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Document Title: Examining Radicalization's Risk and Protective Factors: A Case-Control Study of Violent Extremists, Non-Violent Criminal Extremists, Non-offending Extremists & Regular Violent Offenders

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Mental Illness	.46 (.31)	1.58
Status-Seeking Behaviors	-.05 (.25)	.96
Impulsive Behaviors	.19 (.30)	1.22
Identity	.45 (.37)	1.56
Belonging	-.27 (.26)	.77
Injustice/Grievance	.24 (.29)	1.27
Blamed Other(s)	.82 (.25)	2.27***
Prior Incarceration	.63 (.34)	1.87
Prior Criminal Behavior	-.04 (.27)	.96
Pseudo R²		.25

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

^a Reference category = (0) Single

Note: Dependent Variable: Violent Extremist = 1; Nonviolent Criminal Extremist = 0.

Key: *b* = Unstandardized Coefficients; *SE* = Robust Standard Error; *OR* = Odds Ratio

The multivariate model reveals four variables that are the strongest correlates differentiating VE and NVCEs. First, younger offenders are significantly more likely to be involved in VE than NVCE (OR=.95; p<.001). Second, offenders who blame another person or collective for their grievance are significantly more likely to be VEs than NVCEs (OR=2.27; p<.001). It may be that establishing blame defines the pool of potential targets that a VE may victimize, providing a path for justifying the mobilization to violence. Third, having peers engaged in crime or delinquency is significantly related to engagement in violent extremism (OR=1.88; p<.05), suggesting exposure to such activities may lead to the acceptance of and engagement in violent behaviors to advance an ideological cause. Finally, individuals who have been alienated from social circles or family are significantly more likely to engage in VE as opposed to NVCE (OR=2.09; p<.05), punctuating the potential for negative life experiences to impact one's violent trajectory.

RQ2: How do the presence of risk and protective variables vary when comparing ideological offenders to nonoffending extremists?, and

RQ3: How do the presence of risk and protective variables vary when comparing ideological offenders to regular homicide offenders?

It was common amongst all three ideological categories to experience a negative life transition, albeit jihadist (84%) and far-right (74%) experienced them at a higher percentage than far-left IOs (49%). The most common life events for jihadists were recent relocations (29%), prior victimization (33%), and alienation from a social circle or family (31%). Comparatively, far-right IOs experienced family problems (21%), social alienation (24%), and drug use (22%) most often, although these proportions were not noticeably different compared to jihadists and far left. Far-left IOs had the highest percentage of offenders who experienced a health issue (28%) as well as loss of job/employment (14%). They were similarly likely to have been victimized (26%) as jihadistsexperienced family problems (22%), alienation (18%), and used drugs (17%) at rates comparable to both jihadist and far-right IOs.

Table 3c. Negative Life Events

Variable	Jihadist (n=210)	Far-right (n=212)	Far-left (n=77)
Negative Transitions			
<i>No</i>	34 (16.19%)	56 (26.42%)	39 (50.65%)
<i>Yes</i>	176 (83.81%)	156 (73.58%)	38 (49.35%)
Loss of Job/Employment			
<i>No</i>	191 (90.95%)	192 (90.57%)	66 (85.71%)
<i>Yes</i>	19 (9.05%)	20 (9.43%)	11 (14.29%)
Recent Relocation			
<i>No</i>	150 (71.43%)	198 (93.40%)	64 (83.12%)
<i>Yes</i>	60 (28.57%)	14 (6.60%)	13 (16.88%)
Health Issue			
<i>No</i>	166 (79.05%)	178 (83.96%)	55 (71.43%)
<i>Yes</i>	44 (20.95%)	34 (16.04%)	22 (28.57%)
Victimization			
<i>No</i>	140 (66.67%)	184 (86.79%)	57 (74.03%)
<i>Yes</i>	70 (33.33%)	28 (13.21%)	20 (25.97%)
Family Problems			
<i>No</i>	165 (78.57%)	168 (79.25%)	60 (77.92%)
<i>Yes</i>	45 (21.43%)	44 (20.75%)	17 (22.08%)
Alienation			
<i>No</i>	144 (68.57%)	162 (76.42%)	63 (81.82%)
<i>Yes</i>	66 (31.43%)	50 (23.58%)	14 (18.18%)
Drug Use			
<i>No</i>	173 (82.38%)	166 (78.30%)	64 (83.12%)

<i>Yes</i>	37 (17.62%)	46 (21.70%)	13 (16.88%)
Alcohol Use			
<i>No</i>	194 (92.38%)	191 (90.09%)	76 (98.70%)
<i>Yes</i>	16 (7.62%)	21 (9.91%)	1 (1.30%)

Psychological/Personality factors

The percentage of offenders who had a mental illness or who had previously had a serious mental health issue was relatively similar across all three ideological categories. Jihadist offenders and far-right offenders, however, were much more likely to have demonstrated status-seeking behaviors that indicated a need for moral superiority and to dominate others than far-left IOs (52% vs. 44% vs. 20%). Examples of these behaviors may include deeming oneself a “soldier of god” or a “holy warrior,” expressions that signify a level of status attainable by few. Alternatively, far-left IOs demonstrated impulsive behaviors slightly more frequently than jihadists (29% vs 35%) and much more often than far-right IOs (17% vs. 35%).

Table 3d. Psychological/Personality Factors

Variable	Jihadist (n=210)	Far-right (n=212)	Far-left (n=77)
Mental Illness			
<i>No</i>	150 (71.43%)	164 (77.36%)	54 (70.13%)
<i>Yes</i>	60 (28.57%)	48 (22.64%)	23 (29.87%)
Serious Mental Health Issue			
<i>No</i>	181 (86.19%)	197 (92.92%)	65 (84.42%)
<i>Yes</i>	29 (13.81%)	15 (7.08%)	12 (15.58%)
Status-Seeking Behaviors			
<i>No</i>	101 (48.10%)	118 (55.66%)	62 (80.52%)
<i>Yes</i>	109 (51.90%)	94 (44.34%)	15 (19.48%)
Impulsive Behaviors			
<i>No</i>	148 (70.48%)	177 (83.49%)	50 (64.94%)
<i>Yes</i>	62 (29.52%)	35 (16.51%)	27 (35.06%)

Ideological factors

In their ideological characteristics, jihadists were the most likely to be seeking identity (23% vs. 9% vs. 4%) and express a desire to belong (72% vs. 32% vs. 13%) than far-right or far-left IOs. Fifty-two percent of far-left IOs were involved in political activism, compared to forty-two percent of jihadists and thirty-four percent of far rightists-- results that indicate far-left extremists may have frequently attempted nonviolent and noncriminal avenues of advancing their ideology before engaging in ideological crime and violence. All three categories were similarly likely to perceive an injustice or grievance, but jihadist and far-left offenders were more likely to place the blame for their grievance on a particular person or group of people.

In terms of group affiliation, nearly half of jihadists acted with others without clear group boundaries (49%), with 24% of jihadist IOs acting alone and 21% acting as a member of a formal group. Far-left IOs acted as members of an informal group (44%) or alone (36%) most often, with very few far-left offenders being members of a formalized group (3%). Unlike the other two groups, far-right IOs were fairly evenly distributed across all four categories of group affiliation, suggesting there is not a particular mode of affiliation that characterizes these offenders.

Table 3e. Ideological Factors

Variable	Jihadist (n=210)	Far-right (n=212)	Far-left (n=77)
Identity-Seeking			
<i>No</i>	161 (76.67%)	193 (91.04%)	74 (96.10%)
<i>Yes</i>	49 (23.33%)	19 (8.96%)	2 (3.90%)
Desire to Belong			
<i>No</i>	59 (28.10%)	144 (67.92%)	67 (87.01%)
<i>Yes</i>	151 (71.90%)	68 (32.08%)	10 (12.99%)
Political Activism			
<i>No</i>	121 (57.62%)	140 (66.04%)	37 (48.05%)
<i>Yes</i>	89 (42.38%)	72 (33.96%)	40 (51.95%)
Perceived Injustice/Grievance			
<i>No</i>	56 (26.67%)	82 (38.68%)	27 (35.06%)
<i>Yes</i>	154 (73.33%)	130 (61.32%)	50 (64.94%)

Blamed Other(s)			
<i>No</i>	92 (43.81%)	115 (54.25%)	30 (38.96%)
<i>Yes</i>	118 (56.19%)	97 (45.75%)	47 (61.04%)
Lone/Group Actor			
<i>Acted Alone</i>	51 (24.29%)	46 (21.70%)	28 (36.36%)
<i>Part of formal group</i>	45 (21.43%)	51 (24.06%)	2 (2.60%)
<i>Part of informal group</i>	12 (5.71%)	56 (26.42%)	34 (44.16%)
<i>Acting with others – no clear group boundaries</i>	102 (48.57%)	58 (27.36%)	12 (15.58%)
<i>Missing</i>	0 (0.00%)	1 (0.47%)	1 (1.30%)

Criminal History

In keeping with the trends from previous sections, very few IOs, regardless of ideology, were members of a gang. Across the three ideologies, their criminal histories are comparable, although jihadist IOs are the least likely to have previously been arrested (28% vs. 42% vs. 42%) and least likely to have engaged in prior criminal behavior (44% vs. 59% vs. 71%). A slightly higher percentage of far-right offenders (24%) were previously incarcerated than jihadist (19%) and far-left (16%) IOs. Overall, these results indicate a criminal history is common amongst offenders from all three ideological categories.

Table 3f. Criminal History

Variable	Jihadist (n=210)	Far-right (n=212)	Far-left (n=77)
Gang Member			
<i>No</i>	205 (97.62%)	197 (92.92%)	70 (90.91%)
<i>Yes</i>	5 (2.38%)	15 (7.08%)	7 (0.09%)
Prior Arrest			
<i>No</i>	144 (68.57%)	104 (49.06%)	42 (54.55%)
<i>Yes</i>	59 (28.10%)	90 (42.45%)	32 (41.56%)
<i>Missing</i>	7 (3.33%)	18 (8.49%)	3 (3.90%)
Prior Incarceration			
<i>No</i>	171 (81.43%)	160 (75.47%)	65 (84.42%)
<i>Yes</i>	39 (18.57%)	52 (24.53%)	12 (15.58%)
Prior Criminal Behavior			
<i>No</i>	117 (55.71%)	87 (41.04%)	22 (28.57%)
<i>Yes</i>	93 (44.29%)	125 (58.96%)	55 (71.43%)

Multivariate Analysis for Comparing Jihadist, Far-Right, and Far-Left Ideological Offenders

As opposed to the previous section, where the purpose of the analysis was to ascertain differences between IOs and the two control groups, this section is focused on identifying differences between all three ideological categories. As such, we estimated three binary logistic regression models to compare each ideological category to one another as opposed to a multinomial model, which would only draw comparisons between the reference category and the two defined categories.

Table 3g. Binary Logistic Regression Models Comparing Jihadi, Far-right, and Far-Left Extremist Offenders

Variable	Model 1 Far-Right Vs. Jihadist		Model 2 Far-Right Vs. Far-Left		Model 3 Jihadist Vs. Far-Left	
	b (SE)	OR	b (SE)	OR	b (SE)	OR
Childhood Exposure to Extremism	1.77 (.32)	5.89***	-.94 (.63)	.39	-3.18 (.73)	.04***
Platonic Trouble	.52 (.29)	1.68	-1.02 (.51)	.36*	-1.82 (.62)	.16**
Negative Transitions	.14 (.29)	1.15	-1.48 (.36)	.23***	-1.68 (.53)	.19**
Victimization	.66 (.33)	1.93*	2.01 (.47)	7.49***	.75 (.52)	2.11
Status-Seeking Behaviors	-.17 (.25)	.85	-.95 (.38)	.39*	-.87 (.52)	.42
Identity-Seeking	.48 (.38)	1.62	-.10 (.76)	.93	-.90 (.88)	.41
Desire to Belong	1.60 (.25)	4.93***	-1.35 (.43)	.26**	-3.41 (.52)	.03***
Injustice/Grievance	.29 (.27)	1.30	.84 (.39)	2.32*	.42 (.49)	1.52
Prior Criminal Behavior	-1.28 (.25)	.28***	.72 (.38)	2.06*	2.10 (.49)	8.12***
Pseudo R²	.26		.21		.55	

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

Note: Dependent Variable: **Model 1:** Far-right = 0; Jihadist = 1; **Model 2:** Far-right = 0; Far-left = 1; **Model 3:** Jihadist = 0; Far-left = 1.

Key: *b* = Unstandardized Coefficients; *SE* = Robust Standard Error; *OR* = Odds Ratio

Table 3g presents the results of Models 1-3, with the outcome of interest specified for each model. Model 1 compares far-right and jihadist IOs, with four variables demonstrating a significant relationship in differentiating the two groups. First, jihadists were significantly more

likely to be exposed to extremism as a child than far-right IOs (OR=5.89; $p<.001$). Jihadists were also significantly more likely to experience prior victimization (OR=1.93; $p<.05$) and to express a desire to belong to something than far-right IOs (OR=4.93; $p<.001$). However, jihadists were significantly less likely to have engaged in prior criminal behavior than far-right IOs (OR=.28; $p<.001$).

Model 2 compares far-right and far-left IOs. Far-left IOs were significantly more likely to have a victimization experience (OR=7.49; $p<.001$), perceive an injustice or grievance (OR=2.32; $p<.05$), and have previously engaged in criminal behavior (OR=2.06; $p<.05$) than far-right IOs. Far-left offenders were significantly less likely than far-right offenders to have trouble forming platonic relationships (OR=.36; $p<.05$), experience a negative life transition (OR=.23; $p<.001$), demonstrate status-seeking behaviors (OR=.39; $p<.05$), and express a desire to belong (OR=.26; $P<.01$).

Finally, Model 3 compares jihadist and far-left IOs. Similar to the comparison between jihadists and far-right IOs, far-left offenders were significantly less likely to be exposed to extremism as a child than jihadists (OR=.04; $p<.001$). Far-leftists were also significantly less likely than jihadist IOs to have trouble making and maintaining platonic relationships (OR=.16; $p<.01$), experience a negative life transition (OR=.19; $p<.01$), and to express a desire for belonging (OR=.03; $p<.001$). Far-left offenders, in turn, were significantly more likely to have engaged in prior criminal behavior than jihadist IOs (OR=8.12; $p<.001$).

RQ5: How do the presence of risk and protective variables vary when comparing jihadist, far right, and far left ideological offenders to jihadist, far right, and far left noncriminal extremists?

In this section we break down the ideological categories further by comparing ideological offenders to nonoffending extremists within each ideological category. The purpose of this delineation is to understand how offending extremists differ from nonoffending extremists within a specific ideological group and explore whether those differences are consistent between ideologies.

Table 4a. Sociodemographic

Variable	<u>Jihadist</u>		<u>Far-right</u>		<u>Far-left</u>	
	Offender (n=207)	Nonoffender (n=96)	Offender (n=212)	Nonoffender (n=102)	Offender (n=77)	Nonoffender (n=34)
Gender						
<i>Female</i>	13 (6.19%)	2 (2.08%)	31 (14.62%)	4 (3.92%)	15 (19.48%)	4 (11.76%)
<i>Male</i>	197 (93.81%)	94 (97.92%)	181 (85.38%)	98 (96.08%)	62 (80.52%)	30 (88.24%)
Age	29.88	43.38	41.95	37.19	29.44	36.29
Race/Ethnicity						
<i>White, non-Hispanic</i>	36 (17.14%)	5 (5.21%)	191 (90.09%)	94 (92.16%)	28 (36.36%)	17 (50.00%)
<i>Black, non-Hispanic</i>	50 (23.81%)	19 (19.79%)	7 (3.30%)	1 (0.98%)	31 (40.26%)	14 (41.18%)
<i>Middle Eastern/North African</i>	74 (35.24%)	67 (69.79%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)
<i>Other</i>	47 (22.38%)	2 (2.08%)	8 (3.77%)	0 (0.00%)	3 (3.90%)	2 (5.88%)
<i>Missing</i>	3 (1.43%)	3 (3.13%)	6 (2.83%)	7 (6.86%)	15 (19.48%)	1 (2.94%)
Current Living						
<i>Urban</i>	111 (52.86%)	70 (72.92%)	52 (24.53%)	41 (40.20%)	49 (63.64%)	24 (70.59%)
<i>Suburban</i>	60 (28.57%)	24 (25.00%)	75 (35.38%)	25 (24.51%)	16 (20.78%)	8 (23.53%)
<i>Rural</i>	16 (7.62%)	0 (0.00%)	67 (31.60%)	23 (22.55%)	7 (9.09%)	1 (2.94%)
<i>Missing</i>	23 (10.95%)	2 (2.08%)	18 (8.49%)	13 (12.75%)	5 (6.94%)	1 (2.94%)
Foreign Born						
<i>Foreign Born</i>	107 (50.95%)	49 (51.04%)	1 (0.47%)	1 (0.98%)	3 (3.90%)	1 (2.94%)
<i>U.S. – Born</i>	87 (41.43%)	33 (34.38%)	198 (93.40%)	98 (96.08%)	70 (90.91%)	31 (91.19%)
<i>Missing</i>	16 (7.62%)	14 (14.58%)	13 (6.13%)	3 (2.94%)	4 (5.19%)	2 (5.88%)
Religiosity						
<i>Secular</i>	16 (8.57%)	0 (0.00%)	4 (1.89%)	3 (2.94%)	11 (14.29%)	1 (2.94%)
<i>Somewhat Religious</i>	42 (20.00%)	4 (4.17%)	13 (6.13%)	11 (10.78%)	4 (5.19%)	0 (0.00%)
<i>Very Religious</i>	112 (53.33%)	69 (71.88%)	28 (13.21%)	20 (19.61%)	12 (15.58%)	10 (29.41%)
<i>Missing</i>	38 (18.10%)	23 (23.96%)	167 (78.77%)	68 (66.67%)	50 (64.94%)	23 (67.65%)
Education						
<i>Homeschool</i>	3 (1.43%)	0 (0.00%)	2 (0.94%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)
<i>Some School</i>	28 (13.33%)	1 (1.04%)	18 (8.49%)	4 (3.92%)	5 (6.49%)	0 (0.00%)
<i>High School Diploma/GED</i>	28 (13.33%)	4 (4.17%)	40 (18.87%)	7 (6.86%)	4 (5.19%)	5 (14.71%)
<i>Some college or vocational</i>	75 (35.71%)	5 (5.21%)	26 (12.26%)	7 (6.86%)	18 (23.38%)	0 (0.00%)

<i>College graduate</i>	42 (20.00%)	61 (63.54%)	33 (15.57%)	18 (17.65%)	10 (12.99%)	18 (52.94%)
<i>Missing</i>	34 (16.19%)	25 (26.04%)	93 (43.87%)	66 (64.71%)	40 (51.95%)	11 (32.35%)
Employment History						
<i>Never employed</i>	20 (9.52%)	0 (0.00%)	10 (4.72%)	1 (0.98%)	2 (2.60%)	0 (0.00%)
<i>Sporadically employed</i>	82 (39.05%)	0 (0.00%)	64 (30.19%)	8 (7.84%)	14 (16.18%)	0 (0.00%)
<i>Regularly employed</i>	90 (42.86%)	81 (84.38%)	79 (37.26%)	41 (40.20%)	27 (35.06%)	25 (73.53%)
<i>Missing</i>	18 (8.57%)	15 (15.63%)	59 (27.83%)	52 (50.98%)	34 (44.16%)	9 (26.47%)
Socioeconomic Status						
<i>Low</i>	127 (60.48%)	2 (2.08%)	88 (41.51%)	9 (8.82%)	25 (32.47%)	3 (8.82%)
<i>Middle</i>	55 (26.19%)	35 (36.46%)	42 (19.81%)	24 (23.53%)	12 (15.58%)	16 (47.06%)
<i>High</i>	17 (8.10%)	26 (27.08%)	56 (26.42%)	6 (5.88%)	3 (3.90%)	5 (14.71%)
<i>Missing</i>	11 (5.24%)	33 (34.38%)	26 (12.26%)	63 (61.76%)	37 (48.05%)	10 (29.41%)
Home Ownership						
<i>Rent</i>	102 (48.57%)	11 (11.46%)	50 (23.58%)	15 (14.71%)	38 (49.35%)	6 (17.65%)
<i>Own Home</i>	20 (9.52%)	39 (40.63%)	53 (25.00%)	15 (14.71%)	6 (7.79%)	14 (41.18%)
<i>Homeless</i>	3 (1.43%)	0 (0.00%)	6 (2.83%)	2 (1.96%)	6 (7.79%)	0 (0.00%)
<i>Missing</i>	85 (40.48%)	46 (47.92%)	103 (48.58%)	70 (68.63%)	27 (35.06%)	14 (41.18%)
Military Experience						
<i>No</i>	189 (90.00%)	95 (98.96%)	187 (88.21%)	90 (88.24%)	66 (85.71%)	30 (88.24%)
<i>Yes</i>	21 (10.00%)	1 (1.04%)	25 (11.79%)	12 (11.76%)	11 (14.29%)	4 (11.76%)

Sociodemographic factors

Jihadist. The large majority of jihadist offenders and nonoffenders are male. However, jihadist nonoffenders are over 13 years older on average than offenders. The racial and ethnic composition of the two groups is notably different as well. Twice as many jihadist nonoffenders are Middle Eastern/North African (70%) compared to just 35% of jihadist offenders, who are more often black (24% vs. 20%), white (17% vs. 5%), or another race (22% vs. 2%). Jihadist nonoffenders are more likely than offenders to live in urban areas (53% vs. 73%), and are deemed “very religious” much more often than jihadist offenders (53% vs. 72%).

In terms of education and employment, the differences between the two groups are stark. Jihadist nonoffenders are much more likely to be college educated (20% vs. 63%), and more likely to be regularly employed (43% vs. 84%). In fact, for those who had an employment history known, no jihadist nonoffender had a sporadic or nonexistent work history. These trends continue into SES, where over 60% of violent extremists are classified as low SES, compared to just 2% of nonoffenders who frequently fall into the middle (36%) and high (27%) SES categories. Jihadist offenders are also more likely than nonoffenders to rent their home (49% vs 11%), whereas over 40% of jihadist nonoffenders own their home. Finally, though the occurrence is generally small for both groups, only 1 jihadist nonoffender (1%) had military experience, compared to 10% of jihadist offenders.

Far-Right. In contrast to jihadists, far-right offenders and nonoffenders were much similar in their sociodemographic profiles. While there was a slightly higher percentage of females amongst far-right offenders, they are alike in age, racial/ethnic composition, religiosity, education level, employment history, home ownership, and military experience. The groups

diverge slightly in current living situation, with offenders residing in urban areas less often than nonoffenders (24% vs. 40%). Additionally, though interpretation is limited by the high amount of missing data, far-right offenders are considered low SES more often than nonoffenders (42% vs. 9%).

Far-left. Far-left offenders and nonoffenders shared many sociodemographic characteristics, but differed on many as well. On average, far-left offenders were about 7 years younger than nonoffenders. The two groups were similar in their racial composition, areas of living, religiosity, and military experience. But, there were clear differences in education and employment history. Far-left offenders were college educated much less often than nonoffenders (13% vs. 53%) and were less likely to be regularly employed than nonoffenders (35% vs. 74%). A higher percentage of far-left offenders were low SES compared to nonoffenders (32% vs. 9%), with a plurality of nonoffenders falling into middle class (47%). Offenders also rented their home more often than nonoffenders (49% vs. 18%).

Familial/Social factors

Jihadists. In terms of marital status, a higher percentage of jihadist offenders were single (36% vs. 10%) and had no children (26% vs. 7%) than nonoffenders. This may explain why nearly half of the jihadist nonoffenders lived with a spouse and/or children, compared to 26% of jihadist offenders. Offenders also had only sporadic contact with their family more often than nonoffenders (28% vs. 1%), with nonoffenders being in regular contact more frequently than jihadist offenders (43% vs. 55%). This also tracks with family importance, as more jihadist offenders were distant from their family than nonoffenders (29% vs. 2%), as nonoffenders most

often had close ties to their family (56%). These groups also diverge on familial influences, as over 40% of jihadist offenders had exposure to extremism as a child, compared to just about 14% of nonoffenders. However, neither group had a high prevalence of criminal or extremist family members.

Jihadist offenders express prosocial aspirations less frequently than jihadist nonoffenders (27% vs. 47%). These individuals also experience problems making and maintaining platonic and romantic relationships that were not shared by their nonoffending counterparts. Nearly 46% of jihadist offenders had problems forming romantic connections, with 41% having trouble making platonic friendships, compared to just 4% and 1% of nonoffenders, respectively.

In terms of peers, jihadist offenders were more likely to have no friends (20% vs. 1%), but less likely to have deviant/violent peers than nonoffenders (29% vs. 51%). This finding is likely due to nonoffenders associating with other extremists, who were deemed deviant because of their association with extremist movements. Adding to this point, jihadist offenders associated with criminal and/or delinquent peers much more often (27% vs. 3%), suggesting that the deviant peers nonoffenders associate with are rarely involved in criminal activity. Interestingly, nonoffenders are also more likely than offenders to get along with the peers whom they do associate with (43% vs. 73%).

Table 4b. Familial/Social Factors

Variable	<u>Jihadist</u>		<u>Far-right</u>		<u>Far-left</u>	
	Offender (n=207)	Nonoffender (n=96)	Offender (n=212)	Nonoffender (n=102)	Offender (n=77)	Nonoffender (n=34)
Marital Status						
<i>Single</i>	76 (36.19%)	10 (10.42%)	54 (25.47%)	29 (28.43%)	33 (42.86%)	12 (35.29%)
<i>Married/Partnered</i>	110 (52.38%)	47 (48.96%)	106 (50.00%)	35 (34.31%)	31 (40.26%)	10 (29.41%)
<i>Separated/Divorced/Widowed</i>	16 (7.62%)	3 (3.13%)	26 (12.26%)	6 (5.88%)	7 (9.09%)	3 (8.82%)
<i>Missing</i>	8 (3.81%)	36 (37.50%)	26 (12.26%)	32 (31.37%)	6 (7.79%)	9 (26.47%)
Children						
<i>0</i>	76 (26.19%)	7 (7.29%)	48 (22.64%)	19 (18.63%)	55 (71.43%)	0 (0.00%)
<i>1</i>	29 (13.81%)	12 (12.50%)	33 (15.57%)	15 (14.71%)	2 (2.60%)	5 (14.71%)
<i>2</i>	29 (13.81%)	19 (19.79%)	18 (8.49%)	9 (8.82%)	11 (14.29%)	5 (14.71%)
<i>3</i>	13 (6.19%)	11 (11.46%)	9 (4.25%)	9 (8.82%)	2 (2.60%)	3 (8.82%)
<i>Missing</i>	63 (30.00%)	47 (48.96%)	104 (49.06%)	50 (49.02%)	7 (9.09%)	21 (61.76%)
Parental History						
<i>Parents married</i>	51 (24.29%)	25 (26.04%)	23 (10.85%)	16 (15.69%)	15 (19.48%)	6 (17.65%)
<i>Parents divorced</i>	31 (14.76%)	4 (4.17%)	27 (12.74%)	3 (2.94%)	16 (20.78%)	2 (5.88%)
<i>Parents died</i>	11 (5.24%)	4 (4.17%)	7 (3.30%)	4 (3.92%)	7 (9.09%)	0 (0.00%)
<i>Never Married</i>	8 (3.81%)	0 (0.00%)	1 (0.47%)	1 (0.98%)	3 (3.90%)	2 (5.88%)
<i>Missing</i>	109 (51.90%)	63 (65.63%)	154 (72.64%)	78 (76.47%)	36 (46.75%)	24 (70.59%)
Family Contact						
<i>No contact</i>	22 (10.48%)	3 (3.13%)	20 (9.43%)	0 (0.00%)	8 (10.39%)	3 (8.82%)
<i>Sporadic Contact</i>	59 (28.10%)	1 (1.04%)	24 (11.32%)	1 (0.98%)	11 (14.29%)	1 (2.94%)
<i>Regular Contact</i>	91 (43.33%)	53 (55.21%)	76 (35.85%)	38 (37.25%)	24 (31.17%)	12 (35.29%)
<i>Missing</i>	38 (18.10%)	39 (40.63%)	92 (43.40%)	63 (61.76%)	34 (44.16%)	18 (52.94%)
Childhood Exposure to Extremism						
<i>No</i>	125 (59.52%)	83 (86.46%)	189 (89.15%)	92 (90.20%)	73 (94.81%)	31 (91.18%)
<i>Yes</i>	85 (40.48%)	13 (13.54%)	23 (10.85%)	10 (9.80%)	4 (5.19%)	3 (8.82%)
Familial Criminal History						
<i>No</i>	187 (89.05%)	90 (93.75%)	184 (86.79%)	96 (94.12%)	68 (88.31%)	32 (94.12%)
<i>Yes</i>	22 (10.48%)	4 (4.17%)	25 (11.79%)	5 (4.90%)	8 (10.39%)	2 (5.88%)
<i>Missing</i>	1 (0.48%)	2 (2.08%)	3 (1.42%)	1 (0.98%)	1 (1.30%)	0 (0.00%)

Familial Extremist History						
<i>No</i>	175 (83.33%)	86 (89.58%)	165 (77.83%)	86 (84.31%)	70 (90.91%)	31 (91.18%)
<i>Yes</i>	32 (15.24%)	10 (10.42%)	44 (20.75%)	16 (15.69%)	7 (9.09%)	3 (8.82%)
<i>Missing</i>	3 (1.43%)	0 (0.00%)	3 (1.42%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)
Family Importance in Life						
<i>Distant</i>	60 (28.57%)	2 (2.08%)	39 (18.40%)	3 (2.94%)	19 (24.68%)	0 (0.00%)
<i>Close</i>	89 (42.38%)	54 (56.25%)	63 (29.72%)	40 (39.22%)	33 (42.86%)	18 (52.94%)
<i>Missing</i>	61 (29.05%)	40 (41.67%)	110 (51.89%)	59 (57.84%)	25 (32.47%)	16 (47.06%)
Prosocial Aspirations						
<i>No</i>	153 (72.86%)	51 (53.13%)	164 (77.36%)	81 (79.41%)	46 (59.74%)	16 (47.06%)
<i>Yes</i>	57 (27.14%)	45 (46.88%)	48 (22.64%)	21 (20.59%)	31 (40.26%)	18 (52.94%)
Romantic Troubles						
<i>No</i>	114 (54.29%)	92 (95.83%)	125 (58.96%)	90 (88.24%)	57 (74.03%)	30 (88.24%)
<i>Yes</i>	96 (45.71%)	4 (4.17%)	87 (41.04%)	12 (11.76%)	20 (25.97%)	4 (11.76%)
Platonic Troubles						
<i>No</i>	124 (59.05%)	95 (98.96%)	163 (76.89%)	97 (95.10%)	69 (89.61%)	34 (100%)
<i>Yes</i>	86 (40.95%)	1 (1.04%)	49 (23.11%)	5 (4.90%)	8 (10.39%)	0 (0.00%)
Living Arrangement						
<i>Lived with spouse/children</i>	55 (26.19%)	48 (50.00%)	64 (30.19%)	32 (31.37%)	9 (11.69%)	12 (35.29%)
<i>Lived with family</i>	44 (20.95%)	1 (1.04%)	14 (6.60%)	9 (8.82%)	10 (12.99%)	1 (2.94%)
<i>Lived alone</i>	18 (8.57%)	3 (3.13%)	22 (10.38%)	3 (2.94%)	14 (18.18%)	5 (14.71%)
<i>Live with non-family</i>	26 (12.38%)	3 (3.13%)	21 (9.91%)	4 (3.92%)	11 (14.29%)	0 (0.00%)
<i>Incarcerated</i>	3 (1.43%)	0 (0.00%)	2 (0.94%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)
<i>No stable residence</i>	9 (4.29%)	0 (0.00%)	11 (5.19%)	1 (0.98%)	11 (14.29%)	0 (0.00%)
<i>Missing</i>	55 (26.19%)	41 (42.71%)	78 (36.79%)	53 (51.96%)	22 (28.57%)	16 (47.06%)
Community Status						
<i>Low status/prestige</i>	42 (20.00%)	11 (11.46%)	67 (31.60%)	13 (12.75%)	19 (24.68%)	8 (23.53%)
<i>High status/prestige</i>	21 (10.00%)	49 (51.04%)	19 (8.96%)	4 (3.92%)	14 (18.18%)	14 (41.18%)
<i>Missing</i>	147 (70.00%)	36 (37.50%)	126 (59.43%)	85 (83.33%)	44 (57.14%)	12 (35.29%)
Type of Friends						
<i>None</i>	42 (20.00%)	1 (1.04%)	12 (5.66%)	2 (1.96%)	15 (19.48%)	0 (0.00%)
<i>Deviant/Violent</i>	62 (29.52%)	49 (51.04%)	90 (42.45%)	37 (36.27%)	38 (49.35%)	15 (44.12%)
<i>Nonviolent/Nondeviant</i>	26 (12.38%)	26 (27.08%)	14 (6.60%)	12 (11.76%)	11 (14.29%)	18 (52.94%)

<i>Missing</i>	80 (38.10%)	20 (20.83%)	96 (45.28%)	51 (50.00%)	13 (16.88%)	1 (2.94%)
Criminal/Delinquent Peers						
<i>No</i>	153 (72.86%)	93 (96.88%)	160 (75.47%)	94 (92.16%)	65 (84.42%)	32 (94.12%)
<i>Yes</i>	57 (27.14%)	3 (3.13%)	52 (24.53%)	8 (7.84%)	12 (15.58%)	2 (5.88%)
Get Along with Peers						
<i>No</i>	10 (4.76%)	5 (5.21%)	11 (5.19%)	10 (9.80%)	4 (5.19%)	1 (2.94%)
<i>Yes</i>	91 (43.33%)	70 (72.92%)	43 (20.28%)	25 (24.51%)	25 (32.47%)	30 (88.24%)
<i>Missing</i>	109 (51.90%)	21 (21.88%)	158 (74.53%)	67 (65.69%)	48 (62.34%)	3 (8.82%)

Far-Right. Much like their sociodemographic profiles, far-right offenders and nonoffenders are relatively comparable in their familial and social factors. There are no substantial differences in marital status, children, parental history, family contact, familial criminal or extremist history, prosocial aspirations, or living situation between far-right offenders and nonoffenders. Far-right offenders were more likely to experience romantic troubles (41% vs. 12%) and have platonic troubles (23% vs. 5%) than nonoffenders. The two groups were similarly associated with deviant/violent friends, but far-right offenders had criminal or delinquent peers more often than nonoffenders (25% vs. 8%).

Far-Left. Like far-rightists, far-left offenders and nonoffenders had more in common than not. They were similar in terms of their marital status, parents marital status, family contact, exposure to extremism as a child, familial criminal and extremist history, and living arrangements. Their points of divergence include having children, as most far-left offenders have no children. Far-left offenders were also less likely to be close with their family (43% vs. 53%) and have prosocial aspirations (40% vs. 53%) than nonoffenders. Additionally, far-left offenders were more likely to have romantic troubles (26% vs. 12%) and platonic troubles (10% vs. 0%). In terms of peers, far-left offenders were less likely to have nonviolent/nondeviant peers (14% vs. 53%), and slightly more likely to have peers involved in criminal activity (16% vs. 6%) than nonoffenders. Offenders were also less likely than nonoffenders (32% vs. 88%) to get along with their peers.

Negative Life Events

Jihadists. Jihadist offenders experienced negative life transitions much more frequently than nonoffenders (84% vs. 52%). The most prominent differences between the two groups include

events like recent relocations (29% vs. 3%), health issues (21% vs. 0%), family problems (21% vs. 8%), social alienation (31% vs. 15%), and drug use (18% vs. 1%). Interestingly, nonoffenders had prior victimization experiences more frequently than jihadist offenders (33% vs. 42%).

Far-Right. Mirroring the contrast amongst jihadists, far-right offenders were three times more likely to experience negative life transitions than nonoffenders (74% vs. 25%). Specifically, far-right offenders experience health issues (16% vs. 3%), family problems (21% vs. 10%), social alienation (24% vs. 16%), and drug use (22% vs. 5%) more frequently than nonoffenders.

Far-Left. Overall, far-left offenders and nonoffenders are much more similar than jihadists and far-rightists in their negative life events as about half of both groups have gone through a negative life transition. However, far-left offenders are more likely to be recently relocated (17% vs. 0%), have a medical health issue (29% vs. 6%), experience family problems (22% vs. 9%), and use drugs (17% vs. 0%) than nonoffenders.

Table 4c. Negative Life Events

Variable	Jihadist		Far-right		Far-left	
	Offender (n=207)	Nonoffender (n=96)	Offender (n=212)	Nonoffender (n=102)	Offender (n=77)	Nonoffender (n=34)
Negative Transitions						
<i>No</i>	34 (16.19%)	46 (47.92%)	56 (26.42%)	77 (75.49%)	39 (50.65%)	17 (50.00%)
<i>Yes</i>	176 (83.81%)	50 (52.08%)	156 (73.58%)	25 (24.51%)	38 (49.35%)	17 (50.00%)
Loss of Job/Employment						
<i>No</i>	191 (90.95%)	92 (95.83%)	192 (90.57%)	93 (91.18%)	66 (85.71%)	32 (94.12%)
<i>Yes</i>	19 (9.05%)	4 (4.17%)	20 (9.43%)	9 (8.82%)	11 (14.29%)	2 (5.88%)
Recent Relocation						
<i>No</i>	150 (71.43%)	93 (96.88%)	198 (93.40%)	98 (96.08%)	64 (83.12%)	34 (100%)
<i>Yes</i>	60 (28.57%)	3 (3.13%)	14 (6.60%)	4 (3.92%)	13 (16.88%)	0 (0.00%)
Health Issue						
<i>No</i>	166 (79.05%)	96 (100.00%)	178 (83.96%)	99 (97.06%)	55 (71.43%)	32 (94.12%)
<i>Yes</i>	44 (20.95%)	0 (0.00%)	34 (16.04%)	3 (2.94%)	22 (28.57%)	2 (5.88%)
Victimization						
<i>No</i>	140 (66.67%)	56 (58.33%)	184 (86.79%)	91 (89.22%)	57 (74.03%)	23 (67.65%)
<i>Yes</i>	70 (33.33%)	40 (41.67%)	28 (13.21%)	11 (10.78%)	20 (25.97%)	11 (32.35%)
Family Problems						
<i>No</i>	165 (78.57%)	88 (91.67%)	168 (79.25%)	92 (90.20%)	60 (77.92%)	31 (91.19%)
<i>Yes</i>	45 (21.43%)	8 (8.33%)	44 (20.75%)	10 (9.80%)	17 (22.08%)	3 (8.82%)
Alienation						
<i>No</i>	144 (68.57%)	82 (85.42%)	162 (76.42%)	86 (84.31%)	63 (81.82%)	28 (82.35%)
<i>Yes</i>	66 (31.43%)	14 (14.58%)	50 (23.58%)	16 (15.69%)	14 (18.18%)	6 (17.65%)
Drug Use						
<i>No</i>	173 (82.38%)	95 (98.96%)	166 (78.30%)	97 (95.10%)	64 (83.12%)	34 (100%)
<i>Yes</i>	37 (17.62%)	1 (1.04%)	46 (21.70%)	5 (4.90%)	13 (16.88%)	0 (0.00%)
Alcohol Use						
<i>No</i>	194 (92.38%)	96 (100.00%)	191 (90.09%)	97 (95.10%)	76 (98.70%)	33 (97.06%)
<i>Yes</i>	16 (7.62%)	0 (0.00%)	21 (9.91%)	5 (4.90%)	1 (1.30%)	1 (2.94%)

Psychological/Personality factors

Jihadist. Jihadist offenders were much more likely to have a mental illness (29% vs. 0%) and to have had serious past mental health issues (14% vs. 1%) than jihadist nonoffenders. However, the majority of both groups demonstrated status-seeking behaviors, with nonoffenders having a higher percentage (64%) of individuals who expressed a need for moral superiority over others than jihadist offenders (53%). Jihadist offenders were on the other hand more impulsive, showing impulsive behaviors in about 30% of cases compared to just 3% of nonoffenders.

Far-Right. Echoing jihadists, far-right offenders were more likely than nonoffenders to have a mental illness (22% vs. 1%) or to have had a serious mental health issue in their past (7% vs. 0%). Unlike jihadists, far-right offenders and nonoffenders displayed a comparable prevalence of status-seeking tendencies and impulsive behaviors.

Far-Left. Like jihadists and far-rightists, a much higher percentage of far-left offenders experience a mental illness (30% vs. 0%) and had previously dealt with a serious mental health issue (16% vs. 0%). Mirroring jihadists, far-left offenders were much less likely to have displayed status-seeking behaviors than nonoffenders (19% vs. 44%), but were much more likely to demonstrate impulsive behaviors (35% vs. 9%).

Ideological factors

Jihadist. Jihadist offenders and nonoffenders were alike in their frequency of identity-seeking tendencies, but diverge in their desire to belong as offenders (72%) were much more likely to crave belonging than nonoffenders (22%). Consistent with the findings in earlier sections, nonoffenders were more commonly involved in political activism (42% vs. 83%), a testament to

their use of nonviolent and noncriminal means to advance an ideological cause. Jihadist offenders were more likely to both perceive an injustice or grievance (73% vs. 48%) and blame their grievance on a particular other (56% vs. 31%) than nonoffending extremists. Most often, jihadist offenders acted with others without clear group boundaries (49%) while nonoffenders acted as part of a formal group (77%).

Far-Right. In keeping with earlier sections, far-right offenders and nonoffenders are fairly comparable on the basis of ideological factors. The main differences between the two are that nonoffenders are more frequently involved in political activism than offenders (34% vs. 84%), and far-right offenders are more likely to perceive an injustice or grievance than nonoffenders (61% vs. 46%). Interestingly, though, offenders blame their grievance on a specific other marginally more than nonoffenders (46% vs. 41%). Far-right offenders may act as any one of the modes of group affiliation, but far-right nonoffenders are almost exclusively affiliated with a formal group (78%).

Table 4d. Psychological/Personality Factors

Variable	<u>Jihadist</u>		<u>Far-right</u>		<u>Far-left</u>	
	Offender (n=207)	Nonoffender (n=96)	Offender (n=212)	Nonoffender (n=102)	Offender (n=77)	Nonoffender (n=34)
Mental Illness						
<i>No</i>	150 (71.43%)	96 (100.00%)	164 (77.36%)	101 (99.02%)	54 (70.13%)	34 (100%)
<i>Yes</i>	60 (28.57%)	0 (0.00%)	48 (22.64%)	1 (0.98%)	23 (29.87%)	0 (0.00%)
Serious Mental Health Issue						
<i>No</i>	181 (86.19%)	95 (98.96%)	197 (92.92%)	102 (100.00%)	65 (84.42%)	34 (100%)
<i>Yes</i>	29 (13.81%)	1 (1.04%)	15 (7.08%)	0 (0.00%)	12 (15.58%)	0 (0.00%)
Status-Seeking Behaviors						
<i>No</i>	101 (48.10%)	35 (36.46%)	118 (55.66%)	54 (52.94%)	62 (80.52%)	19 (55.88%)
<i>Yes</i>	109 (51.90%)	61 (63.54%)	94 (44.34%)	48 (47.06%)	15 (19.48%)	15 (44.12%)
Impulsive Behaviors						
<i>No</i>	148 (70.48%)	93 (96.88%)	177 (83.49%)	87 (85.29%)	50 (64.94%)	31 (91.18%)
<i>Yes</i>	62 (29.52%)	3 (3.13%)	35 (16.51%)	15 (14.71%)	27 (35.06%)	3 (8.82%)

Table 4e. Ideological Factors

Variable	<u>Jihadist</u>		<u>Far-right</u>		<u>Far-left</u>	
	Offender (n=207)	Nonoffender (n=96)	Offender (n=212)	Nonoffender (n=102)	Offender (n=77)	Nonoffender (n=34)
Identity-Seeking						
<i>No</i>	161 (76.67%)	74 (77.08%)	193 (91.04%)	94 (92.16%)	74 (96.10%)	29 (85.29%)
<i>Yes</i>	49 (23.33%)	22 (22.92%)	19 (8.96%)	8 (7.84%)	3 (3.90%)	5 (14.71%)
Desire to Belong						
<i>No</i>	59 (28.10%)	75 (78.13%)	144 (67.92%)	76 (74.51%)	67 (87.01%)	31 (91.18%)
<i>Yes</i>	151 (71.90%)	21 (21.88%)	68 (32.08%)	26 (25.49%)	10 (12.99%)	3 (8.82%)
Political Activism						
<i>No</i>	121 (57.62%)	16 (16.67%)	140 (66.04%)	16 (15.69%)	37 (48.05%)	1 (2.94%)
<i>Yes</i>	89 (42.38%)	80 (83.33%)	72 (33.96%)	86 (84.31%)	40 (51.95%)	33 (97.06%)
Perceived Injustice/Grievance						

<i>No</i>	56 (26.67%)	50 (52.08%)	82 (38.68%)	55 (53.92%)	27 (35.06%)	18 (52.94%)
<i>Yes</i>	154 (73.33%)	46 (47.92%)	130 (61.32%)	47 (46.08%)	50 (64.94%)	16 (47.06%)
Blamed Target						
<i>No</i>	92 (43.81%)	66 (68.75%)	115 (54.25%)	60 (58.82%)	30 (38.96%)	22 (64.71%)
<i>Yes</i>	118 (56.19%)	30 (31.25%)	97 (45.75%)	42 (41.18%)	47 (61.04%)	12 (35.29%)
Lone/Group Actor						
<i>Acted Alone</i>	51 (24.29%)	16 (16.67%)	46 (21.70%)	5 (4.90%)	28 (36.36%)	4 (11.76%)
<i>Part of formal group</i>	45 (21.43%)	74 (77.08%)	51 (24.06%)	80 (78.43%)	2 (2.60%)	17 (50.00%)
<i>Part of informal group</i>	12 (5.71%)	3 (3.13%)	56 (26.42%)	10 (9.80%)	34 (44.16%)	11 (32.35%)
<i>Acting with others – no clear group boundaries</i>	102 (48.57%)	3 (3.13%)	58 (27.36%)	7 (6.86%)	12 (15.58%)	2 (5.88%)
<i>Missing</i>	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	1 (0.47%)	0 (0.00%)	1 (1.30%)	0 (0.00%)

Far-Left. In contrast to jihadists, far-left offenders are less likely than nonoffenders to have identity-seeking tendencies (4% vs. 15%). However, mirroring the other two ideologies, far-left offenders are much less involved in political activism than nonoffenders (52% vs. 97%). Like jihadists, far-left offenders are more likely to both perceive an injustice or grievance (65% vs. 47%) and blame others for their grievance (61% vs. 35%) than nonoffenders. Far-left nonoffenders mostly operate as members of a formal (50%) or informal group (32%).

Criminal History

Jihadists. Unsurprisingly, jihadist offenders have more extensive criminal histories than nonoffenders. While gang membership is low for both groups, jihadist offenders are more likely to have been arrested (28% vs. 10%), previously incarcerated (19% vs. 4), and to have committed prior criminal behavior (44% vs. 23%) than jihadist nonoffenders.

Far-Right. Similarly, far-right offenders were more criminally involved than nonoffenders. Gang membership remains a rarity, but far-right offenders were more often arrested (42% vs. 14%), incarcerated (24% vs. 2%), and previously engaged in criminal behavior (59% vs. 24%) than far-right nonoffenders.

Far-Left. The trends for jihadists and far-right offenders and nonoffenders translate into the far-left category as well. There is somewhat of a difference in gang membership between the two groups, with 9% of far-left offenders being members of a gang compared to 0 nonoffenders. Additionally, the difference in previous arrests is less prevalent, as over 35% of far-left nonoffenders were previously arrested compared to 42% of far-left offenders. In turn, far-left

offenders were more likely to have been previously incarcerated (16% vs. 3%) and to have previously engaged in criminal behavior (71% vs. 32%).

Table 4f. Criminal History

Variable	<u>Jihadist</u>		<u>Far-right</u>		<u>Far-left</u>	
	Offender (n=207)	Nonoffender (n=96)	Offender (n=212)	Nonoffender (n=102)	Offender (n=77)	Nonoffender (n=34)
Gang Member						
<i>No</i>	205 (97.62%)	95 (98.96%)	197 (92.92%)	97 (95.10%)	70 (90.91%)	34 (100.00%)
<i>Yes</i>	5 (2.38%)	1 (1.04%)	15 (7.08%)	5 (4.90%)	7 (9.09%)	0 (0.00%)
Prior Arrest						
<i>No</i>	144 (68.57%)	82 (85.42%)	104 (49.06%)	88 (86.27%)	42 (54.55%)	22 (64.71%)
<i>Yes</i>	59 (28.10%)	10 (10.42%)	90 (42.45%)	14 (13.73%)	32 (41.56%)	12 (35.29%)
<i>Missing</i>	7 (3.33%)	4 (4.17%)	18 (8.49%)	0 (0.00%)	3 (3.90%)	0 (0.00%)
Prior Incarceration						
<i>No</i>	171 (81.43%)	92 (95.83%)	160 (75.47%)	100 (98.04%)	65 (84.42%)	33 (97.06%)
<i>Yes</i>	39 (18.57%)	4 (4.17%)	52 (24.53%)	2 (1.96%)	12 (15.58%)	1 (2.94%)
Prior Criminal Behavior						
<i>No</i>	117 (55.71%)	74 (77.08%)	87 (41.04%)	78 (76.47%)	22 (28.57%)	23 (67.65%)
<i>Yes</i>	93 (44.29%)	22 (22.92%)	125 (58.96%)	24 (23.53%)	55 (71.43%)	11 (32.35%)

Multivariate Analysis Comparing Offenders and Nonoffenders by Ideological Category

For the multivariate analysis, we estimate binary logistic regression models to compare ideological offenders and nonoffenders within each ideological category. However, we did not estimate a multivariate model for the sample of far-left offenders and nonoffenders due to the small sample size of that category. The small sample size, coupled with the uneven split of the dependent variable (n=77 offenders; n=34 nonoffenders), posed problems to model convergence and eliminated our ability to include key variables of interest. Thus, we only ran multivariate models for jihadist and far-right ideologues, where such problems were not as prevalent.

Table 4g. Binary Logistic Regression Models Comparing Jihadist Offenders and Nonoffenders (n=300)²

Variable	b (SE)	OR
Race/Ethnicity ^a		
<i>Black, non-hispanic</i>	.31 (.89)	1.35
<i>Middle Eastern/Northern African</i>	1.01 (.79)	2.76
<i>Other</i>	-3.36 (1.24)	.03**
Childhood Exposure to Extremism	-1.65 (.57)	.19**
Prosocial Aspiration	1.21 (.48)	3.35*
Romance Trouble	-2.17 (.70)	.11**
Platonic Trouble	-3.57 (1.47)	.03*
Criminal/Del. Peers	-1.60 (.73)	.20*
Negative Transition	.00 (.52)	1.00
Impulsive Behaviors	-1.30 (.95)	.27
Desire to Belong	-1.43 (.46)	.24**
Political Activism	2.27 (.47)	9.65***
Injustice/Grievance	-.85 (.49)	.43*
Pseudo R²		.63

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

^aReference Category = (1) White

Note: Dependent Variable: Jihadist Ideological Offender = 0; Jihadist Nonoffender = 1

Key: *b* = Unstandardized Coefficients; *SE* = Robust Standard Error; *OR* = Odds Ratio

² Note that we attempted to include *Prior Criminal Behavior* in this model but opted to exclude that variable over concerns of multicollinearity.

Table 4g displays the results of the binary logistic regression model comparing jihadist offenders (=0) to jihadist nonoffenders (=1). Clearly, a number of factors are salient in differentiating jihadist offenders from nonoffenders. First, in their racial and ethnic identity, jihadist nonoffenders were significantly less likely than offenders to be of an “other” racial category, which includes Hispanic, Asian, Native American, or biracial identity (OR=.03; $p<.01$). Jihadist nonoffenders were also less likely to be exposed to extremism as a child (OR=.19; $p<.01$), have problems forming romantic relationships (OR=.11; $p<.01$) and platonic relationships (OR=.03; $p<.05$), have criminal or delinquent peers (OR=.20; $p<.05$), express a desire for belonging (OR=.24; $p<.01$), and perceive an injustice or grievance (OR=.43; $p<.05$). In contrast jihadist nonoffenders were more likely than offenders to have prosocial aspirations (OR=3.35; $p<.05$) and be engaged in political activism (OR=9.65; $p<.001$).

Table 4h. Binary Logistic Regression Models Comparing Far-Right Offenders and Nonoffenders (n=314)

Variable	b(SE)	OR
Romance Trouble	-.66 (.43)	.52
Platonic Trouble	-.17 (.61)	.85
Criminal/Del. Peers	-.01 (.60)	.99
Negative Transition	-1.55 (.37)	.21***
Mental Illness	-2.24 (.84)	.11**
Desire to Belong	.67 (.45)	1.95
Political Activism	2.70 (.41)	14.87***
Injustice/Grievance	-.66 (.37)	.52
Prior Criminal Behavior	-.83 (.31)	.43*
Pseudo R²		.40

*** $p<.001$, ** $p<.01$, * $p<.05$

Note: Dependent Variable: Far-right Ideological Offender = 0; Far-right Nonoffender = 1

Key: *b* = Unstandardized Coefficients; *SE* = Robust Standard Error; *OR* = Odds Ratio

In terms of far-right offenders and nonoffenders, the multivariate model in Table 4h indicates several factors differentiate the two groups. First, far-right nonoffenders are significantly less likely to experience a negative life transition than far-right offenders (OR=.21; $p<.001$).

Nonoffenders are also less likely to have a mental illness (OR=.11; $p<.01$), and less likely to have previously engaged in criminal behavior (OR=.43; $p<.05$). Alternatively, far-right nonoffenders are significantly more likely to engage in political activism than offenders, which is consistent with the descriptive assessment above (OR=14.87; $p<.001$).

RQ6: How do indicators of extremist mobilization vary by the violent/non-violent ideological extremists and across type of ideological motivation (jihadist, far right, far left)?

We provide descriptives for variables related to the mobilization of others or warning behaviors.

In Table 5a, we provide results for extremists who committed violent and nonviolent crimes.

There were no substantive differences comparing the two groups for over one-half of the variables. VEs were however much more likely than NVCEs to prepare a statement related to their crimes (24% vs 8%), communicate their intention to engage in extremist crime and violence to others (36% vs. 19%), glorify violence (50% vs. 20%), communicate with other extremists (55% vs. 43%), advocate for violence (69% v 35%), have angry outbursts (24% vs. 5%), be involved in extremist online spaces (37% vs. 25%), have both formal (29% vs. 17%) and informal (22% vs. 12%) training, have a hierarchical mindset (48% vs. 30%), sympathize with an extremist cause (76% vs. 65%), isolated self from others (31% vs. 6%), and dehumanize others (41% vs. 13%). On the other hand, VEs were much less likely than NCVES to supply resources to other extremists (5% vs. 20%), received third party monies to fund their activities (11% vs. 17%), have suspicious financial transactions (5% vs. 20%), and to reject democratic values and laws (36% vs. 48%). The higher prevalence for the former three factors are consistent with the types of activities that NVCEs often engage in, including material support, tax fraud, or other financial crimes.

Table 5a. Mobilization Indicators

Variable	Violent Extremist (n=258)	Nonviolent Criminal Extremist (n=241)
Hostility Towards Nation		
<i>No</i>	188 (72.87%)	181 (75.10%)
<i>Yes</i>	70 (27.13%)	60 (24.90%)
Prepared Statement		
<i>No</i>	197 (76.36%)	223 (92.53%)
<i>Yes</i>	61 (23.64%)	18 (7.47%)
Mobilized Others		
<i>No</i>	162 (62.79%)	157 (65.15%)
<i>Yes</i>	96 (37.21%)	84 (34.85%)
Sought Travel Help		
<i>No</i>	222 (86.05%)	223 (92.53%)
<i>Yes</i>	26 (13.95%)	18 (7.47%)
Communicating Intent		
<i>No</i>	165 (63.95%)	194 (80.50%)
<i>Yes</i>	93 (36.05%)	47 (19.50%)
Travel Preparations		
<i>No</i>	203 (78.68%)	188 (78.01%)
<i>Yes</i>	55 (21.32%)	53 (21.99%)
Supplying Resources		
<i>No</i>	245 (94.96%)	193 (80.08%)
<i>Yes</i>	13 (5.04%)	48 (19.92%)
Received Third Party Money		
<i>No</i>	229 (88.76%)	200 (82.99%)
<i>Yes</i>	29 (11.24%)	41 (17.01%)
Glorify Violence		
<i>No</i>	128 (49.61%)	193 (80.08%)
<i>Yes</i>	130 (50.39%)	48 (19.92%)
Radicalize Others		
<i>No</i>	187 (72.48%)	180 (74.69%)
<i>Yes</i>	71 (27.52%)	61 (25.31%)
Communicate With Extremists		
<i>No</i>	117 (45.35%)	137 (56.85%)
<i>Yes</i>	141 (54.65%)	104 (43.15%)
Contact Infamous Extremists		
<i>No</i>	207 (80.23%)	202 (82.82%)
<i>Yes</i>	51 (19.77%)	39 (16.18%)
Advocated Violence		
<i>No</i>	79 (30.62%)	156 (64.73%)
<i>Yes</i>	179 (69.38%)	85 (35.27%)
Angry Outbursts		
<i>No</i>	195 (75.58%)	229 (95.02%)
<i>Yes</i>	63 (24.42%)	12 (4.98%)

Produced Media		
<i>No</i>	199 (77.13%)	194 (80.50%)
<i>Yes</i>	59 (22.87%)	47 (19.50%)
Concealment Behaviors		
<i>No</i>	245 (94.96%)	219 (90.87%)
<i>Yes</i>	13 (5.04%)	22 (9.13%)
Manipulate Social Media		
<i>No</i>	247 (95.74%)	222 (92.12%)
<i>Yes</i>	11 (4.26%)	19 (7.88%)
Online Involvement		
<i>No</i>	162 (62.79%)	180 (74.69%)
<i>Yes</i>	96 (37.21%)	61 (25.31%)
Online Preparations		
<i>No</i>	214 (82.95%)	190 (78.84%)
<i>Yes</i>	44 (17.05%)	51 (21.16%)
Formal Training		
<i>No</i>	182 (70.54%)	199 (82.57%)
<i>Yes</i>	76 (29.46%)	42 (17.43%)
Informal Training		
<i>No</i>	200 (77.52%)	211 (87.55%)
<i>Yes</i>	58 (22.48%)	30 (12.45%)
Hierarchical Mindset		
<i>No</i>	133 (51.55%)	168 (69.71%)
<i>Yes</i>	125 (48.45%)	73 (30.29%)
Suspicious Transactions		
<i>No</i>	244 (94.57%)	193 (80.08%)
<i>Yes</i>	14 (5.43%)	48 (19.92%)
Disposal Of Assets		
<i>No</i>	251 (97.29%)	238 (98.76%)
<i>Yes</i>	7 (2.71%)	3 (1.24%)
Unusual Goodbyes		
<i>No</i>	243 (94.19%)	239 (99.17%)
<i>Yes</i>	15 (5.81%)	2 (0.83%)
Sympathize With Cause		
<i>No</i>	62 (24.03%)	84 (34.85%)
<i>Yes</i>	196 (75.97%)	157 (65.15%)
Promote Extreme Narratives		
<i>No</i>	136 (52.71%)	140 (58.09%)
<i>Yes</i>	122 (47.29%)	101 (41.91%)
Isolated Self		
<i>No</i>	179 (69.38%)	226 (93.78%)
<i>Yes</i>	79 (30.62%)	15 (6.22%)
Adopted Multiple Ideologies		
<i>No</i>	242 (93.80%)	235 (97.51%)
<i>Yes</i>	16 (6.20%)	6 (2.49%)
Reject Democratic Values		

<i>No</i>	164 (63.57%)	125 (51.87%)
<i>Yes</i>	94 (36.43%)	116 (48.13%)
Dehumanize Others		
<i>No</i>	153 (59.30%)	210 (87.14%)
<i>Yes</i>	105 (40.70%)	31 (12.86%)
Praising Past Attacks		
<i>No</i>	207 (80.23%)	200 (82.99%)
<i>Yes</i>	51 (19.77%)	41 (17.01%)
Condemning Others		
<i>No</i>	231 (89.53%)	226 (93.78%)
<i>Yes</i>	27 (10.47%)	15 (6.22%)
Lying To Authorities		
<i>No</i>	208 (80.62%)	190 (78.84%)
<i>Yes</i>	50 (19.38%)	51 (21.16%)

Multivariate Analysis

We estimated a binary logistic regression model with the mobilization indicators that were substantively different between VEs and NVCEs. Displayed in Table 5b, several factors are strong predictors of violent extremism at the multivariate level. VEs are significantly more likely to express an acceptance or glorification of violence (OR=3.56; $p<.001$), have a history of angry outbursts (OR=2.91; $p<.01$), have formal weapons or equipment training (OR=2.00; $p<.01$), isolate themselves from friends and family (OR=3.95; $p<.001$), and dehumanize others (OR=2.95; $p<.001$). Alternatively, VEs are significantly less likely to supply resources to extremist causes (OR=.18; $p<.001$), engage in suspicious financial transactions (OR=.33; $p<.01$), and reject conventional democratic values and norms (OR=.33; $p<.001$).

Table 5b. Binary Logistic Regression Comparing Mobilization Indicators Between Violent and Nonviolent Criminal Extremists (n=499)

Variable	b(SE)	OR
Communicating Intent	.18 (.28)	1.20
Glorify Violence	1.27 (.27)	3.56***
Communicate	.37 (.25)	1.45
Supplying Resources	-1.72 (.40)	.18***
Third Party Monies	-.27 (.35)	.76
Angry Outbursts	1.07 (.39)	2.91**
Online Involvement	-.50 (.30)	.61

Formal Training	.69 (.26)	2.00**
Suspicious Transactions	-1.09 (.36)	.33**
Hierarchical Mindset	.38 (.25)	1.47
Isolated Self	1.37 (.40)	3.95***
Reject Democracy	-1.10 (.24)	.33***
Dehumanize Others	1.01 (.30)	2.75***
Pseudo R²		.28

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

Note: Dependent Variable: Violent Extremist = 1; Nonviolent Criminal Extremist = 0.

Key: *b* = Unstandardized Coefficients; *SE* = Robust Standard Error; *OR* = Odds Ratio

Comparing Mobilization Indicators Across Ideological Categories

Table 5b displays the frequencies of our mobilization indicators across the three ideological categories. Although there are some similarities in the presence of warning behaviors comparing across ideology (e.g. mobilization of others, having angry outbursts, disposing of assets, issuing unusual goodbyes, adopting multiple ideologies, and condemning others), there were some stark differences for many of the warning behavior variables. For example, jihadists were more likely to show hostility towards the nation (37% vs. 22% vs. 8%), prepare a statement (28% vs. 5% vs. 9%), seek travel help (25% vs. 0% vs. 1%), prepare to travel (46% vs. .5% vs. 13%), supply resources to extremist movements (27% vs. 1% vs. 1%), accept or glorify violence as a means to achieve ideological goals (60% vs. 15% vs. 25%), communicate with other extremists (64% vs. 46% vs. 16%), advocate for violence (78% vs. 40% vs. 21%), be involved in extremist online spaces (49% vs. 14% vs. 31%), use online spaces to prepare for their attack (30% vs. 7% vs. 18%), have both formal (32% vs. 18% vs. 14%) and informal training (32% vs. 6% vs. 12%), sympathize with an extremist cause (85% vs. 68% vs. 40%), isolate themselves from others (28% vs. 10% vs. 18%), and praise past attacks (33% vs. 5% vs. 9%). Both jihadist and far-right IOs were more likely than far-left IOs to promote extremist narratives (50% vs. 44% vs. 32%), have a hierarchical mindset (42% vs. 40% vs. 5%), and dehumanize others (31% vs. 28% vs.

14%). Far-right IOs in particular were more likely to reject traditional democratic values and laws (35% vs. 62% vs. 5%). Finally, jihadists and far-left IOs communicated their intentions to engage in extremism more often than far-right offenders (37% vs. 17% vs. 32%).

Table 5c. Mobilization Indicators

Variable	Jihadist (n=210)	Far-right (n=212)	Far-Left (n=77)
Hostility Towards Nation			
<i>No</i>	133 (63.33%)	165 (77.83%)	71 (92.21%)
<i>Yes</i>	77 (36.67%)	47 (22.17%)	6 (7.79%)
Prepared Statement			
<i>No</i>	150 (71.43%)	200 (94.34%)	70 (90.91%)
<i>Yes</i>	60 (28.57%)	12 (5.66%)	7 (9.09%)
Mobilized Others			
<i>No</i>	126 (60.00%)	130 (61.32%)	63 (81.82%)
<i>Yes</i>	84 (40.00%)	82 (38.68%)	14 (18.18%)
Sought Travel Help			
<i>No</i>	157 (74.76%)	212 (100.00%)	76 (98.70%)
<i>Yes</i>	53 (25.24%)	0 (0.00%)	1 (1.30%)
Communicating Intent			
<i>No</i>	132 (62.86%)	185 (82.55%)	52 (67.53%)
<i>Yes</i>	78 (37.14%)	37 (17.45%)	25 (32.47%)
Travel Preparations			
<i>No</i>	113 (53.81%)	211 (99.53%)	67 (87.01%)
<i>Yes</i>	97 (46.19%)	1 (0.47%)	10 (12.99%)
Supplying Resources			
<i>No</i>	153 (72.86%)	209 (98.58%)	76 (98.70%)
<i>Yes</i>	57 (27.14%)	3 (1.42%)	1 (1.30%)
Received Third Party Money			
<i>No</i>	168 (80.00%)	185 (87.26%)	76 (98.70%)
<i>Yes</i>	42 (20.00%)	27 (12.74%)	1 (1.30%)
Glorify Violence			
<i>No</i>	83 (39.52%)	180 (84.91%)	58 (75.32%)
<i>Yes</i>	127 (60.48%)	32 (15.09%)	19 (24.68%)
Radicalize Others			
<i>No</i>	143 (68.10%)	157 (74.06%)	67 (87.01%)
<i>Yes</i>	67 (31.90%)	55 (25.94%)	10 (12.99%)
Communicate With Extremists			
<i>No</i>	75 (35.71%)	114 (53.77%)	65 (84.42%)
<i>Yes</i>	135 (64.29%)	98 (46.23%)	12 (15.58%)
Contact Infamous Extremists			
<i>No</i>	156 (74.29%)	186 (87.74%)	67 (87.01%)

<i>Yes</i>	54 (25.71%)	26 (12.26%)	10 (12.99%)
Advocated Violence			
<i>No</i>	46 (21.90%)	128 (60.38%)	61 (79.22%)
<i>Yes</i>	164 (78.10%)	84 (39.62%)	16 (20.78%)
Angry Outbursts			
<i>No</i>	184 (87.62%)	179 (84.43%)	61 (79.22%)
<i>Yes</i>	26 (12.38%)	33 (15.57%)	16 (20.78%)
Produced Media			
<i>No</i>	160 (76.19%)	176 (83.02%)	57 (74.03%)
<i>Yes</i>	50 (23.81%)	36 (16.98%)	20 (25.97%)
Concealment Behaviors			
<i>No</i>	191 (90.95%)	210 (99.06%)	63 (81.82%)
<i>Yes</i>	19 (9.05%)	2 (0.94%)	14 (18.18%)
Manipulate Social Media			
<i>No</i>	190 (90.48%)	212 (100.00%)	67 (87.01%)
<i>Yes</i>	20 (9.52%)	0 (0.00%)	10 (12.99%)
Online Involvement			
<i>No</i>	107 (50.95%)	182 (85.85%)	53 (68.83%)
<i>Yes</i>	103 (49.05%)	30 (14.15%)	24 (31.17%)
Online Preparations			
<i>No</i>	145 (69.05%)	196 (92.45%)	63 (81.82%)
<i>Yes</i>	65 (30.95%)	16 (7.55%)	14 (18.18%)
Formal Training			
<i>No</i>	142 (67.62%)	173 (81.60%)	66 (85.71%)
<i>Yes</i>	68 (32.38%)	39 (18.40%)	11 (14.29%)
Informal Training			
<i>No</i>	143 (68.10%)	200 (94.34%)	68 (88.31%)
<i>Yes</i>	67 (31.90%)	12 (5.66%)	9 (11.69%)
Hierarchical Mindset			
<i>No</i>	122 (58.10%)	106 (50.00%)	73 (94.81%)
<i>Yes</i>	88 (41.90%)	106 (40.00%)	4 (5.19%)
Suspicious Transactions			
<i>No</i>	174 (82.86%)	188 (88.68%)	75 (97.40%)
<i>Yes</i>	36 (17.14%)	24 (11.32%)	2 (2.60%)
Disposal Of Assets			
<i>No</i>	204 (97.14%)	210 (99.06%)	75 (97.40%)
<i>Yes</i>	6 (2.86%)	2 (0.94%)	2 (2.60%)
Unusual Goodbyes			
<i>No</i>	200 (95.24%)	206 (97.17%)	76 (98.70%)
<i>Yes</i>	10 (4.76%)	6 (2.83%)	1 (1.30%)
Sympathize With Cause			
<i>No</i>	32 (15.24%)	68 (32.08%)	46 (59.74%)
<i>Yes</i>	178 (84.76%)	144 (67.92%)	31 (40.26%)
Promote Extreme Narratives			
<i>No</i>	105 (50.00%)	119 (56.13%)	52 (67.53%)
<i>Yes</i>	105 (50.00%)	93 (43.87%)	25 (32.47%)

Isolated Self			
<i>No</i>	152 (72.38%)	190 (89.62%)	63 (81.82%)
<i>Yes</i>	58 (27.62%)	22 (10.38%)	14 (18.18%)
Adopted Multiple Ideologies			
<i>No</i>	198 (94.29%)	204 (96.26%)	75 (97.40%)
<i>Yes</i>	12 (5.71%)	8 (3.77%)	2 (2.60%)
Reject Democratic Values			
<i>No</i>	136 (64.76%)	80 (37.74%)	73 (94.81%)
<i>Yes</i>	74 (35.24%)	132 (62.26%)	4 (5.19%)
Dehumanize Others			
<i>No</i>	145 (69.05%)	152 (71.70%)	66 (85.71%)
<i>Yes</i>	65 (30.95%)	60 (28.30%)	11 (14.29%)
Praising Past Attacks			
<i>No</i>	140 (66.67%)	201 (94.81%)	66 (85.71%)
<i>Yes</i>	70 (33.33%)	11 (5.19%)	11 (9.91%)
Condemning Others			
<i>No</i>	186 (88.57%)	198 (93.40%)	73 (94.81%)
<i>Yes</i>	24 (11.43%)	14 (6.60%)	4 (5.19%)
Lying To Authorities			
<i>No</i>	170 (80.95%)	156 (73.58%)	72 (93.51%)
<i>Yes</i>	40 (19.05%)	56 (26.42%)	5 (6.49%)

Multivariate Analysis

For the multivariate models, we take the same approach as demonstrated in earlier sections and estimate three separate models to compare each ideological category to one another. Because the sample sizes for each of these models are slightly smaller, we were more deliberate on the variable selection and only use variables with the most pronounced differences between ideologies. Additionally, we did not include variables that reported a frequency of 0 or 1 in any of the models, as variables with such low frequencies produced unreliable coefficients with large standard errors.

Table 5d displays the results of each model. Model 1 compared mobilization indicators between far-right and jihadist IOs. Jihadist IOs were significantly more likely than far-right IOs to glorify violence (OR=5.63; $p<.001$), go through some form of informal training (OR=6.22; $p<.001$), be involved in extremist online spaces (OR=3.31; $p<.001$), and praise past extremist

attacks (OR=6.60; $p<.001$). On the other hand, jihadist IOs were significantly less likely to have a hierarchical mindset (OR=.25; $p<.001$) and reject democratic values than far-right IOs.

Table 5d. Binary Logistic Regression Models Comparing Mobilization Indicators Jihadist, Far-right, and Far-Left Extremist Offenders

Variable	Model 1 (n=422) Far-Right Vs. Jihadist		Model 2 (n=289) Far-Right Vs. Far-Left		Model 3 (n=287) Jihadist Vs. Far-Left	
	b(SE)	OR	b(SE)	OR	b(SE)	OR
Hostility	.72 (.38)	2.05	3.02 (1.51)	20.59*	-.66 (.62)	.52
Prepared Statement	.87 (.54)	2.38	.46 (1.04)	1.60	-.52 (.49)	.59
Glorify Violence	1.73 (.35)	5.63***	2.69 (1.36)	14.58*	-.37 (.45)	.69
Communicate With Extremists	.37 (.30)	1.44	-.79 (.46)	.45	-2.19 (.38)	.11***
Informal Training	1.83 (.41)	6.22***	3.79 (1.10)	44.36***	-.89 (.50)	.41
Online Involvement	1.20 (.37)	3.31***	2.87 (.58)	17.70***	-.23 (.47)	.79
Hierarchical Mindset	-1.39 (.31)	.25***	-5.47 (1.35)	.00***	-2.07 (.78)	.13**
Sympathize With Cause	.55 (.33)	1.73	-.89 (.46)	.41	-1.39 (.41)	.25***
Reject Democracy	-2.39 (.35)	.09***	-7.16 (1.84)	.00***	-.90 (.74)	.41
Praising Past Attacks	1.89 (.57)	6.60***	1.00 (1.14)	2.74	-.31 (.52)	1.37
Pseudo R²	.43		.60		.40	

*** $p<.001$, ** $p<.01$, * $p<.05$

Note: Dependent Variable: *Model 1*: Far-right = 0; Jihadist = 1; *Model 2*: Far-right = 0; Far-left = 1; *Model 3*: Jihadist = 0; Far-left = 1.

Key: *b* = Unstandardized Coefficients; *SE* = Robust Standard Error; *OR* = Odds Ratio

Model 2 compares far-right and far-left IOs. Far-left offenders were significantly more likely than far-right offenders to express hostility towards the nation (OR=20.59; $p<.05$), glorify violence (OR=14.58; $p<.05$), have had some informal training (OR=44.36; $p<.001$), and be involved in extremist online spaces (OR=17.70; $p<.001$). With that said, far-left offender were significantly less likely to have a hierarchical mindset (OR=.00; $p<.001$) and reject democratic values (OR=.00; $p<.001$) than far-right IOs.

Finally, Model 3 compares jihadist and far-left IOs. The differences between these two groups are less profound than the previous comparisons, but there are still several mobilization indicators that characterize jihadist and far-left IOs. Specifically, far-left IOs were significantly

less likely to communicate with other extremists (OR=.11; $p<.001$), have a hierarchical mindset (OR=.13; $p<.01$), and sympathize with an extremist cause (OR=.25; $p<.001$) than jihadist IOs.

Comparing Ideological Offenders to Nonoffending Extremists and Non-extremist Violent Offenders

The final warning behavior table (5c) compares IOs to NOEs and NEVOs. It is not surprising that most of these variables were only consistently present when coding materials on the IOs, as these mobilization indicators are situated as precursors to extremist crime and violence. This conceptualization is validated by the exceptionally low frequency of these indicators among the NEVO sample, as the most prevalent indicator for these offenders is a history of angry outbursts (27%), which they do demonstrate at a higher percentage than IOs (15%) or NOEs (5%).

Comparing IOs to NOEs, however, reveal some more interesting differences. IOs are more likely than NOEs to express hostility towards the nation (26% vs. 13%), make preparations to travel for an extremist cause (22% vs. 1%), glorify (36% vs. 27%) and advocate for violence (53% vs. 25%), have a hierarchical mindset (40% vs. 23%), sympathize with extremist causes (71% vs. 26%), promote extremist narratives (45% vs. 24%), isolate oneself (19% vs. 1%), reject democratic values and norms (42% vs. 10%), and dehumanize others (27% vs. 12%). In contrast, a higher percentage of NOEs attempted to radicalize others (26% vs. 60%) and mobilize others to extremist action (38% vs. 63%). Additionally, NOEs were more likely than IOs to communicate with other extremists (49% vs. 77%), produce extremist media (21% vs. 50%), and be involved in online extremist spaces (31% vs. 50%). So, in many ways the warning behaviors that are thought to precede extremist crime and violence may be more relevant to characterizing those extremists who act within the parameters of the law.

Table 5d. Mobilization Indicators

Variable	Extremist Offenders (n=499)	Nonoffending Extremists (n=232)	Regular Non-extremist Violent Offenders (n=240)
Hostility Towards Nation			
<i>No</i>	369 (73.95%)	201 (86.64%)	240 (100.00%)
<i>Yes</i>	130 (26.05%)	31 (13.36%)	0 (0.00%)
Prepared Statement			
<i>No</i>	420 (84.17%)	232 (100.00%)	239 (99.58%)
<i>Yes</i>	79 (15.83%)	0 (0.00%)	1 (0.42%)
Mobilized Others			
<i>No</i>	319 (63.93%)	86 (37.07%)	237 (98.75%)
<i>Yes</i>	180 (36.07%)	146 (62.93%)	3 (1.25%)
Sought Travel Help			
<i>No</i>	445 (89.18%)	231 (99.57%)	239 (99.58%)
<i>Yes</i>	54 (10.82%)	1 (0.43%)	1 (0.42%)
Communicating Intent			
<i>No</i>	359 (71.94%)	189 (81.47%)	237 (98.75%)
<i>Yes</i>	140 (28.06%)	43 (18.53%)	3 (1.25%)
Travel Preparations			
<i>No</i>	391 (78.36%)	228 (98.28%)	240 (100.00%)
<i>Yes</i>	108 (21.64%)	4 (1.72%)	0 (0.00%)
Supplying Resources			
<i>No</i>	438 (87.78%)	226 (97.41%)	240 (100.00%)
<i>Yes</i>	61 (12.22%)	6 (2.59%)	0 (0.00%)
Received Third Party Money			
<i>No</i>	429 (85.97%)	229 (98.71%)	240 (100.00%)
<i>Yes</i>	70 (14.03%)	3 (1.29%)	0 (0.00%)
Glorify Violence			
<i>No</i>	321 (64.33%)	169 (72.84%)	237 (98.75%)
<i>Yes</i>	178 (35.67%)	63 (27.16%)	3 (1.25%)
Radicalize Others			
<i>No</i>	367 (73.55%)	92 (39.66%)	238 (99.17%)
<i>Yes</i>	132 (26.45%)	140 (60.34%)	2 (0.83%)
Communicate With Extremists			
<i>No</i>	254 (50.90%)	54 (23.28%)	237 (98.75%)
<i>Yes</i>	245 (49.10%)	178 (76.72%)	3 (1.25%)
Contact Infamous Extremists			
<i>No</i>	409 (81.96%)	182 (78.45%)	240 (100.00%)
<i>Yes</i>	90 (18.04%)	50 (21.55%)	0 (0.00%)
Advocated Violence			
<i>No</i>	235 (47.09%)	173 (74.57%)	231 (96.25%)
<i>Yes</i>	264 (52.91%)	59 (25.43%)	9 (3.75%)
Angry Outbursts			
<i>No</i>	424 (84.97%)	220 (94.83%)	175 (72.92%)
<i>Yes</i>	75 (15.03%)	12 (5.17%)	65 (27.08%)

Produced Media			
<i>No</i>	393 (78.76%)	117 (50.43%)	238 (99.17%)
<i>Yes</i>	106 (21.24%)	115 (49.57%)	2 (0.83%)
Concealment Behaviors			
<i>No</i>	464 (92.99%)	231 (99.57%)	239 (99.58%)
<i>Yes</i>	35 (7.01%)	1 (0.43%)	1 (0.42%)
Manipulate Social Media			
<i>No</i>	469 (93.99%)	228 (98.28%)	238 (99.17%)
<i>Yes</i>	30 (6.01%)	4 (1.72%)	2 (0.83%)
Online Involvement			
<i>No</i>	342 (68.54%)	116 (50.00%)	233 (97.08%)
<i>Yes</i>	157 (31.46%)	116 (50.00%)	7 (2.92%)
Online Preparations			
<i>No</i>	404 (80.96%)	231 (99.57%)	236 (98.33%)
<i>Yes</i>	95 (19.04%)	1 (0.43%)	4 (1.67%)
Formal Training			
<i>No</i>	381 (76.35%)	218 (93.97%)	236 (98.33%)
<i>Yes</i>	118 (23.65%)	14 (6.03%)	4 (1.67%)
Informal Training			
<i>No</i>	411 (82.36%)	216 (93.10%)	238 (99.17%)
<i>Yes</i>	88 (17.64%)	16 (6.90%)	2 (0.83%)
Hierarchical Mindset			
<i>No</i>	301 (60.32%)	179 (77.16%)	238 (99.17%)
<i>Yes</i>	198 (39.68%)	53 (22.84%)	2 (0.83%)
Suspicious Transactions			
<i>No</i>	437 (87.58%)	231 (99.57%)	239 (99.58%)
<i>Yes</i>	62 (12.42%)	1 (0.43%)	1 (0.42%)
Disposal Of Assets			
<i>No</i>	489 (98.00%)	231 (99.57%)	240 (100.00%)
<i>Yes</i>	10 (2.00%)	1 (0.43%)	0 (0.00%)
Unusual Goodbyes			
<i>No</i>	482 (96.59%)	232 (100.00%)	237 (98.75%)
<i>Yes</i>	17 (3.41%)	0 (0.00%)	3 (1.25%)
Sympathize With Cause			
<i>No</i>	146 (29.26%)	171 (73.71%)	239 (99.58%)
<i>Yes</i>	353 (70.74%)	61 (26.29%)	1 (0.42%)
Promote Extreme Narratives			
<i>No</i>	276 (55.31%)	176 (75.86%)	240 (100.00%)
<i>Yes</i>	223 (44.69%)	56 (24.14%)	0 (0.00%)
Isolated Self			
<i>No</i>	405 (81.16%)	229 (98.71%)	235 (97.92%)
<i>Yes</i>	94 (18.84%)	3 (1.29%)	5 (2.08%)
Adopted Multiple Ideologies			
<i>No</i>	477 (95.59%)	227 (97.84%)	240 (100.00%)
<i>Yes</i>	22 (4.41%)	5 (2.14%)	0 (0.00%)
Reject Democratic Values			

<i>No</i>	289 (57.92%)	209 (90.09%)	240 (100.00%)
<i>Yes</i>	210 (42.08%)	23 (9.91%)	0 (0.00%)
Dehumanize Others			
<i>No</i>	363 (72.75%)	204 (87.93%)	237 (98.75%)
<i>Yes</i>	136 (27.25%)	28 (12.07%)	3 (1.25%)
Praising Past Attacks			
<i>No</i>	407 (81.56%)	207 (89.22%)	240 (100.00%)
<i>Yes</i>	92 (18.44%)	25 (10.78%)	0 (0.00%)
Condemning Others			
<i>No</i>	457 (91.58%)	226 (97.41%)	240 (100.00%)
<i>Yes</i>	42 (8.42%)	6 (2.59%)	0 (0.00%)
Lying To Authorities			
<i>No</i>	398 (79.76%)	222 (95.69%)	205 (85.42%)
<i>Yes</i>	101 (20.24%)	10 (4.31%)	35 (14.58%)

Multivariate Analysis

For the multivariate analysis, we estimate a multinomial logistic regression model to compare the mobilization indicators of IOs to that of NOEs and NEVOs. Consistent with the descriptive analysis, NOEs were significantly more likely to mobilize (RRR=1.94; $p<.05$) and radicalize others (RRR=3.33; $p<.001$) than IOs. They were also more likely to communicate with other extremists (RRR=4.02; $p<.001$) and produce extremist media (RRR=5.45; $p<.001$) than their IO counterparts. NOEs were, however, less likely to have formal training (RRR=.35; $p<.01$), sympathize with an extremist cause (RRR=.07; $p<.001$), and reject conventional democratic values (RRR=.18; $p<.001$) than IOs.

Table 5f. Multinomial Logistic Regression Comparing Mobilization Indicators between Extremist Offenders, Nonoffending Extremists, and Non-extremist Violent Offenders (n=971)

Variable	Nonoffending Extremists		Non-extremist Violent Offenders	
	b(SE)	RRR	b(SE)	RRR
Mobilized Others	.66 (.32)	1.94*	-1.53 (.83)	.22
Glorify Violence	.18 (.29)	1.19	-2.17 (.84)	.11*
Radicalize Others	1.20 (.33)	3.33***	-.34 (1.20)	.71
Communicate with Extremists	1.39 (.25)	4.02***	-3.10 (.78)	.05***
Angry Outbursts	-.82 (.45)	.44	2.28 (.49)	9.81***

Produced Media	1.69 (.30)	5.45***	-.40 (.90)	.67
Online Involvement	.00 (.28)	1.00	-2.00 (.51)	.14**
Formal Training	-1.06 (.35)	.35**	-2.65 (.77)	.07***
Hierarchical Mindset	-.47 (.30)	.63	-3.32 (1.59)	.04*
Sympathize With Cause	-2.65 (.30)	.07***	-4.20 (1.04)	.01***
Promote Extreme Narratives	.28 (.27)	1.33	16.26 (.51)	.00***
Reject Democratic Values	-1.69 (.33)	.18***	18.20 (.31)	.00***
Dehumanize Others	-.65 (.36)	.52	-2.48 (1.75)	.08
Pseudo R²			.58	

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

Note: Dependent Variable: Ideological Offenders = 0 (reference category); Nonoffending extremist = 1; Non-extremist violent offender = 2.

Key: *b* = Unstandardized Coefficients; *SE* = Robust Standard Error; *RRR* = Relative Risk Ratio

Unsurprisingly, the comparison between IOs and NEVOs reveals that IOs are significantly more likely to demonstrate nearly every mobilization indicator included in the model, with the exception of radicalizing others, producing extremist media, and dehumanizing others. However, consistent with the findings above, NEVOs are significantly more likely to have a history of angry outbursts than IOs ($RRR=9.81$; $p<.001$), which speaks volumes to the divergence between IOs and NEVOs on this behavioral characteristic. Nonetheless, it is evident that these indicators of mobilization are much more accurate precursors to extremist crime and violence, or even nonoffending extremism for that matter than regular violence offending.

7.3 | Limitations

This study adds depth to our understanding of how extremists who commit both violent and non-crimes are different from extremists who do not break the law and non-extremists who commit serious crimes. Despite the contributions to the study, there are several limitations to note.

First, it is a significant challenge to study terrorism and other acts of targeted violence because they are rare events. Scholars have been able to address this challenge by developing open-source data collection methodologies. The body of research using such approaches is quite impressive, although there would be some value in standardizing methodological expectations when using open-source data. One of the important standards is to be transparent about the quality and type of data used. As noted, we were unable to test some variables because of the high percentage of cases with missing data for some variables. There is also some debate about whether to code outcomes as missing or count the absence of evidence as a “no.” For example, it was important for our analysis that we were certain that non-offending extremists really never broke the law previously. However, it is not likely that sources would report a negative like this. We were, however, confident in the absence of evidence here (and for other variables) because our search protocol was exhaustive (i.e., we did not limit the number of documents retrieved about a subject—we just collected all publicly available information), it was likely that a source would report this information if it was affirmative, and we also targeted search for information using data aggregators to find this information.

Second, a related challenge to using open-source information is the variation in the number and types of documents available for different types of cases. One would expect to have fewer documents about nonviolent extremists compared to violent extremists because the latter are much more likely to be covered by multiple news outlets and garner deeper attention about the nature of the events. Similarly, one would expect violent homicides committed by extremists to be more consistently newsworthy than non-extremist homicides. It was also interesting how the source documents varied when comparing offending to non-offending extremists. The source documents for offending extremists would get extensively covered in the news media and would often

highlight characteristics of the offender. The source documents for non-offending extremists, however, would be covered in the news but less frequently, but they would engage the media directly by posting on social media, writing articles for media outlets, and being identified by scholars and watchdog organizations as an individual actively involved in an extremist movement. Again, we attempted to limit the impact of such variations by collecting all documents about a case and also by collecting methodological data related to the type of source documents used for data about a case.

Third, the identification of the case controls was challenging for some cases. For example, if a violent homicide occurred by an extremist in a rural area, then having multiple homicides to match was unlikely. Thus, he would have to extend the geographic area in order to identify enough potential matches. The data presented confirm this as we saw some geographic differences across some of the categories because we would have to find cases in a larger geographic unit. Similarly, nonoffending extremists were less likely to be consistently mentioned in source documents for certain locations, so identifying matches was quite a challenge. We sometimes spent several hours on a case identifying potential matches, ensuring they met inclusion criteria, and confirming ideological commitment. If five potential matches were not available, we randomly selected the control case from only the cases that were able to be identified.

8 | Artifacts

8.1 | List of products (e.g., publications, conference papers, technologies, websites, databases), including locations of these products on the Internet or in other archives or databases

We have produced open-source search protocols to collect all publicly available information on offending extremists, nonoffending extremists, and non extremist violent offenders. We have

created a codebook that captures risk and protective factors, warning behaviors, ideological commitment, and reliability scores for the cases.

8.2 | Data sets generated (broad descriptions will suffice)

We have a fully coded database of violent extremists, nonviolent extremists, nonoffending extremists, and non-extremist violent offenders (n=971). The database includes risk and protective factors as well as warning related behaviors.

8.3 | Dissemination activities

We have only disseminated the results so far at the *American Society of Criminology* meetings in 2023. As the project is now complete, we will start to move materials to publication by crafting research briefs that can be disseminated through practitioner-focused organizations and media outlets. We will look to present some of the key findings on warning behaviors to law enforcement conferences (e.g., IACP) and to fusion centers. We will look to publish the findings in peer-reviewed journals and doctoral students will use these data for PhD dissertation projects

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