to save money, while meeting measurable goals and cutting red tape. Agencies whose staff members were known for their lack of response to residents have new performance standards based on how well they meet the needs of residents. Alongside this initiative, is the CCP-funded City Action Line. This phone line for residents to call in complaints and problems regarding city agencies is bilingually advertised in buses and on the radio. Two staff members from the planning department are responsible for answering the phone and then routing the complaint to the

appropriate city agency. The receiving agency then has five days to resolve the complaint. The City Action Line initiative is monitored by the CCP director and the deputy city manager/chief of staff. It has resulted in a major change from the past, when residents could not reach anyone in authority and there was no mechanism for follow-up.

Increase in Neighborhood-Based Services

Several of the CCP sites were reorganizing city services and social services to be more responsive to neighborhoods. Almost all of the CCP sites understood the importance of recognizing the unique needs of individual neighborhoods and that the role of municipal agencies was not to define the problems of these neighborhoods but to give the neighborhoods the tools and power to define the problems for themselves. Agencies would then be able to react to these defined needs by using their resources to craft neighborhood-suggested solutions. CCP's mandate that community policing and community mobilization develop at the same time aided this collaboration

The CCP grant in Phoenix was targeted to one specific neighborhood, Coronado. CCP money was used to rehabilitate a church for use as a community service center—as sort of a one-stop shop. Inside the church are offices for adult probation, juvenile probation, anti-gang organizations, the Boys & Girls Club, Legal Services, ESL classes, the parks and recreation department, and the police department. Having these agencies under the same roof means cooperation among agencies that often work with many of the same families and eases the access to these agencies both for the client families and for the staffs of other agencies. Prior to CCP, many of these agencies did not communicate with each other—the Boys & Girls Club did not coordinate activities with the parks and recreation department; the anti-gang organization did not partner with juvenile probation; and the police department had limited contact with the adult probation officers. This innovation has not only coordinated several city agencies to address neighborhood problems and needs in the neighborhood, but it has resulted in more efficient and improved programs and services.

In Columbia, the police department recognized that reaching out to social services was crucial for aiding its at-risk neighborhoods and families. Key to this concept were the police positions of community mobilizers—officers who focus on specific neighborhoods and serve as the liaison from that neighborhood to private and governmental agencies to help residents solve their problems. The overall strategy was to bring the resources of these organizations to work at the neighborhood level. To understand how this is supposed to function, one can think of a wheel, with the community mobilizer as the hub and the social service and government agencies along the rim. While communication and collaboration from the officer at the hub

to the agencies on the rim has been successful, there is room for improved communication and collaboration among the many agencies involved.

Prior to CCP, Seattle had a citywide master plan for service integration by geographic teams of division heads, regional managers, and other operational-level policy personnel from all city agencies. The planning and implementation stages of CCP focused extra attention and effort on these ongoing initiatives. The city had been trying to redraw their administrative boundaries to match those of the police department, but with CCP the task was completed. "We got our maps together for CCP," one player said. By early 1997, the department of neighborhoods and the police department were sharing four neighborhood storefront offices. These offices serve as drop-in work centers for area police officers and as meeting places for various agencies to coordinate problem-solving efforts. The police department has begun to work with interdepartmental teams on public safety and neighborhood planning issues. These teams are seen as beginning steps in the effort to form a culture of municipal problem solving. The next transition will be to geographically define Neighborhood Action Teams, the building blocks of Seattle's Urban Villages Comprehensive Plan.

Innovative Programming

As mentioned previously, CCP efforts in service delivery yielded some programs and initiatives that were innovative or unique in their approach to addressing common problems. Below are described a small number of these initiatives in each of the BJA categories.

Youth and Gang Programs

A focus on youth was a priority in almost every CCP site. Most CCP sites marshaled an impressive array of easily accessible professional service providers to provide hands on, quality case management to juveniles and their families. Some sites provided this service access through the courts, some through local Boys & Girls Clubs or other types of preventative programming, and some in conjunction with local schools. Salt Lake City, for example, appeared to have a seamless web of services available to juveniles through counseling and referral staff networked across the courthouse, the schools, the Boys & Girls Clubs, the church, and (through the youth and family service workers on the Community Action Teams) in the neighborhoods. The Metro Omaha CCP, on the other hand, had a free-standing juvenile intake/processing center that seemed to provide a physical contact point for the coordination and provision of youth and family services.

A number of sites established either a juvenile drug and/or misdemeanor court that offered alternatives to incarceration and took a case management approach to the juvenile cases that came within its purview. Some of these juvenile courts relied, to

varying degrees, on peer volunteers who acted as jury members, advocates, or even judges. Most offered access to a wide range of counseling and treatment programs for both the juvenile defendants and their families, and required frequent contact with juvenile court and counseling/treatment personnel.

In its program guidelines, BJA urged CCP sites to include programming for at-risk youth as well as for youths involved in gangs. Preventative programming is the philosophy behind Boston's Youth Services Providers Network (described above) and East Bay's *Strike One, You're In* program. Either before or at the first contact with the criminal justice system, both programs provide an influx of social services to the youth and his/her family. It is hoped that this early intervention is the first and last contact that the youth has with the criminal justice system.

Youth violence prevention was a major focus in East Bay, where the large, multi-jurisdictional region coordinates a program that encompasses many facets of a child and youth's life. One East Bay interviewee expressed the sentiments of many CCP participants when she said, "youth at risk of violence and incarceration and those already in the region's juvenile justice system need a full range of prevention, intervention, treatment and aftercare services." The East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership used CCP and other monies to fund their twelve priorities for youth. These included: extended day programs; a gun hotline; school-to-work programs; youth leadership programs; youth academies; safe passage home; truancy prevention; a diversion program for first-time offenders; establishing a common community approach to juvenile offenders; gang diversion; conflict resolution; and laws restricting gun sales.

The new concept in service delivery in East Bay was two-fold. One, it brought together agencies, programs and funding sources to provide a continuum of care. Two, it brought all the separate jurisdictions together to develop programs and procedures that would be uniformly adopted across boundaries. Thus, the different school districts worked together with the Partnership to establish a regional truancy standard and to develop truancy centers with comprehensive case management and referrals to alternative educational programs. A similar approach was taken for establishing a diversion program for first time offenders, whose philosophy was *Strike One, You're In*. This meant that first time juvenile offenders would be brought into a diversion program in an effort to prevent the youth from becoming a repeat offender. The diversion program includes community-based mentoring, peer group counseling, and educational opportunities. Following this philosophy, common juvenile justice guidelines were adopted by the Partnership's member jurisdictions to ensure consistency in punishments, alternative placements, and aftercare programs.

In some sites, schools played a key role in addressing the needs of the juvenile community. East Bay, Phoenix, Salt Lake City, and Metro Omaha all had instituted school-based programs and/or reported strong partnerships with schools.

Phoenix and Salt Lake City had invested in comprehensive truancy programs that tracked truant behavior and attempted to engage parents and guardians—as well as CCP-related personnel—in early identification, prevention and intervention efforts. Metro Omaha had instituted a type of civics curriculum (the TEAM curriculum) consisting of age-appropriate lessons covering a child's entire elementary school career. These lessons ranged from general self-protective behaviors to conflict resolution to drug and gang education and awareness. East Bay reported taking a particular interest in youth issues and, accordingly, forged strong ties with the local school districts. In collaboration with the school districts, the East Bay CCP was able to offer a wide range of after-school and alternative programs to youth.

Community Prosecution and Diversion

Social service agencies and criminal justice institutions traditionally do not work in tandem with each other. The two fields have very different professional languages and objectives. There are confidentiality issues between counselors and their clients that do not lend themselves to close communication with police departments, courts, and probation officers. However, in the CCP sites, valiant efforts were made to bring these fields closer in order to work collaboratively for the clients they have in common. This could most obviously be seen in the new courts at the cutting edge of criminal justice, such as the drug and community courts. Representatives from the criminal justice and social service agencies met for the first time in many of the sites because of CCP-related activities.

The delivery of criminal justice services took some innovative turns at certain CCP sites. Certain required elements of the CCP process, such as needs assessments, data analysis, and problem solving coupled with a frustration with the traditional criminal justice system's inability to decrease neighborhood problems led to community efforts that brought criminal justice down to the local level. As part of the effort to try new forms of community justice, a much stronger emphasis was placed on services for rehabilitation. Thus collaboration between criminal justice and social services agencies was crucial to this effort.

The Hartford Community Court represents the large-scale approach to this collaboration. With CCP monies funding its program design and first nine months of operation, Hartford developed a community court—the second full-time community court in the country. The court began operation in November 1998 and hears misdemeanor offenses and ordinance violations, the types of citations that used to be dismissed from the overburdened state court. Sanctions often include community service in the neighborhood where the offense was committed in order for the offender to make amends to the community. Central to the court's operation is the on-site availability of social service staff. At the time of arraignment, every offender was assessed at the court and service delivery began immediately. Also crucial is

the ability of staff members from different agencies to work together in the interests of a common client. Previously, there was little, if any, communication between agencies to coordinate services.

On the small-scale approach to community justice are the juvenile justice committees that began operating in the Coronado neighborhood of Phoenix. The committees are composed of neighborhood residents who meet to develop sanctions for Coronado youth who commit misdemeanor offenses. The youth choose to have their case heard by the juvenile justice committee rather than have a traditional hearing. Mandatory social service requirements are often part of the sanction. The juvenile justice committees contract with a counseling agency to follow the youth for compliance. If the youth is not complying, then the case reverts to juvenile court for sanctions. The juvenile probation officers educate the resident volunteers about the range of possible sanctions and the availability of services. The juvenile justice committees have the authority to sanction first- and second-time offenders who admit their guilt. The juvenile justice committees have been considered so successful that there are now more than 30 of them in the Phoenix area.

CCP in Metro Omaha funded two alternatives to detention for adjudicated youth and youth awaiting trial. Children At Risk Education (CARE) is a system of electronic monitoring and personal home visits that allow youth to stay at home rather than being placed in overcrowded juvenile or even to adult facilities. Youth in CARE must participate in conflict resolution training as well as education. The second alternative is the Holdover/Day Reporting Center, which holds juveniles in a facility that resembles a college dormitory.

Drugs Courts and Alternatives to Incarceration

Drug courts were clearly a part of the CCP project in the majority of the sites. Less clear was the development of alternatives to incarceration. While many of the drug courts, and indeed the community prosecution and diversion programs, could be viewed as resulting in some alternatives to incarceration, none of the sites developed programming, such as electronic monitoring or day reporting, that one would strictly consider to be an alternative to incarceration.

In some sites, the drug courts existed prior to CCP, but CCP funded components that allowed the court to expand hours, staff, or programming. In a few of the sites, CCP funds actually helped to develop the start-up of the court.

In Metro Denver, the CCP funding arrived "with magical timing" according to the CCP director. CCP started nine months after the court opened and the money was "fast-tracked" to the court, which was experiencing a higher-than-anticipated client load. The CCP money was used to expand the night court operations to several nights a week, and provide salary and benefits for staff. Metro Denver administrators viewed their court as "different in tone and format from other drug courts

around the country and radically different than the traditional urban courtroom approach to felony crimes." It is mandatory for every person arrested in Metro Denver for possession of a controlled substance to go to drug court and be seen by a case manager, who then makes a recommendation to the judge. The court assigns the offender to one of seven treatment levels. The available social services include housing assistance, particularly important because homelessness jeopardizes recovery and the ability of the court to keep track of the client

The CCP effort in Baltimore focused on delivering services to substance abusers and youth in targeted neighborhoods. Efforts went toward changing the way social services were delivered to people as they were processed through the Baltimore Drug Court. CCP paid for a new social service coordinator position at the drug court, who initially worked for the Baltimore Coalition Against Substance Abuse. This coalition works with social service providers in aiding drug-court clients with their social service and literacy needs, especially in regards to reintegrating them into the community. The coordinator created a *help desk* within the drug court as a one-stop destination for assessing needs and accessing social services. According to the coordinator, the most important social service needs of drug court clients are housing, relapse prevention, employment, and medical care. Alleviating these needs became the basis of a strategy called Community Support for Recovery. This strategy emphasizing jobs, housing, and health was overseen by community organizations, the faith community, and recovering addicts. After CCP funding expired, the social services coordinator position was funded with federal local law enforcement block grant monies.

In Wilmington, the juvenile drug court began with the CCP funding and is considered one of the highlights of Wilmington's CCP effort. CCP funds paid for the court to be in session two afternoons a week for 15 months before other BJA funding and state monies were received. Started by the Delaware Family Court, it is one of the first juvenile drug courts in the county. To be eligible for juvenile drug court, a youth arrested on a misdemeanor drug charge must have no prior criminal record. If he or she successfully completes treatment, adjudication is avoided. Treatment includes a physical exam, random monthly urine tests, employment assistance, and counseling for groups, families, and individuals. All of the clients are expected to be employed, in school, or both. The mandated parent involvement is seen as vital to the youth's success and it took a while until the court found a counselor who worked well with families.

Fort Worth does not have an official drug court, but it does have a drug diversion effort, which spurred the first intergovernmental agreement in the criminal justice area in Tarrant County. Called the Tarrant County DIRECT program (Drug Impact Rehabilitation Enhanced Comprehensive Treatment) the program screens individuals for the program and sends them to the Attorney General's office for diversion to treatment. Most of the individuals entering the CCP part of the program come from the felony branch of the court and would otherwise go to prison. The

DIRECT program subcontracts for treatment components, using agencies that already provide community correctional services for the county. During the 18-month program, the CCP grant supported psychological exams, urine tests, detox services, in- and out-patient treatment, and group therapy. The program is attempting to improve its relationship with and gain more support by the district judges. The program is run by a retired, visiting judge and court is held only at night. DIRECT has been sustained past its CCP funding.

Conclusions regarding Social Service Delivery

CCP played the role of catalyst, both financially and philosophically, spurring sites to better coordinate their service delivery systems. People interviewed told the evaluation team repeatedly that BJA's mandate to create programming that was both multi-agency and community-oriented forced many sites to break through bureaucratic boundaries and reorient services in a holistic way. Thus, in many sites, staff from social service and criminal justice agencies were thrust together to develop and implement programming despite their differences in their professional languages, philosophies, and objectives.

Most promising, it appears that these initiatives were never seen as temporary programs to last only as long as the CCP grant. Instead, most of these new programs and processes have become the accepted way of providing services and have become institutionalized into the fabric of the cities.

The mandate of a comprehensive, multi-agency, community-oriented focus yielded some remarkable results. First, evidence clearly shows that CCP succeeded often, and in various ways, in changing the service delivery system itself at several sites. Second, the new partnerships and coalitions tended to be oriented towards improving service delivery on the neighborhood level. In some sites, service delivery was based on needs assessments carried out by community groups and neighborhood residents. Third, the inclusion of staff from many types of agencies, coupled with neighborhood residents, resulted in the creation of many unique and innovative programs. Finally, it appears that many of the programs and processes for service delivery are being sustained, both financially and institutionally. In many of the sites, the changes in service delivery brought on by CCP are now part of business-as-usual.

Continuing Effects of CCP

Synergy and Funding Streams

The idea of *synergy*, working together, with its associated connotation of *multiplier effect*, was central to CCP. Simply, it goes something like this: the total efficacy of citizens, citizen groups, public and private sector organizations, and criminal justice organizations collaborating together to solve crime-causing and crime-related problems is greater than the total efficacy of these groups working independently. Even setting efficiency aside—although clearly not a value to be demeaned—synergy, the argument goes, enhances the ability of each agency, organization, or citizen to have an impact on important problems: the total is greater than the sum its parts.

Moreover, in the context of CCP, synergy implied accumulating support—in effect, a *snowballing*. As benefits accumulated, participation did as well. Thus, while in Boston and Columbia, the faith communities were not *at the table* during the early formations of the CCP effort, over time, their roles were enhanced as criminal justice agencies became more open to their participation. In Boston, the Ten Point Coalition—an association of African American religious leaders—has received considerable national attention for its collaboration with police, prosecutors, and probation officers on a major neighborhood crime control effort and for its own crime prevention initiatives.[20] There are also similar examples of the involvement by recreation departments in Phoenix and Wilmington, and by private security in Fort Worth.

Thus the term *synergy* captures what is perhaps the most important contribution of CCP to involved communities. Most, if not all, of the CCP communities were ready to approach crime and crime control in new ways and, not even the reluctance or inability of police departments to become involved, dampened this commitment or the ability of CCP monies to further this commitment. Some of these communities had extraordinarily dynamic and innovative CCP programs. Salt Lake City's Community Action Teams, were among some of the most dynamic collaborative efforts that were observed, despite a lack of congruence among the mayor, chief of police, and community leaders about the functioning and role of police.

Wilmington, also, had gone through a difficult and morale-destroying conflict between the mayor and chief of police that resulted in the untimely resignation of the chief at a time when crime was spinning out of control. Yet CCP, especially the planning process, brought together players from the Enterprise Communities effort

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[20] See, Christopher Winship and Jenny Berrien, "Boston Cops and Black Churches, *Public Interest,* Number 136, Summer 1999.

and the Weed and Seed program, and ultimately gave rise to the NPCs, perhaps the *crown jewel* in Wilmington's effort. While there is hope that the new leadership of the police department will be able to integrate their efforts with the NPCs, even if they cannot, the capacity of Wilmington's neighborhoods to organize themselves both to access city services and to protect themselves against crime has been substantially enhanced—a considerable achievement. While this research cannot answer the question of whether or not NPCs would have been created without CCP assistance, such a question misses the point. Wilmington's neighborhoods and political structure were prepared to move forward and CCP was there at the right time to provide them with some processes and resources that made it easier.

This perhaps is the most significant finding of this evaluation: CCP was the right program at the right time in virtually every community evaluated. How could this be explained? Whether it was weariness from the unsuccessful thirty-year *war on crime* or the *crack crisis*, or a combination of both, urban leaders in all sectors seemed cognizant of the need to organize themselves to respond to crime in *new* ways. As noted elsewhere, the point of origin for the innovations, and their structure and methods, varied considerably by city. At first, this appeared somewhat surprising. But upon reflection it seems absolutely predictable. Given their political, social, demographic, and cultural variability, it would follow that their points of origin would vary also.

And, because an inchoate consensus developed among the various sectors of society—political, governmental, religious, and commercial—that "something had to be done" and that it could no longer be just done by "others," groups appeared ready both to combine their organizational interests with others and to invest their own resources to regain control of public spaces and youth. Whether it was probation working with police, or private social service agencies working with city government, our field work suggested that such collaborations had synergistic effects. In turn, this sent a message to other organizations both that they had an obligation to deal with the crime problem and that there was a new way of doing business that had promise of substantial payoff. Moreover, the strong indications that collaborative initiatives had great promise gave leverage to community leaders as they attempted to engage cautious or reluctant *traditional* organizations—schools and courts, for example (but, again, the reluctant organizations varied by community).

In sum, CCP was posited on the idea that working together to achieve synergy was the key to effective crime control. There is considerable reason to believe that the idea was right in three respects. First, many organizations were ready to collaborate in new ways. Second, they found that they could collaborate. Finally, it yielded unprecedented programmatic innovation.

Sustainment

Survey Feedback on Sustained Funding

CCP participants were asked a series of questions about their perceptions of the sustainment of CCP initiatives after the grant ends. In the first series of questions, participants were asked to rate their coalition in terms of generating additional funding beyond the grant and locating additional funding resources to apply to the target population. The majority of respondents answered that the coalitions were somewhat effective in generating additional funding (Table 34). Of the twelve sites queried, East Bay and Fort Worth respondents believed their site to be the most effective in procuring additional funding, while Hartford respondents believed it was the least effective in procuring additional funding.

Respondents thought that the CCP sites have faired slightly better in locating additional resources to *apply* to the target population. Over 50 percent of respondents in three cities (East Bay, Fort Worth, and Gary) believed that their coalitions were very effective in locating additional resources to apply to the target population. Overall, however, 49 percent of respondents believed that they were somewhat effective in locating additional resources to apply to the target population.

Table 34: Perceptions of Effectiveness in Sustainment in Year 2 - Wave Two

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Rated Coalition Activities as VERY EFFECTIVE:												
Generating additional funding beyond the grant	13%	38%	20%	21%	13%	67%	56%	25%	5%	13%	38%	19%
	(3)	(11)	(6)	(4)	(4)	(6)	(9)	(1)	(1)	(4)	(8)	(4)
Locating additional resources to apply to the target population	19%	48%	15%	42%	13%	56%	50%	50%	17%	15%	32%	16%
	(5)	(15)	(6)	(8)	(4)	(5)	(8)	(2)	(4)	(5)	(7)	(4)

In a second series of questions, CCP participants were asked about the probability of sustaining funding in specific CCP components after the CCP grant has ended. Of the six components queried, cities appeared to be more confidant about sustaining their community policing initiative. Overall, 36 percent of respondents believed that they were nearly certain that community policing funding would be sustained; 43 percent believed that community policing would likely be funded (Table 35). Over half the respondents believed that procuring sustained funding was either nearly certain or likely for community mobilization, youth and gangs, community prosecution and diversion, and drug courts. Community-based alternatives to incarceration appeared the least likely of procuring sustainment funding.

Table 35: Probability of Sustained Funding after CCP Grant – All Sites- Wave Two

	All CCP Sites					
	Nearly Certain	Likely	About 50/50	Doubtful	Close to Zero	Number of Responses
Community Policing	36%	43%	16%	3%	2%	(290)
Community Mobilization	19%	36%	30%	13%	2%	(286)
Youth and Gangs Programs	16%	43%	28%	10%	3%	(285)
Community Prosecution and Diversion	14%	41%	28%	13%	4%	(234)
Drug Courts	21%	34%	25%	13%	7%	(233)
Community-based Alternatives to Incarceration	14%	31%	28%	22%	5%	(223)

As noted above, participants from the CCP sites believed that the community policing component of the CCP initiative would be the most likely to receive sustained funding after the CCP grant has expired. Individually, however, some cities were more confident than others that this component will continue to be funded. Of the twelve sites, respondents from Columbia were the most confident that funding would be sustained for community policing, 68 percent of respondents were nearly certain that funding would be sustained (Table 36). Fort Worth respondents were almost as confident; 54 percent of respondents believed that they were nearly certain to sustain funding.

Table 36: Probability of Sustained Funding after CCP Grant – Community Policing- Wave Two

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Community Policing												
Nearly Certain	41%	25%	41%	68%	21%	44%	54%	-	15%	33%	48%	44%
Likely	36%	39%	36%	32%	53%	22%	39%	63%	56%	49%	41%	48%
About 50/50	23%	32%	18%	-	18%	11%	8%	37%	15%	15%	11%	4%
Doubtful	-	-	3	-	9%	11%	-	-	7%	-	-	4%
Close to Zero	-	4	3	-	-	11%	-	-	7%	3%	-	-
Number of Responses	(22)	(28)	(39)	(25)	(34)	(9)	(13)	(8)	(27)	(33)	(27)	(25)

Just as Columbia and Fort Worth respondents were the most confident that the community policing component would receive sustainment funding, they were also the most confident that they would acquire funding to sustain the community mobilization component of CCP as well. Half the respondents in Columbia were nearly certain and half in Fort Worth as well as in East Bay and Gary believed that sustained funding was likely after the CCP grant.

Table 37: Probability of Sustained Funding after CCP Grant – Community Mobilization- Wave Two

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Community Mobilization												
Nearly Certain	13%	22%	20%	50%	13%	10%	18%	-	-	35%	28%	17%
Likely	26%	28%	29%	29%	34%	60%	55%	57%	22%	32%	40%	35%
About 50/50	39%	28%	46%	17%	38%	20%	9%	29%	44%	24%	16%	39%
Doubtful	22%	22%	3%	4%	13%	-	18%	14%	26%	5%	16%	9%
Close to Zero	-	-	3%	-	3%	10%	-	-	7	3%	-	-
Number of Responses	(23)	(32)	(35)	(24)	(32)	(10)	(11)	(8)	(27)	(37)	(25)	(23)

Finally, CCP participants had varying opinions on the likelihood of sustaining social service components after the CCP grant ends. Seattle respondents appeared to believe that they would be the most likely to sustain funding for youth and gang programs; in contrast to Columbia, where respondents thought it to be the least likely to sustain funding for youth and gang programs.

Of the twelve cities, Gary respondents appear to believe that community prosecution and diversion funding will be sustained after the CCP grant. Interestingly, Gary respondents ranked high the likelihood that the drug court and community-based alternatives to incarceration would be sustained also. Almost 90 percent of Columbia respondents believed that they were either nearly certain or likely to sustain funding for drug courts and 67 percent of respondents believed that for community-based alternatives to incarceration. The responses varied among the remaining CCP cities depending on the social service component. It is evident that some cities are more likely to continue different aspects of the CCP initiative than others, but overall the continuation of major CCP components appears very likely.

Table 38: Probability of Sustained Funding after CCP Grant – Social Service Delivery Components - Wave Two

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Youth and Gangs Programs												
Nearly Certain	21%	16%	40%	10%	3%	10%	36%	-	4%	18%	15%	14%
Likely	46%	40%	29%	45%	36%	60%	36%	50%	67%	37%	63%	36%
About 50/50	18%	40%	21%	25%	42%	10%	21%	38%	13%	34%	19%	41%
Doubtful	7%	4%	5%	20%	16%	10%	7%	12%	13%	8%	4%	9%
Close to Zero	7%	-	5%	-	3%	10%	-	-	4%	3%	-	-
Number of Responses	(28)	(25)	(38)	(20)	(31)	(10)	(14)	(8)	(24)	(38)	(27)	(22)
Community Prosecution and Diversion												
Nearly Certain	26%	21%	22%	10%	4%	11%	33%	-	8%	3%	8%	21%
Likely	37%	38%	33%	45%	54%	11%	33%	71%	24%	50%	17%	42%
About 50/50	21%	21%	22%	25%	27%	56%	11%	29%	44%	38%	67%	26%
Doubtful	11%	21%	19%	10%	15%	11%	23%	-	12%	3%	8%	11%
Close to Zero	5%	-	4%	10%	-	11%	-	-	12%	6%	-	-
Number of Responses	(19)	(29)	(27)	(20)	(26)	(9)	(9)	(7)	(25)	(32)	(12)	(19)
Drug Courts												
Nearly Certain	13%	22%	25%	33%	17%	11%	50%	14%	5%	6%	17%	32%
Likely	19%	48%	29%	54%	30%	-	10%	86%	27%	37%	33%	37%
About 50/50	25%	26%	14%	13%	33%	56%	20%	-	27%	33%	42%	11%
Doubtful	19%	4%	21%	-	10%	22%	20%	-	27%	15%	8%	21%
Close to Zero	25%	-	10%	-	10%	11%	-	-	14%	9%	-	-
Number of Responses	(16)	(23)	(28)	(24)	(30)	(9)	(10)	(7)	(22)	(33)	(12)	(19)
Community-based Alternatives to Incarceration												
Nearly Certain	13%	28%	7%	24%	12%	-	27%	-	8%	7%	17%	6%
Likely	25%	32%	33%	43%	35%	33%	9%	67%	25%	37%	25%	13%
About 50/50	31%	24%	30%	14%	27%	33%	27%	17%	29%	30%	42%	50%
Doubtful	19%	16%	26%	14%	23%	22%	37%	17%	29%	17%	17%	25%
Close to Zero	13%	-	4%	5%	4%	12%	-	-	8%	10%	-	6%
Number of Responses	(16)	(25)	(27)	(21)	(26)	(9)	(11)	(6)	(24)	(30)	(12)	(16)

Lessons on Sustainment

We have noted elsewhere in this evaluation that one of the key elements of CCP's success has been the openness of BJA officials to sites pursuing existent agendas. As noted elsewhere as well, this should not be read to imply that CCP was a program that allowed local officials to pursue any agenda in some willy-nilly fashion. For example, BJA was quite explicit that a key element of CCP was the pursuit of community policing. Moreover, BJA had a vision of what community policing was, made consulting resources available to communities that were based on this view of community policing, and insisted that communities pursue community policing. Within this framework, however, cities had considerable latitude to shift to community policing within the context of the history of the police department, current opportunities and problems, the current status of community policing in the jurisdiction, and other such variables. This is not to say that site staff were thrilled

about following all of the required guidelines; many complained dramatically about programmatic restrictions and resented the federal intervention. Nevertheless, many found ways to work around the restrictions and others grudgingly acknowledged that some of the guidelines forced on them resulted in positive outcomes. Finally, the restrictions and guidelines still left sites with considerable latitude to pursue their existent agendas.

It would follow from this that if communities had considerable latitude to pursue their own agendas, they would be more likely to sustain those activities than if some external agenda had been imposed on them. This appears to be generally the case and is discussed below.

The second point to be made about sustainability is that CCP consciously attempted to fund the establishment of new ways of doing business among agencies and organizations—public, private, neighborhood, and others. To the extent that communities succeeded in finding new ways of doing business, and those ways of doing business persist, important CCP values are maintained. Basically, this was discussed partially in the section on *synergy*. That is, whether at the level of consent, cooperation, coordination, or collaboration, community agencies and groups learned to work together in ways that they had not heretofore. Such new ways of *doing business* are ends in themselves and East Bay, Boston, Salt Lake City, Phoenix and several other cities stand out in this regard. Even cities like Hartford and Wilmington that, for a variety of reasons, were not able to make great progress in the implementation of community policing, were able to establish new partnerships between neighborhoods and government. This is a very powerful outcome: communities are rallying together to protect themselves against fear, disorder, crime, and urban decay—many very successfully. CCP both caught and fostered this movement.

Third, just as federal administrators learned to let good things happen in communities, communities learned as well about how to foster their agendas with federal funds. Fort Worth and Seattle are good examples of this. Fort Worth combined CCP funds with a variety of other local, state, and federal funds to complete its implementation of community policing citywide. And it did so in a way that could be sustained once CCP funds were no longer available. Seattle took a different approach, primarily using its funds for training—a long range investment in the future of community policing which it believed would foster community policing without obligating the city to future expenses that it could not manage.

Fourth, *good ideas* that were funded and tested with CCP funds were adopted and funded locally, some from private sources, but many others with hard government funding. The line officer grant program in the Metro Denver is one good example. It was an innovative program that caught on and was so popular that state funding developed—a very exceptional outcome in Colorado. (Moreover, other sites adopted the Line Officer Grant *good idea*.) Other sites could be given as examples: Wil-

mington, Baltimore, Phoenix, Columbia, Salt Lake City—in each case CCP funded programs became part of ongoing efforts of communities

Fifth, programs were sustained, indeed expanded, because people associated with CCP moved into governmental agencies that either had more resources or were more influential and used those positions to foster CCP like programs in larger jurisdictions. Baltimore is perhaps the best example of such an outcome where Michael Sarbanes moved from a key role at a city level to a statewide role, where he directed statewide criminal justice efforts. Hartford is another example. There, a police staff person was elevated to the city manager's office, where she was better able to coordinate efforts. The Metro Denver Community Policing Academy is a slightly different example, but is of the same nature—a regional program was adopted statewide, spreading its influence.

Other ways were found to support programs: COPS, grant block funding, private foundations, and municipal funding. Although switching to soft money streams may not appear as powerful as obtaining hard governmental money, the very act of pursuing such funds, and even more so, obtaining them, testifies to the commitment of persons administering CCP programs to sustain them in the future. Many of the initiatives, like the CATs in Salt Lake City and the NPCs in Wilmington are both being continued with local funding.

In sum, in virtually every CCP site, city leaders, police executives, community leaders, and program officers have put forward substantial efforts to sustain CCP initiatives. In contrast to many other programs, one would predict that many CCP initiatives will become part of the local landscape in most CCP communities. Moreover, many ideas from CCP will be duplicated in other communities.

The Role of BJA Utilization of Technical Assistance

Technical assistance is often proposed by funding agencies as an important tool to assist local sites with planning and implementing tasks. In the implementation of CCP, BJA subcontracted technical assistance to Criminal Justice Associates (CJA) and the National Center for the Prevention of Crime (NCPC). The following presents the results of a Technical Assistance Survey conducted during summer 1998. The questionnaire consisted of generally open-ended questions designed to determine respondents' opinions of the technical assistance (TA) provided during the course of the Comprehensive Communities Program. More specifically, respondents were asked about: general types of TA; specific TA provided to the site, and; recommendations for change. The survey was intended to be administered to representatives from 15 CCP sites[21]. However, information was gathered from only 13 of these 15—Metro Atlanta and Gary staff were unavailable for comment. The representatives were typically the current CCP directors/ coordinators for each site, although in one case the CCP coordinator recommended another individual who had more experience and knowledge of the TA. While the results below indicate generally positive opinions, respondents did point to several concerns for each TA component and provided a number of suggestions for improvement.

General Types of Technical Assistance

For the first series of questions, respondents were asked to provide information on the five general types of TA that were given to the sites during the planning and implementation of CCP. These five categories included: written materials sent by the National Center for the Prevention of Crime; media advertisement kits sent by NCPC; needs assessment; site conferences, and; assistance in response to specific information requests. Respondents were asked to rate the quality of each type of TA and to discuss how appropriate and helpful each type of TA was for their site. The following presents the results for each TA category.

Written Materials

When asked to rate the written materials sent by NCPC, all indications were that they were of generally high quality. With the exception of two respondents who rated the materials as average, everyone considered the materials to be above average (three individuals indicated they were good, and five suggested they were very good

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[21] The targeted sites included: Baltimore, Boston, Columbia, East Bay, Fort Worth, Gary, Hartford, Metro Atlanta, Metro Denver, Metro Omaha, Phoenix, Salt Lake City, Seattle, Wichita, and Wilmington.

or excellent). Three respondents felt that the quality of the written materials varied considerably, although it was always from above average to excellent.

Reactions as to the appropriateness and helpfulness of the written materials were somewhat mixed, although most indicated that the information was, in general, appropriate and useful for their sites. This was especially the case when the materials prompted new ideas and new ways of solving problems. A number of respondents noted that the materials geared toward community groups and neighborhood partners were particularly helpful and appropriate to the goals and objectives set forth at their sites. Several also suggested that the written materials were useful in keeping them abreast of the status of CCP, as well as informed of the programs at other CCP sites.

Other positive comments from respondents suggest that they found the written materials to be generally good in terms of presentation and style, and that the information was well-written and user-friendly. This was often reflected by positive feedback from the community. Many felt that the quality of the information was quite high (although one respondent indicated that, through no fault of NCPC, some of the more scholarly information reported on data that was several years old and perhaps outdated). Several respondents specifically said that the materials were used to build up or support a resource library at their site. Many also commented on the inclusiveness of the materials sent by NCPC.

Interestingly enough, one of the most common criticisms of the written materials was also one of its benefits. As one respondent put it: "... the information was inclusive enough to be used in many different ways, but the primary drawback was also its inclusiveness." This statement reflects the attitudes of many of those interviewed. Many felt that the large volume of written materials made the information difficult to manage. At times it was a little overwhelming, and it took some effort to determine who should use the information and how it should be used. Several respondents described a "shotgun approach," whereby a huge amount of material was sent out, some of which was much more relevant than others.

The other main criticism of the written materials perhaps stems from their voluminous nature. Several respondents commented that, while the information was detailed and generally timely, it was often difficult to apply the materials to the needs of their site (i.e. much of the information was not as site-sensitive as hoped). Geared toward a wide audience, some of the materials were much more appropriate and relevant to certain sites than to others.

Media Advertisement Kits

Twelve of the thirteen interviewees responded to the questions concerning the media advertisement kits sent by NCPC. One respondent did not feel knowledgeable enough about them to provide accurate comments. As with the written materials,

most of the individuals who did respond found that the quality of the media advertisement kits was generally very high. Indeed, ten of the twelve respondents indicated that the kits were of above average quality, with half of the twelve reporting that the quality was very good or excellent—no one felt that the quality of the kits was below average.

While most agreed that the quality was very high, respondents varied considerably when discussing the usefulness and appropriateness of the kits to their sites. Three individuals indicated extensive use of the kits, two indicated the kits were of at least some use, and six said they were of little or no use. Two respondents could not comment on the extent of their usefulness.

Several respondents noted that the kits were extremely helpful. This appeared to be especially the case if the site coordinators had had little experience dealing with the media before the CCP process. One site in particular indicated that the media advertisement kits were excellent because they helped individuals develop an understanding of how and when to approach the media, and how to market themselves. Even some sites that did have previous experience with the media utilized the kits because the information in them was used to send a positive, emotionally powerful message. Sites distributed the information to schools, communities, and other media outlets. They reported that the messages were very applicable, regardless of the size of the communities they were used in.

There were a number of reasons why six respondents indicated that the media advertisement kits were of little or no use. First, in a number of cases, the site had already initiated its own media campaign and/or had in-house expertise on the subject. This being the case, the media kits were obviously not as helpful as they could have been. Second, two respondents indicated that their sites did not have the appropriate outlets to take full advantage of the kits. Even if the quality was good and the messages were appropriate, they would have had difficulty using them. Third, one respondent indicated that media efforts were simply not a priority for their site, and so the kits were of limited use. Finally, several individuals indicated that the messages were not applicable enough to their concerns to merit their widespread use.

Needs Assessment

The needs assessment portion of the TA appeared to be a source of some confusion for respondents. The majority of respondents (seven), could not recall or were unclear about the needs assessment that was performed at their site. The remaining six individuals who did clearly recall the needs assessment found it to be of generally good quality (one rated it as average, three rated it as good, and two rated it as very good). When asked, a few of these individuals remember the needs assessment taking place early in the CCP process. If it is indeed the case that the needs as-

sessment occurred early, the fact that many sites have had changes in CCP personnel during the past four years may explain why the response rate on this question was so low.

In any event, most of the individuals who could not recall or were unclear about the needs assessment were unable to comment on how helpful and appropriate it was to their site. Those that did respond to the needs assessment questions provided some interesting information. The more positive comments suggested the idea that the needs assessment was technically appropriate and the information provided was helpful in a general sense. Additionally, one respondent suggested that the needs assessment helped to confirm what the site had already been thinking and pointed them on the right course for the CCP process. Another individual felt that the needs assessment providers did a good job in identifying weaknesses and areas that needed change in their program.

The most common criticism of the needs assessment suggests that while it may have been technically appropriate and helpful, it could have been geared less toward a national model and more toward the local needs of the individual sites. A number of respondents indicated that it would have been more helpful for the needs assessment providers to have had a more intimate knowledge of the immediate needs and goals facing each site. If this were the case, there would have been a great opportunity to take the general information and apply it more appropriately at the local level.

Site Conferences

When asked to rate the quality of the site conferences, most respondents (nine) rated the conferences as good or very good. Three respondents suggested that they varied from average to very good (increasing in quality as time went on), and one respondent suggested that they varied from below average to excellent. It should be noted that some respondents often had difficulty distinguishing between conferences and workshops. The extent to which this difficulty influences the results reported here is unclear.

The helpfulness and appropriateness of the site conferences varied considerably according to the respondents, although everyone seemed to suggest that they were of general benefit to their sites. There were indications that the usefulness of the conferences varied with the quality of the speakers, the overall focus of the conferences, and the focus of the information that was disseminated. On this matter, some respondents returned to the issue of site-specificity—if the focus of the conference and its information could be applied "back home," either for the purposes of site management or program development, the conference itself was viewed as more useful.

For the most part, the responses suggest that the conferences were generally well-structured and well-managed, especially when the sites had direct input in their

development. There were indications from respondents that earlier in the process, BJA had an overly paternalistic attitude toward the sites, and that this was reflected in the structure of the conferences. Along these lines, some respondents indicated that those conferences that were too regimented and "forced" were not as helpful as they could have been because the structure sometimes interfered with the development of relationships between sites.

Interestingly, one of the strongest opinions shared by nearly all respondents (and one of the more consistent findings of the TA survey) was that the conferences were invaluable, not necessarily for the information that was presented, but for the networking that was achieved between sites. Whether or not by design, the conferences served as an opportunity for sharing ideas and providing *peer TA* to other sites. As one respondent put it, "In a way, you can build your own TA based on the ideas of people from other sites who share information with you." Even those individuals who were more critical of the conferences (and the TA in general) acknowledged the importance of the exchange of information that came about whenever site representatives were allowed to interact. People seemed to be very responsive to any attempts to enhance communication between sites. For example, one respondent mentioned that breaking into small group discussions greatly helped with information sharing. There was even some suggestion that the downtime between sessions was valuable for the purpose of information exchange, since this allowed for spontaneous and meaningful (yet informal) conversations. A number of respondents who suggested that the conferences "got better over time" attribute it to the fact that more site input and interaction among individuals was allowed in the schedules.

A comment from one respondent also deserves mention regarding the site conferences. Although no one else specifically mentioned this, it was his impression that the conferences benefited all participants because they helped to develop and make clear the relationship of the sites to BJA. In other words, people were able to develop a better understanding of their responsibilities (as well as BJA's expectations) at the site conferences.

Specific Information Requests

When asked to rate the quality of the assistance received in response to specific information requests, most respondents found it to be excellent. Indeed, ten of the thirteen respondents rated it as very good or excellent. Two individuals rated it as good, and one person could not recall making any specific requests for assistance.

The specific information requests were among the most helpful of the TA offered, although a few sites admitted that they made only a limited number of such requests. There were very few criticisms by respondents of this form of assistance. In fact, people generally found this TA to be timely and honest, with all requests being

addressed in the best manner possible. BJA, NCPC, and CJA all received compliments on this matter. While a few respondents suggested that the TA providers did not always have the magic answers, they were nonetheless good listeners, they offered the best they could with the resources available, and they were helpful to the sites in thinking through problems. Only one site responded that the specific TA rarely was a good fit to their goals and objectives.

The primary reason why respondents found this form of TA so helpful was because the requests addressed the recurring issue of site-specificity. Nearly all respondents either stated outright or alluded to the idea that a site-oriented approach, rather than a national model approach, was a key benefit of the specific requests. The idea that answers to site-specific requests were well received because they addressed site-specific needs may seem a bit obvious. However, the way it was welcomed may be a broader indication of the importance of TA directed at the unique needs of individual sites.

Most and Least Helpful Types of Technical Assistance

In addition to rating the quality, helpfulness, and appropriateness of the five general types of TA that were given to the sites during the planning and implementation of CCP, respondents were asked to state which of the five were the most and least helpful and to explain the reason for their choice. It was discovered during the course of interviewing that many respondents were very reluctant to choose one particular type as *most* and *least* helpful. In an effort to gather as much information as possible, therefore, the interviewer did not continuously pressure them into committing to one choice. The following indicates what thirteen site representatives believed to be the most and least helpful forms of TA.

The Most Helpful

It would appear that the two most helpful forms of TA were the site conferences and the responses to specific information requests. Six respondents rated the site conferences the highest[22], while four individuals indicated that the responses to specific requests were the most useful[23]. Two people were undecided between the site conferences and the specific information requests. Only one person suggested a form of TA other than the conferences or the requests as the most helpful. In this case, the

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[22] Four of the individuals who rated *the site conferences* the highest qualified their answers by saying that *the responses to specific information requests* rated a close second or were nearly as helpful and useful.

[23] Two of the individuals who rated *the responses to specific information requests* the highest qualified their answers by saying that *the site conferences* rated a close second or were nearly as helpful and useful.

respondent rated the written materials sent by NCPC the highest, indicating that it was very useful to have such information available at one's fingertips.

The primary reasons offered as to why the site conferences were considered the most beneficial have been discussed above. Respondents generally believed that they were able to get a great deal of information in one event—both from the content of the conference and from the networking between the sites. The interaction between BJA, TA providers, and peers helped to build experience, resources, and, as one respondent put it, "team spirit." The relationships established between sites at the conferences remain strong despite the fact that CCP itself is coming to an end. A number of individuals mentioned that they stay in touch with their CCP counterparts for information sharing and resource development purposes.

The primary reasons why respondents found the responses to the information requests the most useful were also discussed earlier in this document. Because the responses were normally immediate and tailored to individual needs, they were able to address the specific nature of the problems at the sites in a timely manner. While information from the other sources of TA may have been useful, they were normally presented in a more general sense.

Worth noting are the comments of one respondent who could not decide between the conferences and the specific information requests as the most helpful. She noted that it was difficult to compare the two because they achieved very different ends. For this respondent, the specific requests were most helpful for the site director(s) and for grant administrative issues, whereas the site conferences were most important for professional and community development within the CCP context.

The Least Helpful

Twelve interviewees responded to the "least helpful" question (the thirteenth was reluctant to consider any form of TA as the least helpful). Eight of these twelve indicated that the media advertisement kits were the least useful type of TA. Two respondents mentioned that the needs assessment was the least helpful. Another respondent remarked that the written materials, although helpful, were probably less useful than the other forms of TA that offered greater opportunity for personal interaction. Finally, one individual indicated that because she could not recall the site making any specific information requests, that these were the least useful form of TA for her site. (She did mention that these would seem to have the potential for being very useful.)

Of the eight who found the media advertisement kits to be the least useful form of TA, most felt that the quality of the kits was very good. It was for other reasons (some of which were alluded to earlier) that the kits were not as helpful as other forms of TA. First, in some sites, the capacity to utilize the kits either did not exist or it was not developed well enough to take advantage of the opportunities. Second,

in contrast, some sites had very well developed media campaigns, and so they did not require this form of TA because of their in-house expertise. Third, for some sites, overall media efforts were simply not a priority and/or the kits themselves were simply not appropriate to site-specific needs. Finally, even some sites that used the kits quite extensively found them to be less helpful than other types of TA. For example, one respondent who really liked the media kits stated that they could not stand alone in solving problems—the kits were good at getting people involved and making them aware, but they needed follow-up to be effective.

One of the individuals who stated that the needs assessment was the least helpful form of TA did so because he felt that it was geared too much toward a national model and not specific enough to the needs of his site. The other individual who responded that the needs assessment was the least useful TA did so because he could not remember it occurring, nor had anyone ever told him about it. He therefore argued that it could not have had much of an impact on the site. As previously mentioned, many respondents could not recall or were unclear about the nature of the needs assessment and so declined to comment on its helpfulness and appropriateness to their sites. Statements which suggest that needs assessments were not very memorable may be an indication that they were less useful than other forms of TA.

Specific TA Provided to Sites

In the next series of questions, respondents were provided with four general TA categories: workshops, training, conferences, and other TA. Under each category, a list of specific TA received by the site was provided. Respondents were asked to choose which specific TA on each list was the most appropriate and helpful. The following summarizes the site representatives' responses to these questions.

Workshops

During the course of CCP, there were seven specific workshops open to each site. First, it should be noted that most respondents did not personally attend every workshop. Some were therefore uncomfortable commenting on the ones that they did not attend. Others, however, felt they were able to comment on these events based on the information brought back from other site representatives. These individuals were also able to comment on the workshops' overall impact on the site. A second point to note is that respondents would not comment on a workshop if they were the host site, feeling that they could not be objective about the comments. Finally, many respondents were reluctant to point to just one workshop as the one that stood out. Very often they found more than one to be equally the most helpful.

The workshop that was chosen most often as either the most useful or one of the most useful was the Information Technology workshop in Oakland (seven individu-

als rated this as at least one of the most helpful). A number of respondents noted that a key strength of this workshop was that it included the sites on the planning committee—giving people involved in the process the opportunity to address specific problems from all sites. Indeed, other respondents noted that this event was extremely helpful at getting below the surface to give sites the necessary hands-on information. This information could then be molded and applied to their own approaches that were in development. Because this workshop was to-the-point, addressed a crucial issue, and in many cases had a direct impact, it was largely regarded as one of the more successful TA events.

Also among the more popular was the Youth Violence and Youth Gangs workshop in Boston. Four respondents considered this to be the most helpful or one of the most helpful. Individuals pointed out that they liked the structure of the workshop, which allowed participants to get into the community, meet the partners that Boston was working with, and actually see examples of successful strategies that were operating at the site. Several respondents said that the information was very relevant to the problems their site was facing. Even a site that did not have a huge gang problem said that the workshop was very appropriate because it offered a comprehensive plan (i.e. not just the police), it helped to raise awareness of gang and gun issues, and it offered prevention strategies.

The Sustainment Action Planning in Hartford also received four votes as one of, if not the, most helpful workshop. Three of these respondents felt that it was an important issue which needed to be dealt with as their sites were considering which pieces of their programs to continue. As one respondent put it, after the workshop the site coordinators forced themselves to sit down with their partners and focus on a sustainment plan. She believed that it was also important because it forced them to look at evaluation as an essential component of sustainment, since one does not want to continue that which is not working. Respondents liked the step-by-step approach that was offered at the workshop. One individual did mention that she would have liked such an important part of the process to be explained earlier in the program.

One of the respondents who rated the Sustainment Action Planning as the most useful said so not for the information that was provided, but for the networking between sites that occurred at this workshop. In fact, this particular individual suggested that the information was not very appropriate to his site because it did not take into account regional differences or site-specific needs. Interestingly enough, a number of other respondents suggested that this workshop was one of the least helpful and applicable, either because it was not site-specific or because the site had already developed a sustainment plan.

Metro Denver's Drug Court Training and Fort Worth's Resource Development received three votes each as among the most useful of TA workshops. Metro Denver's event appeared to be especially helpful and appropriate to those sites that did not

have much experience with drug courts prior to the CCP process. Site representatives felt that the information at this workshop was specific and concentrated in subject matter. Respondents also felt that the networking opportunities which were made available at this workshop were very valuable to the development of their drug court planning. Although three respondents rated Fort Worth's Resource Development as the most helpful, they offered few comments in explaining their choice. They simply said that it was timely and appropriate to the needs their particular sites were addressing.

The two workshops that were least likely to be chosen as the most helpful and appropriate were the Program Management in Berkeley and the Community Engagement in Salt Lake City. The Program Management workshop did appeal to two respondents, who both suggested that it was very timely and that it came about during a period when activities really needed to be managed. One respondent felt that the Community Engagement was among the most appropriate because it happened to take place during a time that his site was facing those issues.

It should be noted that Program Management and Community Engagement were the first two workshops, both occurring quite early in the CCP process. The elapsed time, plus the fact that some of the interviewees were not part of CCP until after these events took place, may have had an impact on the findings reported here. It should also be noted that there seemed to be a general consensus among respondents that the workshops improved over time—largely because the sites were given more say in what was to be included and covered.

Training

The thirteen respondents were asked to choose the most helpful training from among a list of several provided to their site. In most cases, this meant choosing between two NCPC/Radio Shack trainings: one on sexual assault awareness, domestic violence prevention, and gang intervention and prevention strategies; and the other on involvement of senior volunteers. Two sites (Hartford and Wichita) were also offered CPTED training. One site (Columbia) was offered support for two drug court training conferences.

It appears that few sites took advantage of the training opportunities. Indeed, seven of the thirteen respondents indicated either that no one attended either training or that very limited use was made of them. In some cases, the respondent could not even remember when the training occurred. Of the respondents who did indicate that site representatives attended one or more of the training sessions, four said that the information from the NCPC/Radio Shack satellite training for sexual assault awareness, domestic violence prevention, and gang intervention and prevention strategies was of some use, although no one suggested extensive use of these materials. One respondent reported that the information was used as a tie-in

with the domestic violence court that is operating at their site. No one suggested that the training on involvement of senior volunteers was the most helpful training TA, and there was apparently very low participation in this particular event.

Two of the sites that received training in addition to the NCPC/Radio Shack satellite events indicated that it was the most helpful. In Columbia, for example, the site representative indicated that the drug court training conferences were very helpful because the site had little experience with drug courts prior to the CCP process. In Wichita, the CPTED training was very useful to community policing officers, who used it to improve security and crime prevention efforts.

Conferences

Respondents were also asked about three specific conferences—the Site Cluster Conference in Baltimore, the Youth Crime Prevention Conference in Miami, and the Conference of Sites in Denver. As with the workshops, not all interviewees attended each conference. Therefore, they either declined to comment on those that they did not attend or they based their comments on the experiences of other representatives from their sites. Also like the workshops, respondents were sometimes reluctant to choose one conference over another as "the most helpful." Overall, the number and quality of respondents' comments would appear to indicate that they were more enthusiastic about the information provided at the workshops than at the conferences, although no one specifically said that this was the case.

There appeared to be mixed opinions about the Site Cluster Conference in Baltimore. While five respondents indicated that it was either the most useful or one of the most useful, two actually said that it was the least appropriate. There were a number of reasons offered by those who liked the conference. It was believed by some that it helped to bring the sites together, develop relationships to BJA, establish the *ground rules* of CCP, and outline the different programs. Others reasoned that in the early stages, it was important to bring senior officials from the sites into the process. This helped to give the program legitimacy and support at the local level. However, those who found this conference to be the least appropriate felt that it was too rigidly structured, offered little of substantive value, and offered little time for sites to interact.

Four respondents thought that the Youth Crime Prevention Conference in Miami was the most helpful. Unfortunately, these individuals offered little in explaining their choice. When asked to explain their answer, the respondents simply indicated that this conference was more informative and in-line with the strategies that were happening at their sites. One site, having sent four youth organizers along with a program coordinator to the conference, did indicate that the youth came back with very positive comments. The sense was that the information from this conference was more focused and directly applicable to the needs of the sites.

Five individuals decided that Denver's Conference of Sites was one of the more helpful conferences. The primary reason for indicating this was because the structure of the conference allowed for more interaction between sites. The conference management was less regimented, allowing site directors to come together and discuss implementation strategies and problems. Again the respondents brought up the idea of networking and how important it was to the CCP process.

Other Site-Specific TA

Respondents were each provided with a list of other types of technical assistance that were provided to their site during the course of CCP. They were then asked to choose the most helpful and appropriate type of TA from that list. The lists varied considerably between sites, ranging from one item in Fort Worth, Metro Omaha, and Phoenix to ten items in Wilmington. The lists were often the source of some confusion for the interviewees. Sometimes they did not remember a particular technical assistance happening, even though they were present during the period when it was apparently taking place. In other cases, they remembered "something" happening, but it was different from what was listed. Because the lists varied considerably, the following will present the comments on a site-specific basis.

In Baltimore, the respondent was asked to consider nine types of technical assistance. She was particularly enthusiastic about CJA's on-site responsibility charting. While this was described as a difficult process, it was very timely and extremely helpful to Baltimore. The respondent indicated that some of the challenges of CCP arose because people at the site misunderstood their roles and responsibilities. The responsibility charting process forced people to sit down and think about their duties. The end result was that everyone's roles were established fairly early in CCP—this brought order and coordination to the program. The respondent also noted that NCPC's CPTED trainings were very helpful for the community, but for grant management purposes, the responsibility charting was essential.

In Boston, the site representative was asked to choose the most helpful from a list of four types of technical assistance. The respondent indicated that CJA's on-site logistical support was the most beneficial to the site. She did not elaborate in great detail as to the reasons why the logistical support was the most useful, but s/he did say that it was very important to the needs of the site management.

In Columbia, the respondent indicated that the NCPC on-site meeting with community mobilizers and site director was the most helpful TA on the list of five items. The respondent noted that this meeting was very important for communication purposes. When TA providers came on-site, they made the site aware of BJA's ideas and concerns. The site was then able to communicate how they were molding those ideas into their own approach.

In Denver, the respondent had only two items to choose from on the list of technical assistance. The respondent indicated that the CJA field visit and meeting with HUD and NIJ were useful. The field visit was particularly helpful because it served as a preparation for the Information Technology workshop in Oakland that happened shortly after this meeting.

In East Bay, the site representative was asked to consider four types of technical assistance. The respondent stressed that both NCPC efforts with PSA's were equally helpful. She did not explain this choice in great detail other than to say that the localization of the PSA's were an important issue for the site.

In Fort Worth, the respondent was given one choice—a CJA / NCPC initiated discussion with the project director to further sustainment efforts. However, the respondent was not sure about this item. After the respondent was unable to find out more information about this discussion from other CCP people at the site, he declined to comment.

In Hartford, the site representative was given a choice of six types of technical assistance that was delivered to the site. However, the respondent was not particularly enthusiastic about any of these choices. She did indicate that the NCPC on-site meeting with two board members of OPMAD was the most useful. The other choices either could not be remembered or were not particularly helpful to the site.

In Metro Omaha, the respondent was given one choice—a CJA/Peer TA on-site discussion on further sustainment efforts. The respondent could not recall this particular discussion and so could not comment on it. However, she did say that any on-site visit was considered very important because the TA provider/BJA could actually see the issues that the site was facing, rather than reacting to the issues as they appeared on paper.

In Phoenix, the site representative was also given just one choice—a CJA initiated discussion on further sustainment efforts. Like the Metro Omaha representative, this respondent could not recall this particular discussion. She did indicate however, that any discussion or information on sustainment was useful to the process.

In Salt Lake City, the respondent was given a choice of three types of technical assistance. The respondent, however, was unclear about these choices, indicating that all three were part of the same effort. This being the case, she could not rate one as more useful than the other two. The respondent did indicate that the overall effort was very helpful to the site.

In Seattle, the site representative was given the choice of five types of technical assistance. The respondent indicated that the NCPC on-site strategy development for a citizen's academy and the NCPC on-site initiated discussion with key site contacts regarding CPTED were equally helpful. Both of these efforts were important be-

cause they were most directly applicable to the projects that were being developed at the site.

In Wichita, the respondent was given a choice between three types of technical assistance. The CJA on-site discussion with the project director regarding assistance in documenting process in sustainment efforts was identified as the most helpful. The respondent reported that this discussion was crucial in obtaining further funding.

In Wilmington, the site representative had a choice of ten forms of technical assistance. She indicated that everything was very useful and had difficulty pointing to one as the most helpful and appropriate. She did specifically mention the CJA on-site meetings to discuss the pilot neighborhood-based community service project as especially appropriate because the topic was completely new to Wilmington.

Comments and Suggestions

For the final series of questions, respondents were asked for additional comments and suggestions on technical assistance. First, they were asked if there was another type of technical assistance that could have been provided that would have been useful to their site. Second, they were asked to give suggestions about how the quality of the TA that was provided could have been improved[24]. It is fairly apparent from the responses that the interviewees were generally satisfied with the assistance given. Nevertheless, respondents provided a number of interesting comments (many of which have been mentioned at various points in this section of the report).

Site Interaction and Site Control

With a good number of respondents reporting that networking among sites was so very helpful and informative to the process, it is not surprising that their suggestions would reflect this sentiment. The most frequent suggestion for improved TA during this survey involved the idea of increased peer interaction. Indeed, interviewees indicated that any attempt to further the interaction between sites could only enhance and improve the process.

Through discussions with peers, individuals often discovered that many of their problems had already been solved at similarly situated sites. With the importance of these discussions realized, there were a number of suggestions from respondents for enhancing peer-to-peer networking. Several individuals felt that this could be done through the use of additional meetings or specialized focus groups. These fo-

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[24] Interviewees often offered one response covering both questions.

cus groups would be designed for the express purpose of bringing together individual sites, matched according to similar attributes and problems, to discuss issues of common concern. Respondents recognized, of course, that for such a strategy to be successful, there would almost certainly need to be a mechanism in place to identify common issues and goals across sites.

Some people felt that, rather than create additional meetings, opportunities for focused discussion among site representatives should be better integrated into existing conferences and workshops. Apparently as CCP progressed, there was a growing trend to allow more interaction among participants at the various events. In fact, several respondents were very pleased to see that as time went on, more opportunities for information exchange and *peer TA* were offered at these events.

Also as time progressed, sites were given more choice over the structure and content of the conferences and workshops. This issue was emphasized by several individuals who suggested that sites should be given even more control over the development and coordination of these events. The respondents indicated that conferences and workshops are most successful when they are coordinated by the sites. Their feeling is that BJA and TA providers, although very necessary and helpful to the process, serve much better as consultants and facilitators than as directors.

Site Specificity and Choice of TA Provider

When the sites had more control over conferences and workshops, not only did interaction among peers increase, but the content of the events became more focused on the specific needs of the specific sites. As could be expected from answers to previous questions on the survey, many respondents returned to the idea of site-specific assistance when discussing possible improvements to TA. Although respondents were genuinely interested in the *national model* approach often presented to them by the TA providers, they were more interested in how that model could be applied to the issues at their site. In some cases, the *national model* (as presented in the written materials, needs assessment, conferences and/or workshops) did not fit well with the uniqueness of a particular site. In this event, site directors would have liked specific technical assistance for help at the local level.

While many respondents believed that a more site-specific approach would be desirable, they offered only a few additional recommendations as to how this may be achieved[25]. These can be broken down into three suggestions. First, some individuals indicated that they wished they had taken more advantage of the specific information requests. Perhaps by increasing awareness of this option, respondents

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[25] It should be noted that respondents were generally very realistic and understanding of the TA providers' abilities to provide site-specific assistance. They acknowledged some of the logistical difficulties and resources that would be required for a completely site-specific approach.

would have been more satisfied with the overall TA effort. Second, other interviewees suggested that giving the sites more choice over TA providers could achieve the desired results. For example, a number of respondents indicated that in certain cases it would have been better to hire local TA providers. These TA providers would have more intimate knowledge of the site and could therefore specifically address the problems in a more complete manner. Third, one respondent suggested that the sites should define the TA they need at the onset of the project, thereby allowing the TA provider the opportunity to think in more site-specific terms.

CCP Knowledge and Information

A number of respondents indicated that they would have liked to have had technical assistance in obtaining certain types of information either before or during the CCP process. For instance, several individuals remarked that it would have been helpful to have had a better understanding of the project, BJA, and BJA's expectations during the planning period and at the onset of the process. This would have prevented several misunderstandings and conflicting messages that occurred at the beginning of the program (although no one ever reported BJA to be uncooperative). In addition, an understanding of BJA's expectations would have helped to inform any necessary evaluation and reporting processes at an early date.

There were also various requests for written summaries and documentation of the CCP process. This was especially the case for those site managers who entered in the project in its later stages. A few respondents indicated that some technical management information (information that was most likely discussed in the early phases of the project) would have been helpful to aid the transition period for new site coordinators. One respondent was cautious in saying this, however. She indicated that it would be a shame for such documentation to take the place of the support from BJA offered to her during the transition.

Other Suggestions

A number of respondents commented on the amount of travel that was required for CCP. Although budgeted for this travel, several site representatives pointed to the hidden costs of travel, and were generally concerned that they were simply away from their bases of operation too often and for too long a period of time. Two suggestions were offered on this matter. First, the idea of satellite TA for sites in close geographic proximity was mentioned. This would cut down on travel costs and time. One respondent was reluctant to recommend this, however, because he would not want to give up opportunities for networking with other sites from across the country. The second recommendation involved the idea of consolidation. One individual noted that, like other sites, hers works with other federal grants from the Department of Justice. Different branches of DOJ will put on similar types of conferences and presenters, but at different times. While this respondent stressed that

the information was always helpful, she believed that more coordination between the different entities of DOJ would reduce repetition of information, as well as reduce the overall amount of travel.

A final suggestion from respondents addressed the issue of marketing CCP. While few specific recommendations were offered, several individuals would liked to have seen more TA that would have allowed them to better market CCP at the local level. One respondent suggested that increased involvement by federal leaders may assist on this matter. His reasoning was that more site visits and presentations by federal officials would gain the attention and interest of local officials. With local leaders having more than just a cursory understanding of the project, they may buy into it more and increase knowledge throughout the community.

Conclusion: CCP's Overall Impact

Important things happened in the CCP sites that were studied. Without exception, sites shifted their strategies for dealing with disorder, fear, and crime. These were major shifts, not petty adjustments or lesser tactical efforts. Below are a number of overarching conclusions about CCP and its impact.

Integration of police, criminal justice agencies, and other public and private agencies exceeded expectations. To the extent that a primary goal of CCP has been to integrate police, criminal justice agencies, other public agencies, and private agencies and organizations, examples can be given in many cities that such integration is moving beyond early expectations. First, strong coalitions have been established in many of the sites that were studied: in our judgment, outstanding progress has been made in Boston, Columbia, East Bay, and Phoenix. Baltimore and Salt Lake City are not far behind. In Wilmington, Hartford, and Metro Omaha, although police integration into collaborations lag, neighborhood organizations and service organizations have collaborated in new ways and have had an impact on how those cities are governed. In Fort Worth and Seattle, less progress seems to be made in coalition building, however, it must be understood that such building was not at the core of their efforts. In each case, their focus was on facilitating the shift to community policing.

In other respects progress was more than expected. For example, in Forth Worth, the security activities of business improvement districts have been integrated into the Fort Worth Police Department's overall strategy for improving the safety and quality of life in downtown Fort Worth. In Columbia, to give another example, one cannot address the issue of public safety without examining the role of churches, especially African-American churches in the central city. Not only are they reclaiming residential neighborhoods through their own construction of housing and new facilities, church-related and sponsored voluntary offender supervision programs appear to be integrated into community supervision of offenders. Other examples could be given from Boston, Salt Lake City, Phoenix, and East Bay where the original boundaries of CCP efforts have been blurred by the inclusion of state agencies, district attorney's offices, churches, and/or the private and voluntary sector. In Metro Denver, community policing training and other programs spread outward from their original regional base, to include the entire state. In other words, political units, organizations, groups, and individuals seemed ready for inclusion in coordinated efforts to reduce fear and crime and to improve the quality of urban life. CCP provided a mechanism through which they could do so.

Inclusion in such efforts was not always an easy process for organizations or groups. For example, some indigenous grass roots organizations risked being accused of *copping out* or *selling out* by such participation, especially groups that had a history of working with gangs or in circumstances where the relationship be-

tween gangs and police had a history of being especially contentious. Consequently, such organizations had the problem of maintaining credibility with their service constituencies when they became involved with governmental agencies such as police, prosecutors, and probation. Likewise, pitfalls existed in attempts to mobilize communities, especially around the issues of representation. Boston's Grove Hall was an outstanding example of such difficulty (although during the more recent past, much of this conflict had been resolved and Grove Hall's Safe Neighborhood Initiative was enjoying not only vitality, but successes in their efforts to have an impact on the neighborhood).

Such inclusion was also troublesome for traditional agencies such as police. When police became involved in neighborhood problem solving, police representatives often found themselves squeezed between neighborhood priorities on the one hand, and traditional police department priorities and ways of conducting business on the other. Such *squeezes* were enormously troublesome both to police who were delegated to become involved in neighborhood problem solving and who were highly-motivated, as well as to other individuals, groups, and organizations who were positioned to move quickly to solve neighborhood problems.

An important point to be made, and a subject for future research, is to identify the forms of working together, and the opportunities and problems that each presents. In retrospect, BOTEC researchers have seen at least four levels of organizational relationship: consent, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. *Consent* merely offers the approval of one organization—say a neighborhood group—to the activities of another—say police. *Cooperation* occurs when one organization conducts a set of activities and another stays out of its way, does not obstruct it, provides some assistance if asked, and generally is supportive of its activities. *Coordination* takes place when at least two organizations conduct their independent activities and work together to ensure that they do not duplicate each others' activities, attempt to mutually support each other, and work to ensure they meet a broad set of needs. *Collaboration* is the most complex relationship because it implies a contractual relationship in which two or more organizations work together on a problem and significantly modify their activities over a period of time. In effect, collaboration requires a new way of doing business. It is complex because it has the structural, administrative, and tactical implications for all participating organizations.

Neighborhoods and communities have been taken seriously. Despite organizational and administrative problems, there have been many examples of neighborhoods and communities being accepted as the basic units for thinking about problems and working for solutions, examples of these neighborhood problems being taken seriously by traditional organizations such as police and prosecutors (a few, at least), and examples of these organizations establishing new forms of accountability to neighborhoods. This has been especially significant in places like Wilmington and Hartford, where political and organizational problems kept police from becoming significant partners. The idea that professionals know

best is on the wane in many communities as police and other official agencies are seriously listening to, and hearing communities. This is the good news. However, despite drug courts and a few other exceptions, (e.g. probation officers' role on the CAT teams in Salt Lake City) probation, parole, and the courts were not living up to their potential for solving neighborhood problems. Most were still involved in mere case processing. Schools must also be brought into the problem identification and problem-solving process.

Many of the CCP program activities had a history in their respective communities. That is, site efforts grew out of an earlier set of experiences—a pursuit of an agenda or vision, if you will—that CCP funds have extended, sped up, or strengthened. In Boston, the use of extended and inclusive police planning process was first conceived in Bratton's administration, but carried out by current Commissioner Paul Evans. Baltimore's effort grew out of a neighborhood lawyer program that focused on housing and is now being transferred city and statewide. In East Bay, community leaders had been pushing for regional collaboration for some time. Finally, in Fort Worth, the implementation of citywide community policing took place first, with Weed and Seed funds, then with routine budget funds, then with resources from a special city tax, and finally with funds from CCP. Salt Lake City's implementation of community policing took a similar route. In other words, most communities used CCP funds to pursue long-term agendas that had their origins in earlier efforts or in other funding sources.

Below are other impressions about the Comprehensive Communities Program that have already been discussed in depth in this report.

- ***Programs had their origins in a variety of sources—community organizations, mayor's and city manager's offices, police departments, neighborhood alliances—yet police participation was crucial to obtaining a sense of control in communities.***

- ***Persons of extraordinary skill and commitment were discovered in many of the sites. These were persons who "truly mattered" in the implementation process.*** It should be noted here that site staff seemed genuinely concerned to implement reforms—that is, there was little inclination to just "get the money and run."

- ***The strategy, or the business, of policing was redefined in all sites***—to be sure some sites were struggling, however, no one seems to doubt that change is taking place. The organizational structures and administrative processes of police departments were either under review or were being accommodated to this new strategy in all sites. New tactics, especially problem solving, were being implemented in all sites.

- *The sophistication of neighborhood groups and community organizations varied widely, even within sites*—some were still involved in simply blaming city government for neighborhood ills, while others had developed a bank of skills and resources that make them a formidable force both in their neighborhoods and citywide.

- *While all sites had some degree of community involvement, in several sites it far exceeded expectations and has continued to expand* to include schools (including institutions of higher learning), churches (including Nation of Islam), private security, business improvement districts, probation and parole, hospitals, prosecutors (including federal prosecutors), service agencies, and business associations as well as traditional neighborhood groups.

- *While innovative programs have been developed in all of the sites, several sites have literally changed how governmental services are delivered to citizens and neighborhoods*—changes that enjoy broad political support (e.g., Salt Lake City, Wilmington, East Bay, and Hartford). Some organizations radically decentralized to accommodate neighborhood concerns.

- *Many anecdotes were conveyed to researchers that suggest that things are substantially different in neighborhoods as a consequence of CCP efforts.* There have been stories of pizzas being delivered in public housing; police officers now parking their cars in areas where in the past even official police cars would be vandalized; merchants modifying their security to make their stores more user-friendly; and buyers clubs being formed in neighborhoods where homes were being abandoned a mere year or two ago. Unfortunately, without data from some comparison neighborhoods, these remain only encouraging anecdotes.

A final impression is that of the wisdom of federal officials in managing CCP. All members of the research team have been involved in large-scale evaluation and research projects in the past. Kelling, for example, was involved in the evaluation of HUD's Urban Initiatives effort in public housing during the early 1980s. The contrast is remarkable. In Urban Initiatives, federal officials knew best and wanted their funds spent in very specific ways—program by program. The bitterness and resentment in the field could not be overstated. But, the money was spent and programs came and went. For a brief time jobs were created. Certainly, some CCP sites felt frustrated at times with the federal administration of the program. Yet, their frustrations were mild in comparison to Urban Initiatives. Moreover, the BOTEC research team is optimistic that many if not most, CCP activities will be sustained. Cities, with full approval by federal officials, have learned to build such funded efforts into their agendas in ways that will not lead to a big letdown in the future.

It is not a stretch to say that CCP was an integral part of the efforts in each city. Does this mean that Fort Worth would not be moving forward to citywide community policing if CCP funds were not available? That Salt Lake City would not be developing CATs? That Boston would not have its broad base of collaboration? That Baltimore would not be developing strong neighborhood/police affiliations? That East Bay would not be achieving political collaboration that was unheard of a decade ago? That Seattle would not be training its officers? Or, that Columbia would not have its community mobilizers? That Wilmington and Hartford would not be developing powerful neighborhood organizations? In each case, the answer probably would be "no." These innovations were likely "in the works" and would be evolving regardless—but, not as swiftly, as thoughtfully, as thoroughly, as knowingly, nor as synergistically. CCP provided more than money to communities—it also provided expertise and a network of learning innovators.

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Appendix A: Data from Coalition Survey

Citizen Involvement I

Reports currently being done ...	Atln	Balt	Bost	Colm	Denv	FtWr	Gary	Hart	Oakl	Salt	Seat	Wich
19a. participate in neighborhood watch program												
1993	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1995		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	
19b. serve as volunteers within the police agency												
1993		✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
1995		✓		✓		✓			✓	✓	✓	
19c. attend citizen police academy												
1993		✓				✓				✓		✓
1995		✓	✓	✓		✓			✓	✓		
19d. serve in citizen patrols coordinated by your agency												
1993		✓				✓		✓	✓	✓		
1995		✓				✓			✓	✓		
19e. serve on citizen advisory councils at neighborhood level												
1993	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	
1995			✓			✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
19f. serve on citizen advisory councils at city-wide level												
1993	✓	✓	✓					✓	✓	✓	✓	
1995			✓			✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
19g. participants in court watch program												
1993								✓			✓	
1995			✓			✓				✓	✓	

19h. serve on advisory group for chief or agency managers													
1993		✓	✓		✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	
1995			✓		✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	

NOTE: no 1993 survey for Gary; no 1995 survey for Atlanta or Wichita

Citizen Involvement II

Reports currently being done ...	Atln	Balt	Bost	Colm	Denv	FtWr	Gary	Hart	Oakl	Salt	Seat	Wich
19i. prepare agreements specify work to be done on problems by citizens and police												
1993	✓							✓	✓			
1995									✓		✓	
19j. work with police to identify and resolve community or neighborhood problems									`			
1993	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
1995		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
19k. help develop policing policies												
1993					✓			✓	✓			
1995			✓			✓		✓	✓		✓	
19l. help evaluate officer performance												
1993												
1995										✓		
19m. help review complaints against police												
1993	✓	✓			✓				✓	✓	✓	✓
1995									✓	✓		
19n. participate in selection process for new officers												
1993												
1995								✓				
19o. participate in promotional process												
1993												
1995										✓		

NOTE: no 1993 survey for Gary; no 1995 survey for Atlanta or Wichita

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Geographical Locus for Management and Accountability I

Reports currently implemented...	Atln	Balt	Bost	Colm	Denv	FtWr	Gary	Hart	Oakl	Salt	Seat	Wich
15f. permanent neighborhood-based offices or stations 1993	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1995		✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓		
15g. mobile neighborhood-based offices or stations 1993	✓					✓			✓		✓	
1995		✓		✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	
15l. fixed assignment of patrol officers to specific beats or areas 1993		✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓		✓	✓
1995		✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
15m. designation of officers as community officers responsible for working in areas with special problems or needs 1993		✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
1995		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
15w. geographically based crime analysis made available to officers at the beat level 1993				✓		✓			✓	✓	✓	✓
1995		✓		✓		✓			✓			

NOTE: no 1993 survey for Gary; no 1995 survey for Atlanta or Wichita

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Geographical Locus for Management and Accountability II

Reports currently in place...	Atln	Balt	Bost	Colm	Denv	FtWr	Gary	Hart	Oakl	Salt	Seat	Wich
16a. command or decision-making responsibility tied to neighborhoods												
1993	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓		✓
1995		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
16b. beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood boundaries												
1993	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓		✓	✓	
1995		✓	✓				✓	✓	✓	✓		
16c. physical decentralization of field services												
1993		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓	✓
1995		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓				
16d. physical decentralization of investigations												
1993						✓					✓	
1995		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓						
16h. decentralized crime analysis unit/function												
1993	✓										✓	
1995		✓				✓	✓					
Reports 'most' patrol officers...	Atln	Balt	Bost	Colm	Denv	FtWr	Gary	Hart	Oakl	Salt	Seat	Wich
17l. act like "chief of the beat" (not asked 1993)												
1995		✓	✓									

NOTE: no 1993 survey for Gary; no 1995 survey for Atlanta or Wichita

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Partnerships with the Public and Other Agencies I

Reports currently implemented...	Atln	Balt	Bost	Colm	Denv	FtWr	Gary	Hart	Oakl	Salt	Seat	Wich
15i. police/youth programs (eg, PAL program, school liaison, mentoring program												
1993	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1995		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
15j. drug education program in schools												
1993	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1995		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	
15p. regularly scheduled meetings with community groups												
1993	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1995		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
15r. training for citizens in problem identification or resolution												
1993		✓							✓	✓		
1995		✓		✓					✓	✓		
15t. landlord/manager training programs for order maintenance & drug reduction												
1993				✓	✓				✓	✓	✓	✓
1995									✓			
15x. interagency involvement in problem identification and resolution												
1993		✓	✓		✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓
1995		✓	✓	✓	✓				✓	✓	✓	

NOTE: no 1993 survey for Gary; no 1995 survey for Atlanta or Wichita

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Partnerships with the Public and Other Agencies II

Reports currently in place ...	Atln	Balt	Bost	Colm	Denv	FtWr	Gary	Hart	Oakl	Salt	Seat	Wich
16e. means of accessing other city or county databases to analyze community conditions												
1993						✓		✓	✓		✓	
1995		✓	✓					✓	✓			

Reports 'most' patrol officers have the responsibility to...	Atln	Balt	Bost	Colm	Denv	FtWr	Gary	Hart	Oakl	Salt	Seat	Wich
17b. develop familiarity with community leaders												
1993		✓		✓		✓		✓			✓	
1995		✓	✓					✓	✓	✓	✓	
17c. work with citizens to identify and resolve area problems												
1993		✓				✓		✓		✓	✓	✓
1995		✓	✓						✓	✓		
17d. assist in organizing community												
1993												
1995			✓									
17e. teach residents how to address community problems												
1993						✓						
1995												
17h. meet regularly with community groups												
1993						✓						
1995			✓									

| 17j. work with other city agencies to solve neighborhood problems 1993 1995 | | | ✓ | | | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ | | |

NOTE: no 1993 survey for Gary; no 1995 survey for Atlanta or Wichita

Other Mechanisms to Ensure Responsiveness to Citizens

	Atln	Balt	Bost	Colm	Denv	FtWr	Gary	Hart	Oakl	Salt	Seat	Wich
Reports currently implemented ...												
15c. citizen surveys to determine community needs and priorities 1993 1995		✓ ✓	✓ ✓		✓			✓ ✓	✓ ✓	✓	✓ ✓	✓
15d. citizen surveys to evaluate police service 1993 1995		✓ ✓	✓ ✓		✓			✓ ✓	✓ ✓	✓ ✓	✓ ✓	
Reports 'most' patrol officers have the responsibility ...												
17k. conduct surveys in area of assignment 1993 1995												

NOTE: no 1993 survey for Gary; no 1995 survey for Atlanta or Wichita

Devolution of Authority to Mid-Level Managers I
(Captains and Lieutenants in Field Operations)

Reports have responsibility ...	Atln	Balt	Bost	Colm	Denv	FtWr	Gary	Hart	Oakl	Salt	Seat	Wich
18a. redesign organization to support problem solving efforts												
1993			✓	✓					✓	✓	✓	
1995		✓		✓					✓		✓	
18b. maintain regular contact with community leaders												
1993	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
1995		✓	✓	✓		✓		✓		✓	✓	
18c. establish interagency relationships												
1993		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1995		✓	✓	✓			✓	✓		✓	✓	
18d. make final decision about which problems are to be addressed in area												
1993			✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
1995		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	
18e. make final decision about how to handle most community problems												
1993			✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	
1995		✓	✓			✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	

NOTE: no 1993 survey for Gary; no 1995 survey for Atlanta or Wichita

Devolution of Authority to Mid-Level Managers II
(Captains and Lieutenants in Field Operations)

Reports have responsibility ...	Atln	Balt	Bost	Colm	Denv	FtWr	Gary	Hart	Oakl	Salt	Seat	Wich
18f. make final decision about application of agency resources to solve problems in area												
1993					✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	
1995		✓	✓			✓			✓	✓	✓	
18g. elicit input from officers about solutions to community problems												
1993		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
1995		✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
18h. manage crime analysis for the area												
1993		✓				✓					✓	
1995		✓									✓	
18i. evaluate performance for the area (new in 1993)												
1995		✓		✓				✓				

NOTE: no 1993 survey for Gary; no 1995 survey for Atlanta or Wichita

Appendix B: Data from Community Policing Survey

Table 1: Major Community Problems Facing CCP Sites

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Illicit drug-dealing	60%	96%	82%	81%	53%	78%	75%	91%	85%	52%	57%	47%
	(40)	(28)	(73)	(27)	(32)	(18)	(16)	(11)	(33)	(69)	(42)	(30)
Illicit drug abuse	60%	93%	72%	69%	50%	89%	81%	73%	73%	54%	55%	63%
	(40)	(28)	(71)	(26)	(32)	(18)	(16)	(11)	(33)	(69)	(42)	(30)
Public drunkenness/underage drinking	32%	27%	27%	38%	32%	22%	31%	18%	18%	32%	20%	29%
	(41)	(26)	(71)	(26)	(31)	(18)	(16)	(11)	(34)	(69)	(40)	(31)
AIDS	24%	50%	31%	23%	13%	72%	13%	9%	36%	11%	23%	6%
	(41)	(28)	(70)	(26)	(31)	(18)	(15)	(11)	(33)	(65)	(40)	(31)
Unemployment	29%	93%	52%	67%	25%	89%	50%	100%	76%	22%	27%	23%
	(41)	(29)	(69)	(27)	(32)	(18)	(16)	(11)	(34)	(67)	(41)	(31)
Teen pregnancy	73%	68%	38%	48%	63%	67%	44%	64%	64%	32%	40%	29%
	(40)	(28)	(71)	(27)	(32)	(18)	(16)	(11)	(33)	(68)	(40)	(31)
School drop-out rate/Truancy	68%	86%	49%	56%	59%	72%	50%	55%	67%	43%	43%	35%
	(41)	(28)	(71)	(27)	(32)	(18)	(16)	(11)	(33)	(69)	(40)	(31)
Trash/abandoned cars and buildings/physical decay/graffiti	15%	83%	29%	22%	6%	39%	56%	45%	58%	33%	22%	23%
	(41)	(29)	(70)	(27)	(31)	(18)	(16)	(11)	(33)	(69)	(41)	(31)
Homelessness	20%	36%	32%	33%	13%	44%	38%	0%	32%	33%	46%	10%
	(41)	(28)	(69)	(27)	(31)	(18)	(16)	(11)	(34)	(69)	(41)	(31)
Domestic violence	51%	29%	61%	44%	75%	67%	38%	18%	41%	46%	48%	68%
	(41)	(28)	(71)	(27)	(32)	(18)	(16)	(11)	(32)	(69)	(40)	(31)
Police misconduct	5%	11%	1%	0%	3%	6%	6%	0%	9%	4%	6%	0%
	(40)	(27)	(68)	(26)	(31)	(18)	(16)	(9)	(32)	(67)	(36)	(31)
Violence by youths	76%	62%	70%	63%	66%	89%	69%	55%	76%	75%	64%	77%
	(41)	(29)	(71)	(27)	(32)	(18)	(16)	(11)	(33)	(69)	(39)	(31)
Violence by adults	66%	66%	43%	44%	38%	67%	25%	45%	45%	50%	35%	32%
	(41)	(29)	(72)	(27)	(32)	(18)	(16)	(11)	(33)	(68)	(40)	(31)
Widespread use of guns	51%	72%	56%	48%	47%	89%	31%	91%	55%	42%	41%	61%
	(41)	(29)	(73)	(27)	(32)	(18)	(16)	(11)	(33)	(69)	(39)	(31)
Property crime	49%	50%	38%	44%	38%	61%	63%	45%	52%	46%	18%	42%
	(41)	(28)	(72)	(27)	(32)	(18)	(16)	(11)	(33)	(68)	(39)	(31)
Prostitution	10%	21%	17%	19%	0%	11%	13%	18%	38%	32%	0%	19%
	(41)	(28)	(70)	(27)	(31)	(18)	(16)	(11)	(34)	(68)	(39)	(31)
Crime in and around schools	24%	36%	27%	65%	10%	56%	6%	27%	21%	36%	15%	17%
	(41)	(28)	(71)	(26)	(31)	(18)	(16)	(11)	(33)	(69)	(39)	(30)
Gangs	51%	21%	56%	0%	47%	72%	63%	100%	70%	70%	38%	87%
	(41)	(28)	(73)	(26)	(32)	(18)	(16)	(11)	(33)	(69)	(39)	(31)
Traffic/accidents	29%	4%	20%	12%	6%	28%	13%	18%	6%	13%	3%	10%
	(41)	(27)	(71)	(25)	(31)	(18)	(16)	(11)	(33)	(68)	(40)	(31)

Table 2: Percentage of Respondents Who Feel that CCP is Addressing the Most Important Issues

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Respondents Who Strongly or Somewhat Agree With Statement												
Coalition is addressing the most important issues	**80%**	**86%**	**89%**	**88%**	**73%**	**89%**	**75%**	**80%**	**87%**	**81%**	**79%**	**86%**
	(35)	(28)	(73)	(26)	(26)	(18)	(12)	(10)	(31)	(59)	(28)	(29)

Table 3: CCP Activities that are Either <u>Underway</u> or <u>Completed</u>

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Recruiting coalition members	100%	89%	96%	91%	83%	100%	89%	71%	95%	70%	93%	91%
	(20)	(18)	(48)	(22)	(23)	(16)	(9)	(7)	(20)	(33)	(15)	(11)
Conducting needs assessment	100%	96%	89%	95%	74%	93%	90%	60%	75%	83%	73%	87%
	(23)	(26)	(53)	(22)	(19)	(15)	(10)	(10)	(16)	(40)	(11)	(15)
Developing communication networks	96%	92%	88%	86%	88%	100%	100%	80%	92%	96%	75%	94%
	(24)	(25)	(58)	(22)	(24)	(18)	(10)	(10)	(26)	(46)	(16)	(16)
Creating/changing internal policies	78%	63%	83%	63%	87%	100%	89%	90%	100%	78%	67%	100%
	(18)	(16)	(54)	(16)	(23)	(18)	(9)	(10)	(17)	(41)	(15)	(12)
Training	81%	88%	77%	58%	92%	77%	75%	89%	83%	79%	71%	85%
	(26)	(25)	(56)	(19)	(24)	(13)	(12)	(9)	(23)	(42)	(24)	(20)
Identifying resources	88%	96%	91%	91%	88%	100%	100%	78%	96%	88%	89%	94%
	(25)	(27)	(58)	(23)	(24)	(16)	(10)	(9)	(23)	(48)	(19)	(18)
Enhancing public relations	83%	85%	80%	77%	86%	88%	82%	89%	88%	79%	70%	94%
	(23)	(26)	(59)	(22)	(22)	(16)	(11)	(9)	(24)	(48)	(20)	(18)
Analyzing cultural barriers	67%	82%	79%	70%	64%	77%	80%	57%	64%	64%	65%	91%
	(18)	(17)	(48)	(20)	(14)	(13)	(10)	(7)	(11)	(45)	(17)	(11)
Developing specific programs	89%	83%	85%	83%	88%	100%	100%	50%	84%	92%	71%	89%
	(27)	(24)	(59)	(24)	(25)	(16)	(10)	(8)	(25)	(49)	(28)	(18)
Implementing specific programs	96%	92%	75%	41%	96%	100%	90%	70%	82%	88%	58%	85%
	(27)	(26)	(56)	(22)	(25)	(18)	(10)	(10)	(22)	(48)	(26)	(20)
Creating an information collection system	76%	84%	71%	53%	92%	79%	90%	88%	65%	78%	53%	81%
	(17)	(19)	(55)	(17)	(26)	(14)	(10)	(8)	(20)	(32)	(15)	(16)
Setting up a system for self-evaluation	75%	50%	64%	33%	56%	79%	67%	56%	36%	68%	58%	71%
	(16)	(18)	(44)	(12)	(16)	(14)	(9)	(9)	(11)	(34)	(12)	(14)

Table 4: CCP Activities that are <u>Planned</u>

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Recruiting coalition members	0%	11%	4%	9%	9%	0%	0%	29%	5%	24%	7%	9%
	(20)	(18)	(48)	(22)	(23)	(16)	(9)	(7)	(20)	(33)	(15)	(11)
Conducting needs assessment	0%	4%	8%	5%	21%	7%	10%	30%	6%	18%	27%	13%
	(23)	(26)	(53)	(22)	(19)	(15)	(10)	(10)	(16)	(40)	(11)	(15)
Developing communication networks	4%	4%	12%	14%	13%	0%	0%	20%	8%	4%	25%	6%
	(23)	(26)	(53)	(22)	(19)	(15)	(10)	(10)	(16)	(40)	(11)	(15)
Creating/changing internal policies	22%	31%	15%	38%	9%	0%	0%	10%	0%	12%	27%	0%
	(24)	(25)	(58)	(22)	(24)	(18)	(10)	(10)	(26)	(46)	(16)	(16)
Training	19%	4%	20%	37%	8%	15%	25%	11%	13%	17%	29%	15%
	(18)	(16)	(54)	(16)	(23)	(18)	(9)	(10)	(17)	(41)	(15)	(12)
Identifying resources	12%	4%	9%	9%	8%	0%	0%	22%	4%	13%	11%	6%
	(26)	(25)	(56)	(19)	(24)	(13)	(12)	(9)	(23)	(42)	(24)	(20)
Enhancing public relations	13%	8%	19%	23%	9%	13%	9%	11%	13%	19%	30%	6%
	(25)	(27)	(58)	(23)	(24)	(16)	(10)	(9)	(23)	(48)	(19)	(18)
Analyzing cultural barriers	11%	6%	13%	25%	14%	15%	10%	43%	36%	24%	29%	9%
	(23)	(26)	(59)	(22)	(22)	(16)	(11)	(9)	(24)	(48)	(20)	(18)
Developing specific programs	7%	13%	14%	17%	12%	0%	0%	50%	16%	8%	25%	11%
	(18)	(17)	(48)	(20)	(14)	(13)	(10)	(7)	(11)	(45)	(17)	(11)
Implementing specific programs	4%	4%	21%	59%	4%	0%	10%	30%	18%	10%	31%	15%
	(27)	(24)	(59)	(24)	(25)	(16)	(10)	(8)	(25)	(49)	(28)	(18)
Creating an information collection system	18%	11%	25%	47%	8%	21%	0%	13%	35%	13%	33%	19%
	(27)	(26)	(56)	(22)	(25)	(18)	(10)	(10)	(22)	(48)	(26)	(20)
Setting up a system for self-evaluation	25%	39%	32%	67%	25%	21%	22%	33%	45%	26%	33%	29%
	(17)	(19)	(55)	(17)	(26)	(14)	(10)	(8)	(20)	(32)	(15)	(16)

Table 5: Factors that Hindered the CCP Program <u>Prior</u> to the Receipt of Funding

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Staff and/or member turnover	65%	54%	37%	5%	80%	71%	38%	63%	38%	45%	30%	18%
	(17)	(13)	(35)	(22)	(15)	(17)	(8)	(8)	(16)	(20)	(10)	(11)
Leadership problems	90%	47%	40%	13%	94%	89%	50%	50%	47%	64%	40%	45%
	(21)	(15)	(40)	(24)	(16)	(18)	(10)	(10)	(19)	(28)	(15)	(20)
Turf conflicts	74%	43%	63%	65%	56%	65%	64%	38%	65%	61%	62%	88%
	(19)	(14)	(40)	(23)	(16)	(17)	(11)	(8)	(20)	(28)	(13)	(17)
Ego/personality differences	80%	46%	66%	48%	59%	83%	64%	63%	65%	64%	55%	59%
	(20)	(13)	(38)	(23)	(17)	(18)	(11)	(8)	(17)	(28)	(11)	(17)
Insufficient funding	91%	79%	88%	90%	83%	83%	89%	50%	93%	85%	50%	78%
	(22)	(14)	(32)	(21)	(18)	(18)	(9)	(6)	(15)	(27)	(14)	(18)
Disagreement over goals of the project	83%	50%	66%	39%	72%	53%	36%	29%	47%	63%	38%	46%
	(18)	(16)	(38)	(23)	(18)	(17)	(11)	(7)	(17)	(27)	(13)	(13)
Time constraints	96%	94%	82%	91%	94%	82%	60%	72%	93%	88%	69%	81%
	(23)	(17)	(39)	(23)	(18)	(17)	(10)	(7)	(15)	(26)	(13)	(16)
Lack of clear action plan	88%	71%	63%	46%	89%	83%	32%	72%	55%	71%	50%	68%
	(26)	(17)	(41)	(24)	(19)	(18)	(12)	(7)	(20)	(28)	(16)	(19)
Lack of commitment from some members	96%	79%	54%	43%	67%	39%	67%	43%	59%	61%	36%	50%
	(24)	(14)	(39)	(23)	(18)	(18)	(9)	(7)	(17)	(28)	(14)	(16)
Red tape at Federal level	94%	57%	72%	80%	93%	94%	67%	20%	67%	71%	63%	75%
	(18)	(7)	(25)	(20)	(15)	(16)	(12)	(5)	(6)	(17)	(8)	(16)
Red tape at local level	95%	75%	70%	57%	87%	40%	73%	43%	86%	70%	50%	76%
	(19)	(12)	(30)	(21)	(15)	(15)	(11)	(7)	(14)	(20)	(10)	(17)
Factions within the coalition	81%	30%	47%	35%	47%	56%	89%	50%	50%	60%	40%	50%
	(16)	(10)	(34)	(23)	(17)	(18)	(9)	(6)	(18)	(25)	(10)	(12)

Table 6: Factors that Hindered the CCP Program <u>Since</u> the Receipt of Funding

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	For Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Staff and/or member turnover	48%	57%	35%	6%	50%	40%	50%	64%	25%	59%	8%	36%
	(21)	(21)	(48)	(17)	(20)	(15)	(10)	(11)	(20)	(39)	(12)	(14)
Leadership problems	65%	25%	36%	28%	82%	63%	55%	50%	36%	70%	20%	38%
	(26)	(24)	(55)	(18)	(22)	(16)	(11)	(10)	(22)	(44)	(15)	(21)
Turf conflicts	63%	41%	53%	69%	35%	73%	50%	60%	72%	72%	42%	75%
	(24)	(22)	(51)	(16)	(20)	(15)	(12)	(10)	(25)	(43)	(12)	(20)
Ego/personality differences	67%	61%	58%	41%	50%	75%	50%	55%	68%	83%	25%	68%
	(24)	(23)	(52)	(17)	(22)	(16)	(12)	(11)	(22)	(42)	(12)	(19)
Insufficient funding	85%	75%	70%	88%	73%	60%	70%	80%	69%	68%	64%	65%
	(26)	(20)	(40)	(17)	(22)	(15)	(10)	(10)	(16)	(37)	(14)	(17)
Disagreement over goals of the project	71%	35%	55%	35%	57%	47%	36%	82%	48%	65%	17%	40%
	(21)	(23)	(53)	(17)	(23)	(15)	(11)	(11)	(21)	(43)	(12)	(15)
Time constraints	89%	88%	77%	76%	91%	80%	50%	82%	70%	93%	80%	74%
	(27)	(24)	(52)	(17)	(22)	(15)	(10)	(11)	(20)	(45)	(15)	(19)
Lack of clear action plan	59%	46%	60%	44%	70%	69%	25%	46%	54%	77%	31%	45%
	(27)	(24)	(55)	(18)	(23)	(16)	(12)	(11)	(26)	(47)	(16)	(20)
Lack of commitment from some members	86%	52%	53%	42%	57%	31%	50%	60%	71%	71%	25%	61%
	(29)	(23)	(51)	(19)	(21)	(16)	(10)	(10)	(21)	(48)	(12)	(18)
Red tape at Federal level	78%	54%	52%	88%	74%	86%	75%	33%	64%	58%	63%	50%
	(23)	(13)	(27)	(17)	(19)	(14)	(12)	(9)	(11)	(24)	(8)	(12)
Red tape at local level	78%	54%	52%	88%	74%	86%	58%	50%	64%	58%	63%	50%
	(23)	(13)	(27)	(17)	(19)	(14)	(12)	(10)	(11)	(24)	(8)	(12)
Factions within the coalition	65%	39%	36%	28%	37%	56%	70%	50%	64%	72%	27%	50%
	(20)	(18)	(47)	(18)	(19)	(16)	(10)	(8)	(22)	(39)	(11)	(14)

Table 7: Perception of Coalition Progress

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Far behind schedule	14%	0%	4%	33%	0%	11%	7%	27%	10%	7%	7%	4%
Somewhat behind schedule	56%	64%	51%	37%	57%	61%	21%	55%	48%	39%	21%	50%
Right on schedule	25%	29%	41%	22%	18%	17%	43%	18%	34%	37%	59%	33%
Ahead of Schedule	6%	7%	4%	7%	25%	11%	29%	0%	7%	17%	14%	13%
Number of Responses	(36)	(28)	(73)	(27)	(28)	(18)	(14)	(11)	(29)	(54)	(29)	(24)

Table 8: Level of Involvement During CCP <u>Planning</u> Phase

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Involved a Great Deal												
CCP project director	**74%**	**96%**	**77%**	**95%**	**88%**	**80%**	**64%**	**44%**	**91%**	**83%**	**67%**	**89%**
	(31)	(26)	(35)	(20)	(25)	(15)	(14)	(9)	(23)	(40)	(21)	(18)
CCP coalition staff	**60%**	**68%**	**66%**	**91%**	**80%**	**80%**	**42%**	**38%**	**65%**	**52%**	**63%**	**50%**
	(25)	(19)	(35)	(22)	(25)	(15)	(12)	(8)	(20)	(31)	(16)	(18)
Grantee/lead organization	**52%**	**63%**	**65%**	**92%**	**77%**	**78%**	**62%**	**50%**	**87%**	**74%**	**80%**	**80%**
	(25)	(24)	(34)	(24)	(22)	(18)	(13)	(8)	(15)	(34)	(20)	(20)
Executive board	**50%**	**36%**	**68%**	**74%**	**68%**	**83%**	**33%**	**56%**	**64%**	**53%**	**62%**	**63%**
	(24)	(11)	(31)	(23)	(28)	(18)	(12)	(9)	(14)	(32)	(13)	(16)
Police department	**44%**	**30%**	**91%**	**96%**	**56%**	**61%**	**86%**	**70%**	**81%**	**77%**	**79%**	**62%**
	(27)	(20)	(57)	(25)	(27)	(18)	(14)	(10)	(26)	(47)	(34)	(21)
CCP sub-committees	**50%**	**29%**	**76%**	**74%**	**42%**	**29%**	**27%**	**29%**	**53%**	**36%**	**38%**	**38%**
	(32)	(17)	(42)	(23)	(24)	(17)	(11)	(7)	(15)	(36)	(13)	(13)
Overall CCP membership	-	**33%**	**54%**	**55%**	-	-	**25%**	**50%**	**38%**	**24%**	**8%**	**33%**
		(15)	(37)	(22)			(12)	(4)	(16)	(33)	(13)	(15)
Business leaders	**23%**	**7%**	**49%**	**32%**	**0%**	**15%**	**8%**	**13%**	**29%**	**4%**	**13%**	**28%**
	(22)	(15)	(41)	(19)	(22)	(13)	(12)	(8)	(17)	(27)	(15)	(18)
City agencies	**37%**	-	-	-	**44%**	**83%**	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(27)				(25)	(18)						
County agencies	**61%**	-	-	-	**28%**	**76%**	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(31)				(25)	(17)						
State agencies	**15%**	-	-	-	**46%**	**20%**	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(27)				(26)	(15)						

(-) Not applicable to Site

Table 9: Level of Involvement During CCP <u>Implementation</u> Phase

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Involved a Great Deal												
CCP project director	73%	85%	86%	100%	93%	75%	71%	46%	86%	82%	76%	79%
	(30)	(27)	(43)	(22)	(27)	(16)	(14)	(11)	(28)	(49)	(25)	(19)
CCP coalition staff	67%	77%	82%	100%	81%	80%	39%	44%	71%	61%	56%	64%
	(24)	(26)	(39)	(22)	(27)	(15)	(13)	(9)	(24)	(44)	(16)	(14)
Grantee/lead organization	46%	74%	72%	91%	71%	78%	71%	40%	82%	63%	90%	76%
	(26)	(23)	(39)	(23)	(24)	(18)	(14)	(10)	(17)	(41)	(20)	(21)
Executive board	41%	57%	70%	64%	63%	67%	31%	43%	73%	48%	17%	45%
	(22)	(14)	(33)	(22)	(27)	(18)	(13)	(7)	(15)	(40)	(12)	(11)
Police department	32%	36%	86%	100%	74%	65%	93%	50%	73%	79%	81%	81%
	(25)	(25)	(63)	(22)	(27)	(17)	(14)	(10)	(30)	(56)	(32)	(21)
CCP sub-committees	45%	48%	70%	62%	41%	25%	25%	30%	53%	59%	33%	21%
	(29)	(25)	(54)	(21)	(27)	(16)	(12)	(10)	(19)	(49)	(12)	(14)
Overall CCP membership	-	45%	48%	70%	-	-	23%	22%	62%	41%	25%	53%
		(29)	(25)	(54)			(13)	(9)	(21)	(27)	(16)	(19)
Business leaders	0%	5%	38%	29%	0%	7%	7%	0%	15%	9%	7%	19%
	(18)	(20)	(50)	(17)	(23)	(14)	(14)	(9)	(20)	(32)	(14)	(16)
City agencies	22%	-	-	-	27%	61%	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(23)				(26)	(18)						
County agencies	22%	-	-	-	27%	61%	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(23)				(26)	(18)						
State agencies	10%	-	-	-	46%	6%	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(21)				(26)	(16)						

(-) Not applicable to Site

Table 10: There are Organizations Respondents Would Have Like to See Better Represented in the Coalition

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
There are organizations you would like to see better represented among the CCP participants	**44%**	**52%**	**52%**	**46%**	**54%**	**50%**	**21%**	**55%**	**62%**	**65%**	**45%**	**38%**
	(36)	(27)	(63)	(24)	(28)	(18)	(14)	(11)	(29)	(60)	(29)	(24)

Table 11: Know of Organizations or Individuals Who Have Ceased to be Active in the Coalition

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Know of organizations/individuals that have ceased to be active in the CCP effort	**16%**	**12%**	**8%**	**8%**	**19%**	**6%**	**0%**	**44%**	**13%**	**18%**	**3%**	**0%**
	(38)	(26)	(74)	(25)	(27)	(18)	(15)	(9)	(31)	(62)	(35)	(27)

Table 12: Coalition has Large General Meetings Representing All Participants and Coalition Has a Number of Separate Committees

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
CCP effort has large general meetings representing all participants	-	81%	84%	85%	-	-	75%	64%	87%	76%	20%	46%
	-	(26)	(68)	(27)	-	-	(12)	(11)	(31)	(59)	(30)	(26)
CCP effort has a number of separate committees	97%	86%	92%	68%	83%	100%	69%	50%	96%	87%	44%	63%
	(36)	(24)	(67)	(17)	(24)	(18)	(9)	(5)	(26)	(47)	(11)	(15)

(-) Site did not receive this question

Figure 13: Perceived level of Both Positive and Negative Conflict

Conflict that IMPROVES decision-making   Conflict that IMPEDES decision-making

Table 14: Perceptions of CCP Membership

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
As a Whole, the Members of the CCP Program Are:												
Cooperative	**53%**	**43%**	**57%**	**42%**	**48%**	**58%**	**50%**	**40%**	**43%**	**36%**	**50%**	**48%**
	(38)	(28)	(72)	(26)	(29)	(19)	(16)	(10)	(30)	(55)	(32)	(29)
Friendly	**55%**	**64%**	**70%**	**50%**	**68%**	**68%**	**44%**	**40%**	**59%**	**54%**	**61%**	**45%**
	(38)	(28)	(74)	(26)	(28)	(19)	(16)	(10)	(29)	(56)	(31)	(29)
Productive	**55%**	**64%**	**70%**	**50%**	**68%**	**68%**	**31%**	**18%**	**59%**	**54%**	**61%**	**45%**
	(38)	(28)	(74)	(26)	(28)	(19)	(16)	(11)	(29)	(56)	(31)	(29)
Powerful	**11%**	**4%**	**21%**	**31%**	**32%**	**61%**	**25%**	**20%**	**21%**	**21%**	**25%**	**24%**
	(37)	(28)	(71)	(26)	(28)	(18)	(16)	(10)	(29)	(57)	(28)	(29)

Table 15: Perceptions of Effectiveness With Coalition-building Activities

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Rated coalition as VERY EFFECTIVE:												
Fostering cooperation among organizations in the coalition	**22%**	**30%**	**55%**	**36%**	**42%**	**44%**	**42%**	**30%**	**36%**	**46%**	**38%**	**20%**
	(32)	(27)	(69)	(25)	(26)	(18)	(12)	(10)	(28)	(52)	(21)	(20)
Fostering the networking and exchange of information among coalition members	**21%**	**30%**	**53%**	**32%**	**44%**	**56%**	**42%**	**30%**	**46%**	**31%**	**16%**	**40%**
	(33)	(27)	(72)	(25)	(27)	(18)	(12)	(10)	(28)	(54)	(19)	(20)
Recruiting new members (individuals or organizations)	**21%**	**36%**	**24%**	**35%**	**4%**	**33%**	**10%**	**10%**	**13%**	**17%**	**50%**	**7%**
	(24)	(22)	(59)	(23)	(25)	(18)	(10)	(10)	(23)	(46)	(16)	(15)
Including members who are representative of the community	**26%**	**50%**	**43%**	**64%**	**15%**	**17%**	**50%**	**27%**	**52%**	**32%**	**54%**	**32%**
	(27)	(28)	(69)	(25)	(27)	(18)	(12)	(11)	(29)	(56)	(24)	(22)
Generating citizen or community involvement	**19%**	**34%**	**33%**	**56%**	**16%**	**6%**	**54%**	**18%**	**46%**	**33%**	**50%**	**22%**
	(27)	(29)	(64)	(25)	(25)	(18)	(13)	(11)	(26)	(52)	(20)	(23)
Creating member consensus about a plan of action	**22%**	**32%**	**40%**	**36%**	**31%**	**39%**	**55%**	**30%**	**29%**	**24%**	**50%**	**5%**
	(27)	(28)	(72)	(25)	(26)	(18)	(11)	(10)	(24)	(49)	(6)	(19)

Table 16: Perception of Effectiveness with Coalition Implementation and Planning Activities

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Rated coalition as VERY EFFECTIVE:												
Planning specific programs	32%	54%	38%	38%	44%	33%	45%	27%	16%	45%	48%	26%
	(34)	(28)	(65)	(21)	(25)	(18)	(11)	(11)	(25)	(51)	(21)	(23)
Implementing specific programs	20%	25%	16%	22%	48%	24%	73%	27%	19%	35%	52%	21%
	(35)	(24)	(55)	(18)	(25)	(17)	(11)	(11)	(21)	(51)	(21)	(24)
Developing programs on schedule	16%	15%	29%	24%	15%	11%	40%	18%	5%	15%	47%	25%
	(31)	(27)	(58)	(17)	(26)	(18)	(10)	(11)	(20)	(47)	(19)	(20)
Generating additional funding beyond the grant	0%	20%	24%	0%	4%	28%	27%	10%	14%	9%	30%	28%
	(22)	(15)	(25)	(12)	(23)	(18)	(11)	(10)	(14)	(23)	(10)	(18)
Locating additional resources to apply to the target problems	14%	48%	26%	18%	4%	33%	27%	20%	28%	21%	31%	24%
	(22)	(21)	(43)	(17)	(23)	(18)	(11)	(10)	(18)	(34)	(16)	(21)
Tailoring services to needs	25%	34%	33%	30%	18%	33%	42%	18%	40%	30%	27%	45%
	(24)	(29)	(57)	(20)	(22)	(15)	(12)	(11)	(20)	(50)	(22)	(22)

Table 17: Attitudes Toward the Coalition

	Metro Atlanta	Baltimore	Boston	Columbia	Metro Denver	East Bay	Fort Worth	Gary	Hartford	Salt Lake	Seattle	Wichita
Strongly or Somewhat Agree With Statement												
I am satisfied with the coalition	65%	97%	89%	89%	79%	83%	68%	46%	84%	82%	76%	79%
	(37)	(29)	(74)	(27)	(28)	(18)	(12)	(11)	(32)	(62)	(33)	(29)
I feel involved with the coalition	74%	86%	92%	89%	82%	89%	75%	55%	78%	77%	53%	61%
	(38)	(29)	(74)	(27)	(28)	(18)	(12)	(11)	(32)	(60)	(32)	(28)
A feeling of unity exists in this coalition	71%	90%	93%	85%	85%	89%	83%	73%	97%	86%	71%	71%
	(38)	(29)	(73)	(27)	(27)	(18)	(12)	(11)	(31)	(59)	(28)	(28)
I feel this coalition is more effective than most groups	64%	79%	77%	77%	71%	89%	92%	46%	59%	81%	72%	74%
	(36)	(29)	(73)	(26)	(28)	(18)	(12)	(11)	(32)	(59)	(29)	(27)
I want to remain a member of this group	86%	100%	96%	100%	85%	89%	100%	100%	97%	95%	93%	100%
	(35)	(29)	(72)	(27)	(27)	(18)	(12)	(10)	(32)	(61)	(30)	(29)
I care about what happens in this coalition	97%	97%	97%	100%	100%	100%	92%	100%	97%	98%	97%	100%
	(37)	(29)	(74)	(27)	(28)	(18)	(12)	(11)	(32)	(62)	(33)	(29)

Community Policing Survey
for the Comprehensive Communities Program

City/County/Town _____   **Executive of Agency** _____

GENERAL INFORMATION

One of the components of the Comprehensive Communities Project is community policing. This questionnaire is designed to take a look at community policing in each of the CCP sites. Some of you might find this survey familiar. Many of you received a similar survey from the Police Foundation in 1993. We are repeating many of the questions in order to gauge how far your site has come in community policing since that time. We plan to do another follow-up in a year, once your CCP participation is near its end. We will be analyzing the information with the help of Mary Ann Wycoff of the Police Executive Research Forum who worked on the 1993 study of community policing nationwide.

This questionnaire is divided into five sections. The first is designed to be answered by the head of the agency. The remaining sections may be delegated by the executive. The questions in Section One are largely reflective of the attitude of the executive, and we guarantee confidentiality for those responses.

Thank you for your time, your commitment, and your thoughtfulness in completing this questionnaire. If you have any questions or comments, please contact Ann Marie Rocheleau or Jamie Laughlin at BOTEC Analysis Corporation at (617) 491-1277.

SECTION ONE: EXECUTIVE VIEWS

Note*: This first section should be completed by the head of the agency. Information in this section will be held in confidence by the researchers; data from these questions will not be identified by specific departments or administrators.*

Community policing is a philosophy that has received considerable attention during the last few years. In its most general sense, community policing seeks to increase interaction between police and citizens for the purpose of improving public safety and the quality of life in the community.

1. As you read each of the following statements, think about community policing as you understand it. Please circle the response code for the category that most closely represents the extent to which you (4) strongly agree, (3) agree, (2) disagree, (1) strongly disagree with each item, or (8) don't know.

		STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW
a.	The concept of community policing is something that law enforcement agencies should pursue.	4	3	2	1	8
b.	It is not clear what community policing means in practical terms.	4	3	2	1	8
c.	In the long run, implementing community policing requires an increase in police resources.	4	3	2	1	8
d.	Other government agencies (non-police) are unlikely to commit sufficient effort to make community policing work.	4	3	2	1	8
e.	Most government officials and political leaders will support community policing.	4	3	2	1	8
f.	Rank-and-file employees are likely to resist changes necessary to accomplish community policing.	4	3	2	1	8
g.	Community policing requires major changes of organizational policies, goals, or mission statements.	4	3	2	1	8
h.	Performance evaluation should be revised to support community policing.	4	3	2	1	8

		STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW
i.	There is no conflict between close police-citizen cooperation and enforcing the law.	4	3	2	1	8
j.	At present, the various police training institutions in this country do not provide adequate training in community policing.	4	3	2	1	8
k.	Community policing requires extensive reorganization of police agencies.	4	3	2	1	8
l.	Citizens would respond to community policing efforts in sufficient numbers to permit police and citizens to work together effectively.	4	3	2	1	8
m.	Conflict among different citizens groups would make it difficult for police and citizens to interact effectively.	4	3	2	1	8
n.	Community policing is a highly effective means of providing police service.	4	3	2	1	8
o.	Community policing may lead law enforcement personnel to become inappropriately involved in local politics.	4	3	2	1	8
p.	Some form of participatory management is necessary for the successful implementation of community policing.	4	3	2	1	8
q.	Community policing requires a major change in the approach to law enforcement training.	4	3	2	1	8
r.	Some communities are not suited for community policing.	4	3	2	1	8
s.	Every aspect of law enforcement work would benefit from a community policing approach.	4	3	2	1	8

2. Listed below are several possible impacts of community policing. Assume that your agency, or one similar to it, plans to implement community policing. How likely do you think it is that the agency or community would experience each potential outcome? Please circle the appropriate code to indicate how likely you think it is that each of the following will occur.

		VERY LIKELY	SOMEWHAT LIKELY	NOT AT ALL LIKELY	DON'T KNOW
a.	The problems that citizens of the community care about most would be reduced.	3	2	1	8
b.	The ability to respond to calls for service would decline.	3	2	1	8
c.	The physical environment of neighborhoods would improve.	3	2	1	8
d.	Citizens would feel more positive about their police/ law enforcement agency.	3	2	1	8
e.	Officer/deputy corruption would increase.	3	2	1	8
f.	The potential for physical conflict between citizens and police would decrease.	3	2	1	8
g.	Officer/deputy job satisfaction would increase.	3	2	1	8
h.	Crime rates would decrease.	3	2	1	8
i.	Crime would be displaced to a non-community policing area.	3	2	1	8

3. Assume again that your agency, or one similar to it, plans to implement community policing. Who in the agency do you believe should be responsible for conducting community policing? Please circle <u>one</u> code only.

Community policing should be the responsibility of:

<u>All</u> organizational personnel	1

All <u>patrol</u> personnel	2
Some specially designated patrol officers	3
A community relations bureau or unit	4
Other (please specify_____):	5

4. What is your estimate of the number of questionnaires, including this one, that your agency has received since January 1, 1992?

Number:_____

The remaining sections of this survey may be completed by someone other than the head of the organization.

Please provide below the name and rank of the person who will complete the remainder of the questionnaire, whom we may contact to clarify answers if necessary.

Respondent Name: _____

Assignment/Rank: _____

Telephone:_____   Fax: _____

SECTION TWO: ORGANIZATION'S EXPERIENCE WITH COMMUNITY POLICING

5. Which of the following statements best describes your agency's current situation with respect to the adoption of a community policing approach? Please circle <u>only one</u> code.

We have not considered adopting a community policing approach.	1
We considered adopting a community policing approach but rejected the idea because it was not the appropriate approach for this agency.	2
We considered adopting a community policing approach, and liked the idea, but it is not practical here at this time.	3
We are now in the process of planning or implementing a community policing approach.	4
We have implemented community policing in specific target areas.	5
We have implemented community policing city-wide.	6

6. To what extent has your agency made use of the following resources in formulating its current approach to policing/law enforcement? Please circle the response that indicates whether the resource was (3) used substantially, was (2) used somewhat, or was (1) not used at all.

		USED SUBSTANTIALLY	USED SOMEWHAT	NOT USED AT ALL
a.	Other police/sheriffs departments	3	2	1
b.	Federal agencies	3	2	1
c.	State planning agencies	3	2	1
d.	Journal articles or books	3	2	1
e.	U.S. Government publications	3	2	1
f.	Academic courses/seminars/ conferences	3	2	1
g.	Law enforcement professional organizations/meetings	3	2	1
h.	Talents and expertise of own departmental personnel	3	2	1
i.	Consultants	3	2	1
j.	Government grants	3	2	1

		USED SUBSTANTIALLY	USED SOMEWHAT	NOT USED AT ALL
k.	Community groups	3	2	1
l.	Other (please specify):	3	2	1

7. If your department, or one like it, were implementing or planning to implement a community policing approach, how important do you feel it would be to obtain or provide each of the following types of training for officers? Please circle the response code that most closely represents your perception of the need for training.

		VERY IMPORTANT	SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT	NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT	DON'T KNOW
a.	Training in how to organize groups and communities	3	2	1	8
b.	Training in community relations	3	2	1	8
c.	Cultural diversity training	3	2	1	8
d.	Training about how to do problem-solving	3	2	1	8
e.	Training about concepts of community policing	3	2	1	8
f.	Training in communication skills	3	2	1	8
g.	Training in human resources management (i.e., selection, training, evaluation, discipline, awards, promotion)	3	2	1	8
h.	Crime analysis or mapping	3	2	1	8
i.	Other (please specify):	3	2	1	8

8. Now consider the training list again. Since 1993, what percentage of sworn officers received training in each of the listed categories?

		PERCENT
a.	Training in how to organize groups and communities	
b.	Training in community relations	
c.	Cultural diversity training	
d.	Training about how to do problem-solving	
e.	Training about concepts of community policing	
f.	Training in communication skills	
g.	Training in human resources management (i.e., selection, training, evaluation, discipline, awards, promotion)	
h.	Crime analysis or mapping	
i.	Other (please specify_____)	

9. If your department, or one like it, were implementing or planning to implement a community policing approach, how important do you feel it would be to obtain or provide each of the following types of training for sworn managers (sergeants, lieutenants, and captains)? Please circle the response code that most closely represents your perception of the need for training.

		VERY IMPORTANT	SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT	NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT	DON'T KNOW
a.	Concepts of community policing	3	2	1	8
b.	Problem solving process	3	2	1	8
c.	Organizing/mobilizing the community	3	2	1	8
d.	Determining/analyzing community needs and resources	3	2	1	8

		VERY IMPORTANT	SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT	NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT	DON'T KNOW
e.	Working with different ethnic groups/cultural diversity	3	2	1	8
f.	Conflict resolution	3	2	1	8
g.	How to monitor or document community policing activities	3	2	1	8
h.	Performance evaluation in a community policing organization	3	2	1	8
i.	Introduction to management concepts	3	2	1	8
j.	Building and sustaining teams	3	2	1	8
k.	Leadership for community policing	3	2	1	8
l.	Managing organizational change	3	2	1	8
m.	Changing the police organizational culture	3	2	1	8
n.	Total quality management in a community policing organization	3	2	1	8
o.	Provide counseling	3	2	1	8
p.	Problem solving techniques (e.g. landlord training, code enforcement, etc.)	3	2	1	8
q.	Other (please specify):	3	2	1	8

10. Now consider the training list again. Since 1993, what percentage of sworn managers received training in each of the listed categories?

		PERCENTAGE
a.	Concepts of community policing	
b.	Problem solving process	
c.	Organizing/mobilizing the community	
d.	Determining/analyzing community needs and resources	
e.	Working with different ethnic groups/cultural diversity	
f.	Conflict resolution	
g.	How to monitor or document community policing activities	
h.	Performance evaluation in a community policing organization	
i.	Introduction to management concepts	
j.	Building and sustaining teams	
k.	Leadership for community policing	
l.	Managing organizational change	
m.	Changing the police organizational culture	
n.	Total quality management in a community policing organization	
o.	Other (please specify):	
p.	Provide counseling	
q.	Problem solving techniques (e.g. landlord training, code enforcement, etc.)	
r.	Other (please specify_____):	

11. Has your agency developed, or is it in the process of developing, new <u>written</u> policies concerning the following?

		YES	NO
a.	Police interactions with other government agencies	1	0
b.	Police interactions with citizens, citizen groups, or private institutions	1	0
c.	Disorderly behavior or conditions	1	0
d.	Procedures to deal with neighborhood problems	1	0
e.	Other (please specify_____):	1	0

12. Have new ordinances or new legislation been created to support your community policing approach?

YES   1   No   0   N/A   9

13. Is the progress or success of your community policing approach measured by your agency on the basis of published goals or objectives?

YES   1   No   0   N/A   9

14. Has your agency's approach to community policing had any of the following effects? (Write "NA" at the end of this statement if your agency does not plan to implement community policing or if you are in the beginning stages of implementing community policing and therefore not at the stage where such effects are visible.)_____

		YES	NO	DON'T KNOW
a.	Improved cooperation between citizens and police	1	0	8
b.	Increased involvement of citizens in efforts to improve the community	1	0	8
c.	Improved citizens' attitudes toward the police	1	0	8
d.	Increased volunteer activities by citizens	1	0	8
e.	Increased officers' level of job satisfaction	1	0	8
f.	Increased response time	1	0	8
g.	Reduced crime against persons	1	0	8
h.	Reduced crime against property	1	0	8
i.	Reduced citizens' fear of crime	1	0	8
j.	Increased citizens' calls for service	1	0	8
k.	Decreased citizen's calls for service	1	0	8
l.	Diversion of calls away from central dispatch	1	0	8
m.	Increased information from citizens to police	1	0	8

SECTION THREE: OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL PROGRAMS AND PRACTICES

15. Please indicate which of the following organizational programs and practices your agency has implemented or plans to implement. For each item listed below, please circle the appropriate code to indicate whether your agency (3) implemented this program or practice, (2) plans to implement this program or practice, or (1) has no plans to implement this program or practice.

		IMPLEMENTED	PLANS TO IMPLEMENT	NO PLANS TO IMPLEMENT
a.	Classification and prioritization of calls to increase officer time for other activities	3	2	1
b.	Alternative response methods for calls (e.g., telephone reports, mail-in reports, scheduled appointments for some calls)	3	2	1

		IMPLEMENTED	PLANS TO IMPLEMENT	NO PLANS TO IMPLEMENT
c.	Citizen surveys to determine community needs and priorities	3	2	1
d.	Citizen surveys to evaluate police service	3	2	1
e.	Victim assistance program	3	2	1
f.	Permanent, neighborhood-based offices or stations	3	2	1
g.	Mobile, neighborhood-based offices or stations	3	2	1
h.	Drug-free zones around schools, parks, or churches	3	2	1
i.	Police/youth programs (e.g., PAL program, school liaison program, mentoring program	3	2	1
j.	Drug education program in schools	3	2	1
k.	Drug tip hot line or Crime Stoppers program	3	2	1
l.	Fixed assignment of patrol officers to specific beats or areas	3	2	1
m.	Designation of some officers as "community" or "neighborhood officers," each of whom is responsible for working in areas identified as having special problems or needs	3	2	1
n.	Foot patrol as a specific assignment	3	2	1
o.	Foot patrol as a periodic expectation for officers assigned to cars	3	2	1
p.	Regularly scheduled meetings with community groups	3	2	1
q.	Specific training for problem identification and resolution	3	2	1
r.	Training for citizens in problem identification or resolution	3	2	1
s.	Regular radio or television programs or "spots" to inform community about crime, criminals, and police activities	3	2	1
t.	Landlord/manager training programs for order maintenance and drug reduction	3	2	1
u.	Building code enforcement as a means of helping remove crime potential (e.g., drug dealing or prostitution) from an area	3	2	1
v.	Use of other regulatory codes to combat drugs and crime	3	2	1
w.	Geographically based crime analysis made available to officers at the beat level	3	2	1
x.	Interagency involvement in problem identification and resolution	3	2	1
y.	Integration with community corrections	3	2	1
z.	Integration with Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADL)	3	2	1

16. Below is a list of organizational arrangements/structures that your agency might use or might have plans to use. For each item listed below, please circle the appropriate code to indicate whether your agency (3) currently uses this program, (2) plans to use this program, or (1) has no plans to use this program or practice.

		CURRENTLY USES	PLANS TO USE	NO PLANS TO USE
a.	Command or decision-making responsibility tied to neighborhoods or geographically defined areas of the jurisdiction	3	2	1
b.	Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood boundaries	3	2	1
c.	Physical decentralization of field services	3	2	1
d.	Physical decentralization of investigations	3	2	1
e.	Means of accessing other city or county data bases to analyze community or neighborhood conditions (e.g., school data, health data, parole/probation records, tax records,	3	2	1

		CURRENTLY USES	PLANS TO USE	NO PLANS TO USE
	licensing data)			
f.	Fixed shifts (changing no more often than annually)	3	2	1
g.	Centralized crime analysis unit/function	3	2	1
h.	Decentralized crime analysis unit/function	3	2	1
i.	Specialized problem solving unit	3	2	1
j.	Specialized community relations unit	3	2	1
k.	Specialized crime prevention unit	3	2	1
l.	Multidisciplinary teams to deal with special problems such as child abuse	3	2	1
m.	Interagency drug task force	3	2	1
n.	Interagency code enforcement	3	2	1

SECTION FOUR: PERSONNEL RESPONSIBILITIES

17. Below is a list of things patrol officers/deputies might be expected to do or for which they might be held responsible. For each function or activity, please circle the appropriate code to indicate whether it is: (0) not practiced or is not applicable to patrol officers/deputies in your agency, (1) the responsibility of a special unit of patrol officers/deputies, (2) the responsibility of some patrol officers/deputies, or (3) the responsibility of most of the patrol officers/deputies in your agency.

		NO / N/A	SPECIAL PATROL UNIT	SOME PATROL OFFICERS / DEPUTIES	MOST PATROL OFFICERS / DEPUTIES
a.	Make door-to-door contacts in neighborhoods	0	1	2	3
b.	Develop familiarity with community leaders in area of assignment	0	1	2	3
c.	Work with citizens to identify and resolve area problems	0	1	2	3
d.	Assist in organizing community	0	1	2	3
e.	Teach residents how to address community problems	0	1	2	3
f.	Work regularly with detectives on cases in area of assignment	0	1	2	3
g.	Conduct crime analysis for area of assignment	0	1	2	3
h.	Meet regularly with community groups	0	1	2	3
i.	Enforce civil and code violations in area	0	1	2	3
j.	Work with other city agencies to solve neighborhood problems	0	1	2	3
k.	Conduct surveys in area of assignment	0	1	2	3
l.	Act like "chief of the beat"	0	1	2	3

18. Below is a list of the possible responsibilities of mid-level managers (e.g. captains and lieutenants) serving in field operation functions. For each item listed below, please circle the appropriate code to indicate whether (3) this is a current responsibility, (2) it is a planned responsibility, or (1) not a planned responsibility of mid-level managers in your agency.

		YES / CURRENT RESPONSIBILITIES	PLANNED RESPONSIBILITIES	NOT PLANNED RESPONSIBILITY
a.	Redesign organization to support problem solving efforts	3	2	1
b.	Maintain regular contact with community leaders	3	2	1

		YES / CURRENT RESPONSIBILITIES	PLANNED RESPONSIBILITIES	NOT PLANNED RESPONSIBILITY
c.	Establish inter-agency relationships	3	2	1
d.	Make final decision about which problems are to be addressed in geographic area of responsibility	3	2	1
e.	Make final decision about how to handle most community problems	3	2	1
f.	Make final decision about application of agency resources to solve problem in geographic area of responsibility	3	2	1
g.	Elicit input from officers/deputies about solutions to community problems	3	2	1
h.	Manage crime analysis for geographic area of responsibility	3	2	1
i.	Evaluate performance with geographic area of responsibility	3	2	1

SECTION FIVE: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

19. Below is a list of the different ways in which your agency might work or plans to work with citizens in the community. For each item listed below, please circle the appropriate code to indicate whether it is (3) currently being done by citizens in your jurisdiction, (2) something that is planned for the future, or (1) not planned to be done by citizens in your jurisdiction.

		CURRENTLY BEING DONE	PLANNED PARTICIPATION	NOT PLANNED PARTICIPATION
a.	Participate in Neighborhood Watch Program	3	2	1
b.	Serve as volunteers within the police agency	3	2	1
c.	Attend citizen police academy	3	2	1
d.	Serve in citizen patrols coordinated by your agency	3	2	1
e.	Serve on citizen advisory councils at <u>neighborhood</u> <u>level</u> to provide input/ feedback on department policies and practices	3	2	1
f.	Serve on citizen advisory councils at <u>city-wide level</u>	3	2	1
g.	Participate in court watch program	3	2	1
h.	Serve on advisory group for chief or other agency managers	3	2	1
i.	Prepare agreements specifying work to be done on problems by citizens and police	3	2	1
j.	Work with police to identify and resolve community or neighborhood problems	3	2	1
k.	Help develop policing policies	3	2	1
l.	Help evaluate officer performance	3	2	1
m.	Help review complaints against police	3	2	1
n.	Participate in selection process for new officers	3	2	1
o.	Participate in promotional process	3	2	1

20. If you have any other comments about community policing or this survey, please write them below or on the back of this page. Thank you for the time you took to fill out this survey.

COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITIES PROJECT COALITION SURVEY

We recently mailed you and others in Columbia a Comprehensive Communities Project (CCP) Coalition Survey. A large percentage of those surveys sent out have not been returned, and we need to receive as many as possible in order to ensure that we paint an accurate picture of CCP implementation. The following points address a number of questions and concerns we have fielded based on the questionnaire:

- **Name/Term Recognition -** The Comprehensive Communities Program is an overarching national initiative funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. You may not be familiar with this project name, despite the fact that you may be working on one of its many components, (e.g. Community Policing, Youth Initiatives, Alternatives to Incarceration). Similarly, different sites have different components, and not all of what we ask may pertain to your site. If this is so, simply write "NA"— not applicable.

- **Type of Evaluation -** We are conducting a process evaluation and not an outcome evaluation. Therefore this survey is not intended to measure the positive outcomes or results of your activities; that aspect may come later. Instead, we are looking to describe how the CCP program works in Columbia. The survey is one way that will help us do that.

- **Timing of Survey -** We understand that some areas have just recently received funding and are just getting started and are concerned that we're catching them too early in their program. We will be repeating the survey and therefore will be able to measure the progress each site makes toward its program goals.

- **Funding -** We have no control over future funding of any programs.

- **Survey Length -** While the survey looks long, it is mostly multiple choice, and should only require 10-15 minutes of your time at most.

- **"But I don't know..." -** Many were concerned that they did not know about all of the aspects of the program we are asking about. That's okay—we expect different people to know about different portions. Please go ahead and fill out those questions you feel you can answer. If you don't know about the topic of any question, either write/circle "DK" (don't know) and this will not reflect negatively upon your organization. Also, we expect that you will not recognize many individuals' names and organizations in Questions 17 and 18 of the survey. Please just respond about those you do know.

We need your survey so that we can describe your site from a variety of points of view. PLEASE PUT YOUR NAME ON THE SURVEY AND SEND IT TO:

BOTEC Analysis Corporation
10 Fawcett Street
Cambridge, MA 02138 **THANK YOU!**

1. In your opinion, what are the major public community problems facing your target area? Please rank the seriousness of the problems listed below. (FOR EACH PROBLEM, CIRCLE ONE ANSWER. IF MORE THAN ONE NEIGHBORHOOD IS INCLUDED IN YOUR CCP PROGRAM, THEN GIVE AN AVERAGE IMPRESSION)

		No Problem	Some Problem	Big Problem
a.	Illicit drug-dealing	1	2	3
b.	Illicit drug abuse	1	2	3
c.	Public drunkenness/underage	1	2	3

drinking

d.	AIDS	1	2	3
e.	Unemployment	1	2	3
f.	Teen pregnancy	1	2	3
g.	School drop-out rate/truancy	1	2	3
h.	Trash/abandoned cars and buildings/physical decay/graffiti	1	2	3
i.	Homelessness	1	2	3
j.	Domestic violence	1	2	3
k.	Police misconduct	1	2	3
l.	Violence by youths	1	2	3
m.	Violence by adults	1	2	3
n.	Widespread use of guns	1	2	3
o.	Property crime	1	2	3
p.	Prostitution	1	2	3
q.	Crime in and around schools	1	2	3
r.	Gangs	1	2	3
s.	Traffic/accidents	1	2	3

2.   What is your function in the CCP effort? _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

3. To what extent has each of the following individuals/groups been involved during the <u>planning phase </u>of CCP— this is, prior to receipt of BJA funding? (FOR EACH GROUP, CIRCLE ONE ANSWER. CIRCLE "DON'T KNOW/NA" IF YOU DO NOT HAVE THAT TYPE OF INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP IN YOUR CITY)

		Not at All	Some	A Great Deal	Don't Know/ NA
a.	CCP project director/coordinator	1	2	3	9
b.	CCP coalition staff	1	2	3	9
c.	Grantee/lead organization	1	2	3	9
d.	Executive board or steering committee	1	2	3	9
e.	Police department	1	2	3	9
f.	CCP sub-committee(s), teams	1	2	3	9
g.	Overall CCP membership	1	2	3	9
h.	Business leader(s)	1	2	3	9
i.	Other (PLEASE SPECIFY)_____	1	2	3	9

4. To what extent has each of the following individuals/groups been involved in the <u>management and implementation </u>of CCP's programs and activities since the receipt of BJA funds? (FOR EACH GROUP, CIRCLE ONE ANSWER. CIRCLE "DON'T KNOW/NA" IF YOU DO NOT HAVE THAT TYPE OF INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP IN YOUR CITY)

		Not at All	Some	A Great Deal	Don't Know/ NA
a.	CCP project director/coordinator	1	2	3	9
b.	CCP coalition staff	1	2	3	9
c.	Grantee/lead organization	1	2	3	9
d.	Executive board or steering committee	1	2	3	9
e.	Police department	1	2	3	9
f.	CCP sub-committee(s), teams	1	2	3	9
g.	Overall CCP membership	1	2	3	9
h.	Business leader(s)	1	2	3	9
i.	Other (PLEASE SPECIFY)_____	1	2	3	9

5. Are there organizations or groups of people that you would like to see better represented among the CCP participants in the future? (CIRCLE ONE)

    1—Yes (ANSWER A)   0—No (GO TO QUESTION 6)

    a. If yes, please list names/organizations. _____
                 _____
                 _____

6. Do you know of any organizations/individuals that have ceased to be active in the CCP effort? (CIRCLE ONE)
    1—Yes (ANSWER A)   0—No (GO TO QUESTION 7)

    a. If yes, please list names/organizations._____

    _____

    _____

7. Does the Columbia CCP effort have large general meetings representing all participants? (CIRCLE ONE)
    1—Yes (ANSWER A)   0—No (GO TO QUESTION 8)

    a. If yes, how many of these full coalition meetings have you attended. _____

8. Does the Columbia CCP effort have a number of separate committees (teams, networks, etc.)? (CIRCLE ONE)
    1—Yes (ANSWER A)   0—No (GO TO QUESTION 9)

    a. What committees or teams do you serve on, or plan to serve on, once they become active? (PLEASE LIST
        THEM IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE TO YOU)

        1 _____

        2 _____

        3 _____

9. Please indicate whether the Columbia CCP Program has been involved in any of the following planning
    activities. (FOR EACH ACTIVITY, BY CIRCLING A NUMBER, INDICATE WHETHER THE ACTIVITY IS PLANNED, IS UNDERWAY, IS
    COMPLETED, OR IS NOT PLANNED)

		Planned	Underway	Completed	Not Planned	Don't Know
a.	Recruiting coalition members	1	2	3	4	9
b.	Conducting needs assessment	1	2	3	4	9
c.	Developing communication networks	1	2	3	4	9
d.	Creating/changing internal policies	1	2	3	4	9
e.	Training	1	2	3	4	9
f.	Identifying resources	1	2	3	4	9
g.	Enhancing public relations	1	2	3	4	9
h.	Analyzing cultural barriers	1	2	3	4	9
i.	Developing specific programs	1	2	3	4	9
j.	Implementing specific programs	1	2	3	4	9
k.	Creating an information collection system	1	2	3	4	9
l.	Setting up a system for self-evaluation	1	2	3	4	9
m.	Other (PLEASE SPECIFY)_____	1	2	3	4	9

10. Think about what the Columbia CCP Program has done to date. Please indicate how effective your program has been in the areas listed below. (CIRCLE ONE ANSWER FOR EACH STATEMENT)

		Very Effective	Somewhat Effective	Somewhat Ineffective	Very Ineffective	Don't Know
a.	Fostering cooperation among organizations in the coalition	1	2	3	4	9
b.	Fostering the networking and exchange of information among coalition members	1	2	3	4	9
c.	Recruiting new members (individuals or organizations)	1	2	3	4	9
d.	Including members who are representative of the community	1	2	3	4	9
e.	Generating citizen or community involvement	1	2	3	4	9
f.	Creating member consensus about a plan of action	1	2	3	4	9
g.	Planning specific programs	1	2	3	4	9
h.	Implementing specific programs	1	2	3	4	9
i.	Developing programs on schedule	1	2	3	4	9
j.	Generating additional funding beyond the grant	1	2	3	4	9
k.	Locating additional resources to apply to the target problems	1	2	3	4	9
l.	Tailoring services to needs	1	2	3	4	9

11. The following questions focus on your attitudes about Columbia's CCP coalition. (As mentioned previously, coalitions are alliances of groups and/or individuals that come together for a common purpose.) Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each statement. (CIRCLE ONE FOR EACH STATEMENT)

		Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree
a.	I am satisfied with the coalition	1	2	3	4
b.	I feel involved with the coalition	1	2	3	4
c.	In spite of individual differences, a feeling of unity exists in this coalition	1	2	3	4
d.	The coalition is addressing the most important issues in our community	1	2	3	4
e.	Compared to the groups I know, I feel this coalition is more effective than most	1	2	3	4
f.	I want to remain a member of this group	1	2	3	4
g.	I care about what happens in this coalition	1	2	3	4

12. All coalitions of individuals and groups have discussions and encounter some amount of conflict when making decisions. For <u>most </u>of your important decisions as a CCP coalition, would you say there has been: (CIRCLE ONE)

1—A great deal of conflict that improves decision-making	2—Some conflict that improves decision-making	3—Little or no conflict
4—Some conflict that impedes decision-making	5—A great deal of conflict that impedes decision-making	6—Don't Know

13. As a whole, how would you rate the members of Columbia's CCP Program with whom you have had contact?
    (CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST REPRESENTS YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT MEMBERS OF THE COALITION AS A GROUP)

Cooperative	1 ---------------2 ---------------3 ---------------4 ---------------5	Uncooperative
Friendly	1 ---------------2 ---------------3 ---------------4 ---------------5	Hostile
Productive	1 ---------------2 ---------------3 ---------------4 ---------------5	Unproductive
Powerful	1 ---------------2 ---------------3 ---------------4 ---------------5	Weak

14. How much have the following events and conditions <u>hindered</u> Columbia's CCP coalition during the two time periods listed below? (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY)

		Before Receipt of Funding				Since the Receipt of Funding			
		No Problem	Some Problem	Big Problem	Don't Know	No Problem	Some Problem	Big Problem	Don't Know
a.	Staff and/or member turnover	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
b.	Leadership problems	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
c.	Turf conflicts	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
d.	Ego/personality differences	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
e.	Insufficient funding	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
f.	Disagreement over goals of the project	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
g.	Time constraints	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
h.	Lack of clear action plan	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
i.	Lack of commitment from some members	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
j.	Red tape at Federal level	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
k.	Red tape at local level	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
l.	Factions within the coalition	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
m.	Other (please specify) _____	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9

15. Overall, how would you evaluate Columbia's CCP effort to build a coalition of agencies, organizations, and individuals?   Would you say that you are: (CIRCLE ONE)

1—Extremely satisfied	2—Very satisfied	3—Somewhat satisfied	4—Not very satisfied	5—Not at all satisfied

16. In comparison to where you thought Columbia's CCP coalition would be at this time, would you say the group is: (CIRCLE ONE)

| 1—Far behind schedule | 2—Somewhat behind schedule | 3—Right on schedule | 4—Somewhat ahead of schedule | 5—Far ahead of schedule |

Network Analysis

17. The following is a list of individuals and organizations that are believed to be part of Columbia's CCP coalition. For each individual listed, please indicate how often you have contact with him or her, by circling one of the numbers ranging from 1 for "Daily" to 5 "Never." If you have CCP contact with other people at the same organization, please list their names next to "Other" and report how often you have contact with them. Your answers are completely confidential. No individual names will be reported.

| | | *Amount of Contact* | | | | |
Organization	Name	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Every Few Months	Never
City of Columbia						
	Mayor Bob Coble	1	2	3	4	5
	Miles Hadley	1	2	3	4	5
	Leona K. Plaugh	1	2	3	4	5
Columbia Police Department						
	Chief Charles Austin	1	2	3	4	5
	Rick Haines	1	2	3	4	5
	Marshell Johnson	1	2	3	4	5
	Nathaniel B. "Chip" Land	1	2	3	4	5
	Estelle Young	1	2	3	4	5
U.S. Attorney's Office						
	Pete Strom	1	2	3	4	5
Columbia Council of Neighborhoods and/or CCP Steering Committee						
	Bill Manley	1	2	3	4	5
	Roland Smallwood	1	2	3	4	5
	Deacon Lathus Williams	1	2	3	4	5
City of Columbia						
	Rick Semon	1	2	3	4	5
Columbia Council on Neighborhoods						
	Bruce Sanders	1	2	3	4	5
Columbia Housing Authority						
	Nancy Stoudemire	1	2	3	4	5
Greater Columbia Community Relations						
	Jesse Washington	1	2	3	4	5
Lin-Col-Lat Community						
	Henry Hopkins	1	2	3	4	5
Martin Luther King Association						
	Durham E. Carter	1	2	3	4	5
Richland Fighting Back						
	Elaine Dowdy	1	2	3	4	5
Rosewood Community Council						
	Mel Jenkins	1	2	3	4	5
Domestic Violence						
Men's Resource Center						
	David Landholt	1	2	3	4	5
Sistercare, Inc.						
	Nancy Barton	1	2	3	4	5

Organization	Name	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Every Few Months	Never
					Amount of Contact	
Alternatives to Incarceration						
Department of Juvenile Justice						
	Flora Boyd	1	2	3	4	5
	Lois Jenkins	1	2	3	4	5
	Lisa Timmerman	1	2	3	4	5
	Joe Benton	1	2	3	4	5
Alternatives and Conflict Resolution						
Richland School District						
	Dr. Don Henderson	1	2	3	4	5
	Jo Ann Anderson	1	2	3	4	5
Diversion						
Alston Wilkes Society						
	Wayne Anson	1	2	3	4	5
Columbia Urban League						
	J.T. McLawhorn	1	2	3	4	5
Operation Success						
	Mohammed Nikravesh	1	2	3	4	5
Drug Court						
	Brett Salley	1	2	3	4	5
Alcohol & Drug Abuse Council						
	Horace Smith	1	2	3	4	5
Richland Judicial Center						
	Honorable Joe Wilson	1	2	3	4	5
Youth Initiatives						
Boys and Girls Clubs						
	Vince Ford	1	2	3	4	5
C.A. Johnson High School						
	Ryan Hollis	1	2	3	4	5
City of Columbia						
	Veryl McIntyre	1	2	3	4	5
Columbia Commission on Children and Youth						
	Karen Oliver	1	2	3	4	5
Keenan High School						
	Robin Reeves	1	2	3	4	5
Other	_____	1	2	3	4	5
Other	_____	1	2	3	4	5

Organizational Involvement

18. Please describe the contribution made to the CCP effort by each organization listed below. Describe an organization's contribution in two ways:

    Effort: Amount of effort made by the organization toward the goals of Columbia's CCP Program (1=Little or no effort; 2=Moderate effort; 3=Large effort).

    Importance: Importance of the organization to the overall success of Columbia's CCP Program (1=Not very important; 2=Moderately important; 3=Very important).

    Your answers are confidential. No individual answers will be reported.

	Effort				Importance			
	Little	**Moderate**	**Large**	**Don't Know**	**Not Very**	**Moderately**	**Very**	**Don't Know**
Columbia Council of Neighborhoods	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
CCP Steering Committee	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
Alcohol & Drug Abuse Council	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
Alston Wilkes Society	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
Boys and Girls Clubs	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
C.A. Johnson High School	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
City of Columbia	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
Columbia Commission on Children and Youth	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
Columbia Police Department	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
Columbia Urban League	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
Department of Juvenile Justice	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
Keenan High School	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
Men's Resource Center	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
Operation Success	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
Richland Judicial Center	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
Richland School District	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
Sistercare, Inc.	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
U.S. Attorney's Office	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
Other_____	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9
Other_____	1	2	3	9	1	2	3	9

19. Is there anything you would like to add that has not been asked in this questionnaire? (PLEASE USE THE SPACE BELOW OR THE BACK OF THE SURVEY FOR ADDITIONAL COMMENTS)