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Follow the Money: How California Counties Are Spending Their Public Safety Realignment Funds

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WORKING PAPER

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The **Stanford Criminal Justice Center** (SCJC), led by faculty co-directors Joan Petersilia and Robert Weisberg and executive director Debbie Mukamal, serves as a research and policy institute on matters related to the criminal justice system. The SCJC is presently undertaking a number of research projects aimed at better understanding the implementation and effect of California's Public Safety Realignment legislation. For more information about our current and past projects, please visit our website: <http://law.stanford.edu/criminal-justice-center>.

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Abstract

The California correctional system is undergoing a dramatic transformation under Assembly Bill 109 (“Realignment”), a law that shifted responsibility from the state to the counties for tens of thousands of offenders. To help manage this change, the state will distribute \$4.4 billion to the counties by 2016-2017. While the legislation directs counties to use these funds for community-based programs, counties retain a substantial amount of spending discretion. Some are expanding offender treatment capacities, while others are shoring up enforcement and control apparatuses. In this report we examine counties’ AB 109 spending reports and budgets to determine which counties emphasize enforcement and which emphasize treatment. We also identify counties that continue to emphasize prior orientations toward punishment and counties that have shifted their priorities in response to Realignment. We then apply quantitative and comparative methods to county budget data to identify political, economic, and criminal justice-related factors that may explain higher AB 109 spending on enforcement or higher spending on treatment, relative to other counties. In short, our analysis shows that counties that elect to allocate more AB 109 funds to enforcement and control generally appear to be responding to local criminal justice needs, including high crime rates, a shortage of law enforcement personnel, and a historic preference for using prison to punish drug offenders. Counties that favor a greater investment in offender treatment and services, meanwhile, are typified by strong electoral support for the Sheriff and relatively under-funded district attorneys and probation departments.

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Executive Summary

On April 5, 2011, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into law AB 109, the “2011 Realignment Legislation Addressing Public Safety” (“Realignment”), which dramatically shifted responsibility from the state to the counties for tens of thousands of offenders. The state was in an unprecedented financial crisis, and recent budget deficits had forced legislators to make tough decisions that included cutting spending not only in the criminal justice system, but in education and other social services as well. Moreover, just a few weeks before the bill’s signing, the United States Supreme Court upheld a lower court judgment ordering California to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of design capacity—a reduction of roughly 40,000 inmates within two years. AB 109 went into effect on October 1, 2011, with three major changes to California corrections:

- (1) Felony offenders who have never been convicted of a “serious,” “violent” or “sexual” crime would be sentenced to local jail rather than state prison.
- (2) Prisoners released from prison who were convicted of a “non-serious,” “non-violent,” and “non-sexual” crime (sometimes called “non-non-nons”) would be subject to county post-release community supervision rather than state parole.
- (3) Parolees who violate conditions of their parole would serve their custodial punishment in county jail rather than state prison.

The goal of AB 109 is to reduce recidivism by managing lower level offenders at the community level in locally designed programs. The legislation also addressed the problem of the “correctional free lunch,” in which the state absorbs the costs of local decisions to incarcerate offenders. By holding and supervising more offenders locally, key actors in the counties are expected to become more sensitive to the practical and financial consequences of their sentencing decisions.

To help local governments shoulder the costs of housing and supervising this new stream of offenders, the state has allocated \$2 billion through 2013-2014 and anticipates distributing \$4.4 billion to the counties by 2016-2017 (Petersilia and Snyder 2013). Realignment encourages counties to use the funds to invest in community-based alternatives, with an emphasis on programs that employ the principles of evidence-based practices. However, counties retain significant discretion in their spending decisions. Some counties are adhering closer to the intended focus on alternative, community-based sanctions, while others are expanding jails, adding sheriff’s deputies, and shoring up other aspects of local law enforcement. County-level AB 109 spending can therefore be arrayed on a spectrum—with enforcement orientation at one end and treatment orientation on the other.

Explaining County Spending

This project uses social scientific concepts and methods to help explain AB 109 spending patterns. We have compiled data that allow us to answer three critical sets of research questions.

- (1) How are counties spending their AB 109 money? Which counties elect to spend more on treatment programs and services? Which elect to spend more on surveillance and law enforcement? Can a method be developed to categorize different county spending patterns?
- (2) Which counties that emphasized treatment and services before Realignment continue to prioritize these approaches? Which counties that emphasized control and surveillance before Realignment continue to emphasize these priorities? Which counties have shifted their priorities in response to Realignment?
- (3) What factors explain county spending patterns?

As a starting point, we acquired each county's 2011-2012 AB 109 Community Corrections Partnership plan and budget. Reading and coding the plans allowed us to categorize them according to those that were more focused on punishment, surveillance, and incarceration, and those that were more focused on treatment and services. The coding of plans involved a qualitative dimension in which we determined the "depth" with which each plan discussed using AB 109 funds for enforcement or control-oriented objectives, and the depth with which each plan discussed using funds for programming and treatment objectives. We then coded the actual budgets each county included with its plan, determining allocations to two key "spending units:"

- *Sheriff and Law Enforcement*, comprised of budget subcategories covering sheriff and municipal law enforcement.
- *Programs and Services*, comprised of budget subcategories covering offender housing, programs and services, health services, and workforce development.

We then created an overall "control orientation index" that arrays counties on a spectrum, with those that emphasize surveillance and custody in their AB 109 spending plans on one end, and those that emphasize programs and services on the other. To determine which counties continue to emphasize prior control orientations and which seem to shift priorities, we developed a measure to indicate counties' pre-AB 109 control orientations by rating each county as "low," "medium" or "high" on the following measures:

- Percent of arrested felons convicted, 2009
- Percent of arrested felons incarcerated (prison, jail), 2009
- Percent of convicted felons incarcerated (prison, jail), 2009
- Imprisonments for violent offenses per 1,000 violent felony arrests, 2010
- Imprisonments for property offenses per 1,000 property felony arrests, 2010
- Imprisonments for drug offenses per 1,000 drug felony arrests, 2010

Rating Counties’ ‘Control Orientations’

After calculating ratings on these six measures, we used the plurality of ratings to assign each county an overall low, medium or high pre-AB 109 control orientation rating.

Using all these data, we created a “before and after” table categorizing counties according to whether their AB 109 spending plans reflect prior control orientations, or whether they reflect a shift in orientation. Table 1 below displays the results.

Table 1: Pre- and Post- Realignment County “Control” Orientation

	AB 109 Implementation Plans (Control Orientation Index)		
Pre-AB 109 control orientation	<i>Low control orientation</i>	<i>Medium control orientation</i>	<i>High control orientation</i>
<i>Low control orientation</i>	Nevada, San Francisco, Plumas, Santa Cruz, Alameda, Mono, Humboldt, Mendocino, Modoc, Sonoma (10)	Del Norte, Sierra, San Diego (3)	Alpine, Contra Costa, Marin, Calaveras, Imperial (5)
<i>Medium control orientation</i>	Fresno, Mariposa, San Joaquin, Ventura (4)	Los Angeles, Napa, Solano, El Dorado, Inyo, Yuba, Lake, Merced, Sacramento (9)	Glenn, Orange, Stanislaus, Colusa, Placer, San Luis Obispo, San Benito (7)
<i>High control orientation</i>	Monterey, Santa Barbara, San Mateo, Shasta, Santa Clara (5)	Tuolumne, Sutter, Trinity, Madera, Amador, Lassen, Riverside, Tehama, Yolo (9)	Kings, San Bernardino, Siskiyou, Tulare, Butte, Kern (6)

Table 1 suggests there is no clear correlation between pre-AB 109 control orientation and the control orientation of AB 109 spending plans. Some counties maintain their pre-AB 109 orientations while others change course. At this initial stage of analysis, we could characterize the five counties that fall into the box designated pre-AB 109 “high control” and post-AB 109 “low control” as the poster counties for Realignment (highlighted in red in Table 1). These counties (Monterey, Santa Barbara, San Mateo, Shasta, and Santa Clara Counties) had adopted more punitive approaches prior to AB 109 (defined basically as sentencing a higher proportion of convicted felons to incarceration), but emphasized treatment programs in their spending plans. Five other counties displayed a relatively light emphasis on punishment before AB 109, but their spending plans emphasize more control-oriented approaches (highlighted in blue in Table 1). Explaining why counties might have made the AB 109 funding choices they did is the subject of the more rigorous analysis we discuss below. It also bears mentioning that for almost half of the counties (25), pre-AB 109 control orientations “matched” the control orientations in their spending plans.

Our quantitative and comparative analyses of county AB 109 budget data identify factors that are associated with greater allocation to the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit, and greater allocation to the *Programs and Services* spending unit. We draw from social scientific literature to identify factors of interest. Broadly, we examine the effect of factors related to local political environments, economic health, and local criminal justice needs. Political factors include electoral conservatism/liberalism, electoral support for key criminal justice officials, and indicators of “racial threat” in each county, such as the black unemployment rate. Economic factors include indicators of economic health and operational expenditures on various components of the criminal justice system. Factors representing local criminal justice needs include crime rates, preference for incarceration, characteristics of the local parolee population, number of criminal justice personnel, recent gain/loss in criminal justice personnel, and jail overcrowding.

To test the relationships between counties’ AB 109 budget allocations and the potential associated factors, we conducted a series of bivariate correlation analyses. We correlated variables representing potential predictive factors related to politics, economics, and local needs with our variables representing budgets for counties’ *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* and *Programs and Services* spending categories.

We find that counties allocate more to their *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending units when:

- Law enforcement expenditures are higher relative to other counties.
- Sheriff expenditures are higher relative to other counties.
- The imprisonment rate for drug felonies is higher.

- The serious (Part I) crime rate is higher.
- The county has a relatively high number of full-time law enforcement personnel.
- The county has recently gained a relatively large number of law enforcement personnel.
- The concentration of high-risk parolees is lower.
- The drug offense arrest rate is lower.

We find that counties allocate more to their *Programs and Services* spending units when:

- The sheriff has received more electoral support.
- The black unemployment rate is higher.
- District attorney expenditures are lower.
- Probation expenditures are lower.

Taking a Deeper Look

We then used the potential explanatory factors identified in our bivariate analyses to guide a series of more advanced analyses of Realignment spending. To suit the unique nature of our data, we apply Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), a method designed to identify explanatory factors in highly detailed, small-N datasets such as ours. QCA applies Boolean algebraic principles in order to determine how different factors combine and interact to explain outcomes of interest such as governmental spending decisions. We thus use QCA to identify the conditions that explain counties' relative emphases on their *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* and *Programs and Services* spending units.

Overall, it appears that:

- *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending is generally a product of local needs (crime conditions and dedication to law enforcement) and preference for punishment.
- *Programs and Services* spending fundamentally revolves around electoral confidence in the Sheriff.

Our comparative analyses show that county spending choices are driven by complicated dynamics, but certain key factors can be identified. Counties that have emphasized *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending are largely reacting to local needs around crime and law enforcement capacity, though these needs may be conditioned by political-ideological factors (i.e., preference for using prison to punish drug offenders). Counties that have emphasized *Programs and Services* appear to do so because of public faith in

law enforcement, and this public support is conditioned by local and organizational need.

Counties in California are diverse, and each has its own set of needs and constraints. Because of the discretion county officials have been given in distributing AB 109 funds, we expected these distinctive needs and constraints to influence spending decisions, and they do. Above all, this report demonstrates that the political and institutional environment of each county will invariably influence how counties carry out Realignment, the most ambitious correctional experiment in a generation. AB 109 has already changed local offender populations and criminal justice practices. As they move forward and adjust to the new reality, counties must carefully assess these changes and pay heed to shifting dynamics that affect their ability to manage offenders safely and in programs that can produce results. The state must also carefully consider each county's unique array of local needs, as well as the local political environment, in formulating future allocations. Without such considerations, tensions between counties and the state may increase, and the intended goals of Realignment may be subverted.

Background

Realignment in California has restructured the ways that the state manages its offender populations—mainly by shifting responsibility from the state to the counties for tens of thousands of these offenders. When Realignment began, the state was in an unprecedented financial crisis, and recent budget deficits had forced legislators to make tough spending cuts not only in the criminal justice system, but in education and other social services as well. Moreover, just a few weeks before the bill’s signing, the United States Supreme Court had upheld a lower court judgment ordering California to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of design capacity—a reduction of roughly 40,000 inmates within two years.

AB 109 went into effect on October 1, 2011, bringing three major changes to California corrections: First, felony offenders who have never been convicted of a “serious,” “violent” or “sexual” crime would be sentenced to local jail rather than state prison; second, prisoners released from prison who were convicted of a “non-serious,” “non-violent,” and “non-sexual” crime (sometimes called “non-non-nons”) would be subject to county post-release community supervision rather than state parole; and third, parolees who violate conditions of their parole would serve their custodial punishment in county jail rather than state prison. In his signing statement, Governor Brown declared, “For too long, the State’s prison system has been a revolving door for lower-level offenders and parole violators who are released within months...Cycling these offenders through state prisons wastes money, aggravates crowded conditions, thwarts rehabilitation, and impedes local law enforcement supervision.” The primary intent of AB 109 is to reduce recidivism by managing lower level offenders at the local level through locally-designed programs. The law also addresses the problem of the “correctional free lunch,” in which the state shoulders the cost of local decisions to imprison offenders (Ball 2011, 2013; Zimring and Hawkins 1991), by increasing local accountability for criminal sanctioning.

To carry out Realignment’s transfer of offender supervision from the state to the county level, California is distributing \$4.4 billion to the counties by 2016-2017, excluding the funding allocated for county planning, staff training, local courts, and jail construction (Brown et al., 2012). Realignment encourages counties to use the new funding for community-based alternatives, with an emphasis on programs that employ the principles of evidence-based practices. However, counties retain significant discretion over AB 109 spending decisions. Some counties are devoting a large proportion of their budgets to expanding alternative, community-based sanctions, while others are making the sheriff and other law enforcement a funding priority. AB 109 spending can therefore be arrayed on a spectrum—with enforcement orientation at one end and treatment orientation on the other.

Overview of Public Safety Realignment

Enacted on October 1, 2011, the Public Safety Realignment Act transfers the management of many low-level offenders from the state to the county level. Thus, specified offenders overseen by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) are “realigned” to local agencies.

Realignment shifts three criminal justice populations from state to county responsibility:

- (1) Post-Release Community Supervision (PRCS): Inmates in state prison whose *current* commitment offense is non-serious, non-violent, and non-sexual (“N3”) are released to county probation, not state parole. PRCS individuals are eligible for discharge in 180 days.
- (2) 1170(h) Offenders: Defendants newly convicted of N3 offenses now serve their sentence locally in jail.¹ Three sentencing options exist for this population:
 - a) Full sentence in county jail (can be served in alternative custody programs);
 - b) A “split sentence”: Combination of a term in county jail and mandatory supervision (MS), which cannot exceed the total term chosen by the sentencing judge. Upon release to MS, a defendant is supervised by probation under the same terms, conditions, and procedures of traditional probation; and
 - c) Traditional probation, which can include up to one year maximum in county jail. A defendant who violates the terms and conditions of probation could be given a full term of imprisonment or a split sentence.
- (3) Parolees: State parole agents will only supervise individuals released from prison whose *current* offense is serious or violent and certain others (i.e. those assessed to be mentally disordered or high risk sex offenders).

Other key elements of AB 109 include:

- Redefining Felonies: Felonies are redefined to include certain crimes punishable in jail for 16 months, 2 years, or 3 years. Almost 500 criminal statutes were amended to require that any adult convicted of CA Penal Code §1170(h) felony crimes cannot be sentenced to prison unless they have a past serious or violent felony conviction.
- Parole and Probation Revocations Heard and Served Locally: PRCS and parole revocations are served in local jails for a maximum revocation sentence of 180 days. As of July 1, 2013, local trial courts hear PRCS and parole revocation hearings.
- Changes to Custody Credits: Jail inmates earn four days of credit for every two days served. Time spent on home detention (i.e., electronic monitoring) is credited as time spent in jail custody.
- Alternative Custody: Electronic monitoring can be used for inmates held in county jail in lieu of bail. Eligible inmates must first be held in custody for 60 days post-arraignment, or 30 days for those charged with misdemeanor offenses.
- Community-Based Punishment: Counties are authorized to use a range of community-based punishment and intermediate sanctions other than jail incarceration alone or traditional probation supervision.

¹ Offenders can be sentenced to prison even if they are currently convicted of an 1170(h) non-prison eligible crime if any of the following apply: (1) conviction of a current or prior serious or violent felony conviction listed in California Penal Code § 667.5(c) or 1192.7c; (2) when the defendant is required to register as a sex offender under California Penal Code § 290; or (3) when the defendant is convicted and sentenced for aggravated theft under the provisions of section 186.1. The Legislature also left over 70 specific crimes where the sentence must be served in state prison. See Couzens, J. Richard, and Tricia A. Bigelow. "Felony Sentencing After Realignment." (July 2013).

Neither the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), the Department of Finance, nor any other state agency needed to approve local AB 109 spending plans. That was all in the hands of local governmental leaders. The legislation (California Penal Code §1230.1) required that each county establish a Community Corrections Partnership (CCP), comprised of the Chief Probation Officer as chair, the District Attorney, the Public Defender, the Presiding Judge of the superior court (or his/her designee), the Chief of Police, the Sheriff, and a representative from social services. In its formation of Community Corrections Partnerships, AB 109 appeared self-consciously designed to create cross-systems collaboration and buy-in among the various actors responsible for implementing the new regime in each county. In addition to requiring the participation of various county officials, the California Penal Code also mandated the inclusion of a representative of a successful community-based organization and a representative of victims to be part of the CCP. The CCP was tasked with developing and implementing the county's Realignment approach, including its spending plan.

AB 109 also established an Executive Committee (EC) of the CCP, comprised entirely of county officials. The EC approved the plan of the larger CCP and sent it to the County Board of Supervisors for approval. The plan was deemed accepted by the County Board of Supervisors if the plan was not rejected by a vote of four-fifths of the board, in which case the plan went back to the CCP for further consideration. In each county, the EC was comprised of the chief probation officer, chief of police, sheriff, district attorney, public defender, a presiding judge of the superior court (or designee), and a representative from either the County Department of Social Services, Mental Health, or Alcohol and Substance Abuse Programs, as appointed by the County Board of Supervisors.

Purpose of the Current Analysis

With this project we aim to use social scientific concepts and methods to help understand county-level AB 109 spending patterns. We have compiled data that allow us to answer three critical sets of research questions.

- (1) How are counties spending their AB 109 money? Which counties elect to spend more on treatment programs and services? Which elect to spend more on surveillance and law enforcement? Can a method be developed to categorize different county spending patterns?
- (2) Which counties that emphasized treatment and services before Realignment continue to prioritize these approaches? Which counties that emphasized control

and surveillance before Realignment continue to emphasize these priorities?
Which counties have shifted their priorities in response to Realignment?

- (3) What factors related to politics, economics, and local criminal justice needs explain county spending patterns?

Data Compilation

Qualitative County Spending Plan Coding

To answer our first research question and to better understand the choices that counties made in response to Realignment, we read and qualitatively coded each county's 2011-2012 AB 109 Community Corrections Partnership plan and budget. By reading and coding each of the counties' plans, we were able to categorize them in terms of those that were more focused on the goals of punishment, surveillance, and incarceration, and those that were more focused on treatment and service provision.²

First, we acquired all 58 county plans and qualitatively coded them. In coding the plans, we first identified a list of topics. The initial list of topics was created from reading and researching AB 109 and discussing the legislation with county practitioners and staff in Attorney General Kamala Harris' Office. We selected topics based on the stated goals of AB 109, news coverage of county concerns, and conversations with key officials interested in particular policy outcomes. The final list of topics coded included: plan process/attitude, alternatives to incarceration, risk assessment, reentry and rehabilitation, probation, jails, law enforcement, measurement of outcomes and data collection, mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment, and housing. Within each of these categories we tracked sub-topics (relevant programs and policy choices) as listed in Appendix A.

Once the initial list of coding topics was created, we read each county plan and noted whether or not they mentioned each topic, and the depth with which they discussed each topic. Each topic was scored on a scale of 0 to 4, with a "0" indicating "no mention," a "1"

² These results are limited in that they are representative only of what counties included in their plans, not what counties are actually doing in response to Realignment. Because many counties prepared their plans in haste, there is reason to believe that they will not all accurately mirror the counties' actual actions since October 2011. Furthermore, counties shared vastly different amounts of detail. The plans ranged in length from two and one-third pages (Lake County) to 120 pages with appendices (Santa Barbara County). The plans also displayed varying degrees of professionalism and writing ability. In addition, the fact that counties had different levels of existing programming made it somewhat challenging to delineate new programs being implemented in response to AB 109.

meaning “mentioned but not discussed in depth,” and a “2”, “3”, or “4” indicating increasing depth of coverage. Further details about our “mention” coding and “depth” coding are provided in Appendix B.

We must note here that counties reported difficulties with AB 109 planning and implementation. Many criminal justice system actors characterized the initiative as poorly planned and imposed on them overnight, leaving them scrambling to prepare for more realigned offenders than they had anticipated (Petersilia 2014). Counties’ first-year spending plans, therefore, might have been more polished and nuanced if they had been given more time. We accept this as a limitation to our data.

Quantitative Budget Analysis Coding

In addition to our qualitative coding of the plan narratives, we have also quantitatively coded the spending plan budgets of the 58 California counties.³ County budget breakdowns were taken primarily from county AB 109 2011-2012 plans. For counties that did not provide a budget breakdown within their plan, we followed up with the county probation office to retrieve budget information.

The budgets varied in their detail and formality. Some counties provided a detailed list of expenditures, while others grouped expenses into broader categories, such as “Sheriff” and “Probation.” From the budgets, we grouped the prospective spending of the counties’ AB 109 program funds into the following spending categories to better compare spending across counties: Detention Release Services/Alternatives, Offender Housing, Sheriff, Probation, Programs and Services, District Attorney, Public Defender, Municipal Law Enforcement, Evaluation and Data Analysis, Administration, Health Services, Workforce Development, Human Resources, and Reserves.⁴ If we were able to identify spending in a particular category that should have been placed in another, we subtracted the amount from the original category and added to the appropriate one. For

³ The budget analysis is limited in several significant ways: First, counties reported dramatically different amounts of detail in their budgets. Some budgets were one sentence long, whereas other budgets were several pages long. Second, many counties left a significant portion of their AB 109 money in reserves. How this money was eventually spent might alter our assessment of the county’s budget. And finally, included in our analysis was only the budget of AB 109 funds, and did not include other sources of funding, such as SB 678 or AB 900.

⁴ Several of the categories require additional definition: The Administration category included clerical or accounting staff; the Health Services category included both mental and physical health services; and the Programming category included behavioral health and substance abuse. We selected these categories to track in our budget analysis after reading the legislation itself and several of the budgets. As with the coding topics for the county plans, the budget categories evolved over the course of our research—several categories were added or taken out of the spreadsheet as the research progressed.

example, if a jail-based treatment program was included in the Sheriff's budget, it was subtracted from the Sheriff category and added to the Programs and Services category.

From the aforementioned spending categories, county Realignment spending was grouped into two broad **spending units** for further analysis: (1) *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* and (2) *Programs and Services*. *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending included the subcategories Sheriff and Municipal Law Enforcement. *Programs and Services* spending included the subcategories Offender Housing, Programs and Services, Health Services, and Workforce Development.⁵ Additional budget items were added to these two spending units through a spot check recoding of the other budget categories.⁶ Specifically, budget items were retrieved from categories of interest in each county's budget and added to the appropriate spending unit. We excluded budget items from the following categories: *Probation* (includes only Probation); *Miscellaneous* (includes District Attorney, Public Defender, Evaluation & Data Analysis, Administration, and Human Resources); and *Unallocated* (includes Reserves).⁷

The total expenditures within the two broad spending units were then taken as a percentage of the county's total AB 109 budget expenditure. Therefore, we can indicate each county's relative emphasis on enforcement or treatment by comparing the percentage of its AB 109 budget devoted to its *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending

⁵ The subcategories District Attorney, Public Defender, Evaluation and Data Analysis, Administration, Human Resources, and Reserves were not included in this part of the analysis.

⁶ The recoding of the county budgets led to a few changes in our understanding of them. With the recoding, across the board, more money overall was allocated to the *Programs and Services* spending unit, largely due to the placement of in-custody programming in that category. The allocation to the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit tended to decrease because some of the allocation was reassigned into *Programs and Services*.

⁷ We had some difficulty allocating the budget from the Detention Release Services/Alternatives category because this area conceptually straddles the boundary between "enforcement" and "treatment." This category specifically includes funding for day reporting centers, in-custody community transition programs, electronic monitoring, pretrial reentry services, and specialty courts—a relatively diverse spectrum of programming. In other words, programs in this category incorporate elements of enforcement and elements of treatment as part of their organizational philosophies and routine practices. Thus, we did not feel comfortable with including the Detention Release Services/Alternatives budget wholly within either the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* or *Programs and Services* spending units. Because Detention Release Services/Alternatives seems to align more closely with treatment than enforcement, we elected to allocate 75% of this budget to *Programs and Services* and 25% to *Sheriff and Law Enforcement*. Later in this report, we examine associations between county budget allocations and key county characteristics of interest (detailed later in this document).

Here, we must also note that we broke down Realignment spending in a number of ways, ultimately deciding to report results based on the budget allocation method described above (i.e., a 75%/25% split of the Detention Release Services/Alternatives budget). We devised four different budgetary breakdowns based on different conceptual spending models. Results across all four breakdowns were very similar, so we choose to report only one. The different breakdowns are described in detail in Appendix D.

unit and the percentage of its budget devoted to its *Programs and Services* spending unit against the total AB 109 budget amount.

Figures 1 and 2 below display the relative spending of each county on their *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* and *Programs and Services* spending units based on their percentile ranks within each of these spending units. Appendix C contains bar charts that present these same data in more detail, as well as a full table of univariate descriptives for all dependent and independent variables. Figures 1 and 2 suggest some geographic clustering of spending preferences (i.e., the colors cluster in certain regions) but we do not have administrative data that speak directly to this issue. Future investigations of AB 109 spending might take the possibility of neighbor county influence into account.

Figure 1: County Spending on Sheriff and Law Enforcement Spending Unit





Figure 2: County Spending on Programs and Services Spending Unit



Outcome of Interest: County Control Orientation Index

We use our qualitative and quantitative coding of the county spending plans and budgets to create an overall “control orientation index,” indicating each county’s relative position on a spectrum, with those that emphasize surveillance and custody in their AB 109 spending plans on one end, and those that emphasize programs and services on the other. We also wanted to determine whether the control orientation in each plan reflected prior county orientations toward punishment. This section describes the manner in which we merged the qualitative and quantitative data in order to create the index of AB 109 county control orientations. We then compare these “post-AB 109” control orientations to counties’ preferences for punishment prior to AB 109.

The first step involved using the qualitative coding of all the county plan narratives to create “narrative description arrays.” This was done by comparing the narrative emphasis on programs and services to the narrative emphasis on surveillance and custody—creating a scoring system for the attention paid to certain items in the text of the plans. In the *Programs and Services* category, the scoring system gave credit for the total number of programs and services mentioned in a plan. Plans also received extra weight for five topics: transitional housing, in-depth description of mental health treatment programs, in-depth description of substance abuse programs, specialty courts, and in-depth discussion of education programs. In the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* category, the index also gave plans credit for the total number of surveillance or custody issues mentioned.⁸ Extra weight was also given to five items: the use of law enforcement to supervise post-sentenced offenders, the construction or expansion of jails, creation of a high-risk probation unit for AB 109 offenders, plans to arm probation officers, and the hiring of law enforcement officers. We then adjusted county control orientation index scores with points awarded based on county budget breakdowns. Specifically, we determined the percentile ranks of each county on their *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* and *Programs and Services* spending units, and adjusted the narrative description arrays with points awarded based on each county’s relative rank on these spending units. Full

⁸ There are several limits to the representativeness of the arrays. Limitations of the narrative-only formula include: (1) the plans are an imperfect measure of the actions the counties will actually take, (2) phased-in plans that focused on responding to immediate infrastructure needs likely appeared more surveillance/custody oriented than full plans may end up being, (3) plans that listed a number of items without fully exploring their implementation may have received more weight on either end of the spectrum than they deserved, and (4) jail expansion or building was not necessarily representative of a greater focus on custody; counties who were extremely focused on programs and services, and who traditionally heavily use alternatives to incarceration, could simply have been out of jail space.

details regarding the narrative description array coding formula can be found in Appendix B.

Once we developed a system for rating the control orientation of each county's AB 109 spending plan, we addressed our second major research question: Which counties' spending plans match previous control orientations and which reflect a shift? To answer this question, we developed metrics for rating the pre-AB 109 control orientations of California counties. We rated each county as "low," "medium," or "high" on the following measures:

- Percent of arrested felons convicted, 2009
- Percent of arrested felons incarcerated (prison, jail), 2009
- Percent of convicted felons incarcerated (prison, jail), 2009
- Imprisonments for violent offenses per 1,000 violent felony arrests, 2010
- Imprisonments for property offenses per 1,000 property felony arrests, 2010
- Imprisonments for drug offenses per 1,000 drug felony arrests, 2010

The break points for low, medium, and high ratings were somewhat arbitrary. Essentially, we attempted to split the 58 counties into rough thirds for each measure above. However, we adjusted the break points to account for "natural splits," or places where there was a numeric gap in rates that suggested a break point. Thus, while the low, medium, and high ratings are accurate with regard to each county's rank compared to state averages, they are somewhat subjective. Still, the low, medium, and high ratings reflect each county's preference for conviction or incarceration relative to other counties in California. (See Appendix E.)

After calculating ratings on the six aforementioned measures, we combined them to assign each county an overall low, medium or high control orientation rating. We used the plurality of "lows," "mediums," and "highs" across the six measures to determine the overall ranking. In other words, counties were rated "low control" if three or more ratings were low; they were rated "medium control" if three or more ratings were medium; and they were rated "high control" if three or more ratings were high. In cases where no rating appeared more times than others (i.e., each rating appeared twice), we assigned "medium control."

Unlike a simple measure of overall incarceration preference, this composite measure of county control orientations presents a holistic indication of county preferences for punishment by combining multiple indices. In addition, the measure explicitly captures county control orientations toward offender types that are more likely to be affected by realignment—specifically, property and drug offenders.

Table 1: Pre- and Post- Realignment County “Control” Orientation

	AB 109 Implementation Plans (Control Orientation Index)		
Pre-AB 109 control orientation	<i>Low control orientation</i>	<i>Medium control orientation</i>	<i>High control orientation</i>
<i>Low control orientation</i>	Nevada, San Francisco, Plumas, Santa Cruz, Alameda, Mono, Humboldt, Mendocino, Modoc, Sonoma (10)	Del Norte, Sierra, San Diego (3)	Alpine, Contra Costa, Marin, Calaveras, Imperial (5)
<i>Medium control orientation</i>	Fresno, Mariposa, San Joaquin, Ventura (4)	Los Angeles, Napa, Solano, El Dorado, Inyo, Yuba, Lake, Merced, Sacramento (9)	Glenn, Orange, Stanislaus, Colusa, Placer, San Luis Obispo, San Benito (7)
<i>High control orientation</i>	Monterey, Santa Barbara, San Mateo, Shasta, Santa Clara (5)	Tuolumne, Sutter, Trinity, Madera, Amador, Lassen, Riverside, Tehama, Yolo (9)	Kings, San Bernardino, Siskiyou, Tulare, Butte, Kern (6)

Whether small counties are included or not, Table 1 suggests that there is no clear correlation between pre-AB 109 control orientation and the control orientation of AB 109 spending plans. Some counties maintained their pre-AB 109 orientations while others seem to have shifted their priorities.

At this initial stage of analysis, we could characterize the five counties that fall into the box designated pre-AB 109 “high control” and post-AB 109 “low control” as the poster counties for Realignment (highlighted in red in Table 1). These counties (Monterey, Santa Barbara, San Mateo, Shasta, and Santa Clara Counties) had adopted more punitive approaches prior to AB 109 (defined basically as sentencing a higher proportion of convicted felons to incarceration), but emphasized treatment programs in their spending plans. Five other counties displayed a relatively light emphasis on punishment before AB 109, but their spending plans emphasize more control-oriented approaches (highlighted in blue in Table 1). It also bears mentioning that for almost half of the counties (25), pre-AB 109 control orientations “matched” the control orientations in their spending plans.

While the results shown in Table 1 are not the product of controlled statistical analyses, they provide background and context for the more advanced analyses that follow, which explain counties' AB 109 funding choices by identifying economic, political, and crime and justice-related factors that are associated with particular spending priorities.

Here, we must emphasize that Table 1 categorizes counties according to the narrative weight they placed on control or treatment in their spending plans, with adjustments made based on their first year AB 109 budgets. In some cases, findings from the narrative descriptions did not match up well with the budget data. Counties might emphasize control in the narrative but treatment in the budget (or vice versa). Thus, there is some amount of "noise" in these data as a result of these differential emphases. Moreover, this rubric only represents analyses of first year AB 109 spending plans. Counties' spending in subsequent years may differ significantly from first year spending.

Some of the measures we used to assess pre-AB 109 control orientations were not reliable for the smallest counties because the arrest numbers in these counties were so small. As a result, small county conviction and incarceration rates were subject to substantial statistical noise and the low, medium or high ratings assigned to them are somewhat questionable. Given that, we urge caution when interpreting the position of counties with fewer than 500 felony arrests in 2009. These counties are Alpine, Amador, Calaveras, Colusa, Del Norte, Glenn, Inyo, Lake, Lassen, Mariposa, Modoc, Mono, Plumas, Sierra, Siskiyou, Trinity, and Tuolumne.

Quantitative and Comparative County Budget Analyses

Explaining County Spending: Background Literature

While measuring and classifying county AB 109 spending patterns is useful, explaining why counties are investing more heavily in one category over another may contribute more to the ongoing evaluation of Realignment in California. Our aim here was to identify factors that predict greater spending on the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit and greater spending on *Programs and Services* spending unit. Drawing on existing social scientific literature, we developed a series of hypotheses and drew data with which to test these hypotheses using our quantitative county budget data. Broadly, prior research suggests that local spending patterns can be a product of factors relating

to politics, economic conditions, and local needs (see Hajnal and Trounstine 2010).⁹ We explain each of these categories in more detail below and discuss the types of data we have compiled to test relevant hypotheses.

Our hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. While they are, in a sense, “competing” against one another, they may also function in a complementary fashion. Predictive factors may combine and interact so that particular factors explain some amount of county spending, and taken together, multiple factors may contribute to a broader understanding of spending patterns. The effect of some factors may be conditional on the presence or absence of others. Our analytical goal in this project is to determine which factors matter, which do not, how much each matters, and the environmental context in which they matter.

Political Factors: Pluralism and Racial Threat

One perspective that emerges from political science scholarship suggests that officials need public support in order to govern, so they are generally responsive to local political climates (Dahl 1961; Donovan and Neiman 1992; Goetz 1994; Meier, Stewart, and England 1991). In other words, decision makers must be attuned to the pluralistic needs of their constituencies. Thus officials are more “successful” when their decisions are in line with public preferences. Local spending decisions, therefore, will be reflective of local political environments. In prior research, the local political environment is typically characterized by its preference for Democratic or Republican candidates and policies—in other words, how liberal or conservative local beliefs appear to be (Goetz 1994; Hajnal and Trounstine 2010).

Scholars have hypothesized that Democratic areas will have greater preference for “redistributive” policies that benefit the disadvantaged, while Republican areas will have greater preference for “development” policies that make areas more attractive to capital investment (Hajnal and Trounstine 2010; Peterson 1981; Stein 1990). In terms of Realignment spending, then, we would expect more Democratic areas to pursue greater investments in treatment, programs, and services, and Republican areas to pursue greater investments in surveillance and control. The political pluralism literature indicates that a treatment and service emphasis aligns with the redistributive ideal of assisting the disadvantaged, while a control and surveillance emphasis aligns with the developmental ideal of protecting capital interests from threats like crime.

⁹ Existing scholarship also suggests that local institutional structures may affect spending (see Hajnal and Trounstine 2010). Thus, conditions such as the city manager form of government (as opposed to mayor and council), at-large elections, non-partisan elections, and term limits can shape public priorities. We have not drawn appropriate data with which to test hypotheses related to these factors.

A related area of research revolves around the idea of “racial threat.” Those working in this area generally hypothesize that communities will be inclined toward punitive approaches to crime when minority populations are large and threatening (Britt 2000; Carmichael 2005; Crawford, Chricos, and Kleck 1998; Jacobs and Carmichael 2004; Lin, Grattet, and Petersilia 2010; Liska 1992). Harsh anti-crime policies are an efficient, popular response to problems that are actually quite complicated and difficult to address. Such policies translate well into the media and effectively tap the cognitive connection between threatening minority populations and crime. Prior tests of racial threat include the size of black or Hispanic populations as predictors of punishment policies and practices, hypothesizing that larger minority populations will be associated with harsher punishment overall (Britt 2000; Lin, Grattet, and Petersilia 2010; Ulmer and Johnson 2004). Racial threat can also extend beyond simple measures of population size and include more precise indicators of “threat” such as minority unemployment rates, poverty, and use of public assistance (Britt 2000).

Applying such thinking to Realignment spending, we compiled the following data to characterize the local political environment:

- The percentage of voters registered as Republicans or Democrats. (Source: California Secretary of State)
- The political parties of the current Sheriff and District Attorney, and the percentage of the votes they received in the last election. (Source: California Secretary of State)
- Expenditures for sheriff, 2000-2009. (Source: Data provided by David Ball and California Attorney General).
- Operational expenditures for the District Attorney’s Office, 2010. (Source: RAND)
- Voting outcomes on all state ballot propositions relating to criminal justice issues between 1978 and 2010. We use these to create county-level indices of public preferences for criminal justice approaches that generally favor treatment or control. (Source: California Secretary of State)

To characterize the amount of racial threat in each county, we have drawn U.S. Census data that reflect:

- Demographic breakdowns of county residents, including percent black race and percent Hispanic ethnicity. (Source: U.S. Census)
- The unemployment rate in each county, broken down by race and ethnicity. (Source: U.S. Census)
- The percent of persons living below poverty in each county, broken down by race and ethnicity. (Source: U.S. Census)

Economic Resources and Competition

An alternative to the political/pluralism perspective is an economic perspective rooted in the idea that localities compete for “mobile capital”—business investments that can choose where they distribute their operational assets (Dye 1987; Hajnal and Trounstein 2010; Minkoff 2009; Peterson 1981). In order to avoid socioeconomic decline, localities must make social and economic environments attractive to the needs of business interests. Thus, officials will be open to investing in services for the disadvantaged when such investments will not hinder business interests. Redistributive spending—the type that helps the disadvantaged—will mainly be emphasized in areas with surplus money to spend. In strained economic environments, developmental spending (that which helps business interests) will be emphasized because a receptive business environment is expected to generate more county revenue.

In terms of Realignment spending, we expect that treatment and service spending would be suppressed by economic hardship. Economically strained counties will not want to dissuade capital investment by emphasizing service provision for the disadvantaged (i.e., offenders). Instead, economically strained counties will focus on surveillance and punishment spending that underscores the goal of keeping the community—and the businesses contained therein—safe. However, we expect to see greater enthusiasm for treatment and service spending in economically healthy counties with budget surpluses, and a relative de-emphasis on surveillance and control.

To test these economic spending hypotheses, we have compiled data on the fiscal/economic health of California counties, including:

- Standard and Poor’s credit rating and outlook for each county. (Source: Standard and Poor’s)
- Annual county revenues and expenditures, 2000-2010. (Source: Standard and Poor’s)
- Amount of long-term debt in each county, 2000-2010. (Source: Standard and Poor’s)
- Expenditures for police, sheriff, all law enforcement, all custody and supervision, 2000-9. (Source: Data provided by David Ball and California Attorney General)
- Operational expenditures for detention, juvenile detention, probation, the District Attorney’s office, public defenders, and trial courts in each county, 2010. (Source: RAND)
- Spending on drug abuse services, medical care, mental health, and public health, 2010. (Source: RAND)
- Number of county psychiatric, rehabilitative, and hospital beds, 2010. (Source: RAND)

Local Needs: Crime Rates and Offender Populations

In addition to political and economic factors, spending can be shaped by local needs. According to one perspective, local governments operate in a technically efficient manner, distributing resources and services to those parties most in need (Boyle and Jacobs 1982; Feiock and West 1993; Hajnal and Trounstein 2010; Lineberry 1977). Policymaking, therefore, is viewed fundamentally as a rational, apolitical process. In terms of Realignment spending, the most important local needs revolve around crime and punishment. Following the local needs theory, officials will do what they think is best to suppress crime and to maintain the capacity of local justice institutions to deal with crime and offender populations. This view also suggests that the relationship between system capacity and crime would be important to Realignment spending decisions. Thus, counties with strained justice institutions (i.e., police, detention, courts) are expected to use their Realignment monies to shore up those institutions, especially if these counties have high crime rates. Counties in which justice institutions are not strained are expected to devote a greater share of Realignment money to treatment and services, especially if those counties have low crime rates.

To test hypotheses related to local needs, we have drawn data about crime rates, offender populations, and the capacities of local justice institutions. To characterize county-level crime conditions, we have compiled the following data:

- Annual arrest data, 2001-2010, by county, by year, for various offense types. These numbers can be combined with U.S. Census data to calculate county-level arrest rates. (Source: California Attorney General, Criminal Justice Statistics Center)
- Serious (Part I) crime rate per 100,000 residents, 2010. (Source: California Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice)
- Dispositions of all arrests, by county, in 2009. (Source: California Attorney General, Criminal Justice Statistics Center)
- Number of parole violators returned to custody in 2000-2009. (Source: David Ball)
- Number of new felon admissions to prison in 2000-2009. (Source: David Ball)
- Number of released parolees classified as “high risk,” 2006-2009. (Source: California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)
- Number of mentally ill parolees in each county in 2012. (Source: California Mental Health Directors Association)
- Recidivism statistics for the cohort of parolees released from prison between 2006 and 2009, by county. These data record baseline characteristics of released parolees, and track their recidivism after release, including the way in which they return to prison and the length of time spent in the community before return. (Source: California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

To characterize the capacity of local justice institutions, we have compiled the following data:

- Number of criminal justice personnel in each county, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2010—broken down by police, sheriff, custody/supervision, and other personnel. We use these data to calculate metrics such as “officers per 100,000 residents” and “percent change in law enforcement personnel over time.” (Source: California Attorney General’s Office, Criminal Justice Statistics Center)
- Average daily jail population, 2011. Jail rates per 1,000 felony arrests with demographic breakdowns. Jailed population as a percentage of capacity. (Source: Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, 2011).
- Imprisonment rates per 1,000 felony arrests with demographic and charge breakdowns, 2010. (Source: Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, 2011).
- Annual costs of imprisonment, 2010. (Source: Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, 2011).

Outcome of Interest: Bivariate Analyses of Realignment Spending Classifications

To test the relationships between counties’ AB 109 budget allocations and the potential associated factors described in the previous section, we conducted a series of bivariate correlation analyses, which assess the strength and reliability of associations between continuous variables like those we have in our dataset. We correlate variables representing the potential predictive factors described in the previous section with our variables representing budgets for counties’ *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* and *Programs and Services* spending units.

Counties allocate more to their *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending units when:

- Law enforcement expenditures are higher relative to other counties.
- Sheriff expenditures are higher relative to other counties.
- The imprisonment rate for drug felonies is higher.
- The serious (Part I) crime rate is higher.
- The county has a relatively high number of full-time law enforcement personnel.
- The county has recently gained a relatively large number of law enforcement personnel.
- The concentration of high risk parolees is lower.
- The drug offense arrest rate is lower.

Counties allocate more to their *Programs and Services* spending units when:

- The sheriff has received more electoral support.
- The Black unemployment rate is higher.
- District attorney expenditures are lower.
- Probation expenditures are lower.

Statistically significant relationships of interest are shown in Table 2 below, which displays correlation coefficients and statistical significance levels.¹⁰

¹⁰ We ran correlations between all independent variables and the four versions of our spending unit variables described earlier in this document. Results were highly consistent across both sets of four spending unit variables. See Appendix D for details.

Table 2: Statistically Significant Bivariate Correlation Results

	<i>Conceptual area</i>	<i>Sheriff and Law Enforcement Spending</i>		<i>Programs and Services Spending</i>
% Sheriff election, 2010	Political (pluralism)	-0.17		0.39***
% Black unemployment, 2010	Political (racial threat)	0.04		0.31**
Law enforcement expenditure per 1,000 residents, 2007	Economic, local needs	0.27**		-0.17
Sheriff expenditure per 1,000 residents, 2007	Political (pluralism), local needs	0.26*		-0.16
District Attorney expenditure per 1,000 residents, 2010	Political (pluralism), economic	0.05		-0.25*
Imprisonments for drug offenses per 1,000 felony drug arrests, 2010	Local needs	0.33***		-0.15
Serious (Part I) crime rate per 100,000 residents, 2010	Local needs	0.29**		0.01
Law enforcement full-time personnel per 100,000 residents, 2010	Local needs	0.23*		-0.13
% change in full-time law enforcement personnel, 2005-2010	Local needs	0.24*		-0.16
Probation expenditure per 1,000 residents, 2010	Economic, local needs	0.21		-0.22*
High-risk parolee concentration, 2006-2009	Local needs	-0.25*		-0.06
Drug offense arrests per 1,000 residents, 2010	Local needs	-0.22*		0.11

* $p \leq .10$; ** $p \leq .05$; *** $p \leq .01$

The findings related to sheriff election percentages are the opposite of what we would expect. The pluralism literature would suggest that elected officials with higher levels of

public support would be freer to pursue their own interests. Thus, counties in which the sheriff enjoyed a higher percentage of the vote would be expected to devote more resources to the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit. They do not. Instead, these counties devote a higher percentage of their AB 109 budgets to the *Programs and Services* spending unit. Perhaps key law enforcement officials in these counties feel liberated by public support to pursue programs that meet the intended goals of Realignment, instead of feeling the need to curry favor with the public by shoring up enforcement apparatuses.

The black unemployment percentage variable is also associated with our spending unit variables in ways that we did not expect. Counties with higher black unemployment rates do not tend to spend more on *Sheriff and Law Enforcement*, as would be predicted by the racial threat hypothesis. Instead, they tend to spend more on *Programs and Services*. This suggests black unemployment may be better categorized as a local need than a facet of racial threat. That is, instead of feeling politically threatened by high unemployment among disadvantaged populations, criminal justice leaders may respond to high black unemployment (or other social conditions this indicator may proxy) by seeking to reduce it through added services that address some of the underlying causes of those conditions.

The findings addressing law enforcement and sheriff expenditures are in line with what we would expect based on the literature related to economics and local needs. Counties that spent more per resident on law enforcement and the sheriff in 2007 planned to use more of their AB 109 funds on the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit. In other words, higher spending on law enforcement before AB 109 relative to other counties is associated with higher spending on law enforcement after AB 109 relative to other counties. In terms of economics, higher law enforcement and sheriff spending prior to Realignment relative to other counties could signal a local emphasis on public safety, which might reflect the importance of protecting capital interests from threats like crime. This pattern may also be reflective of local needs. If a county exhibits social or economic conditions that signal a need for high law enforcement spending, we can expect that county to continue channeling AB 109 funds in that direction. On the other hand, the pattern could also be the result of policy and organizational momentum—counties simply doing what they have already been doing. Placer County, for example, exhibited significantly higher-than-average spending on law enforcement and the sheriff before AB 109 relative to other counties and rates as one of the most enforcement-oriented counties in terms of its planned AB 109 spending.¹¹ In its AB 109 spending plan, Placer County

¹¹ Out of 58 total counties, Placer County ranked 24th in pre-AB 109 law enforcement spending, 21st in pre-AB 109 sheriff spending, and 9th in its planned AB 109 spending on the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit.

states that it “remains committed to incarceration of criminal offenders” and that “incapacitation is the surest short term way to prevent recidivism.”

The findings related to district attorney expenditures partially support political hypotheses linked to pluralism. Counties that spent more on their district attorneys (per resident) allocated less of their AB 109 funds to the *Programs and Services* spending unit. District attorneys are elected officials, responsive to the preferences of their constituents, and they are typically on the side of increased punishment and decreased emphasis on treatment. Thus, counties that have shown district attorneys relative financial favor in the past are expected to allocate more of their AB 109 budgets to *Sheriff and Law Enforcement*. We do not find this relationship in the data. However, we do find that counties with higher district attorney spending allocate less of their AB 109 budgets to *Programs and Services*, so the tendency toward less treatment support is observed in the data. This de-emphasis of treatment in counties with higher district attorney spending may also reflect economic priorities, as higher district attorney spending signals a focus on punishment and control over treatment—possibly as a response to the public safety needs of local economic interests.

Higher likelihood of imprisonment for drug offenses is correlated with enforcement spending. Counties that are more likely to imprison drug offenders allocate more of their AB 109 budgets to the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit. These choices could reflect local needs, as these counties may be dealing with tougher populations of drug offenders who will, after Realignment, have to be controlled locally. Therefore, the allocation of AB 109 money to enforcement and surveillance may be a rational and expected response to these anticipated changes. Local culture and politics may also matter. The association we observe between drug imprisonment rates and enforcement spending may reflect a local political preference for punishment over treatment for these types of offenders. On the other end of the spectrum, the serious (Part I) crime rate per 100,000 residents is also correlated with higher *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending relative to other counties, lending support to the local needs argument. More serious crime signals a need for more law enforcement spending.

Local needs may also be reflected in the correlation between law enforcement personnel and allocating more AB 109 funds to the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit. Having more full-time law enforcement personnel in 2010 is correlated to higher AB 109 spending on *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* relative to other counties. Similarly, a greater percentage increase in full time law enforcement personnel between 2005 and 2010 is also correlated to higher AB 109 spending on *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* relative to other counties. While these findings are reflective of local needs, they are not exactly what we would expect. We anticipated that counties with more strained law enforcement institutions (fewer officers, greater loss of officers between 2005 and 2010) would allocate

more AB 109 funds to their *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending units, but the opposite turned out to be true. This raises two possibilities. First, counties with more full-time law enforcement personnel in 2010 and those that gained more law enforcement personnel between 2005 and 2010 were/are merely responding to increasing crime in their counties, and choose to allocate more AB 109 funds to law enforcement because they are trying to keep pace with local crime issues. Second, law enforcement spending may simply be reflective of local political (pluralistic) priorities. In other words, counties that have tended to spend more on law enforcement in the past are inclined to use Realignment funds on law enforcement because of local preferences.

Some of our correlation findings are difficult to contextualize using our conceptual hypotheses related to politics, economics, and local needs. For example, counties with higher probation expenditures per resident in 2010 allocate less of their AB 109 funds to their *Programs and Services* spending units. Probation conceptually straddles the line between enforcement and treatment, as both of these functions are central to its mission. Probation departments identify behaviors (i.e., violations) that could signal public safety threat and have the power to incapacitate probationers through revocation and custody. At the same time, probation departments serve as an access point to needed services—and often mandate participation in those services as part of the probation term. Counties with higher pre-Realignment probation spending relative to other counties may feel that they have already devoted resources to treatment through their probation departments, and thus may elect to use more of their AB 109 funds on enforcement.

Having a higher concentration of high-risk parolees is correlated with less allocation of AB 109 funds to the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit. Similarly, more drug offense arrests are also correlated to less allocation to the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit. From local needs, we would expect the opposite—that more high-risk parolees and more drug arrests would correlate to more *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending. Perhaps counties that rate highly on these indices are turning away from enforcement approaches and embracing treatment philosophies. Or, counties that rate high on these indices may exhibit pluralistic preferences toward treatment because of underlying political ideologies. To this point, many of the most famously liberal/progressive counties in the state rate above average on drug arrests, including Los Angeles, Alameda, Santa Cruz, and San Francisco Counties. Similarly, in terms of high-risk parolee concentration, San Francisco County ranks first, Alameda County ranks third, and Santa Clara County ranks fourth.

While the independent variables described above were significantly correlated with our spending unit variables, other possible independent predictors of interest were not. Below, we list these unrelated variables.

- Percent registered Republican voters, 2010
- Percent registered Democratic voters, 2010
- District Attorney election percentage, 2010
- Relative punishment-orientation of proposition ballot voting (initiative composite index)
- Percent white residents, 2010
- Percent black residents, 2010
- Percent Hispanic/Latino residents, 2010
- Percent Hispanic/Latino residents who are unemployed, 2010
- Unemployment rate, 2010
- Percent below poverty, 2010
- Percent of residents with college degree, 2006-2010 (average)
- Homeownership rate, 2006-2010 (average)
- Median household income, 2006-2010 (average)
- Standard and Poor's credit rating, 2010
- Revenue per 1,000 residents, 2010
- Long-term debt per 100,000 residents, 2010
- Police expenditures per 1,000 residents, 2007
- Total custody and supervision expenditure per 1,000 residents, 2007
- Operational expenditures on adult detention per 1,000 residents, 2007
- Operational expenditures on detention and corrections per 1,000 residents, 2007
- Operational expenditures on public defender per 1,000 residents, 2007
- Operational expenditures on drug abuse services per 1,000 residents, 2010
- Operational expenditures on mental health services per 1,000 residents, 2010
- Operational expenditures on public health services per 1,000 residents, 2010
- Total adult felony arrests per 1,000 residents, 2010
- Violent offense arrests per 1,000 residents, 2010
- Property offense arrests per 1,000 residents, 2010
- Sex offense arrests per 1,000 residents, 2010
- Concentration of parolees at high risk for property crime, 2006-2009
- Concentration of parolees at risk for violent crime, 2006-2009
- Percent of arrested felons imprisoned, 2009
- Imprisonments for violent offenses per 1,000 violent felony arrests, 2010
- Imprisonments for property offenses per 1,000 violent felony arrests, 2010
- Percent of adult felons imprisoned divided by the serious (Part I) crime rate, 2010
- Percent of adult felons imprisoned divided by the concentration of high-risk parolees
- Percent of new felon admissions to prison, 2010
- Percent of parole violators returned to custody, 2010
- Concentration of high-risk parolees (2006-2009) divided by law enforcement personnel (2010)
- Jail overcrowding

Outcome of Interest: Qualitative Comparative Analyses of County Realignment Spending

The potential explanatory factors identified in our bivariate analyses above guide a series of more advanced analyses of Realignment spending. Correlated factors are not necessarily in competition; different factors may each partially explain county spending tendencies. Examining them together produces more complete, nuanced findings. Moreover, the factors may be conditional or interactive. That is, some may only matter if others are present (or not present). With a large number of counties to analyze (i.e., hundreds), we would be inclined to apply standard multivariate statistical methods to our data such as logistic or linear regression. However, given that there are only 58 counties in California, multivariate approaches would not be very effective due to the limited sample size. Specifically, we would be restricted in the number of predictors we could include in a model, and statistical significance would be difficult to determine.

To suit the unique nature of our data, we apply Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), a method designed to identify explanatory factors in highly detailed, small-N datasets such as ours (Ragin 1987, 2000, 2008). Because the level of detail in these data permits extremely nuanced assessments of interval-level (i.e., continuous) predictor variables, these are sometimes called “fuzzy datasets.”¹² This method is often used to test relationships in geographically limited samples, such as groups of nations, states, or counties. QCA applies Boolean algebraic principles in order to determine how different factors combine and interact to explain outcomes of interest such as governmental spending decisions. For our project, counties are classified according to their relative emphasis on their *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* and *Programs and Services* spending units. We then assess the presence, absence, and relative strength of the possible predictive factors identified in our bivariate analyses. The data are “simplified” through Boolean logic in order to identify the critical conditions that explain spending patterns. This process lines up outcomes of interest against the relative presence or absence of predictive factors (Ragin 1987, 2008; Ragin and Sonnett 2005). The data are reduced algorithmically by comparing all possible configurations of factors and determining the explanatory importance of each. This reduction identifies combinations of explanatory factors that best characterize clusters of counties that are similar in terms of their spending patterns. The two spending patterns we seek to explain are:

- High spending on the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit relative to other counties.

¹² Datasets that are comprised of dichotomous variables are called “crisp datasets.”

- High spending on the *Programs and Services* spending unit relative to other counties.

QCA is possible to execute by hand, but it is much easier to do by using specially developed software called *fs/QCA* (Ragin, Drass, and Davey 2006). The software is freely available for download (<http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml>). We have entered all of our data into *fs/QCA* version 2.5 and conducted comparative county-level analyses as described in the following sections.


Explaining Large Investments in the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* Spending Unit

Our comparative analyses in *fs/QCA* use identified bivariate relationships as a starting point. QCA involves an iterative process in which variables are tested and re-tested in various combinations. Over time, this process yields a “solution” in which subgroups of cases display commonalities that are empirically valid and substantively logical (i.e., the findings “make sense” in terms of existing knowledge). In trying to explain spending on counties’ *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending units, we ultimately focused on variables reflecting law enforcement expenditures (2007), law enforcement personnel concentration (2010), change in full-time law enforcement personnel from 2005-2010, drug arrests (2010), imprisonments for drug offenses (2010), and the serious (Part I) crime rate (2010). We dropped the variable capturing sheriff expenditures (2007) because it is a component part of the broader variable capturing law enforcement expenditures. We also dropped the variable capturing the concentration of high-risk parolees because it did not add much to the QCA solutions. We must note here that this variable displayed an unexpected negative correlation to *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending,¹³ which may be why it did not contribute significantly to the QCA analysis.

Below, we describe four clusters of counties that tend to devote more of their AB 109 budgets to the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit. In *fs/QCA*, these clusters have an overall solution coverage of 0.48 and a consistency of 0.79. The four clusters and their similar and dissimilar tendencies are depicted in Figure 3.

¹³ Correlation results around the high risk parolee concentration variable were also inconsistent across our four sets of dependent variables, casting some doubt on its validity. See Appendix D.

Figure 3: Factors Explaining AB 109 County Spending on *Sheriff and Law Enforcement*



Enforcement Cluster 1: Counties that Need More Law Enforcement Resources

Characteristics of counties in enforcement cluster 1: They have a low drug arrest rate, a low number of law enforcement personnel, and low law enforcement expenditures. (Coverage: 0.23; Consistency: 0.78)

Counties in this cluster do not have a high rate of drug arrests, and they have not, in recent times, invested much in law enforcement personnel. They tend to rate below average on number of full-time law enforcement personnel per resident and law enforcement expenditures per resident. In other words, they have not heavily focused economic resources on law enforcement compared to other counties. Thus, they appear to be using AB 109 funds to strengthen these enforcement apparatuses.

The counties that best fit this characterization are Butte, El Dorado, Kings, Nevada, and San Benito Counties. Table 3 below displays the relative rank of each of these counties (out of 58 total counties) on their allocated budgets to *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending units, alongside their relative ranks on drug arrests, full-time law enforcement personnel, and change in full-time law enforcement personnel.

Table 3: Relative Ranks of Counties on Key Variables of Interest (Enforcement Cluster 1)*

County	Allocation to AB 109 <i>Sheriff and Law Enforcement</i> spending unit	Drug arrests (2010)	Full-time law enforcement personnel (2010)	Law enforcement expenditures (2007)
Butte	6	32	53	50
El Dorado	23	50	52	43
Kings	2	53	56	55
Nevada	11	34	49	39
San Benito	19	57	43	53

*Rank out of 58 total counties

Each of these counties ranks above average on allocation to their *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending units, and they rate substantially below average on the independent variables that explain these allocations—drug arrests, full-time law enforcement personnel, and law enforcement expenditures. This cluster illustrates a pattern in which counties with low rates of drug crime appear to dedicate more AB 109 funds to law enforcement because of their local need for more law enforcement personnel—perhaps in response to changes that Realignment will have on local offender populations.

To that point, some police departments in California have reported that property crimes—particularly auto thefts— have been increasing since Realignment went into effect. To them, this correlates to the Realignment of non-serious, non-violent, non-sexual offenders (“non-non-nons”) to county supervision, since a substantial number of these offenders specialize in property crime (Butler, unpublished student paper). Numerous county plans that we have read, including those from Nevada, El Dorado, and San Benito Counties, explicitly cite rising crime as justification for more allocation to law enforcement or jails. For these counties, increased allocation to their *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending units appears to emerge from Realignment-related crime problems they are anticipating (and beginning to deal with), and the limited abilities of local law enforcement agencies to manage these problems with available resources. Police have also expressed concerns about the perceived legitimacy of their departments if they prove unable to effectively respond to crime problems or appropriately punish offenders.

Enforcement Cluster 2: Control-oriented Counties that Need More Law Enforcement Officers

Characteristics of counties in enforcement cluster 2: They have a low drug arrest rate but a high imprisonment rate for drug crimes. They have recently gained a relatively large number of law enforcement personnel but are still without a high number of law enforcement personnel overall. (Coverage: 0.20; Consistency: 0.80)

These counties also have a low drug arrest rate and relatively few full-time law enforcement personnel. However, they are also characterized by a high preference for prison for drug crimes. These counties have also made gains in law enforcement personnel in recent years. This cluster appears related to cluster 1, and indeed, two of the same counties are found in both clusters—Butte and San Benito Counties. (This is not unusual in QCA, in which a county may exhibit an array of characteristics that place it in multiple clusters.) Counties in both cluster 1 and cluster 2 have relatively low drug arrest rates and they both exhibit a need for more law enforcement personnel. The counties in cluster 2 have made efforts in recent years to shore up law enforcement personnel, but still seem to need more, as they continue to rate below average in terms of numbers of law enforcement personnel. The movement towards more law enforcement may also be contextualized by the counties’ overall punishment orientations, especially toward drug crimes, and perhaps the anticipated changes in crime patterns and offender populations that Realignment will bring. Importantly, drug and property offenders are expected to comprise a substantial proportion of the realigned population (see Baca and Cooper 2013). Thus, counties that practice more aggressive drug prosecutions should expect to invest more resources on local control and enforcement because many of these offenders will be supervised locally under Realignment instead of at the state level.

The counties that best fit this characterization are Butte, Placer, Riverside, and San Benito Counties. Table 4 below displays the relative rank of each of these counties on their allocated budgets to *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending units, alongside their relative ranks on drug arrests, full-time law enforcement personnel, change in full-time law enforcement personnel, and drug crime imprisonment rate.

Table 4: Relative Ranks of Counties on Key Variables of Interest (Enforcement Cluster 2)*

County	Allocation to AB 109 <i>Sheriff and Law Enforcement</i> spending unit	Drug arrests (2010)	Full-time law enforcement personnel (2010)	Change in full-time law enforcement personnel (2005-2010)	Drug crime imprisonment rate (2010)
Butte	6	32	53	24	5
Placer	9	40	54	32	23
Riverside	20	43	45	9	10
San Benito	19	57	43	1	7

*Rank out of 58 total counties

This cluster reinforces the finding that counties with relatively low rates of drug crime dedicate more AB 109 funds to law enforcement because of the local need for more law enforcement personnel. Placer County’s County Corrections Partnership (CCP) plan echoes this general argument:

The CCP is also concerned that the State of California has significantly underestimated the population to be realigned to the County, the impact on the crime rate as a result of the realignment and the impact on local law enforcement agencies. Therefore the funding is disproportionate to the task required, which inhibits the CCP from fully providing for realignment within our community consistent with public safety and legislative intent (p. 4).

In this cluster, the need for more law enforcement resources seems also to be influenced by a preference for punishment for drug crimes. These counties are also extending recent additions to full-time law enforcement personnel, so policy momentum may also be a factor.

Wappler (unpublished student paper) interviewed California sheriffs about Realignment, finding that counties with less aggressive drug prosecutions (e.g., Alameda, San Francisco Counties) seem to have more available jail space, making for a smoother transition to Realignment. Counties like the ones found in this cluster, on the other hand, prosecute drugs crimes aggressively, indicating the need for more enforcement and control

resources because many of these offenders will now be held and supervised locally. In our analyses, we did not find jail overcrowding to be associated with greater allocation to the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit. However, this may be because of the lagged nature of the data. Put simply, prior jail overcrowding may matter less to key officials than anticipated overcrowding, which is more difficult to measure.

Enforcement Cluster 3: Control-oriented Counties with Serious Crime Problems that Need More Law Enforcement Officers

Characteristics of counties in enforcement cluster 3: They have a low drug arrest rate but a high imprisonment rate for drug crimes. They have a high rate of serious crime, and a low number of law enforcement personnel. (Coverage: 0.23; Consistency: 0.77)

The counties in cluster 3, like those in clusters 1 and 2, also have low drug arrest rates and a relatively low number of full-time law enforcement personnel. Cluster 3 counties also exhibit a high preference for prison for drug crimes (like cluster 2). Cluster 3 is differentiated from the first two by high rates of serious crime. Thus, decisions to allocate more AB 109 funds to *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending units are shaped by local needs for more law enforcement officers, as well as preference for prison in drug cases and a local environment in which serious crime is a pressing problem. Cluster 3 counties, therefore, exhibit the need for more law enforcement as a response to serious crime, in an environmental context in which punishment is preferred. As Realignment progresses and more offenders are supervised locally, these counties may see this need as one that will grow significantly.

The counties that best fit this characterization are Butte, Riverside, Sacramento, San Benito, San Joaquin, and Solano Counties. Table 5 below displays the relative rank of each of these counties on their allocated budgets to *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending units, alongside their relative ranks on drug arrests, full-time law enforcement personnel, serious crime rate, and drug crime imprisonment rate.

Table 5: Relative Ranks of Counties on Key Variables of Interest (Enforcement Cluster 3)*

County	Allocation to AB 109 <i>Sheriff and Law Enforcement</i> spending unit	Drug arrests (2010)	Full-time law enforcement personnel (2010)	Serious (Part I) crime rate (2010)	Drug crime imprisonment rate (2010)
Butte	6	32	53	25	5
Riverside	20	43	45	22	10
Sacramento	14	31	34	6	20
San Benito	19	57	43	20	7
San Joaquin	32	48	49	2	18
Solano	24	38	55	9	24

*Rank out of 58 total counties

This is the weakest of the three clusters, exhibiting the lowest rate of consistency (0.77). While the included counties rate above average overall on *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* AB 109 allocation, they are not at the top of the range for this metric. San Joaquin County actually ranks below average (#32). The predictor variables are more consistent, but still show significant rank variation. Nevertheless, the findings in this cluster reinforce those from the first two clusters. Law enforcement personnel needs are critically important, especially in local environments where punishment is preferred and serious crime is a relatively large problem.

Qualitative data from key actor interviews and county spending plans support these arguments. San Joaquin County’s spending plan indicates that they are increasing electronic monitoring resources so they can reserve custodial space for more serious criminals. As mentioned earlier, San Benito County’s plan also cites rising crime as justification for allocating more money to *Sheriff and Law Enforcement*. Sacramento County police (specifically, Citrus Heights) are concerned about their ability to respond to crime as it increases because of Realignment. Police in Solano County (specifically, Fairfield) also cite high crime as a reason to hire more officers, anticipating an increase in repeat offenders who will be realigned, and seeking to maintain reasonable police responses to lower level crimes that occur in the community. In fact, a number of police departments in California report decreased capacities to respond to lower level crime (Butler, unpublished student paper). Solano County police are especially concerned about maintaining legitimacy with its constituents under anticipated resource constraints. Not only are police worrying about crime increases, they are also concerned about the added strain of conducting compliance checks on realigned PCRS offenders and probationers. One officer from the Fairfield Police Department said, “You can only

sprint so long before things break and you get hurt” (Butler, unpublished student paper).

The preference for incarceration that these counties display, specifically for drug crimes, means that available jail space may also be a key concern. Keel, Landin, and Warp (unpublished student paper) interviewed California district attorneys and report that prosecutors are sensitive to available jail space, and some prosecutors admit to modifying their charging practices in response to Realignment’s impact on available jail beds. And as discussed above, future jail bed availability may matter as much, if not more, as current availability. Keel et al. quote District Attorney Donald du Bain of Solano County, who acknowledges that although his county has not faced a jail crowding problem yet, “the time will come when [we] will.” Thinking about future law enforcement and correctional needs has led some counties to dedicate more AB 109 money to shoring up enforcement and control resources.

Enforcement Cluster 4: Control-oriented, High crime Counties

Characteristics of counties in enforcement cluster 4: They have a high drug arrest rate, a high imprisonment rate for drug crimes, and a high rate of serious crime. They have recently gained a relatively large number of law enforcement personnel, and have a high number of law enforcement personnel overall. (Coverage: 0.23; Consistency: 0.78)

This cluster differs in that these counties have high arrest rates for drug crimes and a high number of law enforcement personnel—a number that has grown in recent years. They also have a relative preference for imprisonment on drug crimes and face above-average serious crime rates. The counties that best fit this characterization are Kern, Los Angeles, Tehama, Tulare, Yolo, and Yuba Counties. Table 6 below displays the relative rank of each of these counties on their allocated budgets to *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending units, alongside their relative ranks on drug arrests, full-time law enforcement personnel, change in full-time law enforcement personnel, serious crime rate, and drug crime imprisonment rate.

Table 6: Relative Ranks of Counties on Key Variables of Interest (Enforcement Cluster 4)*

County	Allocation to AB 109 <i>Sheriff and Law Enforcement</i> spending unit	Drug arrests (2010)	Full-time law enforcement personnel (2010)	Change in full-time law enforcement personnel (2005-2010)	Serious (Part I) crime rate (2010)	Drug crime imprisonment rate
Kern	22	12	31	2	4	8
Los Angeles	26	26	11	17	19	17
Tehama	27	2	20	31	24	16
Tulare	13	15	17	12	8	19
Yolo	28	25	30	29	29	6
Yuba	17	28	14	28	28	9

*Rank out of 58 total counties

In general, these counties can be characterized as control-oriented high-crime counties because they have high rates of drug and serious crime and have shown themselves to be committed to adding law enforcement personnel. To this point, Leroy Baca and Gerald Cooper of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (2013) report that in the first year after the passage of AB 109, the jail population in Los Angeles County grew from 15,463 inmates to 18,952 inmates—with 5,806 of these inmates sentenced under AB 109. Baca and Cooper further note that drug crimes account for 40% of all local AB 109 sentences. Thus, counties that have a relatively high preference for prison for drug crimes should expect more strain on jail space than counties that do not prosecute drug offenses so aggressively. The decision to allocate relatively large amounts of AB 109 funds to the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit can therefore be seen as a response to local criminal justice needs, as well as a continuation of pre-existing spending preferences and correctional practices.

Explaining Large Investments in the *Programs and Services* Spending Unit

As with our comparative analyses of relatively large county investments in the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit, we use correlated variables as a starting point for our analysis of allocation to counties’ *Programs and Services* spending units. In trying to explain spending on counties’ *Programs and Services* spending units, we ultimately focused on variables reflecting sheriff election percentage (2010), black unemployment (2010), district attorney expenditures (2010), and probation expenditures (2010). Below, we describe two clusters of counties that tend to devote more of their AB 109

budgets to the *Programs and Services* spending unit. Overall, we found allocations to Programs and Services to be more difficult to explain than allocations to *Sheriff and Law Enforcement*. Only four variables correlated to *Programs and Services* spending in our correlation analyses, and we identify only two clusters of counties through QCA (rather than four). In *fs/QCA*, these two clusters have an overall solution coverage of 0.49 and a consistency of 0.81. Figure 4 summarizes the tendencies of the two clusters.

Figure 4: Factors Explaining AB 109 County Spending on *Programs and Services*



Programs Cluster 1: Counties with High Electoral Support for the Sheriff and a High Black Unemployment Rate.

(Coverage: 0.39; Consistency: 0.84)

This cluster reflects a simple combination of two bivariate correlation findings. We find both sheriff election percentage and the black unemployment rate to be positively correlated with *Programs and Services* spending. This QCA result highlights their combined importance. As we discussed in the section describing the correlation results, the sheriff election percentage variable may stand in for public confidence in the sheriff specifically, and law enforcement generally. Such support may liberate officials to pursue treatment programs that are in line with the intended goals of Realignment. The QCA results demonstrate that this is particularly true when black unemployment is high. The black unemployment rate may proxy a range of other issues related to poverty and socioeconomic need. Thus, high confidence in the sheriff’s office may allow key leaders to address those needs in less politically popular ways—i.e., pursuing treatment as a solution to crime problems.

The counties that best fit this characterization are Alameda, Humboldt, Lake, Lassen, Shasta, and Sonoma Counties. Table 7 below displays the relative rank of each of these counties on their allocated budgets to *Programs and Services* spending units, alongside their relative ranks on sheriff election percentage and black unemployment rate. These six counties rate high on *Programs and Services* allocations, and also on the two predictors of interest.

Table 7: Relative Ranks of Counties on Key Variables of Interest (Programs Cluster 1)*

County	Allocation to AB 109 <i>Programs and Services</i> spending unit	Sheriff election percentage (2010)	Black unemployment rate (2010)
Alameda	21	12	11
Humboldt	2	19	17
Lake	1	1 (tie)	5
Lassen	3	1 (tie)	1
Shasta	13	1 (tie)	6
Sonoma	12	16	14

*Rank out of 58 total counties

Sheriffs are widely reporting increased cooperation across departments in county criminal justice systems. In particular, sheriffs report working closely with probation departments to coordinate “warm handoffs” of locally realigned offenders. Feldman

(unpublished student paper) reports that “out of principle or out of necessity, nearly every Sheriff we interviewed has bought in to the rehabilitative purpose of realignment.” Realignment has also broadened the role of Sheriffs and made more explicit their role in treatment provision. Sheriffs are now responsible for:

- Reconsidering pretrial release and electronic monitoring policies for the pretrial and post-release supervision populations.
- Adapting jail operations to handle an increased number of inmates and the attendant strain on resources, notably in the area of health care and mental health care.
- Considering increases in and diversification of targeted programming options aimed at reducing recidivism and promoting rehabilitation, given that locally realigned inmates would now be spending a longer time in jail.
- Working with prosecutors and judges to implement and take advantage of split sentencing.
- Coordinating with each county’s probation department to determine mandatory supervision strategies.
- Developing, implementing, and measuring evidenced-based practices meant to achieve and optimize other goals (Wappler, unpublished student paper).

The findings around this cluster of counties suggests that Sheriffs with more electoral support may feel more liberated to pursue programmatic goals over enforcement goals, especially in counties with particularly disadvantaged communities of color—which may proxy programmatic need in offender populations. Curtis Hill, the former President of the California States Sheriff’s Association, who also worked as a legislative representative in helping to get AB 109 passed, noted:

That is because [Sheriffs] are independently elected and don’t have to wait around to get approval on the concept of where they want to go with their Board ... once they decide the concept they will need to get the board to approve the funding system at the local level ... Sheriffs were aggressively looking for answers in this area ... prior to Realignment...now [there is a] statutory mechanism that gives them credibility at the local level to go before their boards and say that [they] can do this better than the state. (Wappler, unpublished student paper).

Santa Barbara County Sheriff Bill Brown echoes this idea, focusing more on the expectation that Realignment would force sheriffs to change priorities and the goals of custody:

Despite all of [Realignment’s] challenges ... From my perspective at least, AB 109 is really a sea change in how we’re doing business in the criminal justice system. It

not only has potential for positive change at the state level with prison reform but at the county level too because it's forced [sheriffs] to really reexamine [the] overall system and how [sheriffs] can best achieve results with limited resources. (Wappler, unpublished student paper).

Thus, it seems that sheriffs who enjoy more public confidence can pursue complex strategies that align more closely with the legislative intent of AB 109, especially in counties with particularly disadvantaged communities of color. In addition, many of the counties in this cluster are small counties, where institutional and political environments may not be as much of a hindrance as in larger counties.

Programs Cluster 2: Counties with High Electoral Support for the Sheriff, Low District Attorney Expenditures, and Low Probation Expenditures.

(Coverage: 0.36; Consistency: 0.84)

This cluster reflects a combination of bivariate correlation findings related to sheriff election percentage, district attorney expenditures, and probation expenditures. As with cluster 1, public support of the sheriff is critical. Counties in which sheriffs enjoy high levels of electoral support again tend to spend more on their *Programs and Services* spending units. This cluster is differentiated from cluster 1 in that here, Sheriff electoral support is combined with relatively low expenditures on the district attorney and probation. The effect of district attorney spending levels may reflect relatively light emphasis on prosecution and punishment, and perhaps by extension, more openness to treatment approaches as solutions to crime. As we discussed in our bivariate findings, probation conceptually straddles the line between treatment and enforcement, as it entails elements of each. The finding that lower probation expenditures correlate to higher allocation to *Programs and Services* relative to other counties may indicate that counties generally view probation as a vehicle for treatment, and when expenditures in this area are relatively low, this signals a need for more treatment in criminal justice practice—especially when the county sheriff has high public support and the district attorney's office is not highly funded.

Counties in this cluster include Alameda, Shasta, and Tehama Counties. Table 8 below displays the relative rank of each of these counties on their allocated budgets to *Programs and Services* spending units, alongside their relative ranks on sheriff election percentage, district attorney expenditures, and probation expenditures.

Table 8: Relative Ranks of Counties on Key Variables of Interest (Programs Cluster 2)*

County	Allocation to AB 109 <i>Programs and Services</i> spending unit	Sheriff election percentage (2010)	District attorney expenditures (2010)	Probation expenditures (2010)
Alameda	21	12	36	36
Shasta	13	1 (tie)	40	43
Tehama	11	17	48	33

*Rank out of 58 total counties

This cluster is very similar to cluster 1. Alameda and Shasta Counties fall into both clusters. The key variable is sheriff election percentage. When sheriffs enjoy widespread public support, counties trend towards more allocation to their *Programs and Services* spending units, especially if the black unemployment rate is high, or district attorney and probation expenditures are low. Alameda and Shasta Counties fit both of these models.

Interviews with key officials suggest that the effect of low district attorney expenditures on programs spending may reflect philosophical and practical concerns. Philosophically, the district attorney represents a county’s interests in protecting public safety by punishing and incapacitating offenders. District attorneys in California note, for example, that the public holds them accountable for public safety (Keel et al., unpublished student paper). Practically, district attorneys only experience marginal cost increases under Realignment, but their concerns about public safety have made them more sensitive to resource constraints in their local criminal justice systems. Some prosecutors, report, for example, that they are filing fewer charges for low-level crimes because of these constraints (Keel et al., unpublished student paper). District attorneys also report developing “artful” new charging strategies so that offenders become “prison-eligible” and can thus be sent to state custody instead of being incarcerated in the county and draining local resources. A Deputy District Attorney from Sacramento County further indicates that prosecutor salaries may be negatively affected by local incarceration costs, so charging strategies that funnel offenders into state prisons may be directly linked to the financial health of the district attorney. District attorneys also note that increases in local crime that result from Realignment will burden their offices, as they will be responsible for prosecuting all of these cases. District attorneys, then, generally advocate for more resources to be devoted to county control and enforcement apparatuses, including shoring up prosecutorial resources. In the cluster of counties described in this section, however, district attorneys have been relatively underfunded. Thus, they may not have the influence to direct Realignment spending towards control objectives.

Traditionally low probation expenditures are an important predictive factor in this cluster of counties. Realignment necessarily involves an increase in probation-related functions, since a large number of offenders are essentially being transferred from state parole to local probation caseloads. Key officials also note that because Realignment is stressing jail space, traditional probation is being more heavily relied upon for offender control and supervision. However, if counties have not traditionally dedicated many resources to probation (like the counties found in this cluster), they may not be able to rely on probation as much to accomplish enforcement objectives. Underfunded probation departments may also provide unique opportunities to provide new programming with the influx of Realignment funds. Thus, these counties have elected to allocate relatively more money to treatment approaches. The effect of under-resourced probation departments is also conditional upon the two other factors found in this cluster: public confidence in the Sheriff and under-resourced district attorneys. With limited district attorney power in the county, relatively few probation resources to draw from, and a Sheriff with substantial public support, counties tend to pursue treatment and programming with their AB 109 funds.

Beyond the Numbers

Based on our analyses, it is possible to draw two general conclusions about the factors that tend to shape county spending patterns in the AB 109 era:

Sheriff and Law Enforcement spending is generally a product of local needs (crime conditions and dedication to law enforcement) and preference for punishment.

Programs and Services spending fundamentally revolves around electoral confidence in the Sheriff.

Overall, local needs are most critical to understanding counties that choose to allocate relatively more AB 109 funds to *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending units. The most important factors in these counties are a need for law enforcement personnel or law enforcement funding, a tendency to aggressively prosecute drug offenses, and high rates of serious crime. Counties tend to devote more Realignment funds to this unit when the number of law enforcement personnel is low (enforcement clusters 1, 2, 3) and when expenditures on law enforcement are low (enforcement cluster 1). This dynamic is most pronounced in counties with low rates of drug arrests but high preference for prison in drug cases; in other words, they are not overwhelmed by drug crimes but treat these offenses harshly. High rates of serious crime also contribute to more *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending in counties where law enforcement is relatively under-resourced.

These counties appear to be making sensible choices about their AB 109 allocations. They are in need of more law enforcement personnel, even if they have expanded their ranks in recent years (see cluster 2). As these counties consider the consequences of Realignment, they may anticipate changes in local crime patterns and offender populations, and seek to build up their enforcement and control capacities to deal with these changes. Interviews indicate that these counties are anticipating (or already experiencing) increases in drug and property crime as a result of Realignment. Even though they have relatively low rates of drug and property crime now, they may have to deal with significantly more in the near future, as offenders who would have previously served sentences in state prison and been released to state parole are now incarcerated and supervised locally. A substantial number of these offenders will have addictions, challenges that counties will now have to confront on their own (Baca and Cooper 2013).

Our comparative analyses also identified another type of county that devotes significant AB 109 funding to *Sheriff and Law Enforcement*. These counties have a high number of officers per resident, and they have gained a relatively large number of officers in recent years. Unlike those in the other three clusters, these counties have high rates of drug arrests. They also have high rates of serious crime and a high preference for prison in drug cases. Thus, they are best described as “high crime” and “enforcement-oriented” counties. They emphasize enforcement in their AB 109 budgets because of local needs related to crime and preferences for punishment, rather than lack of law enforcement resources.

Emphasis on the *Programs and Services* spending unit revolves around a political dynamic. The key factor in these counties is sheriff electoral support. Public confidence in the sheriff may liberate key law enforcement officials to pursue the intended goals of Realignment, particularly through the development of evidence-based community alternatives. In programs cluster 1, we found that high sheriff support combined with high black unemployment produces greater allocation to the *Programs and Services* spending unit. We argue that black unemployment may be a proxy indicator for other social problems that are related to crime; in other words, it is more of a local need than a political factor. When sheriffs enjoy high public confidence, counties are able to address problems according to the core principles of Realignment, rather than turning to enforcement, surveillance, and punishment. In programs cluster 2, we found that lower district attorney and probation expenditures combined with high sheriff support produces greater allocation to *Programs and Services*. Here, public confidence in the sheriff combines with a de-emphasis on prosecution, and perhaps a perceived need for more treatment programming because local probation—a critical avenue to treatment—has been underfunded. Overall, findings around *Programs and Services* spending allocations point to a political dynamic (high sheriff support, underfunded district

attorneys) conditioned by local needs (high black unemployment, underfunded probation).

Our comparative analyses show that county spending choices are multifaceted and complicated, but certain key factors can be identified. Counties that have emphasized *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending are largely reacting to local needs around crime and law enforcement capacity, though these needs may be conditioned by political-ideological factors (i.e., preference for prison). Counties that have emphasized *Programs and Services* appear to do so because of public faith in law enforcement, and this public support is conditioned by local and organizational need.

State policymakers, researchers, and other interested groups should understand that county decision makers are thinking hard about the present and the future. Therefore, in considering future Realignment-related policies and budgeting, the state should understand that:

- Counties are focused on making sure they have the capacities to manage current and future offender populations—particularly around law enforcement funding, number of law enforcement officers, and necessary jail space.
- The political and institutional environment of each county will shape the ability of key actors to pursue the intended goals of Realignment. The state should, in particular, consider public support for the sheriff, the influence of the district attorney’s office, and the ability of local probation to meet offenders’ treatment needs.

Realignment is already changing local offender populations and criminal justice practices. Looking forward, counties are assessing these changes and anticipating the resources they will need to manage offenders safely and effectively under the new reality of Realignment. Our analyses show that counties are taking different approaches to managing issues related to Realignment, but these differences are explainable when considering local needs related to crime and law enforcement, as well as key political factors that condition these needs.

Conclusion

The Legislature and Governor gave California counties considerable discretion over the investment of Realignment funds, no doubt recognizing the diverse range of needs and preferences found throughout our state. Our spending plan and budget analyses indicate that counties can be arrayed along a spectrum with one end representing a treatment orientation and the other representing an enforcement orientation.

Comparing narrative and budget data to past preferences for enforcement and punishment yields a “before-and-after” picture, showing which counties continue emphasizing past approaches and which shift their orientations. Some counties that emphasized enforcement before AB 109 continue to emphasize enforcement, while others have chosen to invest more in treatment in programming. Conversely, some counties that emphasized treatment before AB 109 continue to emphasize treatment, while others have chosen to invest more in enforcement.

More revealing are findings identifying factors which lead counties to emphasize treatment or enforcement in their AB 109 budget allocations. In general, counties that emphasize enforcement appear to do so because of local needs—i.e., under-resourced law enforcement agencies, or crime issues that demand attention, or both. Counties that emphasize treatment, meanwhile, appear to do so because of electoral confidence in the sheriff, though this effect is conditioned by local needs (high black unemployment) and prior funding patterns in other areas of the criminal justice system (district attorneys and probation).

Counties in California are diverse, and each has its own set of needs and constraints. Because of the discretion county actors have been given to distribute AB 109 funds, we expected the character of these needs and constraints to matter in analyzing spending decisions, and they do. State officials must therefore be attuned to the unique characteristics of each county in attempting to understand Realignment spending, and in planning for future financial disbursements. Most importantly, officials should focus on counties’ capacities to address current and future crime problems, and the local political environments that shape county-level decision-making. If the state does not adequately consider each county’s local needs and political environment in making allocation decisions, the intended goals of Realignment may be compromised. Thus, examining critical dynamics related to politics and local needs can inform intelligent policy choices around Realignment in the future.

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Appendix A: County Plan Mention and Depth Coding

Topics Coded for Mentions from County Plans

Plan Process/Attitude

Phased-in plan	Notes if the plan will be implemented in phases.
“Interim” plan	Notes if the plan is specifically said to be interim, and re-reviewed at a later date. This does not note plans that comment that the plan is a fluid document and subject to change.
Hired consultant	Notes if the county says that they used a consultant in the writing of the plan. It is possible more counties used consultants than coded, but this only codes counties that explicitly noted their use of a consultant.
Negative about amount of funding	Notes if the county was negative and/or used negative language about the amount of funding total that they received from the state’s AB 109 allocation (i.e. “funding is not sufficient” and “inadequate”)
Negative about formula/formula incentives	Notes if the county was negative about the formula the state used to decide AB 109 funding and/or if the county was negative about the incentives used in the formula (that it was based on current levels of offenders incarcerated in state prison from the county).
Negative about risk levels	Notes if the county was negative about the risk levels of the offenders that they would now be supervising.
Positive about opportunity	Notes if the county is positive about the opportunity that AB 109 presents for the correctional system in their county.
Negative about lack of time to prepare	Notes if the county was negative about the time that they had to prepare for the new AB 109 populations.
Statistical analysis used in planning	Notes if the county said they used statistical analysis in their planning process.
Negative about number of or projection of	Notes if the county was negative about the

number of offenders coming under county supervision	number of offenders that CDCR predicted would come under county supervision or about the actual number of offenders that have to date come under county supervision.
Date plan passed	The date that the county plan was passed by the Board of Supervisors.
Plan updated?	If the county created an updated version of their AB 109 plan.
Number of people listed on the County Corrections Partnership committee	The number of people that the county listed in their plan that participated in the planning and writing of their plan.

Alternative Sanctions

Day reporting centers	If the county will be implementing a Day Reporting Center or a place for day reporting or including the AB 109 population in their current one.
Mental health court	If the county will be implementing a Mental Health Court or including the AB 109 population in their current one.
Drug court	If the county will be implementing a Drug Court or including the AB 109 population in their current one.
Domestic violence review court	If the county will be implementing a Domestic Violence Review Court or including the AB 109 population in their current one.
Proposition 36	If the county will be implementing a Proposition 36 Court or including the AB 109 population in their current one.
Veterans court	If the county will be implementing a Veterans Court or including the AB 109 population in their current one.
Reentry court	If the county will be implementing a Reentry Court or including the AB 109 population in their current one.
Other specialty court	Not in database.
Community service	Notes if the county will be using community service as an alternative sanction.
Flash incarceration	Notes if the county will be using flash incarceration up to 10 days as an alternative sanction.
State fire camp	Notes if the county will be using state fire

	camps as an alternative sanction.
Work release	Notes if the county will be using work furlough or work release as an alternative sanction.
Electronic monitoring (presentencing)	Notes if the county will be using electronic monitoring as an alternative sanction for presentence offenders.
Electronic monitoring (post-sentencing)	Notes if the county will be using electronic monitoring as an alternative sanction for post-sentence offenders.
Offenders are paying part/all of the cost of alternative sanction program	Notes if the county will charge offenders for participation in their alternative sanction program for all or part of the cost.
If offenders are paying, there is a sliding scale or fee waiver available	Notes that if the county will be charging offenders for their alternative sanction program, if there is a sliding scale or fee waiver available for offenders based on ability to pay. (Can only be marked 1 if the previous variable=1.)

Risk Assessment

For determining sanctions	Notes if the county will be using a risk assessment to determine sanctions for offenders (generally in a graduated sanctions/ incentives format).
For determining supervision	Notes if the county will be using a risk assessment to determine the type of supervision, supervision group, or probation officer: offender ratio in supervision.
For determining services needed	Notes if the county will be using a risk assessment to determine the types and kinds of services the offender needs/would be helpful for rehabilitation.
Have current risk assessment tool	Notes if the county states that they already have and/or have been using a risk assessment tool.
Developing new risk assessment tool	Notes if the county will be developing a new risk assessment tool.
COMPAS tool	Notes if the county will be using the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) tool to assess the risk level of offenders.
STRONG tool (Static Risk Assessment Offender Need Guide)	Notes if the county will be using the Static Risk Assessment Offender Need Guide (STRONG)

	tool to assess the risk level of offenders.
CAIS tool (Correctional Assessment and Intervention System)	Notes if the county will be using the Correctional Assessment and Intervention System (CAIS) tool to assess the risk level of offenders.
Wisconsin Risk & Needs Validated Assessment Tool	Notes if the county will be using the Wisconsin Risk & Needs Validated Assessment Tool to assess the risk level of offenders.
Level of Service/Case Management Inventory (LS/CMI)	Notes if the county will be using the Level of Service/Case Management Inventory (LS/CMI) to assess the risk level of offenders.

Rehabilitation & Reentry

Cognitive behavioral intervention	Notes if the county will be using a form of cognitive behavioral intervention for rehabilitation of offenders. This is not limited to Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (which is coded here), but open to all cognitive behavioral interventions used. This variable codes both in jail and community-based cognitive behavioral interventions.
Mentions evidence-based programming	Notes if the county mentions that they will be using evidence-based programming in their rehabilitation and reentry programs. This variable codes both in jail and community-based evidence-based programming.
Explaining how particular program has been validated through studies	Notes if the county describes in their plan how the programs they have or will be implemented are validated through studies (both large-scale and county wide) or through research cited in the plan.
Partnership with community-based organizations	Notes if the county will be partnering with community-based organizations to implement or continue programs in jail or in the community. This variable notes non-faith community-based organizations only, not for-profit, private organization, faith organizations, or other county organizations.
Contracting out for services with private contractor (e.g., BI, Inc.)	Notes if a county will be forming or continuing a contract to implement or continue programs in jail or in the community. Contracts that were coded were for rehabilitation programs,

	housing, and in-jail programming. Contracts that were not coded included OffenderLink (for phone-in reporting) and organizations who make risk assessments (who produce, but do not provide the service).
Faith-based organizations	Notes if a county will be partnering with faith-based organization for to implement or continue programs in jail or in the community. Faith-based programming (generally in jail) was not coded if it was not explicitly run by a faith-based organization.
Mentoring program	Notes if a county has or will have a mentoring program for offenders for rehabilitation and reentry in jail or in the community.
Employment support	Notes if the county will provide or will continue to provide employment support, including help in areas including the job search, resume skills, job placement, and post-placement services to help offenders remain employed. Employment support both in and out of jail was coded.
Vocational training	Notes if the county will provide or will continue to provide vocation training for offenders to give offenders employable skills. Vocational training both in and out of jail was coded.
Education support	Notes if the county will provide or will continue to provide education support. This includes, among other programs, GED classes, higher education, and English as a Second Language classes. Education support both in and out of jail was coded.
Benefits and economic supports	Notes if the county will provide or will continue to provide benefits and economic supports to offenders. This includes counties helping offenders gain access to benefits and economic supports (such as CalWORKs and CalFresh).
Self-help and peer support networks	Notes if the county will provide or will continue to provide self-help and peer support networks for offenders. This included self-help classes (such as anger management) and peer support classes and programs. Self-help and peer support both in and out of jail was coded.
Family involvement	Notes if the county will have or will continue to have the involvement of the offender's family

	to aid his or her rehabilitation and reentry.
Reentry team/program	Notes if the county will provide or will continue to provide a reentry team or program. These programs are specifically targeted to help offenders in the reentry process. Reentry teams and programs who work with offenders pre- and post-release were coded.
Community meetings/community education about Realignment	Notes if the county will be having community meetings and education to help teach the community about what Realignment is and how the new populations of offenders will affect the community, the local justice system, and public safety.
Parenting classes	Notes if the county will provide or will continue to provide parenting classes, teaching parenting skills. Parenting classes both in and out of jail were coded.
Pretrial programming	Notes if the county has or will begin pretrial programming for the presentencing offender population. This includes rehabilitation programming and pretrial release programs.
Gender-specific programming	Notes if the county has or will begin rehabilitation and reentry programming that is gender specific. Gender specific programming both in and out of jail was coded.

Probation

Training for probation department	Notes if the probation department will be receiving training. This includes training to deal with the new populations as well as training in evidence-based practices and programming such as Motivational Interviewing. Other probation training is also included, but regular onboarding training is not.
Hiring new probation officers	Notes if the county will be hiring new probation officers in response to AB 109. This includes re-hiring previously removed positions. Administrative staff for the probation department was not coded.
Weapons training	Notes if the county will be giving weapons training to the probation department in

	response to AB 109.
Arming probation officers	Notes if the county will be arming or continue to arm the probation department.
High-risk probation units for high-risk offenders	Notes if the county will be forming or it already has a high-risk probation unit for high-risk offenders.

Jails

Currently overcrowded jails	Notes if the county mentions that their jails are currently overcrowded. This does not note counties who say that new AB 109 offenders will cause the jails to be overcrowded.
Jails currently under court order	Notes if the county mentions that their jails are currently under court order. This does not note if their jails used to be under court order and now are not.
Building jails	Notes if the county plans on building a new jail to deal with the new population or finishing a current jail building project that will be used to help accommodate the new population.
Expanding existing jails	Notes if the county will be expanding their current jails to increase bed space. This does not include reopening portions of jails that had been closed.
Reopening closed jail space	Notes if the county will be reopening portions of jails that had been closed. This does not include if the county will be expanding their current jails to increase bed space.
Hiring new correctional staff	Notes if the county will be hiring new correctional staff for their jails. This includes re-hiring previously removed positions. Administrative staff in correctional facilities was not coded.
Training for correctional staff	Notes if the county will be training their correctional staff.
Improvements to correctional facilities	Notes if the county will be making improvements to their correctional facilities, including kitchen enlargement and building refurbishment.

Law Enforcement

Hiring new law enforcement staff	Notes if the county will be hiring law
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	enforcement staff. This includes re-hiring previously removed positions. The hiring of administrative staff was not coded.
Funding for law enforcement	Notes if the county will be providing funding for law enforcement on the both the county and the city level.
Training law enforcement to deal with new population	Notes if the county will be training the law enforcement staff to help them deal with the new population. Regular onboarding training is not coded.
Using law enforcement as post-release supervision supervisors (distinguish from presentencing law enforcement supervision)	Notes if the county will use or will continue to use law enforcement at either the county or the city level to aid the probation department with offenders on post-release community supervision. This does not include law enforcement supervising offenders in presentence alternative supervision programs.

Measurement of Outcomes & Data Collection

Internal evaluation	Notes if the county stated that they will be evaluating internally the outcomes of the programs their plan implements.
External evaluation (done by non-profit, etc.)	Notes if the county stated that an outside organization will be evaluating the outcomes of the programs their plan implements.
Evaluation of specific program(s)	Not in database.

Mental Health Treatment

Medications for mentally ill	Notes if the county will provide or continue to provide medications for mentally ill offenders.
Risk assessment for mentally ill	Notes if the county will administer or continue to administer a risk assessment for mentally ill offenders. This includes if the county is assessing for criminogenic risk, and does not include a mental health risk assessment (that assesses a mentally ill individual's risk of harming oneself or others).
Services for mentally ill	Notes if the county will provide or continue to provide services for mentally ill offenders. This includes services both in and out of jail.

Substance Abuse Treatment

Community based substance abuse treatment	Notes if the county will provide or continue to provide services for offenders with substance abuse issues in the community, out of jail.
In jail substance abuse treatment	Notes if the county will provide or continue to provide services for offenders with substance abuse issues while in jail.

Physical Healthcare

In jail	Notes if the county will provide or continue to provide physical health services for offenders while in jail.
In community	Notes if the county will provide or continue to provide physical health services for offenders in the community, out of jail.

Specialized Housing

Housing for the mentally ill/developmentally disabled	Notes if the county will provide or continue to provide housing for mentally ill or developmentally disabled offenders.
Residential substance abuse treatment	Notes if the county will provide or continue to provide housing for offenders that is residential substance abuse treatment.
Transitional housing	Notes if the county will provide or continue to provide transitional housing for offenders upon release.
Housing vouchers	Notes if the county will provide or continue to provide housing vouchers for offenders to help them afford housing upon release.

Topics that had been coded but were either deleted or combined with other variables

Housing for the developmentally disabled	This category was merged with housing for the mentally ill.
District attorney training	This category was deleted.
District attorney funding	This category was deleted. District Attorney funding was allocated by the state to all counties.
Public defender funding	This category was deleted.
Public defender training	This category was deleted. Public Defender funding was allocated by the state to all

	counties.
Court funding	This category was deleted. Superior Court funding was allocated by the state to all counties.

Topics Coded for Depth from County Plans

These variables code for the depth that the county discussed specific programs in their county plan for the Public Safety Realignment Act.

0=no significant depth of coverage

2=1 to 2 paragraphs of coverage

3=more than 2 paragraphs of coverage, with detail about policy or plan at issue

4=exceptionally lengthy and detailed coverage

9=Not available/Plan not submitted

Exception: For community based organizations, contracting out for services, and faith-based organization, if the county mentioned the name of the organization or company with whom they would be working, it was coded at least a 2 (higher with more depth), because it provided more detail than simply stating they would be working with a community- or faith-based organization or contracting with a private contractor.

Alternative Sanctions

Day reporting centers	This codes the depth that the county discussed the details of their implementing a Day Reporting Center or a place for day reporting or including the AB 109 population in their current one.
Specialty courts (all courts combined)	This codes the depth that the county discussed the details of their implementing specialty courts reporting or including the AB 109 population in their current ones. This includes Mental Health Courts, Drug Courts, Domestic Violence Courts, Proposition 36 Courts, Veteran’s Courts, and Reentry Courts.
Community service	This codes the depth that the county discussed the details of their using or continuing to use community service as an alternative sanction.
Flash incarceration	This codes the depth that the county discussed the details of their using flash incarceration as an alternative sanction.
Work release	This codes the depth that the county discussed the details of their using or continuing to use work release as an alternative sanction.

Electronic monitoring	This codes the depth that the county discussed the details of their using or continuing to use electronic monitoring as an alternative sanction. This combines both the pre- and post-sentencing use of electronic monitoring.
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Risk Assessment

Risk assessment	This codes the depth that the county discussed the details of their using or continuing to use a risk assessment to evaluate the risk levels of offenders in the county. This combines discussion of risk for sanctions, supervision, and services with discussion of a specific risk assessment and if the county is developing or already has a risk assessment.
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Rehabilitation & Reentry

Cognitive behavioral intervention	This codes the depth that the county discussed the details of their using or continuing to use cognitive behavioral intervention as a program for rehabilitation. This is not limited to Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (which is also coded here), but open to all cognitive behavioral interventions used. This variable codes both in jail and community-based cognitive behavioral interventions.
Evidence-based programming	This codes the depth that the county discussed the details of their using or continuing to use evidence-based programming for rehabilitation and reentry programs. This variable codes both in jail and community-based evidence-based programming interventions.
Partnership with community-based organizations	This codes the depth that the county discussed the details of their partnering or continuing to partner with community-based organizations to implement or continue programs in jail or in the community. This variable notes non-faith community-based organizations only, not for-profit, private organization, faith organizations, or other county organizations.
Contracting out for services with private contractor (e.g., BI, Inc.)	This codes the depth that the county discussed the details of their forming or continuing a contract to implement or continue programs in

	jail or in the community. Contracts that were coded included rehabilitation programs, housing, and in-jail programming. Contracts that were not coded included OffenderLink (for phone-in reporting) and organizations who make risk assessments (who produce, but do not provide the service).
Faith-based organizations	This codes the depth that the county discussed the details of their partnering or continuing to partner with faith-based organizations to implement or continue programs in jail or in the community. Faith-based programming (generally in jail) was not coded if it was not explicitly run by a faith-based organization.
Mentoring program	This codes the depth that the county discussed a mentoring program for offenders for rehabilitation and reentry in jail or in the community that is current or being implemented.
Employment support	This codes the depth that the county discussed employment support programming that is to be implemented or continued, including help in areas including the job search, resume skills, job placement, and post-placement services to help offenders remain employed. Employment support both in and out of jail was coded.
Vocational training	This codes the depth that the county discussed vocational training programming that is to be implemented or continued to give offenders employable skills. Vocational training both in and out of jail was coded.
Education support	This codes the depth that the county discussed education support programming that is to be implemented or continued This includes, among other programs, GED classes, higher education, and English as a Second Language classes. Education support both in and out of jail was coded.
Benefits and economic supports	This codes the depth that the county discussed benefits or economic supports to offenders that will be implemented or continued. This includes counties helping offenders gain access to benefits and economic supports (such as

	CalWORKs and CalFresh).
Self-help and peer support networks	This codes the depth that the county discussed self-help and peer support networks for offenders that will be implemented or continued. This included self-help classes (such as anger management) and peer support classes and programs. Self-help and peer support both in and out of jail was coded.
Family involvement	This codes the depth that the county discussed having the involvement of the offender's family to aid his or her rehabilitation and reentry that will be implemented or continued.
Reentry team/program	This codes the depth that the county discussed providing a reentry team or program that will be implemented or continued. These programs are specifically targeted to help offenders in the reentry process. Reentry teams and programs who work with offenders pre- and post-release were coded.
Community meetings/community education about Realignment	This codes the depth that the county discussed having community meetings and education to help teach the community about what Realignment is and how the new populations of offenders will affect the community, the local justice system, and public safety.
Parenting classes	This codes the depth that the county discussed providing parenting classes, teaching parenting skills, which will be implemented or continued. Parenting classes both in and out of jail were coded.
Pretrial programming	This codes the depth that the county discussed having or beginning pretrial programming for the presentencing offender population. This includes rehabilitation programming and pretrial release programs.
Gender-specific programming	This codes the depth that the county discussed having or beginning rehabilitation and reentry programming that is gender specific. Gender-specific programming both in and out of jail was coded.

Probation

Training/hiring for probation officers	This variable combines the depth that the
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	county discussed the hiring and training (new and continuing) of probation officers. This includes training to deal with the new populations as well as training in evidence-based practices and programming such as Motivational Interviewing. Other probation training is also included, but regular onboarding training is not. This also includes re-hiring previously removed positions. Administrative staff for the probation department was not coded.
Weapons training/arming probation officers	This variable combines the depth that the county discussed giving or continuing to give weapons training and weapons to probation officers.
High-risk probation units for high-risk offenders	Notes the depth the county discussed the high-risk probation unit for high-risk offenders it will be forming or it already has.

Jails

Currently overcrowded jails/jails under court order for capacity	This variable combines a counties depth of discussion of their currently overcrowded jails or jails currently under court order. This does not note counties who say that new AB 109 offenders will cause the jails to be overcrowded. This also does not note if their jails used to be under court order and now are not.
Building jails	This variable codes the depth of discussion a county has on building a new jail to deal with the new population or finishing a current jail building project that will be used to help accommodate the new population.
Expanding existing jails	This variable codes the depth of discussion a county has on expanding their current jails to increase bed space. This does not include reopening portions of jails that had been closed.
Reopening closed jail space	This variable codes the depth of discussion a county has on reopening portions of jails that had been closed. This does not include if the county will be expanding their current jails to increase bed space.
Hiring/training correctional staff	This variable combines the depth of discussion

	a county has on hiring new correctional staff for their jails and training their correctional staff (new and old). This includes re-hiring previously removed positions. Administrative staff in correctional facilities was not coded.
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Law Enforcement

Hiring/training law enforcement staff	This variable combines the depth of discussion a county has on hiring new law enforcement staff and training their law enforcement staff (new and old) to help them deal with the new population. This includes re-hiring previously removed positions. The hiring of administrative staff was not coded. Regular onboarding training is not coded.
Using law enforcement as post-release supervision supervisors (distinguish from presentencing law enforcement supervision)	This variable codes the depth of discussion a county has on using or continuing to use law enforcement at either the county or the city level to aid the probation department with offenders on post-release. This does not include law enforcement supervising offenders in presentence alternative supervision programs.

Measurement of Outcomes & Data Collection

Measurement of outcomes & data collection	This variable combines the depth of discussion a county has on the measurement of outcomes and data collection done both internally and externally.
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Mental Health Treatment

Mental health treatment	This variable combines the depth of discussion a county has on services they will or continue to provide for the mentally ill, medications they will or continue to provide for the mentally ill, and risk assessment they will or continue to administer for the mentally ill. This includes if the county is assessing for criminogenic risk, and does not include a mental health risk assessment (that assesses a mentally ill individual's risk of harming oneself or others). This also includes services both in and out of jail.
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Substance Abuse Treatment

Substance abuse treatment	This variable combines the depth of discussion that a county has on both in jail and community-based substance about treatment.
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Physical Healthcare

Physical healthcare	This variable combines the depth of discussion that a county has on both in jail and community-based physical healthcare services.
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Specialized Housing

Specialized housing	This variable combines the depth of discussion a county has on housing for the mentally ill or developmentally disabled, residential substance abuse treatment, transitional housing, and housing vouchers.
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Topics that had been coded but were either deleted or combined with other variables

State fire camp	This category was deleted.
Funding for probation officers	This category was deleted.
Arming probation officers	This category was deleted.
Capacity (we are going to separate out these categories)	This category was separated out into currently overcrowded jails/jails under court order for capacity, building jails, expanding existing jails, and re-opening closed jail space.
Funding law enforcement staff	This category was deleted.

Appendix B: Qualitative County Plan Coding Details

This appendix provides additional details about our qualitative coding of the counties' AB 109 County Corrections Partnership (CCP) plans.

Topics that were not mentioned at all were recorded as a "0," and topics that were mentioned were recorded as a "1." We did not code a topic as "mentioned" when it was merely part of the county's description of the AB 109 legislation. Instead, we only assigned scores of "1" to topics mentioned within the county's plan as part of their proposed response to the AB 109 legislation and relevant population(s) of offenders. We also recorded the date that each county passed its plan and the number of people who served on the Community Corrections Partnership.¹⁴

In coding for the depth of coverage, we scored each relevant topic on a scale of 0-4. A "0" indicated no significant depth of coverage—typically meaning that a county had not mentioned a topic at all, or had simply mentioned a topic and gone into no detail about it. A "2" was recorded for any of the coding topics discussed in the county plan for one to two paragraphs. For topics related to working with community-based or faith-based organizations, a "2" was recorded if the county gave specific information regarding organizations with which they would be working. A "3" was recorded for any topic discussed for more than two paragraphs and with detail about the policy or plan at issue. A "4" was recorded for any topic with an exceptionally lengthy and detailed discussion. Fours were given rarely. There was no "1" in the depth coverage coding so that when mentions and depth coverage were combined in one sheet, a "1" would signify a mention and a "2" or higher would indicate more in-depth coverage.

Here, we must note that subtopics within broader topic categories were sometimes combined for our depth coding. For example, we combined the subtopics of housing for the mentally ill and developmentally disabled, residential substance abuse treatment, transitional housing, and housing vouchers into one "specialized housing" category for the depth coding.

During the first round of reading and coding, we recorded our initial impression of the plan in addition to coding the plan. Each plan was read and coded at least three times by different researchers. For plans that were updated, we kept in our spreadsheet the coding for the old plans in addition to the new plan to be able to compare the two plans.

¹⁴ Some counties listed only the Executive Committee of their County Corrections Partnership (CCP), whereas other mentioned all players involved in the planning for the AB 109 population. There is significant variance in the numbers listed, and mean most within the context of the county.

In order to ensure the accuracy of our coding, we also completed a spot check of the coding spreadsheet, by going through each county plan and checking the accuracy of the coding for randomly selected topics.

In Appendix A, we define specific subtopics coded within each broader topic category.

Narrative Description Array Coding Formula

Program/Services Mentions

+1 (15-20)

+2 (21-34)

If a county had between 15 and 20 program or services “mentions” then they got a score of +1. If a county had between 21 and 34 program or services “mentions” then they got a score of +2. If a county had less than 15 program or services “mentions” then they got a score of 0.

Law Enforcement/Surveillance

-1 (6-10)

-2 (11-19)

If a county had between 6 and 10 law enforcement or surveillance “mentions” then they got a score of -1. If a county had between 11 and 19 law enforcement or surveillance “mentions” then they got a score of -2. If a county had less than 6 law enforcement or surveillance “mentions” then they got a score of 0.

Excluded Categories:

Work release

Fire camp

Measurement of Outcomes (all)

Risk Assessment (all)

Other (all)

These categories did not count as a “mention” for the purposes of our calculation of total “mentions,” because they did not cleanly fit into either the “Program/Services” category or the “Law Enforcement/Surveillance” category.

Law Enforcement/ Surveillance (-1)

Law Enforcement helping with supervision of probation

Building/Expanding jails

High risk unit

Arming probation

Hiring Law Enforcement

For each of these things, a county got -1 points.

Programming/Treatment (+1)

Transitional housing

Mental Health (score of 2 or more on depth coding)

Substance Abuse (score of 2 or more on depth coding)

Specialty Court

Education (score of 2 or more on depth coding)

For each of these items, a county got +1 points.

If the county's AB 109 spending plan fell between the median and the 75th percentile for its *Programs and Services* spending unit,¹⁵ that county received two additional points towards the programs and services side of the index. If the county's AB 109 spending plan fell above the 75th percentile for its *Programs and Services* spending unit, that county received three additional points towards the programs and services side of the index. If, on the other hand, the county's spending plan fell between the median and the 75th percentile for their *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit,¹⁶ that county received two points towards the surveillance and custody side of the index. And finally, if the county's spending plan fell above the 75th percentile for the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit, that county received three additional points towards the surveillance and custody side of the index.¹⁷

The control orientation index is thus calculated by taking the raw scoring from the narrative description array (as detailed above) and adjusting those scores as follows:

-If between median and 75th percentile for *Programs and Services* spending unit, then +2

-If in 75th percentile for *Programs and Services* spending unit, then +3

-If between median and 75th percentile for *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit, then -2

-If in 75th percentile for *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit, then -3

¹⁵ Programs and services spending was calculated by adding the categories of programs and services, offender housing, health services, and work force development from the budget spreadsheet.

¹⁶ Law enforcement and jail spending was calculated by adding the categories of sheriff and municipal law enforcement from the budget spreadsheet.

¹⁷ Limitations of the narrative-plus-budget formula include: (1) some plans had to be excluded because we did not have sufficient information about their budgets, (2) we were only imperfectly able to categorize budget expenditures based on the counties' varying levels of specificity, and (3) again, jail spending was not necessarily representative of a greater focus on custody.

Appendix C: Univariate Descriptive Statistics

Figure 5: County-by-County Allocation to the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* Spending Unit




Figure 6: County-by-County Allocation to the *Programs and Services* Spending Unit




Table 9: Descriptions of All Variables in the Data

VARIABLE	OPERATIONALIZATION	MEAN	SD
DEPENDENT VARIABLES			
Allocation to <i>Sheriff and Law Enforcement</i> spending unit, percent	Equals the spending on Sheriff and Municipal Law Enforcement, plus 25% of the alternative detention budget, divided by the county’s 2011-2012 total AB 109 budget expenditure (not the total amount allocated from the state)	0.33	0.20
Allocation to <i>Programs and Services</i> spending unit, percent	Equals the spending on Offender Housing, Programs & Services, Health Services, and Workforce Development, plus 75% of the alternative detention budget, divided by the county’s 2011-2012 total AB 109 budget expenditure (not the total amount allocated from the state)	0.16	0.13
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (Political Factors: Pluralism & Racial Threat)			
Percentage of residents registered to vote as Republican 2010	Equals the total number of registered “Republicans” divided by the total registered voters in each county as of 2010.	0.36	0.10
Percentage of residents registered to vote as Democrats 2010	Equals the total number of registered “Democrats” divided by the total registered voters in each county as of 2010.	0.40	0.09
% Sheriff election 2010	The percentage of the votes that the current Sheriff received in the last election.	0.76	0.21
% DA election 2010	The percentage of the votes that the current District Attorney received in the last election.	0.83	0.22
Initiative Composite Score	Voting outcomes on all state ballot propositions	3.12	5.05

relating to criminal justice issues between 1978 and 2010. We use these to create county-level indices of public preferences for criminal justice approaches that generally favor treatment or control.

Calculated by adding up votes on 14 pieces of “Public Safety” ballot initiatives in California (listed below as taken from CA Secretary of State and research by Bre Jones (2012)), where +1 means a county voted for a more “punitive” option on a ballot initiative and -1 means a county voted for a less “punitive” option.

7: The Death Penalty Act (approved 1978)

8: The Victims’ Bill of Rights (approved June 1982)

115: Crime Victims Justice Reform Act (approved 1990)

129: Drug Enforcement, Prevention, Treatment, Prisons. Bonds (rejected Nov 1990)

133: Drug Enforcement and Prevention. Taxes. Prison Terms. (rejected Nov 1990)

184: The Three Strikes Initiative (approved 1994)

215: Medical Use of Marijuana Initiative or the Compassionate Use Act (approved 1996)”

% Black persons 2010	Percentage of black persons in the total county population in 2010.	3.27	3.29
% Persons of Hispanic or Latino origin 2010	Percentage of Hispanic/Latino persons in the total county population in 2010.	27.95	17.18
% Black residents who are unemployed	Percentage of black persons in the total county population in 2010 who are unemployed.	14.75	9.33
% Hispanic/Latino residents who are	Percentage of Hispanic/Latino persons in the total	11.66	3.47

unemployed	county population in 2010 who are unemployed.		
Unemployment rate 2010	The unemployment rate in each county in 2010.	9.99	2.38
% Persons below poverty level 2010	The percent of persons living below poverty in each county in 2010.	14.22	4.42

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (Economic Resources & Competition)			
Fiscal Health Index (based on S&P credit rating 2010)	<p>S&P's credit ratings evaluate the ability and willingness of a county (as an issuer) to meet its financial obligations in full and on time. Specifically, the ratings (and our numerical coding) are interpreted as below.</p> <p>'AAA' (10)—Extremely strong capacity to meet financial commitments. Highest Rating.</p> <p>'AA' —Very strong capacity. Including AA+ (9), AA (8), and AA- (7).</p> <p>'A'—Strong capacity, but somewhat susceptible to adverse economic conditions and changes in circumstances. Including A+ (6) and A (5).</p> <p>'BBB' —Adequate capacity, but more subject to adverse economic conditions. Including BBB+ (3) and BBB (2).</p> <p>'BBB-' (1)—Considered lowest investment grade by market participants.</p>	5.95	2.22
Revenue per 1,000 residents, 2010	Equals the total amount of revenue a county received in the fiscal year of 2010 divided by its population.	2163229.24	2266187.41
Long term debt per 100,000 residents, 2010	Equals the amount of outstanding principal that a county owes in debt in the fiscal year of 2010 divided by its population.	358572.60	340984.07

Total law enforcement expenditure per 1,000 residents, 2007	Equals the total expenditure of each county for police, sheriff, all law enforcement, all custody and supervision in 2007 divided by its population.	354704.75	310422.37
Police expenditure per 1,000 residents, 2007	Equals the expenditure of each county for police in 2007 divided by its population.	174451.36	102360.34
Sheriff expenditure per 1,000 residents, 2007	Equals the expenditure of each county for sheriff in 2007 divided by its population.	189276.74	324890.58
Total custody & supervision expenditure per 1,000 residents, 2007	Equals the expenditure of each county for custody and supervision in 2007 divided by its population.	163237.09	54708.13
Operational expenditures on adult detention per 1,000 residents, 2007	Equals the operational expenditure for adult detention in each county divided by its population.	92357.08	35057.07
Operational expenditures on juvenile detention per 1,000 residents, 2007	Equals the operational expenditure for juvenile detention in each county divided by its population.	32133.75	20705.92
Operational expenditures on probation per 1,000 residents, 2007	Equals the operational expenditure for probation in each county divided by its population.	46530.94	36181.56
Operational expenditures on detention & corrections per 1,000 residents, 2007	Equals the total operational expenditure for detention, juvenile detention, probation, the District Attorney's office, public defenders, and trial courts in each county divided by its population.	168766.77	65370.05
Operational expenditures on DA per 1,000 residents, 2007	Equals the operational expenditure for the District Attorney's office in each county divided by its population.	45847.56	19551.05
Operational expenditures on public defender per 1,000 residents, 2007	Equals the operational expenditure for public defenders in each county divided by its population.	23395.94	15062.56
Operational expenditures on other trial courts per 1,000 residents, 2007	Equals the operational expenditure for trial courts in each county divided by its population.	11762.73	11851.97

Spending on drug abuse services per 1,000 residents, 2010	Equals the expenditure for drug abuse services in each county divided by its population.	25400.14	37256.33
Spending on mental health per 1,000 residents, 2010	Equals the expenditure for mental health services in each county divided by its population.	147577.98	87266.24
Spending on public health per 1,000 residents, 2010	Equals the expenditure for public health services in each county divided by its population.	117883.71	112166.29
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (Local Needs: Crime Rates & Offender Populations)			
Total adult felony arrests per 1,000 residents, 2010	Equals total adult felony arrests in each county divided by its population.	11.95	3.22
Violent offense arrests per 1,000 residents, 2010	Equals total violent offense arrests in each county divided by its population.	3.19	1.03
Property offense arrests per 1,000 residents, 2010	Equals total property offense arrests in each county divided by its population.	2.60	0.84
Drug offense arrests per 1,000 residents, 2010	Equals total drug offense arrests in each county divided by its population.	3.33	1.39
Sex offenses arrests per 1,000 residents, 2010	Equals total sex offense arrests in each county divided by its population.	0.23	0.14
Part I (serious) crime rate per 100,000 population, 2010	Part I crime includes violent crimes (homicide, sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault) and property crimes (arson, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft) as defined in the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR).	1882.91	625.05
High risk parolees, 2006-2009	Proportion of parolees released to each county classified as "high risk."	0.10	0.02

High property risk parolees, 2006-2009	Proportion of parolees released to each county classified as “high property crime risk.”	0.18	0.03
High violent risk parolees, 2006-2009	Proportion of parolees released to each county classified as “high violent crime risk.”	0.26	0.04
% arrested felons imprisonment, 2009	Equals number of felons imprisoned divided by total number of arrested felons.	0.11	0.06
Imprisonments for violent offenses per 1,000 violent felony arrests, 2010	Equals violent felons imprisoned divided by total number of violent felony arrests.	767.33	324.14
Imprisonments for property offenses per 1,000 property felony arrests, 2010	Equals property felons imprisoned divided by total number of property felony arrests.	314.17	189.30
Imprisonments for drug offenses per 1,000 drug felony arrests, 2010	Equals drug felons imprisoned divided by total number of drug felony arrests.	229.51	193.12
% new felon admissions to prison, 2010	Equals number of new felon admissions to prison divided by total number of admissions to prison.	1.72	4.42
% parole violators returned to custody, 2010	Equals number of parole violator admissions to prison divided by total number of admissions to prison.	1.72	4.79
Law enforcement full-time personnel per 100,000 Residents, 2010	Equals number of full-time law enforcement personnel divided by the population.	2.01	1.55
Percent change in full-time law enforcement personnel, 2005-2010	Equals the total full-time law enforcement personnel in 2005 divided by the total in 2010 and then subtracted from 1. The total law enforcement personnel for counties include the police department, sheriff’s department, and other sworn personnel.	3.90	14.13
High-risk parolees per law enforcement personnel, 2010	Equals the number of high risk parolees divided by the number of law enforcement personnel in each county in 2010.	1.38	1.62
Jail overcrowding	Equals the average daily population (ADP) divided by	84.90	21.37

the rated jail capacity from 2010-2011, indicating the level of overcrowding of county jails.

Other Independent Variables			
% white persons, 2010	Percentage of white persons in the total county population in 2011.	70.07	13.48
Bachelor's degree or higher, percent of persons age 25+, 2006-2010 average	Average percentage of persons with a bachelor's degree or higher in the total county population older than 25 from 2006 to 2010.	24.61	10.33
Homeownership rate, 2006-2010 average	Average percentage of homeownership in the total county population from 2006 to 2010.	63.77	6.80
Median household income, 2006-2010 average	Average median household income from 2007 to 2011.	14.22	4.42
Composite Stress Index	Measures the overall stress level each county is under by averaging the z-scores of below measures: (1) Serious crime rate & Arrest rate for violent crime, (2) High risk parolees per law enforcement personnel & Violent parolees per law enforcement personnel (3) Fiscal revenue per person (reverse coded) & Long-term debt per person (4) Law enforcement personnel change (reverse coded) & Jail overcrowding.	0.00	0.42

Appendix D: Alternate Spending Unit Analyses

In our quantitative and comparative analyses, county Realignment spending is grouped into two broader **spending units**: *Sheriff and Law Enforcement*, and *Programs and Services*. *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending included the subcategories Sheriff and Municipal Law Enforcement. *Programs and Services* spending included the subcategories Offender Housing, Programs and Services, Health Services, and Workforce Development. The total expenditures within the broad *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* and *Programs and Services* spending units were then taken as a percentage of the county's total AB 109 budget expenditure (not the total amount allocated from the state).

As mentioned earlier in this report, we had some difficulty allocating budgets from the Detention Release Services/Alternatives and Probation subcategories because these spending areas conceptually straddle the boundary between “enforcement” and “treatment.” In other words, these programs function as forms of enforcement, but with elements of treatment as part of their organizational philosophies and routine practices. Thus, we did not feel comfortable with including them wholly within either the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* or *Programs and Services* spending units. Of the two, Probation seems more conceptually divided between enforcement and treatment, while Detention Release Services/Alternatives seems to align more closely with treatment than enforcement.

To address these conceptual issues, we created a series of variables to represent the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* or *Programs and Services* spending units. We split Detention Release Services/Alternatives and Probation budgets in different ways to create these variables. Variable set 1 leaves out Detention Release Services/Alternatives and Probation budgets entirely. Variable set 2 adds the Detention Release Services/Alternatives budget to the *Programs and Services* spending unit, and leaves the Probation budget out entirely. Variable set 3 adds 75% of the Detention Release Services/Alternatives budget to the *Programs and Services* spending unit, adds the remaining 25% of the Detention Release Services/Alternatives budget to the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit, and leaves the Probation budget out entirely. Variable set 4 adds 75% of the Detention Release Services/Alternatives budget to the *Programs and Services* spending unit, adds the remaining 25% of the Detention Release Services/Alternatives budget to the *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* spending unit, and divides the Probation budget equally between the two spending units (50% to each).

By diversifying these variable sets, we are able to conduct more reliable analyses around measures that reflect the conceptual diversity of the relevant spending subcategories. Table 10 below summarizes these variable sets.

Table 10: Variable Descriptions for *Sheriff and Law Enforcement* and *Programs and Services* Spending Units

Variable set	Spending unit	Included budget subcategories	Allocation of Detention Release Services/Alternatives budget	Allocation of Probation budget
1	Sheriff and Law Enforcement	-Sheriff -Municipal law enforcement	Not included	Not included
	Programs and Services	-Offender Housing, -Programs and Services -Health Services -Workforce Development	Not included	Not included
2	Sheriff and Law Enforcement	-Sheriff -Municipal law enforcement	0% allocated to Sheriff and Law Enforcement	Not included
	Programs and Services	-Offender Housing, -Programs and Services -Health Services -Workforce Development - Detention Release Services/ Alternatives (100%)	100% allocated to Programs and Services	Not included
3	Sheriff and Law Enforcement	-Sheriff -Municipal law enforcement	25% allocated to Sheriff and Law Enforcement	Not included
	Programs and Services	-Offender Housing, -Programs and Services -Health Services -Workforce Development	75% allocated to Programs and Services	Not included
4	Sheriff and Law Enforcement	-Sheriff -Municipal law enforcement	25% allocated to Sheriff and Law Enforcement	50% allocated to Sheriff and Law Enforcement
	Programs and Services	-Offender Housing, -Programs and Services -Health Services -Workforce Development	75% allocated to Programs and Services	50% allocated to Programs and Services

Next, we present bivariate correlation results, like those found in Table 2 (in the main text of this report), for all four versions of our dependent variables. As a reminder, we elected to report results from set three of the dependent variables in the main report.

Table 11: Bivariate Correlation Results for Four Spending Unit Variable Sets

	SPENDING UNIT							
	<i>Sheriff and Law Enforcement</i>				<i>Programs and Services</i>			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
% Sheriff election, 2010	-0.21	-0.21	-0.17	-0.24*	0.30**	0.37* *	0.39** *	0.32* *
% Black unemployment, 2010	0.03	0.03	0.04	-0.02	0.38**	0.28*	0.31**	0.26*
Law enforcement expenditure per 1,000 residents, 2007	0.29**	0.29**	0.27* *	0.25*	-0.08	-0.17	-0.17	-0.21
Sheriff expenditure per 1,000 residents, 2007	0.26**	0.26**	0.26*	0.23*	-0.11	-0.16	-0.16	-0.21
District Attorney expenditure per 1,000 residents, 2010	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.12	-0.27**	-0.23*	-0.25*	-0.19
Imprisonments for drug offenses per 1,000 felony drug arrests, 2010	0.33**	0.33**	0.33* *	0.29**	-0.11	-0.15	-0.15	-0.20
Serious (Part I) crime rate per 100,000 residents, 2010	0.24*	0.24*	0.29* *	0.29**	-0.09	0.04	0.01	0.00
Law enforcement full-time personnel per 100,000 residents, 2010	0.24*	0.24*	0.23*	0.21	-0.07	-0.14	-0.13	-0.16
% change in full-time law enforcement personnel, 2005-2010	0.24*	0.24*	0.24*	0.29**	-0.15	-0.15	-0.16	-0.12
Probation expenditure per 1,000 residents, 2010	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.20	-0.22	-0.21	-0.22*	-0.25*
High-risk parolee concentration, 2006-2009	-0.18	-0.18	-0.25*	-0.17	0.17	-0.11	-0.06	0.04
Drug offense arrests per 1,000 residents, 2010	-0.26**	-0.26**	-0.22*	-0.08	-0.08	0.14	0.11	0.27* *

*p<=.10; **p<=.05; ***p<=.01

Appendix E: Determination of Pre-AB 109 Control Orientation

Table 12: Pre-Realignment Control Orientation Determination Factors

COUNTY	Percent of arrested felons convicted (2009)	Percent arrested felons convicted (2009) - low medium high	Percent of all arrested felons incarcerated (prison, jail), 2009	Percent arrested felons incarcerated (2009) - low medium high	Percent of convicted felons incarcerated (2009)	Percent convicted felons incarcerated (2009) - low medium high	Violent offense imprisonment rate per 1,000 violent felony arrests (2010)	Violent imprisonment rate (2010) - low medium high	Property offense imprisonment rate per 1,000 property felony arrests (2010)	Property imprisonment rate (2010) - low medium high	Drug offense imprisonment rate per 1,000 drug felony arrests (2010)	Drug imprisonment rate (2010) - low medium high	Pre-AB 109 control orientation (Table 1 y-axis)
Alameda	57.4	L	53.1	M	92.6	H	1065.0	H	157.3	L	70.0	L	L
Alpine	63.6	M	18.2	L	28.6	L	500.0	L	0.0	L	1000.0	H	L
Amador	79.9	H	61.1	H	76.4	M	1000.0	H	714.3	H	279.1	H	H
Butte	69.7	M	51.9	M	74.5	L	1260.0	H	608.1	H	436.0	H	H
Calaveras	56.6	L	44.8	L	79.0	M	378.4	L	231.9	L	169.8	M	L
Colusa	63.3	M	37.2	L	58.8	L	873.0	H	339.6	M	204.5	M	M
Contra Costa	54.3	L	49.7	L	91.5	H	623.6	M	94.1	L	30.6	L	L
Del Norte	57.3	L	51.9	M	90.6	H	548.6	L	183.5	L	79.1	L	L
El Dorado	66.0	M	51.5	M	78.0	M	547.3	L	307.7	M	159.3	M	M
Fresno	62.2	M	55.4	M	89.1	M	770.0	M	293.7	M	178.9	M	M
Glenn	83.5	H	51.4	M	61.6	L	660.2	M	256.1	M	174.2	M	M

Humboldt	57.1	L	32.8	L	57.5	L	705.2	M	283.3	M	196.3	M	L
Imperial	55.6	L	42.5	L	76.4	M	421.4	L	138.5	L	96.8	L	L
Inyo	90.7	H	56.5	M	62.3	L	647.1	M	225.0	L	150.0	M	M
Kern	69.1	M	62.3	H	90.1	H	613.7	M	294.0	M	339.3	H	H
Kings	79.4	H	74.4	H	93.7	H	2119.3	H	1259.7	H	1066.5	H	H
Lake	75.5	H	56.5	M	74.9	L	775.9	M	420.7	H	204.7	M	M
Lassen	70.3	M	63.0	H	89.6	M	850.0	H	406.3	H	301.6	H	H
Los Angeles	66.3	M	54.0	M	81.5	M	1145.9	H	330.5	M	257.2	H	M
Madera	74.5	M	66.7	H	89.6	M	899.7	H	500.0	H	483.4	H	H
Marin	56.3	L	45.8	L	81.4	M	515.9	L	214.8	L	102.6	L	L
Mariposa	86.4	H	67.8	H	78.4	M	687.5	M	340.9	M	106.4	L	M
Mendocino	56.0	L	45.6	L	81.4	M	611.9	M	175.2	L	110.9	L	L
Merced	75.8	H	58.9	M	77.7	M	662.5	M	254.7	M	132.9	L	M
Modoc	46.1	L	30.3	L	65.7	L	338.7	L	111.1	L	30.3	L	L
Mono	74.8	M	64.7	H	86.5	M	325.0	L	209.3	L	88.2	L	L
Monterey	42.4	L	39.0	L	91.8	H	847.2	H	253.5	M	278.5	H	H
Napa	74.1	M	58.6	M	79.0	M	628.0	M	265.6	M	171.8	M	M
Nevada	61.3	M	50.0	M	81.6	M	409.5	L	157.0	L	63.4	L	L
Orange	76.2	H	59.5	M	78.1	M	973.9	H	279.2	M	184.2	M	M

Placer	73.9	M	66.8	H	90.4	H	639.8	M	325.2	M	226.9	M	M
Plumas	62.5	M	62.5	H	100.0	H	406.6	L	244.4	L	131.0	L	L
Riverside	82.5	H	72.6	H	88.0	M	1357.3	H	444.9	H	325.5	H	H
Sacramento	73.6	M	63.2	H	86.0	M	1093.6	H	285.3	M	230.9	M	M
San Benito	74.6	M	53.8	M	72.1	L	457.3	L	275.2	M	383.8	H	M
San Bernardino	79.0	H	72.0	H	91.1	H	867.4	H	306.0	M	229.0	M	H
San Diego	56.8	L	30.0	L	52.8	L	831.4	M	364.5	H	220.6	M	L
San Francisco	42.3	L	41.6	L	98.3	H	330.8	L	116.0	L	39.2	L	L
San Joaquin	69.0	M	22.7	L	33.0	L	941.3	H	334.4	M	241.8	M	M
San Luis Obispo	78.8	H	66.7	H	84.6	M	683.1	M	312.4	M	186.5	M	M
San Mateo	76.9	H	65.5	H	85.1	M	844.4	H	209.5	L	122.9	L	H
Santa Barbara	74.6	M	60.8	H	81.4	M	845.4	H	368.4	H	286.4	H	H
Santa Clara	78.0	H	62.0	H	79.5	M	996.9	H	289.6	M	181.9	M	H
Santa Cruz	74.1	M	61.6	H	83.2	M	549.0	L	154.8	L	73.3	L	L
Shasta	68.4	M	61.8	H	90.4	H	1769.0	H	746.2	H	606.5	H	H
Sierra	62.5	M	62.5	H	100.0	H	384.6	L	90.9	L	0.0	L	L

Siskiyou	76.0	H	38.0	L	50.0	L	841.2	H	600.0	H	204.8	M	H
Solano	58.1	L	48.4	L	83.3	M	778.9	M	271.2	M	222.4	M	M
Sonoma	69.5	M	57.1	M	82.1	M	594.0	L	227.4	L	80.4	L	L
Stanislaus	71.1	M	59.3	M	83.3	M	629.9	M	318.2	M	230.5	M	M
Sutter	83.2	H	79.9	H	96.0	H	559.6	L	366.7	H	311.3	H	H
Tehama	71.4	M	56.7	M	79.5	M	922.1	H	372.5	H	259.8	H	H
Trinity	81.3	H	74.1	H	91.2	H	629.6	M	243.9	L	48.8	L	H
Tulare	71.4	M	62.0	H	86.7	M	917.7	H	376.2	H	232.2	M	H
Tuolumne	88.0	H	64.6	H	73.4	L	870.7	H	283.7	M	184.8	M	H
Ventura	83.2	H	71.9	H	86.4	M	656.8	M	208.4	L	167.2	M	M
Yolo	75.4	H	56.8	M	75.3	M	880.6	H	481.8	H	400.0	H	H
Yuba	70.7	M	58.9	M	83.3	M	821.8	M	298.5	M	336.3	H	M
Cut point for LOW	<60		<50		<75		<600		<250		<150		
Cut point for HIGH	>75		>60		>90		>840		>350		>250		

Table 13: Simplified Pre-Realignment Control Orientation Determinations

County	Pre-AB 109 control orientation	Percent of arrested felons convicted (2009)	Percent of arrested felons incarcerated (2009)	Percent of convicted felons incarcerated (2009)	Violent offense imprisonment rate per 1,000 violent felony arrests (2010)	Property offense imprisonment rate per 1,000 property felony arrests (2010)	Drug offense imprisonment rate per 1,000 drug felony arrests (2010)
Alameda	L	L	M	H	H	L	L
Alpine	L	M	L	L	L	L	H
Amador	H	H	H	M	H	H	H
Butte	H	M	M	L	H	H	H
Calaveras	L	L	L	M	L	L	M
Colusa	M	M	L	L	H	M	M
Contra Costa	L	L	L	H	M	L	L
Del Norte	L	L	M	H	L	L	L
El Dorado	M	M	M	M	L	M	M
Fresno	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Glenn	M	H	M	L	M	M	M
Humboldt	L	L	L	L	M	M	M
Imperial	L	L	L	M	L	L	L
Inyo	M	H	M	L	M	L	M

Kern	H	M	H	H	M	M	H
Kings	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
Lake H	M	H	M	L	M	H	M
Lassen	H	M	H	M	H	H	H
Los Angeles M	M	M	M	M	H	M	H
Madera		M	H	M	H	H	H
Marin	L	L	L	M	L	L	L
Mariposa		H	H	M	M	M	L
Mendocino	L	L	L	M	M	L	L
Merced	M	H	M	M	M	M	L
Modoc	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Mono	L	M	H	M	L	L	L
Monterey	H	L	L	H	H	M	H
Napa	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Nevada	L	M	M	M	L	L	L
Orange		H	M	M	H	M	M
Placer	M	M	H	H	M	M	M
Plumas M	L	M	H	H	L	L	L
Riverside	H	H	H	M	H	H	H

Sacramento	M	M	H	M	H	M	M
San Benito	M	M	M	L	L	M	H
San Bernardino	H	H	H	H	H	M	M
San Diego M	L	L	L	L	M	H	M
San Francisco	L	L	L	H	L	L	L
San Joaquin H	M	M	L	L	H	M	M
San Luis Obispo		H	H	M	M	M	M
San Mateo	H	H	H	M	H	L	L
Santa Barbara		M	H	M	H	H	H
Santa Clara	H	H	H	M	H	M	M
Santa Cruz	L	M	H	M	L	L	L
Shasta		M	H	H	H	H	H
Sierra	L	M	H	H	L	L	L
Siskiyou H	H	H	L	L	H	H	M
Solano	M	L	L	M	M	M	M
Sonoma H	L	M M	M	M	L	L	L
Stanislaus	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Sutter	H	H	H	H	L	H	H
Tehama		M		M	H	H	H

Trinity	H	H	H	H	M	L	L
Tulare	H	M	H	M	H	H	M
Tuolumne	H	H	H	L	H	M	M
Ventura	M	H	H	M	M	L	M
Yolo	H	H	M	M	H	H	H
Yuba	M	M	M	M	M	M	H