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Evaluation of the Riverside Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to  
Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression

Building Resources for the Intervention and Deterrence of Gang Engagement – BRIDGE

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The burden of a complex national evaluation was added to the challenge of developing a comprehensive and innovative gang program. Project staff, the Riverside Police Department, the Juvenile division of the Maricopa County Probation Department, and the City of Riverside Human Resources Department elaborated their data systems, completing extensive program and comparison-youth interviews, police and probation records and tolerating repeated Project visits and observations.

All Project-related personnel contributed to the success of the National Evaluation. They were genuine collaborators. We now know better what needs to be done to reduce the youth gang problem, and how to do it.

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Irving A. Spergel and Staff, National Evaluation

Evaluation of the Riverside Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to  
Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program

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Evaluation of the Riverside Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to  
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## Chapter 1

### **Program and Evaluation Background**

#### Introduction

In 1994, in accordance with Sections 281 and 282 of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Act of 1974, as amended, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (O.J.J.D.P), Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, developed a collaborative process to respond to America's gang problem (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1994). They wanted to implement a comprehensive approach of gang prevention, intervention, and suppression through local programs around the country. Five cities – Bloomington-Normal (McLean County), Illinois; San Antonio, Texas; Mesa, Arizona; Tucson, Arizona; and Riverside, California – were selected and awarded funds for periods of four or five years to develop and conduct a series of coordinated efforts to assess the nature and extent of the local gang problem, and to plan and implement comprehensive, community-wide programs.

The comprehensive initiative also provided funding for technical assistance, and for an evaluation of the development and impact of these programs. This report of the Riverside Project (BRIDGE)<sup>1</sup> is the third of a series of evaluations of each of the five programs.

History. Youth gangs were in existence and had been troublesome for many decades in large cities, among them Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, New York City, Philadelphia, Detroit, San Antonio, and Cleveland (Miller, 2001). Youth gang violence, gang-related drug activities,

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<sup>1</sup> Building Resources for the Intervention and Deterrence of Gang Engagement.

and other forms of gang crime became increasingly prevalent in cities and towns of varying sizes, and in rural areas as well. Violence was increasingly lethal in several of these larger cities, particularly in Los Angeles and Chicago in the late 1980s and throughout much of the 1990s. Drive-by shootings claimed the lives of rival gang members as well as those of innocent bystanders. Entrepreneurial gang members also became active in the distribution of illegal drugs. A range of other types of organized group crimes committed by youth was also prevalent (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1994).

A disturbing trend during the 1980s and 1990s was the emergence, or re-emergence, of the gang problem in large-, mid-, and small-sized cities, in suburban areas, small towns, rural areas and on Indian reservations in almost all 50 states, Puerto Rico and the territories. However, the specific scope, nature and severity of the gang problem in those jurisdictions was not clearly determined. Successful approach(es) for addressing the problem were not identified, at least based on “hard” data.

In an early national survey of law-enforcement agencies, officials in 91% of the 79 largest U.S. cities reported the presence of youth gang problems (Curry, Fox, Ball and Stone, 1992). It conservatively estimated that during 1991 there were 4,881 gangs, with nearly 250,000 gang members. An estimated 780,200 gang members were active in 28,700 youth gangs in 1998. This was a decrease from 1997's figures of 816,000 gang members and 30,500 gangs (National Youth Gang Center, November, 2000). In 1996, 1997, and 1998, Curry, Maxson, and Howell examined gang homicide trends in 1216 cities with populations greater than 25,000. A total of 237 cities reported both a gang problem and at least one gang-related homicide for each of these years. However, relatively few of the cities, excepting Los Angeles and Chicago, reported large

numbers of gang homicides (Curry, Maxson, Howell, 2001 #3).

The characteristics of the gang problem – including such terms as gang, gang member, and gang incident – have not been clearly or consensually defined. A street gang or youth gang, for program and policy-development purposes, may be differentiated from adult crime gangs, prison gangs, motorcycle gangs, drug gangs, tagger groups, racist and terrorist groups, or even minor delinquent groups. Nevertheless, categories of gangs, crime organizations, threat or delinquent groups can overlap, depending on community attitudes and concerns, political pressures, and law-enforcement policy in particular places and times. What generally distinguishes the youth gang are group symbolism and cohesion, identification with turf, commitment to violence and (increasingly) drug use and drug selling, and a chronic and wide range of delinquent activity.

Most active youth-gang members are between the ages of 12 and 20, sometimes younger or older. While gangs comprise mainly males, females increasingly are identified as gang members. Female gang members tend to be less violent than males, less chronically delinquent, and less committed to the gang. Youth in the same gang may engage in variable patterns of delinquent behavior, and usually have different statuses in, and degrees of attachment to, the gangs, which further vary over time. Gang youth, as identified in police data, generally come from low-income, minority, problem families from particular, often-segregated neighborhoods. The definition of a gang or a gang member may vary from state to state, or city to city. The definition of a gang incident or a gang crime may vary depending on: 1) whether the youth has been identified as a member of a criminal gang, or associates with gang members and/or is on a police gang-membership or gang-associate list; or 2) gang-motivated criteria (i.e., the youth has

been involved in an incident involving certain distinctive gang characteristics such as drive-by shooting, intimidation, retaliation, use of symbols, signs, or graffiti) (Klein, 1995; Spergel, 1995). The definitions incorporated in state law often become a basis for increased law-enforcement activity and differential justice-system processing. The gang-membership definition generally results in identification of larger numbers of gang youth than does the gang-motivational definition (Maxson and Klein, 1990).

Some progress has been made in describing and explaining the gang problem. We know little about why gang problems arise and develop in some cities and not in other, apparently similar cities. Very little progress has been made in learning or demonstrating how to deal with the problem successfully. In recent decades, law enforcement has been the dominant agency attempting to control or resolve the problem, which nevertheless continues to develop and spread in sometimes cyclical, seemingly unpredictable ways. Increasingly, policy makers, program operators, and researchers have concluded that the youth-gang problem is highly complex, and that therefore a better-informed and coordinated effort is required from key community and public agency elements to correctly identify and target problem gangs and gang youth, and then to develop an appropriately interrelated approach to successfully address the problem. It is possible that attempting to systematically address the gang problem, and carefully researching program process and effect, will also provide basic knowledge about the nature and scope of the problem.

Preliminary Efforts. In 1987, OJJDP funded The Juvenile Gang Suppression and Intervention Program, a preliminary research and development initiative to investigate and describe conditions

that perpetuate the youth-gang problem, and to develop a model for local community effort to reduce it. Literature reviews, national surveys, site visits, conferences, reports, intervention and technical assistance models were produced. The reports of that program (1987-1991) concluded that the gang problem varied somewhat from community to community, but that it was a result of a combination of interactive factors: poverty, rapid population movement, racism, segregation and social isolation of minority groups, weak family structure, adolescent youth in crisis, the development of youth-gang subcultures, and, in particular, community disorganization, or fragmentation of levels and types of community efforts to address the problem (Spergel, 1995).

A model approach was developed based on the notion that local institutions had to coordinate their efforts and target particular community sectors and unsatisfactory organizational arrangements, as well as particular gangs, gang members and youth highly at risk of gang involvement (Spergel, 1995). In 1994, OJJDP solicited applications for, and subsequently launched, the five-site demonstration of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program (the “Comprehensive Gang Program”). Comprehensive evaluation, training and technical assistance efforts, and the creation of a national advisory board were to be closely associated with and related to the set of demonstration programs (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1994).

## Theory

The Comprehensive Gang Program Model derives from Community Social Disorganization theory and, to some extent, from theories such as Differential Association, Opportunity, Anomie, and Social Control. The community-based program model builds on the

ideas and research of Battin-Pearson et al (1998), Bursik and Grasmick (1993), Cloward and Ohlin (1960), Cohen (1980), Curry and Spergel (1988), Haynie (2001), Hirschi (1969), Klein (1971, 1995), Kobrin (1951), Kornhauser (1978), Markowitz, Bellair, Liska and Liu (2001), Merton (1957), Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush (2001), Sampson (1991), Sampson and Groves (1989), Sampson and Laub (1993), Shaw and McKay (1972), Spergel (1995), Sullivan and Miller (1999), Sutherland and Cressey (1978), Suttles (1968), Thrasher (1927), Veysey and Messner (1999) and Zatz (1987).

Gang-problem communities (or segments of communities) are viewed as comprising two overlapping types – chronic and emerging. The first is characterized by an established, marginalized population and a long-term, serious gang problem. The second is characterized by a recently-arrived, less-marginalized population and a less serious, more recently-developed gang problem. Scope, duration, and severity of both adult and juvenile crime, including gang crime, tend to be greater in the chronic than in the emerging gang-crime communities or their segments. Turf-based gang violence and drug-crime markets, although not always closely related, seem to be more prevalent in chronic gang-problem communities; a range of minor offenses, less serious violence and increasing drug-crime activities seem to be more prevalent in emerging gang-problem communities. The nature of the gang problem and the response to it are also based on state, city or community perceptions of the problem and their level of concern, as well as on organizational and political interests in addressing the problem.

Organized crime and youth-gang crime are often better developed and interrelated in chronic than in emerging gang-problem communities. Local conventional or legitimate institutions are relatively stronger in the emerging gang-crime community or community

segments, and are also better integrated with conventional institutions of the city or the larger community. Moral panic, fear, and presumed defense against and control of newcomer, low-income, minority populations often characterizes the response of formerly-stable but now changing populations and their established community leaders in emerging gang-crime communities (Cohen, 1980; Zatz, 1987). Levels of victimization due to violence are lower in emerging gang-crime communities, but higher in chronic gang-crime communities.

Socialization of youth to the gang in the chronic gang-problem community is more likely to occur because of the presence of established criminal organizations, weak and conflictual conventional agency systems, extensive alienation and lack of social opportunities (Venkatesh, 1999). Youth access to illegitimate opportunities and to organized gangs may not be as well-developed in the emerging gang-problem community, where legitimate opportunities may be relatively more available, and pressures for conventional behavior may be greater (see also Cloward and Ohlin, 1960).

Social-intervention and suppression strategies are poorly integrated in chronic gang-problem communities. The police may pay more attention to serious gang crime, while social agencies and grassroots organizations provide some social support for youth, but mainly for those who are at risk and not necessarily those who are gang involved, committing gang crimes, or who are being suppressed by police. Suppression and intervention strategies are carried out in a manner unrelated to each other in community or social contexts. In emerging gang-problem communities, social intervention and suppression strategies are somewhat better-integrated when targeted to youth committing less-serious gang offenses. In both chronic and emerging gang-problem communities, the schools, the justice system and social service agencies seem to

overreact to the presence of low-income minority youth, who are increasingly identified, or defined, as gang-at-risk or as actual gang members.

Efforts to address dysfunctional social and economic conditions that produce the gang problem require mobilization of agency and citizen interest, social intervention, and the provision of social opportunities, as well as suppression, and especially organizational and policy-and-practice changes, although in different degrees and combinations in the chronic and emerging gang-problem communities. In the chronic gang-problem community, particularly for those youth committed to the gang lifestyle, greater responsibility may be necessary at the city or county level for mobilizing and changing local and area-wide entrenched institutions, coordinating strategies and efforts, and developing and extending resources to control and reduce serious gang problems. In the emerging gang-problem community, particularly for youth at risk and those less committed to the gang lifestyle, greater responsibility may be necessary at the local neighborhood or community level for mobilizing and integrating less-well-developed local institutions, focusing on the coordination of prevention and social-intervention strategies addressed to less-serious gang problems. However, chronic and emerging gang-problem sectors of a community or region may overlap and interact, and therefore variable strategies, targets, and institutional arrangements may be required over time.

### The Comprehensive Gang Program Model

The OJJDP Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program Model consists of three sets of interrelated components: key *program elements*, *strategies*, and *implementation principles*, all directed to the nature and

scope of the gang problem and related demographic, socio-economic, organizational and other local community factors (Chart 1.1). Coordinated policy, program, and worker efforts have to take place at individual-youth, organization, and community levels. Ideally, all components of the Model have to be present, and developed effectively in order for the reduction of the gang problem to occur.

### Program Elements

A series of program structures and processes are necessary to implement the Model, which comprises a steering committee, lead-agency management, an interagency street team (including youth outreach workers), grassroots involvement, social services, criminal justice participation, school participation, and employment and training.

The Steering Committee has to engage the leadership of the community – including the mayor’s office, police and probation departments, other public agencies, local schools, grassroots and community-based organizations – in a comprehensive effort consisting of gang-problem assessment and analysis, policy planning, strategy development, acquisition of resources, pilot-program implementation and refinement, and instrumentalization of the Model. The adaptation of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model requires justice-agency (preferably police) leadership, criminal-justice-system administrative support, as well as modification of policy, and front-line collaborative involvement of community-based youth agencies, schools, business and employment sources, as well as local grassroots groups (particularly churches and neighborhood groups), and even of former gang members themselves. The Steering Committee has to bring key community leaders together in a cohesive structure, with the encouragement and support of

the mayor, city council, or city administrator's office to guide the development of the Gang Program and its approach, one which will both protect the community and target delinquent gang-involved and highly-at-risk youth.

Lead-Agency Management. A lead agency has to be selected to develop, manage and coordinate the various elements of the Comprehensive Gang Program. Such an organization must have a background of work with gang-involved or highly at-risk gang youth, and a broad understanding of their needs and problems. It should have the capacity to mobilize its own agency resources as well as those of other agencies, police and non-profit organizations to enlist grassroots support, and develop additional resources to sustain the Program. A police department (preferably), but also a public school system, community mental-health agency, probation department, or a special youth authority may be positioned to undertake leadership and responsibility for interorganizational and program development. Much depends on the lead agency's commitment to an approach – consisting of outreach and broad, well-balanced social services and community participation as well as social control – which is targeted to highly at-risk and delinquent gang youth, with special attention directed to those youth who are violent or potentially violent, and engaged in drug crimes.

A special requirement is that the lead agency not only have sufficient management, capable staff, and interest and experience in dealing with the gang problem, but also genuine commitment to the comprehensive community-wide gang approach. The normal bureaucratic impulse to acquire and use resources to meet ongoing organizational interests and provision of services must be restrained. It is inappropriate for the lead agency or a consortium of agencies to “buy into the approach,” and simply to “split the pie,” so that each agency can continue to do

what it has usually done, only now with additional resources. The lead agency must be truly committed to a new, institutional and community-participatory approach, which ensures that policy and practices are developed to implement the Model.

The Interagency Street Team should comprise direct-service personnel (especially police, probation, outreach youth workers and case managers; also school officials and community organizers) who continually interact with each other in regard to ongoing assessment of youth and gang situations, differential planning, programming and contacting gang-involved and/or highly-at-risk youth, as well as their families. The team must address the neighborhood contexts and organizational situations that influence the behavior of targeted gang youth in relation to and in coordination with Steering Committee concerns. The outreach or street team is the key youth direct-service component of the Gang Program. Its members are in communication with local groups and neighborhood residents, and it operates during day-time as well as evening and late night hours, on weekends, and during crisis times.

The outreach youth worker has an especially important role to play. He may be a former influential gang member from the neighborhood, with a conventional work record, now fully identified with the norms and values of legitimate society, yet sensitive to the needs and problems of the local youth-gang sub-society and culture. He should be someone who is “streetwise” and able to relate comfortably to the targeted youth. His knowledge is essential to the assessment of the nature of youth-gang problem situations, and he facilitates the outreach efforts of the rest of staff. Qualified and trained outreach youth workers can provide ready access to youth gang members and their families, help define the gang problem, and serve as mediators between the gang, the family, and established local community and institutional sectors. While

the use of outreach youth workers has inherent risks, the benefits to program outcome outweigh the risks.

Grassroots Involvement. Key parts of the community that must be involved in the comprehensive gang-program approach are: 1) established agencies such as police, schools, key governmental organizations, and other agencies concerned with the interests of the local and larger community; and 2) the grassroots community, more often comprising family, neighborhood groups, block clubs, political associations, citizen groups, churches, and other organizations whose members tend more often to live and interact with local citizens, including gang youth in the area. Established agencies often set key program policies (affecting the lives of the residents) which are primarily based on the values and interests of the middle-class community or the city at large, and often control access to opportunities for education and jobs. The grassroots organizations often focus on social support, crisis intervention and socialization issues more directly related to the expressed needs of the local (usually lower class) minority population. Communication and interaction between these two parts of the community in respect to the gang problem are often characterized by absence, ambivalence or antagonism. A gang-problem community is usually characterized not only by a lack of resources, but also by a lack of sufficient interdependence and cooperation among established agencies and grassroots organizations. Grassroots elements as well as established agencies must interact, collaborate and participate in determining the direction of the program, as well as participate in the significant operation of the program street team.

Social Services. A variety of social-service programs should be provided to gang-involved program youth and their families, including younger siblings who may be at risk of

gang membership and delinquent behavior. Targeted program youth often require crisis intervention and referral, and/or direct help with school, employment, and drug-use problems, as well as with gang-related controls and personal-development issues. Social services should also be provided to families of targeted youth who may need assistance with housing, public aid, health care, family dysfunction and conflict-resolution, employment, immigration, racism, and other problems which directly affect gang youth, or may be conducive to their gang behavior.

The street team provides front-line and initial services to gang-involved and gang-at-risk youth. The outreach youth worker and other team members – police, probation, the school teacher or disciplinarian, the neighborhood organizer – as well as lead-agency staff are collectively responsible for an appropriate combination of support and control services for particular youth and gangs. Each member of the team must share some responsibility for a complementary and/or similar approach to the youth's and community's gang problem.

Criminal Justice Participation. Police (including gang detectives, community police, youth-division, school-resource, and narcotics officers), juvenile and adult probation, juvenile and adult parole, and prosecutors and judges must be knowledgeable about the scope and nature of gang-crime in the target area, and participate appropriately in the community's response to it. They must also be closely identified with the Comprehensive Gang Program. Police and probation are especially concerned with the day-to-day social control and suppression of activities of targeted youth, mainly those who are delinquent and gang-involved. They must be careful not to target and label as gang members those youth who are not at high risk for gang involvement. Judicial authority, prosecution, detention and other justice-system elements must support the street team, through graduated sanctions, in such a way as to facilitate the youth's

social development and rehabilitation, and to protect the community.

Police and probation administrators must encourage, if not require, the street-level officers to collaborate with each other, as well as with other members of the street team, including outreach youth workers, educators and job-development personnel, in an integrated social-development and social-control approach. The police have a special responsibility to accurately assess the gang problem, refer youth for services, and especially to address the gang problem in as balanced and rational a way as possible (in terms of long-term effects), especially recognizing the close connection between the gang problem, race/ethnic issues, family concerns, and political pressures and conflicting community interests.

School Participation. Principals, teachers, and disciplinarians of regular public, parochial, and alternative (community, opportunity) schools are key components of the comprehensive approach to the gang problem. Schools, already overwhelmed with a range of educational and social problems, are generally reluctant to deal with the gang problem other than by transferring, suspending, or expelling difficult youth. The Steering Committee and lead-agency administration have to facilitate better understanding of the problem, and (especially) to persuade and assist school personnel to modify school “zero-tolerance” practices that alienate and eliminate gang-involved and at-risk youth from a positive learning experience. The street team should participate in the life of the school and assist school staff in addressing gang-related issues, thereby encouraging better development and use of educational opportunities by gang youth. Targeted youth need to be mainstreamed within the context of regular school to the extent possible, so that they will receive a fully appropriate education to prepare them for productive career development.

The use of alternative schools may or may not be the best way to address the educational and behavioral problems of gang youth. Special tutorial assistance and collaborative arrangements with social agencies and therapeutic programs may assist gang youth to remain in regular school, and to make better use of educational opportunities. If the youth is referred to an alternative school, a high-quality educational program (often with therapeutic and effective controls) must be provided, with a firm commitment by the school administrator to return the youth to a mainstream school as soon as possible. Outreach youth workers have a special responsibility not only to help program youth make the best use of available learning resources, but to assist school staff in better understanding the nature of gang pressures on program youth which arise from situations and crises both inside and outside the school. Outreach youth workers may be able at times to control or neutralize some of these pressures.

Employment and Training. Obtaining a job is critical to the transition of youth from the gang to legitimate and personally satisfying adult roles. Adolescent (particularly older-adolescent) gang youth regard a job as a sign of meaningful entry into the conventional adult world, and of the social and economic reward it brings. It is often a more acceptable and desirable opportunity than returning to school (or than school achievement). Getting and holding a full-time job is a significant step for the youth, one which indicates he no longer needs the gang, nor has the time and motivation to associate with gang members or participate in gang life. Job and work-skills training provide a legitimate and satisfying basis for leaving the gang. Education and job development can be combined through creative arrangements between school, business and industry.

The youth worker and the job developer, closely related to the Gang Program, are the key

personnel responsible for motivating youth to participate in training programs, obtain jobs, and for helping youth sustain a job once employed. A major task of the job developer is contacting employers and training institutions to facilitate access to job and training opportunities for gang youth. Special arrangements may be required to open up jobs for youth who may at first be marginal workers. Special incentives may be necessary to enable employers to hire gang youth. Neighborhood residents, former gang members, and the youth's family are sources of information about hiring opportunities and referrals for jobs, and need to be accessed by the street team. Steady girlfriends or wives also play an important part in urging gang youth to obtain a job, and sustaining him on the job.

### Steps in the Approach

The steps in the implementation of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model (Chart 1.2) are as follows:<sup>2</sup>

- The community leadership, including those in established agencies and grassroots groups, the mayor's office and political leaders, as well as business leaders and the media must acknowledge that a youth-gang problem exists.
- The Steering Committee, including criminal-justice and youth agencies, schools, and other major public, nonprofit, and faith-based organizations, together with grassroots groups, must: conduct an assessment of the nature and scope of the youth-gang problem in the identified target community where gang crime (particularly violence and often drug selling) is most prevalent; develop and use appropriate definitions or descriptions of what

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<sup>2</sup> Adapted from OJJDP Gang-Free Schools and Communities Initiatives 2000.

is a delinquent/criminal gang, a gang member, or a youth who is at risk of gang membership; identify which particular gangs are to be targeted; and identify the organizations available to address the gang problem in its various interrelated aspects. A special assessment team, including university researchers, should assist in this process. The researchers have responsibility for assessing program development and evaluating individual youth and area outcomes.

- Once the Steering Committee is established, a process is undertaken in which a set of goals and objectives is determined, with the assistance and involvement of the lead agency and community leaders at influential and grassroots levels. The goals and objectives must address the identified gang problem and its causal factors (based on the results of the assessment) and be refined over time as a better understanding of the gang problem and what organizations are doing about it emerges. Because of the lack of effective communication, congruence of operations, or meaningful interaction of key organizations and community agencies and groups, special meetings with resulting documentation describing organizational roles, responsibilities, and issues will be necessary.
- The key goals of the program must be the reduction of youth-gang crime, as well as the social-development of gang youth and those youth at high risk for gang involvement. This is to be accomplished by improving the capacity of the community grassroots groups and agencies to address the problem through the application of interrelated strategies of community mobilization, opportunities provision, social intervention, suppression, and organizational change and development targeted to the particular gang problem.

- The Steering Committee, the lead agency and community leaders (perhaps comprising changing personnel and additional agencies and community groups) must interact with each other over time to produce and sustain relevant and increasingly effective programming, i.e., strategies, services, tactics and procedures consistent with the Comprehensive Gang Program Model, particularly its five “core strategies” (see below).
- The Steering Committee and community leaders, as indicated above, must develop an effective ongoing process that assesses the operation, outcome and impact of the program, preferably through systematic evaluation procedures. If program results are positive – i.e., gang crime is absolutely or relatively reduced – then sufficient resources must be provided to sustain program activity and development, and especially to institutionalize its structure and assure long-term funding.
- The process of program development, intervention and attempting to cope with the youth-gang problem not only contributes to a determination of whether the Model has been appropriately applied, but to an ongoing assessment and understanding of the basic nature and changing scope of the problem.

### Strategies

The Model is multi-faceted, involving multi-layered interacting strategies and addressed to individual youth, family members, gang peers, agencies and the community. It is based on theory, research, and practice which proposes that the gang problem is systemic, and a response to rapid social change, lack of social-development opportunities, poverty, institutional racism, existing criminal organizations and opportunities, and also to the fragmentation and inadequacy

of approaches to the problem across multiple organizations. The five core Model strategies and their associated cultural elements are as follows:

### Community Mobilization

- Key established organizations – police, probation, social agencies, schools, manpower agencies, community organizations (including local community grassroots groups), as well as churches, block clubs, and political groups, along with local residents and even former gang members – must be involved and advise on problem definition, analyses, policies, planning and program measures to be undertaken. These efforts should be developed and coordinated by the Steering Committee and the lead agency. This is not an easy process to consummate successfully, and requires judgement, selectivity, and the participation of the variety of organizations and community groups that should be involved within the framework and purposes of the Model.
- A Steering Committee made up of representatives of key established agencies and community organizations (including grassroots groups and faith-based organizations, as well as political and governmental leaders) is closely involved in the development of program policies and practices across agencies and community groups, in support of the operation of the multi-disciplinary street team. Key agencies will generally have to modify policies and practices to support the work of the street team and achieve the objectives of the Program Model. The lead agency takes special responsibility for aiding agency administrators and community group leaders to cross organizational boundaries, and getting the Steering Committee to take collective ownership of the comprehensive-

program initiative.

- The lead agency along with the Steering Committee initiates, develops, and maintains interagency communication and relationships across agencies and community groups. A special challenge is modifying established law-enforcement, school, and governmental policy to include the participation of faith-based and grassroots groups, as well as former youth-gang members, in the steering-committee process. Awareness of population change and sensitivity to the neighborhood and its culture, its varied organizational interests, the needs of gang youth, and the concerns and complaints of local residents, are essential issues for consideration in the operation of the Steering Committee, the street team, and the lead agency. The multi-disciplinary street team must also participate in steering-committee activities, and assist in a broad array of community and neighborhood gang-program-focused development efforts which may evolve from steering-committee considerations.

### Social Intervention

- The street team, especially the youth outreach-worker staff, must collaborate with social service agencies, youth agencies, grassroots groups, schools, and faith-based and other organizations, in directly providing gang and highly at-risk youth with appropriate combinations of prevention, intervention, and socialized-control services, depending on individual youth and community needs. Gangs and their members are different, and change over time; differential diagnoses and treatment/intervention-planning must occur. Not necessarily all youth should be provided with the same pattern or dosages of social

control and services, or even with highly-coordinated services or contacts. Issues of labeling youth as “gang involved” or “highly at risk for gang involvement” should be carefully addressed.

- Street outreach services focus simultaneously on protecting community citizens (including gang youth) from gang crime, enforcing the law, serving the interests and needs of targeted youth and their families, and on assuring the linkage of youth to social services and the case-coordination of these services.
- Group activities are carefully developed so as not to cohere delinquent or gang youth to each other. Primary attention is on individualized youth interests, and the needs of gang-involved and highly-at-risk youth which, if met, contribute to their better transition and attachment to mainstream institutions of school, training and employment, and to association with non-gang peers.
- Sensitivity to the influence of gang norms and values, and street-team skill in the use of group, community and situational structures and processes are important, particularly at times of crisis when violent and serious criminal behavior is likely to occur and has to be prevented and controlled.
- A clear, mutually-understood and accepting relationship between the street team (including the youth outreach worker), the individual youth and the gang must be established so that the youth and the gang clearly understand the purpose of the program, the nature and scope of the team’s operation and the interdependent roles of team members.
- Social intervention and social control should not be restricted to a 9 AM to 5 PM agency-

based workday routine of making contact and assisting youth with social-development needs, school attendance, and meeting justice-system reporting requirements. Outreach (including social intervention) focuses on contacts with youth in the neighborhood, at home, and in hangouts during evenings, on weekends, and in crisis times, and assisting youth to assume legitimate obligations to the neighborhood and the larger society.

### Provision of Social Opportunities

- Access to opportunities, especially for further education, training, and jobs must be provided to gang youth and those at high risk of gang involvement. Such access has to be structured, and supported through the collective policy and administrative efforts of the Steering Committee, the lead agency, community agencies, and the implementation activities of the street-level team.
- The members of the Steering Committee should be in a position to provide special and/or additional and sustained access to opportunity systems in their own agencies and across organizations, in order to better mainstream program youth into legitimate society. Appropriate arrangements have to be made to avoid segregating gang youth from mainstream society in the course of providing opportunities to them.
- The street team (especially the outreach youth workers and case managers) serves to mediate relationships and modify exclusionary policies and practices of agencies, so that targeted youth have access to and are carefully prepared to make use of educational and training programs and jobs. In this process, agency, school, and employment personnel must be willing and prepared to modify their practices, and to assist these vulnerable

youth who have special needs and social limitations. Social-control and social-intervention tactics have to be carefully integrated in this process.

- The street team collaborates with local residents and families, as well as with grassroots groups, businesses, schools, and social-agency personnel in the provision of, and access to, opportunities for gang-involved and highly at-risk youth.
- The opportunity-needs of siblings, parents and peers of program youth are also addressed, to the extent possible, particularly as the fulfillment of those needs may assist in facilitating the transition of program youth to non-delinquent and non-gang roles.
- Of special importance is encouragement of the contributions of businesses, industry, government, and legislators in providing improved access to school, job, and training opportunities for lower-income and minority (including gang) youth, in part through not excluding those youth who may already have criminal records. In this process, in order for youth to make the best use of opportunities provided, appropriate social-control and social-support measures may also be necessary.

### Suppression/Social Control

- The development by staff of formal and informal procedures of social control in order to hold youth accountable for their behavior is integral to a comprehensive approach to gang youth. Highly-targeted sweeps and interdiction of gang youth about to engage in (or who have actually engaged in) criminal acts are appropriate. However, labeling as gang members those youth who are not gang members, and targeting minority youth for a whole range of minor and questionable offenses, are inappropriate. Social control must

be based on understanding the gang youth's behavior and his context, the scope of agency responsibility, positive communications, respect for youth, some level of youth accountability, law-enforcement discretion in use of suppression tactics, and must focus on youth who are involved (or prove to be involved) in serious delinquent behavior.

- Controls are broadly conceived, and range from arrest and warnings to behavior-modeling, advice, counseling, crisis-intervention and positive attention paid to youth interests and needs by members of the street team. Carefully structured arrangements may be required in which activities such as recreation, athletic events, holiday and family celebrations, cultural and ethnic events, group meetings, or conflict-mediation sessions can be provided, involving police, probation, youth workers and the gang youth in sharing mutual or communal experiences, obligations and benefits. At the same time, information-sharing among all team members about serious, criminal acts by gang members is required so that offenders are accurately identified, arrested and prosecuted, as necessary.
- Suppression involves the street team organizing neighbors to patrol neighborhoods, encouraging them to report criminal acts to the police, making sure that gang youth show up for probation or parole interviews and court appearances, as well as getting gang youth not to hang on street corners, not to incur neighborhood disapproval, and to help clean up litter and remove graffiti.
- Social control also requires the defense of gang youth from false accusations and prosecution, illegal harassment and/or brutal treatment by police officers, defending or vouching for youth in court when they are falsely accused or brought in for violations of

local laws (which themselves may prove to be illegal and/or unconstitutional). The street team, administrators of the lead agency, Steering Committee members and community leaders must not only directly and indirectly contribute to the suppression of unlawful (especially serious) criminal behavior, but to the modification of criminal-justice-system policies and practices that unjustly target and criminalize and/or punish gang youth.

- Valid definitions of the nature and scope of gang crime, especially gang incidents, must be developed, and appropriate data collected, managed, and used. Accurate and meaningful gang information should be routinely collected and shared among members of the street team and the Steering Committee – with due regard to issues of confidentiality – as a basis for ongoing diagnosis and assessment of the gang problem and the development of effective policies and programs.
- Special commitments from police administrators to accept the Model, and special training sessions for gang specialists or team police to implement the Model correctly, may be required to assure that police and criminal-justice personnel participate in the Gang Program. The purpose of the Program is not simply to assist police or probation to acquire intelligence in order to make better arrests, but also to train the police to refer troublemakers and troubled gang youth to social and mental-health agencies when appropriate.
- Suppression, along with social intervention, opportunities-provision, and relevant organizational change, should be viewed as part of an interrelated and interdependent community-building process focused on reducing gang crime. The lead agency, the members of the street team and the Steering Committee share responsibility for carrying

out the suppression or social-control functions critical for building a “good” community, one of benefit to gang-involved youth as well as to other citizens of the local and larger communities. Not all gang members are likely to be or to become delinquents and/or serious offenders. Most gang youth in gang-crime communities will normally grow out of their delinquent or criminal gang involvement.

### Organizational Change and Development

- Organizational change and development underlie the strategies of the Comprehensive Gang Program. Local institutions must change, and local agency and community-group procedures must be developed both to reduce gang crime and to meet the social needs of gang youth. Enhanced law enforcement alone, and enhanced preventive and treatment services alone, may be ineffective and may even exacerbate the gang problem.
- Positive change in individual youth-gang-member behavior may occur in due course naturally, but can be hastened and facilitated through interrelated, interdisciplinary and collaborative activities by the team of workers within a context of respective agency and community-group support for the Model. The activities of street-team personnel, in community groups and across agencies, may have to be modified to achieve a more generalist mission, e.g., the police take some responsibility (and the probation officer even greater responsibility) for social intervention, the outreach workers assist with suppression of serious crime and violence, and the community organizers encourage distrusting, fearful neighborhood residents to communicate with the police about gang-crime incidents, and collaborate with law enforcement on better ways to address the

problem.

- Organizational policies, practices, and worker responsibilities have to become more community-oriented, even communal, taking into consideration the particular interests, needs, and cultural backgrounds of local residents, including those of the targeted gang youth themselves. Panicked and punitive responses to the gang problem by established members of the community, together with elitist, bureaucratic, non-community-oriented agency approaches to gang youth, are counter-productive.
- Administrative arrangements, special training, and close supervision of staff must be established (particularly for youth-outreach and law-enforcement workers) in order to know and understand what the street-level workers are doing in the community, and develop collaborative roles in a mutually respectful and effective fashion.
- Staff development and training of the intervention team has to be both collaborative, as well as on a separate, subunit, professional basis. Appropriate measures must evolve for data sharing, interactive social intervention, suppression-planning and other implementation activities. Not all types of data about youth gang-member activities have to be shared, nor all types of team-member activity planned together; only those that significantly impact the achievement of program objectives and goals.
- Data systems and case management are established so that contacts and services provided by all members of the street intervention team can be documented and monitored for effective targeting, ongoing assessment of youth, program planning, and for measuring program quality and effects. These data then become the basis for evaluating outcomes at individual, gang, program, agency, interagency, and community levels.

## Program Implementation Principles

A special set of principles guides the approach of the various organizations, community groups, and staffs in the implementation of the Model strategies. The principles constitute the way to develop, carry out, and ultimately sustain the Program Model.

### Targeting

It is critically important that the Steering Committee and lead agency select the right neighborhoods, gangs and youth in the community who account for the gang problem, and that they identify the organizations addressing (and which should be addressing) the problem. This includes identifying the most significant aspects of the gang problem, based on careful initial and ongoing assessments of gang situations, the specific youth involved, and the locations and contexts of gang activities. There are many cultural and organizational myths which create obstacles to appropriate identification and assessment of the gang problem. Police may claim that the gang problem is pervasive throughout the whole city, when in fact gang incidents, gang hangouts, and where gang youth live tend to be concentrated only in certain parts of a community. Youth agencies may claim they are serving at-risk or gang-involved youth, when they are not. Schools committed to “zero tolerance” and rigid suspension policies for minority youth who may (or may not) be gang members can contribute to the development of the gang problem.

A careful assessment of the gang problem from a street-based as well as an agency-based perspective is necessary to determine which gangs and gang members are most involved in serious crime (including drug selling and violence), where and when the gang offenses are being

committed, and what specific community situations and changed organizational policies and practices are critical to understanding and addressing the specifics of the problem. It is important not only to regard the gang problem as systemic, but to focus on the most serious aspects of the problem. Hardcore youth, including key gang leaders and influentials, are the critical focus of initial attention, as much to develop access to other gang members and ultimately focus on gang activity by at-risk youth.

Unfocused violence-prevention, general public-health approaches, non-targeted suppression, and reactive citizen demonstrations (such as neighborhood marches or protest meetings) may be useful for particular agency- or community-cathartic purposes, but may be of little value for problem-solving and positive community development in regard to the problem. Ceremonial meetings by interagency coalitions may also become devices to avoid dealing with the gang problem. To be avoided are responses based strictly on political interests, narrow agency missions and opportunism, professional turf considerations, ignorance of the details of the problem, and impulsive collective action.

### Balance of Strategies

Once the specific problem(s), target area(s), target gang-youth, and institutions' or agencies' policies and practices are identified, a set of balanced strategies must be considered and operationalized. Dominance of particular strategies in regard to program development may be inappropriate. One type of program service and/or set of control activities will not be suitable for all circumstances or for all youth. There are varying community gang problem situations. Gang youth have varying commitments to the gang life and varying degrees of troublesome personal

problems during the course of their careers. Targeting hardcore gang youth only for suppression, younger gang youth or wannabees for prevention services, and “creaming” only selected youth for jobs are not consistent with the Model. A differential mix and dosage of multiple strategies is required for different circumstances and specific categories of program youth at different times.

An imbalanced strategy may result in a dominant suppression approach, which contributes to excessive imprisonment of youth who could have been readily served in the community with a combination of treatment, opportunities-provision and graduated sanctions. An imbalanced strategy may serve to label at-risk (especially minority) youth as gang members and make them more subject to arrest for minor offenses (or even non-offenses). An approach which focuses only on recreation and group activities may increase gang cohesion, and the solidification of delinquent norms, and may not meet the longer-term socialization and community-integration needs of alienated gang youth.

An appropriate mix of agency and grassroots participation is extremely important. A basic goal of the approach – to improve community capacity to address youth-gang crime – cannot be achieved unless critically important organizational and community-based components are involved in the program’s development. The Model is not served if only established social or youth agencies or law enforcement organizations participate. On the other hand, if the program is primarily based on grassroots participation, adequate resources may not be available to implement, sustain, or institutionalize the approach. Community-building and social integration across different community sectors relevant to the gang problem have to take place.

### Intensity (Dosage) of Services/Contacts

Dosage refers to the duration, frequency and continuity of particular worker contacts, services and strategies carried out for different categories of youth. An optimum dosage may be necessary for a positive outcome. However, a balance of strategies, types of workers, coordination of worker contacts, and the nature of specific services and controls may be more important than the amount or intensity of services or contacts provided. Coordination among team workers in relation to particular types of youth may be more important than the specific range or intensity of services or strategies provided by each of them.

The length and frequency of contact the youth has in the program may or may not be related to positive outcome. Once the youth begins to make progress, it may be beneficial for him to disassociate himself from the program. The particular purpose and appropriate intensity of relationships of particular workers with different types of youth are important in predicting outcome for different categories of youth in the program.

### Continuity of Services/Contacts

The same worker or the same combination of workers providing services and contacts for a substantial period of time may have more influence in determining positive outcome than different workers contacting particular youth for only short periods of time. Continuity of personalized, positive contact is important, particularly for gang or delinquent youth who have special needs for social support and control, and for building trusting relationships with adults. Gang youth are often distrustful of adults and exploitive of relationships with them. Workers may be viewed as undependable, rejecting, hostile, or as easily manipulated. It takes a good deal

of time for the worker(s) to develop a positive working (controlling and helping) relationship with certain gang youth. Service interruption and lack of continuity of contact may result in further alienation of the youth, and interfere with the program's plan for his or her rehabilitation. A return to, or intensification of, gang behaviors may result from the absence of (or undependable contacts with) a worker during periods of crisis that the youth may not be able to manage on his own. An accessible and responsive worker whom the youth trusts and needs at such junctures may be critically important.

### Commitment

The Comprehensive Gang Program Model challenges existing agency policies and procedures and existing professional specialization norms, requires the development of new knowledge and skills, and seemingly creates extra work and distress for all, at least in the transition period. Commitment by community leaders and program operators to the promise and the validity of the approach does not come quickly or easily. Appropriate steering-committee, lead-agency-management and extra supervisory support and commitment have to be developed. Program lead-agency administrators and supervisors and steering-committee members may not be fully aware of the difficulties and challenges faced by direct-service, street-team workers, of the special needs of staff for support (and sometimes controls) in their outreach activities, or (particularly) of the problems and frustrations of outreach workers on the streets. Steering-committee members and program administrators must persevere in their program-support efforts, and they must periodically renew their commitment to the Comprehensive Gang Program approach.

Work with gang youth and gang problems is complex, difficult and frustrating. Gang youth are often undependable, elusive, and hostile in their relationships with adults and peers, and require a high level of sensitivity, firmness and concentrated attention by workers.

Traditional agency, school, and other institutional staff may not be interested in, prepared for, or have sufficient resources to work with troublesome gang youth. The team workers on the street have to develop multidimensional skills. Street-team, lead-agency, and steering-committee efforts together must be reinforcing, and combine to introduce an integrated world of real opportunity, social support, and constraints for gang youth.

Chart 1.1  
 Comprehensive Gang Program Model  
 Goal 1: Improve Community Capacity to Address Youth Gang Crime  
 Goal 2: Reduce Gang Crime

**Community Context  
 Social Disorganization Factors:**

- Demographic
- Socio-economic
- Family Characteristics
- Ecological
- Cultural





Chart 1.2  
 Comprehensive Gang Program: Process Model  
 Steps in the Application of the Approach



OJJDP Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program  
 (Candice Kane)

## Chapter 2

### **Evaluation Issues and Problems**

We do not attempt to review the literature on gang (or gang violence) prevention, intervention, or suppression programs. A growing list of such reviews exists (Curry, 1995; Klein, 1995; Howell, 2000; Mihalec, Irwin, Elliott, Fagan and Hansen, 2001; Reed and Decker, 2002; Sivilli, Yim and Nugent, 1995; Spergel, 1995). Gang programs in earlier decades emphasized single-strategy approaches to gang prevention, social intervention, crisis intervention, community organization, street work, interagency coordination, and community organization. Evaluations of these programs suggest negative, indeterminate, or in a very few cases limited positive results (Howell, Egley and Gleason, 2000). Community-based gang programs have failed for a range of reasons: poor conceptualization, vague or conflicting objectives, weak implementation, organizational-goal displacement (particularly by police and youth agencies), interagency conflict, politicization, lack of sustained effort, insufficient resources, etc.

The evidence that a particular approach does or does not work, however, may be due not only to program design or implementation, but also to the failures of public policy and the limitations of evaluation research methodologies (Curry, 1995). Gang-program approaches assessed as successful by community leaders, politicians, and policy makers may not necessarily be sustained, and those assessed as failures (sometimes based on inadequate “research” evaluations) which are nevertheless consistent with community myth and traditional agency missions may continue to flourish. Evaluation research, particularly outcome research, has

### 2.1

generally had little or no impact on policy or gang-program development. It has not contributed to the creation of alternate or modified approaches to the gang problem. This may be due in large measure to the complexity of community-based gang programs, and to the difficulties of designing and implementing complex evaluations of such programs in the community.

Below, we discuss briefly those elements of gang research methodology which we believe are essential for the effective evaluation of gang-programs implemented within a comprehensive community or interagency framework. We focus on some of the issues or obstacles relevant to gang-program evaluations. Ideally, program-evaluation models require experimental and quasi-experimental designs and rigorous procedures which usually cannot be applied in the real world of gang-program development, policy changes and difficult-to-observe program operations. Evaluation research is expected to be objective and preferably independent of program operations. However, the critical (often politicized) nature of community-based gang programming requires an interdependent and sustained relationship between evaluation and program personnel from program start (or even conception) to finish. This characterizes – to some extent – the best of classic community-based gang program research (Gold and Mattick, 1974; Klein, 1968, 1971; Miller, 1962), limited as it is by the present-day research, methodological, and statistical standards.

There are issues which have not been adequately addressed or resolved in past or current evaluations of comprehensive and/or community-based gang programs, and with which we have had to contend in our present evaluation of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program.

## 2.2

Cooperation with Program Operators and Data Managers. Project directors and program operators are prone to distrust gang researchers who may not be sufficiently knowledgeable about their program's pressures, interests and constraints. Gang project or program directors are under great and conflicting pressure to accommodate program development to the interests and needs of funders, community residents, steering committees or advisory boards, partner agencies (including criminal-justice and social-service agencies), as well as the media, government or political officials, and the program youth themselves. This is particularly so in the case of a program which is not expected to last more than four or five years.

Program operators generally regard evaluators as a necessary evil, since they may affect the flow of funding for the program, and are costly in terms of program time and effort which they believe should be directed instead to specific, ongoing program or agency operations. Evaluators interfere with agency program operations and program information systems, to the extent that they exist. Program operators can be skilled at avoiding, or partially complying with, evaluator requests for data; and even when pressured or compelled to comply, they tend to provide incomplete or inadequate data for evaluation purposes. The gang program administrator's interest and desire to comply with the evaluation-research design and need for data is tempered by his need to survive in a limited-resource agency environment.

Gang-program operators are also over-stressed by the complexity, frustrations and unpredictability of community-based gang-program operations. They may be subjected to a day-to-day pervasive sense of impending program failure. The gang program principal operator tends not to know much about gangs or gang youth, or how or whether he can conduct a community-wide or street-based program that will provide clearly positive results. The evaluator enters the

chaotic, community gang-problem arena without sufficient understanding of the complex agency/community-group relationships and conflicts, and the diverse interests of the various program-related actors associated with the program. These actors usually control various kinds of program-process or outcome data essential to the evaluator for achieving research-evaluation objectives.

The evaluator therefore must expend considerable effort to understand local community and program contextual factors and establish a basis for a positive relationship with program operators, particularly those who control data sources. The commitments and procedures for access to evaluation data have to be negotiated and renegotiated if valid data are to be obtained in the evaluation process, and substantive outcomes are to be both objective and meaningful to the key community constituents, funders, program operators, and the research community. The gang-program evaluators have to engage key program-related personnel as soon as possible, and regard them not only as providers of data but as partners in the development of a successful evaluation.

Research Design. Good program evaluation ideally should be designed to assess program process, individual outcome, and the program's impact on the gang and the community, based on an explicit (hopefully well-developed) program model which is theoretically relevant and operationally practicable. However, the program evaluator's primary purpose is not to test theory, but to test a program model which usually contains elements of several theories and interests. Gang programs in the real world cannot be encompassed by one set of theories or interests. This is a particularly difficult challenge for social scientists, including criminologists,

who are often more interested in testing theoretical propositions than describing the specific nature and determining the effects of a program model. Funders are interested in testing policy which is not usually clearly formulated and embodied in the projects they support. Program managers, furthermore, are mainly concerned with matters of program development and its contribution to their agency's value – economic, political and organizational. A consensus must be reached in the funder+program operator+evaluator relationship as to the mutually-acceptable goals and specific objectives of the program to be tested. This process may drag on a long time, with consensus and satisfaction among those involved never fully achieved.

The purposes, program components, objectives and activities that reduce gang-delinquent behavior need to be specified and agreed upon by the program operator and key influentials and the evaluator: what key-agency services and worker contacts are to be provided, for which types of youth, for what purposes and how (i.e., what project activities are expected to produce what intended results). Research variables, i.e., independent, mediating, outcome, and controlling factors (e.g., youth demographics, gang status and delinquency characteristics) must be articulated and related to the program model, as well as conditioned by the reality of program structure and operation. Ultimately, the main job of the evaluator is to know what the program components are, what they are intended to do, and what they in fact do. This process occurs through ongoing dialogue and mutual accommodation between the project operator and evaluator. This evaluator+program-operator relationship determines what and how evaluation-design procedures for data collection and analysis are implemented and related to the program model. Obviously, some flexibility has to be built into the implementation of both the program and evaluation models. The researcher and program operator have to negotiate continually to

accommodate the needs of both program and evaluation implementation.

Community-based gang evaluation research is not scientific, experimental or even medical research, in which all elements are (ideally) rigidly controlled. At best, community-based gang research is quasi-experimental, with room for limited change in research design and modification of program practices.

Technical Assistance. An intermediary may be required to assure that informed and focused program development is initiated and sustained, which meets the needs of the program operator as well as serves the interests of the funder and the evaluator. Ideally, the technical-assistance team is established to warrantee the investment of the sponsor or funder and guide the program operator. While technical assistance is provided mainly to assist the program operator, involvement of the evaluator is also required to insure that he, the program operator, the technical-assistance team, and the funding agency are on board together as to the nature of the program model and how it is to be implemented.

The program and evaluation models have to be effectively articulated and sustained. Additions, gaps, failures, and changes have to be identified, made explicit, accepted consensually as early as possible, and over time, have to be anticipated, recognized and accounted for. These include those of the technical assistance team, the evaluator, and the funder as well as the program operator, which must be identified and corrected, with limited politicization. In any case, the evaluator has a special responsibility for controlling the integrity of the program model for research purposes. This complexity of relationships, which can support or handicap common understanding and effective implementation of the program model, is avoided when the program

operator and the evaluator are the same person, when the evaluator and the technical-assistance person are partners with the program operator in the development of the program model, and/or when the funder or sponsor of the program is strongly identified with the evaluator's conception of the program model and its implementation.

### Start-Up Problems

Program Youth Selection. An initial problem in the implementation of the comprehensive community-based gang program model arises when youth selected are not representative of the expected program universe, i.e., they are not gang members or youth clearly at risk for gang involvement. The problem may be compounded because the program operator and the evaluator often do not know what the characteristics of gang youth in the community truly are until a sufficient number of youth have actually entered the program. Procedures for who is eligible for and admitted to the program are not developed or clearly communicated to program staff and/or referring agencies. Certain gang or at-risk youth may not be available or easily recruited, or even allowed into the program. Conflicting views may arise early as to who should be eligible for and indeed are admitted to the program.

A key problem is that sources of reliable information about target-youth characteristics (e.g., gang membership) may not be available at the start of the program. Police, probation, schools, or in-house agency workers may not know the identity and location of gangs, the specific character of their activities, and which youth in or associated with the gang are at what level of risk. The criteria of gang membership may not exist or be adequately utilized, if in existence, and the concept of risk may not be delineated. Gang-related information about youth

referred to the program ideally should be obtained from multiple sources: official police records, established youth agencies, neighbors, local community groups, sometimes family members, peer groups, and former and (especially) present gang members themselves. Constraints of law, police practice, and community attitudes may not make this a simple task.

The evaluator must know as soon as possible which youth are selected in terms of age, race/ethnicity, gender, justice-system background, gang-membership status, why they are referred to the program, and by whom. We know from previous research that gender, age, race/ethnicity, and prior arrests of youth may be critical factors in determining eligibility for the program, and predicting expected outcomes. Females are less likely than males to be serious or chronic delinquents, or gang members. Younger gang youth, 12 to 14 or 15 years of age, are more likely to show increasing levels of gang delinquency than older gang youth.

The research or theoretical interests of the evaluator may deter him from a close examination of who these youth are, and why they got into the program. He may be less interested in the types of youth who should be in the program (based on the program model) than in the specific characteristics of youth or gangs which may be useful to his own ongoing research or theory development. He may focus too much on hardcore or at-risk youth, females rather than males, the psychological or structural characteristics of gangs, and insufficiently on the selection of youth consistent with the program model. The acquisition of simple, basic data (on age, gender, race/ethnicity, and – as soon as possible – gang membership status and offense or arrest history) for youth who enter the program is essential for program-development and evaluation purposes. These data become the basis for comparison-sample selection and multivariate analyses of the program and control variables that affect outcome.

Gang Membership Status and Prior Delinquency. Extensive research indicates there is a very close relationship between gang membership and the youth's delinquent behavior, especially during the youth's active or self-declared gang membership phase. Obviously, the evaluator's task is to determine to what extent the youth is a gang member as well as a delinquent (and what types of delinquency he or she commits) in relation to criteria for selection into the program. Each of these two complex factors must be considered as variables, yet they may not be known to program staff, and not necessarily clearly revealed even by gang youth themselves. A key proposition not recognized or accepted by many policy and program operators, or even by researchers, is that not all gang youth are or will become delinquent, and not all delinquents are or will be gang members. Non-delinquent and non-gang delinquent youth may respond worse to the program in terms of outcome than gang youth who may be less delinquent and less committed to the gang life. Most community-based gang programs probably deal with a varied sample of gang and non-gang, delinquent and non-delinquent youth.

A variety of sources of data on gang and delinquent behavior in different contexts over time may have to be accessed. Multiple sources of information from field observations, self-reports, police records, and program-worker information may be required to determine eligibility of youth for the program, and to predict outcome. Consistency of findings about the nature and level of gang identification and delinquency provides validity as to how the youth is to be classified. Delinquency and gang-involvement scales may have to be developed. Different types of delinquency and different patterns of peer association must be identified and addressed prior to and over the course of the youth's involvement in the program. Gang youth may change their patterns of offending (from turf or interpersonal violence to relatively more criminal-gain

behavior, including drug selling or vice versa), or may follow conventional routes and build legitimate careers, with and without program intervention.

Sampling. Typologies of gangs and gang youth abound (Klein, 1995; Spergel, 1995; Fagan, 1989; Spergel and Wa, 2003). What gang or pre-gang youth universe from which to select the program sample depends on the nature and purpose of the program and, ideally, on some assessment of the community's actual gang problem. Characteristics of the universe of gangs and youth at-risk in a particular community may be based on police, other criminal-justice, school, youth-agency, and media information, and occasionally on community surveys. The youth referred to a gang program may or may not be representative of gang youth, or youth highly at risk for gang involvement known to the police or other agencies.

In earlier decades, youth in community gang programs were selected based on field or street observations of, and work with, particular gangs and their membership. Based on these observations, youth in specific gangs were the primary targets of service, research and evaluation. More recently, program youth appear to be derived from existing youth in agency, probation, school, and correctional caseloads. This may reflect the increased prevalence and dispersion of the youth-gang problem, and a lack of familiarity with the gang problem in its community context by established agency personnel and researchers.

Another primary, related task of the evaluator is to select a comparison-group sample, i.e., non-served youth with characteristics similar or equivalent to program youth. However, as suggested earlier, both the program operator and evaluator may not clearly know *a priori*, up front, or even during the program period what the gang or delinquency characteristics of program

youth are. A time lag usually exists between selecting program and comparison youth. Finding, selecting and interviewing appropriate comparison youth may not be easy. Police, probation, and youth agencies may have insufficient information about the characteristics of gang youth selected for the program, and even less information about appropriate comparison gang youth, where they are located and how they are to be contacted. Comparison-gang youth often tend to be less delinquent or problematic than program youth. When a community-wide consortium establishes a gang program, it usually tries to focus on the most eligible, problematic gangs, and sometimes gang members in the most gang-problematic neighborhood. Gang youth arrested for current, very serious crimes and/or violence tend not to be eligible for community-based gang programs. They are usually confined.

Probably the best solution to the problem of obtaining or developing similar, let alone equivalent, samples in the open community is to use several types of comparison groups, if funding permits. Co-arrestee gang members from the same gangs are often similar; youth from other or the same-named gangs in an equivalent gang area in the same city may be sufficiently comparable. Individual program youth may be used as their own controls, matched for an earlier and equivalent age period when they were not served, i.e., using a growth-curve model for analysis purposes. This option assumes that community contexts, gang patterns, and police practices have been comparable during the pre-program and program periods, which may not be the case. Usually, there are sufficient non-served comparison youth available in the program or comparison areas for analysis purposes. Researchers may select a comparison group from a comparable city, but this may create special problems for analysis unless community context factors are controlled. Appropriate measurement and multivariate analytic techniques can, within

limits, compensate for not randomly selecting program and comparison youth.

### Sources of Data and Data-Collection Instruments

Multiple sources of data and multiple units of analysis are essential in community gang-program research. Gang-as-a-unit and community-level gang incident or arrest data, as well as ethnographic or field observations, are important for interpreting and explaining individual-level findings. However, researcher field observation and police-arrest or individual-youth-interview data alone may not be sufficient for program evaluation. Interviews, field observations and police and agency-worker program records of individual youth are required to measure program-effect patterns. The classic use of field observations as a primary basis for theorizing about program effects unrelated to what the worker(s) do with particular youth is not adequate for evaluation research (see Miller, 1957; Klein, 1971; Short and Strodtbeck, 1965).

Program Process Data. Special worker-service, or program-tracking or recording devices have to be created to describe the key program activities or worker contacts provided to, and received by, program youth. Existing agency records (whether police, probation, or social-agency) may be insufficient for purposes of testing the program model. The problem of collecting data from workers or agency records is compounded when information derived from multiple sources across multiple agencies has to be integrated. Evaluation of comprehensive gang programs must develop commonly understood terms across different agencies, community groups and staffs, which also take unique organizational and worker roles and missions into consideration.

Commonly accepted definitions of program measures must be established, since services

or contacts may have different definitions and purposes for different agencies and worker disciplines. The nature of collaboration among workers and agencies in the provision of services has to be viewed as an important variable. The identity and function of the particular service provider gives special meaning to the service or contact with the youth, and therefore has to be duly recognized and its significance understood. The variety of measures developed to obtain data on meaningful program effects has to include types and dosages of services provided by the different workers.

Measurement. The need to integrate data (even at the same level of analysis) derived from different sources of data, the control of differences between program and comparison youth characteristics and their different selection methods and number of times youth were interviewed, the integration of multiple variables (especially when sample sizes are relatively small), as well as missing data – all create formidable measurement problems in community-based, gang-program research. Meaningful connections across variables, as well as the reduction of the number of variables, have to be engineered. The use of factor-analytic procedures may not be sufficient. Key program-model concepts and propositions are critically important as a basis for selection of and combining variables and interpretation of findings. Appropriate scales may be required to reduce ratio or interval data to ordinal or nominal-level data, especially when program and comparison-youth characteristics are highly disparate and sample size is small.

Special measures or indices have to be created to test propositions of the program model. For example, a gang-involvement scale may have to be conceptualized and specific items introduced to measure change over time, not only in terms of the youth's original gang- or non-

gang-membership status, but in terms of an associated or causal cluster of items such as rank in the gang, level of gang participation, time spent with gang friends, gang victimization, gang membership status of parents or siblings, etc.

Analysis. Differences in findings of key characteristics of program and comparison youth have to be related to the specific effects of the program. Whether the program or parts of the program are successful or unsuccessful in predicting or accounting for differences with the non-served sample may best be determined through the use of multivariate analytic procedures, particularly the use of General Linear Modeling and Logistical Regression. Such analyses may still be unconvincing unless other sources of data using both the same and different units of analysis (such as related gang, agency, program-structure, and community characteristics and changes) are available to throw light on the reasons for the individual-level findings. In other words, the analysis of program effects based on individual-level findings may not be sufficient to determine what the program accomplished or failed to accomplish.

The congruence of findings in the relationship of the same or similar variables using different sources of data (e.g., individual youth self-reports, police arrest data, field observations and agency progress reports) and different units of analysis (group, and community-level), and their possibly-reciprocal relationships, are the bases for making judgements about the value of the program. Furthermore, researcher and program-operator qualitative and quantitative observations, as well as theory and prior research findings, provide reference points against which to measure not only the reliability and validity of the findings, but their interpretation. The degrees of rigor of the different but associated program and evaluation analyses have to be duly

acknowledged.

### **The Evaluation Model**

The Riverside Project (BRIDGE) Evaluation examined the nature of program implementation, and the services and contacts provided to individual youth, based on the requirements of the program Model. It examined individual-youth outcome in relation to the nature and scope of services and contacts provided by different workers, and to some extent the impact of the program on gang and non-gang crime at the community level. Sufficient qualitative and quantitative data from different sources were examined at different levels of analysis to determine the value of the program model as developed and tested in Riverside.

The Evaluation Model was based on a relationship of factors which interact with or influence each other, beginning with contextual factors (including community social disorganization factors) and ending with changes-in-crime factors at the individual-youth, gang, and community levels. A variety of intermediate factors (such as organizational relationships, program structure, services and worker contacts provided, changes in youth life-course/life-space behaviors and law enforcement policies and practices) were also identified, and the direction and strength of their influence analyzed (Chart 2.1).

#### **I. Community Social Disorganization Factors**

Certain ecological, economic, social, and cultural conditions or changes were expected to create the community circumstances favorable to the development of the gang problem, which included groups of youth engaged in violence, drug selling and other criminal activities. These

generating circumstances included: the rapid movement, expansion, and/or shift of population (particularly of low-income minority groups) into the program area, and the relative decline of a stable, often middle-class, non-minority population; the presence of a large adolescent male minority population weakly supported by and integrated into basic socialization, educational and employment systems in the community; and the development of criminal structures as alternate opportunity systems.

## II. Organizational and Interorganizational Factors

Local institutions were unable to accommodate the interests and needs (and to address the problems) of a changing population that required increased access to services, social and economic opportunities, and controls on youth who were in gangs and at high risk for gang membership. Key city, county, and local governmental and non-governmental interests and leadership were to coalesce to address the problem, with the aid of federal resources. Key mandated organizations and strategies were to be included in the development of the program.

## III. Program Implementation Structures

A steering committee was to be established, containing representatives of mandated organizations including criminal-justice and social agencies, grassroots and community-based groups, business and religious groups, and – directly or indirectly – the participation of governmental leadership. A program structure was then to evolve from and/or closely relate to the steering committee, which would be responsible for implementing the program, characterized by interrelated strategies of community mobilization, outreach social services, provision of social

opportunities, suppression/social control, and organizational change and development. A key component of the program structure was to be an interagency street team to target youth, both gang-involved and those at high risk.

#### IV. Services and Worker Contacts

The team of police, probation officers, outreach youth workers, case managers, and others was to target eligible youth referred to the program from court, police, youth agencies, neighbors, and even fellow gang members. The team was to collaboratively provide a range of services, opportunities, and controls for the targeted youth.

#### V. Changes in Youth Circumstances and Behaviors

The key objectives of the street team, within the framework of steering-committee and program leadership, was to change the delinquent behavior of program youth to more pro-social behavior patterns while protecting established community interests, especially by reducing the youth's gang involvement, facilitating school achievement and conformity to school rules and responsibilities, and providing access to training and jobs. Increased resources and access to treatment services for the youth and his family, as well as additional social and cultural opportunities, were to be provided.

#### VI. Individual-Youth Outcome

These changes in the life space and life course of program youth were expected to result in a reduction of criminal behavior, particularly violence and drug selling and drug use.

Evidence of the success or failure of the program at the individual-youth level was to be a reduction, increase, or no-change in the youth's self-reported offenses or official arrests, especially in comparison to similar youth not exposed to the program.

#### VII. Law-Enforcement Policy and Practice

Effective participation by police and probation officers on the street team, and the involvement of criminal-justice administrators on the steering committee, were expected to contribute to greater understanding of target-community and family social problems, greater collaboration with social-agency functions, and better understanding of program-youth problems, as well as provide for improved and targeted surveillance of program-youth behaviors. This was expected to result in relatively lower rates of arrests of program youth, and better control of the area gang problem.

#### VIII. Gang-as-a-Unit Crime Change

Program effects at the individual-youth level were expected to be translated into gang-level behavioral effects, depending on the degree to which program youth were representative of active gangs, the scope and structure of the established gangs, and the extent to which program workers reached out to gangs and gang youth in the neighborhood.

#### IX. Target-Area Outcome Crime Change

Changes in target-area crime, particularly gang-related incidents, were contingent on changes in (and/or control of) program-youth behavior, and especially their gang-as-a-unit

behavior. In general, the program was expected to directly and powerfully influence program youth behavior, but (less powerfully) to contribute to change in gang-as-a-unit behavior. These changes were expected to have an effect on the rates of gang crime in the area, depending on the number and types of gang youth in the program, and (indirectly) their gangs.

### Implementing the Evaluation

The evaluations of the Program Model across the five sites – Mesa, Tucson, Riverside, San Antonio, and Bloomington-Normal – were simultaneous and complex, requiring extensive collaboration among local project personnel, local evaluators and technical-assistance and national-evaluation teams, within the general guidelines set by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and aided by the suggestions of a National Advisory Board. Major problems of research design, program modification and implementation, data collection, sample development, and analysis had to be addressed at all stages of the evaluations. The National Evaluator, the University of Chicago, was responsible for overall research design, instrument development, coordination of data management within and across sites, and the interim and final analyses. The National Evaluator had no responsibility for program implementation, and only partial responsibility for the selection of the program- and comparison-youth samples and implementation of data collection procedures. The Local Evaluator at each site was appointed and funded by the local Program Director, under guidelines formulated by the National Evaluator and OJJDP.

Problems of evaluation were dependent in the final instance on resolution of program-development issues, e.g., getting the program off the ground. Early problems of a lack of

understanding of the Program Model and how to implement it, as well as slow acceptance of required data-collection procedures by program operators at the local sites, had to be addressed. Not all components of the Model were adequately implemented by the local site operators; not all procedures for local data collection were followed. The difficulties of program-youth (and especially comparison-youth) sample selection and collection of interview data were not fully anticipated, either at local or national levels. Distinctive, individual-site program and evaluation problems were encountered; some were never fully overcome.

The problems of insufficient understanding and acceptance of the Program Model by the local sites were largely handled by OJJDP management and technical-assistance staff, but they also involved the National Evaluator. Much of the early problem of Program Model implementation and local-evaluation data collection surfaced around the issue of who was to be selected for the program. The local Program Directors generally presumed that the primary, long-term purpose of the program was prevention and early intervention, i.e. targeting at-risk, usually younger youth, not yet gang members or even having police arrest records. At some of the sites, key organizations such as police and youth agencies assumed that the funds they received were to help them keep doing what each organization separately had been doing all along.

The problems of sample selection and implementation of the Model were further complicated when the local projects were required to focus on bringing both gang delinquents and youth at high risk for gang involvement into the program. None of the lead agencies had experience developing a program combining social-service and suppression activities. The initial applications to OJJDP did not clearly articulate the criteria for the selection of youth into the

program. The lead agencies did not have the experience or know-how to reach gang delinquents directly from the streets. No grassroots organizations, neighborhood groups or former gang members with access to gangs or gang youth were involved in program planning, or even later in program implementation. The programs would be based mainly on referrals of youth from probation sources (mainly juvenile probation) and to a limited extent from schools – youth who might be suspended or expelled and who were regarded as troublesome, but not necessarily gang-involved or at serious risk for gang involvement. The probation departments, especially juvenile probation, came to be heavily invested in the programs.

The selection of both the program-youth and comparison-youth samples would require special evaluation efforts, particularly by the Local Evaluators. A comparable gang-problem community, where the program was not established, had to be selected. It was not clear which areas and which kinds of youth would be selected for the comparison samples. At four of the five sites, another part of the same city was selected. At the fifth site, another city (or set of twin cities) was chosen.

Each Local Evaluator had his or her own research interest, which sometimes was complementary to the evaluation mission of the National Evaluator, sometimes not. At four of the five sites, the Local Evaluator had no research experience with gang youth. Some of the Local Evaluators were not particularly interested in testing the Program Model, and delegated major sections of the local-evaluation responsibility to students. There were changes of Local Evaluators at two of the sites. There were also long delays in initiating the data-collection process.

Collection of data was a great burden for local program personnel, as well as for the

National and Local Evaluators, at all the sites. A variety of continuing obstacles had to be overcome. The original plan for data collection included: individual-youth surveys of 100 program and 100 comparison youth to be administered by Local Evaluators at annual interview periods; summary program-service records of contacts by workers with each youth, to be gathered every three months by the different program workers at each site; and complete police arrest and confinement histories for all program and comparison youth, to be collected by Local Evaluators with the aid of Project administrators. The effort to obtain official school records and misconduct histories for each program and comparison youth had to be aborted because of the unavailability of such records, and the lack of complete attendance or grade records. Gang-as-a-unit data for all gangs and community gang-crime statistics had to be obtained by the National Evaluation staff from gang-crime police and crime analysts in the program and comparison areas. Organization surveys were to be collected by the National Evaluation staff from 20-25 administrators in key agencies and organizations addressing the gang problem in each of the program and comparison areas.


The data collected also included: on-site observations of program operations by Local and National Evaluation staff; interviews of program staff; minutes of Steering-Committee meetings; minutes of cluster (multi-site program staff) meetings; minutes of monthly telephone conferences with key program staff from each site; reviews of yearly funding applications, progress reports and records of special communications by each site with OJJDP; and, lastly, program-performance measures based on interviews with key local-agency and Steering Committee personnel at the end of the 4- to 5-year program periods.

Evaluations undertaken at each of the project sites posed complex and distinctive

problems. Site visits by the National Evaluation staff were made two or three times per year. Visits to the National Evaluation office in Chicago were also made periodically by some site Project Directors and Local Evaluators to provide information and resolve evaluation issues. In many respects, data collection represented the most difficult and time-consuming part of the evaluation process, extending well into the data-organization, cleaning, and data-analysis phases. This happened in large measure because multiple sources and many years-worth of data had to be gathered from different service providers, and especially because problems of data reliability were not discovered until the analysis stage of the evaluation for each site, when the different data sets were integrated. The various providers at the sites, including the lead agencies, were not always sure which youth were in the program and which youth were not. Missing and incorrect data were belatedly discovered. These issues were often resolved only at the final stage of the integration of data sets.

Chart 2.1

Evaluation Model  
 (Comparison-Area Components = I, II, V [partial], VI, VIII, IX)



## Chapter 3

### **The Program and Comparison Areas**

The Project – The Riverside Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program – was established in 1995, and changed its name to BRIDGE (Building Resources for the Intervention and Deterrence of Gang Engagement) in 1999. The Project focused its five-year (1995-2000) period of operation on two areas of Riverside with high rates of general crime, including gang-crime: Eastside and Arlanza. A third high (gang) crime-rate area was selected as a comparison area: Casa Blanca. Each area had its own somewhat distinctive historical, population, socio-economic and gang-problem character. In the demographic analysis later in this chapter (and also in later analyses of area arrest patterns [Chapter 11]) we focus on those parts of the areas where the large majority of program or comparison youth were concentrated (70% or more). Changes in gang size and gang-crime characteristics, as well as in overall crime rates are addressed on an area basis in Chapter 13.

Riverside city, located in Riverside County in California, has a somewhat unique origin. It was founded in 1870 by a group of Easterners and immigrants from England and Canada who volunteered to transfer traditions of culture and education to a location between Los Angeles and San Diego, equidistant from desert and mountains – an area with an extraordinarily mild climate. The city proposed and developed a successful citrus industry. By 1882, there were more than half a million citizens in California, almost half of which were in Riverside. The development of refrigerated railroad cars and innovative agricultural systems established Riverside as the wealthiest city in the state, per capita, by 1985 (City of Riverside Official Website).

### 3.1

While Riverside presently has a majority white population, some of its families of Hispanic (mainly Mexican) origin reach back more than a hundred years, when Casa Blanca was a shanty town near a citrus packing plant. “Hundreds of acres of orange groves, along with race, separated the community from white Riverside” (Petix and O’Neill Hill, 2000). Riverside has been influenced by Hispanic, Indian and European cultures and class structures.

In 1996, Riverside County, with its 1.3 million residents, was identified as the 20<sup>th</sup> most populous county in the nation and the seventh largest in California. Between 1983 and 1994, it experienced the largest population increase (81%) of any county in California. The city of Riverside, with a population of 226,505 (1990 U.S. Census), the largest and most urban city in the county, had experienced an increase of 42% in population growth between 1980 and 1990. The adjoining city, Moreno Valley, had the highest growth rate (300%) of any city in the nation.

The majority of Riverside’s city-wide population in 1990 was white (61.5%); the Hispanic population was 26.7% (not including its undocumented population, which had increased tenfold between 1970 and 1990); the African-American population constituted 7.0%; Asians 4.9%; and American Indians 0.67% (U.S. Census 1990). The large proportion of minority residents and relative newcomers was concentrated in Eastside, Arlanza/La Sierra, and Casa Blanca, comprising immigrants and newcomer populations located in dense, inexpensive, and attached-housing areas. A conflict of cultures and experience periodically surfaced among these groups, especially the Mexican-American and African-American populations in Eastside (Riverside First-Year OJJDP Funding Proposal, 1994).

The neighborhoods of Eastside, Arlanza/La Sierra, and Casa Blanca became the most impoverished and racially-divided areas of the city, with the highest ratios of unemployment,

poverty, crime, school dropouts, female-headed households, teen pregnancy and gang activity. These conditions characterized the neighboring streets of the University of California-Riverside, which once was a “vital economic corridor and relatively peaceful neighborhood” (Ibid).

The original funding application by the University of California-Riverside noted that the phenomenal growth and problems of these areas were largely due to rising housing costs in neighboring Orange County, urban flight from Los Angeles, and the influx of immigrants from Mexico and Central and South America. The Riverside socio-economic infrastructure was severely strained by this rapidly and increasingly segregated population growth, and also by the subsequent downturn in the economy caused by military-base closings and defense industry cutbacks. The recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s hit hardest among the mainly newcomer, non-white minority populations located in these areas of the city (Ibid).

Poverty, unemployment, an overtaxed social and economic infrastructure, and different and sometimes conflicting cultures were the context for the development of a range of neighborhood problems, including racial strife, gangs and (increasingly) drug use and the drug trade. Riverside was also in the middle of one of the Southwest’s largest and best-known corridors for drug manufacturing, especially methamphetamine (Ibid).

Problems of poverty and racial tensions, intermixed with gang conflict between Hispanics (mainly Mexican-American) and African-American gangs and drug distribution operations, were particularly evident in Eastside. Conflicts among Hispanic gangs (as well as to some extent between Hispanic and African-American gangs), the release of older gang members from prison, increased migration of Hispanics and the development of newcomer Hispanic gangs, and the movement into Eastside of African-American gang members from Los Angeles (who were

mainly interested in the drug trade) were major contributing factors to violence in the streets.

The problems of Arlanza were comparatively muted – families had lived in the area longer, extended families were present, and income and educational levels were somewhat higher. Nevertheless, conflicts flared between newcomer and settled Hispanic youth, particularly those from low-income families emigrating from Orange County.

Casa Blanca was a smaller community, a mile square, with a smaller population than Eastside or Arlanza. It was an older community with a long settlement tradition of poor Mexican farm workers, who could originally buy \$50 lots and \$200 houses. In 1949, Casa Blanca had only two paved streets. Sewers, street lights and paved roads did not arrive until the 1950s. Nevertheless, it was a relatively well-organized community, with a “most active community action group,” yet with a tradition of interrelated organized crime, and family and youth gang conflict among its Hispanic population (Petix and O’Neill Hill, March 19, 2000). A series of six intra-ethnic Mexican male killings occurred in Casa Blanca in 2000, which were unsolved as of 2002.

Severe tensions between Mexican-American and African-American populations, and between African-American and white populations, rose in the late 1990s, particularly in Eastside. Events occurred that shocked the city. Tension among the African-American and Hispanic populations – especially Latino and African-American gangs, which had been somewhat lower in the early years of the Project – flared up in late 1998. The grandson of a veteran African-American civil rights leader was killed in the Eastside community, and a 17-year-old Hispanic suspected gang member was arrested in connection with the slaying (O’Neill Hill, November 13, 1998). In early December, 1998, an African-American male adult who lost his part-time job at

an Eastside community center walked into the meeting room behind the City Hall Chambers and fired a handgun at officials. The Mayor, two council members, and several police officers were wounded in the attack and ensuing rescue (Smith, 1998).

In late December, 1998, a 19-year-old African-American woman was killed by four white Riverside officers who mistakenly viewed her as somehow threatening, as she sat in her locked car. Her death severely strained relations (which were already tense) between the Police and Riverside's minority communities. The killing unleashed a barrage of criticism from across the state and nation (Nissenbaum, 1998).

Community leaders in Riverside called for reforms. A California State Department of Justice report revealed that Riverside police arrests were four times more likely for African-Americans, and two times more likely for Hispanics, compared to whites. The ratios were not unusual and reflected regional, state, and national patterns. Riverside's share of minority arrests was somewhat higher than State and county averages, however (Danielisk, March 24, 1999).

These community traditions and issues appear to have been the context in which the Riverside Project evolved, developed and changed leadership, and were possibly responsible for more effective policy and procedures toward the end of the Project period. We describe these Project changes and effects in the following chapters. First, however, we briefly update community population trends based on data from the 2000 U.S. Census, which may have further conditioned Project program development and results. (Some details of social characteristics, on an area basis, from more recent U.S. Census 2000 reports are presented in Chapter 13.)

### Changes in Population Characteristics: City, Program and Comparison Areas

The rate of population growth in Riverside slowed between 1990 and 2000. The absolute number and percentage of whites decreased, but the absolute number and percentage of Hispanics (mainly Mexican-Americans) increased, in the city as a whole, and in the program and comparison areas. The rates of increase in the Hispanic population, however, were greater in the program and comparison areas than in the city as a whole, probably reflecting the greater concentration and social isolation of Mexican and Mexican-Americans in the program and comparison areas. In the city as a whole, using one-race census responses, there was a 12.7% increase in overall population, accounted for by a 16.2% decrease in white population and a 13.6% increase in Hispanic population (Table 3.1).

In the Eastside program area (elaborated to also include part of the downtown and University neighborhoods from which program youth were selected), using one-race responses, there was an increase of only 2.6% in overall population, but a 32.1% decrease in white and a 25.7% increase in Hispanic population (Table 3.2). In the Arlanza program area (elaborated to include parts of the La Sierra Acres, La Sierra and Arlington neighborhoods from which program youth were selected), using one-race responses, there was an increase of 15.6% total population but a 31.6% decrease in white and an 87.1% increase in Hispanic population (Table 3.3).

In the Casa Blanca comparison area (elaborated to also include parts of the Victoria, Magnolia Center, and Airport neighborhoods), also using one-race responses, there was an increase of only 4.2% in total population, but a 24.4% decrease in white and 56.2% increase in Hispanic population (Table 3.4).

In 1990, whites had been the majority population in the city proper, in Arlanza and Casa

Blanca (modified areas), but not in Eastside (modified area). In 2000, they were the largest plurality but not majority population (46.8%) citywide, but Hispanics were the absolute majority population in Eastside (54.4%) and in Arlanza (55.1%). Whites and Hispanics made up equivalent proportions (44.8%) of the population in Casa Blanca. Furthermore, while there was a 13.6% growth in the African-American population citywide, a 35.9% increase in Arlanza and a 0.5% increase in Casa Blanca, there was an 18.5% decrease in Eastside. Nevertheless, Eastside still had a larger population of African-Americans than the city and in Arlanza and Casa Blanca.

Asian populations increased in the city as a whole, and in the program and comparison areas. American Indian populations remained stable in the city and in the program and comparison areas, increasing slightly in Eastside (10.1%). Asians ranged between 3.3% and 8.5% of the city and area populations; American Indian populations between 0.6% and 1.2%.

These changes in population composition strongly indicated a growing but relatively greater concentration of Hispanics (mainly Mexican and Mexican-Americans) in the program and comparison areas than in the city as a whole. A possibly slight desegregation or integration pattern of African-Americans in the city and the program and comparison areas was also indicated.

To what extent these population changes were associated with relatively increasing problems of poverty, unemployment, family breakdown and/or low educational achievement for program and comparison-area populations, we do not know at this time because of the unavailability as yet of area-level socio-economic 2000 Census data. However, it is likely that social problems have increased in the program and comparison areas, particularly Eastside, relative to the city as a whole.

Table 3.1  
Selected Population Characteristics  
1990 and 2000 Census  
Riverside, California

Year	Race/Ethnic Composition (n and %)								
	Total Population	Non-Hispanic White	Non-Hispanic African-American	Hispanic Origin/Latino (any race)		Asian/Pacific Islander	American Indian	Other	Two or More Races
				TOTAL	<i>Mexican</i>				
1990	226,505 (100.0)	138,746 (61.3)	15,896 (7.0)	58,826 (26.0)	50,152 (85.3)	11,120 (4.9)	1,405 (0.6)	512 (0.2)	NA
2000	255,166	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
difference (%)	+12.7	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
2000 <sup>a</sup> (low estimate)	248,608 (100.1)	116,254 (46.8)	18,051 (7.3)	97,315 (39.1)	79,041 (81.2)	15,081 (6.1)	1,415 (0.6)	492 (0.2)	(6,558)
difference (%)	---	-14.5	+0.3	+13.1	-4.1	+1.2	0	0	---
2000 <sup>b</sup> (high estimate)	262,112 (99.9)	121,595 (46.4)	20,211 (7.7)	97,315 (37.1)	79,041 (81.2)	17,379 (6.6)	3,135 (1.2)	2,477 (0.9)	---
difference (%)	---	-14.9	+0.7	+11.1	-4.1	+1.7	+0.6	+0.7	---

Totals do not always sum due to rounding error.

<sup>a</sup> Because individuals could report only one race in 1990 and could report more than one race in 2000, and because of other changes in the 2000 census questionnaire, the race data for 1990 and 2000 are not directly comparable. Only individual one-race responses were used to calculate racial/ethnic percentages for the columns in this row. The percentages were calculated from the figure of 248,608, and should be considered low estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. In actuality, the total population for 2000 is 255,166: the sum of the one-race responses—248,608—and the two-or-more-race responses—6,558. Because individuals in the Hispanic/ Latino category could be of any race, they are not affected by the two-or-more-race-response exclusion; there is no difference in low or high estimates for this category in 2000.

<sup>b</sup> In order to account for individuals who reported two or more races in 2000, this row includes counts for the individuals in all categories that they marked. For example, a person indicating “White **and** Black” or “African-American **and** Asian” is included in the counts for White, Black and Asian. Counting individuals more than once for each racial/ethnic category they reported gives a total population of 262,112, which was used to calculate the high estimates for the racial/ethnic percentages in this row.

Table 3.2  
Selected Population Characteristics  
1990 and 2000 Census  
**Eastside, Downtown, and University Neighborhoods**

Year	Race/Ethnic Composition (n and %)								
	Total Population	Non-Hispanic White	Non-Hispanic African-American	Hispanic Origin/Latino (any race)		Asian/Pacific Islander	American Indian	Other	Two or More Races
				TOTAL	<i>Mexican</i>				
1990	33,370 (100.0)	11,166 (33.5)	5,717 (17.1)	14,451 (43.3)	13,053 (90.3)	1,769 (5.3)	145 (0.4)	122 (0.4)	NA
2000	34,222	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
difference (%)	+2.6	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
2000 <sup>a</sup> (low estimate)	33,382 (100.0)	7,577 (22.7)	4,660 (14.0)	18,155 (54.4)	15,411 (84.9)	2,718 (8.1)	181 (0.5)	91 (0.3)	(820)
difference (%)	---	-10.8	-3.1	+11.1	-5.4	+2.8	+0.1	-0.1	---
2000 <sup>b</sup> (high estimate)	35,108 (100.1)	8,179 (23.3)	5,017 (14.3)	18,155 (51.7)	15,411 (84.9)	2,981 (8.5)	372 (1.1)	404 (1.2)	---
difference (%)	---	-10.2	-2.8	+8.4	-5.4	+3.2	+0.7	+0.8	---

Totals do not always sum due to rounding error.

<sup>a</sup> Because individuals could report only one race in 1990 and could report more than one race in 2000, and because of other changes in the 2000 census questionnaire, the race data for 1990 and 2000 are not directly comparable. Only individual one-race responses were used to calculate racial/ethnic percentages for the columns in this row. The percentages were calculated from the figure of 33,382, and should be considered low estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. In actuality, the total population for 2000 is 34,222: the sum of the one-race responses—33,282—and the two-or-more-race responses—820. Because individuals in the Hispanic/ Latino category could be of any race, they are not affected by the two-or-more-race-response exclusion; there is no difference in low or high estimates for this category in 2000.

<sup>b</sup> In order to account for individuals who reported two or more races in 2000, this row includes counts for the individuals in all categories that they marked. For example, a person indicating “White **and** Black” or “African-American **and** Asian” is included in the counts for White, Black and Asian. Counting individuals more than once for each racial/ethnic category they reported gives a total population of 35,108, which was used to calculate the high estimates for the racial/ethnic percentages in this row.

Table 3.3  
Selected Population Characteristics  
1990 and 2000 Census  
**Arlanza, La Sierra Acres, La Sierra and Arlington Neighborhoods**

Year	Race/Ethnic Composition (n and %)								
	Total Population	Non-Hispanic White	Non-Hispanic African-American	Hispanic Origin/Latino (any race)		Asian/Pacific Islander	American Indian	Other	Two or More Races
				TOTAL	<i>Mexican</i>				
<b>1990</b>	45,474 (100.1)	25,990 (57.2)	1,944 (4.3)	15,131 (33.3)	13,053 (86.3)	1,857 (4.1)	428 (0.9)	124 (0.3)	NA
<b>2000</b>	52,590	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
<b>difference (%)</b>	+15.6	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
<b>2000<sup>a</sup> (low estimate)</b>	51,412 (100.0)	17,770 (34.6)	2,642 (5.1)	28,316 (55.1)	23,492 (83.0)	2,266 (4.4)	353 (0.7)	65 (0.1)	(1,178)
<b>difference (%)</b>	---	-22.6	+0.8	+21.8	-3.3	+0.3	-0.2	-0.2	---
<b>2000<sup>b</sup> (high estimate)</b>	53,694 (100.0)	18,768 (35.0)	2,955 (5.5)	28,316 (52.7)	23,492 (83.0)	2,573 (4.8)	640 (1.2)	442 (0.8)	---
<b>difference (%)</b>	---	-22.2	+1.2	+20.6	-3.3	+0.7	+0.3	+0.5	---

Totals do not always sum due to rounding error.

<sup>a</sup> Because individuals could report only one race in 1990 and could report more than one race in 2000, and because of other changes in the 2000 census questionnaire, the race data for 1990 and 2000 are not directly comparable. Only individual one-race responses were used to calculate racial/ethnic percentages for the columns in this row. The percentages were calculated from the figure of 51,412, and should be considered low estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. In actuality, the total population for 2000 is 52,590: the sum of the one-race responses—51,412—and the two-or-more-race responses—1,178. Because individuals in the Hispanic/ Latino category could be of any race, they are not affected by the two-or-more-race-response exclusion; there is no difference in low or high estimates for this category in 2000.

<sup>b</sup> In order to account for individuals who reported two or more races in 2000, this row includes counts for the individuals in all categories that they marked. For example, a person indicating “White **and** Black” or “African-American **and** Asian” is included in the counts for White, Black and Asian. Counting individuals more than once for each racial/ethnic category they reported gives a total population of 53,694, which was used to calculate the high estimates for the racial/ethnic percentages in this row.

Table 3.4  
Selected Population Characteristics  
1990 and 2000 Census  
**Casa Blanca, Victoria, Magnolia Center, Ramona and Airport Neighborhoods**

Year	Race/Ethnic Composition (n and %)								
	Total Population	Non-Hispanic White	Non-Hispanic African-American	Hispanic Origin/Latino (any race)		Asian/Pacific Islander	American Indian	Other	Two or More Races
				TOTAL	<i>Mexican</i>				
1990	26,405 (100.0)	15,931 (60.3)	1,713 (6.5)	7,715 (29.2)	6,730 (87.2)	849 (3.2)	154 (0.6)	43 (0.2)	NA
2000	27,516	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
difference (%)	+4.2	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
2000 <sup>a</sup> (low estimate)	26,916 (100.1)	12,051 (44.8)	1,721 (6.4)	12,053 (44.8)	9,894 (82.1)	882 (3.3)	153 (0.6)	56 (0.2)	(600)
difference (%)	---	-15.5	-0.1	+15.6	-5.1	+0.1	0	0	---
2000 <sup>b</sup> (high estimate)	28,158 (99.9)	12,554 (44.6)	1,925 (6.8)	12,053 (42.8)	9,894 (82.1)	1,081 (3.8)	310 (1.1)	235 (0.8)	---
difference (%)	---	-15.7	+0.3	+13.6	-5.1	+0.6	+0.5	+0.6	---

Totals do not always sum due to rounding error.

<sup>a</sup> Because individuals could report only one race in 1990 and could report more than one race in 2000, and because of other changes in the 2000 census questionnaire, the race data for 1990 and 2000 are not directly comparable. Only individual one-race responses were used to calculate racial/ethnic percentages for the columns in this row. The percentages were calculated from the figure of 26,916, and should be considered low estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. In actuality, the total population for 2000 is 27,516: the sum of the one-race responses – 26,916 – and the two-or-more-race responses – 600. Because individuals in the Hispanic/Latino category could be of any race, they are not affected by the two-or-more-race-response exclusion; there is no difference in low or high estimates for this category in 2000.

<sup>b</sup>In order to account for individuals who reported two or more races in 2000, this row includes counts for the individuals in all categories that they marked. For example, a person indicating “White **and** Black” or “African-American **and** Asian” is included in the counts for White, Black and Asian. Counting individuals more than once for each racial/ethnic category they reported gives a total population of 28,158, which was used to calculate the high estimates for the racial/ethnic percentages in this row.

## Chapter 4

### The Gang Problem in Riverside

There was concern by officials of the University of California-Riverside, and criminal-justice, government, and community leaders, about the perceived increasing scope and severity of gang crime in Riverside in the period just prior to and during the beginning phases of Project development. More gangs and more youth, particularly Hispanic and African-American youth, seemed to be present and committing serious crimes in low-income minority communities such as Eastside, Arlanza and Casa Blanca.

The University was particularly concerned about the rise in homicides, and increased incidents of violence and drug crime identified as gang-related in the University area adjoining Eastside. The gang problem was chronic in certain Riverside communities, but regarded as emerging in others. The Presiding Judge of the Riverside Juvenile Court viewed the development of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program “to be an important opportunity for the city of Riverside. We are dealing with a serious gang problem which during the past two years has become increasingly deadly” (Judge Haven’s letter to Shay Bilchik, OJJDP Administrator, July 12, 1996).

There were varying views, however, about the nature and scope of the gang problem. The County gang prosecutor observed that the key problem associated with gangs was violence, not drugs. Many gang members, particularly from other cities, were selling drugs in Riverside. Some of these gangs had settled in the city and were not turf gangs. There were also gangs of

local origin who were territorial, vying for control and protection of certain neighborhoods. On the other hand, the Riverside Police Department lieutenant assigned to the Project claimed that 90% of the gang problem was drug dealing (Field Notes, I. Spergel February 22-23, 1996).

The same police administrator noted (based on a series of community meetings sponsored by the Project Steering Committee in 1995) that the gang problem was different in different parts of the city. In Casa Blanca, the gang problem had been around for a hundred years. In other areas, gangs had been around for less than 25 years. Some of the Hispanic youth gangs in the different areas were tied into the Mexican Mafia, a major adult criminal gang. Some of the inner-city churches were perceived by the police to be connected to the Mexican Mafia, shielding gang members involved in violence and drug activity (Ibid).

There was some agreement that the most significant gang-problem areas were in low-income Hispanic and African-American parts of the city, particularly Eastside and Arlanza (the program areas) and Casa Blanca (the comparison area). Nevertheless, the original Co-Director of the Project insisted that the gang problem was randomly distributed throughout the city and that all parts of the city should be served by the Project. He was interested in a prevention and early-intervention approach (Site Visit Notes, I. Spergel, September 13, 1999).

A prevailing view also was that gang violence was closely associated with racial tensions between Hispanics and African-Americans, mainly in Eastside. Major factors apparently creating or sustaining these tensions were an increase in the Hispanic population in the area, and the development of conflicts between Hispanic and African-American gangs based on the drug interests of prison gang members from the area. Several youth in the program stressed that prison gang leaders called the “shots” in the area.

There was some difference of view, however, as to the extent to which gang conflict in Eastside was racially motivated. There were gangs with members of mixed racial and ethnic background in Riverside, and some of the Hispanic and African-American gangs did not fight each other. However, some of the cliques of the same Hispanic gang were fighting each other. In the early period, African-American gangs in Eastside and elsewhere were more loosely organized, but relatively more involved in drug operations, while Hispanic gangs were relatively more committed to turf violence.

Arlanza had a higher concentration of Hispanics and Hispanic gang members than Eastside. Households were more stable, with higher income levels, and gang violence was more sporadic and somewhat less serious. Families and gang members from Orange County had moved into the area, and there were periodic encounters between segments of these gangs and more established gangs in this area.

There were white and Asian gangs in Riverside, relatively more prevalent outside of the program and comparison areas, who were less violent and less likely to be considered a threat to the community, although there was evidence of gang crime and an increasing number of white-supremacist gang members in the city. In general, there was little evidence of inter-ethnic violence between gangs, except in the Eastside area.

Casa Blanca, the comparison area, was the smallest in population and geographic size, and as indicated, had a long history of gang and family-related conflict. Such violence erupted occasionally and unpredictably. There were five presumed gang homicides in 1999 which remained unresolved in 2001. The violence seemed to occur between gangs related to two families. Solutions to the gang/family violence across the different gang turfs in Casa Blanca

were difficult to achieve because of the code of silence (Petix and O'Neill Hill, March 19, 2000).

There was general evidence that most of the gang violence, drug operations, and other gang problems took place at night and to a considerable extent on the streets of Riverside. This view of the police and the National Evaluation staff was not accepted by the Project Director and the director of the agency that supplied youth workers. During the first four years of its existence, the Project addressed the gang problem mainly on a 9-to-5 basis during weekdays. The assumption was that gang youth were not out on the streets at night, or that they were highly mobile and could not be found other than through home and agency contacts.

#### Numbers of Gangs and Gang Members

Estimates of the numbers of gangs and gang members appeared to be highly variable and exaggerated, at least during the early years of the Project. This could have resulted in part because there was not systematic effort to account for gang incidents prior to 1997. Cliques or sets (subparts) of gangs may have been counted as separate gangs. There was also some confusion as to whether the numbers referred to all of Riverside, or only to the program and comparison areas. In Chapter 13, we attempt to account for changes in numbers of gangs and gang members (as well as gang-related incidents) in these areas between the program and pre-program period. In this chapter, we focus on perceptions and reports of the police and program operators.

The first Riverside OJJDP Funding Application (September, 1994) indicated that “over the past three years, the city of Riverside has experienced a growth in gang membership from 1500 to over 4000. There are now 242 gangs operating in our city.” In a site visit by the

National Evaluation staff, the Riverside Police Department Crime Analyst and a police administrator spoke of documenting 5,000 gang members and 400 gangs in the city of Riverside (Kane and Spergel Memoranda, February 24, 1996). The number of gangs claimed for Riverside was essentially as large as those numbers claimed for Los Angeles, which said it had 406 gangs, the largest number of street gangs of any city in the country (Krikorian, October 28, 1997). Based on media reports, the Inland Empire region, including cities such as Riverside, Moreno Valley, San Bernardino County, and Corona-Morco, claimed more than 700 gangs and 36,000 gang members (Riverside Project Progress Report, September 1, 1998-December 31, 1998).

At about the same time, the Riverside County prosecutor identified 350 gangs in Riverside County (Press-Enterprise Newspapers, December 31, 1998), fewer than the 400 gangs identified earlier in Riverside City. However, the number of gangs and gang members reported in the Riverside Progress Report to OJJDP (January 1- July 31, 1999 – based on media reports) was now 2,500 gang members and 86 gangs, although the same report states, “each year more youth are recruited into gangs” (Ibid). A little earlier the Riverside Press-Enterprise (August 29, 1992) reported, “the Nazi low-riders have grown from a prison gang of about thirty members to a gang of 1500 committing crimes against minorities and law enforcement.”

According to a Project Progress Report (July 1, 1997-December 31, 1998), a major African-American gang, “2800 Block Crips,” mainly located in Eastside, had tripled its membership since 1995 and “many multi-generational Black families in the Casa Blanca area contain ‘2800 Block Crips’ members.”

In an attempt to gain some clarity about the numbers of gangs identified by the Riverside Police Department in the program and comparison areas, the National Evaluation staff engaged

in extensive discussions with senior street-based police officers in the areas, who listed 30 gangs. Furthermore, the Project youth workers indicated that program youth were members of only 7 gangs from the program area (Memorandum from I. Spergel to J. Burch, August 26, 1998). The Project's fifth-year funding application identifies 962 gang members and 10 gangs in the program and comparison areas (September 1, 1998). However, about a year later in a media report (Youth Today, Myers, November, 2000), the Project Director returns to earlier figures for the number of gang members – more than 2,500 – and 86 gangs.

Initially, it was very difficult, if not impossible, to come to any firm estimate of the scope of the gang problem in Riverside, or the program and comparison areas, based on these varying estimates of Project and criminal-justice personnel and media reports of the numbers of gangs and gang youth. In general, it appeared there was a tendency to overestimate the scope, but perhaps not the nature, of the gang problems and the numbers of gangs and gang members that were actually present (see Chapter 13).

### Nature of the Gang Problem

Riverside's first application for OJJDP funding states that "gang crime has become a major concern of citizens, as drive-by shootings, carjackings, drug dealing and burglaries had increased." The second application for funding reported that based on Riverside Police statistics, the city experienced 30 homicides, 17 of them gang-related. However, in the course of a site visit by the National Evaluation staff in 1996, police officials claimed there were 38 gang homicides in 1994, but 12 in 1995. Apparently, there is some lack of precision in identifying homicides as gang related or not.

Gang violence in Riverside, particularly in the Eastside, seemed to have subsided during the third year of the program. There was some indication that violence between African-American and Hispanic gangs might have been a result of unceasing competition between gang members who were dealing drugs; various factions of the same Hispanic gang had also been warring with each other presumably over turf. Nevertheless, it was not clear whether the reduction of violence was because of new tougher laws, increased suppression, project program effects or something else (Riverside Fourth-Year OJJDP Funding Application, 1998).

A Project Progress Report (September 1 - December 31, 1998) quoted the Riverside Press-Enterprise (December 31, 1998) to the effect that gangs were “branching out beyond fights for turf and control over drug trafficking.” For example, members and allies of one Riverside street gang were presumably “responsible for about 25 violent, carefully orchestrated bank heists [in the region] in recent years, according to the FBI and police.” To what extent this reflected the typical nature of crime committed by street gangs was unclear. In the course of a National Evaluation staff site visit (I. Spergel Notes, June 29-July 1, 1998), a key youth worker in the Eastside area stated that most gang youth “were involved in shoplifting, theft, joy-riding, drug use, and alcohol consumption but as a rule not violence.”

In the early years of the Project, Riverside (particularly Eastside) experienced an increase in violence between Hispanic and African-American gang members, with local African-American citizens (who were not gang members) as victims. There were also 5 Hispanic killings that were presumed to be gang related in Casa Blanca in the period 1999-2000 (O’Neill Hill, Press-Enterprise, May 17, 2000). The level of violence presumably rose again in 1999, based on a report of the Project Director: “last year [1999], police classified 17 of the city’s 31 homicides

as gang-related – up from three out of 19 homicides in 1998” (Myers, Youth Today November, 2000).

Despite the difficulty of accurately or reliably assessing the nature of gang violence and gang crime during the Project period using Project and police interviews and media reports, it was likely that a fairly serious gang and non-gang violence problem was present in Riverside, at least based on the perceptions of a variety of people. In a house-to-house survey conducted early in the Project by staff of a violence-prevention project of a grassroots organization in Eastside, 38% of elementary school students said they regularly witnessed violence, and 55% said they were concerned for their personal safety every day. Furthermore, in a police survey of citizens about a local park area, conducted by the Riverside Police Department, 47% of respondents reported that gang activity was the most-often observed criminal activity, with narcotics dealing (34%) and prostitution (24%) close behind. Most of the respondents said they had been a victim of a robbery (Purnell, February 10, 2000).

### Definition of the Gang Problem

The scope and nature of the gang problem may have been influenced by the California Penal Code, by general community attitudes, and by law enforcement attitudes implementing sections of the Penal Code. The California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (S.T.E.P.) of 1988 may have set the parameters for the identification, control, and punishment of gang members and associates suspected of (or actually) committing a range of crimes. The Gang Terrorism Act established a series of connections between “participation in a criminal street gang,” “pattern of criminal gang activity,” and a “criminal street gang.” Some of the subsections

of Penal Code § 186.22 state the following:

“Any person who actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who wilfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a period not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison for one, two, or three years” [emphasis added]

“ ‘Pattern of criminal gang activity’ means the commission, attempted commission, or solicitation of two or more of the following offenses, provided ... the last of those offenses occurred within three years after a prior offense, and the offenses are committed on separate occasions, or by two or more persons;

- 1) assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury
- 2) Robbery with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury
- 3) unlawful homicide or manslaughter
- 4) the sale, possession for sale, transportation, manufacture, offer for sale, or offer to manufacture controlled substances
- 5) shooting at an inhabited dwelling or occupied motor vehicle
- 6) arson of an inhabited dwelling or occupied motor vehicle
- 7) the intimidation of witnesses and victims

“ ‘Criminal street gang’ means any ongoing organization, association or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated [above] in paragraph (1) to (7)... which has a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal activity.”

The Act provides that anyone convicted of a felony under conditions listed above shall be punished by an additional term of one, two, or three years at the court’s discretion. Furthermore, for a felony punishable by life imprisonment, a minimum of 15 years must be served before parole eligibility.

In Riverside, a police officer has five categories of information by which to classify an individual as a gang member: 1) the youth claims or admits gang membership; 2) he/she is identified by an informant; 3) he/she is identified by an interested informant but the information is verified by a reliable source such as a relative; 4) the youth resides or frequents gang areas, is identified by dress, hand sign, tattoos; 5) the youth associates or is arrested with other known gang members. At least one of these categories must be met to classify the individual as a gang member (Riverside Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, April 1996).

The California S.T.E.P. Act is articulated in a sufficiently broad manner to give local police and prosecutors wide discretion in identifying, contacting, arresting, and prosecuting youth suspected of being gang members in certain areas of the city. In effect, minority youth in certain areas of Riverside may be at special risk of being identified as gang members or gang associates,

and suspected of committing a gang crime. The law and its implementation also does not sufficiently distinguish different types of gangs, gang members or gang-member associates and their differential potential for committing different types of crimes. A Riverside County Office of Education staff member complained that:

“More needs to be done to modify erroneous attitudes by law enforcement and the community regarding gang youth, i.e., minority as gang members; all gang members are characterized by the same high level of evil intent and criminality” (Perez and Purnell Site Visit, March 22-23, 2000).

California state law takes a “tough” approach to minors accused of committing a crime. The law permits children older than 14 years to be charged as adults, if prosecutors show a minor fails to meet any of five “criteria of fitness” to be processed in juvenile court: the youth’s criminal sophistication, chance for rehabilitation in the juvenile system, prior delinquency, past rehabilitation effects, and the gravity of the crime. The juvenile offender, particularly if he is defined as a gang member, should probably be subjected to the punishment in adult court rather than provided with the possibility of rehabilitation in Juvenile Court (Project Committee Policy Discussion, Riverside Project Progress Report – September 1, 1998-December 31, 1998).

According to early Project policy reports, gang members ought not be eligible for diversion programs. The view was that a gang member placed on probation for a first offense would not be successful in the completion of his probation period, and that a gang member by definition is part of a criminal organization and a different type of person than other hitherto law-abiding first offenders.

It is likely that this negative view of the potential of youth gang members to be rehabilitated and to play constructive roles in the community stems from the definition, by law, that street gang members, under fairly broad interpretation, may be street terrorists. If this interpretation is correct, then it is a destructive and false interpretation of what terrorism is and what it takes to be a terrorist.

According to a U.S. Department of State report, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001... “for purposes of statistical analysis and policy-making: the term ‘terrorism’ means pre-meditated, politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” (Atran, 2003, *Science*).

“For the U.S. Congress, ‘act of terrorism’ means an activity that – (A) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any State, or that would be criminal violation if committed within jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; and (B) appears to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnaping” (Ibid).

The key element of terrorism – the use of violence to attain political ends – is missing in the California Penal Code definition. A law which institutionalizes and misrepresents the nature of youth gangs, gang members, gang-member associates, and the delinquencies or crimes they commit (or do not commit) can contribute to a widening and intensification of the gang problem. There is already evidence that California’s broad definition of a gang-related homicide (present in Los Angeles) – i.e., as one committed by a person simply identified as a gang member – may double the number of gang homicides and may increase the scope of the gang problem compared

to a more restricted definition based on the intent or motivation of the person identified as a gang member (as is the case in Chicago) (Klein, 1995).

It is possible that a particular state law, the exaggerated and misinformed concerns of key citizens, and the policies and practices of law-enforcement officials – unless modified – may create impediments to the successful implementation and achievement of a comprehensive local community-wide approach to gang prevention, intervention and suppression.

## Chapter 5

### Riversides's Response to the Gang Problem

#### The Initial Phase

In 1994, the Riverside Police Department reported a sharp rise in gang activity associated with an increase in drug dealing, carjacking, burglaries and shootings. Concerns were expressed by citizens, local community organizations and the University of California-Riverside, in the areas where much of the crime was occurring. In response, the Mayor's office encouraged the Police Department and the University to seek federal funding to address Riverside's gang problem. The University's Office of Education and Community Initiatives began working with the City Manager, the Mayor, the Police Department, the school systems, other public agencies and local community organizations to develop a comprehensive plan "to impact" street gangs (*The Shield*, Riverside Police Department, undated).

The University's initial application to the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention stated the goal of the proposed Project and several ambitious objectives:

"to test a comprehensive program model [the OJJDP model] – one which will mobilize the multidisciplinary leadership within the Riverside community and reduce the incidence of gang membership and gang-related crime. We will reduce the incidence of gang-related crime among 12-24 year old [youth] by 40% by Year 3 of the project ... We will obtain baseline data on the social and economic opportunities available to our high risk youth and increase those opportunities by 40% ... We will place more youth into intervention services each year of the

project implementation ... We will increase the rate of employment of youth age 15-24 by 30%” (First-Year OJJDP Funding Application, 1994).

The application states that the “encompassing philosophy,” and a long-term aim of the Project is “prevention of general community risk factors.” This was broader than the intent of the federal initiative. The Project’s original interest was to “establish a philosophy and umbrella under which we can collaborate and sustain an effective vision for a healthy community ... we will develop program, policy, and practices that can work together toward illuminating risk factors in the community.” The Project was to focus on at-risk youth, but also include an emphasis on a strong suppression component from the Riverside Police Department, vertical prosecution of gang leaders involved in ongoing criminal activity, and use the S.T.E.P. sentencing enhancements to eliminate those gang leaders’ influence on at-risk youth.

With the focus of the Project on prevention, there were concerns by Steering Committee members that the Project might duplicate the efforts of other initiatives in Riverside focusing on problems of at-risk youth and families (Steering Committee Minutes, March 15, 1996).

It was apparent (based on early discussions of community leadership and representatives of the University of California) that the primary purpose of the Project was consensus building about the prevalence of a gang problem, and the development of a long-term, research-based strategic plan to prevent the development of a gang problem among at-risk youth, while secondarily reducing serious gang behavior, probably through a strong suppression approach. The aims of prevention, intervention, and suppression were to be pursued separately. How they were to be pursued interactively, and the resulting programs that evolved, was to result from an

extensive planning process to address the gang problem citywide.

Based on an early statement by the University of California-Riverside (undated), the Project objectives were listed as follows:

“1) The building of community consensus and empowerment that we do have a significant gang problem that is not limited to one area of our city ... 2) establishment of a permanent umbrella entity to operate as an assessment and program planning body to address the issues of gang violence and juvenile delinquency in the city of Riverside ... 3) the development within six months of a long range strategic plan that is based on promising research and community priorities ... 4) the building of a capacity among a wide spectrum of leadership in our community to identify risk behaviors contributing to health and behavior problems among our youth and the ability to implement effective protective factors against the effects of risk ... 5) develop effective data collection mechanisms and successful information sharing strategies to guide policy and program planning for youth and family initiatives ... 6) the reduction and prevalence of youth gang crime, particularly homicides, assaults, and drug trafficking ... 7) community mobilization centered on a research based prevention framework”

As the planning and problem-assessment process developed in the first Project year, the OJJDP administrators, Technical Assistance consultant, and National Evaluator raised concerns: that the Project was employing a long-range strategic-planning and data-collection process,

without consideration of program development during the Project years; that focus was on the citywide gang-problem (when it was concentrated in certain parts of the city, based on the initial application); that attention was centered on prevention but not on intervention and suppression for gang-involved offenders; and that its concentration on data collection for purposes of process and outcome evaluation would obviate the need for a national cross-site evaluation.

The Steering Committee of representatives of community-agencies generally subscribed to the long-term planning process. A specific set of procedures, formats and schedules was proposed in which the steering committee participated, and others would evolve their own separate systems of intervention based on perceived needs or problems of youth and what the particular organizations felt they could or should do about them. The planning process was to involve the collection of as much available data as possible about the particular organization's present functioning and purpose for the future. This would be the initial phase of informing the various organizations what each was doing (Spergel, Summary Field Notes, February 24, 1996).

As part of the strategic planning process, and probably at the behest or at least support of the Mayor's office (concerned not only with the gang problem, but with the coordination of organizational efforts in addressing the problem), a series of neighborhood forums was scheduled throughout the city. The forums were expected to attract local organizations, community groups, and citizens for the purpose of examining organizational and programmatic responses to gangs and gang crime, as well as risk factors, and recommend what changes and additional programs might be needed. Such information could feed into the development of the strategic plan (Steering Committee Minutes, February 15, 1995).

The proceedings of these forums, in which Steering Committee members were involved

and which were staffed by the then Project Coordinator, were not made available. The Coordinator was fired because of “failure to document” what was occurring at these local community meetings (Spergal Summary Field Notes, February 24, 1996). To what extent the Steering Committee and the Project Director found these forums useful was not clear. Earlier, the Riverside Police Department had expressed opposition to the participation of certain grassroots and church leaders who sheltered or protected gang leaders. It was not until the latter part of the Project period that serious efforts were made to involve grassroots organizations in Steering Committee deliberations and program efforts.

Under constraints of OJJDP, the Project Director, along with the Steering Committee and other key agencies that were or would be directing program operations, the Police Department, the Juvenile Probation Department and the Youth Service Center began to plan a program targeted to gang-involved probationers from Juvenile Probation who were from two areas of Riverside, Eastside and Arlanza. Focus would shift to intervention and close supervision of these youth, with later focus on at-risk youth. The Project Director accepted the suggestion of the Technical Assistance consultant that a pilot program should be developed to test or develop the basis for a later citywide program (Kane, Site Visit Notes, February 27, 1996). The long-term strategic planning process continued.

By the second year, the program began to serve adjudicated youth from Juvenile Probation who were identified as gang members, and were also said to be involved in violent crime. The pilot project was expected to enhance the development of a “strategic plan regarding the nature and extent of a range of problem behaviors associated with Riverside’s low-violating gangs” (Riverside Progress Report, July 1, 1997-December 31, 1997).

The Steering Committee working groups continued to prepare drafts of Information and Operations Briefs (IOBs), now addressing the problems and needs of gang-involved youth. Draft papers were prepared that described the policies and procedures of various community-service and control sectors of the city directed to (or that could be directed to) the gang problem. A variety of agencies and community organizations, particularly those already represented on the Steering Committee, participated in the creation of the IOBs that described particular agency functions, program issues of concern, as well as the further development of policies and practices that would be useful in the better control and service of gang youth, particularly within existing agency parameters:

1. Youth Employment – Riverside County Office of Education and the city’s Department of Human Services;
2. Education – Alvord and Riverside Unified School Districts;
3. Drug Abuse – County of Riverside Department of Mental Health;
4. Sentencing procedures – Riverside County Juvenile Court;
5. Law Enforcement – City of Riverside Police Department (including School Resource Officers);
6. Juvenile Probation – Riverside County Probation (including field services and juvenile hall);
7. Parole – California Youth Authority;
8. Prosecution – Riverside County District Attorney’s Office;
9. Public Housing – the Housing Authority of the City of Riverside;
10. Recreation – City of Riverside Parks and Recreation Department

(Progress Report, July 1, 1998-December 31, 1998).

Not all of these agencies were directly or initially involved in the provision of services or in program development. The Project transitioned from strategic planning for gang prevention citywide to focusing on gang youth who were referred from Juvenile probation. The Director and Co-Director were under great pressure from OJJDP to make acceptable changes. They worked very hard to transition the Project, persuading the Steering Committee to modify their original strategic-planning approach. A specific program plan was now developed to target probation youth referred to the Project for job training and placement, education, literacy counseling, recreation, and intensive supervision and monitoring by probation, with the aid of outreach youth services; special attention was to be given to assisting police and probation with certain system changes, such as improved case identification and communication about gang youth within and across these two departments (Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, April, 1996).

As the Project progressed, it was expected to broaden its focus beyond suppression to include intervention and prevention for at-risk youth who had a propensity toward violence and crime but may not have been adjudicated (Progress Report, July 1, 1996-December 31, 1996). An elaborate assessment and case-management system was to be developed. Nevertheless, the Project Director and Co-Director continued to have reservations about the OJJDP model and, in particular, how it was to be interpreted. The Project Director said that she and the Steering Committee believed that a comprehensive approach

“meant across the city and not to the exclusion of any neighborhood or population. Furthermore, the words prevention, intervention, and suppression

were perceived as a full scale application that went down to prevention for the very young elementary ages. Participation in the model federal initiative meant that the city would be able to develop the capacity to identify the range of serious risk factors for youth attraction to and sustained involvement in gang related criminal and drug abuse activities; and then select for implementation of strategies that targeted the identified risk factors” (letter from the Project Director to a National Evaluation Staff member, March 4, 1997).

The Project Director and Co-Director questioned the National Evaluator’s need to collect data using his data instruments. They believed the data he required were already available. There was reluctance to utilize National Evaluation instruments and even at first to provide a Project name on their local national youth survey. The reluctance to name the Project had a complex rationale:

“The project ... is an initiative ... by a task force to create organizational change and community mobilization necessary to strengthen the responses to gang violence across all agencies ... Most steering committee members objected to a project name receiving credit for their efforts to engage in strengthening their agency’s program response. If the JTPA [Job Training and Partnership Act] improved services in job training by undertaking the organizational changes necessary to serve our high risk population, they felt it was theirs to own and report. The same sentiments were held by the schools, police and community organizations ...” (Ibid).

Project administrators were at first reluctant to burden various service personnel at Juvenile Probation and the police department with completing National Evaluation program-process forms or providing access to aggregate-level police data. Special intervention by OJJDP administrators was required to begin to facilitate the provision of required program data to the National Evaluator. The Project Co-Director had collected a great deal of citywide data and did not see the need for an outside evaluation to collect either program-process or outcome data.

An independent Technical Assistance consultant, who was employed to provide training to Project staff, stated

“I see no evidence that they [Riverside Project] are addressing the requirement from the OJJDP Research Summary and Technical Assistance Manual to ‘target both younger and older gang members.’ I have seen no evidence of components of the Riverside Project to conduct intervention strategies with individual gang members” (Comments of Independent Consultant, circa January 1997).

At about the same time, the Project’s Technical Assistance consultant was also raising questions about the extent to which the Riverside Project was following the OJJDP program model

“Data vs. Program Needs. Considerable effort was being devoted to identifying data which will document the activity of the various partners ... I am concerned that the project leaders’ interest in documenting the project is a higher priority than developing the resources for the project .... that could enhance the program

activities;

Limited Community Involvement. The community does not appear to be involved in the project in a meaningful way. This is particularly true for representatives of the two target communities ....

Role of the Steering Committee. The role of the steering committee appears to have been downsized since our last visit. It is my sense that leadership decision-making has shifted from the steering committee to the project directors ...” (C. Kane memo to I. Spergel, January 12, 1999).

Many talented and highly competent leaders from various parts of the community had been involved in the development and support of the Project. The Mayor and his staff had been fully involved with and continually supportive of the plans and efforts of the Project. There was never any doubt about the Mayor’s, the police department’s and the probation department’s concerns about the gang problem in Riverside and the need to address it in comprehensive terms. The general support and interest of the University was also evident, but perhaps for reasons more directly concerned with its own institutional interests to provide a safe and attractive environment for its students and to better evaluate its educational and research enterprise.

The University was prepared to engage in a planning, education, and research process around the gang problem, but in the long run it could not take responsibility for mobilizing the community, developing and sustaining a program to directly resolve the gang problem. The

University structure and mission probably constrained staff and faculty of OECI [Office of Education and Community Initiatives] primarily to assist city government in developing plans to address the problem, but perhaps to go no further.

The Project Director, a highly creative planner and program developer, was successful in the development of a complex proposal that focused on a long-term strategic-planning process utilizing theory and research about gangs. The Steering Committee planning sessions that produced draft Information Operations Briefs (IOB) was a useful basis for interagency understanding of what the different organizations concerned were doing about the problem. A great deal of data was collected citywide. However, at the point when the Project Director and Co-Director were required to plan and implement a pilot program in limited areas of the city where the gang problem was concentrated, the general planning process was curtailed but not entirely abandoned.

The Project Director had successfully enlisted and helped organize key leadership of the city and the county to address the gang problem. A specific program-planning and development process was undertaken based on a consortium of key agencies that were concerned with and already addressing or could be addressing the problem. Juvenile Probation would take the initial leadership in referring youth to the program and providing services and controls for them, with the aid of the Riverside Police Department, the Youth Service Center, and the job training and development unit of the city's Department of Human Resources. The creation of the Service Needs Assessment Team (SNAT), consisting of staff from the various organizations providing services to (or in critical contact with) youth in the program, was a major contribution to the coordination of services for program youth across agencies. It became the key mechanism for

influencing organizational change, and the implementation of the comprehensive community-wide model.

The Project Director and Co-Director tendered their resignations during the third year of program operations. There had been a lack of full cooperation on their part in collecting data and providing access to data (particularly worker-tracking process data) necessary for program evaluation of the Riverside model. The Project as it developed was also not meeting their own long-term planning and research objectives. At the same time, the University of California-Riverside terminated its position as lead agency.

### **The Later Phase**

Following a site visit to Riverside in early July 1998, the OJJDP Program Manager sent a letter to the Project Director. He summarized agreements, discussions and commitments made during the earlier July visit:

“The University of California-Riverside will be transitioning the gang project to the day-to-day control and responsibility of the City of Riverside by September 1, 1998... the lead agency will be the Riverside Police Department, and while a new project director/coordinator is sought, the current liaison to the project from the Riverside Police Department will act as the project director. It is my understanding that you will remain involved during the transition to assist the steering committee and interim project director ...” (Letter from J. Burch to C. Peck, July 17, 1998).

In the fourth-year application for continuation of funding for the Riverside Project, the Police Department indicated that, in the transition of Project leadership,

“there would be no gaps in advocacy for the balance needed in the model’s operations between suppression and opportunities for target youth ... the steering committee recommended that the project director will regularly report to the chair and co-chair of the steering committee, one being from the community, the other from law enforcement. Unfortunately, the co-chair position, due to a lack of willingness by any community organizations currently serving on the steering committee to take on the responsibility of co-chair, went to probation” (Fourth-Year OJJDP Funding Application, July, 1998).

The fourth-year application also stressed the importance of broadening the representation of the community grassroots and community-based organizations on the steering committee. The report noted the resignation and dropping off of community members from the target area since the start of the program. The challenge was to provide involvement of the community on the task force or Steering Committee through incentives to participate, possibly through a stipend for community members to help offset some of the expense such participation incurred (Ibid).

While earlier Project leadership had focused on the need to break down barriers of interagency communication among participating agencies, and especially to increase the participation of middle management in responding to Riverside’s gang-violence problem (Report by OEI, March 13, 1998), attention was shifting to better understanding and relating to the needs of the local community and its representatives who were more directly confronted with and

knowledgeable about the gang problem. Citywide or community-wide agencies alone (such as police, probation, and the Youth Service Center) could not be responsible for addressing the problem. There was pressure from juvenile court judges to find ways other than arrest and confinement to address youth gang problems (Spergel Site Visit Notes, July 2, 1998).

In January 1999, the Acting Director of the Project from the Riverside Police Department became the Director, and a new Coordinator was appointed, who later became the Director. In June 1999, a new Commander of the police Gang Unit was assigned, and also was appointed chair of the Steering Committee (Progress Report, January 1, 1999 – July 31, 1999). The new Local Evaluator was the director of the Presley Center for Criminal Studies at the University of California-Riverside. He replaced the former Co-Director who had also been the Local Evaluator.

The changes in top staff personnel were supported by the Mayor's Office and key public agencies. The Steering Committee, which had not met regularly, was re-activated. Grassroots and community-based organizations were more involved. The new Director, with the support of the Riverside Police Department, was in significantly greater contact with community agencies, community groups and leaders of various churches or faith groups than the previous Director had been. Attendance at the SNAT meetings grew, now involving representatives from local agencies from the target areas. The outreach youth workers were now collaborating with local agencies in the provision of services to program youth.

Project staff, as well as local community-based agencies, seemed to become more identified with the Project and its comprehensive objectives. Several key agency representatives assigned to the Project as staff, or as members of the Steering Committee, became "believers" in

the value of the Project.

The change in approach – emphasizing better cross-agency collaboration and community involvement – may have been a response to the effects of the new Director, as well as to escalating racial and gang tensions in the latter part of 1998 and the early months of 1999. Local and state government pressures, as well as citizen concerns over the activities of the police and their response to racially-motivated killings, led to greater cultural sensitivity to local community problems and greater collaboration with local groups in addressing the increased gang violence.

In October 1999, the Project changed its name to Project BRIDGE (Building Resources for the Intervention and Deterrence of Gang Engagement). Steering-Committee members thought the name well reflected the purpose and spirit of the Project, which would help in marketing the program's positive effects (Progress Report, August 1, 1999 – January 31, 2000). The naming of the Project and its support by a wide range of agencies signified a substantial cross-agency buy-in to the Project.

There was evidence, based on Riverside Police Department statistics, of a decline in felony crimes including murder, rape, robbery, and assault, compared to the period when the Project began. The fourth year of the Project had also brought greater awareness to the community of the needs of gang youth, and of the efforts by the Project leadership to sustain the Project after federal funding was to be terminated at the end of the fifth Project year.

There was also increased concern by Project leadership (in particular by the head of the police Gang Unit and the Local Evaluator) that youth who had entered the program early may have been delinquent but only peripherally involved in the gangs. Efforts to bring more hardcore gang youth into the program were planned. This was to be done in part by the greater

involvement of outreach youth workers with gang youth on the streets. Policy changes in the Youth Service Center, which provided outreach youth workers to the Project, were required. They would not permit their members to engage gang youth in the community in the evenings and on weekends. The outreach workers had good contacts with many gang youth, and the relationships they developed both with other Project workers and with local community-based agencies could be critical both to aiding gang youth and providing law enforcement with appropriate information to control gang crime.

The new Director of the Project had apparently developed a unique authority to implement the program within the framework of the OJJDP model design through her community contacts, close relationship with outreach youth workers, the support of the Riverside Police Department and members of the Steering Committee and her very considerable involvement in all aspects of the program.

There was evidence of greater coordination among police and probation, and changes in practice in targeting gang youth. They were more attentive to the need for services for gang youth, as well as appropriate surveillance and detention or court processing. Gang Unit officers took a more active role in case planning and program development for Project youth. There was greater respect for and collaboration with outreach youth workers by police and probation. The Alford and Riverside unified school system administrators permitted outreach youth workers to contact school personnel and meet with program youth on school property. The courts and detention centers were willing to have outreach workers contact youth in custody.

As the OJJDP grant period grew to a close, the Project broadened its interests in problems and circumstances that concerned many gang youth and their parents who were not citizens of the

United States.

“An important challenge for the project has been increasing youth access to naturalization services. Parents of several project youth, who have lived in this country since they were infants never filed petitions for legal residency.

Therefore, these youth are not able to participate in the program’s job training programs or obtain positive employment” (Progress Report, July 1 – December 31, 2001).

The Project Director was later able to receive legal counsel and naturalization services for such youth, with the aid of the Mexican Consulate and other organizations. The Project also became more involved with a range of organizations in the development of collaborative efforts to address (or plan to address) mental-health issues, racial/ethnic tensions and other problems of gang youth, their families, and their neighborhoods, at local community, citywide, and county levels, including in Project target areas. A more effective arrangement for outreach youth workers to attend to the needs of Project youth at night and on weekends was planned. A more consistent and committed effort to implement the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Program strategies had been achieved. Public agency and local community support, as well as city and state financial support were provided. The program seemed to be on the way to institutionalization as part of the Riverside Police Department.

Much progress had been made, major barriers of attitude and practice had been overcome, the interests and needs of gang youth were better understood, and a variety of public and community agencies were now beginning to accept gang youth into their ongoing programs – all

as part of the coordinated efforts of Project BRIDGE.

## Chapter 6

### Program Implementation: Strengths and Weaknesses

#### Introduction

The Riverside Program did not begin to substantially meet the requirements of the Comprehensive Gang Program as interpreted by the OJJDP administrators, the National Evaluator and the Technical Assistance consultant until the latter phase of the Project, when a new Project Director was appointed. A significant transition occurred when leadership of the Project was transformed from the University of California-Riverside to the Riverside Police Department. The Project earlier had already begun to shift focus from a citywide strategic-planning structure to a program-development structure and process for gang-involved youth on probation who were located in the target areas.

The Riverside Juvenile Probation Department took major responsibility for assigning selected adjudicated youth on probation to the program – youth who were gang involved and had a history of violent behavior. Outreach-youth-worker support services, training and job placement services, close supervision, targeted police suppression, and confinement as well as a variety of other services were prescribed for program youth. Probation officers provided certain case-management functions, e.g., home visits and requiring youth to attend school and stay out of trouble. The first Riverside Project administrator, the University of California-Riverside, coordinated the development of services, mainly through the organizing and convening of SNAT (Services Needs Assessment Team) meetings and the creation of a Steering Committee.

A major objective of the Project Director and Co-Director during the early years

continued to be meeting with agency and community representatives to gather information which would be useful in long-range planning for the prevention, intervention and suppression of the gang problem. A great deal of data was collected and communicated about organizational operations, concerns about the gang problem, and ways to address it. Drafts of Information Operation Briefs (IOBs) were prepared. The lessons learned from the more limited OJJDP-funded program, which was directed to gang youth on probation in Eastside and Arlanza, were to be integrated with findings of the IOBs in a later, more gang-prevention-oriented program that would be implemented citywide.

In the following discussion we focus on the process and issues connected with the implementation of the strategies of community mobilization, social intervention, and organizational change and development in the Riverside program. Our findings are mainly based on qualitative data derived from Project funding applications to OJJDP, progress reports, site visits by the National Evaluators, and local agency reports. In later chapters we provide findings based on quantitative data derived from program-process records, police arrest histories, and youth interviews to determine the nature of services and outcomes for youth in the program compared to youth who were not provided with services, as well as possible program effects at community-area levels.

### Community Mobilization

The mobilization of the Riverside community originated with the University's desire to address the interests of the Mayor's office and to facilitate control of the gang problem citywide, as well as in the community adjoining the University. A Task Force was assembled by the first

Project Director to prepare a proposal for funding from the OJJDP Gang Initiative. The purpose of the Task Force, later to become the Project's Steering Committee, was not simply to assess the nature and scope of the gang problem, but to discover what agencies were doing about it and how best to coordinate their efforts. A planning process would be initiated

“To inform and educate members on the status of Riverside's current organizational structure and effort inclusive of measurable outcomes in addressing the prevention, intervention and suppression of gangs.

As members are informed and educated on current efforts and outcomes, develop a long term strategic plan, monitoring the effectiveness of the strategic plan and making recommendations to improve the outcome. The strategic plan will provide recommendations and programmatic practices to more effectively prevent, intervene and suppress gang membership and gang-related crimes in Riverside” (Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, December 15, 1995).

The objectives of the Task Force were

1. “Building of community consensus and empowerment that we do have a significant gang problem that is not limited to one area of our city and that we are not powerless to reduce the problem in our community;
2. establishment of a permanent umbrella entity to operate as an assessment and program planning body to address issues of gang violence and juvenile delinquency in the city of Riverside;

3. the development within six months of a long range strategic plan that is based on promoting research and community priorities to reduce and eliminate illegal gang activities in the city of Riverside ..." (University of California – Riverside, 'Riverside Community Program for the Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression of Gangs,' undated).

A formal structure of community leadership was to include a range of public, non-profit, community-based agencies, businesses and the faith community. The structure was to have by-laws and "consist of not fewer than eighteen members or more than twenty-four members appointed in accordance with the requirements of the OJJDP grant and with the approval of the Task Force." The Steering Committee was to comprise a specified number of representatives from the following agencies: schools (2), youth employment (1), grassroots and community-mobilization groups (6), community-based agencies (2), law enforcement (1), probation (1), judiciary (1), prosecution (1), correction/parole (1), public housing (1), mental health (1), religious community (1), city of Riverside (3), medical community (1), business community (1) (By-Laws of the Riverside Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program, undated).

With award of the OJJDP contract to Riverside, the Project and the Steering Committee scheduled a series of Town Hall meetings in various parts of the city in late 1995. The "face-to-face forums" were to be arranged by those members of the Task Force who had grassroots connections. The Town Hall meetings were expected to "be a communication conduit for keeping the entire Task Force apprised of the milieu of grassroots efforts and provide

opportunities for community feedback directly to the Task Force on the comprehensive plan activities” (First-Year OJJDP Funding Application Revised, January 1995).

The Town Hall meetings apparently proved troublesome, not productive, and were aborted. Grassroots and community-based concerns and ideas were not immediately incorporated into long-range planning efforts. Participation by neighborhood agencies and gangs was limited. There was evidence that the Riverside Police Department disapproved of the participation of representatives of certain groups and churches, at least one of whom was perceived as supportive of gang activities (I. Spergel, Site Visit Notes, January 9, 1996).

The idea of a long-range, strategic-planning process was also not acceptable to all members of the Task Force, some of whom would have preferred to obtain the OJJDP funds to augment their own programs’ efforts to address the gang problem (I. Spergel, Site Visit Notes, February 24, 1996). The Project Director’s idea of a long-range planning process prevailed. A longer-term rather than shorter-term planning process was to lead to agency changes prior to actual program development.

The OJJDP administrators objected to a long-term planning process. They felt a shorter period of planning for the program was required. On the advice of the Technical Assistance consultant, the program could be conceived as a pilot test and integrated with the strategic planning process. It was important to sustain grant funding, and with the support of the Steering Committee – especially representatives of the Mayor’s Office, the Riverside Police Department, the Riverside County Probation Department, the Juvenile Court Presiding Judge, the Prosecutor’s Office and the Youth Service Center – the idea of a pilot program was accepted.

“The program will initially target gang-involved youth 12 to 24 years old, and others who directly influence youth gangs, particularly as regards violent gang activity..... [and] male and female youth in turf-based gangs, as well as those in mobile gangs engaged in a variety of serious crimes including drug trafficking, property crimes and with connections to organized crime, but whose identification with the youth gang is primarily for symbolic, communal, or status development purposes” (Steering Committee Minutes, March 15, 1996).

Toward the end of the first year of program operation, the Project Director stressed that the Project orientation had transitioned from general planning with an emphasis on prevention and early intervention for younger youth, to suppression and social intervention for somewhat older youth known to probation and located in the two target areas – Eastside and Arlanza. An elaborate assessment and case-management system had developed. At the same time, a strategic-planning process was still underway (Spergel Site Visit Notes, January 10, 1997).

The community-mobilization process was not effectively engaged. “The role of the Steering Committee appears to have diminished ... leadership and decision-making have shifted from the Steering Committee to the Project Director and Co-Director ... the grassroots groups are not involved in any meaningful way in the Steering Committee or implementation of the action plan (C. Kane Memorandum, January 12, 1997).

Although the program was underway and Project agencies seemed to be cooperating in the provision of services and close supervision of targeted youth, considerable emphasis continued on the collection of data from various agency sources, city and county-wide

(particularly probation, the courts, police, and schools), which would be useful in the strategic-planning process. There was also reluctance to provide data to the National Evaluation team which would be useful to cross-site evaluation and testing the Comprehensive Gang Program Model. Certain agencies were reluctant to use National Evaluation forms. Special concerns were expressed, and visits from OJJDP administrators and the National Evaluation team were necessary to resolve these issues.

Given these and other (personal) pressures, the Project Director and Co-Director resigned in the latter part of the second year of program operations (the third year of the OJJDP grant). A transition of the lead agency from the University of California-Riverside to the Riverside Police Department was arranged. Project records were transferred. A new Project Director and Local Evaluator had to be selected. The Steering Committee became more active in this process.

The Steering Committee recommended that one of the chairs of the Committee represent law enforcement and the other chair represent community agencies. The police representative was accepted as chairperson, but a representative of a community agency could not be found for the co-chair position, which was subsequently filled by a representative of the Riverside County Probation Department. At the same time, a recommendation was made that representation on the Steering Committee be broadened, since “the steering committee lacks community representation and has experienced the resignation and dropping off of community members from the target area” (Fourth-Year OJJDP Funding Application, July 20, 1998).

A series of racially-motivated community incidents (including two killings), gang violence in the Eastside target area and shootings at City Hall in late 1998 generated citywide, state, and national attention. Focus on the tensions and conflicts that existed between the

Riverside Police and the African-American community led to city and statewide investigations and calls by community leaders for a change in police attitudes and practices. Greater sensitivity to community concerns and interests was required.

A context for change not only in program leadership but in program approach and Steering Committee composition occurred. The Riverside Police Department liaison officer, assigned as temporary Project Director and temporary Steering-Committee chair, reported to the Committee that, “the Project was attempting to broaden contact with community agencies, particularly grassroots organizations and the faith community.” He stated that the new Project Coordinator (who later became appointed the Project Director) “has begun meeting with community leaders to discuss collaboration work ...” (Steering Committee Minutes, February 10, 1999). The change in leadership seemed to put the Project back on track.

The new Project Director held a series of meetings with local agency representatives to address issues of gang violence, as well as to engage grassroots organizations more directly in program operations. Recreational activities for older youth were to be developed. The local organizations in Eastside began to provide support for the work of outreach youth workers. Project meetings and activities were held at local agencies. The outreach youth workers, as well as Project police and probation officers, made special efforts not only to constrain gang activity but, in the process, to reduce racial tensions. Some of the representatives of local agencies began to appear at local SNAT and Steering Committee meetings (Progress Report to OJJDP, January 1, 1999 – July 31, 1999). The Project began to emphasize its community outreach function, particularly through advertising the role of the outreach youth worker, and the variety of educational, job, and cultural activities it offered to Project youth.

One of the major accomplishments of Project leadership (which did not come to full fruition until after OJJDP funding ceased) was the transfer of responsibility for sponsorship of the Project's outreach youth-work component from the Youth Service Center to the Riverside Department of Human Resources. The Youth Service Center had not fully complied with important requirements of the youth work component of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model. Most importantly, they had not permitted youth workers to be present on the streets in the evenings or on weekends.

#### Youth Selected for the Program

The first youth selected for participation in the program were adjudicated youth on probation who were suspected of being gang members or committing violent crimes. They were identified as Phase-I youth, and were mainly males. Later, youth selected for the program were expected to be non-adjudicated youth who would be referred by police, youth workers, and community agencies, and who might also be involved in gang-related crimes but not yet on probation. These were identified as Phase-II youth. However, few Phase-II youth were selected for the program in the course of the five-year OJJDP Project period.

A number of Steering Committee members, as well as the first Project Director, were particularly interested in recruiting youth at high risk of gang involvement. The first Project Director stated shortly after the initiation of program operators that "within the next 60 days we will begin working with Phase II population" (Steering Committee Minutes, February 27, 1997). The second-year application to OJJDP for continued funding also proposed that, although the program will focus on suppression or supervision of youth, "as the program progresses it will

broaden its focus to include intervention and prevention for gang-involved at-risk youth” (Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, August, 1996). These youth might have a mental-health history, placement history, school problems, substance abuse problems and an “attitude.” They would be selected based on information (provided by Riverside Police Department gang detectives, probation officers and outreach workers) such as: “gang involvement, gang influence, involvement in crime but never caught, or may be on probation with another officer and relationship to other core gang members” (Progress Report, July 1, 1997 – December 31, 1998).

A National Evaluation staff member observed early on that the “Riverside program was essentially to be a probation aftercare or supplementary program” (C. Peters, Field Notes, January 11, 1997). The emphasis on selecting adjudicated probationers for the program may have been based not only on the Project Director’s need to quickly enroll gang youth in the program in order to meet OJJDP’s requirements, but also on the local justice system’s need to reduce the cost of processing gang-involved adjudicated youth by placing them in local institutions (I. Spergel Site Visit Notes, July 2, 1998).

While it was clear that Phase-I youth were adjudicated youth on probation, it was not clear (based on preliminary analysis of program-youth interviews by the National Evaluation staff and later on comments of representatives of the Police Department) that all Phase-I youth were necessarily gang involved or hardcore delinquent or violent youth. Based on youth self-reports, not all Riverside program youth were gang members or involved in serious crimes. They seemed less delinquent than youth in similar types of programs at the other Comprehensive Gang Program sites. The issue of whether Riverside program youth were gang involved came to a head in the course of a special meeting early in Project operations between local staff (including

police, probation officers and outreach youth workers) and the National Evaluation staff. The local Project staff insisted the youth were lying during the interviews, that they were all gang members and were trying to conceal the fact because of California's S.T.E.P. law which provided extra punishment if the youth were found guilty of a crime.

Towards the end of the third program year, after the Project had been transferred from the University of California-Riverside to the Riverside Police Department, the Acting Project Director stated, "a large number of youth were being served, but only a finite number were gang members ... the youth they initially thought were in gangs are not, or are no longer in gangs, are not a big threat to the community ..." (A. Pytlak comment in November 24, 1998 Monthly Conference Call with National Evaluation Staff). Nevertheless, contradictory statements about the characteristics of program youth continued to be made by Project-related personnel in a variety of reports and publications.

In the Fifth-Year OJJDP Funding Application (July, 1999), the Project Director listed one of the Project goals for the sixth year of operations as the "establishment of a protocol to identify youth who are most appropriate for program involvement."

#### Service Needs Assessment Team (SNAT)

The Service Needs Assessment Team (SNAT), developed by the first Project Director, was a means to better understand and plan for integrated services and controls to meet the needs of individual target youth. SNAT consisted of staff members from the organizations contracted to provide services to target youth and to control their activities in the community (the two Project police officers, the two probation officers, the outreach youth workers, representatives of

the school districts, and the Riverside Department of Human Resources Employment Coordinator), as well as (towards the end of the Project period) representatives of local and citywide agencies and grassroots organizations concerned with the gang problem in the target areas. Two types of SNAT meetings were organized: Services and Security. Most Project staff and community representatives attended both meetings. Police Gang Investigators and School Resource Officers (who were officers of the Riverside Police Department) attended only the Security meetings. Additional guests, particularly at the Security meetings, included representatives of the California Youth Authority, Riverside County Adult Probation and Riverside Housing Authority.

The SNAT Service meetings were a means of more effectively referring youth to particular agencies for services, and following up on progress. Information brought forth by key agency staff and shared with others at the meetings included data from court dispositional reports, probation notes and observations by outreach youth workers. The SNAT Security meetings focused on information about gang-violent incidents and potentials for gang crime in the target communities. Information was exchanged that provided intelligence to police, probation, and occasionally prosecutors, and aided in the solution of crimes and vertical prosecution.

SNAT meetings provided the principal structure and process for a comprehensive approach to addressing the defined gang problem. It facilitated the participation and investment of agencies in the Steering Committee. It was the basis for a strategic planning and organizational policy-change and program-development practice, in immediate and practical terms. Representatives of agencies began to understand each other's program activities,

particularly as they related to, complemented, and augmented their own program objectives, often with the same youth and facilities.

Much information about individual youth and gang situations was exchanged informally (particularly among Project police, probation officers, and outreach youth workers) before or after meetings, which improved services for and controls on the targeted program youth. Problems of relationships among team members and issues of organizational practice were brought up and usually resolved.

A set of procedures was established for the conduct of exchanges of information about particular youth. The Project probation officers usually took the lead in bringing up the individual-youth case. SNAT members responded to the information provided by the probation officer with data they had on the youth's behavior and needs for services. A summary service plan was written up (or revised) at the meeting. The youth was then referred to a particular agency for initial services, additional services, or modified services.

Attendance at SNAT meetings by representatives of the Alford Unified and Riverside Unified School Districts made for more effective collaboration. Outreach youth workers were permitted on school premises and also called upon to resolve gang issues and conflicts between target youth and teachers. SNAT meetings also made for greater collaboration among Project police and probation and the District Attorney's office, resulting in searches and arrests of youth engaged in suspicious or criminal activities. Information from outreach youth workers provided "missing links" in investigations or follow-up studies of gang incidents.

Nevertheless, the effects of action taken by Project probation or police officers based on information offered by outreach youth workers could create difficulties for the youth workers. In

one case the youth worker appeared at the family home close to the time a target youth was arrested. The youth worker was held responsible for the arrest. After discussion of the incident at a SNAT meeting, a method evolved to notify youth workers of relevant law enforcement and probation – to avoid a repetition of the situation (Fifth-Year OJJDP Funding Application, July, 1999).

The Probation Department and the Juvenile Court began to use youth workers to provide services to targeted gang members who were on home arrest, in the period after OJJDP funding terminated (Progress Report, January 1, 2002 – June 30, 2002). The pattern of improved communication among Project team members, much of it occurring at SNAT meetings, was the key basis for the perception of the effectiveness of the Project.

“Probation Supervisor: ‘Much of the effectiveness of the program is due to the combination of service and suppression which is lacking in other programs;’

Police Liaison: ‘the last several gang-related homicides were quickly solved with the involvement of personnel in the Project due to communication. ... for a fact it would not have happened as quickly without their assistance.’ ” (Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, January 19, 2000).

### The Role of Probation: Suppression, Services and Case Management

Since the great majority of youth who were referred to the program were on probation, probation officers played a critical role in the development of Riverside’s Comprehensive Gang

Program Model. The Juvenile Probation officer had a broad range of responsibilities in regard to formal and informal probation. The goals and objectives of the Probation Department were:

“First, to assist the court in its sentencing decisions, i.e., to provide the court with detailed information on the youth gang member along with recommendations regarding possible sanctions and rehabilitation options for the judge to consider; second, to effectively enforce the orders of the court and the laws of the State with special regard to limiting the criminal activity of youth gang members; third, to assist criminal justice and community agencies as well as grassroots groups to coordinate information and develop efforts both to control and prevent gang behavior; and fourth to broker special school and employment opportunities for youth gang probationers to better meet their social development needs” (Riverside Probation Department, circa 1994-1995).

By law, the responsibilities of the Juvenile Probation officer included the supervision of delinquent and pre-delinquent minors not placed on formal probation.

“The candidate for informal probation is generally a first time or second time offender, 15 years of age or younger. The offenses are usually misdemeanors; [the offender] comes from a dysfunctional family, has a history of school problems, running away from home, substance abuse, possible gang affiliation and family criminality” (Memorandum of the Associate Director, Probation Department, November 30, 1995).

A variety of resources, particularly of a custodial nature, were available to the court (often determined specifically by the Juvenile Probation Officer) including community service, home confinement, electronic monitoring, detention in Juvenile Hall, probation camps or residential facilities managed by the probation department, as well as placement in foster and group homes and other residential treatment facilities, in addition to supervision. The highest sanction available to the Juvenile Court judges was commitment to the California Youth Authority, which usually occurred only after an unsuccessful attempt to rehabilitate the offender at a lower level of probation or residential treatment. A gang youth engaged in a serious offense might be sentenced to CYA on a first offense, however.

The youth identified as a gang member who came before the court was ordinarily regarded as ineligible for diversion or community-based programs, and was likely to be referred to placement. Many of the youth in the program experienced multiple placements. An armed probation officer was mandatory during the probationary period following release from custody. The gang youth was usually not considered suitable for diversion.

“By definition, the gang member is a member of a criminal organization that seeks to control an area outside of the law ... the gang member is an individual who is committed to a criminal organization and as such is an entirely different type of being than the otherwise law-abiding first offender” (I.O.B. for Diversion Programs, Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, August, 1996).

This definition and description is not consistent with research evidence that most gang members are active only for a short period of time and normally outgrow their delinquent careers

in late adolescence (Thornberry, Krohn, Lizotte, Smith, Tobin, 2003; Esbensen, Huizinga, Weiher, 1993).

Systematic procedures for referral of youth to the program were established. The youth (identified through the Gang Violence Suppression Unit [GVSU] Probation Screening Form) who resided or practiced his gang lifestyle in the target areas was assigned to the Project probation officers. The assigned probation officer met with the youth and his parent(s) in an orientation meeting to go over the provisions of probation, as well as to indicate opportunities available in the Comprehensive Gang Program. Later in the development of the program the probation officer also obtained a signed consent from the youth and his parents to attend the program, even if the youth was a ward of the court and required to attend (Third-Year OJJDP Funding Application, June, 1997). Probation officers were increasingly able to carry out their varied duties. They were aided by outreach youth workers in monitoring and assisting youth in complying with court requirements, attending school or job-training sessions and providing increased social opportunities. They were able to increase their presence at schools and community agencies at gang-crisis times. In a letter of support for the Project, the Chief Probation Officer wrote:

“The Riverside County Probation Department is very pleased with the accomplishments of the Riverside Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program. The program has been instrumental in the identification, supervision and suppression of identified gang members in the target areas of Eastside and Arlanza. The two ..... Department of Probation officers have worked closely with the Police Department in coordinated

law enforcement activities and with the Youth Service Center, City of Riverside and community agencies in the referral of target youth for services including job referrals, education, counseling and joint case management” (Letter from Chief Probation Officer to Steering Committee Chair; Fifth-Year OJJDP Funding Application, July, 1999).

### Outreach Youth-Worker Services

The concept of an outreach youth worker was new to Riverside, in the sense that a youth worker could be detached from a youth-serving agency to identify gang-involved youth in a neighborhood, and could provide them with services such as crisis counseling, school and job-training support, while also collaborating with criminal-justice agencies. According to the OJJDP Model, the youth worker would have to be available for crisis intervention at various times during the course of the day, evening or night to prevent and control gang activity. Riverside, unlike other (mainly large) urban centers had no tradition of outreach youth work involving gang youth.

The Riverside Project Director contracted with a major citywide youth-service agency – the Youth Service Center – a non-profit counseling agency addressing the needs of young people and their parents through various programs of prevention, social intervention and treatment. The agency had no experience with a detached-worker or outreach-youth-service approach to gang-involved youth in the neighborhood.

The Center’s two primary programs were outreach (i.e., decentralized agency service) and counseling. The outreach program consisted of professional counselors stationed in schools –

elementary, middle, high, and continuation – to provide prevention services to individual youth and consultation to school staff around issues of substance abuse, child abuse, depression, suicide, family problems, peer relationships, and delinquency. The counseling program offered outpatient treatment services, mainly individual, group, and family counseling at various locations around the city.

The Youth Service Center agreed to develop and provide a gang outreach youth-work service to begin in the first program year. It hired part-time outreach workers and a supervisor. The outreach youth workers were to provide “rapport-building services, school advocacy, academic progress check-ins, referrals to anger management and cultural-diversity classes, and family support” (Purnell, February 10, 2000). They were available to monitor service delivery, but case management was the primary responsibility of the Project probation officers (Progress Report, July 1, 1996 – December 31, 1996). Youth workers were assigned to drive youth to and from school and manpower training sessions, make some home contacts, and to provide limited counseling support. They were to be available to individual youth between the hours of 8:00 AM and 5:00 PM, but not to relate to gang situations in the streets.

Problems began to occur in the relations between the youth workers and the police, especially in the context of new State laws. One law would have held workers responsible for weapons and/or drugs possessed by gang youth when in the worker’s vehicle. The second law would require anyone with access to a school campus to undergo a criminal background check and fingerprinting. The Project Director and Co-Director consulted with police and District Attorney officials to prevent problems from arising. Matters seemed to come to a head when one of the African-American outreach workers was repeatedly pulled over by police with program

youth in his car while performing Project duties, when no one in the car was violating any law. Again, the Project Director held a meeting with police, the District Attorney and other officials. A set of procedures was drawn up for the outreach youth worker to follow when pulled over by the police, to avoid such situations in the future.

Pressures on the outreach youth workers seemed to ease when police statistics indicated a sharp drop in crime in the Eastside area. The Police Chief announced his appreciation for the Project, and particularly for outreach-worker efforts, at a Steering Committee meeting (Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, December 12, 1997).

The role of the outreach youth worker was increasingly well accepted by Project and community-agency personnel. This included a deeper commitment by police, probation, local youth-serving organizations and the schools to the use of outreach youth workers with gang-involved youth. Outreach youth workers were also now in touch with program youth in placement facilities, Juvenile Hall, group homes and foster homes (Progress Report, September 1, 1998 – December 31, 1998).

The development of the role of outreach youth workers in relation to Project police and probation was encouraging.

“A much needed movement of the outreach worker’s role toward advocacy has occurred. During the second [Project] year, when the outreach component was being established, the role of the outreach workers leaned heavily toward assisting probation. [In the third Project year] ... outreach workers [were] assisting in court advocacy [for youth], transportation, school advocacy, and lively discussions with probation officers about the positive things each youth is doing

... [youth workers] have a great deal to do with easing gang tensions by assisting law enforcement with defining the local scuttles and changes in gang tension” (Fourth-Year for OJJDP Funding Application, July, 1998).

However, problems with the outreach-youth-worker component were beginning to occur. A persistent complaint from OJJDP administrators, the National Evaluator and the Technical Assistance consultant was that youth workers were not permitted to work in the neighborhood at night or on weekends, to better assess gang situations and more effectively fulfil their crisis-intervention tasks. These concerns had also been raised by both Project Directors in the early and later phases of the program. Nevertheless, the Director of the Youth Service Center was adamant in his refusal to permit youth workers to carry out their duties beyond the regularly-scheduled (mainly weekly) daylight, hours. However, several of the outreach youth workers, on their own initiative and on their own time, did contact program youth at night, particularly in response to crisis calls from youth and their parents. At the same time, outreach youth workers complained about their own low wages and the lack of resources for recreational activities for program youth. These and other frustrations resulted in high turnover among the outreach youth-worker staff.

Eventually, questions began to be raised about outreach-worker performance. Youth workers might not have been working with the hardcore gang-involved youth on probation. They were spending more time with less-delinquent program youth and those who were more responsive to their outreach efforts. Several of the workers appeared not to be working at certain times, and in certain places.

The Chair of the Steering Committee, (who was also the police liaison to the Project) found fault with outreach youth workers

“not sharing insights ... on certain gangs or clients ... because of fear that if they share information, they might ruin their relationships with certain clients, or ... it is simply because the outreach workers are not there and do not have the type of insight they should. He suspects it might be a combination of both [reasons] ... the outreach workers may not be fully credible. The Lieutenant did not directly blame the outreach workers. He stressed that the lack of adequate supervision might be the problem” (F. Perez and L. Purnell Site Visit Notes, March 27, 2000).

Questions also continued to be raised about whether the Youth Service Center was the appropriate agency to have developed the Project’s outreach-youth-work component. The Center’s Director had not been responsive to complaints about his failure to assign outreach workers to evening and nighttime work, and to pay them an adequate wage. Gang violence had again increased in one of the target areas, and youth workers were not available to fully address the problem (Spergel Site Visit Notes, August 26, 2000).

With termination of OJJDP Project funding approaching, and with the availability of limited local funds for continuing Project component operations, renegotiation of contracts was required. A somewhat modified approach to the role of the outreach youth worker was requested by the Project Director and Riverside Police officers, which the Youth Service Center could not provide. In November 2001, the Department of Human Services’ application to implement the youth-work component based on conditions set by the Riverside Police Department was accepted (Progress Report, July 1, 2000 – December 31, 2001).

The new job description for outreach youth workers emphasized social intervention and assisting program youth to participate in community activities. The outreach workers were to serve as liaisons between program youth, the City of Riverside, community resources, and other agencies. The role of the outreach youth worker as an assistant to probation and police officers was de-emphasized, and collaboration with Project staff and community agencies was emphasized.

### Provision of Social Opportunities

#### Job Training and Placement

One of the best-developed and most effective components of the Project was the employment-training/preparation and job-placement program of the Human Resources Department of the City of Riverside. A six-week training program with a stipend of \$150 was developed, which proved highly successful. While a variety of other employment-preparation and training programs specifically targeted to gang-involved youth on probation were available in Riverside – JTPA/RCOE training arrangements in the County Office of Education through the Job Training and Partnership Act, the Regional Occupational Program (ROP), and the Urban League Training and tutorial program – they did not provide as complete a set of services as did the Department of Human Services. They did collaborate with the program in providing assessment or tutorial services to youth.

The Human Resources Department entered into a contract with the Project to provide training and placement services, including a broad range of services such as “one-on-one job

coaching, basic life-skills training, financial management, resume writing, workshops, cultural diversity training and other job-related training” (City of Riverside Information Booklet, May 1, 2000).

The objective of the Job Training and Placement component was also to actively network with the business community to “seek positive employment for target youth ... employers will be provided with a qualified competent pool of applicants to fulfill their need for employment” (Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, August, 1996). A marketing flyer was developed to create a cadre of employers that would hold job slots open for targeted youth. “Forty-three out of 104 employers contacted agreed to work with the Project by creating job opportunities for the targeted youth” (Third-Year OJJDP Funding Application, July, 1997).

The job-training and placement program was highly attractive to program youth, and there was little evidence of friction between youth who may have come from rival gangs from different parts of the city. Youth were generally placed in minimum or near-minimum-wage positions, full-time or part-time (e.g., jobs in food service, factory, sales, clerical and a few in semi-skilled craft or technical jobs). Older youth were more likely to already have found be holding jobs. However, youth were not always sufficiently educated or literate to qualify for the jobs available. In a few cases, the job developer sought to get employers to build mentoring and tutorial sessions into their job opportunities. Towards the end of the Project period, the Project Director, with the aid of the job developer, planned to broaden job-training opportunities by developing an arrangement with a local corporation that would prepare youth to be entrepreneurs.

A key problem that the Project Director began to address (just after termination of OJJDP funding, but as the program continued) was the youth’s lack of citizenship or legal residence in

the United States. Youth could not obtain access to the Department of Human Services JTPA training program without such documentation. Many of the youth's families had been resident in the country and community for years. Some of the program youth had been in the country since they were infants, but their parents had never filed petitions for legal residency. The Project Director was able to secure legal counsel and naturalization services for one program youth with the assistance of the Mexican Consulate and the Friends Service Committee. Additional assistance was also being offered for other cases of need (Progress Report, July 1 – December 31, 2001).

#### Educational Assistance

The school system in Riverside was mainly concerned with the impact of gangs on the educational process and on the security of students generally. While individual school personnel (particularly in special schools) were interested in educational assistance and achievement of gang-involved youth, there were no programs specifically addressed to the needs of youth. School administrators were primarily concerned with preventing or controlling gang incidents. While representatives of the two school systems (Unified Riverside District and Unified Alvard District) were regular, participating members of the Project Steering Committee, a liaison from the Alvard Unified District did not participate in the SNAT meetings until later in the program. Nevertheless, both school systems made it possible for outreach youth workers to meet program youth at their schools, mainly the special schools.

The Riverside school systems tended to place students (particularly expelled students) who could not fit into the regular school program in community schools, alternative schools for

voluntary and involuntary transfer students, and also in opportunity schools for youth “awaiting expulsion.” In Eastside and Casa Blanca, there were comprehensive schools being established at which social agency personnel and services were present (Spergel Site Visit Notes, February 24, 1996).

The school system administrators and teachers were aware of the presence of gang-involved youth in the schools, but preferred not to officially recognize it, in large measure to avoid labeling youth as gang members. The schools did not keep official records of who was a gang member, or statistics on gang incidents. School resource officers, who were members of the Riverside Police Department, and school disciplinary personnel were the key staff who possessed information about gang members and gang-related situations, which was occasionally passed on to city and state police.

“It appeared that school staff, particularly assistant principals and school resource officers knew the youth who were in gangs but did not keep formal records of such youth or the incidents in which they were involved. They felt that the campuses were neutral or supposed to be neutral territory. The assumption generally was that gang conflicts occurred before or after the school was in session ... School officials [also] indicated that there were 5 high schools in the Alvord Unified School District and two high schools in the Riverside Unified District and that all had experienced drive-bys” (C. Kane, Site Visit Notes, February 27, 1996).

The school systems confronted many economic and social problems in educating youth in

the various schools, particularly in the Eastside community. The problem of school attendance was particularly severe

“Youth in Eastside sometimes can’t go to school because they have no shoes or appropriate clothes ... you have people who have been in the area for a long time but move every month ...” (Third-Year OJJDP Funding Application, June, 1997).

Most youth in the program were no longer attending school. By and large most youth did not transfer back to regular school or graduate from high school. The schools tended to pass youth along although they might have been seriously academically deficient. A variety of tutorial and literacy-training opportunities existed through local social agencies and several university or college outreach programs, largely staffed by volunteers. The SNAT-meeting attendees frequently discussed these problems but could not find satisfactory answers. Most of the discussions at the SNAT meetings were taken up with immediate gang-crisis concerns that affected or could affect particular schools.

Project personnel performed a valuable function for the schools by preventing gang violence – particularly through exchange of information at SNAT Security meetings, which included school resource personnel. While the Project may have been useful to the various schools (especially community and alternative schools) in facilitating educational progress for some of the program youth and assisting with the maintenance of security, there was little attempt to influence school policy in respect to educational programs directed specifically to gang youth.

## Suppression

The Riverside Police Department was a key supporter and developer of the Project, particularly at the point the Project transferred from the University of California-Riverside to the Riverside Police Department. The police lieutenants assigned over time to the Project were also chairpersons of the Steering Committee, and exercised critical influence in community mobilization, program innovation, and administration of the Project. They had a broad conception of where the Project needed to go in meeting a range of youth, agency, and interagency needs in respect to the gang problem and the social development of gang-involved youth. Their involvement was essential to the development of the Project as it moved from a focus on improved suppression efficiency to a focus on providing services to program youth, and greater sensitivity to and collaboration with local agencies and community-based organizations.

However, it was unclear to what extent the role of the gang investigators assigned to the Project was basically modified towards a broader and more community-oriented perspective of the gang problem. Initially, the Project gang officers were part of a seven-member gang unit and were strongly suppression oriented. They rode in teams, particularly when they knew they would be in contact with gang members. Most of their time was spent building cases against gang members selling drugs. They targeted certain individuals, kept them under surveillance (often following drug buys) and gathered evidence to warrant significant sentences. They were also involved in targeted gang enforcement, particularly in Eastside or Casa Blanca – areas which happened to have the most or most-serious gang activity. When not involved in targeted enforcement, they rode around and conducted “shakedowns,” i.e., stopping suspected gang members, photographing them, taking down their names and addresses, and persuading them to

talk and provide information that could aid local, regional, and statewide gang-control efforts. Such information was transferred to statewide gang files.

While the Project gang investigators were highly knowledgeable about gang youth, their hangouts, their school and family situations, and were respectful of youth they interrogated, closely following legal procedures, they were also efficient and aggressive, and cynical about the value of the Project, particularly the likelihood of program youth leaving the gang and changing their ways. Their recommendations for addressing the gang problem were more arrests, longer incarcerations, and more officers in the gang unit. They were in favor of targeting gang-related violence at the earliest moment possible. They believed the strongest aspect of the city's approach to the gang problem was suppression (C. Kane Site Visit Notes, February 27, 1996).

Project administrators and police lieutenants were interested in better presenting the gang problem as a basis for creating better policy and resource-allocation in control of the problem. The Riverside Police Department did not at first have the capacity or manpower to adequately collect and analyze gang-incident data, particularly gang violence information. The OJJDP grant funded a crime analyst (in particular to strengthen the collection and reporting of gang-related information) as well as two gang investigators (Steering Committee Minutes, May 16, 1997; Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, August, 1996).

Based on the law-enforcement emphasis of the Project, the National Evaluator foresaw "a possible enhancement of gang labeling and control of gang youth [and an increase in arrests]," which in fact did not develop (Spergel Memorandum, August 19, 1999). According to the second-year funding application, the Project was expected to provide information that would assist gang investigators in arresting gang leaders and the most active members of each gang,

followed by vertical prosecution and S.T.E.P. enhancement-sentencing to remove youth from the community for long periods (Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, August, 1996).

At both administrative and operational levels, the Police Department's major concern was improving the flow of information about gang activity not only to Gang Unit officers from the community, but also within the department and across law-enforcement agencies in the region. The Police Chief observed that the biggest crime of gangs was stealing cars, and there was little exchange of information between the Gang Unit and the Property Crime Unit in the Department. The Project was expected to aid with information sharing in a variety of ways and thus aid in solving gang crime (Steering Committee Minutes, January 19, 1997).

Additional, systematic information about gang activity was also needed to improve the Police Department's capacity "to forecast and predict gang activity." Project SNAT meetings would help in this regard. The Police Department was attempting to get beyond a reactive approach, addressing mainly crisis situations. Police, probation, and outreach workers sharing information would enhance police operations. More efficient police operations, followed by harsher penalties for drug and gang activity, would reduce gang activity (Progress Report, September 1 – December 31, 1998).

The aggressive police-suppression approach of the Riverside Police Department may have been modified after the occurrence of series of racial incidents involving the death of two African-Americans, and a male African-American who went on a shooting rampage at a Council meeting in City Hall in late 1998. Subsequently, there were national, state and local repercussions, reports, and recommendations by a special city panel of community leaders. The local panel report "urged police officials to work toward better racial and cultural sensitivity"

(Majors, May 7, 1999). Project administrators and Project police became more involved in discussions with local agencies and community residents about collaborating to deal with racial and gang-conflict situations, particularly in Eastside. The police were participating more and more in neighborhood protection meetings (Purnell and Priester, July 1999).

### Organizational Change and Development

The OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Program Model proposed that an underlying strategy in addressing the gang problem was a change in existing policies and the development of more appropriate strategies, and this was to occur through the interaction of the three strategies – *community mobilization, social intervention, and opportunities provision*. Change in the dominant suppression strategy did not necessarily occur directly, but more indirectly as suppression personnel interacted with outreach youth workers, school and employment training personnel at the operations level, and with a variety of agency and community leaders represented on the Steering Committee.

A key mechanism for organizational change and development in Riverside may have been the SNAT structure, devised by the original University of California-Riverside administrator, particularly as it incorporated the use of an outreach youth service and the provision of additional social opportunities targeted to gang youth. In due course, there was greater involvement and collaboration of local grassroots organizations in the provision of services. The interaction of agency personnel with diverse strategic orientations, which now had to be better interrelated, was a source of modest organizational change.

The SNAT structure created a dynamic for more efficient suppression activity and also

increased provision of services and opportunities, which may have not only balanced but perhaps modified the suppression approach over time. There was increased collaboration between police and probation; outreach-youth and referral services were also developed, and a range of services and opportunities were now provided to youth – tutoring, family counseling, drug treatment, training and job-development and school-mediation services.

With the recurrence of racial and gang conflict in Eastside, additional services – anger management and cultural diversity sessions – were provided to program youth. Local agencies, police and probation collaborated with Project outreach workers to prevent outbreaks. The SNAT meetings were the venue for discussions that led to increased development of services, and collaboration among local-agency and city personnel. Through the participation of a greater range of agencies at SNAT meetings, a number of organizations broadened their conceptions about the needs for services or controls for gang-involved youth.

“Agencies [not directly involved in Project-sponsored services] are working together to identify gaps in services ... For example, the Parks and Recreational Department is reviewing its capacity to provide additional recreational and cultural programs for youth ... Alvord Unified Intervention Specialists [a newly-created position designed to address the needs of at-risk youth] and another [Alvord] representative have been attending SNAT meetings regularly ...” (Fifth-Year OJJDP Funding Application, June, 1999).

Changes in outlook and expanded responsibilities of the SNAT team members were also taking place as the Project-period wound down.

“Gang Unit officers have taken a more active role in case planning and program development for project youth. Youth’s progress and barriers to provide intervention services are discussed during both safety and service meetings. Outreach workers have assumed more case management responsibilities and have also become more knowledgeable about community resources” (Progress Report, August 1, 1999 – January 31, 2000).

Perceptions of Project Success. There was an increasing perception of Project success in terms of reduction of crime in Riverside, and particularly in the Project-defined target areas (Parker, 2002). “Riverside saw a drop of 10% during the first part of 1997 in comparison with the first six months of 1996 and according to police department statistics. That follows a decline of 3% from 1994 through 1996” (O’Neill Hill, September 17, 1999). (However, it should be noted that Project service operations did not begin until January 1997.)

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention declared “the Riverside gang Project has done an outstanding job at adapting and implementing the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model and this achievement reflects the hard work and commitment of the City, County, and State agencies in Riverside” (Lubitz, August 16, 1999). “Congressman Ken Calvert spoke briefly in support of the program, stressing the willingness of his office to do what is necessary to help find funding” (Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, January 19, 2000).

The National Evaluators, in their preliminary assessment of the Riverside Project, wrote:

“Program development has been effective and positive results are evident.

Based on the analysis of records of a preliminary group of 20 program youth,

there is evidence of a considerable reduction of both total self-reported offenses and arrests of program youth during the program period ...” (Spergel et al, May 15, 2000).

## Chapter 7

### Changes in Perceptions of Crime, Program Strategy and Performance

We attempted to measure changes in organizations' perceptions of the gang problem and changes in their program strategies between the first and third year of the Project. We measured these changes comparatively, across the five demonstration sites, but with focus on Riverside. We also assessed how well model elements, strategies and principles were achieved, based on the views of Riverside community and agency leaders, and the observations of the National Evaluators.

#### Organization Survey (Rolando V. Sosa)

Our purpose in the organization survey was to describe whether and how the observations of key executives and administrators changed between the first and third years of their Project's development in regard to gang and non-gang crimes and their own program strategies. Key organization officers were surveyed at each of the five Project sites. The lead-agency administration provided a list of local organizations and contact persons prior to the initial (Time I) survey, and the list was revised or updated prior to the follow-up (Time II) survey. During the Time-I survey, representatives of 132 organizations across the five Project sites were interviewed, and during the Time-II survey representatives of 104 organizations were interviewed. Several organizations were either no longer active or related to the program, or responsive to the survey, and several new organizations were added at Time II.

Representatives of 21 Riverside organizations completed interviews both at Time I and

Time II, about the average response rate for the five sites (20.8). The same respondent did not necessarily complete both the Time-I and Time-II surveys. The percentage of respondents was particularly low in Riverside (42.9%), compared to the average across sites (69.2%).

Organization and leadership participation rates were particularly variable in Riverside. There was probably a greater range of organizations participating in the Riverside Project and on its Steering Committee than at any other site – governmental leaders, public agencies, community-based and grassroots organizations.

The 21 organizations in Riverside who completed surveys at both Time I and Time II (the

\* symbol denotes organizations which had the same respondents at both Times) were:

Riverside Police Department \*

District Attorney's Office \*

Riverside County Probation Department

Riverside Juvenile Hall

California Youth Authority

Kistler, McCarty and Percy \* (representing the Riverside Employment Commission)

Riverside Human Resources Department \*

Job Partnership Agency

Riverside Parks and Recreation Department

City Manager's Office

Interagency Services for Families (Mental Health)

Mayor's Office

Mental Health Service Supervisor \*

Substance Abuse Program (Alvord High School System) \*

Horth High School \*

Lincolnm High School

Alvord High School

Norte Vista High School \*

Project Director (University of California – Riverside) \*

Riverside Unified School District

Mothers Against Gangs

The key city, county, and statewide-agency officials responding to the survey were mainly from the criminal-justice system and school districts. One respondent, a former police officer, now represented a legal firm. There were no respondents from community-based youth or faith organizations who completed both Time-I and Time-II surveys; social-service agencies were generally interviewed either at Time I or Time II only.

The 8 Riverside organizations responding only at Time I were:

Riverside County Adult Probation

Project Star, Urban League

University Heights Middle School

Central Middle School

Riverside Poly High School

Arlanza Community Center

Riverside County Housing Authority

Stratton Community Center

The 4 Riverside organizations responding only at Time II were:

Youth Service Center

12<sup>th</sup> Street Community School

Raincross High School, Riverside Unified Schools

Riverside County Office of Education

In general, organizations interviewed at both Time I and Time II represented the more active Project participants. Several Time-I participants (particularly from community-based agencies) did return actively to participation in the Project during its last two years, including serving on the Steering Committee . Several of the organizations represented in the Time-II survey were only peripherally involved in the program at Time I, but became very active at Time II.

The persons who represented their organizations both at Time I and Time II were highly influential in the development of the Project. They were mainly males, in their mid-forties, with Bachelor and Master degrees and an average of 9 or 10 years experience at the same agency. We note that Riverside had the highest combined proportion of minority respondents (Hispanic and African-American), particularly at the Time II survey (35.2%), but the lowest proportion of respondents who lived in the program area (0%).

Crime Problems. Respondents were able to differentiate gang and non-gang delinquency or

crime problems across sites. In general, gang crimes of all types were regarded as a more serious community problem than non-gang crimes, both at Time I and Time II. At Time I, gang crime was regarded as a very serious program-area problem at three of the five sites, including Riverside, but fell to the level of moderately serious at Time II (Table 7.1).

Gang and non-gang drug crime was regarded as the most serious of all types of crime at both Time I and Time II, across all of the sites. Gang violence, regardless of severity, was regarded as less of a problem in the communities. Non-gang crime was regarded as less serious than gang crime. Property crime was viewed as less serious than violent crime. The differentiation between violence and property crime was less pronounced in most of the areas, including Riverside, at both Time I and Time II (Table 7.1).

Gang-related crimes were perceived as generally declining at all of the sites, and significantly declining at two of the sites. Also, all types of gang-related violence were perceived as declining across all of the sites, including Riverside. This was not the case for gang drug-related crime, particularly in Riverside, where it was perceived as either about the same or increasing, i.e., becoming a very serious problem. Gang and non-gang property crime was also perceived as declining in Riverside.

In general, non-gang-related crime was not regarded as persistently declining at all of the sites. Riverside respondents perceived non-gang crime as declining, more so than other sites. Gang and non-gang violence and serious violence were viewed as declining in Riverside. The decline in non-gang, less-serious violence was significant; it was perceived as a small problem. Non-gang drug crime was perceived as increasing at three of the five sites, but as decreasing slightly in Riverside.

## 7.5

Gang Problems Affecting Particular Organizations. We asked not only how serious the problem was in the program area, but also how serious the problem was as it was confronted by the particular organization. Each organization may have experienced the gang problem differently in terms of the varied purposes, scope and nature of its operations.

On average, all organizations at each site felt that the gang problem it was confronting was getting worse. The problem of gangs for organizations or agencies had become significantly worse at three of the other sites, but not in Riverside. Although it had stayed the same there, it was still perceived at a higher level than at other sites (Table 7.2).

Implementation of Strategies. At both Time I and Time II, organization respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness of the aggregate of community-agency strategies in addressing the gang problem. The program strategies were identified as *provision of social opportunities, social intervention, suppression* and *community mobilization*, in all their respective dimensions.

Community mobilization was identified as particularly important in the first years of the Project. A great deal of attention was directed to its component elements or substrategies: coordination in defining the problem, coordination in information sharing, and community participation and planning. Defining the problem was important early in the Project period; information-sharing among agencies was particularly important once the Project and (especially) program-service operations were underway. Community participation and planning were important throughout.

At Time I, organizations at the various sites viewed their community agency strategies at a “good” level in respect to coordination in defining the problem, sharing information, and community participation and planning, and generally improving, particularly in respect to

information-sharing. However, there was a perception of some deterioration in regard to community participation and planning, particularly citizen participation. Community planning had also not improved. At Time II, suppression strategies were generally regarded as at “good” or effective levels across the sites, and even slightly improved. Considerable improvement was seen in the implementation of the strategies of social intervention and social-opportunities provision, which improved significantly. However, the provision of social opportunities was still only at a “fair,” not even an “average,” level across all sites, including Riverside (Table 7.3).

There were variations in perceptions of how good or effective the different strategies were at all the sites between Time I and Time II. Riverside had the lowest average overall score in respect to defining the gang problem of all the sites, at both Time I and Time II, but by Time II had made considerable improvement in reaching agreements as to what the gang problem was. While Riverside made overall progress in information-sharing, much of that progress was in respect to service needs of gang youth. Little progress was made in sharing information about the criminal activities of youth. Riverside also made little progress in community-mobilization efforts, particularly in regard to mobilizing citizen action against gangs.

The provision of social opportunities was only “fair” at all the sites, both at Time I and Time II. The lowest scores were present for employment opportunities for gang youth compared to other strategies. However, Riverside made better progress in making employment opportunities available for gang youth than did the other sites.

Respondents in Riverside perceived that the greatest community progress was made in regard to the strategy of social intervention for gang youth. Riverside’s social intervention scores were the lowest at Time I, and the highest at Time II, relative to all other sites. At Time I,

Riverside respondents perceived social services as “poor,” but at Time II social services were almost at a “good” level. Suppression strategies generally received “good,” and indeed higher (improved) ratings across all sites, both at Time I and Time II. However, the rating of the strategy of suppression by Riverside respondents was lower at Time II compared to three of the other sites.

Summary. Riverside organization respondents perceived the gang problem to be a serious one at Time I, but a less-serious (or moderate) problem at Time II. More progress was made in the reduction of gang violence than in the reduction of the gang drug problem, which remained a very serious problem. At Time I, respondents in Riverside were somewhat more sanguine, believing their particular organizations were facing a gang problem that was improving. Riverside respondents did not perceive that either their strategy of community participation and planning, or interagency coordination in respect to information-sharing were particularly good, but they were improving. Riverside respondents perceived that high levels of progress were made between Time I and Time II in respect to their provision of social opportunities (particularly employment training and placement) and social intervention or services for gang youth, more so than at any other site.

#### Project Performance Indicators (Lorita A. Purnell and Elisa Barrios)

In the final months of the Project, the National Evaluators asked key program-agency administrators, Steering Committee members and (sometimes) Local Evaluators or representatives of grassroots organizations to assess how the local Projects were implemented.

Assessments were measured using a series of performance-rating scales derived from the Comprehensive Gang Program Model. Six Riverside program-related personnel supplied the ratings, including the Riverside Police Department Project liaison, a representative of the Riverside Unified School District, a principal of an alternative school, the Director of the Youth Service Center, a community activist, and the Dean of a Baptist college – all highly involved with the Project through most of its operational period. The performance-rating scales were also completed by three members of the National Evaluation team.

The rating scales covered the major and specific Model dimensions: the *program elements* – team approach, Steering Committee, grassroots involvement, youth outreach, criminal justice, school participation, employment/training, lead-agency management; the *program strategies* – community mobilization, social intervention, opportunities provision, suppression/social control, organizational change and development; and the *program implementation principles* – targeting, balance, intensity, continuity, commitment. (There were variable numbers of subcategories for each of the categories, e.g., team approach, community mobilization, targeting, etc.). The scale for each subcategory was: 0 = no good; 1 = poor; 2 = fair; 3 = good; 4 = very good. The largest number of subcategories was in four categories: lead-agency management, suppression/social control, criminal justice, and schools. There were missing responses, mainly due to raters' lack of knowledge about particular aspects of the Project (Table 7.4).

The scores per category were first summed and averaged (not counting missing scores), and then the scores of all categories were summed. The scores of the local Riverside Project raters (n = 6) and the scores of the National Evaluators (n = 3) were scored separately and

combined (without weighting them), then compared. The scales (unweighted) for all raters (n = 9) was 3.48, in the “good” range. The only scores that were in the “fair” range were grassroots involvement, school participation, lead-agency management and community mobilization.

Of special interest was the difference in level, but similarity in range, of scores of the Riverside Project raters and the National Evaluators. The Project performance-assessment ratings by the local raters were generally higher (3.44; “good”) than those of the National Evaluators (2.86; “fair”). The only exception was a slight difference in scores for employment/training – higher by the National Evaluators (3.80), lower by the Riverside site raters (3.66); both scores were nevertheless at the upper end of the scale (Table 7.5)

The overall rankings of the two sets of raters were highly similar (although at different qualitative levels). The total of the rater category-assessments (n = 18) were significantly correlated ( $R = 0.63$ ;  $p = 0.005$ ). The categories which the local raters assessed at higher levels than did the National Evaluators were grassroots involvement, youth outreach and school participation, although both sets of respondents rated the Project’s accomplishments in respect to grassroots involvement and school participation at the lower end of their respective scales. The important difference was in respect to youth outreach, and perhaps social intervention. The Project made important progress in these two program categories, from a particularly low level at the start of the Project, to a good or fairly good level at the end of the Project period, due as much to the changing structure of the Project as to the quality of the outreach youth workers and social-intervention services provided.

## Conclusion

The assessment of change in strategies by the organization respondents, and the Project performance ratings and the qualitative findings of the local Project leaders and National Evaluators appeared to be complementary and consistent. The Riverside Project was distinguished by the greatest amount of organizational change and positive development of all of the sites. The city of Riverside and the Project confronted many crises of population change, racial and ethnic tensions, and gang-related drug and violence problems. An extraordinarily high degree of involvement, commitment and support by city administration, the criminal justice system, the schools, and increasingly by community-based agencies appeared to predict the success and institutionalization of the Project approach.

**Table 7.1**  
**Organization Survey Mean Ratings<sup>1</sup> of Gang and Non-Gang Crime in Program Area**  
**By Site and By Time Period**

Type of Crime <sup>2</sup>	San Antonio (n=12)		Tucson (n=18)		Mesa (n=17)		Bloomington-Normal (n=24)		Riverside (n=15)		Total <sup>3</sup> (N=86)	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
<b>Gang Total</b>	<b>4.27</b>	<b>3.61*</b>	<b>4.27</b>	<b>3.97</b>	<b>3.66</b>	<b>3.09*</b>	<b>3.07</b>	<b>3.11</b>	<b>4.00</b>	<b>3.29</b>	<b>3.74</b>	<b>3.36***</b>
Serious Violence	4.32	3.45	4.40	3.92	3.55	3.08*	3.25	3.10	3.66	3.39	3.76	3.35***
Other Violence	4.27	3.50*	4.21	4.07	3.62	2.85*	3.07	2.93	3.88	3.46	3.72	3.30***
Drugs	4.33	4.04	4.50	4.38	3.94	3.62	3.85	4.04	4.13	4.15	4.11	4.04
Property	4.27	3.76*	4.00	3.64	3.47	3.06	2.41	2.53	3.70	3.35	3.41	3.16*
<b>Non-gang Total</b>	<b>2.93</b>	<b>2.95</b>	<b>3.15</b>	<b>3.37</b>	<b>2.87</b>	<b>2.31</b>	<b>2.39</b>	<b>2.40</b>	<b>3.06</b>	<b>2.45</b>	<b>2.81</b>	<b>2.64</b>
Serious Violence	2.89	2.60	2.63	3.09*	2.54	2.11	2.31	2.15	2.68	2.35	2.55	2.41
Other Violence	2.55	2.80	3.14	3.43	2.82	2.03*	2.18	2.11	2.88	2.35*	2.67	2.47
Drugs	3.09	3.36	3.72	3.91	3.47	2.88	3.21	3.31	3.67	3.53	3.43	3.39
Property	3.11	3.41	3.21	3.19	3.16	2.43*	2.29	2.33	3.10	2.70	2.89	2.71

For differences between time periods: \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001.

Instruments: Time I and Time II Organization Surveys  
 Evaluation of "The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program"  
 School of Social Service Administration  
 The University of Chicago  
 Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa

<sup>1</sup> Respondents were asked to rate the seriousness of gang and non-gang crime on the following scale: 1=No Problem; 2=Small Problem; 3=Moderate Problem; 4=Serious Problem; 5=Very Serious Problem.

<sup>2</sup> The question asks: "For each crime, please rate how serious a crime problem you think exists in [specific program area for each site] in the last 6 months." Specific crimes were categorized as: 1) **serious violence** – robbery, battery without a weapon, battery with a weapon, and drive-by shootings; 2) **other violence** – threats/intimidation, possession of a knife, and possession of a gun; 3) **drugs** – both selling drugs and using drugs; and 4) **property** – vandalism/graffiti, breaking and entering, and car theft.

<sup>3</sup> The total number of organizations completing a survey at both time periods is 104. The total in this table indicates the number of organizations providing a valid response.

**Table 7.2**  
**Gang Problem Experienced by Organizations**  
**By Site and By Time Period: Mean Rating**

Survey Item	San Antonio (n=13)		Tucson (n=15)		Mesa (n=17)		Bloomington- Normal (n=23)		Riverside (n=15)		Total (N=83) <sup>1</sup>	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
<b>Gang Problem Experienced by Your Organization...</b> <sup>2</sup>	1.92	2.23	1.33	2.13**	1.59	2.12**	1.74	2.35**	1.87	2.67	1.69	2.30***

For differences between time periods: \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001.

Instruments: Time I and Time II Organization Surveys  
 Evaluation of “The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program”  
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 Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa

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<sup>1</sup> The total number of organizations completing a survey at both time periods is 104. The total in this table indicates the number of organizations providing a valid response.

<sup>2</sup> Respondents were asked to rate the gang problem experienced by their organization on the following scale: 1=Become Worse; 2=Stayed About the Same; 3=Became Better. In the Time I Organization Survey, the question was: “**Over the last 3 years**, would you say the youth gang problem experienced by your organization has become worse, stayed about the same, or become better?” In the Time II Organization Survey, the question differs only in reference to the time period: “**Over the last year**, would you say the gang problem experienced by your organization has become worse, stayed about the same, or become better?”

**Table 7.3**  
**Organizations' Perceptions of Community Strategies Concerning the Gang Problem**  
**By Site and By Time Period: Mean Rating**

Strategy <sup>1</sup>	San Antonio (n=13)		Tucson (n=21)		Mesa (n=17)		Bloomington- Normal (n=25)		Riverside (n=19)		Total <sup>2</sup> (N=95)	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
<b>Community Mobilization</b>												
<b>Coordination: Organizations Defining the Gang Problem</b>	<b>3.81</b>	<b>3.62</b>	<b>3.53</b>	<b>3.78</b>	<b>3.53</b>	<b>3.56</b>	<b>3.70</b>	<b>4.07</b>	<b>3.20</b>	<b>3.53</b>	<b>3.55</b>	<b>3.74</b>
Agreement On What a Gang Is	4.23	3.95	3.84	3.95	3.76	3.76	3.80	4.28	3.53	3.92	3.82	3.99
Agreement On Which Individuals Are Gang Members	3.77	3.69	3.68	4.00	3.59	3.71	3.64	4.00*	3.00	3.44	3.53	3.78
Agreement On What A Gang Incident Is	3.46	3.69	3.63	3.89	3.76	3.47	3.88	4.12	3.16	3.58	3.61	3.79
Agreement On What Should Be Done About The Youth-Gang Problem	3.77	3.23	2.90	3.35	3.00	3.29	3.48	3.88	3.16	3.18	3.25	3.41
<b>Coordination: Organization Information Sharing</b>	<b>3.38</b>	<b>3.25</b>	<b>3.08</b>	<b>3.44</b>	<b>3.06</b>	<b>3.53</b>	<b>3.33</b>	<b>4.27*</b>	<b>2.69</b>	<b>3.36</b>	<b>3.11</b>	<b>3.64***</b>
Sharing Information About Criminal Actions Of Specific Gang Youth	3.77	3.38	3.30	3.60	3.24	3.65	3.38	4.38*	2.81	2.42	3.27	3.73
Sharing Information About Service Needs Of Specific Gang Youth	3.08	3.17	2.89	3.42	2.88	3.41	3.20	4.16*	2.66	3.26	2.95	3.55
<b>Community Participation and Planning</b>	<b>2.88</b>	<b>2.31</b>	<b>2.79</b>	<b>2.84</b>	<b>3.03</b>	<b>3.00</b>	<b>3.68</b>	<b>3.72</b>	<b>2.72</b>	<b>2.61</b>	<b>3.08</b>	<b>2.98</b>
Citizen Action Regarding Gangs	3.23	2.23	2.67	2.81	3.00	2.82	3.52	3.32	2.45	2.42	2.99	2.78
Community Planning Regarding Gangs	2.54	2.38	2.90	2.86	3.06	3.18	3.84	4.12	3.00	2.79	3.16	3.15

For differences between time periods: \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; and \*\*\* p<.001.

<sup>1</sup> Respondents were asked to rate these items on the following scale: 1=Poor; 2=Fair; 3=Average; 4=Good; 5=Excellent.

<sup>2</sup> The total number of organizations completing a survey at both time periods is 104. The total in this table indicates the number of organizations providing a valid response.

**Table 7.3 (continued)**  
**Organizations' Perceptions of Community Strategies Concerning The Gang Problem**  
**By Site and By Time Period: Mean Rating**

Strategy	San Antonio (n=13)		Tucson (n=21)		Mesa (n=17)		Bloomington- Normal (n=25)		Riverside (n=19)		Total (N=95)	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
<b>Social Intervention</b> Local Service-Agency Programming To Deal With The Gang Problem	<b>2.62</b>	<b>2.85</b>	<b>3.00</b>	<b>3.15</b>	<b>3.06</b>	<b>3.29</b>	<b>3.60</b>	<b>3.64</b>	<b>2.42</b>	<b>3.84</b>	<b>2.99</b>	<b>3.28*</b>
	2.62	2.85	3.00	3.15	3.06	3.29	3.60	3.64	2.42	3.84	2.99	3.28*
<b>Social Opportunities</b> Employment Opportunities For Gang Youth Access To Education Programs For Gang Youth	<b>2.31</b>	<b>2.38</b>	<b>2.39</b>	<b>2.47</b>	<b>2.47</b>	<b>2.79</b>	<b>2.35</b>	<b>2.85</b>	<b>2.32</b>	<b>2.81</b>	<b>2.37</b>	<b>2.69*</b>
	2.23	2.08	1.95	2.15	2.06	2.35	1.83	2.46	1.62	2.38	1.93	2.28*
	2.38	2.69	2.80	2.85	2.88	3.24	2.88	3.25	3.14	3.22	2.84	3.07
<b>Suppression</b> Law Enforcement Efforts Regarding Gangs	<b>3.83</b>	<b>3.58</b>	<b>3.95</b>	<b>3.95</b>	<b>3.82</b>	<b>4.00</b>	<b>4.40</b>	<b>4.48</b>	<b>3.37</b>	<b>3.84</b>	<b>3.92</b>	<b>4.01</b>
	3.83	3.58	3.95	3.95	3.82	4.00	4.40	4.48	3.37	3.84	3.92	4.01

For differences between time periods: \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; and \*\*\* p<.001.

Instruments: Time I and Time II Organization Surveys  
 Evaluation of "The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program"  
 School of Social Service Administration  
 The University of Chicago  
 Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa

Table 7.4  
Riverside Project Performance Scale Distribution  
(All Raters)

Model Indicators <sup>a</sup>	Ratings					Missing Response	Total Responses	Combined Mean
	0 no good	1 poor	2 fair	3 good	4 very good			
<b>Program Elements</b>								
Team Approach	0	0	8	34	25	32	67	3.25
Steering Committee	0	1	14	28	37	19	80	3.26
Grassroots Involvement	2	2	23	28	21	5	76	2.84
Youth Outreach	0	4	16	27	47	27	94	3.24
Criminal Justice	0	1	8	41	79	42	129	3.53
School Participation	0	12	37	49	41	21	139	2.85
Employment/Training	0	0	1	6	26	12	33	3.75
Lead-Agency Management	0	0	15	69	71	51	155	2.71
<b>Program Strategies</b>								
Community Mobilization	0	2	22	27	14	52	65	2.81
Social Intervention	0	0	11	43	37	16	91	3.28
Opportunities Provision	0	0	4	21	19	31	44	3.34
Suppression/Social Control	0	4	26	57	66	32	153	3.20
Organizational Change and Development	0	0	4	21	19	35	44	3.34
<b>Program Implementation Principles</b>								
Targeting	0	0	6	16	11	7	33	3.15
Balance	0	0	2	7	6	3	15	3.26
Intensity	0	0	3	13	14	6	30	3.36
Continuity	0	0	2	11	14	9	27	3.44
Commitment	0	0	3	9	17	7	29	3.48

Instrument: Performance Indicator Survey  
Evaluation of "The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to  
Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program"  
School of Social Service Administration  
The University of Chicago  
Lorita A. Purnell and Elisa Barrios

<sup>a</sup> Each of the Elements, Strategies and Implementation Principles contain varying numbers of items.

Table 7.5  
Riverside Project Performance Indicators: Mean Scores<sup>a</sup> by Type of Rater

Model Indicators	Raters		Combined Mean
	Riverside Program-Related Personnel (N = 6)	National Evaluation Staff (N = 3)	
<b>Program Elements</b>			
Team Approach	3.67	2.81	3.25
Steering Committee	3.53	2.90	3.26
Grassroots Involvement	3.16	2.25	2.84
Youth Outreach	3.69	2.62	3.24
Criminal Justice	3.75	3.26	3.53
School Participation	3.20	2.28	2.85
Employment/Training	3.66	3.80	3.75
Lead-Agency Management	3.55	3.13	2.71
<b>Program Strategies</b>			
Community Mobilization	3.30	2.58	2.81
Social Intervention	3.58	2.83	3.28
Opportunities Provision	3.58	3.18	3.34
Suppression/Social Control	2.95	2.51	3.20
Organizational Change and Development	3.58	3.18	3.34
<b>Program Implementation Principles</b>			
Targeting	3.33	3.09	3.15
Balance	3.55	3.0	3.26
Intensity	3.61	3.0	3.36
Continuity	3.46	3.41	3.44
Commitment	3.70	3.16	3.48
<b>Totals</b>	<b>3.44<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>2.86<sup>c</sup></b>	<b>3.48</b>

Instrument: Performance Indicator Survey  
Evaluation of "The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program"  
School of Social Service Administration  
The University of Chicago  
Lorita A. Purnell and Elisa Barrios

<sup>a</sup> Based on a rating scale of: 0 = no good; 1 = poor; 2 = fair; 3 = good; 4 = very good.

<sup>b</sup> Pearson Correlation (N = 18, R = 0.63, p = 0.005).

<sup>c</sup> Ibid.

## Chapter 8

### **Research Method: Data Management, Measurement and Analysis**

The Evaluation attempted to answer several interrelated questions: 1) how, and to what extent, was the Comprehensive Community-Wide Gang Program Model implemented?; 2) did the Riverside program contribute to a relative reduction in youth gang crime, particularly at the individual-youth level?; and 3) to what extent did the program contribute to a change in gang crime at the community level? We have addressed the first question in the previous chapters of this report, in terms of the Project's origin and structure, the development of its response to the gang problem, and the extent to which the program elements, strategies, and principles were adapted in a manner consistent with the OJJDP Model.

We now move to a discussion of the more specific nature of program services, worker contacts, and arrest and (briefly) self-report outcomes for individual youth. Later we examine the possible effects of the program which may have led to a reduction in crime at the community or area level. Our general hypothesis is that certain patterns of program services and worker contacts contribute to a reduction in delinquency or crime, and/or to a change in key life-course or life-space characteristics of program youth, which more directly contributes to a change (reduction) in their gang involvement and delinquency. Before we proceed, we need to describe the methods used to obtain our findings, i.e., research design, the instruments employed to gather data, and the resolution of problems we encountered in data collection and analysis. We pay special attention to data-collection, data-integration and sample-comparability problems, and the measurement and analysis procedures used to overcome many of them.

### 8.1

At the start of the program, we anticipated and planned for a sample at each site of at least 100 program and 100 comparison youth<sup>1</sup> identified as gang members (or youth at high risk of gang involvement) and whom we would be able to interview at least twice. The youth were expected to be mainly between the ages of 12 and 20 years, predominantly male (but with a substantial number of females), mainly African-American and/or Latino, and (to a lesser extent) non-Hispanic white, Asian, and Native American. We expected the samples to reflect the nature of the gang-delinquency problem at each of the selected sites, based on community perceptions, and especially on police arrest data. Gang-problem program and equivalent comparison areas, and program and equivalent comparison youth were to be chosen by Project-site program and local evaluation personnel, based on criteria consistent with the Comprehensive Gang Program Model, i.e., focus on gang-involved youth who had arrest records or were at high risk for arrest. Many of these expectations were met and sometimes exceeded in Riverside over time.

### Data Management

A great deal of extra research time and effort was involved in resolving data-management problems. The time needed to determine the accuracy of data extended into the analysis period, when we discovered discrepancies in information about the same youth provided from different sources, e.g., probation and police. We describe how these problems were resolved under the following headings: *data collection, collaboration, data infrastructure development, accessing and transferring data, and sample comparability.*

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<sup>1</sup>In Riverside we obtained program process (worker tracking) data on 201 program youth; Time-I interview data on 116 program youth and 77 comparison youth; and police arrest histories for all program (n = 201) and comparison (n = 77) youth.

## Data Collection

Our key individual-level data-collection instruments were the Individual Gang-Member Survey, the Worker Tracking Form for program youth only, and police arrest histories for both program and comparison youth (interviewed and non-interviewed). Somewhat simpler and shorter forms were used to collect data on program exposure (i.e., dates of entry to and exit from the program) and risk period (i.e., the amount of time the youth spent in detention or corrections and was not at risk for crime activity or arrest in the community).

After youth (and/or parental) informed consent was obtained, the gang-member survey was administered to program and comparison youth by the Local Evaluator's interview staff from the University of California – Riverside. The hour-long interview requested information from the youth regarding: demographics (gender, race/ethnicity, age); gang activity; school performance; employment; leisure time and friends; crime and fear in the neighborhood; the youth's neighborhood relationships; gang-membership status; gang structure, size, and activities; family composition and relationships; self-reported delinquency; self-reported arrests; criminal-justice experience; and the nature of his or her response to program activities and worker contacts. Information on self-esteem and alienation was also gathered. The interviews were administered at yearly intervals, approximately one year apart – Time I and Time II. However, while 116 program youth completed a Time I interview, only 84 of these completed a Time II interview (85 program youth were not interviewed either at Time I or Time II). Seventy-seven (77) comparison youth were interviewed at Time I, but only 17 of these were interviewed at Time II. The local interviewers had a particularly difficult time making contact with and interviewing comparison youth. We partially compensated for the lack of sufficient numbers of interviews

with comparison youth in our sample by using police arrest-history data for an additional 50 youth who were selected by the Riverside Juvenile Probation Department, who were gang-involved and from the comparison area or adjacent streets not overlapping the program area. In other words, we had to rely more heavily on use of arrest data than self-report data in regard to outcome variables.

A program-services tracking form was completed by each worker having contact with youth. Basic socio-demographic information about the youth was collected, as well as Project worker's perceptions of the youth's gang membership status, dates of the youth's contacts with the worker, average number and duration of contacts with the youth, reasons for the youth being in the program, sources of referral, types of services the worker provided, types of referrals made, the worker's perception of his own helpfulness in providing services to youth, and which other workers were contacted in servicing program youth. The worker tracking form was completed on a quarterly basis for each individual program youth contacted by the worker – mainly probation officers, outreach youth workers and police.

The local-site police Crime Analyst completed an entire police history for each program and comparison youth, whether the youth was interviewed or not. The criminal history included information on all juvenile and adult arrests, warrants or suspect cases in the city of Riverside recorded in the youth's files: dates and locations of arrests; home addresses of the youth; gang-involvement characteristics; arrest charges; nature of weapons used; brief description of each arrest incident; disposition of the incident; and whether the youth was placed in custody. In Riverside, police histories included all of the youth's contacts with the police, prior to his/her program entry and updated through the end of the youth's program period. Data for the

additional 50 youth added to the comparison sample was gathered from the Riverside Juvenile Probation Department, and included the length of time each youth was confined in jail or a correctional institution for each arrest.

### Collaboration

The implementation of the research design was influenced by the structure of the Evaluation. As indicated above, those directly involved in the Evaluation included a National Evaluation team at the University of Chicago, Local Evaluators at each of the five sites, program and evaluation management staff of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice, and a National Advisory Board. The Technical Assistance team was closely associated with, if not integrated into, the complex program/research Evaluation structure. The National Evaluation was directed by the Principal Investigator at the School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago. He and his team were responsible for the design of the Evaluation, including sampling frames, data-collection instruments, and management of the Evaluation across the local sites. Program and comparison youth interviews, individual police arrest histories, and program worker-tracking forms were completed by local Project personnel. Community-crime, census, gang-as-a-unit, program-performance-indicator, organization-survey and qualitative, on-site observational and other data were collected mainly by the National Evaluation team, with the aid of local agency personnel. All individual-level and aggregate-level data were processed, cleaned, and analyzed by the National Evaluation staff in Chicago.

The OJJDP Special Emphasis and the Research and Development Division's program

and research managers, and other OJJDP administrative staff, played significant roles in the development and coordination of the program and the Evaluation research. OJJDP staff worked to assure the proper implementation of the Model. Most importantly, they assisted and pressured the Local Evaluators and Project Directors to complete their Evaluation-related assignments in conformity with the National Evaluation and Program-Model designs, according to funding agreements. The OJJDP staff mediated conflicts that arose between National Evaluators, Local Evaluators and local program staff. The National Evaluators also participated in resolving differences between local program staff and Local Evaluators, who were not always in close communication and collaboration with each other, particularly in respect to the collection of individual gang-member surveys. Collection of worker-tracking data from service providers, particularly from probation and police, was a special problem for the National Evaluation staff.

To an extent, collaboration between local program-development and local evaluation staffs was structured into the combined local program and evaluation budget. Local evaluation funding came out of the local-site's program budget, and was determined by the local Project Director. The Technical Assistance and National Evaluation staffs were also closely integrated; their functions were carried out by some of the same people, although funded from different budget sources. Since the Model and ways to implement it were developed at the University of Chicago, the Principal Investigator took primary responsibility for the National Evaluation; the Co-principal Investigator of the Evaluation took primary responsibility for technical assistance. Both worked in close collaboration with each other.

A National Advisory Board was established, comprising three national experts in the areas of gang research and gang-program development. The Advisory Board met annually with

OJJDP program and research managers and the National-Evaluation and Technical-Assistance teams to generally advise on research design, review Evaluation objectives and procedures, assess Evaluation progress, and recommend modification of Evaluation strategies. They also participated in selected cross-site program-leadership meetings. However, the Advisory Board was not directly involved in local-program or local-evaluation issues.

### Data-Infrastructure Development

Relevant information had to be collected and data processing systems had to be developed at the local level to provide the National Evaluators with useful data that would be comparable across sites. Originally, none of the local sites had data systems sufficient for National-Evaluation purposes. It was not always clear on what basis certain youth were included in the program and others not, what the relevant gang and non-gang characteristics of youth were, how the youth's problem was diagnosed, what activities or treatments were appropriate, etc.

There was a special problem in regard to gathering gang-incident or offense data from police sources. The definition and procedures for collection of these data at the individual-youth or community levels were not necessarily established at the beginning of the Project period. A definition of a gang incident simply may have referred to a situation involving a drive-by shooting or a graffiti incident. A gang incident at most sites was essentially a criminal event in which an identified gang member had been involved. The police departments at the different sites had to develop specific mechanisms for identifying a gang or non-gang-related incident; whether a gang incident was based on gang function or purpose, or whether it was based simply on the youth's identification as a gang member. In Riverside, a gang incident was based on the

involvement and identification of a subject, offender or victim who was classified as a gang member. Juvenile or youth gangs were distinguished from tagger groups, motorcycle, prison, or adult criminal gangs. Existing police data systems had to be designed or redesigned to accommodate both national and local operational definitions, and data-collection and data-organizing procedures. The development of criminal histories for youth known to one or more police jurisdictions sometimes required the integration of police-history data from several sources in the same or overlapping law enforcement jurisdictions.

A further problem was clarification of whether individual youth in the police histories were suspects, offenders, or were arrested on a warrant. A suspect might not necessarily be arrested, yet a suspect could be regarded as equivalent to an arrestee in some sites. Also, a warrant arrest did not necessarily mean that a new crime or incident had occurred; the youth may simply have violated a probation condition. In Riverside, the problems of interpreting police data were resolved in part by focusing only on individual-youth arrests, not on suspect cases.

The collection of aggregate or community-level police data created additional problems for the local police Crime Analyst. It required the realignment of police beats and districts for criminal-incident or arrest-reporting purposes, using program and comparison-area boundaries determined by the National Evaluation, further specified by where program and comparison youth hung out, their residence locations, and where they were arrested.

### Accessing and Transferring Data

Data Sources. Access to data sources was closely related to the problem of developing appropriate data systems at the local sites which would be useful both to the Local and National

Evaluators. The data were often located in different sections or bureaus of the police departments, i.e., juvenile, adult, and drug-crime sections might have to be accessed separately to obtain a complete youth history. Arrest dispositions might not be located in police records, but only at corrections departments or detention centers. Criminal-case data were sometimes available in computerized form, sometimes only in hard copy. The police and sheriff dealing with the same youth in the program or comparison area might also not customarily share data. Police Crime Analysts and court clerks were generally reluctant to provide access to case records to outsiders. Access to confinement information about youth was also difficult to obtain either from probation, court or corrections systems. Criminal-justice data were particularly difficult to access and use for cross-site comparison purposes. Official data systems varied; offense codes differed at each site. Special arrangements had to be made through local police chiefs, chief probation officers, and sometimes presiding judges to accommodate local and national-evaluation needs for access to such data.

Computerized data was sometimes provided in a local-police format and submitted on a diskette, which often contained local data-input and classification errors and omissions which had to be corrected. Police department data systems changed over time, and different local data analysts could not always readily access data from a previous system. Errors in data transfer from local police Crime Analysts to Local Evaluators and then to the National Evaluators were numerous. Software systems might be different and incompatible across the police-department, local-evaluator, and national-evaluation sites.

Interviews. Interviewing gang youth and those at high risk of gang involvement presented another series of problems. Local interviewers were often students and local women

from middle-class backgrounds who had little familiarity with gang youth or gang-problem neighborhoods. Many of the interviewers were fearful of contacting youth at their homes or in public areas, particularly in the evening or on weekends. Interview locations that assured privacy, safety, and some comfort for both the youth and the interviewees were difficult to arrange. Interviewing youth at local Project offices, where police or probation staff might be present, was inappropriate. Special skills, sensitivity, and Spanish-language ability were also often required to explain the purpose of the research and obtain informed consents from the youth, and his or her parent if the youth was a juvenile. Contacting and obtaining informed consents from comparison youth was even more difficult. Furthermore, considerable effort was required to reestablish contact with a youth in the open community to obtain second or third interviews. As time went on, the youth might no longer have contact with the Project or with other established (“broker” or intermediary) organizations. This was a special problem with comparison youth.

Worker-Contact Data. Obtaining consent from agency directors and cooperation from Project workers to complete program-process data (i.e., standardized worker-service or contact-activity records from the different types of workers) proved to be another formidable problem. Project-related agencies had their own systems of recordkeeping, and their workers did not welcome the additional bureaucratic burden of keeping extra records. It was difficult for police or probation to understand why the recordkeeping they did for their own agencies was not sufficient for Project purposes. Some of the workers did not believe the National Evaluation program-tracking form was adequate to document all that they were doing in the Project. At the Riverside site, the probation department insisted at first that all the necessary data for the

Evaluation was already available, either in hard-copy or computer records. However, this turned out not to be the case.

Cooperation and Training. Youth agencies did not have a tradition of systematic recordkeeping, although outreach youth workers were somewhat less resistant to completion of worker-tracking forms than were the Project workers from criminal-justice agencies, especially the police. Special pressures from OJJDP had to be brought to bear to assure police cooperation, since a substantial amount of Project funding was allocated to the police. Probation officers and youth workers eventually became more interested in completing worker tracking forms, while school and manpower-agency personnel generally refused.

Local Evaluators and their data collectors usually had to have permission to use existing local data sources – whether police, court, or school records – and required training in how to interview gang youth. Inherent in the process of obtaining good data was not only the training of local data collectors, but also developing cooperation among them and local program-site management staffs. Training sessions on the individual gang-member survey forms were conducted by National Evaluation staff with the data collectors at each of the local sites. Refresher training sessions took place when new local data collectors were hired.

### Sample Comparability

A major challenge was establishing comparability of the gang-involved and highly gang-at-risk youth in the program and comparison areas. We needed to find comparison youth from a comparable, gang-problem area or community who were similar to program youth, and we expected that Local Evaluators could identify such communities and would have sufficient

know-how and skill to obtain interviews from such youth. Police usually provided information on comparable gang-problem areas, but finding specific youth, or groups of youth, to match program youth was no easy matter, for several reasons.

Ideally, the nature and scope of the youth-gang problem, and specific information about the youth-gang population in both the Project and comparison areas, should have been known before the program was implemented and the Evaluation developed. This was not the case. The details of program-youth gang membership status, gang structure, gang process, and the delinquency problems in the program area were just becoming known to program personnel and the Local Evaluators as the Projects were starting up. There was even less specific knowledge of the gang problem and the gang population in the comparison communities. The difficulties of selecting comparable youth to interview in the comparison areas was also compounded because there was no easy access to them. While it was not clear how representative program youth were of the general youth-gang population in the program area, at least gang youth characteristics in the program area ordinarily would become known over time, and these youth would be more reachable than gang youth in the comparison areas.

Information about potential comparison youth and how to contact them had to be obtained from a variety of persons – police, local-agency personnel, neighborhood informants, and former gang members. The process of contacting and “using” these intermediaries was difficult, somewhat unpredictable, took time, and was not always effective. (One enterprising and risk-taking Local Evaluator had her data collectors simply knock on doors in the comparison area to find prospective gang-member interviewees. She developed a gang-member network approach, and was successful up to a point.) In addition, Evaluators found that comparison youth

were often less delinquent than program youth, and sometimes disproportionately female. The National Evaluators tried to adjust for these problems of sample comparability in part through better selection of comparison youth for the Time-II interviews, and various statistical-control procedures.

### Measurement

We had to overcome problems of: 1) mismatched samples; 2) erratic timing of interviews; 3) missing worker-tracking data, especially from the early days of the program; 4) different police arrest practices for youth in different local city jurisdictions or across cities; and 5) different time periods for collection and integration of certain types of data. Nevertheless, while the collection of youth-specific data from different sources initially made for extra staff burdens, it indicated gaps and contradictions in the data, and allowed us to go back and supplement the data and develop more accurate and relevant information on the youth samples.

Mismatched Samples. While youth in the program and comparison samples were usually 12 to 20 years of age, both samples sometimes contained a number of youth who were older than 20 years. We included all of these youth in the analyses. (There were no youth in our samples under 12 years of age.) We adjusted for specific youth-age differences (to facilitate age comparisons between program and comparison samples) by placing youth in three age categories – 14 years and under, 15 to 16 or 15 to 17 years, 17 to 18 years, and 19 years and over – depending on the age distribution at the sites and on state criminal law specifying the age cut-off between juvenile and adult status. In general, program and comparison youth at each site were

mainly between 14 and 20 years of age, predominantly male, mainly Latino (Mexican-American), to some extent African-American, and to a very limited extent non-Latino white, Native American, and Asian-American.

Erratic Timing of Interviews. Program youth were not always administered a Time-I interview when they came into the program. In a few cases, Time-I interviews took place before the program officially began, but they were mainly administered at any time within the first three to six months of the youth's entry into the program. The interval between the Time-I and Time-II interviews of program youth was generally a year to a year-and-a-quarter, but a handful of youth were administered Time-II interviews slightly before the end of the first-year interval, or slightly after the 1¼-year interval. We tested (or compared) youth interviewed at somewhat different Time-I and Time-II periods. In all cases, the differences in interview intervals did not significantly affect outcome findings.

Comparison youth were interviewed at later time periods than were program youth. Genders had to be matched, and the ages of comparison youth had to be adjusted to match those of program youth, either at the time of their initial interview or when they entered the program. This had to be done so that criminal-history periods of comparison youth matched those of the program youth, based on age and length of time in the program.

Missing Worker Tracking Forms. A research problem was not simply that certain workers were reluctant to complete worker tracking forms describing the kinds of services they provided to youth and/or the contacts they made with other workers around program youth. At some sites,

worker tracking did not commence until several months after the program had been underway. For the period prior to worker-tracking data collection, we sometimes had no detailed evidence of services or worker contacts provided to specific youth. However, we did have relatively accurate official Project-entry dates, criminal histories, and youth-confinement records for all program youth, and the youth's own record of services received (from the individual gang-member survey). We were able to determine statistically if projected, additional services data would have made a difference in outcome for program youth.

Different Arrest Patterns Across Areas. We learned belatedly that the arrest procedures and practices of police in the program and comparison areas differed at some sites. The police might arrest youth for certain status offenses and not for others, or they could be more pro-active in identifying gang youth and arresting them for a different range of offenses or crimes, minor or major, in one area of the city than another, or in different cities. This could explain why frequency of arrests varied among program and comparison youth. The youth samples from the program and comparison areas might otherwise be similar – looking at interview and self-reported offense data and controlling for key youth characteristics (e.g., school performance, employment, family structure, household income, personal problems, use of or selling drugs) – but might differ in arrest patterns. This was particularly a problem when comparison youth came from a different city.

The best we could do to show that an adequate match existed between the program and comparison youth samples was to use different sources of outcome data, i.e., self-report and police offense and arrest data in separate multivariate analyses, and hope that somewhat similar,

or explainable, change patterns would emerge. We could also examine trends and compare similarities and differences at the individual-youth arrest and gang-offense levels with those at the gang-as-a-unit and general-community levels in the program and comparison areas.

Different Time Periods for Data Collection. Ideally, all of the data at the individual-youth level (gang-member-survey, worker-tracking, police-arrest, program-exposure, and confinement-period) should have been integrated into one data set. But this assumed that the time frames for the data collected for each youth would match, i.e., that interviews, services provided, worker contacts, police arrests, and program exposure covered the same periods for each youth. They did not.

Official police data covered a longer period – as much as 3 or 4 years, both before and during the program period – than the interview-interval period. The police arrest-history period could be selected to match the pre-program, program-exposure and interview-interval periods. The program worker-tracking period averaged about 2½ years; the interval between the Time-I and Time-II interviews was usually shorter – 1 to 1¼ years – and generally represented only a part of the total program and criminal-history period. Our preferred analysis time period became the longer police arrest-history period, matched to program-exposure time.

### Analysis Strategy

In order to predict possible youth outcome changes, we utilized a minimum of one month of time during which the program could reasonably have had an effect (based on detailed program-service, program-exposure, police-history, and to some extent self-report data). This

would be the basis for determining the Project's success or failure in the prevention, intervention, and suppression of delinquency and crime, particularly at the individual-youth level. We analyzed the data in different stages, moving from simpler, larger sample analyses with less extensive data, to more complex and richer analyses using smaller youth samples. The major steps in our approach were:

1. Compare the effects of the program using police data and program exposure over the full program period (based on program-entry and exit data) for matched program and comparison youth. We determined what the effects were on youth during their full program-exposure period, compared to an identical period for comparison youth. While the advantage of this approach was the utilization of the longest period of possible program effect, it did not include detailed data on characteristics of program youth obtained from worker-tracking or most of the interview records. All we could do was control for age, gender, race/ethnicity, for whether the youth (or Project personnel) said he had been a gang member, and for pre-program arrests. We determined the effects of the program on youth using the police outcome variables of *total arrests*, *serious violence arrests*, *total violence arrests* (serious and less serious), *property arrests*, *drug arrests*, and *other arrests* (usually for minor offenses) in a series of multivariate analyses.

2. Next, compare the effects of the program on youth using not only police-arrest data but also specific worker-tracking service and contact data. These program service/contact variables were indicators of key elements of the Model strategy at the individual-youth level. A limitation was that we might not have a genuine baseline for when program effects could have started for some of the youth. However, we did measure or estimate the program effects on those youth who had been in the program before worker tracking forms were used. We used the same

control variables as we did in the analysis described above, and compared arrest changes for program youth during the program period compared to the pre-program period.

3. As in (1) above, compare the effects of the program, now using self-report (program and comparison youth) data instead of police arrest data, and the general or imputed (but non-detailed) program-exposure effects during the 1 to 1¼ -year period between the Time-I and Time-II interviews. The advantage of this approach was in using the youth's self-reported offenses (including specific gang-related) behaviors, as well as contextual (including neighborhood, family, gang, etc.) data, more extensively over the six-month-prior-to-Time-I and six-month-prior-to-Time-II interview periods, 1 to 1¼ years apart. Again, controlling for age, gender, race/ethnicity, gang membership status, and pre-program self-reported offenses, we looked for differences in total offenses, serious violence offenses, total violence offenses, property offenses and drug-selling offenses over time. Again, limitations in measuring change were the short interview-interval period and the smaller size of the samples.

4. Compare the effects of the pattern of program services and contacts on program youth and introduce mediating variables derived from the interview findings, such as *changes in youth neighborhood and life-space/life-course characteristics* (e.g., gang membership, gang involvement, size of the gang, school participation and employment). The key outcome variables would be *differences in police arrests assuming that mediating change factors in the Time-I/Time-II interview intervals were related to outcome based on differences between the pre-program and program arrest periods*. Similar control and outcome variables using police arrest data were employed. We were interested in the effects of the program variables (e.g., individual and family counseling services, suppression, etc.) on the mediating variables, and finally in the

effects of the changes in the mediating variables on the changes in the outcome variables for different program youth. This assumed there was sufficient sample data (especially Time-I and Time-II interview data) for program and comparison youth, which was not quite the case for the Riverside Project.

### Matching Youth Samples (Kwai Ming Wa)

Our analysis strategies depended on establishing equivalency in the program and comparison-youth samples, particularly using program youth who had worker-tracking data (see also discussion in Chapter 9). We had to make sure our comparison youth and those program youth with no worker-tracking records and with less than one month of services/contacts were adequately matched to our program youth who had tracking records and a month or more of services/contacts, i.e., on key demographics (especially age and gender) and program-exposure time.<sup>2</sup> Special assessment and matching procedures were required.

Our total sample consisted of 369 youth. We compared all the samples, but concentrated on the program youth sample having worker-tracking records and a month or more of services/contacts (n = 182), and the comparison youth sample having no worker contacts or services (n = 135).

Comparison youth were identified from three sources: local-evaluation interview contacts (n = 77); Riverside County Juvenile Probation Department (n = 50), and the City of Riverside Police Department (n = 8). The comparison youth identified as gang members or youth at high

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<sup>2</sup> The program-exposure period was the period between the program youth's dates of entry into, and exit from, the program.

risk of gang membership were said by Project personnel to be comparable to program youth. Program youth were identified from a Project list of all youth who were provided with worker contacts or services (n = 234). Project workers provided information through program-tracking records on 201 of these youth, of whom 182 had a program-exposure period of one or more months. There were an additional 52 youth who had either no worker-tracking records of services/contacts (n = 33), or who were in the program for less than one month (n = 19).

The purpose of the matching procedure was to establish appropriate program and pre-program periods in which to compare arrests of youth from the three samples using gender, age, and length of youth exposure to the program as criteria. The main objective was to match comparison youth who had arrest records with program worker-tracked youth who had arrest records. This would provide each comparison youth with a hypothetical program entry and exit date determined by the matched program youth's entry and exit dates. The number of arrests could then be counted for both program and comparison youth in equivalent program and pre-program periods. When a youth had no arrest history, the estimated length of time in the program (or its equivalent), whether long or short, had no effect on the arrest-count procedure. Arrests in the program and pre-program periods would always sum to zero.

We identified youth in the worker-tracked, one-month-or more-program-period program sample (n = 182), as well as those in the comparison sample (n = 135), who were arrested before January 1, 2001, i.e., the end of the Project period. Of the program worker-tracked group, 174 youth had arrest histories; of the program non-worker-tracked group, 44 had arrests histories prior to January 1, 2001. Of the comparison sample (n - 135), 99 had arrest histories prior to January 1, 2001 and 36 did not.

The basic matching strategy was to pair comparison youth with arrests by gender (n = 99, 89 males and 10 females), with program worker-tracked youth with arrests (n = 174, 165 males and 9 females), and also by age (closest birthday), on a one-comparison-youth to one-program-youth basis. Generally, the birthdays of the matched comparison and program youth occurred within a month or two of each other. Since there was one more female in the comparison than in the program worker-tracked sample, she was matched with a male in the program worker-tracked sample with the closest birthday. However, there remained 75 males in the program worker-tracked group who had not been matched with a comparison youth.

Next, we matched the 52 program non-worker-tracked youth (49 males and 3 females), of whom 44 (42 males and 2 females) had some arrest history prior to January 1, 2001, with the 174 program worker-tracked youth with arrest histories. Since these individuals stayed in the program less than a month or had no worker-tracking record, their program and pre-program arrest count was by definition zero. Nevertheless, the 44 program non-worker-tracked youth with arrest histories were matched by gender and age, on a one-to-one basis, to the remaining program worker-tracked youth (n = 75) to obtain comparable program and pre-program period lengths for counting arrests. (Again, there were two more females in the program non-worker-tracked group with arrests, than in the worker-tracked group with arrests; they were matched with their worker-tracked male counterparts on the basis of age.) There still remained 31 program worker-tracked youth with arrests (all males).

Finally, the comparison youth without arrests (n = 36, 27 males and 9 females) were matched to the remaining program youth – worker-tracked and non-worker-tracked, with and without arrests – on the basis of gender and age, in order to estimate length of program and pre-

program period.

### Summary

In the course of collaboration between program operators and evaluation personnel, the National Evaluators developed a variety of strategies and procedures to overcome data-management problems: assisting in the development of appropriate local data systems; assisting and constraining local program and evaluation personnel to adapt to National Evaluation data-system requirements; and establishing comparable program and comparison-youth samples. Equivalency was established between the program youth who had worker-tracking records and those who did not, as well as with the comparison (non-served) sample, based on age, gender, and program-exposure time. A series of multivariate analyses using police-arrest and self-reported offense variables, in separate but similar equations, was carried out to determine program effects for both program samples (worker tracked and non-worker-tracked) in relation to the comparison sample.

## Chapter 9

### Selected Characteristics of Program and Comparison Youth

In this chapter, we present a picture of program and comparison youth in the pre-program and/or program interview period(s). We focus on single-dimensional characteristics of youth: demographic, arrest, self-report, gang membership status, probation, detention status, and certain behaviors such as drug use and drug selling. These differences across samples are statistically controlled in our later multivariate analyses. The nature and scope of Project-worker contacts and services to program youth, and their effects on some of these characteristics, are described in the following chapters.

Our discussion covers all youth who participated in the Project and received services. We use data from various sources – the Individual Gang-Member Surveys, the Project’s worker-tracking records, and Riverside Police and Probation Department records – to describe our samples: program youth with worker-tracking records ( $N = 182$ ), program youth with no worker-tracking records ( $N = 52$ ), and the comparison youth ( $N = 135$ ). The 182 youth in the key program sample – the worker-tracked sample – were provided with more than a month of worker contacts and services. The program non-worker-tracked sample comprises 52 youth who were in the program for less than a month ( $n = 19$ ), or for whom no worker services documentation exists ( $n = 33$ ). The comparison sample comprises 135 youth from similar gang-problem neighborhoods in Riverside who were not provided with Project contacts and services. Certain characteristics of youth are derived from Time-I interview data.

#### 9.1

## Demographic Characteristics

Gender. Males predominate in our samples. Of the total sample (N = 369), 90.5% are male and 9.5% are female. The gender distribution is similar across the two program samples: worker-tracked (92.9% males, 7.1% females); non-worker-tracked (94.2% males, 5.8% females). There are relatively more females in the comparison sample (males = 85.9%, females = 14.1%) (Table 9.1).

Race/Ethnicity. Latinos (Mexican-American) comprise the large majority of youth in our three samples: comparison (71.1%), program worker-tracked (76.4%), and program non-worker-tracked (61.5%). African-Americans are also a significant group in the comparison (17.8%) and program worker-tracked (18.1%) samples, and especially in the program non-worker-tracked sample (36.5%). Youth of other races/ethnicities comprise only 7.1% of the total sample, including non-Latino white (n = 14), Native-American (n = 9) and Asian-American (n = 2), and are mainly in the comparison and program worker-tracked samples (Table 9.2).

Age. The ages of youth are categorized into three groups: 12 to 14, 15 to 17, and 18 to 24. The 15- to 17-year-old group is the largest (55.6%) of the total sample, and larger in the comparison (53.6%) and the program worker-tracked (61.5%) samples than in the program non-worker-tracked sample (48.1%). The youngest age group, 12 to 14, consists of the smallest number of youth in all three samples – 8% to 9% (Table 9.3).

## Arrest Histories

Arrest histories were obtained from the Riverside Police Department for all program and comparison youth arrested in the city of Riverside. The histories covered all recorded contacts

(arrests and otherwise) the youth had with the Riverside Police Department prior to January 1, 2001 (when the program ended). Youth were generally arrested in the city, usually in the police district where they lived or their gang hung out. We address the issue of where sample-youth arrests occurred in our discussion of changes in aggregate gang offenses in the program and comparison areas in Chapter 13.

Our Evaluation focus is on arrest-pattern changes at the individual-youth or area levels between the pre-program and program periods, depending on how long the program youth was in the program (and the equivalent matched periods for comparison youth). However, a few youth may have arrests prior to the pre-program period. To create a complete picture of early arrest history, we present arrest data on youth in the three samples in both their prior and pre-program periods. The data in Table 9.4 indicate that more of the program worker-tracked youth (71.4%) than comparison youth (57.8%) or program non-worker-tracked youth (26.9%) have prior and pre-program arrests. The program worker-tracked and the comparison youth are better matched in the early period with each other than they are with the program non-worker-tracked youth, who later became only peripherally involved in the program.

Arres in the Pre-Program Period. Of the total youth in the three samples (N = 369), only 68.3% (n = 252) are included in our analysis of youth arrested in the pre-program period, program period, or both. The remainder either have no arrests, or arrests in other periods (prior-to-pre-program or post-program). Included in the matched samples of youth arrested either in the pre-program or program period, or in both periods, are: comparison youth (n = 78), program worker-tracked youth (n = 140), and program non-worker-tracked youth (n = 34). (Not all of these were necessarily arrested in all of the three arrest periods.)

The profiles of youth with records of arrests in the matched pre-program period were as follows: slightly more comparison youth (67.9%, n = 53) than program worker-tracked youth (63.6%, n = 89), and fewer program non-worker-tracked youth (35.3%, n = 12), had been arrested in the pre-program period. While comparison and program youth were fairly equivalent in proportions of youth with arrests, program worker-tracked youth were slightly more likely to have more than one or two pre-program arrests (34.2%) than comparison youth (38.3%) and program non-worker-tracked youth (11.8%). There were also differences in the types of charges sample youth were arrested for.<sup>1</sup> More program youth (18.6%) were arrested for serious violence than comparison youth (9.0%). However, more comparison youth (16.7%) were arrested for drug crimes than program youth (11.4%). More program youth overall were arrested for a variety of different types of crime (other than drugs). Generally, a smaller proportion of program non-worker-tracked youth were arrested for all categories of crimes in the pre-program period (Table 9.5).

### Probation and Detention Status

We could not precisely determine what proportion of youth in our three samples were on

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<sup>1</sup> The five types of charges are categorized as follows: 1) **serious violence** which comprises murder, attempted murder, aggravated battery, armed robbery, armed violence and aggravated assault; 2) **total violence** which includes the serious violence charges above and simple battery, robbery, arson, attempted robbery, simple assault, home invasion, domestic assault, domestic battery, sex crime, street fighting, and intimidation; 3) **drugs** which includes manufacture/distribution/delivery of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance, possession of cannabis/marijuana, under the influence of cocaine, under the influence of methamphetamine, and possession of a non-narcotic controlled substance; 4) **property** which includes burglary, auto theft, theft, attempted theft, shoplifting, vandalism, graffiti, trespassing, possession of burglary tools and possession of stolen property; 5) **other** which includes status offense, unlawful possession of firearms or weapons, unlawful use of weapon(s), aggravated discharge of a firearm, possession of a firearm and ammo, curfew violation, motor vehicle act, loitering or gang loitering, resisting/obstructing a peace officer, minor drinking, intoxication of minor, possession of alcohol/minor, possession of alcoholic beverage, drinking.

probation, but the vast majority surely were. Of the 182 program worker-tracked youth, 179 (98.4%) were referred to the program from the Riverside Juvenile Probation Department. Of the 135 comparison youth, at least 73 were on probation, including the 50 youth referred to the program by the Riverside Juvenile Probation Department. (We estimate that most of these 73 were in our arrest sample.) Furthermore, of the interviewed comparison group (N = 77), 25 declared they were or had been on probation. We were able to determine that only 18 of the 52 program non-worker-tracked youth were on probation. In other words, the program worker-tracked and comparison youth, particularly those arrested only in the program period, were probably probationers. We are less sure about the program non-worker-tracked sample. We suspect that a majority of these arrestees (n = 34) were probationers.

We were able to determine that substantially more of the 182 program worker-tracked youth (n = 99, 54.4%) had detention or incarceration experience in the pre-program period than did the 135 comparison youth (n = 49, 36.3%) and the 52 program non-worker-tracked youth (n = 16, 30.8%). Furthermore, the confinement experience of program worker-tracked youth tended to be longer as a proportion of their pre-program period than that of comparison or program non-worker-tracked youth, although the majority of youth in each of the samples was in confinement for less than 10% of their pre-program time.

### Gang-Membership Status

It was difficult to reliably and accurately assess the gang-membership status of youth in the three samples. Project workers were more likely to indicate that a particular youth was a gang member than was the youth himself. In large measure this was a consequence of a

California law which encouraged extra punishment for youth identified as gang members. Lack of information about the gang-membership status of many comparison and program non-worker-tracked youth was a special problem. Our general approach in identifying a youth as a gang member, associate gang member or non-gang youth was to obtain available information from the youth's Time-I interview, and from Project-worker observations in the worker-tracking records. Weight was given to the youth's own view of his gang-membership status. If such information was not available, then the worker's views were sought. If gang-membership information was lacking, then the youth's status was classified as unknown.

Table 9.6 shows that while the gang-membership status of program worker-tracked youth is generally known, significant gaps in information exist for the comparison and program non-worker-tracked youth. Including unknowns, we calculate the percentage of gang members in the three samples as follows: program worker-tracked youth, 72.0%; program non-worker-tracked youth, 26.9%, and comparison youth, 23.7%. The percentage of associate gang members is less than that of gang members in each of the samples: program worker-tracked, 9.3%; program non-worker-tracked, 1.9%; and comparison, 17.8%. There is little variation in percentages of non-gang youth and associate gang members, except in the program worker-tracked group, where the percentage of non-gang youth is higher (17.0%) than associate gang members (9.3%).

If we eliminate the unknown category (Table 9.7), the proportion of non-gang youth in the program worker-tracked sample remains relatively unchanged, but the proportion of gang members in the program non-worker-tracked youth sample almost triples (87.5%) and the proportion in the comparison sample almost doubles (41.6%). The proportions of gang members, associate gang members, and non-gang youth are probably closer to reality than the

figures reported in Table 9.6. Our estimate is that 75% of program worker-tracked youth, about 60% of program non-worker-tracked youth, and about 50% of comparison youth were gang members prior to the program period.

### Drug Use/Selling, Alcohol Use and Access to Handguns

While we could not always obtain certain information about sample youth through official records, we often could get it through the Time-I youth interviews. (The program and comparison youth samples were a subset of the larger samples used in our arrest analysis: interviewed program worker-tracked youth = 117, and interviewed comparison youth = 77. The following are derived from the Time-I interview data.

Drug Use. More comparison (60.8%) than program (51.8%) youth self-reported drug use at Time-I interviews. The primary drugs used in both samples were marijuana and methamphetamines. Somewhat more comparison than program youth were engaged in use of a wide variety of illegal drugs including cocaine, crack, heroin, PCP, and LST (Table 9.8). A much higher percentage of comparison (25.7%) than program (5.3%) youth were using drugs 15 or more times per month. On average, drug use was 4.6 times more frequent for comparison youth.

Drug Selling. A little more than 20% of all youth interviewed at Time I said they were selling drugs (comparison youth = 21.9%, program youth = 21.1%). The primary drugs sold, similar to those used, were marijuana and methamphetamines. However, more comparison youth said they sold marijuana (20.5%) than did program youth (14.9%), while slightly more program (14.0%) than comparison (12.3%) youth said they were selling methamphetamines. Interviewed

youth were less forthcoming in reporting the frequency of their drug-selling. Nevertheless, there was evidence that, of those who responded, relatively more comparison youth (16.9%) than program (6.0%) youth were selling drugs on a daily basis. Selling drugs appeared to be a systematic enterprise for a few of the interviewed youth, more of whom were in the comparison sample than the program sample (Table 9.8).

Alcohol Use. At Time I, more youth in the interviewed samples said they were using alcohol (comparison = 82.4%, program = 84.5%) than using drugs. Days-per-month of alcohol use were relatively greater for comparison youth (7.9) than program youth (2.9). Nevertheless, the frequency of alcohol use appeared to be lower than that of drug use.

Access to Handguns. At the Time-I interview, most youth responded to the question of whether they had access to a handgun. Only 3 comparison and 2 program youth failed to respond. Fifty percent (50%) of the comparison youth (n = 75) and 40.2% of the program youth (n = 115) said they had access to a handgun.

## Summary

Of the total sample of 369 youth (at program entry, or its equivalent for comparison youth) – program worker-tracked youth (N = 182), comparison youth (N = 135) and the program non-worker-tracked (N = 52) youth – 90.5% were male, 12.3% were Latino (Mexican-American), and the principal age groups were 15 to 17 years (55.6%) and 18 years and older (35.5%). The program worker-tracked sample contained more Latino and younger youth than the comparison samples, and especially more than the program non-worker-tracked sample.

In the pre-program period, more program worker-tracked youth (71.4%) had arrest

records (particularly in the matched program and pre-program periods) than either comparison youth (56.8%) or program non-worker-tracked youth (26.9%). Program worker-tracked youth also tended more often to be repeat offenders than youth in the other two samples, in terms of pre-program arrests. While program worker-tracked and comparison youth had somewhat similar pre-program arrest patterns in respect to total arrests, total violence arrests, property arrests and arrests for a variety of minor crimes, they seemed to differ in respect to arrests for serious violence and drugs. More program worker-tracked youth than comparison youth were involved in serious violence, but more comparison youth had drug arrests. Few program non-worker-tracked youth seemed to be arrested in general.

The large majority of youth appeared to have had probation experience. Almost all program worker-tracked youth were on probation, referred from Riverside County Juvenile Probation. The majority of youth in all the samples also appeared to have been gang members or associate gang members. This was particularly true for the program non-worker-tracked youth, who also had more substantial pre-program detention or incarceration experience than youth in the other two samples.

Based on Time-I interviews, administered only to a subset of youth from the program worker-tracked and comparison samples, both groups reported use of illicit drugs, particularly marijuana and methamphetamines (comparison: 60.8%, program: 51.8%). A higher percentage of comparison youth (25.7%) than program youth (5.3%) were using drugs on average 15 or more times per month. While about 21% of youth in both groups were selling drugs, more comparison youth (16.9%) than program youth (6.0%) were selling drugs on a daily basis (mainly marijuana and methamphetamines). More comparison (50.5%) than program worker-

tracked youth (40.2%) also said they had access to a handgun.

Program worker-tracked and comparison youth appeared to be most similar across a range of indicators useful in our analysis. Program non-worker-tracked youth were only peripherally involved in the program. While we do include them in some parts of the analysis, we exclude them in other parts because of small sample size, or because limited information was available.

Table 9.1  
Demographic Characteristics of Youth Samples (N = 369)  
Gender

Youth Sample	Male	Female	Total
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
Comparison	116 (85.93)	19 (14.07)	135 (36.59)
Program Worker-Tracked	169 (92.86)	13 (7.14)	182 (49.32)
Program Non-Worker-Tracked	49 (94.23)	3 (5.77)	52 (14.09)
Total	334 (90.51)	35 (9.49)	369 (100.0)

Table 9.2  
Demographic Characteristics of Youth Samples (N = 369)  
Race/Ethnicity

Youth Sample	African-American	Latino (Mexican-American)	Other <sup>a</sup>	Total
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
Comparison	24 (17.78)	96 (71.11)	15 (11.11)	135 (36.59)
Program Worker-Tracked	33 (18.13)	139 (76.37)	10 (5.49)	182 (49.32)
Program Non-Worker-Tracked	19 (36.54)	32 (61.54)	1 (1.92)	52 (14.09)
Total	76 (20.60)	267 (72.36)	26 (7.05)	369 (100.00)

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<sup>a</sup> Other comprises: non-Latino white (n = 14), Native American (n = 9), Asian-American (n = 2).

Table 9.3  
Demographic Characteristics of Youth Samples (N = 369)  
Age Categories

Youth Sample	14 and Under	15 to 17	18 and Over	Total
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
Comparison	11 (8.15)	71 (52.59)	53 (39.26)	135 (36.59)
Program Worker-Tracked	17 (9.34)	112 (61.54)	53 (29.12)	182 (49.32)
Program Non-Worker-Tracked	5 (9.62)	22 (42.31)	25 (48.08)	52 (14.09)
Total	33 (8.94)	205 (55.56)	131 (35.50)	369 (100.00)

Table 9.4  
Arrest Histories  
Prior and Pre-Program Periods<sup>a</sup> Only (N = 369)

Youth Sample	Arrest Period			
	Prior	Pre-Program	Combined Prior and Pre-Program	No Arrest(s) in Either Period
	n (%)	n (%)	n (%)	n (%)
Comparison N = 135	25 (18.5)	31 (23.0)	22 (16.3)	57 (43.2)
Program Worker- Tracked N = 182	40 (22.0)	64 (35.1)	26 (14.3)	52 (28.6)
Program Non- Worker-Tracked N = 52	2 (3.8)	9 (17.3)	3 (5.8)	38 (73.1)

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<sup>a</sup> For purposes of program evaluation, youth in the three samples are matched based on the length of time the program worker-tracked youth was in the program. Focus of the outcome analysis is on the pre-program and program periods. However, several youth in the three samples had arrests prior to the (matched) pre-program period (see Chapter 8).

Table 9.5  
Arrest Histories  
Pre-Program Period (N = 252)  
By Type of Arrest Charges<sup>a</sup>

Youth Sample	Total Youth Arrested	Serious Violence	Total Violence	Drugs	Property	Other
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N %
Comparison N = 78	53 (67.9)	7 (9.0)	24 (30.8)	13 (16.7)	20 (25.6)	25 (32.1)
Program Worker-Tracked N = 140	89 (63.6)	26 (18.6)	36 (32.9)	16 (11.4)	39 (27.9)	54 (38.8)
Program Non-Worker-Tracked N = 34	12 (35.3)	3 (9.0)	5 (14.7)	3 (8.8)	1 (2.9)	6 (17.6)

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<sup>a</sup> The type of arrest charge refers to the five types of arrest charges for which a youth was arrested (see footnote 2, p. 9.4). If a youth was arrested for more than one charge, it refers to the most serious charge for that particular arrest.

Table 9.6  
Gang-Membership Status<sup>a</sup>  
Including Unknowns

Youth Sample	Gang Membership Status			
	Unknown	Non-Gang Youth	Gang Member	Associate Gang Member
	n (%)	n (%)	n (%)	n (%)
Comparison N = 135	58 (43.0)	21 (15.6)	32 (23.7)	24 (17.8)
Program Worker-Tracked (N = 182)	3 (1.7)	31 (17.0)	131 (72.0)	17 (9.3)
Program Non-Worker-Tracked (N = 52)	36 (69.2)	1 (1.9)	14 (26.9)	1 (1.9)

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<sup>a</sup> Data is derived from Time-I interviews and from worker-tracking reports. If the interview response and worker-tracking data differed, the interview response was used.

Table 9.7  
Gang-Membership Status<sup>a</sup>  
Excluding Unknowns

Youth Sample	Gang-Membership Status		
	Non-Gang Youth	Gang Member	Associate Gang Member
	n (%)	n (%)	n (%)
Comparison (N = 77)	21 (27.3)	32 (41.6)	24 (31.2)
Program Worker-Tracked (N = 179)	31 (17.3)	131 (73.2)	17 (9.5)
Program Non-Worker-Tracked (N = 16)	1 (6.3)	14 (87.5)	1 (6.3)

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<sup>a</sup> Data is derived from Time-I interviews and from worker-tracking reports. If the interview response and worker-tracking data differed, the interview response was used.

Table 9.8  
Type of Drug Use/Drug Selling  
Youth Interviewed at Time I (N = 194)

Type of Drug	Drug Use				Drug Selling			
	Comparison (n = 77)		Program (n = 117)		Comparison (n = 77)		Program (n = 117)	
	Response (yes plus no) (n)	yes %						
Any Drug	(74)	60.8	(114)	51.8	(73)	21.9	(114)	21.1
Marijuana	(74)	58.1	(114)	51.8	(73)	20.5	(114)	14.9
Cocaine	(73)	8.2	(114)	5.3	(73)	4.1	(114)	1.8
Crack	(74)	8.1	(113)	0.9	(73)	2.6	(114)	0.9
Heroin	(74)	1.4	(113)	0.0	(73)	1.4	(114)	0.9
Methamphetamine	(74)	25.7	(114)	20.2	(73)	12.3	(114)	14.0
PCP	(74)	6.8	(113)	5.3	(73)	2.7	(114)	1.8
LSD	(74)	13.5	(114)	5.3	(73)	2.7	(114)	4.4
Glue	(74)	1.4	(114)	0.9	—	—	—	—
Gas	(73)	0.0	(114)	0.0	—	—	—	—
Other	(60)	0.0	(91)	4.4	(66)	0.0	(106)	(0.0)
Alcohol	(74)	82.4	(103)	84.5				

## Chapter 10

### **Program Services and Worker Contacts**

(Rolando V. Sosa)

#### Introduction

The Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program was based on the assumption that not only the individual youth, but the community and its organizations and programs were involved in both the creation and the solution of the youth gang problem. The Comprehensive Gang Program Model assumed that key organizations in the community were not adequately coordinated in developing an appropriate program approach of worker contacts and services, and that sufficient resources might not have been available to target gang-involved or highly gang-at-risk youth. The Model required that agencies and grassroots groups to develop and rearrange their programs to better target youth, particularly through an appropriate combination of coordinated school, job, counseling, and suppression activities. A truly comprehensive approach was necessary, one which included different types of agencies and local groups concerned with and/or closely related to gang youth, to their families, and to those at highest risk of gang delinquency.

The Projects at the five Model sites were not only expected to mobilize both agency and grassroots elements, but to establish outreach contacts with targeted gang youth who were only partially (or not interactively) served and socially controlled. From a structural and process perspective, the Model required not only a steering committee of community leaders and the involvement of representatives of key organizations, but also an outreach team consisting of

street-level workers from the key organizations and community groups concerned with the youth-gang problem. The community direct-service or contact team should include police officers, probation officers, outreach youth workers and case managers, as well as teachers, manpower workers and specialized treatment workers. In particular, probation and police officers should be interested in providing social support, as well as suppression measures. Outreach youth workers should come from the same gang neighborhoods and be able to assist youth with social support, and access to appropriate social services, e.g., drug treatment and family counseling.

The workers were to target selected youth from certain gangs and gang segments. The youth were expected to be both gang members who were chronic delinquents, and youth at high risk for both gang membership and delinquency. The Project team was to implement program strategies – particularly social services, provision of social opportunities, and suppression – in an interrelated and balanced manner. Agency services would have to be modified – with emphasis on outreach – and better coordinated. Worker services and contacts should extend over a period of months or years, as necessary, with especially-frequent contacts with hardcore gang-delinquent youth. The workers were expected to be not only skilled but flexible in working with gang youth and agencies and highly committed to implementation of the Model.

Model elements were substantially developed towards the end of the OJJDP funding period in Riverside. Probation officers were the key, almost the exclusive, source of referral of youth to the program during the Project period. Along with the Police, they embodied the authoritative character of the program. Probation officers were substantially (and increasingly) involved in the social-development component of the Project in collaboration with outreach youth workers and job-development workers from the Riverside Human Resources Department.

Outreach youth workers were a key source of social support to program youth, and (increasingly) of contacts with other agencies on their behalf. There was limited involvement of neighborhood or grassroots organizations in the work or direction of the program until later in the Project period, particularly under the leadership of the second Project Director, hired in late 1998.

A key question was whether the Project and its component agencies worked more with gang-at-risk and less-delinquent youth than with more seriously gang-delinquent youth. The majority of youth in the program did not have a history of serious violence or drug arrests. However, the youth with more arrests were provided with more services than those who had fewer arrests. Outreach youth workers were not street-based; they generally confined their services and contacts to youth referred to the program by juvenile probation officers. Coordination of Project-worker, police, and probation contacts and services was largely developed at weekly (or bi-weekly) Services Needs Assessment Team (SNAT) meetings, involving all or most of the Project workers. Communication, planning and collaboration of the efforts of the workers from the various agencies (and community groups) were regarded as indicators of successful interagency and community mobilization.

### The Worker Tracking Form

The major instrument for obtaining data regarding services to and contacts with program youth by the different Project workers was the 12-page Worker Tracking Form, containing mainly closed-ended, check-off items and several open-ended questions. Each worker was expected to summarize the nature and scope of his/her direct contacts with program youth and the services provided (including referral services) during each three-month calendar quarter. The

number of contacts with youth appeared to be reasonably accurate, but the number of services were probably underestimated in the process.

The form requested the following types of information from the worker: identification of the worker and his organization; identification of the youth; the youth's demographics (age, race/ethnicity, etc.) and gang affiliation (along with rank in the gang); the dates of worker contact with the youth (first contact after program entry, first and last contact in the reporting period); number and types of contacts with the youth; types of services provided; referrals made on behalf of the youth; a rating of the youth's progress; identification of services or referrals felt by the worker to be most helpful to the youth; and observations and ratings by the worker regarding the youth's degree of involvement in various gang and non-gang delinquent activities during the reporting period. Also very important was an accounting of coordinated contacts, i.e., which other workers (both Project workers and workers from outside agencies) were contacted in regard to the youth. This information measured the nature and level of coordination of efforts in regard to particular youth.

Fifty-five (55) services or activities of workers were identified, and then further combined into eight major service/activity categories for analytic purposes: case planning, group-oriented services, individual counseling, family counseling, school-related services, job-related services, suppression, and material support. Project probation officers and outreach youth workers (both supported by Project police officers) and various other Project-affiliated workers from outside agencies (e.g., schools and Riverside Human Resources Department workers) were the key workers expected to supply services to or have contacts with youth. At the Riverside site, worker tracking forms were completed almost exclusively by probation officers and outreach youth

workers, and to a limited extent by Project police officers. No other type of worker (even though sometimes closely and meaningfully associated with the provision of services and contacts to program youth) completed worker tracking forms.

Project strategies were indicated by specific categories of services and contacts, for example: *social intervention* – individual counseling, group discussion and family counseling (including crisis intervention); *social opportunities provision* – vocational or job-related and education-related services such as school placement, GED program and continuing education; *suppression* – arrest, probation, parole, confinement, detention, monitoring, surveillance. The strategy of community mobilization was coordinated contacts, specified at the level of worker contacts with each other in relation to a particular youth. The strategy of *organizational change and development* was indicated by the program’s focus on different types and combinations of services and contacts as the program developed.

Forms Completed. One-thousand, eight-hundred and thirty-five (1,835) worker tracking forms for 201 program youth were completed during the Riverside program. (An additional 33 youth appeared in program-entry records, but we had no information for them on demographics, length of stay in the program or services provided.) We include all 201 youth with worker tracking forms in our program aggregate-level analysis. However, we found that only 182 of these youth received Project services and contacts for one month or more during the program period. Of these 182 youth (on whom we focus in later analyses), 113 completed a Time-I gang-member survey, and 69 were not interviewed at all.

Our analysis reveals that there was little difference in the scope or nature of services and contacts provided to either interviewed or non-interviewed youth, particularly on a monthly

basis. The differences appeared to be mainly a function of the length of time the youth was in the program. Interviewed youth were in the program at least twice as many months (mean = 27.4; median = 29.5) as non-interviewed youth (mean = 13.6; median = 11.2). Our outcome analysis will center attention on patterns of Project services and worker contacts that may have contributed to changes in youth arrest patterns. Length of time in the program was an important predictor of reduced arrests.

A total of 9,146 services (probably an underestimate) were provided and 13,970 worker contacts made to the 201 program youth during the four years of program operation, 1997-2000. An average of 9.1 worker tracking forms were completed for each of the 201 youth.

Six (6) probation officers completed 51.9% of the 1,835 worker tracking forms, 9 outreach youth workers completed 45.9%, and 2 police officers completed 2.2%. We note there was a good deal of youth-worker staff turnover in the Riverside Project, as well as initial resistance by probation officers, and on-going resistance by police officers to completing the forms. Probation officers did not begin to fill out forms until the end of the first year of program-service operations, but in many cases they were able to recapture records of earlier contacts with youth from their own agency's records. Outreach youth workers began to complete forms in January, 1997, when program operations began.

Nevertheless, an adequate basis exists to analyze the effects of different patterns of worker services and contacts for all youth in the program. Worker tracking forms and program-youth entry and exit records were independent data sources for verifying length of time in the program.

## Youth Characteristics and Sources of Referral to the Program

All youth (N = 201) who participated in the program were included in the analysis, whether they were interviewed or not. All were referred by Juvenile Probation officers assigned to the program. Nineteen (19) youth who had worker-tracking records but were in the program for less than one month were excluded. Approximately three quarters of the youth (76.1%) entered the program in the first 18 months of Project operations.

Of the 201 youth, 93.5% (n = 188) were male and 6.5% (n = 13) were female. The youth sample was 74.6% (n = 150) Latino (mainly of Mexican ancestry), 20.4% (n = 41) African-American, 2.5% (n = 5) Asian-American, and 2.5 (n = 5) non-Latino white. Most of the youth (44.3%) were 16 and 17 year olds at program entry, followed by 18- to 22-year-olds (30.3%), and 12- to 15-years-olds (24.4%). Age and gender distributions did not vary significantly by Latino or African-American race/ethnicity (Table 10.1).

## Dosage of Services and Worker Contacts

Interviewed youth tended to be in the program longer – an average of 27.4 months – and non-interviewed youth tended to be in the program for a shorter period – an average of 13.6 months – but both categories were provided with almost the same average number (and types) of services (2.4) on a monthly basis. Slightly more worker contacts were made on a monthly basis with interviewed youth (3.8) than with non-interviewed youth (3.4). Coordinated contacts by Project workers with other workers on behalf of program youth were slightly less frequent, an average of 1.0 monthly contacts for interviewed youth and 0.8 monthly contacts for non-

interviewed youth (Table 10.2). While youth with more pre-program arrests<sup>1</sup> were in the program longer than those with fewer pre-program arrests, they were not necessarily provided with more services and direct worker contacts. However, they did have slightly more frequent monthly coordinated contacts (Table 10.3).

### Types of Services Provided, and Change Patterns Over Time

The primary services or activities provided, regardless of length of time the youth was in the program, were individual counseling (20.1%) and suppression (20.1%). Other services provided were: group services (15.5%), particularly to youth who were in the program for a relatively short period of time; job-related services (12.8%), more often provided to youth who were in the program for relatively longer periods of time; and case planning (13.7%). The least-provided services were family counseling (3.4%), material support (6.4%) and school services (7.4%) (Table 10.4).

More youth were provided services (and at a higher rate) in the middle two years of the program than in the first and last years. However, the pattern in the provision of particular types of services changed during the four-year course of the program (Table 10.5). Individual counseling, group services, and material support tended to increase; family counseling and suppression activities tended to decrease; job and school services slightly decreased. The sharpest relative increase in types of services over the program period was for individual counseling, from 16.2% to 26.7% of total services offered between the first two and the second

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<sup>1</sup> Pre-program arrests refers to the total number of arrests the youth had during the pre-program period which covers the period just prior to the youth's entry into the program, and is equivalent to the length of time the youth was in the program.

two program years. The largest decline was for school services from 9.5% to 4.8% of total services (Table 10.6).

The greatest numbers of services were provided by outreach youth workers (31.9 services per youth), followed by probation officers (25.4 services) and police officers (1.6 services) over the four-year program period. Different aggregate patterns of services were provided by each type of worker. The outreach youth workers provided primarily individual counseling (24.4%), group services (22.5%), and job-related services (15.7%). The probation officers provided mainly suppression (54.9%), case planning (16.3%) and individual counseling (14.2%). Police provided only suppression activities (100.0%) (Table 10.7).

### Patterns of Service

Patterns of the provision of services varied somewhat based on particular socio-demographic characteristics of program youth – gender, age, race/ethnicity, gang membership status, and pre-program arrests (Table 10.8).

Gender. Although males comprised the large majority (93.5%) of youth in the program, females were provided with a slightly higher rate of services over the full program period: 50.8 services per female, 45.1 services per male. The pattern of types of services also varied. As a proportion of total services, males were provided with relatively more suppression (20.5%) than were females (14.5%), but females were provided with relatively more family counseling (6.1%) compared to males (3.0%), and more school services (9.4%) compared to males (7.2%). On the other hand, more case-planning services were provided to males (14.0%) compared to females (10.2%).

Age. There was little difference in the pattern of services to youth based on age. Younger youth were provided with relatively more family counseling (4.0%) than 16- to 17- (2.8%) and 18- to 24-year-olds (3.2%), but the pattern was somewhat reversed in respect to job-related assistance: 18- to 24-year-olds (12.8%), 16- to 17-year-olds (13.0%) and 12- to 15-year-olds (9.0%).

Nevertheless, the youngest age group (n = 42) was provided with the most services per youth during the four-year program period (59.95), compared to the 16- to 17-year-olds (n = 92) 53.03, and the 18- to 24-year-olds (n = 65), 26.80. Note that the youngest age group was provided with twice as many services as the oldest age group.

Race/Ethnicity. The two major racial/ethnic groups provided with services were the Latino/Mexican-American youth (n = 150) and the African-American youth (n = 41). While Latino youth were provided with more services per youth (47.3) than African-American youth (40.4), there were systematic differences in the types of services provided. While African-American youth were provided with considerably less case planning and suppression, they were provided with more material support, group and individual counseling, family counseling, job assistance, and school referrals than Latino youth. African-American youth were provided with more job services (16.3%) compared to Latino youth (12.2%), and less suppression (16.9%) compared to Latino youth (20.7%).

Gang Membership Status. According to the observations of Project probation officers and outreach youth workers, almost all of the program youth were gang members: 94.8% (n = 184) gang members, and 5.2% (n = 10) wannabes or associate gang members. In our analyses using interview data (Chapter 9), we found a larger percentage of these same program youth

claiming they were non-gang youth (17.5%), at least at the time of program entry. Comparing worker-defined gang members and wannabes, we found that gang members were provided with more than twice as many services (48.3) per youth than wannabes (23.1) over the four-year program period. Gang members were provided with more case planning (13.9%) than wannabes (7.8%), and also with a great deal more suppression (20.5%) than wannabes (4.3%). However, wannabes were systematically provided with more of all the other types of services than were gang members (particularly group services, job and school services and recreation).

Pre-Program Arrests. Youth with more pre-program arrests generally were provided with more services: youth with 0 pre-program arrests were provided with 28.9 services; those with more than 0 and less than 2 pre-program arrests, 55.2; those with 2 to less than 4 pre-program arrests, 66.9; and youth with 4 or more pre-program arrests, 80.8. While most youth in the program (n = 111) had no arrests in the pre-program period, a substantial number (n = 40) had arrests earlier than the pre-program period. There was little to distinguish patterns of services to youth based on numbers of pre-program, or even earlier-period, arrests.

In general, a higher rate of services was provided to youth who had pre-program arrests, and to those whom workers identified as gang members.

### Patterns of Worker Contacts

While there was some difference in the types of services provided, there were greater differences in numbered contacts with the various categories of youth, depending on who was supplying the services. A similar range of services was provided by probation officers and youth

workers, but the number of contacts to different categories of youth varied considerably (Table 10.9).

Gender. While females were provided with more services per youth, outreach youth workers had an overall higher rate of contacts with females (82.7) than with males (46.2) during the program period. This contrasted with a greater proportion of contacts by Project probation officers with males (21.1) than with females (12.7). The police, who reported very few contacts with program youth, had three times as many contacts (0.3) with males as with females (0.1).

Age. Similarly, outreach youth workers had a relatively higher rate of contact with youth across all age groups – particularly with youth 12 to 15 years old (72.9) – than did probation officers (26.8). Outreach youth workers had relatively more contacts with 12- to 15-year-olds than with 16- to 17-year-olds (55.8); probation had about the same number of contacts with both of these younger age groups. Youth workers and probation officers had relatively less contact with the oldest age group – 18 to 24 years old. Police directed most of their contacts to youth 16 to 17 years old, and least to the 12- to 15-year-olds.

Race/Ethnicity. While total contacts per youth were about the same for Latino and African-American youth, the distribution of these contacts was a little different. Outreach youth workers had relatively greater contact with African-American youth (52.9) than Latino youth (48.0). This pattern was reversed for probation officers, who had relatively greater contact with Latino youth (21.8) than African-American youth (17.5). Although there were few non-Latino white youth (n = 5) in the program, probation officers had relatively high amounts of contact with them (21.6). Police had slightly higher levels of contacts with non-Latino white youth (0.4) compared to other racial/ethnic youth groups.

Gang Membership Status. All three types of Project workers had higher proportions of contacts with gang members than with wannabes during the program period. While outreach youth workers had almost twice as many contacts with gang members (51.3) as with wannabes (28.9), probation officers had relatively greater contact – about 21 times more – with gang members (22.4) than with wannabes (1.1). Police also had greater contact with gang members (0.3) than with wannabes (0.1).

Pre-Program Arrests. Probation officers and outreach youth workers had different frequencies of contact with youth depending on their numbers of pre-program arrests. The higher the number of pre-program arrests for youth, the greater the number of contacts provided. The difference in relative proportions of contacts was particularly evident in the work of probation officers. Youth with no pre-program arrests were provided with 11.1 contacts per youth; youth with more than 0 but less than 2 pre-program arrests were provided with 20.6 contacts; youth with 2 to less than 4 pre-program arrests had 36.2 contacts; and youth with 4 or more pre-program arrests had 40.3 contacts by probation officers. In terms of numbers of contacts, outreach youth workers provided the most for youth at different levels of pre-program and prior-to-pre-program arrests. Police, who made fewer contacts, made less distinctions in providing contacts to youth with different numbers of pre-program arrests.

### Coordinated Contacts

A key concept of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model was team work and the coordination of services. Coordination, or the interrelationship, of contacts by representatives of key organizations concerned with the gang problem was an indicator of the strategy of

community mobilization at the inter-agency level. Thus, a purpose of the Project was to implement a set of interrelated control and social-support or social-development functions, depending on the kind of problem the youth as a gang member represented to himself and to the community.

Data from the worker-tracking form permitted us to compute the number of contacts each type of Project worker had with the other types of workers, both in the Project and outside the Project. Furthermore, we were able to assess the general scope and nature of coordinated contacts provided to youth during the first half (1997-1998) and the second half (1999-2000) of the Project's program operations. Probation officers and outreach youth workers were the principal initiators of coordinated contacts. There was apparently a limited amount of coordination (i.e., sharing of information related to the provision of services and complementary action) as a proportion of total contacts by Project workers with each other and with workers in other agencies (Table 10.10). These coordinated worker contacts were predictive of reduced levels of certain types of arrests in the program period (see Chapter 12).

The proportion of coordinated contacts initiated by Project workers together was 27.4% of total direct contacts with program youth over the four-year program period. In other words, one of approximately every four contacts by a Project worker with program youth was a coordinated contact undertaken with another worker. The proportion of coordinated contacts with program youth declined from 30.7% in the first two years of the program to 23.7% in the last two years (Table 10.10). It is not clear whether this pattern of contacts with other workers represents a high, moderate, or low level of coordination, related to a reduction of the youth's delinquent behavior. We examine this question in our later analyses of the effects of different

services, numbers of contacts, and coordinated contacts on outcome, in respect to changes in arrest patterns (Chapter 12).

Of all contacts initiated by probation officers and outreach youth workers, the largest proportion (27.9%) was with other workers in their respective agencies. This was particularly the case for youth workers, who increased their intra-agency contacts from 30.8% to 45.3% between the first two and last two years of the Project. Both probation and youth workers also initiated considerable contact with school personnel (20.5%) during the four-year program period, followed by contacts with other agencies (14.3%) – mainly the manpower components of the Riverside Human Resources Department. Outreach youth workers decreased their contacts with police from 2.4% to 0.7%, and their contacts with school personnel from 26.6% to 15.7% between the first two and the last two program years. There was little change in patterns of coordinated contacts initiated by probation officers over the same periods (Tables 10.11, 10.12 and 10.13).

Of interest also is that while the total number of direct contacts by all Project workers with program youth declined from 45.6 to 39.2 between the first and second halves of the program, the number of direct contacts by outreach youth workers increased from 60.1% to 81.1%, and probation officers reduced their direct contacts from 39.5% to 18.6% (Table 10.14). Similarly, the proportion of coordinated contacts initiated by outreach youth workers increased from 31.4% to 52.7%, while those initiated by probation officers decreased from 68.7% to 47.3% between the first and second halves of the program (Tables 10.12 and 10.13).

It appears that outreach youth workers increased both their direct and coordinated contacts with program youth. At the same time, probation officers decreased their direct and

coordinated contacts with youth. Nevertheless, while probation officers continued to maintain their broad range of contacts with workers from other agencies, youth workers limited theirs (particularly their coordinated contacts with police officers and school personnel).

### Summary

The description of the services and worker contacts provided to Riverside program youth was based on data derived from 1,835 worker-tracking forms documenting the Project workers' contacts with and provision of services to 201 program youth during the program period – January 1, 1997 through December 31, 2000. The forms were completed every three months for each youth, for an average of 9.1 forms per youth.

A total of 9,146 services, 13,900 direct worker contacts and 3,821 coordinated worker contacts were provided to program youth, both interviewed and non-interviewed. The source of referral of these youth (188 males and 13 females) was the Riverside Juvenile Probation Department. Youth interviewed at Time I (62.1%) and non-interviewed youth (37.9%) comprised the worker-tracking sample. Interviewed youth were in the program an average of 27.4 months; non-interviewed youth, 13.6 months. However, there was little difference in the nature and scope of the services provided to these youth, although perhaps somewhat more group-counseling services and slightly fewer suppression services were provided to non-interviewed youth. In general, youth in the program for shorter periods of time were less delinquent (based on pre-program arrest histories) than those who were in the program for longer periods of time.

Females made up only 6.5% of the program sample, and were provided with more

services than males. The youngest age category of youth, 12 to 15 years old, was provided with more services (per youth) than the 16- to 17-year-olds and the 18- to 24-year-olds. Latino (Mexican-American) (74.6%) and African-American (20.4%) comprised almost the entire program sample. The remainder of the youth were Asian-American (2.5%) and non-Latino white (2.5%). Project workers regarded all youth in the program as either gang members (94.8%) or wannabes (5.2%), although (based on self-reports) 17.5% of interviewed program youth said they were non-gang youth.) Project workers provided gang members with twice as many services per youth as they did to wannabes. Youth with a greater number of arrests in the pre-program (or even earlier) period were provided with more services and worker contacts than those with fewer pre-program arrests.

The combined services or activities provided most by outreach youth workers and probation officers were individual counseling (21.0%) and suppression (20.1%). Other services provided were group services (15.5%), job training and referral (12.8%), and case planning (13.6%). Services provided the least were family counseling (3.2%), material support (6.4%) and school services (7.4%). Outreach youth workers provided most of the services (67.2%); probation officers (32.2%) and police officers (0.6%) the remainder. The primary services provided by youth workers were individual counseling (24.4%), group discussion/counseling (22.5%) and job referral (15.7%). The service they provided least often was suppression (2.7%). The primary services provided by probation officers were suppression (54.9%), followed by case planning (16.3%) and individual counseling (14.2%). The services they least often provided were material support (0.7%) and family counseling (0.9%). The only activity Project police reported providing was suppression (100.0%).

Of the total contacts provided by Project workers, 27.4% involved coordinated contact with other workers around a particular program youth, i.e., sharing information, planning, and coordination. Coordinated contacts often involved contacts with manpower and school personnel, and were regarded as critically important in implementing the program Model. They were expected to be related to greater reduction in arrests than would have been possible without such coordination or worker teamwork across agencies.

There was evidence of some decrease in coordinated contacts over time. In general, probation officers made more coordinated contacts than outreach youth workers. About a quarter of all coordinated contacts were made by probation officers with outreach youth workers, and about the same percent by outreach youth workers with probation officers. Probation officers initiated significantly more contacts with police (20.7%) than did youth workers (1.5%). Youth workers carried out a higher percentage of their coordinated contacts with workers in their own organizations than did probation officers in theirs. Generally, probation officers had a wider range of contacts with workers from different agencies than did outreach youth workers.

**Table 10.1**  
**Selected Demographic Characteristics of Program Youth at Program Entry**  
**By Year and 6-Month Period**

Selected Demographic Characteristics	Year and 6-Month Period								Total % (n)
	percent and (n)								
	1997		1998		1999		2000		
	1-1 to 6-30	7-1 to 12-31	1-1 to 6-30	7-1 to 12-31	1-1 to 6-30	7-1 to 12-31	1-1 to 6-30	7-1 to 12-31	
Male	29.4 (59)	21.9 (44)	18.9 (38)	5.5 (11)	1.0 (2)	4.0 (8)	11.9 (24)	1.0 (2)	93.5 (188)
Female	2.0 (4)	1.0 (2)	3.0 (6)	0	0	0	0.5 (1)	0	6.5 (13)
Latino <sup>1</sup>	21.4 (43)	19.4 (39)	16.4 (33)	3.5 (7)	1.0 (2)	2.5 (5)	10.4 (21)	0.5 (1)	75.1 (151)
African-American	7.5 (15)	3.0 (6)	5.0 (10)	1.0 (2)	0	0.5 (1)	2.0 (4)	0.5 (1)	20.4 (39)
Asian-American	1.0 (2)	0	0.5 (1)	0	0	1.0 (2)	0	0	2.5 (5)
Non-Latino White	1.5 (3)	0.5 (1)	0	1.0 (2)	0	0	0	0	3.0 (6)
12 to 15 years-old <sup>2</sup>	6.0 (12)	3.5 (7)	7.0 (14)	1.5 (3)	0	0	6.5 (13)	0	24.4 (49)
16 to 17 years old	14.9 (30)	12.4 (25)	6.5 (13)	3.0 (6)	0	2.5 (5)	4.0 (8)	1.0 (2)	44.3 (89)
18 to 24 years-old	9.5 (19)	7.0 (14)	8.5 (17)	1.0 (2)	1.0 (2)	1.5 (3)	2.0 (4)	(0)	30.3 (61)
<b>Total<sup>3</sup></b>	31.3 (63)	22.9 (46)	21.9 (44)	5.5 (11)	1.0 (2)	4.0 (8)	12.4 (25)	1.0 (2)	100.0 (201)

<sup>1</sup> Primarily youth of Mexican ancestry.

<sup>2</sup> Excludes two youth with missing birth dates; their age at program entry could not be calculated.

<sup>3</sup> Row and column percentage totals do not sum due to rounding.

**Table 10.2**  
**Dosage of Services and Contacts**  
**Interviewed and Non-Interviewed Program Youth (N=182)**

Program Youth Sample <sup>1</sup>	Months in Program		Total Services	Services per Youth per Month	Total Direct Contacts	Direct Contacts per Youth per Month	Total Coordinated Contacts	Coordinated Contacts per Youth per Month
	Mean	Median						
Interviewed (N=113) <sup>2</sup>	27.4	29.5	7,331	2.4	11,423	3.8	3,149	1.0
Non-Interviewed (N=69)	13.6	11.2	1,751	2.3	2,447	3.4	658	0.8

<sup>1</sup>Excludes 19 program youth (3 interviewed, 16 non-interviewed) who had less than one month (30.44 days) of services.

<sup>2</sup>One interviewed youth with no worker-tracking records was excluded.

Table 10.3  
Dosage of Services and Contacts  
By Level of Pre-Program Arrests

Pre-Program Level of Arrests	Months in Program		Total Services	Services per Youth per Month	Total Direct Contacts	Direct Contacts per Youth per Month	Total Coordinated Contacts	Coordinated Contacts per Youth per Month
	Mean	Median						
None <sup>1</sup> (n=93)	16.7	15.1	3,204	2.3	4,580	3.3	1,273	0.9
Less than 2 (n=33)	22.1	24.8	1,822	2.7	2,733	4.4	655	0.9
2 to Less than 4 (n=34)	29.2	31.1	2,342	2.4	3,574	3.6	1,093	1.1
4 or More (n=22)	34.3	36.9	1,778	2.3	3,049	3.8	801	1.0

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<sup>1</sup>Includes 40 youth who had arrests prior to the pre-program period.

**Table 10.4**  
**Number of Services by TI Survey Status (N=201)**  
**(1835 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>TI Survey Status</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u>Number of Youth</u>	<u>Services per Youth</u>
Less than 1	2	3	29	15	1	2	1	11	64	19	3.4
Month											
Non-interviewed	254	109	354	367	45	225	91	306	1,751	69	25.4
Interviewed	996	469	1,037	1,536	246	947	581	1,519	7,331	113	64.9
<b>Totals</b>	1,252	581	1,420	1,918	292	1,174	673	1,836	9,146	201	45.5

**Percentage of Types of Services Provided by TI Survey Status (N=201)**  
**(1835 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>TI Survey Status</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Row %</u>
Less than 1	3.1%	4.7%	45.3%	23.4%	1.6%	3.1%	1.6%	17.2%	100.0%
Month									
Non-interviewed	14.5%	6.2%	20.2%	21.0%	2.6%	12.8%	5.2%	17.5%	100.0%
Interviewed	13.6%	6.4%	14.1%	21.0%	3.4%	12.9%	7.9%	20.7%	100.0%
<b>Totals</b>	13.7%	6.4%	15.5%	21.0%	3.2%	12.8%	7.4%	20.1%	100.0%

**Table 10.5**  
**Number of Services by 6-month Period for All Youth (N=201)**  
**(1835 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Year &amp; Period</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u>Number of Youth</u>	<u>Srvs per Youth</u>
1997 1	20	22	73	59	21	153	56	162	566	48	11.8
1997 2	88	39	152	91	29	175	123	289	986	96	10.3
1998 1	212	55	210	236	60	283	145	384	1,585	132	12.0
1998 2	332	113	209	420	71	154	150	391	1,840	125	14.7
1999 1	260	81	227	400	54	119	77	222	1,440	112	12.9
1999 2	145	83	207	271	13	108	43	167	1,037	101	10.3
2000 1	180	154	256	352	44	145	64	220	1,415	114	12.4
2000 2	15	34	86	89	0	37	15	1	277	65	4.3
<b>Totals</b>	<b>1,252</b>	<b>581</b>	<b>1,420</b>	<b>1,918</b>	<b>292</b>	<b>1,174</b>	<b>673</b>	<b>1,836</b>	<b>9,146</b>	<b>793</b>	<b>11.5</b>

**Percentage of Types of Services by 6-Month Period for All Youth (N=201)**  
**(1835 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Year &amp; Period</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Row %</u>
1997 1	3.5%	3.9%	12.9%	10.4%	3.7%	27.0%	9.9%	28.6%	100.0%
1997 2	8.9%	4.0%	15.4%	9.2%	2.9%	17.7%	12.5%	29.3%	100.0%
1998 1	13.4%	3.5%	13.2%	14.9%	3.8%	17.9%	9.1%	24.2%	100.0%
1998 2	18.0%	6.1%	11.4%	22.8%	3.9%	8.4%	8.2%	21.3%	100.0%
1999 1	18.1%	5.6%	15.8%	27.8%	3.8%	8.3%	5.3%	15.4%	100.0%
1999 2	14.0%	8.0%	20.0%	26.1%	1.3%	10.4%	4.1%	16.1%	100.0%
2000 1	12.7%	10.9%	18.1%	24.9%	3.1%	10.2%	4.5%	15.5%	100.0%
2000 2	5.4%	12.3%	31.0%	32.1%	0.0%	13.4%	5.4%	0.4%	100.0%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>13.7%</b>	<b>6.4%</b>	<b>15.5%</b>	<b>21.0%</b>	<b>3.2%</b>	<b>12.8%</b>	<b>7.4%</b>	<b>20.1%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**Notes:**

Overall there were 9,146 services provided to 201 youth, i.e., approximately 46 (45.5) services, per youth, on average.

Nine outreach workers and one outreach supervisor completed 952 worker tracking forms (51.9%), six probation officers completed 842 forms, (45.9%), and two police officers completed 41 forms (2.2%).

**Table 10.6**  
**Number of Services by Two-Year Project Periods for All Youth (N=201)**  
**(1835 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Period</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u>Number of Youth</u>	<u>Services per Youth</u>
1997-1998	652	229	644	806	181	765	474	1,226	4,977	162	30.7
1999-2000*	600	352	776	1,112	111	409	199	610	4,169	167	25.0
<b>Totals</b>	<b>1,252</b>	<b>581</b>	<b>1,420</b>	<b>1,918</b>	<b>292</b>	<b>1,174</b>	<b>673</b>	<b>1,836</b>	<b>9,146</b>	<b>329</b>	<b>27.8</b>

**Percentage of Types of Services by Two-Year Project Periods for All Youth (N=201)**  
**(1835 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Period</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Row %</u>
1997-1998	13.1%	4.6%	12.9%	16.2%	3.6%	15.4%	9.5%	24.6%	100.0%
1999-2000*	14.4%	8.4%	18.6%	26.7%	2.7%	9.8%	4.8%	14.6%	100.0%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>13.7%</b>	<b>6.4%</b>	<b>15.5%</b>	<b>21.0%</b>	<b>3.2%</b>	<b>12.8%</b>	<b>7.4%</b>	<b>20.1%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

\*This period covers only 18 months – January 1, 1999 through August 31,2000.

**Table 10.7**  
**Number of Services by Worker Type (N=201)**  
**(1835 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Project Worker Type</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u>Number of Youth</u>	<u>Services per Youth</u>
Outreach Youth Worker	771	559	1381	1499	266	967	541	166	6150	193	31.87
Probation	481	22	39	419	26	207	132	1617	2943	116	25.37
Police	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	53	53	34	1.56
<b>Totals</b>	1252	581	1420	1918	292	1174	673	1836	9146	343	26.66

**Percentage of Type of Service Provided by Worker Type (N=201)**  
**(1835 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Project Worker Type</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Row %</u>
Outreach Youth Worker	12.5%	9.1%	22.5%	24.4%	4.3%	15.7%	8.8%	2.7%	100.0%
Probation	16.3%	0.7%	1.3%	14.2%	0.9%	7.0%	4.5%	54.9%	100.0%
Police	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Totals</b>	13.7%	6.4%	15.5%	21.0%	3.2%	12.8%	7.4%	20.1%	100.0%

Notes:

Project outreach youth workers completed 1,218 forms (66.4%), probation officers completed 576 forms (31.4%), two police officers completed 41 forms ( 2.2%).

**Table 10.8**  
**Number of Services by Gender (N=201)**  
**(1835 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Gender</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u>Number of Youth</u>	<u>Services per Youth</u>
Male	1185	521	1327	1768	252	1082	611	1740	8486	188	45.1
Female	67	60	93	150	40	92	62	96	660	13	50.8
<b>Totals</b>	<b>1252</b>	<b>581</b>	<b>1420</b>	<b>1918</b>	<b>292</b>	<b>1174</b>	<b>673</b>	<b>1836</b>	<b>9146</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>45.5</b>

**Percentage of Types of Services by Gender (N=201)**  
**(1835 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Gender</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Row %</u>
Male	14.0%	6.1%	15.6%	20.8%	3.0%	12.8%	7.2%	20.5%	100.0%
Female	10.2%	9.1%	14.1%	22.7%	6.1%	13.9%	9.4%	14.5%	100.0%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>13.7%</b>	<b>6.4%</b>	<b>15.5%</b>	<b>21.0%</b>	<b>3.2%</b>	<b>12.8%</b>	<b>7.4%</b>	<b>20.1%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**Number of Services by Age Category (N=199)**  
**(1833 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Age Category</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u>Number of Youth</u>	<u>Services per Youth</u>
12-15 yrs-old	362	179	398	579	100	227	181	492	2518	42	60.0
16-17yrs-old	616	338	714	1037	136	636	391	1011	4879	92	53.0
18-24 yrs-old	274	64	304	301	55	310	101	333	1742	65	26.8
<b>Totals</b>	<b>1252</b>	<b>581</b>	<b>1416</b>	<b>1917</b>	<b>291</b>	<b>1173</b>	<b>673</b>	<b>1836</b>	<b>9139</b>	<b>199</b>	<b>45.9</b>

**Percentage of Types of Services by Age Category (N=199)**  
**(1833 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Age Category</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Row %</u>
12-15 yrs-old	14.4%	7.1%	15.8%	23.0%	4.0%	9.0%	7.2%	19.5%	100.0%
16-17yrs-old	12.6%	6.9%	14.6%	21.3%	2.8%	13.0%	8.0%	20.7%	100.0%
18-24 yrs-old	13.7%	6.4%	15.5%	21.0%	3.2%	12.8%	7.4%	20.1%	100.0%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>13.7%</b>	<b>6.4%</b>	<b>15.5%</b>	<b>21.0%</b>	<b>3.2%</b>	<b>12.8%</b>	<b>7.4%</b>	<b>20.1%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Notes: Excludes 2 youth with one worker-tracking record each whose age at program entry could not be determined.

**Table 10.8 (cont'd)**  
**Number of Services by Race/Ethnicity (N=201)**  
**(1835 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Race/Ethnicity</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u>Number of Youth</u>	<u>Services per Youth</u>
Latino/Mexican American	1100	420	1103	1440	216	867	485	1468	7099	150	47.33
African-American	99	141	259	385	62	270	161	281	1658	41	40.44
Asian-American	17	10	28	34	1	12	12	23	137	5	27.40
Non-Latino White	36	10	30	59	13	25	15	64	252	5	50.40
<b>Totals</b>	<b>1252</b>	<b>581</b>	<b>1420</b>	<b>1918</b>	<b>292</b>	<b>1174</b>	<b>673</b>	<b>1836</b>	<b>9146</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>45.50</b>

**Percentage of Types of Services by Race/Ethnicity (N=201)**  
**(1835 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Race/Ethnicity</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Row %</u>
Latino/Mexican American	15.5%	5.9%	15.5%	20.3%	3.0%	12.2%	6.8%	20.7%	100.0%
African-American	6.0%	8.5%	15.6%	23.2%	3.7%	16.3%	9.7%	16.9%	100.0%
Asian-American	13.7%	6.4%	15.5%	21.0%	3.2%	12.8%	7.4%	20.1%	100.0%
Non-Latino White	13.7%	6.4%	15.5%	21.0%	3.2%	12.8%	7.4%	20.1%	100.0%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>13.7%</b>	<b>6.4%</b>	<b>15.5%</b>	<b>21.0%</b>	<b>3.2%</b>	<b>12.8%</b>	<b>7.4%</b>	<b>20.1%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**Table 10.8 (cont'd)**  
**Number of Services by Worker-Reported Youth Gang Membership Status (N=194)**  
**(1835 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Gang Membership Status</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u>Number of Youth</u>	<u>Services per Youth</u>
Gang Member	1231	557	1360	1865	279	1131	636	1822	8881	184	48.27
Wannabe	18	24	47	49	11	38	34	10	231	10	23.10
Non-Gang Youth	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
<b>Totals</b>	1249	581	1407	1914	290	1169	670	1832	9112	194	46.97

**Percentage of Types of Services by Worker-Reported Youth Gang Membership Status (N=194)**  
**(1835 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Gang Membership Status</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Row %</u>
Gang Member	13.9%	6.3%	15.3%	21.0%	3.1%	12.7%	7.2%	20.5%	100.0%
Wannabe	7.8%	10.4%	20.3%	21.2%	4.8%	16.5%	14.7%	4.3%	100.0%
Non-Gang Youth	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
<b>Totals</b>	13.7%	6.4%	15.4%	21.0%	3.2%	12.8%	7.4%	20.1%	100.0%

Notes:

Excluding 7 program youth who with no worker-reported gang membership status.

**Table 10.8 (cont'd)**  
**Number of Services by Pre-Program Level of Arrests (N=201)**  
**(1,835 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Pre-Program</u> <u>Level of Arrests</u>	<u>Case</u> <u>Planning</u>	<u>Material</u> <u>Support</u>	<u>Group</u> <u>Counseling</u>	<u>Individual</u> <u>Counseling</u>	<u>Family</u> <u>Counseling</u>	<u>Job</u> <u>Services</u>	<u>School</u> <u>Services</u>	<u>Suppression</u> <u>Services</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Services</u>	<u>Number</u> <u>of Youth</u>	<u>Services per</u> <u>Youth</u>
None	449	186	538	702	104	380	226	619	3,204	111	28.9
Less than 2	252	151	297	357	55	265	151	294	1,822	33	55.2
2 to <4	359	128	353	510	69	258	173	492	2,342	35	66.9
4 or More	192	116	232	349	64	271	123	431	1,778	22	80.8
<b>Totals</b>	1252	581	1420	1918	292	1174	673	1836	9,146	201	45.5

**Percentage of Types of Services by Pre-Program Level of Arrests (N=201)**  
**(1,835 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Pre-Program</u> <u>Level of Arrests</u>	<u>Case</u> <u>Planning</u>	<u>Material</u> <u>Support</u>	<u>Group</u> <u>Counseling</u>	<u>Individual</u> <u>Counseling</u>	<u>Family</u> <u>Counseling</u>	<u>Job</u> <u>Services</u>	<u>School</u> <u>Services</u>	<u>Suppression</u> <u>Services</u>	<u>Row %</u>
None	14.0%	5.8%	16.8%	21.9%	3.2%	11.9%	7.1%	19.3%	100.0%
Less than 2	13.8%	8.3%	16.3%	19.6%	3.0%	14.5%	8.3%	16.1%	100.0%
2 to <4	15.3%	5.5%	15.1%	21.8%	2.9%	11.0%	7.4%	21.0%	100.0%
4 or More	10.8%	6.5%	13.0%	19.6%	3.6%	15.2%	6.9%	24.2%	100.0%
<b>Totals</b>	13.7%	6.4%	15.5%	21.0%	3.2%	12.8%	7.4%	20.1%	100.0%

**Table 10.9**  
**Number of Direct Contacts per Youth by Gender and Type of Program Worker (N=201)**  
**(1835 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Gender</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u># of Youth</u>
Male	46.2	21.1	0.3	67.5	188
Female	82.7	12.7	0.1	95.5	13
<b>Totals</b>	<b>48.5</b>	<b>20.6</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>69.3</b>	<b>201</b>

**Number of Direct Contacts per Youth by Age Category and Type of Program Worker (N=199)**  
**(1833 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Age Category</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u># of Youth</u>
12-15 yrs-old	72.9	26.8	0.1	99.8	42
16-17 yrs-old	55.8	25.6	0.3	81.7	92
18-24 yrs-old	23.9	10.0	0.2	34.2	65
<b>Totals</b>	<b>49.0</b>	<b>20.8</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>70.0</b>	<b>199</b>

Notes:

Excludes 2 youth with one worker-tracking record each whose age at program entry could not be determined.

**Number of Direct Contacts per Youth by Youth's Race/Ethnicity**  
**And by Type of Program Worker (N=201)**  
**(1835 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Race/Ethnicity</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u># of Youth</u>
Latino/Mexican American	48.0	21.8	0.2	70.0	150
African-American	52.9	17.5	0.3	70.7	41
Asian-American	35.0	8.8	0.0	43.8	5
Non-Latino White	40.4	21.6	0.4	62.4	5
<b>Totals</b>	<b>48.5</b>	<b>20.6</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>69.3</b>	<b>201</b>

**Number of Direct Contacts per Youth by Youth's Worker-Reported Gang Membership Status**  
**and Type of Program Worker (N=194)**  
**(1825 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Gang Membership Status</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u># of Youth</u>
Gang Member	51.3	22.4	0.3	73.9	184.0
Wannabe	28.9	1.1	0.1	30.1	10.0
Non-Gang Youth	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<b>Totals</b>	<b>50.1</b>	<b>21.3</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>104.0</b>	<b>194.0</b>

Notes:

Excludes 7 youth with no worker-reported gang membership status.

**Table 10.9 (cont'd)**  
**Number of Direct Contacts per Youth by Youth's Level of Pre-program Arrests**  
**And by Type of Program Worker (N=201)**  
**(1,835 Worker Tracking Forms)**

<u>Level of Pre-Program Arrests</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u># of Youth</u>
None	30.0	11.1	0.2	41.3	111
Less than 2	62.0	20.6	0.3	82.8	33
2 to <4	65.5	36.2	0.4	102.1	35
4 or More	95.0	43.3	0.3	138.6	22
<b>Totals</b>	48.5	20.6	0.2	69.3	201

Table 10.10  
 Coordinated Contacts as a Proportion of Total Direct Contacts  
 By Two-Year Period

Period	Coordinated Contacts	Direct Contacts	Proportion of Coordinated Contacts
1997 -1998	2,271	7,391	30.7
1999-2000 <sup>1</sup>	1,550	6,545	23.7
1997-2000	3,821	13,936	27.4

1. The 1999-2000 Period does not include September through December 2000.

Table 10.11  
 Coordinated Contacts  
 By Type of Project Worker and Type of Worker Contacted  
 Total Pre-Program Period, January 1997 through August 2000

Type of Project Worker Initiating Contact <sup>1</sup>	Type of Worker Contacted percent and (n) <sup>2</sup>						
	Police	Probation/ Parole	School	Outreach	Other <sup>3</sup>	Within Project Worker's Own Organization	Total <sup>4</sup> (N)
Outreach	1.5 (23)	26.3 (403)	20.8 (318)	---	12.9 (197)	38.5 (590)	100.0 (1,531; 40.1%)
Probation	20.7 (474)	—	20.3 (465)	23.0 (527)	15.2 (348)	20.8 (476)	100.0 (2,290; 59.9%)
Total (N)	13.0 (497)	10.5 (403)	20.5 (783)	13.8 (527)	14.3 (545)	27.9 (1,066)	100.0 (3,821; 100.0%)

<sup>1</sup>Excludes 41 worker tracking forms completed by two officers from the Riverside Police Department who indicated that they had no contacts with other agencies or organizations concerning program participants. Qualitative data, including site visits by national evaluators, clearly demonstrated that Riverside police officers were in contact with other agencies or organizations concerning program participants (especially probation officers, and to some extent outreach workers from the Youth Service Center).

<sup>2</sup>Percentages are based on 1,835 worker tracking forms for 201 program youth.

<sup>3</sup>Approximately 84 percent of contacts with worker(s) from "other" organizations were principally with the City of Riverside Human Resources Dept. which provided job training, development, placement and referrals to program participants.

<sup>4</sup>Row and column percentages do not always sum, due to rounding.

Table 10.12  
 Coordinated Contacts  
 By Type of Project Worker and Type of Worker Contacted  
 First Half of the Program Period, January 1997 through December 1998

Type of Project Worker Initiating Contact <sup>1</sup>	Type of Worker Contacted percent and (n) <sup>2</sup>						
	Police	Probation/ Parole	School	Outreach	Other <sup>3</sup>	Within Project Worker's Own Organization	Total <sup>4</sup> (N)
Outreach	2.4 (17)	27.6 (197)	26.8 (190)	---	12.6 (90)	30.8 (220)	100.0 (714; 31.4%)
Probation	20.6 (320)	---	21.1 (328)	21.0 (327)	17.5 (273)	19.8 (309)	68.6 (1,557; 68.6%)
Total (N)	14.8 (337)	8.7 (197)	22.8 (518)	14.4 (327)	16.0 (363)	23.3 (529)	100.0 (2,271; 100.0%)

<sup>1</sup> Excludes 25 worker tracking forms completed by two officers from the Riverside Police Department who indicated that they had no contacts with other agencies or organizations concerning program participants. Qualitative data, including site visits by national evaluators, clearly demonstrated that Riverside police officers were in contact with other agencies or organizations concerning program participants (especially probation officers, and to some extent outreach workers from the Youth Service Center).

<sup>2</sup> Percentages are based on 988 worker tracking forms for 162 program youth.

<sup>3</sup> Approximately 94 percent of contacts with worker(s) from "other" organizations were principally with the City of Riverside Human Resources Dept., which provided job training, development, placement and referrals to program participants.

<sup>4</sup> Row and column percentages do not always sum, due to rounding.

**Table 10.13**  
**Coordinated Contacts**  
**By Type of Project Worker and Type of Worker Contacted**  
**Second Half of Program Period, January 1999 through August 2000**

Type of Project Worker Initiating Contact <sup>1</sup>	Type of Worker Contacted percent and (n) <sup>2</sup>						
	Police	Probation/ Parole	School	Outreach	Other <sup>3</sup>	Within Worker Organization	Total <sup>4</sup> (N)
Outreach	0.7 (6)	25.2 (206)	15.7 (128)	---	13.1 (107)	45.3 (370)	100.0 (817; 52.7%)
Probation	21.0 (154)	—	18.7 (137)	27.3 (200)	10.2 (75)	22.8 (167)	100.0 (733; 47.3%)
Total (N)	10.3 (160)	13.3 (206)	17.1 (265)	12.9 (200)	11.7 (182)	34.6 (537)	100.0 (1,550; 100.0%)

<sup>1</sup> Excludes the results of 16 worker tracking forms completed by two officers from the Riverside Police Department who indicated that they had no contacts with other agencies or organizations concerning program participants. Qualitative data, including site visits by national evaluators, clearly demonstrated that Riverside police officers were in contact with other agencies or organizations concerning program participants (especially probation officers, and to some extent outreach workers from the Youth Service Center).

<sup>2</sup> Percentages are based on 847 worker tracking forms for 167 program youth.

<sup>3</sup> Approximately 66 percent of contacts with worker(s) from “other” organizations were principally with the City of Riverside Human Resources Dept., which provided job training, development, placement and referrals to program participants.

<sup>4</sup> Row and column percentages do not always sum, due to rounding.

**Table 10.14**  
**Number of Direct Contacts by Program Period and by Type of Project Worker (N=201)**

<u>Program Period</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Contacts per Youth</u>
1997-1998	4444	2916	31	7391	162	45.6
1999-2000*	5310	1217	18	6545	167	39.2
1997-2000	9754	4133	49	13936	329	42.4

**Percentage of Direct Contacts by Program Period and by Type of Project Worker (N=201)**

<u>Program Period</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Total</u>
1997-1998	60.1%	39.5%	0.4%	100.0%
1999-2000*	81.1%	18.6%	0.3%	100.0%
1997-2000	70.0%	29.7%	0.4%	100.0%

\* The 1999-2000 Period does not include September through December of 2000.

## Chapter 11

### **General Program and Comparison-Youth Arrest Outcomes**

(Kwai Ming Wa)

#### Introduction

In this chapter, we examine the general effects of the program using arrest variables. We are interested in the program's effectiveness in reducing arrests for youth from the program areas (mainly Eastside and Arlanza), compared to youth from the comparison area (mainly Casa Blanca) who were not provided with services and worker contacts. We use statistical models to control for differences between program-youth and comparison-youth characteristics, and to tell us to what extent youth characteristics and other variables, in addition to program effects, account for changes in arrest patterns during the program period compared to the pre-program period. In the following chapter, we will address the question of whether particular patterns of services or worker contacts account for changes in arrest patterns.

In the first set of analyses – the General Linear (GLM) and Logistic Regression models – we use the six outcome or dependent variables: *yearly total arrest changes*, which includes arrests for all offenses; *yearly serious violence arrest changes*, which includes arrests for homicide, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and aggravated robbery; *yearly total violence arrest changes*, which combines arrests for serious violence and less-serious violence (such as simple assault, simple battery, attempted robbery, street fighting, and intimidation); *yearly total drug arrest changes*; *yearly property arrest changes*, and *yearly “other” arrest changes*.<sup>1</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup> Refer to Appendix A for a description of charge categories for the different types of arrests.

GLM models estimate differences or changes in the mean number of arrests for program worker-tracked and comparison youth between the pre-program and program periods, controlling for several demographic characteristics of the youth.<sup>2</sup> The GLM models provide us with information to answer the question: Did the mean level of change in arrests decrease, increase or stay the same – not only for the program and comparison-youth samples, but for subsamples based on gender, race/ethnicity, age, gang membership, length of time in the program (or its equivalent for comparison youth) and pre-program arrest histories? The Logistic Regression equations address a different question: What factors are associated with program youth being a success (having a decrease in arrests), or being a failure (increasing or staying at the same level of arrests), in relation to comparison youth with similar characteristics? The Logistic Regression models predict how many youth succeeded and how many failed, comparing one sample or subsample to another.

For each of the six outcome variables in the GLM models, the number of arrests was annualized, in order to control for varying numbers of arrests during varying program-period lengths, which were matched with pre-program periods for each youth. The outcome variables measure the mean yearly differences in the number of arrests for youth between the pre-program and program periods.<sup>3</sup>

Seven independent variables are generally included in the GLM equations to explain

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<sup>2</sup> Note that even after matching comparison youth with program youth on characteristics of age/race/ethnicity, gender and length of time in the program (or equivalent), other differences remained, e.g., number and types of pre-program arrests and gang membership (see Chapter 9).

<sup>3</sup> First, the yearly mean number of arrests was calculated using the total number of arrests for each youth during the program and pre-program period, divided by the length in years for each period. Second, the mean yearly change was calculated by subtracting the mean number of yearly arrests in the program period from the mean number of yearly arrests in the pre-program period for each youth.

variance in the six dependent (outcome) variables. The independent variables are: *project* – program youth with worker-tracking records and comparison youth, including program youth interviewed at Time I and other comparison youth referred to the program from the Riverside Juvenile Probation Department and the Police Department (all program non-worker-tracked youth are excluded, due to insufficient data); *level* (or category) of *yearly pre-program total arrests*<sup>4</sup>; *age group* at program entry (15 years and under, 16 to 17 years, 18 years and over); *gang membership* – whether comparison youth and program youth classified themselves (or were classified by Riverside Juvenile Probation) as gang members, gang associates, non-gang youth, or unknown; *gender*; *race/ethnicity* (Latino, African-American, Other); and *length of time in the program* (less/more than two years).<sup>5</sup> Three interaction terms were added to the models: *project* × *age group*; *project* × *program-period length*; and *project* × *prior pre-program yearly arrests*. Youth who had zero pre-program and zero program arrests (“zero-zero”) were excluded from the GLM models. Probation status was also excluded from the analysis, since almost all youth (program and comparison) were on probation at program entry. The following sections present the findings of the “best” GLM and Logistic Regression models.

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<sup>4</sup> The level or category of total yearly pre-program arrests was ranked as follows: 1) none = no arrests; 2) low = 0.01 to 0.99 arrests; 3) medium = 1.0 to 1.99 arrests; and 4) high ≥ 2.00 arrests.

<sup>5</sup> Note that program length for comparison youth is equivalent to that of their matched program youth.

## Models

### *Yearly Total Arrests*

#### GLM Model

In the GLM model for yearly total arrest changes – consisting of 77 comparison youth and 139 program worker-tracked youth (N = 216)<sup>6</sup>, the model explained 46.6% of the variance in the dependent variable, and was significant (p < 0.001). *Yearly pre-program total arrests* (p < 0.001), and *program length* (p < 0.010) were significant; *age group* (p < 0.057) and *gender* (p < 0.083) were marginally significant. In this model, and in all of the other GLM equations, *pre-program yearly total arrests* is usually the most powerful variable influencing outcome. The greater the number of pre-program arrests, the fewer the number of program-period arrests, and the fewer the number of pre-program arrests, the greater the number of program-period arrests.

*Project*, per se, was not significant (p < 0.327) in the model. Both program and comparison youth decreased their average total number of yearly arrests over time. What is of special interest in this and the other models below, is that length of time in the program (or equivalent for comparison youth) was an important factor in explaining a reduction in arrests. The youth was more likely to reduce his total arrests in a period of two or more years from the time of program entry than over a shorter period (less than two years). This could be a result of both program-exposure time and maturation.

There were declines in yearly total arrests for almost all youth, whether program or comparison, but most of these declines were not statistically significant. Total arrests declined

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<sup>6</sup> One comparison and one program youth who had arrest histories were excluded from the analysis because the data were incomplete.

more for females than males ( $p = 0.083$ ); slightly more for African-American than Latino or other racial/ethnic categories of youth; more for gang-member associates than gang members, and more than for non-gang youth or those whose gang membership was unknown. Total arrests for youth 18 and over declined significantly more than for the 15 and under age group ( $p = 0.025$ ) and for the 16- and 17-year-olds ( $p = 0.068$ ).

In sum, there appeared to be no significant difference in yearly total arrests for program youth compared to comparison youth. Program-exposure period or maturation ( $p = 0.010$ ), as well as statistical regression ( $p < 0.001$ ), accounted for most of the reduction in yearly total arrests (Table 11.1).

### Logistic Regression Model

In the Logistic Regression model for yearly total arrest change, we focused on the effects of the Project on youth who either reduced or increased/remained the same in their levels of total arrests. We include only those program and comparison youth with arrests in the pre-program or program periods ( $N = 218$ ). If the youth reduced his/her level of total arrests, we classified him/her as a success; if he/she increased or remained at the same level of total arrests, we classified him/her as a failure. In the logistic equations we included five variables: *project* (comparison versus program worker-tracked youth); *race/ethnicity* (Latino versus non-Latino); *age group* at program entry (15 and under versus 18 and older; 16 and 17 versus 18 and older); and *pre-program yearly total arrests* (medium/high versus none/low). In this and subsequent analyses, we excluded the *gender* variable (assuming magnitude and probably not direction was the only difference between males and females) and any interaction terms. The results were

similar to those of the GLM model for total arrests, except that although the level of least square mean arrests went down, more youth – program and comparison – increased (57.8%) than reduced (42.2%) their arrests.

The Logistic Regression equation was statistically significant (Chi-square = 42.75,  $p < 0.001$ ). The strongest variable was again *pre-program total arrests* ( $p < 0.001$ ). No other variable was significant. The odds ratio of success to failure was 21.7% better for non-Latinos than Latinos. Again, the oldest age group, 18 years and older, did 47.3% better than did the youngest age group, 15 years and under; but the oldest age group did only 3.6% better than the 16- and 17-year-olds in their odds ratio of success to failure (Table 11.2). The Project had no effect in either lowering the mean level of total arrests for program youth, or increasing the odds of success to failure in reducing total arrests, compared to comparison youth.

### ***Yearly Serious Violence Arrests***

#### GLM Model

About a quarter ( $n = 57, 26.4\%$ ) of the total sample of program and comparison youth were arrested for serious (i.e., felony) violence in the program and pre-program periods. However, more program youth ( $n = 41, 29.5\%$ ) than comparison youth ( $n = 16, 20.8\%$ ) were arrested for serious violence.

The GLM model for yearly serious violence arrest change ( $N = 57; 41$  program and 16 comparison youth) was significant (R-square = 0.791,  $p < 0.001$ ). We used the same seven variables as in the GLM equation, except that the outcome variable is *yearly serious violence*

*arrest change*.<sup>7</sup> Four variables are significant and/or marginally significant: *pre-program serious violence arrests* ( $p < 0.001$ ), *program length* ( $p = 0.048$ ), *project* ( $p = 0.061$ ), and the interaction term *pre-program yearly serious violence arrests*  $\times$  *project* ( $p = 0.026$ ).

Youth in the program sample decreased (LS mean = -0.393), and comparison youth increased (0.464) their levels of serious violence arrests in the program period compared to the pre-program period, controlling for other variables. African-American youth marginally decreased their serious violence arrests compared to others (i.e., Native American and non-Latinos) ( $p = 0.091$ ). The difference between African-Americans and Latinos was not significant. Gang members slightly but non-significantly increased their serious violence arrests. Differences across age groups was also non-significant. The youngest age group had a slight decline. The 16- and 17-year-old program subsample had the greatest decline in relation to the same-age comparison subsample ( $p = 0.074$ ) and relative to all of the other age groups. Program length and/or maturation made a difference. The youth with longer program exposure (i.e, two or more years) had a significantly ( $p = 0.048$ ) larger decline than youth with shorter program exposure (i.e., less than two years). Nevertheless, program youth with two or more years of program exposure had the greatest decline of all subgroups. Program worker-tracked youth generally experienced a greater reduction in serious violence arrests than matched comparison youth (Table 11.3).

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<sup>7</sup> The level of pre-program yearly serious violence arrests was ranked as follows: 1) none = no serious violence arrests; 2) low = 0.01 to 0.049 arrests; 3) medium = 0.05 to 1.0 arrests; and 4) high = 1 or more arrests.

## Logistic Regression Model

\_\_\_\_\_ Again, in this model as all of the other models, we included only program and comparison youth with records of serious violence arrests in the program and/or pre-program periods (n = 57). The pattern of findings in the GLM and the Logistic Regression models was similar. The model was statistically significant (Chi-square = 19.123, p = 0.002). However, pre-program serious violence arrests was the only significant variable (p = 0.139). Program youth had a higher odds ratio (3.09) of success to failure than comparison youth. The odds ratio of success to failure in reducing serious violence arrests was 47.0% greater for non-Latino than Latino youth. The 15-and-under youth were twice as likely to be successes as failures as the oldest youth (18 years and older), but the 16- and 17-year-old youth had a 35.0% odds ratio of success to failure, compared to the 18-and-older youth (Table 11.4).

It was clear that the Project had a positive (but not quite statistically significant) effect in reducing the level and likelihood of serious violence arrests for program youth compared to the equivalent comparison youth. The effect on program 16- and 17-year-olds was particularly noteworthy.

## ***Yearly Total Violence Arrests***

### GLM Model

The sample of youth with histories of violence arrests, (both serious and less serious)<sup>8</sup> was 118 – program n = 78 (56.1%); comparison n = 40 (51.9%). The results of the GLM model

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<sup>8</sup> The level of pre-program yearly total violence arrests was ranked as follows: 1) none = no violence arrests; 2) low = 0.01 to 0.049 arrests; 3) medium = 0.05 to 1.00 arrests; and high = 1.00 or more violence arrests.

with *change in yearly total violence arrests* as the dependent variable was significant (R-square = 0.609,  $p < 0.001$ ), somewhat similar to the results of the GLM model for serious violence arrest change. Both program and comparison youth reduced their mean yearly total violence arrest levels. The significant and/or marginally significant variables were: *pre-program yearly total violence arrests* ( $p < 0.001$ ), *program length* ( $p < 0.001$ ), *age* ( $p = 0.073$ ), and the interaction term *pre-program yearly total violence arrests*  $\times$  *project* ( $p = 0.026$ ) (Table 11.5). The level of reduction of total violence arrests was greater for program youth (LS mean = -0.469) than for comparison youth (LS mean = -0.237), but the difference was not statistically significant. The Project had a greater effect in lowering serious violence arrests than total violence arrests.

There was no difference in program and comparison-youth subsamples in gender, race/ethnicity, gang membership and age. The youngest age group (15 years and under) – whether program or comparison – did significantly better than the oldest age group (18 years and over) in lowering yearly total violence-arrest levels ( $p = 0.023$ ), but only slightly better than the 16- and 17-year-old subgroup. Program youth who were in the program two years or more did better than comparison youth over an equivalent time period, and also did significantly better than program youth who were in the program less than two years ( $p = 0.001$ ).

### Logistic Regression Model

The pattern of success in total violence arrest change was somewhat less than that of serious violence arrest change. There were (n = 63) and successes (n = 56) in the two samples, program and comparison. The model was statistically significant (Chi-square = 54.590,  $p < 0.001$ ). Only pre-program yearly total violence arrests was significant ( $p < 0.001$ ). The odds

ratio of success to failure was 67.2% greater for program youth than comparison youth. An interesting reversal, relative to the results for serious violence arrest change, was that Latino youth had a 58.7% greater odds ratio of success to failure in reducing their level of total violence arrests, compared to non-Latino youth. Odds ratios for yearly total violence arrest change among different age groups were similar to those for yearly serious violence arrest change. The youngest age group (15 and under) had an odds ratio of success to failure that was two-and-a-half times greater than that for the 18-and-older group. The 16- and 17-year-olds did 22.17% better than the 18-and-older group (Table 11.6).

In sum, the Project was effective in lowering yearly levels of both total violence and serious violence arrests for program youth, and achieving higher ratios of success to failure, than was the case for comparison youth. The reduction and success ratios were greater for the younger than the older age groups.

### ***Yearly Drug Arrests***

#### GLM Model

Over the course of the program and pre-program periods, a total of 64 youth (43 program and 21 comparison) were arrested on drug charges. However, the pattern of arrest changes<sup>9</sup> appeared to be the reverse for drug arrests compared to violence arrests. More comparison youth (61.9%, n = 13) were arrested on drug charges than program youth (37.2%, n = 16) during the pre-program period, but more program youth (62.8%, n = 27) than comparison youth (38.1%, n =

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<sup>9</sup> The level of pre-program yearly drug arrests was ranked as follows: 1) none = no drug arrests; 2) low = 0.01 to 0.49 arrests; 3) medium = 0.05 to 1.0 arrests; and 4) high 1 or more drug arrests.

8) were arrested for drugs in the program period. The GLM model was significant (R-square = 0.648,  $p < 0.001$ ).

The significant variables in the equation were *pre-program yearly drug arrest change* ( $p < 0.001$ ), *project* ( $p < 0.001$ ), *program length* ( $p = 0.028$ ), and *gang membership* ( $p = 0.033$ ) (Table 11.7). Comparison youth reduced their drug arrests (LS mean = -0.42), and did significantly better than program youth, who increased their drug arrests (LS mean = +0.830). African-American youth increased their drug arrests more than Latino youth and the other racial/ethnic groups. Gang members decreased (LS mean = -0.100) and associate gang members increased (LS mean = +0.222) their drug arrests; non-gang youth decreased their drug arrests even more (LS mean = -0.219). None of these differences were statistically significant. Age group also made no significant difference, although the youngest group had more of an increase in drug arrests than did the two older age groups. Youth who were in the program more than two years increased their drug arrests less than those who were in the program less than two years ( $p = 0.004$ ), but comparison youth decreased their mean level of drug arrests, regardless of length of program-exposure (or equivalent) time.

### Logistic Regression Model

The results of the Logistic Regression models were not necessarily consistent with those of the GLM models. Much depended on how the variable – category of pre-program arrests – was classified. When we divided our categories of pre-program drug arrests into low/medium/high versus none, the comparison sample had a higher success-to-failure odds ratio; when we divided our categories of pre-program drug arrests into medium/high versus none/low,

the program sample had a higher success-to-failure odds ratio. The analytic dilemma was whether to regard the level of pre-program arrests for drugs as zero versus low/medium/high, or as zero/low versus medium/high, as appropriate or realistic categorizations of alternative drug-arrest patterns in low-income, high-crime areas. Ideally, youth should not be involved in any illicit drug activities – use, possession, sale, manufacture, or transport. However, in communities where drug activities were endemic, some level of control of the problem might have been as much as could have been achieved, at least over the short term.

In the pre-program period, most program youth had no drug arrests ( $n = 27$ ); the remainder had low ( $n = 11$ ), medium ( $n = 5$ ) and high ( $n = 0$ ) arrests for drugs. Most comparison youth had high ( $n = 5$ ) and medium ( $n = 6$ ), relative to low ( $n = 2$ ) and no arrests ( $n = 8$ ) in the pre-program period. We conducted two Logistic Regression analyses, each with a different categorization of pre-program drug arrests; one symbolized an absolute zero subgroup, the other a zero/low subgroup. Both models ( $n = 64$  youth) were significant ( $p < 0.001$ ) at the same level with (Chi-square = 47.591 and 47.683, respectively).

Logistic Model A. In our first model – absolute zero pre-program arrests – with pre-program drug arrests classified as low/medium/high versus none, comparison youth had a better odds ratio of success to failure than program youth. Although no variable was significant in the equation, the odds ratio of success to failure was almost nine times greater for the comparison youth than the program youth. Latinos did better than non-Latinos (odds ratio = 14.761); 15-and-under youth did better (odds ratio = 15.712) than 18-and-older youth, and 16- and 17-year-olds had a higher rate of success to failure (odds ratio = 5.42) than 18-and-older youth (Table 11.8).

Logistical Model B. In our second model – relative low pre-program drug arrests – with

pre-program drug arrests classified as none/low versus medium/high, program youth had a better odds ratio of success to failure than comparison youth. Although no variables were significant in the equation, the odds ratio of success to failure was greater for program youth than for comparison youth (odds ratio = 999.99). Latinos and younger youth continued to do better than non-Latino and other age groups (Table 11.9). Depending on category of pre-program arrest selected, each sub-sample did better than the other in the ratio of youth who were successes to failures in reducing their drug arrests.

We also observe that there were no displacement or substantive arrest-change patterns for program or comparison youth, at least in respect to serious violence and drug arrests. In other words, youth who were arrested for serious violence in the pre-program period were more likely to also be arrested for serious violence in the program period. Also, youth who were arrested for drugs in the pre-program period were more likely to be arrested for drugs in the program period. A pattern of serious violence arrests was not necessarily likely to predict drug arrests, and vice versa. A limited specialization pattern of arrests was more likely for youth who were chronic offenders.

### ***Yearly Property Arrests***

#### GLM Model

There was little difference in patterns of yearly property arrests for program and comparison youth in both the program and pre-program periods; the GLM model was significant (R-square = 0.621,  $p < 0.001$ ). The only variable that was significant in the equation was *pre-program yearly property arrest change* ( $p < 0.001$ ). Property arrests declined for both program

and comparison youth, with no significant difference in mean declines between them. There were no significant differences in the subgroup comparisons for gender, race/ethnicity, gang membership and age group. All subgroups decreased their property arrests, except for youth who had no pre-program property arrests (Table 11.10).

### Logistic Regression Model

Although there was a general tendency in the GLM models for the program-sample and comparison-sample mean arrests to decline, there were more youth who failed than succeeded in reducing arrests for property offenses in both samples (program = 32 successes versus 42 failures; comparison = 17 successes versus 42 failures). The Logistic Regression model was significant (Chi-square = 66.726,  $p < 0.001$ ). The only significant variable in the equation was *pre-program yearly property arrests*. The odds ratio of success to failure was 19.4% greater for Latino than non-Latino youth and 55.8% greater for 15-and-under youth than for 18-and-older youth, although the 18-and-older youth had a 61.8% better odds ratio of success to failure in reducing property arrests than 16- and 17-year-olds. There was no evidence that the Project had an effect in the reduction of yearly property arrests for program youth (Table 11.11).

### ***Yearly “Other” Arrests***

#### GLM Model

More youth (n = 139) were involved in a range of other arrests (mainly of a minor nature, such as curfew violation, drinking [minors] gang loitering, resisting an officer, and unlawful possession of a firearm), than were involved in arrests for violence, drugs, or property offenses.

A majority of program youth were involved in such “other” arrests during the program and pre-program periods. The GLM model for “other” arrests comprised 91 program and 48 comparison youth and was significant (R-square = 0.629,  $p < 0.001$ ) (Table 11.12). The pattern of change for the samples of youth was similar to that for total arrests.

The significant variables in the equation were: *pre-program yearly “other” arrest change*<sup>10</sup> ( $p < 0.001$ ), *age group* ( $p < 0.010$ ), *program length* ( $p < 0.015$ ), and *gender* ( $p < 0.058$ ). Comparison youth (LS mean = -0.502) had a slightly greater decline in “other” arrests than program youth (LS mean = -0.331). Females had a greater decline than males. There was little difference in level of decline for youth of different racial/ethnic backgrounds. Contrary to the findings in other models, the oldest subgroup of youth (18 years and over) had significantly lower mean yearly “other” arrests than 15-and-under youth ( $p < 0.004$ ), and lower mean yearly “other” arrests than 16- and 17-year olds ( $p < 0.019$ ). Again, program youth who were in the program two or more years had lower mean yearly “other” arrests than youth who were in the program for less than two years ( $p < 0.004$ ).

### Logistic Regression Model

The Logistic Regression model was significant (Chi-square = 20.429,  $p < 0.001$ ). Two variables were significant: *pre-program yearly “other” arrests* ( $p < 0.001$ ) and *age group* ( $p < 0.040$ ). The odds ratio of success to failure was 3.7% higher for comparison youth than program youth; non-Latino youth had a higher (99%) success-to-failure ratio than Latino youth. The odds

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<sup>10</sup> The level of pre-program yearly “other” arrests was ranked as follows: 1) none = no “other” arrests; low = 0.09 to 0.99 arrests; 3) medium = 1.0 to 1.99 arrests; and 4) high = 2 or more “other” arrests.

ratio of success to failure was 3.28 times higher for youth 18 years and over than for 15-and-under youth, and 66.0% higher than for 16- and 17-year-olds (Table 11.13).

### Summary

The Project was effective in contributing to the reduction of arrests and the increase of odds of success to failure of program youth in respect to serious violence and total violence arrests. Due to the dissimilarity of pre-program arrest patterns, more program than comparison youth were arrested for drug offenses in the program period than the pre-program period. Program youth had relatively lower ratios of failure to success for multiple arrests for drug offenses. There was no significant difference in the reduction of arrests between the pre-program and program periods, or odds ratios of success to failure in respect to total arrests, property arrests, or “other” arrests. In almost all cases, youth who were in the program for two years or more did better than youth who were in the program for less than two years. Females – although there were very few in the program (7.5%) or comparison (7.9%) samples – did better in lowering arrest levels for all offenses than males. There was little or no difference in arrest-change patterns for gang members, gang associates, or non-gang youth. Generally, older youth did better than younger youth in the mean reductions and odds ratios of successes to failures in respect to total arrests, property arrests and “other” (minor) arrests, but younger youth did better than older youth in the mean reductions and odds ratios of successes to failures in respect to serious violence arrests, total violence arrests and drug arrests.

Table 11.1

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Arrests (Controlling for Yearly Total Arrests in the Pre-Program Period).

11.1(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.466)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked	1	1.926	0.96	0.327
Gender: Male vs Female	1	6.050	3.03	0.083
Race/Ethnicity: African American, Latino, Other	2	0.530	0.27	0.767
Gang Membership: Gang Member, Gang Associate, Non-Gang Youth, Unknown	3	0.624	0.31	0.816
Age Group at Program Entry: 15 & under, 16 to 17, and 18 & over	2	5.807	2.91	0.057
Program Length: <2 Yrs vs >=2 Yrs	1	13.429	6.72	0.010*
Pre-Program Yearly Total Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	78.596	39.34	0.000***
Project XAge Group	2	0.099	0.05	0.952
Project XProgram Length	1	1.689	0.85	0.359
Project XPre-Program Yearly Total Arrests	3	0.302	0.15	0.929
Within error	196	1.998	—	—
Total	215	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

11.1(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Pre-Program Yearly Total Arrests Covariate

Pre-Program Yearly Total Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	76	1.330	0.295	1	—	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
Low	68	-0.101	0.292	2		—	0.557	0.000***
Medium	48	-0.268	0.324	3			—	0.000***
High	24	-2.544	0.391	4				—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

11.1(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Program Length Main Effect

Program Length	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2
<2 Yrs	70	-0.081	0.308	0.010*
>=2 Yrs	146	-0.711	0.264	

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

Table 11.2

Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly Total Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and Comparison Youth.

11.2(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	35	43	78
Program Worker-Tracked	57	83	140

† Total number of youth arrested (N=218).

11.2(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=42.175 \*\*\* with 5 df)

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $\chi^2$	Odds † Ratio
Intercept	1	0.031	0.199	0.878	—
Project (1=Comparison, -1=Program Worker-Tracked)	1	0.114	0.159	0.473	1.256
Race/Ethnicity (1=Latino, -1=Non-Latino)	1	-0.098	0.187	0.598	0.822
Age Group at Program Entry (1=15 & Under, -1=18 & Over)	1	-0.247	0.239	0.301	0.679
Age Group at Program Entry (1=16 to 17, -1=18 & Over)	1	0.106	0.207	0.610	0.965
Pre-Program Yearly Total Arrests (1=Medium & High, -1=None & Low)	1	0.974	0.161	0.000***	7.011

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

† Odd ratio represents the ratio of the odds of success of the group coded as 1 to that coded as -1. The inverse of this ratio indicates the odds of success of the group coded as -1 to that coded as 1.

Table 11.3

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Serious Violence Arrests (Controlling for Yearly Serious Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period).

## 11.3(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.791)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked	1	1.676	3.73	0.061
Gender: Male vs Female	1	0.263	0.58	0.449
Race/Ethnicity: African American, Latino, Other	2	0.687	1.53	0.231
Gang Membership: Gang Member, Gang Associate, Non-Gang Youth, Unknown	3	0.192	0.43	0.734
Age Group at Program Entry: 15 & under, 16 to 17, and 18 & over	2	0.141	0.31	0.733
Program Length: <2 Yrs vs >=2 Yrs	1	1.884	4.19	0.048*
Pre-Program Yearly Serious Violence Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	9.123	20.28	0.000***
Project XAge Group	2	0.219	0.49	0.619
Project XProgram Length	1	0.019	0.04	0.839
Project XPre-Program Yearly Serious Violence Arrests	3	1.555	3.46	0.026*
Within error	37	0.450	—	—
Total	56	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

11.3(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Serious Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Pre-Program Yearly Serious Violence Arrests Covariate

Pre-Program Yearly Serious Violence Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	24	1.435	0.439	1	—	0.002**	0.000***	0.000***
Low	19	0.477	0.477	2		—	0.369	0.000***
Medium	10	0.138	0.472	3			—	0.000***
High	4	-1.907	0.563	4				—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

11.3(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Serious Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Program Length Main Effect

Program Length	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2
<2 Yrs	18	0.356	0.466	0.048*
>=2 Yrs	39	-0.285	0.430	

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

13.3(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Serious Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project X Pre-Program Yearly Serious Violence Arrests Interaction

Project	Pre-Program Yearly Serious Violence Arrests	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)								
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Comparison	None	1.446	0.481	9	1	—	*		*		*	‡	‡
Comparison	Low	0.400	0.587	4	2		—						‡
Comparison	Med	0.546	0.706	2	3			—					‡
Comparison	High	-0.536	0.870	1	4				—	*			†
Program	None	1.423	0.464	15	5					—	†	‡	‡
Program	Low	0.553	0.525	15	6						—	*	‡
Program	Med	-0.269	0.444	8	7							—	‡
Program	High	-3.278	0.569	3	8								—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; †  $p < .01$ ; and ‡  $p < .001$ .

Table 11.4

Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly Serious Violence Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and Comparison Youth.

11.4(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	5	11	16
Program Worker-Tracked	24	17	41

‡ Youth without serious violence arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=62; Program=99) are coded as missing.

† Total number of youth arrested (N=218).

11.4(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=19.123\*\* with 5 df)

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $\chi^2$	Odds † Ratio
Intercept	1	0.908	0.635	0.153	—
Project (1=Comparison, -1=Program Worker-Tracked)	1	-0.564	0.381	0.139	0.324
Race/Ethnicity (1=Latino, -1=Non-Latino)	1	-0.194	0.366	0.597	0.679
Age Group at Program Entry (1=15 & Under, -1=18 & Over)	1	0.393	0.515	0.445	2.098
Age Group at Program Entry (1=16 to 17, -1=18 & Over)	1	-0.046	0.457	0.920	1.352
Pre-Program Yearly Serious Violence Arrests (1=Medium & High, -1=None & Low)	1	1.666	0.576	0.004**	28.014

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

† Odd ratio represents the ratio of the odds of success of the group coded as 1 to that coded as -1. The inverse of this ratio indicates the odds of success of the group coded as -1 to that coded as 1.

Table 11.5

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests (Controlling for Yearly Total Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period).

11.5(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.609)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked	1	0.466	0.60	0.442
Gender: Male vs Female	1	0.004	0.01	0.942
Race/Ethnicity: African American, Latino, Other	2	0.656	0.08	0.920
Gang Membership: Gang Member, Gang Associate, Non-Gang Youth, Unknown	3	0.457	0.58	0.627
Age Group at Program Entry: 15 & under, 16 to 17, and 18 & over	2	2.100	2.69	0.073
Program Length: <2 Yrs vs >=2 Yrs	1	5.436	6.95	0.010*
Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	31.427	40.21	0.000***
Project XAge Group	2	0.068	0.09	0.917
Project XProgram Length	1	1.663	2.13	0.148
Project XPre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests	3	2.525	3.23	0.026*
Within error	98	0.782	—	—
Total	117	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

11.5(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests Covariate

Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	49	1.019	0.288	1	—	0.005**	0.000***	0.000***
Low	32	0.281	0.327	2		—	0.012*	0.000***
Medium	25	-0.445	0.327	3			—	0.000***
High	12	-2.268	0.358	4				—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

11.5(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Program Length Main Effect

Program Length	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2
<2 Yrs	34	-0.036	0.299	0.010*
>=2 Yrs	84	-0.670	0.284	

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

11.5(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project X Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests Interaction

Project	Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)								
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Comparison	None	0.909	0.333	17	1	—		‡	‡			‡	‡
Comparison	Low	0.099	0.443	7	2		—		†	*			‡
Comparison	Med	-0.524	0.433	9	3			—		‡	*		‡
Comparison	High	-1.432	0.440	7	4				—	‡	‡	*	†
Program	None	1.129	0.328	32	5					—	*	‡	‡
Program	Low	0.464	0.383	15	6						—	†	‡
Program	Med	-0.366	0.362	16	7							—	‡
Program	High	-3.103	0.496	5	8								—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; †  $p < .01$ ; and ‡  $p < .001$ .

Table 11.6

Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly Total Violence Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and Comparison Youth.

11.6(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	20	21	41
Program Worker-Tracked	36	42	78

‡ Youth without violence arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=37; Program=62) are coded as missing. Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=218).

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=218).

11.6(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=54.590\*\*\* with 5 df)

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $\chi^2$	Odds † Ratio
Intercept	1	0.617	0.370	0.095	—
Project (1=Comparison, -1=Program Worker-Tracked)	1	-0.257	0.272	0.346	0.598
Race/Ethnicity (1=Latino, -1=Non-Latino)	1	0.231	0.297	0.437	1.587
Age Group at Program Entry (1=15 & Under, -1=18 & Over)	1	0.564	0.363	0.121	2.574
Age Group at Program Entry (1=16 to 17, -1=18 & Over)	1	-0.182	0.326	0.577	1.221
Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests (1=Medium & High, -1=None & Low)	1	1.954	0.357	0.000***	49.803

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

† Odd ratio represents the ratio of the odds of success of the group coded as 1 to that coded as -1. The inverse of this ratio indicates the odds of success of the group coded as -1 to that coded as 1.

Table 11.7

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Drug Arrests (Controlling for Yearly Drug Arrests in the Pre-Program Period).

11.7(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.648)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked	1	5.058	11.65	0.001**
Race/Ethnicity: African American, Latino, Other	2	0.090	0.21	0.814
Gang Membership: Gang Member, Gang Associate, Non-Gang Youth, Unknown	3	1.374	3.17	0.033*
Age Group at Program Entry: 15 & under, 16 to 17, and 18 & over	2	0.110	0.25	0.778
Program Length: <2 Yrs vs >=2 Yrs	1	2.228	5.13	0.028*
Pre-Program Yearly Drug Arrests: None, Low, Medium&High	2	5.074	11.69	0.000***
Project XAge Group	2	0.095	0.22	0.805
Project XProgram Length	1	1.008	2.32	0.134
Project XPre-Program Yearly Drug Arrests	2	0.473	1.09	0.344
Within error	47	0.434	—	—
Total	63	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

11.7(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Project Main Effect

Project	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2
Comparison	21	-0.421	0.312	0.001**
Program	43	0.830	0.259	

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

11.7(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Program Length Main Effect

Program Length	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2			
<2 Yrs	18	0.472	0.294	0.028*			
>=2 Yrs	46	-0.063	0.198				

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

11.7(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Pre-Program Yearly Drug Arrests Main Effect

Pre-Program Yearly Drug Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
None	35	0.791	0.228	1	—	0.132	0.000***
Low	13	0.305	0.345	2		—	0.032*
Medium /High	16	-0.481	0.273	3			—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

Table 11.8

Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly Drug Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and Comparison Youth.

11.8(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	10	11	21
Program Worker-Tracked	11	32	43

‡ Youth without drug arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=57; Program=97) are coded as missing.

† Total number of youth arrested (N=218).

11.8(b) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ by Pre-Program Yearly Drug Arrests

Project	Success	Failure	Total §
Comparison with No Pre-Program Drug Arrests	0	8	8
Comparison with Low/Medium/High Pre-Program Drug Arrests	10	3	13
Program with No Pre-Program Drug Arrests	0	27	27
Program with Low/Medium/High Pre-Program Drug Arrests	11	5	16

§ Total number of youth who have been arrested for Drugs (N=64).

11.8(c) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=47.591\*\*\* with 5 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $\chi^2$	Odds † Ratio
Intercept	1	-6.818	111.10	0.951	—
Project (1=Comparison, -1=Program Worker-Tracked)	1	0.127	0.491	0.796	8.834
Race/Ethnicity (1=Latino, -1=Non-Latino)	1	0.304	0.532	0.568	14.761
Age Group at Program Entry (1=15 & Under, -1=18 & Over)	1	0.164	0.873	0.851	15.712
Age Group at Program Entry (1=16 to 17, -1=18 & Over)	1	-0.210	0.699	0.764	5.427
Pre-Program Yearly Drug Arrests (1=Low, Medium & High, -1=None)	1	7.664	111.10	0.945	999.999

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

† Odd ratio represents the ratio of the odds of success of the group coded as 1 to that coded as -1. The inverse of this ratio indicates the odds of success of the group coded as -1 to that coded as 1.

Table 11.9

Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly Drug Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and Comparison Youth.

11.9(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	10	11	21
Program Worker-Tracked	11	32	43

‡ Youth without drug arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=57; Program=97) are coded as missing.

† Total number of youth arrested (N=218).

11.9(b) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ by Pre-Program Yearly Drug Arrests

Project	Success	Failure	Total §
Comparison with No/Low Pre-Program Drug Arrests	0	10	10
Comparison with Medium/High Pre-Program Drug Arrests	10	1	11
Program with No/Low Pre-Program Drug Arrests	6	32	38
Program with Medium/High Pre-Program Drug Arrests	5	0	5

§ Total number of youth who have been arrested for Drugs (N=64).

11.9(c) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=47.683\*\*\* with 5 df)

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $\chi^2$	Odds † Ratio
Intercept	1	1.634	28.409	0.954	—
Project (1=Comparison, -1=Program Worker-Tracked)	1	-5.742	95.605	0.952	0.001
Race/Ethnicity (1=Latino, -1=Non-Latino)	1	0.688	0.729	0.345	3.956
Age Group at Program Entry (1=15 & Under, -1=18 & Over)	1	3.809	56.803	0.947	999.999
Age Group at Program Entry (1=16 to 17, -1=18 & Over)	1	3.996	56.800	0.944	999.999
Pre-Program Yearly Drug Arrests (1=Medium & High, -1=None & Low)	1	13.154	128.100	0.918	999.999

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

† Odd ratio represents the ratio of the odds of success of the group coded as 1 to that coded as -1. The inverse of this ratio indicates the odds of success of the group coded as -1 to that coded as 1.

Table 11.10

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Property Arrests (Controlling for Yearly Property Arrests in the Pre-Program Period).

11.10(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.621)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked	1	0.225	0.42	0.520
Gender: Male vs Female	1	0.346	0.64	0.425
Race/Ethnicity: African American, Latino, Other	2	0.138	0.26	0.774
Gang Membership: Gang Member, Gang Associate, Non-Gang Youth, Unknown	3	0.159	0.29	0.829
Age Group at Program Entry: 15 & under, 16 to 17, and 18 & over	2	0.480	0.89	0.414
Program Length: <2 Yrs vs >=2 Yrs	1	0.004	0.01	0.931
Pre-Program Yearly Property Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	17.512	32.50	0.000***
Project XAge Group	2	0.389	0.72	0.489
Project XProgram Length	1	0.769	1.43	0.235
Project XPre-Program Yearly Property Arrests	3	0.495	0.92	0.436
Within error	88	0.539	—	—
Total	107	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

11.10(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Pre-Program Yearly Property Arrests Covariate

Pre-Program Yearly Property Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	51	0.798	0.228	1	—	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
Low	17	-0.245	0.251	2		—	0.029*	0.012*
Medium	25	-0.881	0.271	3			—	0.647
High	15	-1.009	0.272	4				—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

Table 11.11

Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly Property Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and Comparison Youth.

11.11(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	17	19	38
Program Worker-Tracked	32	42	74

‡ Youth without property arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=40; Program=66) are coded as missing.

† Total number of youth arrested (N=218).

11.11(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=66.726\*\*\* with 5 df)

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $\chi^2$	Odds † Ratio
Intercept	1	0.421	0.401	0.293	—
Project (1=Comparison, -1=Program Worker-Tracked)	1	0.089	0.302	0.768	1.194
Race/Ethnicity (1=Latino, -1=Non-Latino)	1	0.052	0.355	0.884	1.109
Age Group at Program Entry (1=15 & Under, -1=18 & Over)	1	0.468	0.420	0.265	1.558
Age Group at Program Entry (1=16 to 17, -1=18 & Over)	1	-0.493	0.419	0.240	0.596
Pre-Program Yearly Property Arrests (1=Medium & High, -1=None & Low)	1	2.060	0.341	0.000***	61.613

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

† Odd ratio represents the ratio of the odds of success of the group coded as 1 to that coded as -1. The inverse of this ratio indicates the odds of success of the group coded as -1 to that coded as 1.

Table 11.12

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly “Other” Arrests (Controlling for Yearly “Other” Arrests in the Pre-Program Period).

11.12(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.629)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked	1	0.345	0.82	0.366
Gender: Male vs Female	1	1.535	3.66	0.058
Race/Ethnicity: African American, Latino, Other	2	0.074	0.18	0.838
Gang Membership: Gang Member, Gang Associate, Non-Gang Youth, Unknown	3	0.543	1.30	0.279
Age Group at Program Entry: 15 & under, 16 to 17, and 18 & over	2	2.010	4.80	0.010**
Program Length: <2 Yrs vs >=2 Yrs	1	2.579	6.15	0.015*
Pre-Program Yearly “Other” Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	19.187	45.78	0.000***
Project XAge Group	2	0.242	0.58	0.563
Project XProgram Length	1	0.585	1.40	0.240
Project XPre-Program Yearly “Other” Arrests	3	0.350	0.83	0.477
Within error	117	0.419	—	—
Total	136	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

11.12(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly “Other” Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test for the Program Length Main Effect

Program Length	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2
<2 Yrs	35	-0.426	0.203	0.015*
>=2 Yrs	102	-0.807	0.185	

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

11.12(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly “Other” Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Pre-Program Yearly “Other” Arrests Covariate

Pre-Program Yearly “Other” Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	59	0.798	0.228	1	—	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
Low	62	-0.245	0.251	2		—	0.024*	0.011*
Medium	11	-0.881	0.271	3			—	0.647
High	5	-1.009	0.272	4				—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

11.12(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Other Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Age Group Main Effect

Age Group	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
15 & Under	38	-0.405	0.194	1	—	0.132	0.000***
16 to 17	58	-0.532	0.214	2		—	0.032*
18 & Over	41	-0.912	0.198	3			—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

Table 11.13.

Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly “Other” Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and Comparison Youth.

11.13(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	21	27	48
Program Worker-Tracked	38	53	91

‡ Youth without other arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=30; Program=49) are coded as missing.

† Total number of youth arrested (N=218).

11.13(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=20.429\*\*\* with 5 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $\chi^2$	Odds † Ratio
Intercept	1	0.767	0.382	0.045*	—
Project (1=Comparison, -1=Program Worker-Tracked)	1	0.018	0.198	0.928	1.037
Race/Ethnicity (1=Latino, -1=Non-Latino)	1	-0.343	0.223	0.124	0.503
Age Group at Program Entry (1=15 & Under, -1=18 & Over)	1	-0.623	0.300	0.038*	0.305
Age Group at Program Entry (1=16 to 17, -1=18 & Over)	1	0.057	0.257	0.825	0.601
Pre-Program Yearly “Other” Arrests (1=None & Low, -1=Medium & High)	1	-1.164	0.353	0.001***	0.097

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

† Odd ratio represents the ratio of the odds of success of the group coded as 1 to that coded as -1. The inverse of this ratio indicates the odds of success of the group coded as -1 to that coded as 1.

## Chapter 12

### **Specific Services/Worker Contacts Affecting Arrest Outcomes**

(Kwai Ming Wa and Rolando V. Sosa)

#### Introduction

In this chapter we are interested in which specific services and worker contacts contributed to positive changes in arrest patterns for program youth, particularly in reductions in arrests for total violence, serious violence and drug crimes. (Greater reduction or probabilities of success to failure did not occur for program youth in respect to total arrests, property arrests or “other” arrests.)

The samples in the present analysis consist only of program youth who had arrest histories in the program and pre-program periods for total violence (N = 79), serious violence (N = 41), and drug crimes (N = 43). Our samples and subsamples are smaller than in the previous analyses (Chapter 11). We have excluded certain characteristics of youth, in order to better identify specific services and worker contacts that were effective.

The variables we eliminated are: *program length*, which had a dominant positive effect (longer program length correlates highly with reduction), since the magnitude of reduction or increase in arrests is irrelevant to the direction of change (i.e., success or failure); *gender* – since there were only three females who had violence arrests (n = 2), serious violence arrests (n = 1), and drug arrests (n = 0); *race/ethnicity*; and *gang membership* – since in the earlier analyses they did not indicate change in different arrest patterns.

The General Linear Models (GLM) in the present analyses contain five variables or

interaction terms: youth's *age group at program entry* (17 years and under, 18 years and over); category of *pre-program arrests* (none, low, medium, and high); categories of *service or worker contact* (none, low, medium, high); *service or worker contacts* × *age group*; and *service or worker contact* × *pre-program arrest category*.

Each model includes the particular type of service, direct-worker-contact, or coordinated-worker-contact variable that is best or strongest in predicting a reduced level of arrests.

Direct services to youth: three specific types of services; – job and/or school services, individual counseling and suppression; and total services consisting of these 3 services and others.

Direct worker contacts with youth: contacts by outreach youth workers and/or by probation officers with individual program youth. The types and number of services provided by these workers were not equivalent to the types and numbers of contacts made. Multiple types and numbers of services were usually provided by particular workers or combinations of workers at each contact.

Coordinated worker contacts. These were contacts by Project workers with each other, or with workers from other agencies not directly related to the Project, on behalf of youth at particular times. These coordinated contacts involved exchange of information and/or collaboration in the provision of services, although not necessarily simultaneous contacts with the youth at a particular time.

Direct services/contacts and coordinated contacts were essential components of the program Model. This meant that workers with different approaches to servicing youth would better complement or modify their approaches to achieve the objectives of youth social

development and arrest reduction. Such a fully complementary, or interdependent, approach was not readily developed. It was not until the last year of Project operations that the role of the outreach youth workers was fully accepted by probation and police officers, and the agency sponsoring the outreach youth workers began to substantially develop the street-oriented character of the outreach youth-worker role.

It was possible for coordinated contacts by the outreach youth workers and probation officers to be either consistent and reinforcing, or inconsistent, with contrary effects on youth behavior. Coordinated approaches were particularly important in determining which services or contacts with youth were effective in lowering arrests. Services and contacts, whether direct or coordinated, were classified in the categories of none, low, medium, and high, except for the variables of total services and total contacts (without the none category), which included youth who had any variety of services or contacts.

One would expect that a higher level of aggregated services or contacts by different workers together should result in better effects (mainly lowering arrests), other factors being equivalent, such as age, gender, pre-program arrests and gang membership. This did not necessarily occur. Sometimes coordinated contacts resulted in an opposite effect in terms of the youth's arrest outcome. Contacts by outreach youth workers with school or job personnel could be associated with an increase in arrests for youth, while such contacts by probation officers could be associated with a decrease, although when these contacts were combined, the outcomes for the youth could still be associated with some decline in certain types of arrests. Coordinated contacts could explain why high (or higher) levels of contacts may be more or less effective than low (or lower) levels of contacts.

In Table 12.1 – a matrix of nine correlated variables – we observe some of these effects by examining the magnitudes and directions of their correlation coefficients. The variables include three dependent variables – *yearly total violence arrest change*, *yearly serious violence arrest change*, and *yearly drug arrest change* – as well as two sets of variables: one involving coordinated contacts with school personnel by outreach youth workers alone, probation officers alone and by a combination of these contacts; the other involving coordinated contacts with job personnel by outreach youth workers alone, by probation officers alone and by a combination of such contacts. We use no statistical controls for age, gender, and pre-program arrests in this analysis, and we don't necessarily make any causal connections between variables. Our primary purpose is to indicate that levels or frequencies of particular direct contacts, services, or coordinated contacts delivered by particular types of workers may not result in a fully additive result.

While the correlations between different types of arrests are very high, the correlations between different service providers – outreach youth workers and probation officers – may not necessarily be related, or even have an effect or be correlated in the same direction with particular arrest changes. For example, decreases in total violence arrests ( $r = -0.164$ ), serious violence arrests ( $r = -0.292$ ), and drug arrests ( $r = -0.279$ ) are associated with an increase in contacts by probation officers with school personnel, but increases in total violence arrests ( $r = 0.176$ ), serious violence arrests ( $r = 0.274$ ) and drug arrests ( $r = 0.179$ ) are associated with an increase in contacts by outreach youth workers with school personnel. The combined effect of these coordinated contacts with school personnel nevertheless suggests that a lower level of such contacts may still be significant in reducing the three types of arrests: total violence ( $r = -0.042$ ),

serious violence ( $r = -0.083$ ) and drugs ( $r = -0.167$ ). The same pattern occurs with the job-coordination contact variable in the same matrix.

The results of the following analyses need to be interpreted with some caution. In the following GLM models, our focus is on change in mean levels or arrests between the program and pre-program periods. We can compute differences in the number of arrests of a certain type between the program and pre-program periods, and attribute the difference (possibly) to program effect. However, we cannot causally relate specific services, direct contacts and coordinated contacts to specific arrests that occurred in the program period. It is possible that additional services, contacts, and coordinated contacts occurred subsequent to arrests in the program period. This is a further reason that the level of services, direct contacts, or coordinated contacts may not be directly proportional to reduction in arrests that occurred in the program period. Finally, caution is required in comparing mean changes in arrests based on age categories alone. The number of youth 18 years and older in our various service, contact or coordinated-contact frequency cells is relatively small.

What is most important in the following analyses is the significance of the type of program intervention indicated as a main effect in the summary table (a) of each of the models. We select for presentation only those GLM models of specific services, direct contacts or coordinated-contacts which were significant – whether predicting increased or decreased arrests for program youth. Only certain service and coordinated-contact variables achieve statistical significance of 0.05 or better, and sometimes only marginal significance, whether of the specific intervention variable or the interaction term. No direct-contact variables are significant in any of the models.

All of the GLM models are highly statistically significant ( $p < 0.001$ ). Each of the equations has five variables: *age group at program entry* (17 and under, 18 and over); *pre-program yearly arrests* (none, low, medium, high); the particular *service/coordinated contact*; and the interaction terms *service/coordinated contact*  $\times$  *age group* and *service/coordinated contact*  $\times$  *pre-program arrests*. The results of the pre-program-arrest variable (a regression effect) indicate that youth with higher levels of arrests in the pre-program period reduce their levels of arrests in the program period, and youth with lower levels of arrests in the pre-program period increase their levels of arrests in the program period.

### Services

Total Services and Yearly Total Violence Arrest Change (R-square = 0.579, N = 78). Total services included the following categories: case planning, group services (including recreation), individual counseling, family counseling, job services, school-related services, suppression and material services (including transportation). The variables which were significant, in addition to category of *pre-program yearly total violence arrests* (less- and more-serious) ( $p = 0.000$ ), were *age group at program entry* ( $p = 0.019$ ) and the interaction term *total services*  $\times$  *age group* ( $p = 0.003$ ) (Table 12.2). Youth who received a low level or medium level of total services had a reduction in total violence arrests, while youth who received a high level of services had an increase in total violence arrests. The differences between the low/medium and high levels of services were statistically significant.

The anomalous relationship of high levels of total services to outcome was probably based on the fact that youth who were arrested for various violent acts in the program period

were likely to be provided with more services than would otherwise have been the case. Those who were provided with low and medium levels of total services comprised 66.1% (n = 52) of the program youth arrested. Furthermore, only 3 youth (18 years and over) were provided with high levels of total services and had increases in their total violence arrests. Most younger youth (17 and under; 73.3%) were provided with medium and high levels of total services. In general, the more services of various kinds provided to program youth across all age groups, the greater the reduction in arrests for all types of violent acts.

Individual Counseling and Yearly Total Violence Arrest Change (R-square = 0.519, N = 78).

Individual counseling comprised 21.0% of the total services provided to program youth.

Individual counseling was 24.4% of total services by outreach youth workers, and 14.2% of total services by probation officers. The GLM model contains the following significant or marginally significant variables: category of *pre-program yearly total violence arrests* (p = 0.000), *individual counseling* (p = 0.075), and the interaction term *individual counseling × age group* (p = 0.043) (Table 12.3).

Low and medium levels of individual counseling, particularly for 17-and-under youth (n=37), and high levels for 18-and-over youth (n = 2) accounted for reduced arrests. While low and medium levels were successful for 61.7% of the younger youth, they were less successful for older youth. Only 11.1% of older youth provided with high levels of individual counseling reduced their total violence arrests. Younger youth seemed to respond more positively than older youth. Overall, 67.9% of all youth provided with individual counseling (medium and high levels) reduced their frequencies of total violence arrests.

Suppression Services and Yearly Total Violence Arrest Change (R-square = 0.597, N = 78).

Suppression services (or activities) included arrest, home confinement, probation violation and detention, and comprised 20.1% of total services by all workers; mainly probation officers (54.9%), but less by outreach youth workers (2.7%). The GLM model contained three statistically significant variables: category of *pre-program yearly total violence arrests* ( $p = 0.000$ ); *suppression services* ( $p = 0.004$ ), and the interaction term *suppression services*  $\times$  *age group* ( $p = 0.003$ ) (Table 12.4).

None/low ( $n = 28$ ) and ( $n = 24$ ) medium levels of suppression accounted for a reduction in total violence arrests for 66.7% ( $n = 52$ ) of program youth ( $n = 78$ ). Medium and high levels of suppression resulted in a reduction in total violence arrests for 65.0% of younger youth (17 and under) while none/low and medium levels of suppression resulted in a reduction in total violence arrests for 66.7% of older youth (18 and older).

In sum, moderate to low levels of total services by Project workers (including especially individual counseling and suppression) resulted in a reduction in total violence arrests for about two-thirds of youth during the program period compared to the pre-program period. It is possible that a high level of contacts or services is a response to increases in criminal activities during the program period.

### Coordinated Worker Contacts

Not only total services, and certain services in particular, but also the structure of the delivery of services contributed to a reduction in different types of arrests, including total violence, serious violence, and drug arrests. Coordination or teamwork was a key element of the

Comprehensive Gang Program Model, not only at the interagency policy level, but also through collaboration at the direct-service or contact level of workers from these agencies on behalf of individual youth.

Total Worker Coordinated Contacts and Yearly Serious Violence Arrest Change (R-square = 0.582, N = 41). A broad range of contacts by Project workers with each other and with other non-Project workers contributed to the reduction of serious violence arrests during the program period.

In general, low levels of total worker coordinated contacts were more effective than medium or high levels of contacts for 29.3% of youth with histories of serious violence arrests. High levels of total worker coordinated contacts accounted for a reduction in serious violence arrests for 42.9% of youth 17 years and younger, while low or medium levels of total worker coordinated contacts accounted for an 83.3% reduction in serious violence arrests for youth 18 years and older. Worker-coordinated efforts appeared to be more effective with older than younger youth. However, older youth were only 14.6% of the sample of youth with arrest histories for serious violence.

Two variables were significant in the model for total worker coordinated contacts and serious violence arrest change: *pre-program yearly serious violence arrests* ( $p = 0.000$ ) and the interaction term *total worker coordinated contacts*  $\times$  *category of pre-program yearly serious violence arrests* ( $p = 0.049$ ). The variable of total worker coordinated contacts was, by itself, not statistically significant (Table 12.5).

Probation Officer and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts and Yearly Total Violence Arrest Change (R-square = 0.499, N = 78). Three variables were statistically significant, or almost statistically significant: category of *pre-program yearly total violence arrests* ( $p = 0.000$ ), the interaction term *probation officers and job personnel coordinated contacts*  $\times$  *age group* ( $p = 0.043$ ), and the main effect *probation officers and job personnel coordinated contacts* ( $p = 0.108$ ) (Table 12.6).

This kind of intervention was particularly important for youth in the reduction of total violence arrests. Project-related services were available through a special program at the Riverside Department of Human Services. Referrals to the program came directly from the probation officers, although outreach youth workers were involved in transporting program youth to job-orientation and job-preparation sessions.

Job-related services at high levels of coordinated contact between probation officers and job personnel were somewhat effective in reducing total violence arrests for 48.3% of younger youth (17 years and under). No or low levels of coordinated contact were effective for 55.5% of the older youth (18 years and over). It is apparent that no coordinated contacts for older youth produced some reduction in total violence arrests.

Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts and Yearly Serious Violence Arrest Change (R-square = 0.565, N = 41). Coordinated contacts between probation officers and job personnel also appear to account for a reduction in serious violence arrests. Only one variable is significant in the model: category of *pre-program serious violence arrests* ( $p = 0.000$ ).

*Probation-officer and job personnel coordinated contacts* again only approach marginal

significance ( $p = 0.108$ ) as does the interaction term *probation officers and job personnel coordinated contacts*  $\times$  *age group* ( $p = 0.076$ ) (Table 12.7).

When we categorize youth by age groups, slightly more (5 out of 6; 83.3%) older youth have reductions in serious violence arrests than younger youth (77.1%), and the reductions in serious violence arrests for older youth are considerably larger. Seventy-eight percent (78.0%) of youth in the two age groups combined experience some level of reduction in serious violence arrests. Again, we find that program youth can reduce their levels of serious violence arrests even without coordinated probation and job-personnel contacts. Twenty-six and eight-tenths percent (26.8%) of youth ( $n = 12$ ) who were provided with no such coordinated contacts, and 68.9% of youth ( $n = 20$ ) who were provided with these coordinated contacts, reduced their serious violence arrests.

Outreach Youth Workers/ Probation Officers and School Personnel Coordinated Contacts and Yearly Total Violence Arrest Charge (R-square = 0.596, N = 78). Contacts by outreach youth workers with Project probation officers made up 20.5% of all the coordinated contacts between Project and non-Project workers. The highest proportion of all coordinated contacts with personnel not directly part of the Project team was with school personnel. These coordinated contacts with school personnel were effective in contributing to the reduction of total violence arrests of program youth in the program period, compared to the pre-program period.

Three highly significant variables in the model were: category of *pre-program yearly total violence arrests* ( $p = 0.000$ ); *outreach youth workers/probation officers coordinated contacts with school personnel* ( $p = 0.004$ ); and the interaction term *outreach youth*

*workers/probation officers coordinated contacts with school personnel* × *age group* ( $p = 0.002$ ) (Table 12.8).

Low frequencies of these coordinated contacts were associated with reduced total violence arrests for 48.7% of program youth who had arrest histories for violence. This type of coordination or teamwork was effective with 90.0% of youth 17 years and under, and with 58.3% of youth 18 years and over. Coordinated contacts by outreach youth workers and probation officers with school personnel were effective at both high and low levels for youth 17 years and under, while low levels of coordinated contact were effective with youth 18 years and older. Furthermore, 33.3% of older youth who received no level of coordinated contacts reduced their total violence arrests.

Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School/Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts and Yearly Total Violence Arrest Change ( $R\text{-square} = 0.568$ ,  $N = 78$ ). Coordinated contacts by outreach youth workers and probation officers with school and job personnel were effective in the reduction of total violence arrests for the large majority of program youth. A similar set of variables was highly significant in this model: category of *pre-program yearly total violence arrests* ( $p = 0.000$ ); *outreach youth workers and probation officers in coordination with school and/or job personnel* ( $p = 0.004$ ); and the interaction term *outreach youth workers/probation officers and school/job personnel coordinated contacts* × *age group* ( $p = 0.002$ ) (Table 12.9).

Both low and medium levels of these coordinated contacts were associated with the reduction of total violence arrests for 57.7% of all program youth. Coordination among these two types of project workers and social-opportunity-providing personnel (school and job-related) was effective at medium and high levels of contact in reducing total violence arrests for 85.0% of

youth 17 and under, and at low and medium levels of contact for 72.2% of youth 18 years and older.

Job-preparation and school-related opportunities for program youth were probably interrelated. Positive effects resulted when Project workers collaborated with each other and with different types of opportunity-providing personnel on behalf of particular program youth.

Outreach Youth Workers and Probation Officers Coordinated Contacts and Yearly Drug Arrest Changes (R-square = 0.68, N = 43). Coordinated contacts between outreach youth workers and probation officers were not particularly successful in lowering mean levels of arrests for program youth. As indicated in Chapter 11, more program youth were arrested on drug charges in the program period than in the pre-program period. The model accounted for increased drug arrests for program youth. The significant variables were: category of *pre-program drug arrests* ( $p = 0.000$ ); *outreach youth worker and probation officer coordinated contacts* ( $p = 0.025$ ); and the interaction term *outreach youth worker and probation officer coordinated contacts*  $\times$  *age group* ( $p = 0.019$ ) (Table 12.10).

Only 18.6% ( $n = 8$ ) of the youth who had histories of drug arrests reduced their drug arrests in response to coordinated contacts from outreach youth workers and probation officers. Such contacts by Project workers were at a medium level. The workers were not at all effective with any of the younger youth (17 and under), who comprised 67.4% of the drug-arrestee sample. They were effective at medium levels of contact with only 2 youth 18 and older.

Based on worker-tracking records, 24.8% ( $n = 50$ ) of program youth ( $N = 201$ ) were provided with various drug-treatment services: 25 youth were provided services by outreach

youth workers, and 38 by probation officers; there were 7 youth provided with such services by the two types of workers together. As a consequence, any (or further) drug arrests for many of these youth may have been prevented. Nevertheless, a substantial number of program youth who had drug-arrest histories (32.6%; n = 14) were not provided with coordinated drug-treatment services. Although coordinated contacts with these youth around other problems may have been provided, there was no coordination of services/contacts (or possibly inadequate targeting) for these youth for drug-related problems.

### Program Youth Views About Program Services

(Jaesok Son)

In the course of the Time-I and the Time-II gang-member surveys, program youth were asked to identify the worker contacts and services they received, and how helpful they were. The responses were then compared with self-reported offense changes between the Time-I and Time-II interview periods – an approximately 1¼-year interval. The offenses were aggregated into the categories of total violence, serious violence, and drugs offenses.

The purpose of the analysis was to determine whether the receipt of services as well as different types of services were associated with a decrease or increase in the various categories of self-reported offenses between Time I and Time II. Only youth who reported a violence, serious violence or drug offense at Time I or Time II were included in the analysis. A total of 70 program youth completed the services section of the survey at both interview periods. Not all youth self-reported each type of offense, and not every youth reported receipt of every type of service.

Most of the program youth said they received social-intervention services (individual

counseling, crisis intervention, family counseling, health services, alcohol and drug treatment) – 61.4% (n = 43); job services (job counseling, help locating a job, job training) – 75.7% (n = 53); school services (counseling about school problems or services, GED/alternative, and tutoring) – 44.3% (n = 31) and transportation – 51.4% (n = 36). Youth said they received fewer of the other types of services, such as: recreation – 22.9% (n = 16); material support (help with obtaining social benefits/material things) – 15.7% (n = 11); legal assistance – 12.9% (n = 9); and a variety of other services – 7.1% (n = 5). Multiple types of services were received by most youth, particularly those who listed the four main types of services – social intervention, school, job, and transportation. Job and transportation services were regarded as helpful or very helpful by more youth than any other type of service.

### Services Received and Offense Changes

In the simple analysis conducted – but not controlled for age, gender or other factors – we were interested in: 1) the extent of the relationship between types of services youth reported they received and self-reported offense changes between Time I and Time II, especially total-violence, serious-violence and drug-offense changes; and 2) whether the patterns of changes in self-reported offenses corresponded roughly to patterns of changes in arrests related to similar services provided or contacts reported by Project workers.

The results of the analysis were limited also by the following: youth self-reported contacts almost exclusively with outreach youth workers; they self-reported smaller proportions of offenses and services received than was indicated by arrest and worker-tracking records; the list of self-reported offense charges in the individual-youth survey was a shorter list than the arrest

charges in the police records; suppression worker contacts or services were not identified by youth. Youth with self-reports was a subsample of those program youth with worker-tracking records (almost all of whom were included in our various GLM and Logistic Regression analyses).

The service that most youth (80.0% or more) said they received was social intervention; the service that fewest youth said they received was school services (55% to 65%). In this youth subsample, 67.1% (n = 47) reported violence offenses; 28.6% (n = 20) reported serious violence offenses and 30.0% (n = 21) reported drug offenses, more than was indicated by the arrest data, which covered a longer period of time than the interview interval.

Based on the types of services the youth said they received, we calculated the percent of decline in self-reported offenses. For youth who said they did not receive a particular type of service, we also recorded the percent of decline. The percent of youth with declines in self-reported offenses was highest for those youth who reported drug-selling offenses. The highest percent of youth who said they received each of the four types of services reported greater declines (except for school-related services) than youth who said they did not receive social-intervention, job-related or transportation services (Table 12.11).

Youth who said they received school services usually reported less decline in each of the types of offenses than youth who said they did not receive school services. Youth with school services had the lowest percentage of decline compared to youth without school services, particularly in respect to serious violence offenses.

Contrary to findings from the arrest and worker-tracking data, transportation service was viewed as the most effective service in terms of the percent of youth who reported declines for

each type of self-reported offense. However, it is likely that outreach youth workers provided a variety of services as they drove youth to school and to job-training or placement programs. Transportation service was identified by workers at 6.9% of total services they provided, according to their program-tracking records, but in self-reports of services received, the youth said they accounted for roughly a quarter of services received.

The perceptions of youth in the subsample of program youth who were interviewed about services received were very positive, and suggest generally that the services they received may have been related to decreases in self-reported total violence, serious violence and drug offenses. The values of certain services received (as reported by youth) did not necessarily match those in the worker-tracking records. For reasons indicated above, we do not attempt to relate the self-reported services and offenses data to the findings of worker-service/contact and arrest data. Our conclusions are based mainly on the more complete records available for the entire sample of program youth over the longer periods of time used in the arrest-data analyses.

Table 12.1  
Correlation (*r*) Matrix of Change in Arrests (#1–3) and  
Coordinated Contacts (#4–9)

Change in Arrests/ Coordinated Contacts Variable	Correlation ( <i>r</i> ) Significance ( <i>p</i> ) Sample Size ( <i>N</i> )								
		#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7	#8	#9
#1 Yearly Total Violence Arrests Change	<i>r</i>	.962 ‡	.715 ‡	.176	-.164	-.042	.099	-.091	-.050
	<i>p</i>	.000	.000	.122	.151	.714	.387	.429	.665
	<i>N</i>	41	24	78	78	78	78	78	78
#2 Yearly Serious Violence Arrests Change	<i>r</i>	1.000	.899 ‡	.274	-.292	-.083	.055	-.207	-.181
	<i>p</i>	-	.000	.082	.064	.608	.734	.194	.258
	<i>N</i>	41	14	41	41	41	41	41	41
#3 Yearly Drug Arrests Change	<i>r</i>		1.000	.127	-.279	-.167	-.113	-.332*	-.339*
	<i>p</i>		-	.419	.070	.285	.472	.029	.026
	<i>N</i>		43	43	43	43	43	43	43
#4 Outreach Youth Workers and School Personnel Coordinated Contacts	<i>r</i>			1.000	-.077	.583 ‡	.554 ‡	-.099	.242 ‡
	<i>p</i>			-	.300	.000	.000	.185	.001
	<i>N</i>			182	182	182	182	182	182
#5 Probation Officers and School Personnel Coordinated Contacts	<i>r</i>				1.000	.765 ‡	-.139	.779 ‡	.610 ‡
	<i>p</i>				-	.000	.061	.000	.000
	<i>N</i>				182	182	182	182	182
#6 Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School Personnel Coordinated Contacts	<i>r</i>					1.000	.244 ‡	.571 ‡	.653 ‡
	<i>p</i>					-	.001	.000	.000
	<i>N</i>					182	182	182	182
#7 Outreach Youth Workers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts	<i>r</i>						1.000	-.137	.473 ‡
	<i>p</i>						-	.065	.000
	<i>N</i>						182	182	182
#8 Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts	<i>r</i>							1.000	.808 ‡
	<i>p</i>							-	.000
	<i>N</i>							182	182
#9 Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts	<i>r</i>								1.000
	<i>p</i>								-
	<i>N</i>								182

For significant correlation: \*  $p < .05$ , †  $p < .01$  and ‡  $p < .001$ .

**Table 12.2**  
**An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests**  
**Total Services**  
 (Controlling for Yearly Total Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period)

12.2(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.579)\*\*\* (N = 78)

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Age Group at Program Entry: 17 & under, 18 & over	1	5.523	5.81	0.019*
Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests: None, Low, Medium/High	2	41.923	22.04	0.000***
Total Services: Low, Medium, High	2	14.235	7.48	0.001**
Total Services × Age Group	2	12.097	6.36	0.003**
Total Services × Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests	4	1.783	0.47	0.789
Within error	66	0.951	—	—
Total	77	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

12.2(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and  
 Pairwise *t* Test for Total Services Main Factor

Total Services	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
Low	20	-0.076	0.311	1	—	0.813	0.004**
Medium	32	-0.161	0.184	2		—	0.000***
High	26	1.285	0.333	3			—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

12.2(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Age Group × Total Services Interaction

Age Group	Total Services	Adjust -ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)						
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6
17 & Under	Low	0.145	0.263	16	1	—					‡
17 & Under	Med	-0.256	0.230	21	2		—				‡
17 & Under	High	-0.018	0.212	23	3			—			‡
18 & Over	Low	-0.297	0.530	4	4				—		‡
18 & Over	Med	-0.067	0.310	11	5					—	‡
18 & Over	High	2.587	0.644	3	6						—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; †  $p < .01$ ; and ‡  $p < .001$  .

Table 12.3  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests  
**Individual Counseling**  
 (Controlling for Yearly Total Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period)

12.3(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.519)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Age Group at Program Entry: 17 & under, 18 & over	1	1.432	1.32	0.255
Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests: None, Low, Medium/High	2	26.965	24.80	0.000***
Individual Counseling: Low, Medium, High	2	2.931	2.70	0.075
Individual Counseling × Age Group	2	3.579	3.29	0.043*
Individual Counseling × Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests	4	1.167	1.07	0.377
Within error	66	1.087	—	—
Total	77	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

12.3(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and  
 Pairwise *t* Test for Individual Counseling Main Factor

Individual Counseling	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
Low	28	-0.094	0.221	1	—	0.030*	0.981
Medium	25	0.672	0.266	2		—	0.133
High	25	-0.106	0.436	3			—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

12.3(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Age Group × Individual Counseling Interaction

Age Group	Individual Counseling	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)						
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6
17 & Under	Low	-0.258	0.253	17	1	—				†	
17 & Under	Med	-0.139	0.234	20	2		—			†	
17 & Under	High	0.253	0.254	23	3			—		*	
18 & Over	Low	0.070	0.365	11	4				—	*	
18 & Over	Med	1.483	0.481	5	5					—	*
18 & Over	High	-0.465	0.805	2	6						—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; †  $p < .01$ ; and ‡  $p < .001$  .

Table 12.4  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests  
**Suppression Services**  
 (Controlling for Yearly Total Violence Arrests in the Pre-program Period)

12.4(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.597)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Age Group at Program Entry: 17 & under, 18 & over	1	2.329	2.56	0.115
Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests: None, Low, Medium/High	2	26.638	29.25	0.000***
Suppression Services: None/Low, Medium, High	2	5.469	6.01	0.004**
Suppression Services × Age Group	2	6.005	6.59	0.003**
Suppression Services × Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests	4	1.756	1.93	0.116
Within error	66	0.911	—	—
Total	77	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

12.4(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and  
 Pairwise *t* Test for Suppression Services Main Factor

Suppression Services	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
None/Low	28	-0.106	0.225	1	—	0.696	0.006**
Medium	24	-0.240	0.256	2		—	0.003**
High	26	0.800	0.224	3			—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

12.4(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Age Group × Suppression Services Interaction

Age Group	Sup- pression Services	Adjust -ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)							
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	
17 & Under	None/Low	0.175	0.234	21	1	—						†
17 & Under	Med	-0.299	0.227	19	2		—					‡
17 & Under	High	-0.108	0.233	20	3			—				‡
18 & Over	None/Low	-0.387	0.372	7	4				—			‡
18 & Over	Med	-0.181	0.478	5	5					—		†
18 & Over	High	1.709	0.415	6	6						—	

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; †  $p < .01$ ; and ‡  $p < .001$  .

Table 12.5  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Serious Violence Arrests  
**Total Coordinated Worker Contacts**  
 (Controlling for Yearly Serious Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period)

12.5(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.582)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Age Group at Program Entry: 17 & under, 18 & over	1	0.620	0.77	0.388
Pre-Program Yearly Serious Violence Arrests: None, Low/Medium/High	1	20.511	25.32	0.000***
Total Coordinated Worker Contacts: Low, Medium, High	2	1.093	1.35	0.274
Total Coordinated Worker Contacts × Age Group	2	2.678	3.31	0.049*
Total Coordinated Worker Contacts × Pre- Program Yearly Serious Violence Arrests	2	0.102	0.13	0.883
Within error	32	0.810	—	—
Total	40	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

12.5(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Serious Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and  
 Pairwise *t* Test for Total Coordinated Worker Contacts Main Factor

Total Coordinated Worker Contacts	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
Low	12	-0.023	0.346	1	—	0.697	0.119
Medium	13	0.161	0.312	2		—	0.191
High	16	0.916	0.470	3			—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

12.5(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Serious Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Age Group × Total Coordinated Worker Contacts Interaction

Age Group	Total Coordinated Worker Contacts	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)						
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6
17 & Under	Low	0.178	0.285	10	1	—					
17 & Under	Med	0.496	0.304	10	2		—				
17 & Under	High	-0.215	0.263	15	3			—			*
18 & Over	Low	-0.224	0.636	2	4				—		
18 & Over	Med	-0.173	0.527	3	5				—		
18 & Over	High	2.046	0.938	1	6					—	*

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; †  $p < .01$ ; and ‡  $p < .001$  .

Table 12.6  
**An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests**  
**Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts**  
 (Controlling for Yearly Total Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period)

12.6(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.499)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Age Group at Program Entry: 17 & under, 18 & over	1	0.218	0.19	0.662
Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests: None, Low, Medium/High	2	24.289	21.45	0.000***
Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordination: None, Low, High	2	2.607	2.30	0.108
Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts X Age Group	2	3.753	3.31	0.043*
Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts X Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests	4	0.502	0.44	0.777
Within error	66	1.132	—	—
Total	77	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

12.6(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and  
 Pairwise *t* Test for Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts Main  
 Factor

Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
None	21	-0.150	0.289	1	—	0.922	0.088
Low	20	-0.191	0.304	2		—	0.079
High	37	0.476	0.216	3			—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

12.6(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Age Group × Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts Interaction

Age Group	Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts	Adjust-ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)						
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6
17 & Under	None	0.029	0.313	15	1	—					*
17 & Under	Low	0.029	0.280	16	2		—				*
17 & Under	High	-0.131	0.211	29	3			—			*
18 & Over	None	-0.329	0.449	6	4				—		*
18 & Over	Low	-0.410	0.562	4	5					—	*
18 & Over	High	1.084	0.403	8	6						—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; †  $p < .01$ ; and ‡  $p < .001$  .

Table 12.7  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Serious Violence Arrests  
**Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts**  
 (Controlling for Yearly Serious Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period)

12.7(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.565)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Age Group at Program Entry: 17 & under, 18 & over	1	1.298	1.54	0.224
Pre-Program Yearly Serious Violence Arrests: None, Low/Medium/High	1	19.126	22.68	0.000***
Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts: None, Low, High	2	2.014	2.39	0.108
Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts × Age Group	2	2.360	2.80	0.076
Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts × Pre-Program Yearly Serious Violence Arrests	2	1.132	1.34	0.276
Within error	32	0.843	—	—
Total	40	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

12.7(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Serious Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and  
 Pairwise *t* Test for Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts Main  
 Factor

Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				<i>i/j</i>	1	2	3
None	12	-0.028	0.357	1	—	0.882	0.067*
Low	11	-0.100	0.337	2		—	0.048*
High	18	1.102	0.476	3			—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

12.7(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Serious Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Age Group × Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts Interaction

Age Group	Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)						
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6
17 & Under	None	-0.051	0.295	10	1	—					*
17 & Under	Low	0.186	0.360	8	2		—				
17 & Under	High	-0.029	0.263	17	3			—			
18 & Over	None	-0.004	0.649	2	4				—		
18 & Over	Low	-0.388	0.540	3	5					—	*
18 & Over	High	2.233	0.955	1	6						—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; †  $p < .01$ ; and ‡  $p < .001$  .

Table 12.8  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests  
**Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers  
 and School Personnel Coordinated Contacts**  
 (Controlling for Yearly Total Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period)

12.8(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.596)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Age Group at Program Entry: 17 & under, 18 & over	1	1.024	1.12	0.293
Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests: None, Low, Medium/High	2	28.707	31.45	0.000***
Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School Personnel Coordinated Contacts: None, Low, High	2	5.564	6.10	0.004**
Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School Personnel Coordination × Age Group	2	6.341	6.95	0.002**
Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School Personnel Coordinated Contacts × Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests	4	1.113	1.22	0.311
Within error	66	0.913	—	—
Total	77	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

12.8(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and  
 Pairwise *t* Test for Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School Personnel  
 Coordinated Contacts Main Factor

Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School Personnel Coordinated Contacts	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
None	12	0.105	0.380	1	—	0.448	0.091
Low	38	-0.227	0.209	2		—	0.001***
High	28	0.834	0.238	3			—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

12.8(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Age Group × Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School Personnel Coordinated Contacts Interaction

Age Group	Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School Personnel Coordinated Contacts	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)						
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6
17 & Under	None	0.497	0.52	6	1	—					
17 & Under	Low	-0.143	0.18	31	2		—				‡
17 & Under	High	-0.073	0.22	23	3			—			‡
18 & Over	None	-0.287	0.42	6	4				—		†
18 & Over	Low	-0.310	0.38	7	5					—	‡
18 & Over	High	1.821	0.45	5	6						—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; †  $p < .01$ ; and ‡  $p < .001$ .

Table 12.9  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests  
**Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and  
 School/Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts**  
 (Controlling for Yearly Total Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period)

12.9(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.568)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Age Group at Program Entry: 17 & under, 18 & over	1	2.515	2.57	0.113
Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests: None, Low, Medium/High	2	26.875	27.51	0.000***
Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School/Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts: Low, Medium, High	2	5.911	6.05	0.004**
Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School/Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts × Age Group	2	7.180	7.35	0.002**
Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School/Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts × Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests	4	0.563	0.58	0.681
Within error	66	0.977	—	—
Total	77	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

12.9(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and  
 Pairwise *t* Test for Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School/Job  
 Personnel Coordinated Contacts Main Factor

Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School/Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts	N	Adjust ed Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
Low	14	-0.109	0.307	1	—	0.806	0.015*
Medium	31	-0.202	0.219	2		—	0.002**
High	33	0.874	0.243	3			—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

12.9(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Age Group × Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School/Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts Interaction

Age Group	Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School/Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts	Adjust-ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)						
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6
17 & Under	Low	0.121	0.370	9	1	—					†
17 & Under	Medium	-0.098	0.218	23	2		—				‡
17 & Under	High	-0.164	0.202	28	3			—			‡
18 & Over	Low	-0.339	0.454	5	4				—		‡
18 & Over	Medium	-0.307	0.379	8	5					—	‡
18 & Over	High	1.912	0.461	5	6						—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; †  $p < .01$ ; and ‡  $p < .001$  .

**Table 12.10**  
**An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Drug Arrests**  
**Outreach Youth Workers and Probation Officers Coordinated Contacts**  
(Controlling for Yearly Drug Arrests in the Pre-Program Period)

12.10(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.687)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Age Group at Program Entry: 17 & under, 18 & over	1	0.018	0.09	0.763
Pre-Program Yearly Drug Arrests: None, Low/Medium/High	1	3.278	17.07	0.000***
Outreach Youth Workers and Probation Officers Coordinated Contacts: None, Low, Medium, High	3	2.062	3.58	0.025*
Outreach Youth Workers and Probation Officers Coordinated Contacts × Age Group	3	2.215	3.84	0.019*
Outreach Youth Workers and Probation Officers Coordinated Contacts × Pre- Program Yearly Drug Arrests	3	0.854	1.48	0.239
Within error	31	0.192	—	—
Total	42	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

12.10(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Outreach Youth Workers and Probation Officers Coordinated Contacts Main Factor

Outreach Youth Workers and Probation Officers Coordinated Contacts	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	14	0.337	0.145	1	—	0.471	0.130	0.042*
Low	9	0.185	0.149	2		—	0.377	0.013*
Medium	8	-0.027	0.183	3			—	0.003**
High	12	0.932	0.240	4				—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

12.10(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Age Group X Outreach Youth Workers and Probation Officers Coordinated Contacts Interaction

Age Group	Outreach Youth Workers and Probation Officers Coordinated Contacts	Adjust-ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)								
					i/	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
17 & Under	None	0.522	0.171	8	1	—						*	*
17 & Under	Low	0.060	0.233	4	2		—						†
17 & Under	Med	0.380	0.240	6	3			—					*
17 & Under	High	0.341	0.133	11	4				—				*
18 & Over	None	0.151	0.203	6	5					—			*
18 & Over	Low	0.310	0.198	5	6						—		*
18 & Over	Med	-0.433	0.392	2	7							—	†
18 & Over	High	1.524	0.458	1	8								—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; †  $p < .01$ ; and ‡  $p < .001$  .

Table 12.11  
Percent Declines in Self-Reported Offenses  
By Youth Receiving/Not Receiving Services

Offense Category (N=Sample Size)	Type of Service	Youth Receiving Service N <sub>yes</sub>	Number (N <sub>1</sub> ) and Percent (% <sub>1</sub> ) of Youth Declined in Self-Reported Offenses	Youth <u>Not</u> Receiving Service N <sub>no</sub>	Number (N <sub>2</sub> ) and Percent (% <sub>2</sub> ) of Youth Declined in Self-Reported Offenses
Total Violence (N=47)	Social Intervention	38	20 (52.6)	9	3 (33.3)
	Job Services	38	20 (52.6)	9	3 (33.3)
	School Related Services	27	14 (51.9)	20	9 (45.0)
	Transportation	35	19 (54.3)	12	4 (33.3)
Serious Violence (N=20)	Social Intervention	16	8 (50.0)	4	2 (50.0)
	Job Services	15	9 (60.0)	5	1 (20.0)
	School Related Services	11	4 (36.4)	9	6 (66.7)
	Transportation	14	9 (64.3)	6	5 (83.3)
Drug (N=21)	Social Intervention	20	12 (60.0)	1	0 (0)
	Job Services	16	10 (62.5)	5	2 (40.0)
	School Related Services	14	8 (57.1)	7	4 (57.1)
	Transportation	16	11 (68.8)	5	1 (20.0)

Note that  $N = (N_{yes} + N_{no})$ ;  $N_{yes} = N_1 / \%_1$  and  $N_{no} = N_2 / \%_2$ .

## Chapter 13

### **Gang and Area Effects**

The Riverside Project (BRIDGE) focused on the coordinated provision of enhanced community-based services to youth (mainly gang members) who were on juvenile probation. The key workers who provided services and controls were Juvenile Probation officers from the Riverside County Probation Department, outreach youth workers from the Youth Service Center, manpower training personnel from the Riverside Department of Human Resources, and officers of the Gang Unit of the Riverside Police Department. The Project did not focus on gang-as-a-unit effects (i.e., changes in activities and structures of gangs on the street), except perhaps through the ongoing efforts of the gang police to suppress and control gang activity. Outreach youth workers were not assigned on the street to the specific gangs or gang sections of which program youth were members.

There were also continuing efforts through the Steering Committee and its network of agencies to provide enhanced services and controls to program youth. However, the Project did not necessarily address the interrelationship of gang youth in the program, particular gangs, and distinctive community characteristics or problems in each of the Project areas that might have contributed to program youth (gang) problems. Therefore, it was not likely that the Project would have directly affected changes in the gang problem at the gang-as-a-unit or community-area levels.

Data were available from various sources to indicate whether changes occurred at the gang and community levels in the program and comparison areas, over approximately the same

time periods that individual program and comparison youth changes might have occurred. We could determine whether parallel kinds of changes were taking place in terms of gang and crime-incident patterns, but we could not make a direct connection between change at individual and aggregate levels of the gang problem.

We obtained data on aggregate-level change from four somewhat similar but not necessarily interrelated sources: interviews of individual program and comparison youth about possible changes in their gang-membership and gang-involvement status between the Time I and Time II interviews (approximately a 1¼-year period); perceptions of Riverside Police Department Gang Unit officers about changes in the size and scope of crime committed by gangs in the program and comparison areas over a four-year period; and statistical reports from the Riverside Police Department about changes in different categories of crime incidents (including gang-related offenses) in the program and comparison areas, during the five years of the program and pre-program periods. We also analyzed social characteristics of program-area populations based on 2000 Census data, that might account for changes in the nature and scope of the gang problem.

### Youth Interview Data

Gang Membership Change. Program youth (n = 84) and comparison youth (n = 17) were asked a series of questions at both Time I and Time II (approximately 1¼ years apart) about their gang-membership status. Was the youth a gang member? and if so, how did he classify him/herself: former gang member; active gang member in the last six months; recently-active gang member; or always-active gang member? For purposes of analysis, we aggregated youth into two

categories of gang membership status: non-gang youth and former gang member together versus active gang member in the last six months, recently-active gang member, and always-active gang member together.

A similar proportion of program youth said they were recent or currently-active gang members – 70.2% at Time I and 69.9% at Time II. However, a smaller proportion of comparison youth said they were recently or currently-active gang members at Time I (17.7%), and active at Time II (47.1%). While the results were favorable in regard to the possible effects of the Project, it should be noted that the size of the comparison sample was particularly small, and we used no demographic controls in the two comparisons (Table 13.1).

Gang-Involvement Change. Our S/W Gang Involvement Scale (Appendix B) was a way to measure changes in the youth's degree and context of gang involvement, which may have contributed to his delinquent as well as gang behavior. The Scale contained 11 items: 1) whether parents, siblings, or anyone else in the current household had ever been a gang member; 2) the ratio of close gang friends to non-gang friends; 3) time spent with gang friends; 4) areas in the neighborhood where the youth was afraid to walk alone because of gang-related concerns; 5) whether any close relative had been a victim of a gang crime; 6) whether the youth had ever been the victim of a gang crime; 7) whether the youth was currently an active gang member; 8) the most recent rank of the youth in the gang; 9) the youth's knowledge of current gang size; 10) whether the youth had ever received a gang violation; and 11) whether the youth thought he would ever leave the gang.

The gang-involvement score increased for both the program and comparison youth

samples, i.e., youth in each of the samples was more gang-involved at Time II than at Time I. The increase in involvement was a little greater for comparison youth than program youth, but these difference scores were not statistically significant, using a T-test.

Gang Size Change. Youth were also asked to indicate the size of their gangs at the Time I and Time II interviews: the responses suggested a great range of sizes at each interview period, although not all youth interviewed either at Time I and Time II responded to the question. In general – whether computing means or medians – responses indicated a perceived increase in gang size by program youth (n = 46: Time I median = 30.0, Time II median = 46.5); and a decrease by comparison youth (n = 12: Time I median = 27.5, Time II median = 25.0) (albeit based on small and demographically uncontrolled samples).

In sum, it is likely that both program and comparison youth remained, or became increasingly involved as gang members; perhaps slightly less for program than comparison youth. At the same time, program youth said their gangs were getting a little larger while comparison youth said their gangs were getting a little smaller. In general (based on these and data presented below), we estimate that the gang-membership status of program and comparison youth, and the size of their gangs, did not vary much between Time I and Time II.

### Gang Unit Police Interviews

The Riverside Police Department Gang Unit officers, who had knowledge of gangs in both the program and comparison areas, were asked to identify the number and size of gangs at the end of the first year of program operations (1998) and four years later (2002). The final

estimates were made approximately one year after OJJDP funding ceased (but not the end of program operations). The officers were also asked to rank the degree of involvement of the gangs in violence, drugs and property crime, and to base on their estimates as much as possible on official records. Four of the seventeen gangs identified as committing crimes were based outside of the program and comparison areas, but intruded into these areas (Table 13.2).

There was some evidence of an increase in size of gangs located in the two program areas between 1997 and 2001, particularly in Arlanza, but a decrease in the size of gangs in the comparison area (Casa Blanca). Nevertheless, the estimates of gang size must be viewed with some caution. Gang-membership size varies from day to day and circumstance to circumstance. The core subgroups of the gangs are usually quite small. We see no evidence of a decrease in gang size, particularly in the program areas, especially since the estimates of gang size by program and comparison youth and the Gang Unit police appear to be roughly comparable.

The Gang Unit police were also asked to estimate the degree to which each of the gangs were involved in drug, violence, and property crime, using a scale of 1-10, with 10 indicating the most extensive involvement by the gang in the particular type of crime. Estimates were made in November, 1998, and again in January, 2002. At each period, gangs were perceived as more involved in violence than drug or property crime. (This perception is not consistent with that of agency administrators, see Chapter 7.) African-American gangs were viewed as the most criminally oriented across the areas, but sharp drops in crime were perceived for them over time. The Gang Unit officers perceived that gang crime of all kinds was decreasing in severity, with little difference in the level of decrease between the program and comparison areas. There were limitations to these estimates. There were fewer gangs and gang members, and lower levels of

gang crime generally, in the comparison area than in the program areas at each time period (Table 13.3).

### Area Crime Offense Changes

The most reliable data available on general crime offenses were individual offense statistics reported by the Riverside Police Department. Offense data were provided for the period 1994 to 1996, and 1997 to 1999. Due to changes in the data system in 1994, we were unable to compare changes in offense data and rates for the full pre-program period, 1993-1996, and for the full program period, 1997-2000. Another limitation was that drug-offense data were not available for the entire program and pre-program period. However, serious-violence, less-serious violence, and property-offense data were available for the pre-program period, 1994-1996, and the program period 1997-1999. Juvenile and adult gang and non-gang offense data were not differentiated (Appendix A).

The data for the different categories of offenses were aggregated for each of the two program areas (Eastside and associated neighborhoods and Arlanza and associated neighborhoods), the comparison area (Casa Blanca and associated neighborhoods), and the remaining areas in Riverside. Table 13.4 presents the absolute numbers of these categories of offenses in the areas during three program years, 1997-1999, matched with three pre-program years, 1994-1996, and the aggregate change in total numbers of offenses between the two periods.

To control for differences in population size, we also computed rates of offenses per 1000 persons in each area. Rates were much higher for each of the categories of offenses in Eastside

compared to the three other areas. Rates for serious violence were particularly high. Rates for Arlanza were also higher than for each of the two other areas, Casa Blanca and the rest of the Riverside areas aggregated (Table 13.5).

Declines occurred for all categories of offenses in each area between the pre-program and program periods. Somewhat greater declines in rates for serious and less-serious violence offenses occurred in Arlanza compared to the three other areas. The rates of decline for all categories of offenses were lower (i.e., there was less of a decline) in Eastside than in each of the other three areas. We note that the rates of decline for property offenses were greater in Casa Blanca and the rest of Riverside than in the two program areas.

In general, the decline in rates for the different categories of offenses (gang and non-gang, adults and juveniles together) do not differ substantially across the four areas. The only effect that could possibly have been associated with the Project may have been the declines in rates for serious and less-serious violence in Arlanza, which were greater than in any of the three other areas. We need to explore the possible association of the Project on an area basis, specifically in respect to changes in gang-related offenses.

Gang-Related Offenses. A method for collecting gang-related data was not developed by the Riverside Police Department until 1995. The reliability of gang-related offense data collected between 1997 and 2000 is probably better than that collected between 1995 and 1996. The collection of these data appears to have been somewhat independent of the collection of offense data generally. We aggregate the offenses into the same three categories, now including drugs and “other” minor offenses as well as total offenses (Figures 13.1 through 13.6). We also

provide a seventh combination of gang-related offenses – serious-violence, less-serious violence, and drug offenses (Figure 13.7) to determine if there is a parallel set of offense changes that might be related to arrest changes that occurred for program and comparison youth (see Chapters 11 and 12).

Again, because of possible poor gang-offense data-system development, we have questions about the reliability of offense patterning prior to 1998. Changes in specific types rather than categories of gang-related offenses are somewhat better identified before 1998 because of the different scales used. When we graph all gang-related offenses together, it appears that the greatest rise begins to occur in 1998.

Consistent with aggregate-level offense data in the above section, total gang-related offenses in Eastside are greater than in the other areas, including the rest of Riverside. The lowest numbers of gang-related offenses (we did not compute rates for gang-related offenses) are in Casa Blanca, in large measure because of the area's small population. The increase in total gang-related offenses is particularly marked in the rest of Riverside, however.

The pattern of change in gang-related serious violence offenses – probably the most reliable of the gang-related offense data because of the seriousness and visibility of the offenses – shows some variation across the areas. The highest level of gang-related serious-violence offenses is reported for Eastside, which also seems to have had the least variation in numbers of these offenses. The trend in serious violence offenses for Arlanza appears to have shifted from a low level in the pre-program period to a high level in the program period, with a sharp drop between 1999 and 2000. The number of gang-related serious violence offenses is lowest for Casa Blanca each year, with a rise between 1995 and 1999, and also a sharp drop between 1999

and 2000. The pattern for the rest of Riverside is somewhat similar to that for Casa Blanca (Figure 13.2).

The pattern of change in regard to less-serious gang-related violence offenses is different from that for gang-related serious violence offenses. The changes are sharper, particularly between 1998 and 2000. Numbers of less-serious violence offenses take a sharp upswing in the years 1998 through 1999 and beyond, particularly for Eastside and the rest of Riverside. The rise in less-serious gang-related violence offenses is more gradual in Casa Blanca through 2000, but these offenses decline in Arlanza between 1999 and 2000 – the only area showing a decline in both serious and less-serious gang-related offenses (Figures 13.2, 13.3).

The greatest difference in patterns of gang-related offenses among the four areas is in regard to drug crime. Not only is the level of gang-related drug offenses consistently highest in Eastside, but the rise is extremely sharp – with almost a seven-fold increase in drug offenses – between 1998 and 1999, but with a decrease between 1999 and 2000. The next-largest increase is for the areas in the rest of Riverside between 1998 and 2000. Casa Blanca experiences the lowest increase in gang-related drug offenses between 1998 and 2000. The only area (in addition to Eastside) that has a decrease in gang-related drug offenses between 1999 and 2000 is Arlanza (Figure 13.4).

The pattern of gang-related property offenses appears to have been different from other gang-related offenses in all areas between 1995 and 1999. Gang-related property crime is almost zero in all of the areas between 1995 and 1998 (which may be a recording artifact). These gang-related offenses began to increase in 1998. The sharpest increase is in the rest of Riverside between 1999 and 2000. The increase in Arlanza is higher than in Eastside and Casa Blanca

between 1999 and 2000. Eastside gang-related property offenses approach the lower level of increase of such offenses in Casa Blanca (Figure 13.5).

Gang-related “other” offenses (including mainly minor crimes such as disorderly conduct and mob action) are prevalent in all of the areas at a low level between 1995 and 1998, and then rise more sharply between 1998 and 1999, and decline almost as sharply between 1999 and 2000. The sharpest rise occurs in Eastside and the rest of the Riverside areas, followed by Arlanza. The lowest level of change, whether increase or decrease, is in Casa Blanca (Figure 13.6).

Finally, we aggregated gang-related serious violence, less-serious violence, and drug offenses in each of the four areas for purposes of determining whether there might have been a distinctive Project effect in Eastside and Arlanza, compared to Casa Blanca and the rest of Riverside, in lowering the level of these gang-related offenses. This effect could be regarded as parallel to effects on youth in the program.

Figure 13.7 adds the data on the three types of gang-related offenses – serious violence, less-serious violence and drugs – together. This combined offenses category again indicates the high levels of gang-related offenses in Eastside, with a sharp rise between 1998 and 1999 and a leveling-off between 1999 and 2000. A somewhat similar rise (at a lower level of offenses) occurs in Arlanza between 1998 and 1999, but then a sharp decrease takes place between 1999 and 2000. An increase in these types of gang-related offenses occurs in the rest of Riverside. There is a slight rise in these gang-related offenses in Casa Blanca between 1998 and 1999, and a slight leveling-off between 1999 and 2000.

If we were to further aggregate these gang-related offenses for Eastside and Arlanza, we would probably see a greater leveling-off in a combination of gang-related serious-violence, less-

serious violence, and drug offenses than in either Casa Blanca or the rest of Riverside, particularly between 1999 and 2000. However, key questions remain: why are the patterns of these gang-related offenses so different between the two program areas? Can these differences in the latter part of the program period be attributed to program services/contacts, and/or differences in social (especially economic) characteristics of the populations in Eastside and Arlanza?

Service Differences for Youth in Eastside and Arlanza. In this section we briefly compare Program youth from Eastside and Arlanza, to determine whether the distribution of types of offenses for which they were arrested (particularly violence and drugs) reflects the character of gang-related offenses in their respective areas. We are also interested in whether program youth from each of the areas were provided with similar or different patterns of services, which might be related to the different character of their gang-related offenses, and also to the nature and scope of such offenses in their areas.

A similar number and proportion of youth from Eastside (n = 62; 34.1%) and Arlanza (n = 62; 34.1%) were provided with services. Youth in the program were also from Casa Blanca (n = 11, 6.0%) (some of whom moved from the program areas to Casa Blanca during the program period), and from areas near Arlanza and Eastside (n = 47; 25.8%). The number of total services per youth was greater in Eastside (56.4) and Arlanza (52.9) than for youth in Casa Blanca (43.4) and for youth in the areas immediately adjacent to Arlanza and Eastside (39.0). The number of direct contacts per youth by Project workers was of a somewhat similar order: more for Eastside (87.0) and Arlanza (86.5) youth than for Casa Blanca (50.9) and other adjacent-area youth (54.3).

We focus on youth from Eastside and Arlanza, for whom services and worker contacts were primarily intended. We attempt first to discover whether their patterns of arrest histories were specially related to distinctive arrest patterns in the areas in which they lived and (usually) where their gangs hung out. Second, we attempt to discover whether program youth from Eastside and Arlanza were provided with different patterns of services.

Of the small sample of youth in the program who had histories of serious violence arrests in the program and pre-program periods, 12 were from Eastside and 16 from Arlanza. This distribution was not indicative of the relative number of youth with arrests or offenses for serious violence in Eastside compared to those in Arlanza. It was possible that seriously violent offenders from Eastside were less likely to be referred to the program than those from Arlanza. On the other hand, Eastside youth reduced their level of violence more (LS mean = 0.950) than Arlanza youth (LS mean = -0.498), controlling for age, pre-program arrests, and length of time in the program.

Of the youth in the program who had histories of both serious-violence and less-serious-violence arrests in the program and pre-program periods, more were from Eastside (n = 18) than Arlanza (n = 10), and youth from Eastside appear to have done slightly better in reducing arrests than program youth from Arlanza. Of the program youth with drug-arrest histories, more come from Eastside (n = 18) than Arlanza (n = 10). Again, program youth from Eastside did slightly better in the program period compared to the pre-program period than did program youth from Arlanza. The comparison of changes in offenses and/or arrests at the aggregate and individual level also cannot be clearly made, based on the difference in time periods, lack of demographic and other controls, and the lack of consistent definitions of offense or arrest patterns, as well as

small sample size of program youth in the analysis. The best we can say is that the area problem of drug crime appears to be somewhat more characteristic of program youth from Eastside than it is of Arlanza program youth.

Nevertheless, of some interest for purposes of program evaluation (assuming there were some contextual influences on youth to engage in certain types or combinations of offenses) is the question of whether youth from the two areas were provided with different patterns of services and contacts. To some extent this indeed was the case. In this comparison, we do not control for gender, race/ethnicity, age, length of time in the program or pre-program arrest history. The proportions of the different categories of services provided (as a percent of total services) were as follows:

Area (N)	Material Support	Group	Job	Suppression	Total Services
Eastside (62)	4.6	16.2	10.5	25.0	3,495
Arlanza (62)	8.4	15.1	13.0	17.6	3,277

Eastside youth were provided with less material support and job services than Arlanza youth; Eastside youth were also provided with slightly more group services and substantially more suppression activities. There were almost no differences in patterns of other services provided.

We also observe a difference in the nature of worker contacts provided to youth from the two areas. The number of total direct contacts to program youth was roughly the same: Eastside = 87.0 and Arlanza = 86.5. However, the distribution of contacts by the different types of workers varied. The percent of outreach-youth-worker contacts provided was greater to Arlanza

youth (67.9) than Eastside youth (52.5), but the percentage of probation contacts provided was greater to Eastside youth (34.1) than to Arlanza youth (18.3).

We cannot adequately relate individual-level to aggregate-level effects. The somewhat different pattern of services and contacts provided to youth from the different areas may have had less to do with the influence of the Project and more with the nature of resources available to the populations in the two areas. The race/ethnic characteristic of the population did not vary as much as its economic status.

Effects of Area Population Characteristics. We believe that different population characteristics may account in large measure for differences in the nature, levels, and changes in crime, including gang offenses. The patterns of program services and worker contacts provided to youth may have been associated with these differences. In general, household income levels for Latinos (whose youth were mainly represented in the program) were lowest, as they were for all racial/ethnic groups in Eastside compared to other areas. Latino households had a greater percent of population at the lowest income level in 2000 compared to 1990 (Table 13.6) (See also Appendix C). Levels of household income for Latino households in Arlanza and Casa Blanca were higher at both time periods (Table 13.7 and Table 13.8). Further, while income was rising for Latino households in these two areas, it was getting worse for Latino households in Eastside between 1990 and 2000. Levels of African-American household income were even lower in Eastside, but they were not deteriorating (as they were for Latino households).

It is highly probable that social (and especially economic) effects contributed to the high levels of gang-related violence and especially drug offenses in Eastside compared to other area

over the program period. It is also possible that the Project contributed to some moderation of gang-related serious-violence and drug offenses in both Eastside and Arlanza, particularly during the last year of the Project period – we cannot be sure. We know that serious violence was significantly reduced for program youth, and that program youth were not, and did not become, chronic drug arrestees.

We cannot detect significant differences in outcome for the subsamples of program youth despite the differences in patterns of services and worker contacts. It is likely that the patterns were different, in part because of the different nature and severity of the gang problem in each area. Nevertheless, it is possible to speculate that had a more appropriate pattern of services been provided to Eastside youth (particularly material support and job services), even more positive effects in terms of reduction of gang-related serious violence (and especially drug) offenses might have been achieved for Eastside youth (and perhaps with some area effects).

### Summary

We have insufficient evidence to indicate that program services and contacts affected individual program youth's involvement in the gang, or his perception of his gang's size. The Project did not have a distinctive effect on the size of the gangs or the nature of gang-related crime in the program area, at least based on the perceptions of Gang Unit police officers.

While serious-violence, less-serious-violence and property offenses declined generally across the program and comparison areas and the rest of Riverside between the pre-program and program periods, they declined more rapidly in Arlanza than in the other areas. There is also some evidence (based on gang-related offense data) that serious-violence and to some extent

drug offenses may have declined or moderated at a better rate in the two program areas than in the comparison area or the rest of Riverside, particularly in the last year of the Project period.

It is possible, but not demonstrable, that the Project had some positive effect on Eastside and (especially) Arlanza area-wide rates for these two offenses. Household income levels were higher in Arlanza than in Eastside, and this could have primarily contributed to greater reductions in offense rates in Arlanza. Although Eastside youth in the program generally had more positive results than Arlanza youth, more material support and job services might possibly have had an even more positive effect, with some indirect effects at the area level.

Table 13.1  
 Gang Membership Changes: Percent (n)  
 Program and Comparison Youth  
 Interview Time I -Time II

Gang Membership Status	Program Youth		Comparison Youth	
	Time I (n)	Time II (n)	Time I (n)	Time II (n)
Active Gang Member: 6 months ago/recently/always	29.8% (25)	31.0% (26)	17.6% (3)	52.9% (9)
Non-gang Youth/Former gang member	70.2% (59)	69.9% (58)	82.3% (14)	47.1% (8)
Total	100.0% (84)	100.0% (84)	100.0% (17)	100.0% (17)

Table 13.2  
Estimates of Gang Size<sup>a</sup>  
Police Interview Time I-Time IV

Gang	Gang Location	Program Area		Comparison Area	
		Time I 11/1998	Time II 1/2002	Time I 11/1998	Time II 1/2002
1	Eastside	498	500	0	0
2	Eastside	175	180	0	0
3	Eastside	20	30	0	0
4	Eastside & Arlanza	100	150	0	0
5	Arlanza	100	170	0	0
6	Arlanza	75	30	0	0
7	Arlanza	25	10	0	0
8	Arlanza & Casa Blanca	0	10	26	0
9	Arlanza	60	30	0	0
10	Arlanza	40	100	0	0
11	Arlanza & Casa Blanca	No estimate given at Time I	10	No estimate given at Time I	20
12	Casa Blanca & Arlanza	0	15	231	205
13	Casa Blanca	0	0	50	40
14*		25	0	0	0
15*		15	0	0	0
16*		55	0	0	0
17*		45	0	0	0
Totals		1,233	1,235	307	265

\*These gangs contribute to the crimes and violence in the program **and** comparison areas, but the gangs are not based in those areas.

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<sup>a</sup> Time-I estimates were provided by the Riverside Police Department via telephone interview in November, 1998; Time-II estimates in January, 2002.

Table 13.3  
Perceptions of Severity of Gang Crime<sup>a</sup>:  
Police Interview Time I - Time IV

Gang	Date	Programt Area			Comparison Area		
		Drugs	Violence	Property	Drugs	Violence	Property
1	11/1998	10	10	10			
	1/2002	3	10	6			
	difference	-7	0	-4			
2	11/1998	8	9	8			
	1/2002	8	10	5			
	difference	0	1	-3			
3	11/1998	4	7	5			
	1/2002	3	5	5			
	difference	-1	-2	0			
4	11/1998	10	10	6			
	1/2002	10	8	3			
	difference	0	-2	-3			
5	11/1998	5	5	5			
	1/2002	6	6	5			
	difference	1	1	0			
6	11/1998	5	5	5			
	1/2002	3	6	3			
	difference	-2	1	-2			
7	11/1998	5	5	5			
	1/2002	1	3	1			
	difference	-4	-2	-4			

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<sup>a</sup> Time-I estimates were provided by the Riverside Police Department via telephone interview in November, 1998; Time-II estimates in January, 2002.

Table 13.3, cont.  
Perceptions of Severity of Gang Crime  
Police Interview Time I - Time IV

Gang	Date	Program Areas			Comparison Areas		
		Drugs	Violence	Property	Drugs	Violence	Property
8	11/1998	7	5	7			
	1/2002	0	5	3			
	difference	-7	0	-4			
9	11/1998	7	7	7			
	1/2002	3	6	2			
	difference	-4	-1	-5			
10	11/1998	5	7	5			
	1/2002	6	8	5			
	difference	1	1	0			
11	11/1998	10	10	10	10	10	10
	1/2002	10	3	10	10	3	10
	difference	0	-7	0	0	-7	0
12	11/1998				10	10	10
	1/2002				6	10	2
	difference				-4	0	-8
13	11/1998				10	1	2
	1/2002				10	3	2
	difference				0	2	0
14	11/1998	4	4	4			
	1/2002	3	2	0			
	difference	-1	-2	-4			
15*	11/1998	1	8	3			
	1/2002	1	6	2			
	difference	0	-2	-1			

Table 13.3, cont.  
 Perceptions of Severity of Gang Crime  
 Police Interview Time I - Time IV

Gang	Date	Program Areas			Comparison Areas		
		Drugs	Violence	Property	Drugs	Violence	Property
16*	11/1998	2	2	2			
	1/2002	1	1	0			
	difference	-1	-1	-2			
17*	11/1998	5	5	5			
	1/2002	3	6	4			
	difference	-2	1	-1			
All Gangs: Average Difference	—	DT	VT	PT	DC	VC	PC
		-1.8	-0.9	-2.2	-1.3	-1.6	-2.6

**Table 13.4**  
**Number of Offenses By Offense Type, Area<sup>a</sup> and Period (1994-1996; 1997-1999)**

<b>Eastside</b>	<b>Pre-Program Period<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>Program Period<sup>c</sup></b>	<b>Absolute Change</b>
Serious Violence Offenses <sup>d</sup>	2,051	1,382	-669
Violence Offenses <sup>e</sup>	3,277	2,442	-835
Property Offenses <sup>f</sup>	8,480	6,115	-2,365
<b>Total</b>	<b>13,808</b>	<b>9,939</b>	<b>-3,869</b>
<b>Arlanza</b>	<b>Pre-Program Period</b>	<b>Program Period</b>	<b>Absolute Change</b>
Serious Violence Offenses	1,835	1,141	-694
Violence Offenses	3,752	2,564	-1,188
Property Offenses	10,852	7,885	-2,967
<b>Total</b>	<b>16,439</b>	<b>11,590</b>	<b>-4,849</b>
<b>Casa Blanca</b>	<b>Pre-Program Period</b>	<b>Program Period</b>	<b>Absolute Change</b>
Serous Violence Offenses	835	520	-315
Violence Offenses	1,563	1,143	-420
Property Offenses	4,620	2,810	-1,810
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,018</b>	<b>4,473</b>	<b>-2,545</b>
<b>Rest of Riverside</b>	<b>Pre-Program Period</b>	<b>Program Period</b>	<b>Absolute Change</b>
Serious Violence Offenses	2,840	1,857	-983
Violence Offenses	5,876	4,232	-1,644
Property Offenses	23,014	14,151	-8,863
<b>Total</b>	<b>31,730</b>	<b>20,240</b>	<b>-11,490</b>

<sup>a</sup>See Appendix C for a definition of the areas listed in this table and comparable police reporting districts.

<sup>b</sup>The Preprogram Period covers the three-year period from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 1996.

<sup>c</sup>The Program Period covers the three-year period from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1999.

<sup>d</sup>Serious Violence Offenses include murder and attempted murder; non-negligent manslaughter; rape by force and attempted rape, strong-arm robbery ; aggravated assault (including aggravated battery).

<sup>e</sup>Violence Offenses include simple assault; robbery and attempted robbery (excluding strong-arm robbery).

<sup>f</sup>Property Offenses include burglary and forcible burglary of a residence and non-residence; attempted burglary; motor vehicle theft of a car, truck, bus, motorcycle or other vehicle; petty and grand theft and attempted theft; shoplifting; other .

**Table 13.5**  
**Offense Rate<sup>a</sup> (per 1,000) By Offense Type, Area<sup>b</sup> and Period**

<b>Eastside</b>	<b>Pre-Program Period<sup>c</sup></b>	<b>Program Period<sup>d</sup></b>	<b>Percent Change</b>
Serious Violence Offenses <sup>e</sup>	60.7	40.6	-33.1
Violence Offenses <sup>f</sup>	97.0	71.7	-26.1
Property Offenses <sup>g</sup>	250.9	179.6	-28.4
Total	408.6	291.9	-28.6
<b>Arlanza</b>	<b>Pre-Program Period</b>	<b>Program Period</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>
Serious Violence Offenses	37.5	22.3	-40.5
Violence Offenses	76.7	50.2	-34.6
Property Offenses	221.9	154.3	-30.5
Total	336.1	226.8	-32.5
<b>Casa Blanca</b>	<b>Pre-Program Period</b>	<b>Program Period</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>
Serous Violence Offenses	31.0	19.1	-38.4
Violence Offenses	58.0	41.9	-27.8
Property Offenses	171.4	103.0	-39.9
Total	260.4	164.0	-37.0
<b>Rest of Riverside</b>	<b>Pre-Program Period</b>	<b>Program Period</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>
Serious Violence Offenses	21.7	13.6	-37.3
Violence Offenses	45.0	31.0	-31.1
Property Offenses	176.1	103.5	-41.2
Total	242.8	148.1	-39.0

<sup>a</sup>The offense rate is the number of offenses per 1,000 persons. Using the population totals for the 1990 and 2000 Censuses, population estimates were calculated for each year between 1990 and 2000. The corresponding population yearly estimates during the three-year pre-program period were averaged. The offense rate was then calculated by dividing the three-year aggregated number of arrests for each type of offense by the three-year averaged population totals. Using this same method, offense rates were also calculated for the program periods.

<sup>b</sup>See Appendix C for a definition of the areas listed in this table and comparable police reporting districts.

<sup>c</sup>The Pre-program Period covers the period from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 1996.

<sup>d</sup>The Program Period covers the period from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1999.

<sup>e</sup>Serious Violence Offenses comprise murder and attempted murder; non-negligent manslaughter; rape by force and attempted rape, strong-arm robbery; aggravated assault (including aggravated battery).

<sup>f</sup>Violence Offenses include simple assault; robbery and attempted robbery (excluding strong-arm robbery).

<sup>g</sup>Property Offenses include burglary and forcible burglary of a residence and non-residence; attempted burglary; motor vehicle theft of a car, truck, bus, motorcycle or other vehicle; petty and grand theft and attempted theft; shoplifting; other .

Table 13.6  
Household Characteristics  
By Income Category and By Selected Racial and Ethnic Group  
1990 and 2000 Census<sup>a</sup>  
**Eastside, Downtown and University Neighborhoods<sup>b</sup>**

Racial and Ethnic Group	1990 <sup>c</sup> (1989 dollars)	2000 <sup>d</sup> (1999 dollars)
<b>White</b>		
Less than \$15,000	38.8	36.3
\$15,000 to \$34,999	37.1	32.1
\$35,000 to \$49,999	14.0	12.5
\$50,000 or more	10.1	19.1
<b>African-American or Black</b>		
Less than \$15,000	43.8	38.7
\$15,000 to \$34,999	32.1	33.5
\$35,000 to \$49,999	14.9	9.4
\$50,000 or more	9.2	18.4
<b>Latino or Hispanic</b>		
Less than \$15,000	28.0	31.1
\$15,000 to \$34,999	48.1	34.5
\$35,000 to \$49,999	14.4	15.1
\$50,000 or more	9.5	19.3

<sup>a</sup>The 1990 and 2000 Census data presented in the table come from the 1990 and 2000 Summary Tape File 3 (STF 3) -sample data.

<sup>b</sup>The geographic area comprising these City of Riverside neighborhoods includes all of the Eastside, and only parts of the Downtown and University neighborhoods. See Appendix C for a more detailed description of the complete area.

<sup>c</sup> Because the 1990 Census tables include Hispanic households in the numbers for black and white households, the percentages for this table include Hispanic households in the percentages for these two racial groups for 1990. The inclusion of Hispanic households has relatively no affect on the percentages for black households. However, it has a much greater impact on the percentage for white households, considering that 40 to 45 percent of Hispanics self- identified their racial group as "white" in 1990.

<sup>d</sup> Excludes Hispanic households, since they are excluded from the numbers for white and black households in the 2000 Census tables.

Table 13.7  
Household Characteristics  
By Income Category and By Selected Racial and Ethnic Group  
1990 and 2000 Census<sup>a</sup>  
**Arlanza, La Sierra Acres, La Sierra and Arlington Neighborhoods<sup>b</sup>**

Racial and Ethnic Group	1990 <sup>c</sup> (1989 dollars)	2000 <sup>d</sup> (1999 dollars)
<b>White</b>		
Less than \$15,000	17.6	16.1
\$15,000 to \$34,999	30.8	26.9
\$35,000 to \$49,999	24.3	17.8
\$50,000 or more	27.4	39.1
<b>African-American or Black</b>		
Less than \$15,000	12.5	24.1
\$15,000 to \$34,999	46.1	24.7
\$35,000 to \$49,999	12.5	22.3
\$50,000 or more	28.9	28.8
<b>Latino or Hispanic</b>		
Less than \$15,000	16.7	12.7
\$15,000 to \$34,999	42.3	33.6
\$35,000 to \$49,999	24.7	21.3
\$50,000 or more	16.3	32.4

<sup>a</sup>The 1990 and 2000 Census data presented in the table come from the 1990 and 2000 Summary Tape Files 3 (STF 3) -sample data.

<sup>b</sup>The geographic area comprising these City of Riverside neighborhoods includes all of Arlanza and Arlington neighborhoods, and only parts of the La Sierra Acres and La Sierra neighborhoods. See Appendix C for a more detailed description of the complete area.

<sup>c</sup>Because the 1990 Census tables include Hispanic households in the numbers for black and white households, the percentages for this table include Hispanic households in the percentages for these two racial groups for 1990. The inclusion of Hispanic households has relatively no affect on the percentages for black households. However, it has a much greater impact on the percentage for white households, considering that 40 to 45 percent of Hispanics self-identified their racial group as "white" in 1990.

<sup>d</sup>Excludes Hispanic households, since they are excluded from the numbers for white and black households in the 2000 Census tables.

Table 13.8  
Household Characteristics  
By Income Category and By Selected Racial and Ethnic Group  
1990 and 2000 Census<sup>a</sup>  
**Casa Blanca, Victoria, Magnolia Center, Ramona and Airport Neighborhoods<sup>b</sup>**

Racial and Ethnic Group	1990 <sup>c</sup> (1989 dollars)	2000 <sup>d</sup> (1999 dollars)
<b>White</b>		
Less than \$15,000	16.4	12.3
\$15,000 to \$34,999	33.6	27.1
\$35,000 to \$49,999	22.4	19.8
\$50,000 or more	27.6	40.8
<b>African-American or Black</b>		
Less than \$15,000	12.4	20.3
\$15,000 to \$34,999	42.6	35.8
\$35,000 to \$49,999	15.2	12.9
\$50,000 or more	29.7	31.0
<b>Latino or Hispanic</b>		
Less than \$15,000	21.8	15.5
\$15,000 to \$34,999	36.4	31.2
\$35,000 to \$49,999	23.7	20.5
\$50,000 or more	18.1	32.8


<sup>a</sup>The 1990 and 2000 Census data presented in the table come from the 1990 and 2000 Summary Tape Files 3 (STF 3) -sample data.

<sup>b</sup>The geographic area comprising these City of Riverside neighborhoods includes all of the Casa Blanca neighborhood, and only parts of the Victoria, Magnolia Center, Ramona and Airport neighborhoods. See Appendix C for a more detailed description of the complete area.


<sup>c</sup>Because the 1990 Census tables include Hispanic households in the numbers for black and white households, the percentages for this table include Hispanic households in the percentages for these two racial groups for 1990. The inclusion of Hispanic households has relatively no affect on the percentages for black households. However, it has a much greater impact on the percentage for white households, considering that 40 to 45 percent of Hispanics self-identified their racial group as "white" in 1990.

<sup>d</sup>Excludes Hispanic households, since they are excluded from the numbers for white and black households in the 2000 Census tables.

**Figure 13.1**  
**Total Number of Gang-Related Offenses by Area**



**Figure 13.2**  
**Number of Gang-Related Serious Violence Offenses by Area**



**Figure 13.3**  
**Number of Gang-Related Violence Offenses by Area**







Figure 13.4  
Number of Gang-Related Drug Offenses by Area




**Figure 13.5**  
**Number of Gang-Related Property Offenses by Area**



**Figure 13.6**  
**Number of Gang-Related "Other" Offenses by Area**



**Figure 13.7**  
**Number of Gang-Related Serious Violence, Less Serious Violence and Drug Offenses by Area**



## Chapter 14

### **Executive Summary**

#### Program Model

The Riverside, California project was established in 1995 as a test of the OJJDP Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program. The model was based on the notion that local institutions had to coordinate their organizational efforts and target particular gang-problem communities and particular gangs, gang members and youth highly at risk of gang involvement. Program elements of the Model included a steering committee, an interagency street team, grassroots involvement, social services, criminal justice participation, school participation, and employment and training opportunities.

The Model was multi-faceted, involving multiple agencies interactively addressing individual youth, family members, and gang peers. The five core Model strategies were community mobilization, social intervention, provision of social opportunities, suppression/social control, and organizational change and development. The program principles included a balance of community strategies, intensity of services/contacts with targeted youth, sufficient continuity of services/contacts by Project workers, and strong commitment to the Program Model by key city leaders, agencies and community groups.

#### Evaluating the Model

Quasi-experimental design and multiple sources of data were essential to test the Comprehensive Gang Program Model in Riverside. Specialized worker-tracking records were

required. Commonly accepted definitions of program services and contacts across agencies had to be developed. Different findings had to be related to the specific and combined effects of the organizations and workers in the program. The evaluation examined both individual-youth outcome (mainly change in arrests) as predicted by the nature and scope of services and contacts provided by the different kinds of workers, and the impact of the program at the community level.

Evaluation problems were usually related to resolution of program-development issues such as getting the program off the ground, lack of understanding of the Model and how to implement it, sample selection of program and comparison youth, and mitigation of the burden of data collection for program staff. Program development and interrelated local and National Evaluation efforts posed distinctive and complex problems.

### Riverside Program and Comparison Areas

The Riverside Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program changed its name to BRIDGE (Building Resources for the Intervention and Deterrence of Gang Engagement) in 1999, and focused its five-year (1995-2000) period of Project operations on two areas of the city with high rates of gang crime – Eastside and Arlanza. Another gang-crime community – Casa Blanca – was selected as a comparison area. Each area had its own distinctive historical, population, socioeconomic and gang-problem character.

Between 1983 and 1994, Riverside experienced the largest population increase (81%) of any community in California. The Eastside, Arlanza and Casa Blanca areas became the most

impoverished areas of the city, with the highest rates of unemployment, poverty, crime, school dropouts, female-headed households, teen pregnancies and gang activity. Population growth in Riverside slowed between 1990 and 2000. The absolute number and percentage of whites decreased, but the absolute number and percentage of Hispanics (mainly Mexican-Americans) increased, particularly in the program and comparison areas. In 1990, non-Hispanic whites had been the majority population in the city proper, as well as in Arlanza and Casa Blanca, but not in Eastside. In 2000, whites were the plurality population (46.8%) citywide, Hispanics were the majority population in Eastside (54.4%) and in Arlanza (55.1%), and whites and Hispanics made up equivalent proportions (44.8%) of the population in Casa Blanca. Poverty, racial/ethnic and gang problems were increasingly concentrated, particularly in Eastside, but to a lesser extent in Arlanza and Casa Blanca.

### The Riverside Gang Problem

There was a perceived increase in the scope and severity of gang crime in certain areas of Riverside just prior to the start of the Project. The University of California-Riverside (UC-Riverside) was concerned about the rise in homicides and increasing incidents of violence and drug crime identified as gang related in the University area adjoining Eastside. There were varying views, however, about the nature and scope of the gang problem. A police administrator noted that the gang problem was different in different parts of the city. There was some agreement that the most significant gang-problem areas were in low-income Hispanic (mainly Mexican-American) and African-American parts of the city, particularly Eastside, Arlanza, and Casa Blanca. Nevertheless, the original Co-Director of the Project initially stationed at UC-

Riverside insisted that the gang problem was randomly distributed throughout the city, and that all parts of the city should be served by the Project. A prevailing view was that the gang problem was associated with racial/ethnic tensions between Hispanics and African-Americans, drug-gang interests, migration of populations from the Los Angeles area, and the influence of the Mexican Mafia. Nevertheless, most of the preliminary evidence suggested that the fighting between gangs involved mainly local Mexican-American youth groups.

Estimates of the numbers of gangs and gang members were highly variable and somewhat exaggerated during the early years of the Project. The first application for Project funding in 1994 claimed there were 242 gangs in Riverside. One police administrator, two years later, claimed there were 5,000 gang members and 400 gangs in the city. Based on media reports, there were more than 700 gangs and 36,000 gang members in the county. By Project's end (but not program termination), the Riverside Police Department gang specialist had identified approximately 1,300 gang members and 17 criminal youth gangs in the program and comparison areas, and probably no more than 2,600 gang members in the rest of the city.

The scope of the gang problem and concerns about it were affected by the California Penal Code, and by law enforcement practices implementing sections of the Code. The California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act of 1998 was sufficiently broad so that minority youth in certain neighborhoods were at special risk of being identified as gang members or gang associates, suspected of committing a gang crime, and, if found guilty, subjected to extra confinement in correctional institutions.

## Riverside's Response to the Gang Problem

The Riverside Mayor's office encouraged the Riverside Police Department and the UC-Riverside to seek federal funding to address the city's gang problem. The University's Office of Education and Community Initiatives (OECI) submitted its first application to OJJDP for funding under the Comprehensive Gang Program initiative of 1994. Its emphasis was on strategic planning to address the at-risk youth population citywide, with an emphasis also on strong suppression and vertical prosecution of gang leaders. The primary purpose of the Project was consensus-building about the prevalence of the gang problem. The aims of prevention, intervention and suppression were to be pursued separately, with special focus on the collection of data from various sources to develop a long-range strategic plan. Originally, attention was not centered on program activities.

Under OJJDP advice and constraints, the Project Director and the Steering Committee shifted focus to a comprehensive program to deal directly with gang youth referred by the Riverside County Juvenile Probation Department. An elaborate assessment and case-management system was to be developed. The program had youth-employment, outreach-youth-work, and educational and police components. The Service Needs Assessment Team (SNAT) – developed by the then Project Director and consisting of staff from the various organizations providing services to or contacts with program youth – was to become a major contributor to the coordination of services for program youth across agencies. SNAT also became a key mechanism for influencing organization change, and the implementation of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model.

The Project Director and Co-Director (who was also the Local Evaluator of the Project)

tendered their resignations during the third year of Project operations (i.e., the fourth year of the Project), and a new Project Director was recruited. The UC-Riverside transitioned the Project to the City of Riverside by the end of 1998, with the Riverside Police Department now the lead agency. A senior police officer became the Acting Project Director, as well as Chairman of the Steering Committee.

With the arrival of the new Coordinator (who later became the Project Director), attention shifted to a closer relationship with local community and grassroots agencies. SNAT meetings now also involved representatives of local agencies, and fostered greater involvement of school and other public agencies. Part of the shift in approach may have been an effort to better respond to increased racial and gang tensions in the latter part of 1998 and early months of 1999.

There was evidence of greater coordination among police and probation, and changes in practice in targeting gang youth, which included more attention to the need for services for gang youth, as well as appropriate surveillance, and detention or court processing. Riverside Police Gang Unit officers took a more active role in case planning and program development for Project youth. School system administrators permitted outreach youth workers to contact school personnel and meet with program youth on school property.

### Program Implementation

The idea of a pilot program, integrated with the long-range planning process, was attempted by the original Project Director. The program initially targeted gang-involved youth 12 to 21 years of age who were juveniles on probation and particularly involved in violent gang activity. The plan to involve gang youth not on probation was never implemented. Probation

exercised a key leadership role in referring youth for additional services and controls. The outreach-youth-worker role was new for youth agencies or projects in Riverside, and gradually shifted from assisting Project probation officers to advocating for program youth, and partnership with probation and police, with increased responsibility for socially supporting youth.

One of the best-developed components of the Project was the employment-training and participation program of the Riverside Department of Human Resources, particularly its six-month training program and stipend of \$150 for youth completing the program. A network of employers was also developed for qualified applicants from the pool of trained program youth.

Representatives of the two public school systems were key members of the Steering Committee. A staff member of one of the school systems began to attend SNAT meetings on a regular basis towards the end of the Project period. Several of the community and alternative schools welcomed the efforts of probation, and particularly of outreach youth workers, to address conflict issues between program youth and/or teachers, and assure regular attendance at school.

The two Riverside Police Department lieutenants assigned to the Project exercised critical influence in community mobilization of agency interest, program innovation, and administration of the Project. They had a broad conception of where the Project needed to go in meeting a range of youth-agency and interagency needs in respect to both the gang problem and the social development of gang-involved youth. They were essential to the development of the Project as it moved from a focus on improved suppression efficiency to services for program youth.

However, to what extent the role of Gang Unit officers assigned to the Project was basically modified to encompass a broader and more community-oriented, social-development perspective on the gang problem was unclear. Finally, we note that a number of organizations broadened

their conceptions about the needs for services and/or controls for gang-involved youth through participation in SNAT meetings, and expanded their service and staff provision for them.

### Changes in Perceptions of Crime, Program Strategy and Performance

We attempted to measure changes in the views of crime and program strategies of key agencies connected with the program area during the first three years of the Project, and also the degree to which the Project met criteria of the Model by the end of the five-year program period. Riverside organization respondents directly involved in the Project, as well as other agency leaders, perceived the gang problem to be serious in the first year, but less serious (or moderate) in the third year. They perceived that considerable progress was made in the reduction of gang violence, but less in the reduction of the gang drug problem, which remained at the most serious level of all the problems. The respondents indicated that high levels of progress were made in respect to the provision of social opportunities for program youth (particularly employment training and job placement, and social-intervention services). The respondents did not believe that much progress was made in local-agency or grassroots participation, or in interagency coordination, particularly the sharing of information and long-term planning in regard to the gang problem.

Model elements, strategies, and principles generally were regarded by key Project-related personnel, as well as by the National Evaluators, as adapted at a “good” level. Of the five sites testing the Model, Riverside achieved probably the greatest measure of positive change and positive development. An extraordinarily high degree of involvement, commitment, and support by city administration, the criminal-justice system, the schools, and increasingly by community-

based agencies appeared to predict success in reducing key aspects of the gang problem, and the institutionalization of the Model approach.

#### Research Method: Data Management, Measurement and Analysis

The National Evaluation attempted to answer several interrelated questions: 1) how, and to what extent was the Riverside Comprehensive Gang Program Model implemented?; 2) did the Riverside program contribute to a relative and/or absolute reduction in gang crime, particularly at the individual-youth level?; and 3) to what extent did the program contribute to a change in gang crime at the community level in the program area?

Key elements in the implementation of the complex research design were the collection of interview data from appropriate samples of gang-involved and highly-at-risk program and comparison youth, access to complete arrest histories of these youth, and extensive reporting of what worker-services and contacts were provided by the Project probation officers, outreach youth workers, police and other workers providing services and contacts (e.g., manpower, school and drug-treatment personnel), as well as the collection of aggregate-level community crime and project-development information. Data was to be collected at the individual-youth, gang, program, organization and community levels.

In due course, extensive collaboration was established with local program and local evaluation personnel by the National Evaluators, who were in close collaboration with OJJDP staff. A great deal of data was collected, particularly at the program-service and individual-youth levels, but only limited interview data was collected from a comparison-youth sample. Extensive police arrest histories were collected for all program and comparison youth.

## Selected Characteristics of Program and Comparison Youth

The total sample consisted of 369 youth: 182 program youth for whom we had adequate program-process or worker-tracking data; 52 program youth who were in the program for less than the minimum exposure period of one month (or for whom we did not have program/worker data); and 135 comparison youth. Ninety and five-tenths percent (90.5%) of the total sample were males, 72.4% were Latino (Mexican-American), 20.6% were African-American, and 7.1% were non-Latino whites (n = 14), Native American (n = 9), and Asian-American (n = 2). The major age groups at the time of program entry were 15 to 17 years (55.6%) and 18 years and over (35.5%); the remainder were 12 to 14 years old (8.9%).

More of the program worker-tracked youth (74.4%) than comparison youth (56.8%) or program non-worker-tracked youth (26.0%) had arrest histories in the pre-program (or prior-to-pre-program) period. More program worker-tracked youth had pre-program arrest histories of serious and less-serious violence (51.5%) than comparison youth (39.8%) and program non-worker-tracked youth (23.7%). More comparison youth (16.7%) had pre-program arrest histories of drug arrests than program worker-tracked youth (11.4%) and program non-worker-tracked youth (8.8%). Almost all youth in the program reported themselves (or were estimated by Project staff) to be gang members or associate gang members. Seventeen and three-tenths percent (17.3%) of program worker-tracked youth, 6.3% of program non-worker-tracked youth, and 27.3% of comparison youth were reported to be non-gang youth.

Almost all program worker-tracked youth (98.4%) were referred to the program from the Riverside Juvenile Probation Department; at least 65.0% of comparison youth had a probation background, and we suspect that the majority of program non-worker-tracked youth had

probation histories. More program youth (54.4%) than comparison youth (36.3%) or program non-worker-tracked youth (30.8%) had detention or incarceration histories. Of the program worker-tracked youth (N = 116) and comparison youth (n = 77) interviewed at Time I, more comparison youth (60.8%) than program youth (51.8%) self-reported drug use. About an equal proportion of comparison youth (21.9%) and program youth (21.1%) reported drug selling. Fifty percent (50.0%) of comparison youth and 40.2% of program worker-tracked youth said they had access to a handgun.

#### Program Structure and Process: Services, Worker Contacts, and Strategies

Project outreach youth workers, probation officers, and police officers documented contacts with, and provision of services to, 201 program youth during the period January 1, 1997 through December 31, 2000. A total of 9,146 services, 13,900 direct worker contacts and 3,821 coordinated worker contacts were provided. Youth were in the program for an average of a little more than two years. In general, youth in the program for shorter periods of time were less delinquent than those in the program for longer periods.

The primary services or activities provided – regardless of length of time the youth was in the program – were individual counseling (21.0%), job training and job referral (12.8%) and case planning (13.6%). The services provided the least were family counseling (3.2%), material support (including transportation) (6.4%), and school-related services (7.4%). Based on Project worker-tracking data, outreach youth workers provided most of the services (67.2%), followed by probation officers (32.2%) and police officers (0.6%).

Of all program worker contacts, 27.4% were coordinated contacts regarding particular

program youth involving contacts among workers both in the Project and outside of it. About a quarter of all coordinated contacts were initiated by probation officers with outreach youth workers, and about the same percent were initiated by outreach youth workers with probation officers. Probation officers made more contacts with police (20.7%) than did outreach youth workers (1.5%). Generally, probation officers had a wider range of contacts with workers from different agencies in the city than did outreach youth workers.

### Arrest Outcomes for Program and Comparison Youth

We examined the effects of the program in general, using arrest-pattern changes, before we looked at the effects of specific services and worker contacts. We were interested in the effects of the program on youth who came from the program areas (mainly Eastside and Arlanza), compared to youth from the comparison area (mainly Casa Blanca), who were not provided with Project services and worker contacts. Multivariate statistical models were used to control for differences in demographic, pre-program-arrest and other characteristics between program youth and comparison youth.

The Project was effective in contributing to the reduction of serious violence arrests and other types of violence arrests of program youth during the program period compared to the pre-program period. Serious violence arrests increased for the comparison youth during the same periods. Program youth were three times as successful in the odds ratio of success to failure in reducing serious-violence arrests as comparison youth. Program youth also had a lower ratio of failure to success for repeat drug arrests. There was no significant difference between the program and comparison youth in respect to patterns of property arrests, “other” (minor) arrests,

or total arrests. In almost all cases, youth who were in the program two years or more did much better in reducing arrests than youth who were in the program for less than two years.

There was little or no difference in arrest-change patterns for youth identified as gang members, associate gang members, or non-gang youth. Generally, older youth did better than younger youth in the reduction of total arrest, property arrests and “other” arrests, but younger youth did better than older youth in reductions (or success to failure ratios) in arrests for serious violence, total violence, and drugs.

#### Services/Worker Contacts and Arrest Outcomes

There were particular patterns of services and worker contacts that contributed to the reduction of serious violence arrests, total violence arrests (including serious and less-serious violence), and drug arrests. Several types of intervention services accounted for reductions in these kinds of arrests: total services (i.e., a combination of individual counseling, job services, school-related services, suppression activities, as well as family counseling, group services and material services); (especially) individual-counseling; and suppression services.

More youth 18 years and over (83.3%) than youth 17 years and younger (73.4%) reduced their arrests for total violence during the program period as a result of the provision of the overall set of services. Individual counseling was effective, but not as effective as a full range of services. Individual counseling was effective with more younger youth (33.3%) than older youth (11.1%). Suppression activities (e.g., arrest; detention, probation violation) were also effective for 42.9% of younger youth and 83.3% of older youth.

Different types of coordinated contacts were particularly effective in reducing total

violence arrests and, in some cases, serious (felony) violence arrests. The highest reduction in total violence arrests for all youth who reduced their total violence arrests occurred when probation officers, police officers and outreach youth workers worked together with job and school personnel in relation to particular youth. A slightly higher proportion of younger youth (85.0%) compared to older youth (72.2%) reduced their pattern of serious and less-serious violence arrests. In general, Project workers were least effective in reducing the level of drug-related arrests through a coordinated approach, particularly for youth 17 and under. They were only slightly more effective with older youth.

### Gang and Area Effects

The available evidence suggests that the Project did not reduce program youth's membership and involvement in gangs relative to that of comparison youth during the course of the Project period. There was no distinctive Project effect on the size of gang membership in the program areas, based on interviews of program and comparison youth and observations of Riverside Police Department Gang Unit officers. However, there was evidence that serious violence offenses, less-serious violence offenses, and property offenses did decline substantially across all areas of Riverside. These offenses (gang and non-gang related) may have declined more rapidly in Arlanza than in the other areas of Riverside. This was particularly the case for gang-related offenses. The Project may have had a more positive effect on youth from Arlanza than from Eastside, which was a more economically depressed area, with higher area rates of crime than any other area of Riverside. Probably relatively more services (particularly of a social and economic-support nature) were required for program youth from Eastside.

## Appendix A

### Police Arrest Charges

Crime	Charges	
Serious Violence	Murder (M) Attempted Murder (AttM) Manslaughter (MNS) Aggravated Battery (AB) Aggravated Assault (AA)	Armed Robbery (AR) Armed Violence (AV) Drive-By Shooting (DBS) Criminal Sexual Assault/Abuse (CSA)
Violence	Battery (B) Robbery (R) Kidnapping (KDN) Arson (AN) Assault (A) Home Invasion (HI) Attempted Aggravated Battery (AttAB) Attempted Robbery (AttR) Hijacking/Motor Vehicle (HJK/MV) Domestic Assault (DA) Domestic Battery (DB) Sex Crime (SXC)	Child Abuse (CA) Street Fighting (SF) Mob Action (MA) Educational Intimidation (EI) Hate Crime (HTC) Stalking (STK) Telephone Harassment (TH) Intimidation (INT) Ethnic Intimidation (ETHI) Racial Incident (RI) Unlawful Restraint (UR) Protection Order (PO)
Property	Burglary (BG) Auto Theft (AT) Theft (T) Possession of Stolen Motor Vehicle (PSMV)  Receipt of Stolen Motor Vehicle (PSMV) Sale of Stolen Motor Vehicle (PSMV) Theft of Lost Property (TLP) Attempted Burglary (AttBG) Attempted Theft (AttT) Shoplifting (SHP) Possession of Stolen Property (PSP) Receipt of Stolen Property (RSP)	Possession of Mislaid Property (PMP) Criminal Damage to Property (CDTP) Criminal Damage to Land (CDTL) Criminal Damage to (Motor) Vehicle (CDTV)  Graffiti (GR) Vandalism (VDL) Trespass (TR) Criminal Trespass to Residence (CTTR) Criminal Trespass to Land (CTTL) Criminal Trespass to Property (CTTP) Criminal Trespass to (Motor) Vehicle Possession of Burglary Tools (PBT)

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Crime	Charges	
Drugs	Manufacture/Distribution/Delivery of Controlled Substance (M/D/D-CS) Possession of Controlled Substance (PCS) Possession of Cannabis/Marijuana (PC) Possession of Non-Narcotic Controlled Substance (PNCS)	Under the Influence of Cocaine (UICO) Under the Influence of Meth (UIM) Under the Influence of Cannabis/Marijuana (UIC) Driving under the Influence of Drugs (DUID)
Weapon	Unlawful Use of Weapons (UUW) Aggravated Discharge of Firearm (ADF) Unlawful Sale of Weapons (USW) Unlawful Possession of Firearms (UPF)	Unlawful Possession of Weapons (UPW) Possession of Firearm and Ammo (PF/A) Unregistered Gun Carriage (UGC) No FOID (UGC)
Public Disturbance	Resisting/Obstructing a Peace Officer (R/O-PO) Disorderly Conduct (D/C) Reckless Conduct (RC) Curfew Violation (CV) Loitering (L)	Gang Loitering (GL) Gang Assembly (GA) Unlawful Assembly (UA) Contempt of Court (C/C) Obstruction of Justice (OJ)
Alcohol	Driving under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs (DUI) Sale of Alcohol/Minor (SAM) Minor Drinking (MDR) Intoxication of Minor (IOM)	Possession of Alcohol/Minor (PAM) Possession of Alcoholic Beverage (PAB) Drinking (DR) Transportation of Open Alcohol (TOA)
Other	Other (OTH) Status Offense (SO) Attempted Suicide (AttSU) Motor Vehicle Act (MVA) Fraudulent/Unlawful ID (FID) Contributing to Delinquency of Minor (CDM) Exhibitionism (EX) Public Indecency (PI) Maintaining a Public Nuisance (MPN)	Child Neglect (CN) Child Care Referral (CCR) Forgery (FO) Bank Fraud (BF)

## Appendix B

### S/W Gang Involvement Scale

### S/W Gang Involvement Scale

There is an extensive literature that consistently demonstrates that gang members commit more crime, and more serious crime (especially violence), than either delinquent non-gang youth or non-delinquents. However, many self-report, survey, and cohort studies simply ask the youth respondent whether he or she is or has been a gang member, which then becomes the all-important independent variable predicting highly-frequent and/or serious levels of crime participation. Gang membership in this type of quantitative (although not observational or ethnographic) study is viewed as a categorical variable. The youth is a gang member – an invariable status – at a particular point or set of points in time. However, for purposes of program development, based on the youth’s life-course changes (Sampson and Laub 1993), it is important to emphasize the variability of this status.

The reality is that there are different degrees of gang membership, and different circumstances which influence the youth’s gang status and role over time. The degree of the youth’s commitment to the gang role may determine his gang delinquent behavior. The variability of gang membership and its relationship to delinquency, within and across time periods, has not been adequately factored into gang research, policy, program development and evaluation. It is critically important, therefore, to test the proposition that all gang members are not the same; that they all have not been and will not be subjected to the same influences; that they all are not and will not be involved in gang structures and processes to the same degree over time; and, consequently, that the nature and levels of their delinquent behaviors identified as gang-related can be expected to vary. In other words, while it is important to know whether the youth is a gang member or not, this fact alone is not sufficient to account for or to predict the

level of the youth's subsequent delinquency. It is important also to assess the changing nature and processes of the youth's specific context of gang involvement which, along with other variables such as his changing patterns of educational achievement, employment status, and sources of income, may more substantially account for his level of delinquency.

The S/W Gang Involvement Scale may be useful for determining the youth's level of risk for gang delinquency, and may provide guidance for policy and program planning as to what measures to take in the prevention, intervention, and suppression of the youth's actual or potential gang behavior, after he has been initially identified as a gang member. The nature of gang involvement must be broken down into components that characterize the youth's prior and current gang status, and the prior and current conditions that proximately contribute to it. These temporal and contextual factors continuously interact with each other, and may have an effect on the youth's delinquent behavior.

The S/W Gang Involvement Scale, for research purposes, provides the Evaluators with a way to measure effects of the program in terms of the youth's degree and context of gang involvement, at different points in time, which may result in delinquent behavior. It is important not only to measure the effect of the program on the youth who may or may not have been a gang member when he entered the program, but also to measure to what extent the program was successful in preventing or reducing the youth's gang involvement during the program period. The S/W Scale has not yet been tested or validated, and is used in an exploratory way in the present analysis to measure changes in the youth's gang involvement, which, in turn, may have caused changes in the youth's total offenses during the course of the program.

The present scale contains 11 items obtained from the Individual Gang Member Survey:

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whether parents, siblings, or anyone else in the current household has ever been a gang member (yes = at least 1, no = not in the household); ratio of close gang friends to non-gang friends (yes = a few and some, no = none or no close friends); time spent with gang friends (yes = some, no = none); areas in neighborhood where the youth was afraid to walk alone because of gang-related concerns (yes, no); whether any close relative of the youth has been a victim of gang crime (yes, no); whether the youth has been a victim of gang crime (yes, no); whether the youth is currently an active gang member (yes, no); the most recent rank of the youth in the gang (yes = leader, core, regular; no = peripheral, associate, wannabe); the youth's knowledge of current gang size (yes, no); whether the youth has ever received a gang violation (yes, no); if the youth thinks he will ever leave the gang (yes, no).

Scores are established for the Time-I and Time-II interview responses. A maximum score of 11 is possible at each interview, if all responses are "yes." A difference score between Time I and Time II measures the amount of change in gang involvement that has occurred. We anticipate that the difference score will enable us to predict program effects on gang involvement of the youth, and that changes in gang involvement will help us predict changes in levels of offenses.

## Appendix C

### Riverside Program and Comparison Areas

## Riverside Program and Comparison Areas

In order to determine the boundaries for the program and comparison areas in Riverside, California, we first reviewed the program (target) and comparison area boundaries.<sup>1</sup> We identified residences of the program and comparison youth and demarcated the corresponding Riverside Police Department (RPD) reporting districts. This analysis revealed that 156 (72.2%) of the 216 program youth resided in a smaller geographic area (fewer number of RPD reporting districts) than those delimited by the Project, while 64.9% (n = 85) of the 131 comparison youth lived in a larger geographic area than the area delimited by the Project.<sup>2</sup>

Based on the results of the youth-residence analysis, we defined the program and comparison areas to correspond more closely to the RPD reporting districts for the youths' residences. To further check the adjusted boundaries, we analyzed individual arrest data for program and comparison youth. We found that 76.5 % of arrests for both program and comparison youth occurred in the adjusted areas.

After adjusting the boundaries of the program and comparison areas, we matched them to the borders of the comparable census tracts and block groups for the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census (see Appendix Table C-1).

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<sup>1</sup> The Eastside target area includes the Riverside Police Department (RPD) reporting districts A02, A03, A11, A12, A13, B01, B02, B04, B11, B12, B13, C01, C02, C11, C12, C13, C14, C15, C16, D01, D07, D12, D15, E01, E02, E03, E04, E08 and U02. The Arlanza target area includes the RPD reporting districts F01, F02, F03, F04, H01, H02, H03, H04, H05, H06, H07, H11, H12, H13, H14, H15, I01, I02, I03, I04, I05, I06, I07, I08, I10, J00, J01, J02, J03, J04, J05, J06, J07, J08, J09, J11, J12, J13, J17 and J18. The Casa Blanca comparison area includes RPD reporting districts G05, G11 and G14.

<sup>2</sup> We were unable to identify the addresses and corresponding reporting districts for 19 program youth and 3 comparison youth.

Appendix Table C -1

<b>Riverside Neighborhoods</b>	<b>Riverside Police Department Reporting Districts</b>	<b>1990 Census Tracts &amp; Block Groups (BG)</b>	<b>2000 Census Tracts &amp; Block Groups (BG)</b>
<u>Eastside</u> , Downtown and University	A12, B02, B04, B11, B12, B13, C01, C02, C11, C12, C14, D01, D02, D03, D07, D12, D15	304, 305, 422.03, 422.10, 422.11, 301 BG 2-3, 303	304, 305.01, 305.02, 305.03, 422.09, 422.10, 422.11, 301 BG 2-3, 303
<u>Arlanza</u> , La Sierra Acres, La Sierra and Arlington	H01, H02, H03, H06, H07, H11, H12, H13, H14, H15, I03, I04, I07, I11, I17, J00, J03, J04, J05, J08, J09, J11, J13, J17, J18	410, 411, 412, 413, 414.01 BG 1, 414.01 BG 5, 316	410.01, 410.02, 410.03, 410.04, 411, 412.01, 412.02, 410.03, 413, 414.07, 316
<u>Casa Blanca</u> , Victoria, Magnolia Center, Ramona and Airport	F02, F03, F04, F05, F06, F11, F12, F13, F14, G05, G11, G12, G14, G18	313, 312 BG 2-5, 314.01, 314.02, 310 BG 5-6, 309 BG 2, 309 BG 9	313, 312, BG 2-5, 314.01, 314.02, 310.02, 309 BG 2, 309 BG 9

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