

# **Executive Office of the President Office of National Drug Control Policy**

# High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program Report to Congress

**June 2010** 

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Strategic Objectives
HIDTA Program Background Information
National HIDTA Program Evaluation
Assessment of Law Enforcement Intelligence Sharing in the HIDTA Program
Assessment of Drug Enforcement Task Forces in HIDTAs
Individual HIDTA Reports
Organization of Reports · · · · · · 24
Appalachia 27
Atlanta 32
Central Florida · · · · · 35
Central Valley California · · · · · 38
Chicago 42
Gulf Coast · · · · · 46
Hawaii 51
Houston 56
Lake County · · · · · 62
Los Angeles · · · · · 65
Michigan 70
Midwest 73
Milwaukee
Nevada 85
New England · · · · · 89
New York/New Jersey · · · · 94
North Florida · · · · · 100
North Texas
Northern California · · · · · 108
Northwest
Ohio
Oregon
Philadelphia/Camden · · · · · 127
Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands · · · · · 134
Rocky Mountain · · · · 138
South Florida · · · · · 142
SWB - Arizona Region · · · · · 146
SWB - California Region · · · · · 151
SWB - New Mexico Region · · · · · 156

SWB - South Texas Region · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	161
SWB - West Texas Region · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	165
Washington/Baltimore · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	169
<u>Appendices</u>	
Appendix A: Domestic Highway Enforcement Strategy · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	A-1
Appendix B: Northwest HIDTA's Northern Border Efforts	B-1
Appendix C: Appalachia & South Florida HIDTA Case Study · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	C-1
Appendix D: New England HIDTA Investigative Support Center and the Massachusetts	
Commonwealth Fusion Center · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	D-1

# **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Pursuant to the requirements of Section 301 of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Reauthorization Act of 2006, Public Law 109-469, ONDCP is providing Congress with this report on the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs). In order to present a national overview and individual HIDTA focus, this report provides background information and addresses three Congressional reporting requirements in one cohesive and coordinated document. This document is divided into an Executive Summary, Strategic Objectives, and five primary sections:

# 1. HIDTA Program Background Information

The HIDTA program provides assistance to Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies operating in areas determined to be critical drug trafficking regions of the Nation. There are currently 28 regional HIDTAs which include approximately 15% of all counties in the United States and 58% of the U.S. population. HIDTA-designated counties are located in 45 states plus Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. Through the HIDTA program, representatives of Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies in each HIDTA region coordinate and collaborate to address the specific drug threats of that region.

# 2. National HIDTA Program Evaluation

This report provides Congress with an evaluation of HIDTA performance. ONDCP has established two goals for the HIDTA Program which address program effectiveness, program efficiency, and program management, while reflecting the continued refinement of the process ONDCP has developed to manage and measure HIDTA performance. The first goal aims to reduce drug availability by assisting Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies participating in HIDTAs to dismantle and disrupt drug trafficking organizations. The second goal focuses on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA initiatives. In order to report on their achievement of these goals, each HIDTA is required to provide the following four documents pertaining to its geographical area, on which its performance evaluation is based: 1) A Threat Assessment; 2) A HIDTA Strategy; 3) An Initiative Description and Budget Proposal; and 4) An Annual Report.

## 3. Assessment of Law Enforcement Intelligence Sharing in the HIDTA Program

This report outlines the formal processes of the HIDTA program to assess law enforcement intelligence and information sharing, and highlights the formal evaluation and review process within the HIDTA program, including policy and budget guidance; FY 2009 funding levels for intelligence; processes for sharing Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement information; and the measures needed to achieve effective sharing of information. The HIDTA program has 57 operational intelligence and information sharing initiatives. Each HIDTA capitalizes on the combined resources of the Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement communities. The HIDTAs prepare and review threat assessments and apply the appropriate law enforcement response to combat illegal drug activity in our Nation.

# 4. Assessment of Drug Enforcement Task Forces in HIDTAs

This report provides Congress with an assessment of drug enforcement task forces in HIDTAs. Regardless of the method of funding task forces [HIDTA, Justice Action Grant (JAG)/Byrne-sponsored, etc.], the 28 HIDTAs provide a coordination umbrella for Federal, State, local, and tribal drug law enforcement efforts; foster a strategy-driven systemic approach to integrate and synchronize efforts; facilitate efficiency, effectiveness, and cooperation among and between various agencies; and focus on outcomes and impacts. Using both formal and informal methods of coordination among drug enforcement task forces, the HIDTAs act as neutral centers to manage, deconflict, analyze, and report on drug enforcement activities in their respective regions.

# 5. Individual HIDTA Reports

To address the specific reporting requirements, an analysis of each HIDTA is included in this report. These reports are succinct descriptions of the individual HIDTAs and their responses to the Congressional report requirements. For a more comprehensive look at an individual HIDTA's performance in addressing specific drug threats, ONDCP can provide an Annual Report, Strategy, or Threat Assessment on any specific HIDTA, upon request. While the descriptions in this report highlight the individual HIDTAs, the following is an example of a successful operation involving multiple HIDTAs, cooperation among every level of law enforcement, intelligence sharing across the Nation, and a combined effort to disrupt the La Familia Cartel, a major drug trafficking organization (DTO) based in Mexico and operating in the United States.

# Example of a Successful HIDTA Operation

A four-year, nationwide investigation, Project Coronado, culminated with a takedown on October 21-22, 2009. This operation targeted the La Familia cartel and involved 38 cities in 19 states across the United States. It is the largest single U.S. strike against Mexican drug cartels in history and resulted in a total of 1,186 individuals arrested and seizures of \$33 million in U.S. currency, 1,999 kilograms of cocaine, 1,240 kilograms of methamphetamine, 29 pounds of heroin, 16,390 pounds of marijuana, 389 weapons, 269 vehicles, and 2 clandestine drug labs.

Many HIDTAs participated in Project Coronado. The following case description shows the effort of the Northwest HIDTA's investigation and enforcement action against this cartel.

In December of 2008, a Confidential Informant (CI) reported that Arturo Barajas-Garcia, an Hispanic male from Michoacán, Mexico, was selling large quantities of crystal methamphetamine from Monroe, Washington. Investigation and telephone toll analysis determined that the Barajas DTO was a major supplier of cocaine and methamphetamine in Washington State and that this DTO was connected to several active Title III investigations across the country. All of these investigations were linked to Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) Jesus MENDEZ-Vargas of the La Familia cartel in Mexico and the subject of the DEA Special Operations Division (SOD) Project Coronado. A SOD coordination meeting was held in Redondo Beach, CA on September 1-2, 2009 to discuss all of the cases and an eventual nationwide takedown. The two-day meeting was attended by 120 agents, task force officers, and attorneys from 17 states, merging 10 separate SOD operations into a nationwide investigation named Project Coronado. The Northwest HIDTA Integrated Task Force and the South

Snohomish Narcotics Task Force quickly took the lead in coordinating and maintaining contact with agents in other field divisions and passing lead information to other Project Coronado members. In Washington, 21 Federal indictments and 6 State arrest warrants were issued. On October 21, 2009, the DEA Seattle portion of the investigation arrested 25 subjects, including Barajas-Garcia, and seized 13 kilograms of methamphetamine, 11 kilograms of cocaine, \$230,000 in U.S. currency, and a methamphetamine conversion lab.

On February 4, 2010, Barajas-Garcia pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court to Conspiracy to Distribute Controlled Substances and Conspiracy to Engage in Money Laundering. Prosecutors will recommend a sentence of 13 to 17 years in prison when Barajas-Garcia is sentenced on May 14, 2010.

### STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

This report demonstrates how the HIDTA program works to achieve the long-term goal of reducing drug trafficking and drug production in the United States by:

- (A) Facilitating cooperation among Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to share information and implement coordinated enforcement activities;
- (B) Enhancing law enforcement intelligence sharing among Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies;
- (C) Providing reliable law enforcement intelligence to law enforcement agencies needed to design effective enforcement strategies and operations; and
- (D) Supporting coordinated law enforcement strategies which maximize the use of available resources to reduce the supply of illegal drugs in designated areas and in the United States as a whole.

ONDCP developed three specific strategic objectives in response to an analysis of the various components of this report. These strategic objectives, to be accomplished in FY 2010, include processes ONDCP either is currently undertaking, or will soon undertake, to achieve a more effective and efficient HIDTA program.

# Increase the level of participation in HIDTA Intelligence and Investigative Support Centers (IISC)<sup>1</sup> by Federal agencies.

- Survey every HIDTA to determine the percentage of full-time agency participation in HIDTA IISCs:
- Survey HIDTAs quarterly to determine the level of participation;
- Create a headquarters-level interagency working group to coordinate efforts that focus resources in HIDTA IISCs, identify obstacles, and identify needed resources; and
- The ONDCP Director will encourage increased participation in IISCs by approaching Federal agencies (DEA, FBI, ICE) through a series of focused meetings outlining required resources.

# Improve information flow and collaboration among HIDTAs and non-HIDTA task forces.

- Receive and disseminate recommendations and best practices from HIDTAs
  regarding the improvement of information flow and collaboration among HIDTA and
  non-HIDTA task forces;
- Survey the HIDTAs to determine the barriers and resource requirements to connect to the National Virtual Pointer System (NVPS). The NVPS provides participating agencies the capability to exchange target pointer information through a single point of entry using a sensitive but unclassified secure network; and
- Host strategy coordination meetings with HIDTAs on improving information flow among all drug enforcement task forces in their region.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Intelligence and Investigative Support Centers (IISC) were previously known as Intelligence Support Centers (ISC) or Investigative Support Centers (ISC).

Ensure HIDTA investigative and interdiction initiatives focus on primary drug threats and are in alignment with the National Drug Control Strategy and national goals.

- Inform HIDTA Directors that each HIDTA must establish and submit operational priorities in their annual Strategies, to include the identification of primary drug threats and their corresponding task forces; and
- Require that, each year, HIDTA Strategies identify primary drug threats and the corresponding assigned and funded task forces.

# HIDTA PROGRAM BACKGROUND INFORMATION

# **Purpose**

The purpose of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program, as defined by its authorizing statute [21 U.S.C. 1706 (d)], is to reduce drug trafficking and drug production in the United States by:

- (A) Facilitating cooperation among Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to share information and implement coordinated enforcement activities;
- (B) Enhancing law enforcement intelligence sharing among Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies;
- (C) Providing reliable law enforcement intelligence to law enforcement agencies needed to design effective enforcement strategies and operations; and
- (D) Supporting coordinated law enforcement strategies which maximize the use of available resources to reduce the supply of illegal drugs in designated areas and in the United States as a whole.

# **Program Description**

The HIDTA program provides assistance to Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies operating in areas determined to be critical drug trafficking regions of the United States.

The statute authorizing the HIDTA program [21 U.S.C. 1706 (d)] requires the ONDCP Director, when determining whether to designate an area as a high intensity drug trafficking area, to consider the extent to which: 1) the area is a significant center of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, or distribution; 2) State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies have committed resources to respond to the drug trafficking problem in the area, thereby indicating a determination to respond aggressively to the problem; 3) drug-related activities in the area are having a significant harmful impact in the area, and in other areas of the country; and 4) a significant increase in allocation of Federal resources is necessary to respond adequately to drug-related activities in the area.

There are currently 28 regional HIDTAs<sup>2</sup> which include approximately 15% of all counties in the United States and 58% of the U.S. population. HIDTA-designated counties are located in 45 states, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia.

The HIDTA program provides resources to Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies in each HIDTA region to carry out activities that address the specific drug threats of that region. At the local level, the HIDTAs are directed and guided by Executive Boards<sup>3</sup> composed of an equal number of regional Federal and non-Federal (State, local, and tribal) law enforcement leaders.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> In addition, the Southwest Border HIDTA is divided into five regions (Arizona, California, New Mexico, South Texas, and West Texas), each of which operates in many respects as a separate HIDTA in a coordinated fashion.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Each HIDTA is governed by an Executive Board. Only those agencies with a staff member assigned full-time in a HIDTA initiative may be a voting member of the Board. The Board must apportion an equal number of votes between representatives of participating Federal agencies and representatives of participating State, local, and tribal agencies. The representatives are the local heads of the participating agency and are unpaid positions.

A central feature of the HIDTA program is the discretion granted to the Executive Boards to design and implement initiatives that confront the specific drug trafficking threats in each HIDTA region. This flexibility has ensured that each HIDTA Executive Board can tailor its strategy and initiatives to local conditions and can respond more quickly to changes in those conditions than would be possible if a single central office controlled the 28 HIDTAs. Each HIDTA assesses the drug trafficking threat in its defined area for the upcoming year, develops a strategy to address that threat, designs initiatives to implement the strategy, proposes funding needed to carry out the initiatives, and prepares an annual report describing its performance of the previous year. Each HIDTA's annual strategy contains its overall performance objectives to be attained through various initiatives.

In addition to management and coordination initiatives that fund the basic HIDTA administrative costs (e.g., salaries, rent, facilities, and other charges for the local HIDTA Director and the HIDTA administrative staff), the types of activities funded by the HIDTA program are:

- 1) Enforcement initiatives comprised of multi-agency investigative, interdiction, and prosecution activities targeting drug trafficking and money laundering organizations, drug production organizations, drug gangs, drug fugitives, and other serious crimes with a drug nexus;
- 2) Intelligence and information-sharing initiatives that furnish intelligence (tactical, operational, and strategic), deconfliction services (event and case/subject), information collection and dissemination, and other analytical support for HIDTA initiatives and participating agencies;
- 3) Support initiatives that provide assistance beyond the core enforcement and intelligence and information-sharing initiatives; e.g., training, crime and forensic labs, and information technology initiatives; and
  - 4) Drug use prevention and drug treatment initiatives.

## Discretionary Enforcement Projects

Through discretionary funds, the HIDTA program funds two major projects that provide support to HIDTAs throughout the Nation by addressing specific drug trafficking concerns: the Domestic Marijuana Eradication and Investigation Project (DMEIP) and the Domestic Highway Enforcement Program (DHE).

The DMEIP coordinates multi-agency efforts to investigate marijuana production with an emphasis on public lands controlled by Federal and State governments. Because of their remote locations and the limited presence of law enforcement, these public lands have become sites for the cultivation of marijuana, particularly in California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington, Tennessee, Kentucky, and West Virginia (the "M7" States).

In 2006, ONDCP initiated the Domestic Highway Enforcement (DHE) initiative to assist the HIDTAs with market disruption through a coordinated nationwide highway enforcement strategy. The DHE strategy is based on collaborative, intelligence-led policing<sup>4</sup> to enhance

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See Appendix A, "The Domestic Highway Enforcement Strategy: Leveraging Diverse Intelligence Components," for a case study on DHE's intelligence-led policing.

coordinated, multi-jurisdictional operational law enforcement efforts on the Nation's highway system, thereby increasing public safety and reducing criminal utilization on drug trafficking corridors specifically identified by the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). The 48 contiguous states participate in sharing plans and intelligence and coordinating operations. The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) supports the DHE initiative through its National Seizure System (NSS), on-line DHE community website, the Tactical Incident Notification System (TINS), and its Predictive Intelligence Unit. In 2009, DHE discretionary funds (\$4.5M) were allocated to all but five HIDTAs and initiatives funded by these dollars resulted in \$938.8M in drugs and assets seized.

# Administrative Support Program

The National HIDTA Assistance Center (NHAC), located in Miami, Florida, provides financial services to assist ONDCP in the administration of the HIDTA program and manages the HIDTA financial management system, which is a database used for budgeting and grant administration. The center also provides training and multi-media support to the HIDTAs. The NHAC funds a national coordinator for HIDTA.net (a national system for HIDTA connectivity and information sharing based on the RISS.net system sponsored by the Department of Justice). HIDTA.net is not duplicative of RISS.net; rather, it is a system that utilizes RISS.net for connectivity.

The National Methamphetamine Pharmaceuticals Initiative (NMPI) assists the HIDTAs with coordination, information sharing, and training to prosecutors, investigators, intelligence analysts, and chemists to enhance the identification of criminal targets; to increase the number of chemical/pharmaceutical drug crime-related investigations and prosecutions; and to curtail foreign chemical and precursor sources that are utilized by U.S. illicit drug manufacturers. The NMPI is funded through the Southwest Border HIDTA (California Region).

### Prevention and Treatment Initiatives

Prevention and treatment initiatives are in operation among several of the HIDTAs. Two examples of these initiatives exist within the Southwest Border HIDTA – California Region California Region and the Northwest HIDTA. In both cases, the initiatives reach across multiple sectors of the communities they serve, such as drug courts, community coalitions, and drug treatment and recovery centers.

In the California Region initiative, there are four lead agencies: California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, California National Guard, Californians for Drug Free Youth, and the San Diego Prevention Coalition. This program has developed a balanced approach toward both supply reduction and demand reduction. A three-pronged approach of enforcement, prevention, and treatment creates the necessary balance to effectively impact drug abuse, a serious threat to this region's public safety. California Region member agencies participate in drug awareness, education, and prevention through individual, localized efforts. The California Region has taken a leadership and coordination role in the enforcement of drug laws, as well as the interdiction of drugs entering California through the Southwest border. This initiative incorporates a community-oriented demand reduction program coordinated within the HIDTA.

The second example, the Northwest HIDTA has a prevention/treatment initiative that focuses on four areas of activity: drug court development, community coalition support, public

education and awareness, and an evaluation program to enhance performance of the other three areas.

# Tribal Affairs Initiatives

The HIDTA program has awarded funds to support Native American projects in the States of Arizona, New Mexico, Oregon, Texas, Oklahoma, and Washington. In all cases, developing a HIDTA task force model of multi-agency participation was a pre-requisite for funding consideration. For example, the Yakama Nation initiative in the Northwest HIDTA focuses on identifying and targeting drug trafficking organizations responsible for cultivating marijuana on tribal lands. The Task Force consists of Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement officers working jointly on investigations and seizures of illegal drugs. In 2008, this Task Force was responsible for the arrest of 152 individuals generating 131 cases and a seizure of 20 tons of marijuana.

# NATIONAL HIDTA PROGRAM EVALUATION [SEC. 301(K)(2)(A)&(B)]

Section 301(k)(2)(A)&(B) of the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006, Public Law 109-469, requires ONDCP to provide Congress with an evaluation of HIDTA performance. To comply with Section 301 (k)(1), ONDCP submitted a report to Congress on April 16, 2007; a copy of which can be provided upon request. The specific requirements of this section are contained below. To meet this requirement, this report by ONDCP includes an individual assessment of each HIDTA that describes their respective purposes and objectives, as well as an individual evaluation of the program.

# **Reporting Requirement**

The text of the reporting requirement states:

- 1. "(k) EVALUATION.—
- "(1) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the Dec. 29, 2006 date of the enactment of this section, the Director shall, after consulting with the Executive Boards of each designated high intensity drug trafficking area, submit a report to Congress that describes, for each designated high intensity drug trafficking area—
  - "(A) the specific purposes for the high intensity drug trafficking area;
- "(B) the specific long-term and short-term goals and objectives for the high intensity drug trafficking area;
- "(C) the measurements that will be used to evaluate the performance of the high intensity drug trafficking area in achieving the long-term and short-term goals; and
- "(D) the reporting requirements needed to evaluate the performance of the high intensity drug trafficking area in achieving the long-term and short-term goals.
- "(2) EVALUATION OF HIDTA PROGRAM AS PART OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY.—For each designated high intensity drug trafficking area, the Director shall submit, as part of the annual National Drug Control Strategy report, a report that—
  - "(A) describes—
  - "(i) the specific purposes for the high intensity drug trafficking area; and
- "(ii) the specific long-term and short-term goals and objectives for the high intensity drug trafficking area; and
- "(B) includes an evaluation of the performance of the high intensity drug trafficking area in accomplishing the specific long-term and short-term goals and objectives identified under paragraph (1)(B).

# Measurements Used to Evaluate the Performance of Each HIDTA

ONDCP has established two goals for the HIDTA program which address program effectiveness, program efficiency, and program management, while reflecting the continued refinement of the process ONDCP has developed to manage and measure HIDTA performance. The first goal aims to reduce drug availability by assisting Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies participating in HIDTAs to dismantle and disrupt drug trafficking organizations. The second goal focuses on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA initiatives.

To demonstrate its efforts to accomplish the first goal, each HIDTA must collect and enter information on drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), money laundering organizations (MLOs), and Consolidated Priority Organization Target list-(CPOT) related DTOs and MLOs known to operate in its region into the HIDTA Performance Management Process (PMP) database. Each HIDTA is also required to enter data regarding seizures of drugs and drug-related assets. The information in the PMP database must be updated at least quarterly to keep the database current and accurate, and must also indicate when a DTO has been disrupted or dismantled or when some other change in its status occurs.

The second HIDTA goal recognizes that it is not enough for a HIDTA to simply accomplish its outcomes; it must also achieve them efficiently. This more comprehensive accomplishment is measured as the average HIDTA cost per DTO disrupted or dismantled. As part of the second goal, each HIDTA must also address information sharing and training in its ongoing activities.

ONDCP continuously assesses the effectiveness of the HIDTA program. Using a qualified independent contractor, ONDCP conducts seven HIDTA region performance audits annually to provide assurance of the accuracy and integrity of performance information provided by the HIDTAs in the PMP system and presented in their annual performance reports. Each individual audit helps guide a HIDTA toward better performance management. The contractor compiles results and makes recommendations that help ONDCP make improvements to the overall performance of the HIDTA program. ONDCP also works with the HIDTAs to ensure that the findings and recommendations in each audit report are addressed.

It is important to note that regional threats determine the investigatory response to the nature of the threat and the complexity of the targeted organization, which can range from large, multinational organizations, to more regional or local targets. The variances in expenditures reflect the resources required to disrupt and dismantle the particular DTOs represented in the threat assessment. Major resource commitments are required for addressing international DTOs, while other organizations that are regionally and locally situated can be disrupted and dismantled with fewer required resources. This variable approach allows for the needed program flexibility to address many different nationwide threats by numerous DTOs.

# **Reporting Requirements Needed to Evaluate Performance**

Each HIDTA is required to provide the following four reports pertaining to the geographical area on which its performance evaluation is based:

(1) **Threat Assessment.** The Threat Assessment is an annual analysis of drug trafficking and related activities taking place in the HIDTA. Its primary purpose is to provide a basis for the

development of the HIDTA Strategy by identifying and describing the organizations that manufacture, cultivate, import, transport, or distribute illegal drugs in the region. The Threat Assessment must also specifically identify and describe those drug trafficking activities that affect other parts of the United States.

- (2) **HIDTA Strategy.** Using the two HIDTA program goals as starting points, the HIDTA designs a Strategy that reflects the drug threats identified in its Threat Assessment and the HIDTA's capacity to address these threats.
- (3) Initiative Description and Budget Proposals. The HIDTA must submit annual Initiative Description and Budget Proposals identifying the activities that will be undertaken to implement its Strategy. These proposals must provide: (1) realistic annual funding needs for each initiative; (2) specific quantitative performance targets; and (3) sufficient detail for ONDCP to assess whether the proposed initiatives are consistent with the HIDTA's Strategy and are likely to achieve the performance targets proposed by the HIDTA in their Annual Reports and Strategy. This Strategy can be provided upon request.
- (4) Annual Report. The HIDTA must produce an Annual Report that describes its activities, reports its progress in implementing its Strategy, and must document how it met the annual performance targets for the preceding calendar year.

The HIDTA Annual Report, Threat Assessment, and Strategy must be based on DTOs and MLOs identified in the PMP Database.

ONDCP uses data drawn from the PMP to assess the performance of the respective HIDTAs.

# **Program Accomplishments**

FY 2009 achievements will be available and shared with Congress in Summer 2010, once data has been fully collected and analyzed. For FY 2008, the most recent year for which complete data is available, annual reports indicate there were 670 HIDTA initiatives <sup>5</sup> in the 28 HIDTAs and five U.S. Southwest border regions. These initiatives were staffed by more than 6,300 Federal agents and analysts and nearly 16,000 State, local and tribal officers, analysts, and other representatives.

In FY 2009, ONDCP provided \$3,023,323 in HIDTA discretionary funding to the DMEIP. These resources are used for officer overtime, aviation flying hours, special equipment purchases, other investigative costs, and to help coordinate eradication efforts by the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Defense (National Guard), and the M7<sup>6</sup> States. In FY 2009, ONDCP contributed to the eradication of 9.4 million plants in the M7 States, an increase of more than 2 million plants from 2008.

In FY 2009, ONDCP provided \$500,000 in HIDTA baseline funding and \$200,000 in HIDTA discretionary funding to the NMPI. The purpose of the NMPI is to counter the production, distribution, and consumption of methamphetamine and precursor chemicals in the United States through training, information sharing, assisting in targeting criminal enterprises

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Initiatives are activities that implement portions of a HIDTA's Strategy as opposed to an organization of activities/investigative efforts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> M7 refers to seven States known as the Marijuana Seven: California, Hawaii, Kentucky, Oregon, Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia.

involved in these activities, and investigative support. In FY 2009, the NMPI continued to sponsor and manage conferences among U.S. Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement and certain international partners such as China and Canada. As a result of an added focus on pharmaceuticals, the NMPI further monitors programs that impact diversion control of legal substances that could be or have been abused.

In FY 2009, ONDCP released an updated National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy. The HIDTA program, and specifically the five regions of the Southwest Border (SWB) HIDTA, plays a significant role in the implementation of that Strategy. The SWB HIDTA has as its primary goal the disruption of the flow of illicit drugs from Mexico, and has expanded its mission to include the movement of cash, assets, and weapons from the U.S. into Mexico. While in FY 2008 the SWB HIDTA continued to participate in various initiatives along the entire border and in the Domestic Highway Enforcement (DHE) program, this HIDTA also increased its focus on initiatives in support of the Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy. Improved and enhanced cooperation, communications, and coordination are an integral part of the SWB HIDTA as it assists in the implementation of the Strategy.

As a follow-up to the goals and objectives set forth in the report provided to Congress on April 16, 2007, and as required by the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006, Public Law 109-469, performance information reported by the HIDTAs continues to show the HIDTA program is meeting performance targets and is devoted toward effective and efficient performance.

Finally, in accordance with the Office of Management and Budget assessment guidance, ONDCP has developed a strategy to assess the effectiveness of the overall HIDTA program. An independent contractor has begun conducting performance-related audits in order to provide assurance of the accuracy and integrity of performance information presented by the HIDTAs in their Annual Reports. The results to date have provided important information that has been employed to improve and refine the HIDTA PMP system. The assessment results have been used to improve a range of HIDTA activities, including refining performance target setting, better identifying training needs, and clarifying PMP definitions. Seven HIDTAs were audited in FY 2009, the first year of the contract. Over a period of five years, all of the HIDTAs will be part of the audit cycle. These audits, to be completed by September 2012, will be used as another tool to assess the performance of the HIDTA program as a whole.

# ASSESSMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE SHARING IN THE HIDTA PROGRAM (SEC. 301(M)(1-3))

Section 301(m)(1-3) of the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006, Public Law 109-469, requires ONDCP to provide Congress with an assessment of law enforcement intelligence sharing in the HIDTA program.

# **Reporting Requirement**

The text of the reporting requirement states:

"(m) Assessment of Law Enforcement Intelligence Sharing in High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, and as part of each subsequent annual National Drug Control Strategy report, the Director, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to Congress a report—

- (1) evaluating existing and planned law enforcement intelligence systems supported by each high intensity drug trafficking area, or utilized by task forces receiving any funding under the Program, including the extent to which such systems ensure access and availability of law enforcement intelligence to Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies within the high intensity drug trafficking area and outside of it;
- (2) the extent to which Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies participating in each high intensity drug trafficking area are sharing law enforcement intelligence information to assess current drug trafficking threats and design appropriate enforcement strategies; and
- (3) the measures needed to improve effective sharing of information and law enforcement intelligence regarding drug trafficking and drug production among Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement participating in a high intensity drug trafficking area, and between such agencies and similar agencies outside the high intensity drug trafficking area."

# **Introduction to the Intelligence Sharing Report**

The HIDTA program has 57 operational intelligence and information sharing initiatives, including 32 Intelligence and Investigative Support Centers (IISC) and 25 hubs. Each HIDTA capitalizes on the combined resources of the Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement communities. The HIDTAs prepare and review Threat Assessments and apply the appropriate law enforcement response to combat illegal drug activity in our Nation.

This report outlines the formal processes of the HIDTA program to assess law enforcement intelligence and information sharing, and highlights the formal evaluation and review process within the HIDTA program, including policy and budget guidance; FY 2009

funding levels for intelligence; processes for sharing Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement information; and the measures needed to achieve effective sharing of information.

# **Evaluation of Existing and Planned Law Enforcement Intelligence Systems**

Section 11 of the HIDTA program Policy and Budget Guidance provides specific guidance and requirements for the program review of all HIDTAs, including the intelligence and information sharing-initiatives. ONDCP reviews of individual HIDTAs are conducted in two phases:

Phase 1: Annual reviews by ONDCP of each HIDTA's budget package, including its Threat Assessment, Strategy, Initiative descriptions and budget proposals, and Annual Report; and

Phase 2: Annual internal program reviews that each individual HIDTA is required to conduct.

This report constitutes an evaluation of law enforcement intelligence systems providing support to, and participating in, the various HIDTAs. It includes information on the existing and planned law enforcement intelligence systems supported by each HIDTA, or utilized by task forces receiving funding under the program. This report further describes the extent to which Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies participating in each HIDTA are sharing law enforcement intelligence information to assess current drug trafficking threats and design appropriate enforcement strategies. Finally, it articulates the measures needed to improve effective sharing of information and law enforcement intelligence regarding drug trafficking and drug production among Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies participating in a HIDTA, and between such agencies and similar agencies outside the HIDTA.

## Basic Requirements of Intelligence and Information Sharing

Section 5 of the HIDTA program Policy and Budget Guidance provides specific guidance and requirements for intelligence and information sharing among HIDTAs. Each HIDTA must develop and implement, at least, one intelligence and information sharing initiative that is responsible for developing information and intelligence collection requirements and for collecting, evaluating, collating, analyzing, and disseminating law enforcement information and intelligence for the entire HIDTA. The initiative must consist of co-located participants from Federal and State, local, or tribal agencies. Participating agencies provide on-site, direct access to pertinent databases at the primary intelligence center, in accordance with agency requirements.

HIDTA intelligence and information sharing initiatives must comply with applicable Federal, State, and local regulations, including Federal Regulation 28 C.F.R. Part 23, "Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies." HIDTAs provide intelligence and information-sharing services in a single primary intelligence center. HIDTA Executive Boards have discretion to establish additional intelligence and information-sharing components to suit the specific circumstances of their HIDTA region. Further information regarding each HIDTA's intelligence and information-sharing initiatives can be found in the Individual HIDTA reports section, starting on page 25.

# Objectives of Intelligence and Information Initiatives

HIDTAs are to provide actionable, accurate, detailed, and timely drug and criminal intelligence, information, and analytical support to HIDTA enforcement initiatives, to HIDTA participating agencies, and to other law enforcement agencies and intelligence centers. Further, HIDTAs collect, collate, analyze, and disseminate information about offenders, crimes, and/or events to law enforcement agencies.

# **Key Components of the Intelligence and Information-Sharing Initiatives**

Each intelligence and information-sharing initiative is comprised of the following components:

# Threat Assessment Preparation

Each HIDTA prepares an annual Threat Assessment documenting the drug trafficking activities within its region, an overview of which is included in the description on each individual HIDTA in this report. The full Threat Assessment includes:

- Demographics of the region
- An overview of the drug threat, including:
  - o Drug Trafficking Organizations and their impact on the region;
  - Production and/or growing of illegal drugs to include cocaine, methamphetamine, associated methamphetamine chemicals, heroin, marijuana, ecstasy, and other illegal drugs;
  - O Transportation of illegal drugs, to include air, land, and sea threats; drug transportation activity; organizations; highways corridors; quantities and methods of transportation; and emerging transportation trends;
  - o Distribution methods and trends;
  - o Illicit finance activities; and
  - o Crime rates and trends.

# Event and Case/Subject Deconfliction

A critical component of intelligence and information sharing is ensuring safety among law enforcement agencies participating in the HIDTA program. Individual HIDTAs are required to provide a mechanism to deconflict targets and events within their respective regions.

### Analytical Support

These initiatives support drug enforcement operations, track potential threats to officer safety, and manage and analyze case information and drug trafficking activities to prepare cases for prosecution. They provide support through telephone toll analysis, analytical case support, operational intelligence programs, officer safety bulletins, and post-seizure analysis. Additionally, some HIDTAs have the capability to provide case-specific analytical support by taking drug intelligence information provided by investigators and displaying the data into a usable format across agencies. This format usually includes a graphical representation of the information which, when processed, is turned back to the initial investigator for appropriate dissemination.

# *Information Sharing*

HIDTAs have access to systems that enable them to securely share information that is sensitive, but unclassified, with intelligence components in their regions and with other HIDTAs. These systems include, but are not limited to: RISS.net, HIDTA.net, LEO, ADNET-U and Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, DEA-MERLIN (classified), Narcotics and Dangerous Drug Indexing System, Central Index System, U.S. Postal Inspector Warrant Information Network, Federal Bureau of Prisons-Sentry, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, Homeland Security Information Network, National Drug Pointer Index , National Seizure System, commercial databases such as Autotrack, Choicepoint, Lexis Nexis, as well as numerous databases from departments of motor vehicles, county prosecution offices, sheriff offices, city police departments, and parole offices.

In order to ensure information integrity and security, HIDTAs maintain and enforce security rules and practices required by the agencies providing the information. In addition, HIDTAs make use of commercial off-the-shelf firewalls which conform to industry standards for encryption and security.

# Core Functions of Intelligence and Information Initiatives

Core functions of the intelligence and information-sharing initiatives within the HIDTAs include: obtaining access to, and using, law enforcement, proprietary, and public databases; establishing and maintaining electronic connectivity to other HIDTAs through the HIDTA.Net/RISS.Net; and sharing drug-related information with other HIDTA intelligence centers and national intelligence centers.

### Other core features include:

- Investigative Databases. Each participating agency is required to provide co-located access to its investigative databases at the HIDTA's primary intelligence center.
- Electronic Connectivity. HIDTAs are responsible for establishing and maintaining the capacity (e.g., hardware, software, policies, and procedures) to continuously and securely share information with other HIDTAs and law enforcement/intelligence components.
- Sharing. HIDTAs must ensure all participating agencies receive relevant information and intelligence products in a timely fashion. HIDTAs also establish guidelines for disseminating information directly to other HIDTAs and law enforcement agencies that may benefit from the information.

# Staffing Requirements of Intelligence and Information-Sharing Initiatives

Each intelligence and information-sharing initiative in a HIDTA is sponsored by at least one participating law enforcement agency. Each HIDTA's Executive Board ensures there is joint Federal and State/local management over intelligence and information-sharing initiatives. Supervisors of such initiatives are sworn Federal, State, local, or tribal law enforcement officers or law enforcement intelligence analysts designated by a participating agency. At least one supervisor represents a Federal agency and at least one represents a State or local agency.

# Coordination and Information Sharing Requirements

HIDTA initiatives use the HIDTA's intelligence and information-sharing initiative for event and case/subject deconfliction of all enforcement and operational activities. HIDTA intelligence components maintain working relationships with intelligence components of the participating agencies and other law enforcement agencies in the HIDTA region.

Applicable Federal, State, or local laws, regulations, or policies regarding the collection, storage, and dissemination of investigative information govern the operation of a HIDTA intelligence and information-sharing initiative. Components of intelligence and information-sharing initiatives disseminate intelligence to participating agencies, subject to appropriate legal restrictions.

Event deconfliction ensures law enforcement agencies working in close proximity of each other are immediately notified when enforcement actions are planned in a manner that threatens effective coordination or that compromises the operations of fellow agencies. Notification of such conflicts enhances officer safety and promotes the coordination of operations in a multi-agency environment. Similarly, target deconfliction alerts investigators when an individual, business, Internet site, or address is being investigated by more than one person or agency. Notification of duplicate targets encourages investigators to share information and resources.

There are several deconfliction systems now being utilized by HIDTAs to accomplish this task:

- Secure Automated Fast Event/Target Network (SAFETNet): SAFETNet is an event/target deconfliction system developed, owned and operated by a consortium of 17 HIDTAs across the country;
- *HIDTA Internet-based Information System (HIBIS)*: HIBIS is a web-based case management system administered by the South Florida HIDTA, which provides analysts with the ability to compartmentalize investigative information and share data internally as well as with other HIDTAs;
- Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS): RISSIntel is information entered by RISS member agencies (law enforcement) into a databases hosted by one of the six RISS (Regional Information Sharing Systems). RISSSafe is a deconfliction program available to any RISS member that can do event and target deconfliction; and
- Case Explorer: Case Explorer is a '.net' case management, event/case deconfliction, intelligence and tip management database that is owned and administered by the Washington/Baltimore HIDTA.

To further enhance the functionality of these systems, HIDTAs have collaborated with DEA and RISS personnel to develop and implement a method to connect with DEA's target deconfliction system known, NDPIX. The connectivity among these powerful systems now provides for a truly nationwide deconfliction solution.

Those intelligence products initiated by a HIDTA's intelligence and information sharing initiative which have a nexus to ongoing cases conducted by a HIDTA Task Force are disseminated to the agency or agencies with an investigative or operational interest. Additional dissemination of the products is subject to approval by the lead agencies.

# **HIDTA Intelligence and Information Sharing Committee**

The HIDTA directors have established a HIDTA intelligence and information sharing committee comprised of selected HIDTA directors to consult on issues related to intelligence and information-sharing matters. An ONDCP staff member provides the committee members with guidance, recommendations, and approval as required. The Committee may establish working groups to assist in its work and may request assistance from intelligence program managers, information technology specialists, and others from the HIDTAs.

# **Conclusion to the Intelligence Sharing Report**

Intelligence and information-sharing initiatives continuously validate the regional drug threat and ensure the proper focus of a HIDTA's regional strategy. Specifically, the Threat Assessment is primarily used to allocate operational law enforcement task forces (initiatives) and resources to combat the illegal drug threat in the designated region. This is a process that is continually updated and based on the current or emerging threat. HIDTAs may allocate new resources, form new task forces, reallocate, or combine current resources in an effort to ensure continued results.

"Actionable intelligence and information" is a term that has been used in the law enforcement community for several years and refers to a process that is the foundation of the HIDTA intelligence architecture. Simply stated, it is using intelligence information to drive and/or direct criminal investigations. In the past, particularly with narcotics cases, investigators followed the lead of cooperating individuals (informants) rather than directing law enforcement to pursue targets and avenues dictated by intelligence information. Currently, however, HIDTA Intelligence and Investigative Support Centers (IISCs) and post-seizure analysis teams are now able to analyze the information they collect and determine related cases and identify new targets and trends, which may lead to a new path for an investigator to follow. They provide intelligence that can be acted upon and strategically developed, rather than just collated, packaged, and filed.

In addition to the HIDTA Threat Assessment, many HIDTAs, as a matter of course, prepare bulletins, alerts, and newsletters that are widely distributed throughout the HIDTA program. Specific intelligence products may contain information that includes, but is not limited to:

- Identify links between DTOs which are then relayed to law enforcement personnel for the targeting, investigation, and disruption or dismantlement of identified DTOs;
- Cluster arrests involving similar drug packaging/stamps; i.e. heroin brand names; or link to previous arrests through database research and alert law enforcement;
- Evaluate geographic commonalities by graphic depiction in maps to project areas in need of increased enforcement; and
- Provide reviews and weekly progress reports on ongoing projects/investigations, as well as drug-related information found beyond HIDTA resources.

In FY 2009, \$234 million was appropriated to the HIDTA Program, including over \$60 million for intelligence and information sharing. The HIDTA program has a robust and well-established system for sharing information and intelligence within each HIDTA, between the various regional HIDTAs, and with many other law enforcement agencies not located in HIDTA-

designated areas. There are 57 initiatives within the HIDTA program that focus on intelligence and information sharing, and each HIDTA has at least one such initiative. The 57 initiatives are distributed throughout the 11 independent cities, 466 counties included in the HIDTA program, and 45 states (South Carolina, Idaho, Minnesota, Delaware, and Alaska do not have HIDTA-designated counties).

These initiatives are directly responsible for developing information and intelligence collection requirements and for collecting, evaluating, analyzing, and disseminating law enforcement information and intelligence for the entire HIDTA program.

Not only do the initiatives strengthen the individual HIDTA, the HIDTA program's intelligence and information-sharing initiatives and subsystems facilitate the free flow of intelligence and information throughout the system and allow for a more strategic approach to identifying drug threats. According to the HIDTA Program's Performance Measurement Process (PMP) database, the HIDTA program's advanced process of identifying threats to facilitate the allocation of critical law enforcement assets against individuals and organizations trafficking in illegal drugs has proven effective.

The design and development of the HIDTA intelligence subsystem has demonstrated an ability to react quickly to new drug threats as they emerge. As intelligence collection and information sharing needs change among the agencies and entities of Federal, State, local, and tribal information and intelligence systems, the participants operating within the HIDTA intelligence subsystem respond and develop and integrate efficient and effective methods to share intelligence and information.

The HIDTA program has implemented an efficient method to achieve its goals of disrupting the illegal drug market and combating illegal drug activity by leveraging additional law enforcement resources and by integrating with other information systems and processes. Close cooperation and coordination with Department of Homeland Security-sponsored fusion systems is an essential next stage for a coordinated response and will further streamline law enforcement efforts across multiple enforcement missions. The HIDTA intelligence subsystem has been, and continues to be, a model for the successful integration and sharing of Federal, State, local, and tribal intelligence and information.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See Appendix B ("The Northwest HIDTA's Northern Border Efforts: Fueled by Intelligence and Sustained by Cooperation"), Appendix C ("The Appalachia HIDTA and the South Florida HIDTA: A Case Study in Cooperation"), and Appendix D ("The New England HIDTA Investigative Support Center and the Massachusetts Commonwealth Fusion Center: A Successful Integration") for examples of successful intelligence and information sharing.

# ASSESSMENT OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCES IN HIDTAS (SEC. 301(1)(1)(2)(A-G))

Section 301(1)(1)(2)(A-G) of the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006, Public Law 109-469, requires ONDCP to provide Congress with an assessment of drug enforcement task forces in HIDTAs.

# **Reporting Requirement**

The text of the reporting requirement states:

ASSESSMENT OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCES IN HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREAS.—

- "Not later than one year after the date of enactment of this subsection, and as part of each subsequent annual National Drug Control Strategy report, the Director shall submit to Congress a report—
- (1) assessing the number and operation of all Federally funded drug enforcement task forces within each high intensity drug trafficking area; and
- (2) describing—
  - (A) each Federal, State, local, and tribal drug enforcement task force operating in the high intensity drug trafficking area;
  - (B) how such task forces coordinate with each other, with any high intensity drug trafficking area task force, and with investigations receiving funds from the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force;
  - (C) what steps, if any, each such task force takes to share information regarding drug trafficking and drug production with other Federally funded drug enforcement task forces in the high intensity drug trafficking area;
  - (D) the role of the high intensity drug trafficking area in coordinating the sharing of such information among task forces;
  - (E) the nature and extent of cooperation by each Federal, State, local, and tribal participant in ensuring that such information is shared among law enforcement agencies and with the high intensity drug trafficking area;
  - (F) the nature and extent to which information-sharing and enforcement activities are coordinated with joint terrorism task forces in the high intensity drug trafficking area; and
  - (G) any recommendations for measures needed to ensure that task force resources are utilized efficiently and effectively to reduce the availability of illegal drugs in the high intensity drug trafficking areas.

# **Federal Task Force Report**

Regardless of the method of funding for the participating task forces (HIDTA, Justice Action Grant/Byrne-sponsored, etc.), the 28 HIDTAs provide a coordination umbrella for Federal, State, local, and tribal drug law enforcement efforts; foster a strategy-driven systemic approach to integrate and synchronize efforts; facilitate efficiency, effectiveness, and cooperation among and between various agencies; and focus on outcomes and impacts.

Due to the success of the HIDTA program, the use of sophisticated equipment and investigative techniques to dismantle drug-trafficking organizations is now standard procedure, and the philosophy of sharing information and pursuing cases beyond local regional boundaries has become the norm, rather than the exception.

In order to ensure coordination among HIDTA and non-HIDTA task forces, every HIDTA mandates its task forces and encourages participating agencies to deconflict targets and subjects under scrutiny. Deconfliction is a guiding principle and goal of the HIDTA Program. It is the process or system used to determine if multiple law enforcement agencies are investigating the same person, crime, or organization, and providing notification and contact information to each agency having a shared interest in the case determined to be in conflict. These deconfliction programs allow agents to ensure investigations do not overlap between each other, and prevent blue-on-blue events by keeping agencies informed of other law enforcement activities close to their current undercover operations. The systems are tailored to provide investigators with points of contact as well as email responses to supervisory personnel in order to keep agency management informed of possible situations their groups may encounter on the streets while working in an undercover capacity. Investigators and their managers can then communicate their interest, determine if an independent or merged investigation should occur, and exchange investigative details, often accelerating the pace of enforcement action.

Deconfliction and case management are not the only issues encountered by multiple task forces operating in the same area. Intelligence and information sharing is essential to coordinated and effective operations; therefore, each HIDTA must have at least one "intelligence and information-sharing initiative" designed to develop intelligence, share information, and provide analytical and technical support to enforcement initiatives. These initiatives include at least one Intelligence and Investigative Support Center (IISC) staffed by representatives of participating agencies who have direct on-site access to their agencies' information databases. The IISCs manage the reporting, analysis, and dissemination of case management and threat related information. This requires the HIDTA work with all law enforcement agencies in preparing the required annual Threat Assessment and Strategy documents for its region. The IISCs also pass these documents and threat information to national intelligence centers, which include the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) and the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). HIDTA task forces also turn over and coordinate any terrorism-related information and/or investigative leads to the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF).

Informally, HIDTAs coordinate and collaborate with other drug-enforcement task forces through a variety of methods: drug unit commanders meetings, law enforcement coordinating committees, the Department of Justice's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) case review and coordination meetings, law enforcement conferences, weekly intelligence bulletins, quarterly newsletters, and training opportunities. For example, HIDTAs

provide regular training to area drug unit personnel; this training not only provides investigative tools, but promotes communication and cooperation among the investigators who train together.

Per Section 301(l)(1)(2)(C-F) of the report requirements, this report to Congress includes individual HIDTA reports containing a description of each Federal, State, local, and tribal drug enforcement task force operating in the HIDTA region. Within each HIDTA description, there is also an explanation of how these regional task forces coordinate with each other.

Using both formal and informal methods of coordination among drug enforcement task forces, the HIDTAs act as neutral centers to manage, deconflict, analyze, and report on drug enforcement activities in their respective regions. Even with the IISCs, the deconfliction and case management systems, and the informal methods of coordination, there are always opportunities for improvement. As mentioned in the Strategic Objectives section of this report, ONDCP plans to improve information flow and collaboration through the National Virtual Pointer System and increased Federal participation in IISCs.

### INDIVIDUAL HIDTA REPORTS

To address the specific requests from the reporting requirements, individual HIDTA reports are provided. These reports are succinct descriptions of the individual HIDTAs and their responses to the Congressional report requirements. For a more comprehensive look at an individual HIDTA's performance in addressing specific drug threats, ONDCP will, upon request, provide an Annual Report, Strategy, or Threat Assessment for any specific HIDTA.

## **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

Per the Sec. 301 (k)(2)(A) of the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006, P.L. 109-469 reporting requirement, this section, in each individual HIDTA report, highlights the specific purpose and mission for the HIDTA.

## **STRATEGY**

Per the Sec. 301 (k)(2)(B) of the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006, P.L. 109-469 reporting requirement, this section, in each individual HIDTA report, highlights the specific long-term goals and objectives for the HIDTA.

### **LOCATION**

This section, in each individual HIDTA report, identifies the geographical location of the HIDTA, including the HIDTA-designated counties in its area of responsibility.

## *INITIATIVES*

This section, in each individual HIDTA report, highlights the total number of initiatives in each HIDTA and the number of enforcement and intelligence related initiatives. Support and management initiatives are not included in the breakdown. Initiatives are considered activities that implement portions of a HIDTA's Strategy, as opposed to an organization of activities or investigative efforts.

# SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

Per the Section 301(k)(2)(B) of the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006, P.L. 109-469 reporting requirement, this section, in each individual HIDTA report, highlights the specific short-term goals and objectives for the HIDTA. These expected objectives are measured in the table below for 2009.

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment*: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009						

**Year:** Individual HIDTAs are not required to submit 2009 results until May 2010. These numbers reflect the performance targets established by the HIDTAs for 2009 and not actual results from 2009.

**DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/Dismantled:** A DTO is an organization consisting of five or more persons that (1) has a clearly defined chain-of-command and (2) whose principal activity is to generate income or acquire assets through a continuing series of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, transportation, or distribution activities. An organization is "dismantled" when the leadership, financial base, and supply network of the organization is incapable of operating and/or reconstituting itself. An organization is "disrupted" when the normal and effective operation of the organization is impeded, as indicated by changes in organizational leadership and/or changes in methods of financing, transportation, distribution, communications, or drug production. There is no precise way to calculate or measure whether a DTO/MLO is disrupted. This is a subjective assessment made by the case agent or initiative supervisor.

**Target Return on Investment - Assets:** Return on Investment (ROI) is the ratio between the wholesale value of cash and non-cash assets seized and the amount of HIDTA funds expended on enforcement and intelligence initiatives.

**Target Return on Investment - Drugs:** Return on Investment is the ratio between the wholesale value of drugs seized and the amount of HIDTA funds expended on enforcement and intelligence initiatives.

**Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted:** Deconfliction is the process of determining if multiple law enforcement agencies are investigating the same person, crime, or organization or multiple law enforcement agencies are conducting an enforcement action (e.g., a raid, undercover operation, surveillance, or action) in close proximity to one another during a specified time period. The process includes notifying each agency of the duplication.

**Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support:** Analytical support means the services an analyst provides to support an investigation to include, but not be limited to, Association/Link/Network Analysis, Commodity Flow Analysis, Crime-Pattern Analysis, Financial Analysis, or Flow Analysis.

**Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred:** A lead is the provision of sufficient information to another HIDTA or non-HIDTA entity for the purpose of enabling that entity to conduct an independent investigation; it does not matter if or when an independent investigation is opened.

## THREAT ASSESSMENT

As required by Section 301(m)(1-3) of the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006, P.L. 109-469, each individual HIDTA report highlights the Threat Assessment for each HIDTA. While each HIDTA provides an in-depth Threat Assessment annually, this section includes a short overview of the drug trends and threats in the HIDTA region. These assessments are

developed through cooperation among Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement, as well as the National Drug Intelligence Center.

## **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

As required by Section 301(m)(1-3) of the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006, P.L. 109-469, each individual HIDTA report identifies the HIDTA Intelligence Initiatives in each region. Each HIDTA must have, at least, one intelligence and information-sharing initiative that is responsible for developing information and intelligence collection requirements and for collecting, evaluating, collating, analyzing, and disseminating law enforcement information and intelligence for the entire HIDTA. These initiatives are required to have participants from Federal and State, local, or tribal agencies.

## TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

As required by Section 301(l)(1) and (2)(A) of the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006, P.L. 109-469, each individual HIDTA report lists the name and locations of each Federal, State, local, and tribal drug enforcement task force operating in the HIDTA region.

### TASK FORCE COORDINATION

As required by Section 301(l)(2)(B-F) of the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006, P.L. 109-469, each individual HIDTA report highlights how task forces coordinate with each other; the steps taken to share information among task forces; the role of the HIDTA in coordinating information sharing; and the extent of current cooperation among participants.

### HIDTA EVALUATION

As required by Section 301(k)(2)(B) of the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006, P.L. 109-469, each individual HIDTA report includes an evaluation of the performance of the HIDTA in accomplishing the goals and objectives. The increase or decrease in the number of DTOs disrupted or dismantled is affected by developing cases, varying levels of DTOs, national and international scope of investigations, differing levels of sophistication and size of DTOs, and the ability to acquire resources.

# Appalachia HIDTA – Designated in 1998 Executive Director – Frank Rapier

### **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The mission of the Appalachia HIDTA (AHIDTA) is to measurably reduce, particularly as it relates to marijuana, the production and trafficking of illegal drugs in its immediate area; drug-related violent crime in the region; and the impact that drug production and trafficking have on other areas of the United States. Although marijuana is its primary focus, the Appalachia HIDTA responds to the threat posed by the illicit trafficking of other drugs, as required. Central to this mission is the expansion of cooperative, multi-jurisdictional law enforcement efforts involving HIDTA-funded and non-HIDTA-funded resources.

### **STRATEGY**

The AHIDTA will facilitate the necessary cooperation and effective working relationships among 6 U.S. Attorneys' Offices, 7 Federal agencies, 13 State agencies, and 61 local agencies to achieve the common goal of disrupting and dismantling DTOs by targeting drug cultivation, distribution, drug-related violent crime, and reducing demand.

### **LOCATION**

The AHIDTA operates out of London, Kentucky. It encompasses the following counties in three states:

- 28 counties in Kentucky: Adair, Bell, Breathitt, Clay, Clinton, Cumberland, Floyd, Harlan, Jackson, Jefferson, Knott, Knox, Laurel, Lee, Leslie, Letcher, McCreary, Magoffin, Marion, Owsley, Perry, Pike, Pulaski, Rockcastle, Taylor, Warren, Wayne, and Whitley;
- 30 counties in Tennessee: Bledsoe, Campbell, Claiborne, Clay, Cocke, Cumberland, Fentress, Franklin, Grainger, Greene, Grundy, Hamblen, Hamilton, Hawkins, Jackson, Jefferson, Knox, Macon, Marion, Overton, Pickett, Putnam, Rhea, Roane, Scott, Sequatchie, Sevier, Unicoi, Washington, and White; and
- 9 counties in West Virginia: Boone, Cabell, Kanawha, Lincoln, Logan, Mason, McDowell, Mingo, and Wayne.

## *INITIATIVES*

The AHIDTA has 21 initiatives, which include 1 intelligence initiative, 18 investigation/interdiction/eradication initiatives, 1 management initiative, and 1 support initiative.

### SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YE	EAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
20	009	97	2	201	4,920	375	695

### THREAT ASSESSMENT

Appalachia is a major source of domestically produced marijuana and a destination for foreign produced marijuana. The Appalachia region is faced with a grave threat from the trafficking and abuse of prescription drugs. Additionally, the region is plagued by crack cocaine, powder cocaine, drug-related violence, and methamphetamine production and abuse. Marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, and increasingly prescription drugs, are transported by land to Appalachia and in many instances, to Atlanta, Georgia.

In 2009, marijuana production in the AHIDTA will exceed 500,000 plants. The diversion and abuse of controlled pharmaceutical drugs, particularly oxycodone and hydrocodone, will continue to pose a significant threat but recede slightly over time. In the near term, traffickers and abusers of diverted pharmaceuticals will continue attempts to circumvent the law by traveling to Florida to obtain large quantities of these narcotic analgesics. If the State of Florida implements a prescription drug monitoring program (PDMP), some traffickers and abusers will be stopped and incarcerated. The number of methamphetamine/clandestine labs, dumpsites, and chemical/glassware seizures in the AHIDTA will increase, but will not reach record levels. Indoor marijuana grow operations are expected to increase in number and sophistication.

## **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

AHIDTA has an IISC in Kentucky, with intelligence components in Tennessee and West Virginia. The mission of the IISC is to assist AHIDTA Initiatives in executing the AHIDTA Strategy by providing a wide range of intelligence services and products. These services/products include, but are not limited to, event and subject deconfliction services for officer safety and enhanced intelligence production; strategic intelligence for refined targeting and officer resource allocation, in-service analytical intelligence training, telephone toll analysis, financial analysis, the preparation of Threat Assessments, strategic reports, and organizational studies; informant/defendant debriefings, cultivating new sources of information; performing post-seizure and search warrant analysis; supporting arrest operations; preparing and conducting briefings for visitors to the AHIDTA; and assisting in trial preparations. Additionally, the IISC prepares scheduled and one-time intelligence products, assists in the preparation of management reports, and responds or assists in responses to requests for AHIDTA information from Federal, State, and local entities.

# TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Bowling Green Warren County Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Bowling Green, KY
Second Judicial Drug and Violent Crime Task Force	Blountville, TN
West Virginia DEA HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Charleston, WV
Metropolitan Drug Enforcement Network Team	Charleston, WV
Tennessee Methamphetamine Task Force	Chattanooga, TN
DEA South Tennessee Task Force	Chattanooga, TN
Columbia Area Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Columbia, KY
Thirteenth Judicial Drug and Violent Crime Task Force	Cookeville, TN
TBI Middle Tennessee Task Force	Cookeville, TN
Third Judicial Drug and Violent Crime Task Force	Greeneville, TN
Fifteenth Judicial Drug and Violent Crime Task Force	Hartsville, TN
Kentucky River Task Force (Operation UNITE)	Hazard, KY
Hazard Investigative Initiative	Hazard, KY
Huntington Violent Crimes & Drug Task Force	Huntington, WV
Eighth Judicial Drug and Violent Crime Task Force	Jacksboro, TN
Twelfth Judicial Drug and Violent Crime Task Force	Jasper, TN
First Judicial Drug and Violent Crime Task Force	Johnson City, TN
DEA Upper East Tennessee Task Force	Johnson City, TN
Ninth Judicial Drug Task Force	Kingston, TN
Sixth Judicial Drug Task Force	Knoxville, TN
DEA Rocky Top Task Force	Knoxville, TN
FBI Rocky Top Task Force	Knoxville, TN
U.S. 119 Task Force	Logan, WV
DEA London Task Force (HIDTA)	London, KY
National Forest Marijuana Investigative Initiative	London, KY
Southeast Kentucky OCDETF/Public Corruption Task Force	London, KY
Cumberland Valley Task Force (Operation UNITE)	London, KY
Kentucky Eradication Initiative	London, KY
Fourteenth Judicial Drug and Violent Crime Task Force	Manchester, TN
Big Sandy Narcotics Task Force	Prestonsburg, KY
Fourth Judicial Drug and Violent Crime Task Force	Sevierville, TN
Lake Cumberland Area Drug Task Force	Somerset, KY
West Virginia Eradication Initiative	South Charleston, WV

### TASK FORCE COORDINATION

The Executive Board and the staff of the AHIDTA provide a coordination umbrella for Federal, State, and local drug law enforcement efforts; foster a Strategy-driven systemic approach to integrate and synchronize efforts; facilitate efficiency, effectiveness, and cooperation among and between Federal, State, and local agencies; and focus on outcomes and impacts. AHIDTA task forces coordinate activities and operations with each other, other task forces, and law enforcement agencies in many forms and formats. These task forces have long-standing relationships and frequently interact with each other through United States Attorneys' Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee training events, quarterly HIDTA state committee meetings, HIDTA conferences, annual director reviews, and other specialized training events in all three States. This facilitates the exchange of information and trends, and leads to working relationships that would not exist without this interaction. The HIDTA and OCDETF goals are congruent as to taking an organization dismantlement approach to drug law enforcement. Frequently, HIDTA cases also have OCDETF designations.

The AHIDTA mandates its task forces and encourages agencies participate in deconfliction of targets and subjects. This protects officers and helps agencies coordinate multiple drug investigation activities to prevent operational conflicts. The AHIDTA encourages agencies inside and outside the area to use the Secure Automated Fast Event Tracking Network (SAFETNet) and provides free training and access through the Appalachia HIDTA IISC. To date, there are over 230 law enforcement agencies in Kentucky, Tennessee, and West Virginia, located inside and outside of the HIDTA-designated area that participate in the deconfliction program.

The AHIDTA IISC coordinates the sharing of information for all its initiatives, as well as other task forces, and law enforcement inside and outside its designated area. The IISC allows initiatives and other participants to share information concerning organizational structures of DTOs, transportation and distribution modes of operation and other related intelligence. The IISC also shares intelligence with task forces and law enforcement agencies that is received from EPIC, the Regional Organized Crime Information Center, other HIDTAs, and other sources, including other law enforcement agencies and task forces outside the Appalachia HIDTA.

## HIDTA EVALUATION

The AHIDTA Strategy focuses resources and interagency efforts on regional drug threats, and facilitates coordination between Federal, State, and local agencies. The HIDTA has provided data to show the impact of its expenditures on identified performance measures and on drug trafficking. Information provided by the HIDTA indicates these efforts have contributed to significant reductions in marijuana cultivation by local growers. However, intelligence data indicates the drug threat is changing, as large marijuana grows are established by foreign nationals in remote areas of Kentucky, Tennessee, and West Virginia. HIDTA task forces recently seized such marijuana grows in Campbell County, Tennessee (151,000 plants) and in Knox County, Kentucky (6,800 plants). Additionally, the HIDTA was informed of 62,000 marijuana plants located in four marijuana plots in Grant, Hardy, and Pendleton (non-HIDTA) counties, West Virginia.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs, arresting and prosecuting traffickers, and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the AHIDTA disrupted or dismantled 88 DTOs, compared to 85 DTOs the prior year. Its law enforcement initiatives successfully disrupted and/or dismantled 90% of the 98 DTOs they expected to disrupt or dismantle in 2008. The 88 DTOs disrupted and/or dismantled represent 40% of the 218 under investigation by Appalachia HIDTA law enforcement initiatives. Of the 218 DTOs under investigation, 150 (69%) operated in multiple states beyond the Appalachia HIDTA region or were involved in international operations.

# Atlanta HIDTA – Designated in 1995 Executive Director – Jack Killorin

## **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The mission of the Atlanta HIDTA is to measurably and accountably:

- Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking and money laundering organizations through intelligence-driven multi-jurisdictional operations;
- Improve the safety and effectiveness of law enforcement operations; and
- Improve communication and information sharing among criminal justice, drug prevention, and drug treatment professionals in support of ONDCP objectives.

## **STRATEGY**

The Atlanta HIDTA fosters collaborative working relationships among over 40 Federal, State, and local investigative and prosecuting agencies conducting intelligence-driven operations against major DTOs.

### **LOCATION**

The Atlanta HIDTA operates out of Atlanta, Georgia. It currently includes the following counties in two States:

- 12 counties in Georgia: De Kalb and Fulton (including the city of Atlanta) and Hartsfield Jackson Airport (which is part of Henry County) were designated in 1995; Cobb and Gwinnett were designated in 2006; and Barrow, Bartow, Cherokee, Clayton, Douglas, Fayette, Forsyth, and Henry, in 2008;
- 8 counties in North Carolina: Alamance, Durham, Guilford, Johnston, Randolph, Wake, Wayne, and Wilson.

### **INITIATIVES**

The Atlanta HIDTA has 10 initiatives, which include 1 management, 2 support, 1 prevention, 1 intelligence, and 5 investigation/interdiction/prosecution and initiatives.

# SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	40	1	7	1,050	125	25

### THREAT ASSESSMENT

Atlanta remains the primary area of operations in the Eastern United States for Mexican cartels distributing narcotics and smuggling bulk currency. In 2008, the spread of these cartel operations resulted in the expansion of the Atlanta HIDTA from 4 counties in the metropolitan Atlanta area to 12, and the addition of 5 counties in the Raleigh/Durham area of North Carolina. In 2009, three counties in the Greensboro, North Carolina area were added.

## **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

Atlanta HIDTA's Intelligence and Investigative Support Center (IISC) was formerly called the Drug Intelligence Fusion Component. It has been part of Atlanta HIDTA since its founding in 1995. The IISC is located at Atlanta HIDTA's Operations Center and is supervised by a DEA Supervisory Intelligence Analyst. The IISC provides analytical intelligence (toll, link and document analyses, interviews/debriefings, administrative subpoenas, subpoena requests, profiles of suspects, database checks, etc.) and information management support to Atlanta HIDTA's law enforcement initiatives and to Domestic Highway Enforcement. The IISC also provides operational subject, case, and event deconfliction and investigative coordination for law enforcement agencies. Policies guiding structure, services, security clearance access and linkage with other HIDTAs and Federal, State, and local databases are in conformance with the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan and ONDCP policy guidance and with those of the Atlanta HIDTA Executive Board. The Atlanta Metro HIDTA's IISC is linked through RISSNET to all HIDTA programs (task force and intelligence centers) employing this virtual private network.

# TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Metro Task Force (HIDTA)	Atlanta, GA
DeKalb Task Force (HIDTA)	Decatur, GA
Triangle Initiative (HIDTA)	Durham, NC
Triad Initiative (HIDTA)	Greensboro, NC
West Metro Regional Drug Enforcement Office (Byrne/JAG)	Carrollton, GA
OCDETF Strike Force	Atlanta, GA

# TASK FORCE COORDINATION

There are significant formal and informal coordination mechanisms among all relevant task forces in the Atlanta HIDTA area, regardless of whether or not they receive Federal funding. Many of these mechanisms are enhanced or enabled by the Atlanta HIDTA. Informally, participants know each other from operational contacts, periodic meetings, and HIDTA/OCDETF/Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee-sponsored training and conferences. Agencies participating in one task force often have officers assigned to other task forces, thereby promoting information exchange and coordination. HIDTA-sponsored deconfliction services promote event and target coordination among task forces and agencies. Executives from agencies with personnel participating in HIDTA initiatives serve on the HIDTA Executive Board, thereby promoting information exchange and coordination. The Atlanta

HIDTA task force groups exchange information regularly with narcotics units and task forces in the area where active cases are under investigation and with area units; and task forces regularly contact the IISC to develop or coordinate leads. The IISC publishes and distributes intelligence bulletins to the area narcotics investigation units and task forces.

All area task forces are interviewed by the Atlanta HIDTA IISC in preparing the required annual Threat Assessment. This information is then shared with the agencies interviewed and with the Atlanta HIDTA Executive Board. The Executive Board is comprised of the heads of the participating investigative and prosecutorial agencies in the HIDTA. In addition, area narcotics enforcement units attend periodic conferences and drug unit commander meetings, including those sponsored by the Atlanta HIDTA and OCDETF.

#### HIDTA EVALUATION

The Atlanta HIDTA continues to be the main distribution hub for Mexican Cartel DTOs and MLOs operating in the eastern part of the United States. Over the past several years, this activity has spread throughout North Georgia and into North Carolina's Research Triangle and elsewhere in North Carolina. To target this threat, the HIDTA has been expanded with the addition of counties in Georgia and North Carolina.

The Atlanta HIDTA has implemented a three-part Strategy (geographical, functional, and operational) to focus on upper and mid-level drug trafficking and money laundering organizations.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting or dismantling major DTOs, arresting and prosecuting traffickers, and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 56 DTOs, compared to 41 the prior year. The increase in DTOs dismantled and disrupted is due to the geographical expansion of the HIDTA and internal restructuring to enhance investigative efforts.

# Central Florida HIDTA – Designated in 1998 Executive Director – William Fernandez

# **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The mission of the Central Florida HIDTA (CF HIDTA) is to improve the quality of life in Central Florida by reducing drug availability and crime through the effective disruption and dismantling of DTOs impacting Central Florida and other areas of the United States.

## **STRATEGY**

The HIDTA will continue to foster cooperative and effective working relationships between the Office of the U.S. Attorney, eight Federal agencies, and eight State and local agencies to achieve the common goals of dismantling, or disrupting, DTOs and reducing the demand for drugs.

## **LOCATION**

The CF HIDTA operates out of Sanford, Florida. It encompasses a seven-county area including Pinellas, Hillsborough, Polk, Osceola, Orange, Seminole, and Volusia Counties.

# **INITIATIVES**

The CF HIDTA has 14 initiatives, which include 1 management, 1 support, 1 intelligence, and 11 investigation/investigation/interdiction initiatives.

# SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	55	5	24	1,810	269	108

# THREAT ASSESSMENT

The passage of the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005 (Title VII of P.L. 109-177) had an immediate impact on the number of clandestine laboratories encountered by the CF HIDTA. However, the smurfing of purchases of those products has reversed the trend, and it is expected to continue. It is expected that Mexican DTOs will continue to gain a share of the methamphetamine market. Cocaine will continue to be the primary drug problem with prescription drug abuse and trafficking and its attendant violence following closely behind.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> "smurfing" refers to the action of going from store-to-store purchasing the maximum limit allowable under the law of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine products and then pooling these products, which will then be provided to a meth producer.

Drug-related violence will continue to increase, continuing a disturbing trend. It is estimated that 70 percent of all violent crime in the CF HIDTA is connected to the drug trade. Indoor marijuana grow houses will continue to proliferate in Central Florida, as producers and traffickers become aware of the enormous profits which can be gained from this activity.

# **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

The ONDCP funds the Central Florida Intelligence and Investigative Support Center (CFIISC) as an initiative of the CF HIDTA. The CFIISC was created with the designation of the CF HIDTA in 1998 to provide collocated multi-agency intelligence support to regional drug law enforcement agencies to enhance their ability to dismantle and disrupt drug trafficking organizations.

There is a commitment that the CFIISC be a hub of information that is translated into effective investigative enforcement efforts. The CHIISC assists in guiding and enhancing operational cases; and the result is to cause a qualitative, as well as a quantitative reduction in the drug trafficking, money laundering, and drug-related violent criminal activity affecting Central Florida and other areas of the United States.

The success of the CFIISC is measured through assessments of the previously mentioned investigative efforts and the extent to which major and secondary organizations involved in these criminal activities have been disrupted or dismantled. Additional assessments are made through the coordinated and cooperative efforts of Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to address the specific criminal activity.

The mission of the CFIISC is to actively collect, analyze, and disseminate information on the composition, scope, and dynamics of money laundering, drug trafficking, distribution, and drug-related violent crime organizations; and to provide clarity and an understanding of the organized criminal elements operating throughout Central Florida.

## TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Pinellas County (HIDTA)	Largo
Colombian/South American DTO (HIDTA)	Tampa
DEA HIDTA Methamphetamine Task Force (HIDTA)	Tampa
DEA State/Local Task Force	Tampa
Polk County HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Bartow
Osceola County Investigative Bureau (HIDTA)	Kissimmee
Metropolitan Bureau Of Investigation (HIDTA)	Orlando
City County Investigative Bureau (HIDTA)	Sanford
DEA HIDTA Heroin Task Force (HIDTA)	Heathrow
DEA Mex/Poly Task Force (HIDTA)	Heathrow
DEA State/Local Task Force	Heathrow
Volusia Bureau of Investigation (HIDTA)	Daytona

#### TASK FORCE COORDINATION

The CF HIDTA funds 10 drug task forces and one fugitive apprehension task force. The CF HIDTA is overseen by a balanced (Federal/State and local) Executive Board made up of participating law enforcement officials. All task forces utilize the CFIISC for deconfliction of cases, subjects, and activities. All law enforcement agencies in the area are encouraged to utilize the CFIISC for information sharing and deconfliction.

CF HIDTA task forces meet and are evaluated quarterly. They routinely coordinate activities with other regional task forces, as well as other HIDTA task forces across the State and country. While the sharing of intelligence is requested of all law enforcement agencies, there is certainly more amongst the HIDTA task forces. All CF HIDTA task forces are requested to be vigilant in obtaining and sharing information relating to national security. CF HIDTA task forces strive to meet an ever-changing drug threat through the re-direction of their efforts when needed. The annual Threat Assessment serves as a guideline when a change in focus is needed. This document is shared with other regional task forces.

# **HIDTA EVALUATION**

ONDCP will continue to work with the CF HIDTA to improve performance, including the ability to set appropriate targets. In 2008, the HIDTA began using three-year averaging to help establish targets.

The CF HIDTA has taken positive steps to address an increased threat of indoor marijuana cultivation, an increase in methamphetamine labs, and pharmaceutical diversion in its region.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting or dismantling major DTOs, arresting and prosecuting traffickers, and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the CF HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 50 DTOs, compared to 62 the prior year. The decrease in the number of DTOs disrupted or dismantled is due to several long-term and complex investigations and a heightened focus by two initiatives on an increased threat of indoor marijuana grows. The increased focus on indoor marijuana grows addressed a significant public safety issue, but resulted in limited DTO dismantlement or disruption.

# Central Valley California HIDTA – Designated in 1999 Executive Director – William Ruzzamenti

# **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The mission of the Central Valley California HIDTA (CVC HIDTA) is to reduce the manufacture or growth, trafficking, and distribution of marijuana, methamphetamine, precursor chemicals, and other dangerous drugs by attacking and dismantling the large-scale and often violent organizations responsible through the implementation of cooperative and innovative strategies. The goals of the CVC HIDTA are to reduce drug availability by disrupting and dismantling DTOs, and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the region's law enforcement organizations.

## **STRATEGY**

The CVC HIDTA applies the traditional law enforcement methodologies and techniques that have proved effective against DTOs. Nearly 150 Federal, State, county, and city law enforcement members representing over 25 agencies comprise the CVC HIDTA initiatives. The integration and coordination of task force efforts are supported by a network of criminal intelligence analysts and integrated intelligence centers.

# **LOCATION**

The CVC HIDTA operates out of Sacramento, California. The 10 counties that comprise the CVC HIDTA region include Kern, Kings, Madera, Merced, Shasta, Stanislaus, San Joaquin, Fresno, Tulare, and Sacramento.

#### *INITIATIVES*

The CVC HIDTA has 14 initiatives, which include 1 management, 1 support, 2 intelligence, and 10 investigation/interdiction initiatives.

#### SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	68	2	2,000	14,900	2,451	79

## THREAT ASSESSMENT

The HIDTA's greatest drug problems are related to methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine, and heroin. The 10-county region is a leading producer of outdoor and indoor grown Sinsemilla marijuana and methamphetamine. Outdoor marijuana growing usually takes place in forests and remote public lands. Large cannabis plots are usually tended by illegal aliens, many

of whom are armed. They pose a grave danger to hikers, campers, and forest workers. In 2008, over 5.1 million marijuana plants were eradicated in the State, with nearly 1.3 million from CVC HIDTA counties. Organized bands of "smurfers" roam the region purchasing thousands of pseudoephedrine tablets from pharmacies. <sup>9</sup> These are sold to meth lab operators. Large superlabs producing over 10 pounds of methamphetamine in a single cycle operate in the region. This area is a national drug production and transshipment hub. According to intelligence, Mexico-based DTOs produce and smuggle into the Central Valley of California much of the heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine for transport to U.S. drug markets, while Asian DTOs produce marijuana, and distribute ecstasy around the country. Approximately 75 percent of all marijuana grown on public lands is done by individuals from Michoacán, Mexico. HIDTA initiatives report the vast majority of all DTOs operating in the Central Valley HIDTA counties are comprised of foreign nationals. When DTO members were arrested and debriefed, they possessed official Mexican voter registration cards and Mexican driver's licenses, showing their Mexican state and city of origin. With regard to Asian DTOs, 50 Chinese DTO-related indoor grow houses were eradicated in Sacramento, Elk Grove, Galt, and Lathrop from May 2006 to January 2007. These were joint DEA and local agency investigations with physical evidence and debriefings indicating that several of these arrestees had ties to Asian organized crime and San Francisco street gangs such as the Jackson Street Boys and the Hop Sing Tong.

## INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES

The IISC's mission of providing tactical and strategic intelligence services to the HIDTA participating agencies and Executive Board is accomplished under the leadership of a DEA Supervisor and California BNE managers. The IISC's analysts are both centralized and decentralized. It operates from a central intelligence office in Fresno, yet has decentralized analysts placed in other offices in Fresno, Los Angeles, Bakersfield, Modesto, and Sacramento. Decentralization of services is needed because the HIDTA initiatives span a geographic area of over 300 miles. Two analysts serve in the Los Angeles HIDTA Clearinghouse (LA CLEAR) providing critical event deconfliction services to the CVC HIDTA. The HIDTA's contract analysts are supplemented with intelligence analysts from the California National Guard.

The Marijuana Intelligence Fusion Center, which began in 2005 as an unfunded initiative of the DMEIP, is now a base-funded initiative of the CVC HIDTA's intelligence subsystem. The mission of the Fusion Center is to provide tactical and strategic intelligence support to drug investigations; to collect and analyze intelligence and investigative information about marijuana producing DTOs; to identify the structure, membership, interrelationships, and operations of DTO's; and to provide this intelligence and information to enforcement agency investigators and managers.

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 $<sup>^{9}</sup>$  "smurfers": numerous individuals going from store to store purchasing the maximum limit of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine products at each store and then pooling their purchases.

## TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Fresno Area Meth Task Force (HIDTA)	Fresno County
Fresno Area Surveillance Team (HIDTA)	Fresno County
Merced Mariposa Task Force (HIDTA)	Merced County
Sacramento Area Intelligence Narcotic Task Force (HIDTA)	Sacramento County
Stanislaus San Joaquin Meth Task Force (HIDTA)	Stanislaus
Southern Tri-County Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Kern County
Central Valley Marijuana Investigative Team (HIDTA)	Fresno County
Northern States Marijuana Investigative Team (HIDTA)	Shasta County
Mountain and Valley Marijuana Investigative Team (HIDTA)	Sacramento County
Shasta Marijuana Eradication Team (HIDTA)	Shasta County
Shasta Domestic Highway Enforcement (HIDTA)	Shasta County
Fresno Domestic Highway Enforcement (HIDTA)	Fresno County
Joint Fugitives Task Force (HIDTA)	Fresno County
IISC (HIDTA)	Fresno County
Marijuana Intelligence Fusion Center (HIDTA)	Sacramento County
DEA Multi-agency Drug Task Force	Sacramento
FBI Operation Safe Streets Task Force	Redding
FBI Operation Safe Streets Task Force	Sacramento
FBI Operation Safe Streets Task Force	Stockton
FBI Operation Safe Streets Task Force	Modesto
FBI Operation Safe Streets Task Force	Bakersfield
Madera Narcotics Enforcement Team (Byrne Grant)	Madera
Merced Multi-Agency Narcotics Enforcement Team (Byrne Grant)	Merced
Kings County Narcotics Task Force (Byrne Grant)	Hanford

# TASK FORCE COORDINATION

CVC HIDTA task forces routinely coordinate investigations and tactical deployments with one another when their operations enter into an adjoining jurisdiction, via in-person communications or through the Western States Information Network (WSIN) deconfliction system. Using this multi-State deconfliction system is essential to task force operations. Investigative subjects and critical/tactical events are posted in WSIN as routine operating procedures. Coordination is generally achieved through information sharing, leveraging of resources, sharing of analytical resources, pooling of analysts, shared computer networks and software, and enhanced training opportunities. Up to 39 percent of the case/subject entries have been found to be already on record and of interest to other investigators or agencies. CVC HIDTA initiatives coordinate with other HIDTAs regarding cross-country transportation investigations and meet quarterly to share investigative information.

CVC HIDTA initiatives are comprised of multi-jurisdictional agencies at the local, State, and Federal level. These agencies include city police departments, county sheriff's offices, the U.S. Marshal Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the National Guard, DEA, FBI, Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement, Department of Justice, the U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. National Park Service and the ATF. Information sharing between HIDTA initiatives takes place at regularly scheduled meetings where investigative activity is discussed with the team commanders.

The CVC HIDTA Executive Board has members from both the local and Federal agencies. Local sheriff offices and police departments, the IRS, FBI, ICE, DEA, National Park Service, ATF, U.S. Attorneys, and the U.S. Marshals Service are all represented. The Executive Board meets on a regular basis to evaluate funding, training, and effectiveness of the initiatives. The Executive Board is continually kept apprised of changing threats and needs of the area enabling them to disseminate that information among their own agencies. The board members also bring pertinent information from their agencies to the HIDTA.

Training programs are open to all agencies in the region. Terrorism-related information programs have alerted regional agencies and drug task forces of the importance of sharing information with the JTTF. The program director is working on an MOU with JTTF to get a full-time analyst assigned to the Marijuana Intelligence Fusion Center to better facilitate communications between the two organizations. Information is researched through the files of the EPIC database, which includes DHS records. Intelligence Fusion Center records have been supplied to DHS representatives at the Sacramento JTTF.

# **HIDTA EVALUATION**

ONDCP will continue to work with the CVC HIDTA to appropriately array its resources against methamphetamine, as well as other drugs, such as marijuana.

The CVC HIDTA underwent an external, independent audit of their performance measures and policy adherence. The audit found that the HIDTA adheres to the formal requirements of the HIDTA program and has sufficient oversight over their performance reporting.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 75 DTOs, compared to 43 the prior year. This increase is due to investigations begun in 2007 which came to completion in 2008.

# Chicago HIDTA – Designated in 1995 Executive Director – Kurt Schmid

# **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The mission of the Chicago HIDTA is to enhance and coordinate drug control efforts among Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in its geographic area of responsibility, the surrounding region, and other affected areas of the country.

## **STRATEGY**

The Chicago HIDTA continues to foster cooperative and effective working relationships among Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in order to eliminate or reduce drug trafficking and its harmful consequences. This includes coordinated efforts to reduce the production, manufacturing, distribution, transportation, and chronic use of illegal drugs, as well as the attendant money laundering of drug proceeds.

# **LOCATION**

The Chicago HIDTA operates out of Chicago, Illinois. It encompasses four counties in the State of Illinois: Cook, (City of Chicago), Grundy, Kendall, and Will.

## *INITIATIVES*

The Chicago HIDTA has 12 initiatives, which include 1 Management, 1 training, 1 Intelligence, and 9 Investigation/Interdiction initiatives.

# SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEA	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
200	94	3	6	11,000	80	308

## THREAT ASSESSMENT

Chicago is not only one of the largest consumer markets for cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and other illicit drugs, but it also serves as a national-level transshipment hub and distribution center for these drugs to other areas of the country. The distribution and abuse of cocaine, followed by heroin and marijuana, are the primary drug threats in the Chicago HIDTA region. Intelligence and on-going cases indicate that large quantities of these drugs are transported to the area by Mexican DTOs and criminal groups, principally from locations along the U.S. Southwest border. In 2008, Chicago HIDTA initiatives reported the seizure of 2,479 kilograms of cocaine, 122 kilograms of heroin, and 10,275 kilograms of marijuana. Mexican DTOs and criminal

groups dominate the wholesale transportation and distribution of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana; they typically obtain these drugs directly from DTOs operating in Mexico and provide them to street gang leaders in the region for retail-level distribution. Street gangs are the primary retail distributors of illicit drugs. These gangs regularly engage in violent criminal activities to protect their drug supplies, distribution territories, and illicit drug proceeds. Street gangs are continuing their incursion into outlying areas and are becoming increasingly problematic for suburban law enforcement. In addition, the Chicago metropolitan area has one of the highest rates of drug-use prevalence in the United States. The most recent data available from the Illinois Department of Human Services, Office of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse (DASA), indicates that the HIDTA region accounted for more than half (55.3%) of all treatment provider services received by patients in Illinois in 2007.

## INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES

The mission of the Chicago HIDTA IISC is to facilitate the interaction and sharing of information to support multi-agency efforts to further drug-related and/or criminal investigations. The operational mission of the IISC is to provide actionable, accurate, detailed, and timely tactical, investigative, and strategic criminal intelligence to HIDTA initiatives, HIDTA participating agencies, and other law enforcement agencies as appropriate, enabling a more effective and efficient utilization of valuable investigative resources.

Functions of the IISC includes: the collection, compilation, and analysis of information regarding illicit drug and associated criminal activities, the dissemination and exchange of value-added counter drug intelligence products, a regional pointer event and target deconfliction system, an "all source" counter drug information gateway accessible to all law enforcement agencies, case and trial support to Federal and State counterdrug and related prosecutions, the coordination of counterdrug and related law enforcement training and technical assistance to law enforcement counterdrug efforts.

The Management Information System (MIS) is a subsystem of the IISC; its mission is to provide the HIDTA enforcement and intelligence initiatives with state-of-the-art resources for intelligence gathering and analysis. These resources include access to relevant information through a myriad of Federal, State, municipal, and public information stores; software for analysis and presentation of case data; custom-built databases for storage and organization of law enforcement data; innovations of analytical methodologies created from MIS staff and analyst collaborations; and wider availability of HIDTA resources via network infrastructure.

# TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Joliet Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad (HIDTA)	Romeoville
Intelligence and Investigative Support Center (HIDTA)	Cook County
Consolidated Priority Organization Target Initiative Task Force (HIDTA)	Cook County
Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Initiative Task Force (HIDTA)	Cook County
Package Interdiction Initiative Task Force (HIDTA)	Cook County
Regional Drug Trafficking Organization Initiative/Violent Crimes Task Force	Cook County

(HIDTA)	
Street Narcotics and Gangs Initiative Task Force (HIDTA)	Cook County
Tri-County Multi-Jurisdictional Counterdrug Enforcement Initiative Task Force	
(HIDTA)	Cook County
Violent Gang Conspiracy Group Initiative Task Force (HIDTA)	Cook County
Multi Jurisdictional Financial Enforcement Group Initiative Task Force (HIDTA)	Cook County
Domestic Highway Enforcement/Narcotics Interdiction Team (HIDTA)	Cook County
Safe Streets Task Force on Gangs – Tactical (FBI)	Cook County
Safe Streets Task Force on Gangs – 1 (African American Gangs) (FBI)	Cook County
Safe Streets Task Force on Gangs – 2 (Hispanic Gangs) / (FBI)	Cook County
Safe Streets Task Force on Gangs / West RA (non-Chicago) (FBI)	Cook County
Will County Violent Crimes Task Force (FBI)	Cook County
Will County CPAT (Cooperative Police Assistance Team) (FBI)	Cook County

## TASK FORCE COORDINATION

Five of the above HIDTA-funded initiatives/task forces (the IISC, the Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Initiative Task Force, the Violent Gang Conspiracy Group Initiative Task Force, the Multi Jurisdictional Financial Enforcement Group Initiative Task Force, and the Domestic Highway Enforcement/Narcotics Interdiction Team) are collocated on a single, secure floor in a Chicago office building. The IISC includes analysts from the Cook County Sheriff's Department, DEA, the Chicago Police Department, and the Illinois National Guard. This collocation and diversity helps to foster information sharing among law enforcement agencies. All task force initiatives within the Chicago HIDTA are required to cooperate and interact with the IISC. Chicago HIDTA also conducts quarterly information-sharing meetings with initiative supervisors. Timely intelligence bulletins and other relevant regional law enforcement information are shared electronically through an extensive contact list, and intelligence is routinely shared with the Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center. Chicago HIDTA initiatives are encouraged to seek OCDETF designation and funding when an investigation is multi-jurisdictional, focuses on an organization involved with drug trafficking and/or a money laundering, and shows a conspiracy.

All HIDTA initiatives and numerous law enforcement agencies in the region are interviewed in preparing the required annual Threat Assessment resulting in correlation and sharing of information. HIDTA-funded initiatives, as well as the Chicago Police Department, are mandated to utilize the Chicago HIDTA SAFETNet target and event deconfliction system. This system is also used by 219 other law enforcement agencies in the region. Chicago also serves as the SAFETNet node for HIDTAs in Milwaukee, WI; Lake County, IN; Cleveland, OH; and the Statewide Terrorism & Intelligence Center in Springfield, Illinois. All HIDTA initiatives/task forces are continually monitored and assessed by the Executive Board utilizing the HIDTA program's PMP system.

FBI task forces regularly use the services of the Chicago HIDTA IISC. The HIDTA region also includes the FBI's Chicago Terrorist Task Force (CTTF), whose mission is to prevent, detect, deter, and investigate attacks perpetrated by domestic and international terrorists

in the Northern District of Illinois. Founded in 1981, the CTTF investigates the activities of both international and domestic terrorist organizations. The CTTF also investigates all criminal activities, including the acquisition by terrorists of funds, weapons, explosives, false identifications, and other means.

Additionally, the CTTF works with all Federal, State, and local agencies, as well as the private sector, to establish appropriate responses to terrorist attacks. The CTTF is comprised of Chicago Police Detectives, Illinois State Police Investigators, as well as Agents of the FBI, the U.S. Secret Service, the ATF, the U.S. Customs Service, and the IRS.

## **HIDTA EVALUATION**

The Chicago HIDTA's area of responsibility constitutes one of the Nation's most active illegal drug distribution centers. Coupled with a severe challenge presented by large and well-organized "street gangs," the Chicago HIDTA has recognized the need to expand its total number of initiatives and to be more inclusive by involving more Federal agencies. It is seeking to enhance its efforts in this area.

The HIDTA Executive Board is more enthusiastically engaged in the oversight, allocation of resources, response to emerging threats, and operations than ever before in the HIDTA's history. The new Executive Director has been in position for several months, and is aggressively expanding and enhancing the information and intelligence-sharing capabilities of the HIDTA. These two actions will aid the Chicago HIDTA in addressing the multiple threats it faces.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting or dismantling major DTOs, arresting and prosecuting traffickers, and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 61 DTOs, compared to 68 the prior year. A lengthy investigation into a DTO responsible for large scale cocaine and heroin distribution initiated by several of the Chicago HIDTA's task forces in 2007 and completed in 2008 resulted in 59 arrests as well as substantial seizures of drugs and drug related assets. A number of the DTOs connected to this investigation were arrested in 2007.

# Gulf Coast HIDTA – Designated in 1996 Executive Director – Tony Soto

# **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The specific mission of the Gulf Coast (GC) HIDTA is to reduce illicit drug availability and its harmful consequences within its designated areas by standing intelligence-driven task forces and supporting infrastructure designed to target, disrupt, and eliminate DTOs impacting the region and beyond.

## **STRATEGY**

The GC HIDTA works to promote an effective working relationship among and between the GC HIDTA law enforcement initiatives by designing and deploying an infrastructure that fosters information sharing and ensures a coordinated response to the drug threat, as well as realizes an environment through which the participating Federal and State/local agencies may achieve the goals of disrupting and dismantling DTOs and reducing the demand for drugs by focusing on specific drug threat elements unique to their respective areas.

## **LOCATION**

The GC HIDTA operates out of Metairie, Louisiana. It encompasses the following counties in four States:

- Alabama—Baldwin, Jefferson, Madison, Mobile, Montgomery, and Morgan;
- Arkansas—Benton, Jefferson, Pulaski, and Washington;
- Louisiana—Bossier, Caddo, Calcasieu, East Baton Rouge, Jefferson, Lafayette, Orleans, and Ouachita Parishes; and
- Mississippi—Hancock, Harrison, Hinds, Jackson, Lafayette, Madison, and Rankin.

# *INITIATIVES*

The GC HIDTA has 29 initiatives, which include 1 management, 1 training, 2 intelligence, and 25 investigation/interdiction initiatives.

## SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YE	AR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
20	09	227	3	7.25	3,300	10,165	1,014

## THREAT ASSESSMENT

The GC HIDTA is a geographically diverse area consisting of 25 HIDTA-designated counties/parishes in the States of Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana. The drug which continues to pose the greatest threat in the GC HIDTA is cocaine, along with its derivative, crack. Law enforcement intelligence indicates that cocaine/crack is transported into the GC HIDTA by Mexican poly-DTOs and subsequently distributed by local drug-trafficking groups. Methamphetamine is ranked, overall, as the second most serious threat. In Arkansas, methamphetamine surpasses cocaine/crack as the primary threat. In the past 24 months, each State has enacted and begun enforcement of provisions designed to regulate the sale of methamphetamine precursors. As a result, the number of clandestine methamphetamine labs has decreased each year, although the amount of methamphetamine encountered by HIDTA initiatives has remained constant with indications of potential increase. This is because Mexican based DTOs have stepped in to fill the void with 'ice' methamphetamine. 10 Illicitly diverted pharmaceuticals obtained through Internet pharmacies, Mexican DTOs, and pain management clinics remain a significant threat across the GC HIDTA. Overdose deaths and injuries from OxyContin, methadone, and their combination with other drugs, such as Soma, remain high and, in some cases, surpass those of more familiar drugs such as heroin. Violent crime continues to impact the safety and quality of life of the citizens in the GC HIDTA. Violent drug trafficking groups have returned to the storm-ravaged areas of Louisiana and Mississippi, leading to a series of violent crimes and related social problems. A 2009 survey found that 20 percent of the 25 most dangerous metropolitan areas of the U.S. are located in the GC HIDTA.

## **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

The mission of the Investigative Support Network (ISN) is to implement the GC HIDTA Strategy by addressing drug trafficking modalities noted in the annual Threat Assessment and facilitating the effective and efficient sharing of information between and among GC HIDTA participant agencies, non-participating agencies within the GC HIDTA, and other HIDTA enforcement entities nationwide. Its operational mission is to provide the full spectrum of intelligence products to law enforcement agencies, thereby enabling effective and efficient use of drug investigative resources.

The Network Coordination Group (NCG), the Technical Operations Group (TOG), the Title III Wire Intercept Center and the IT Systems Administrators are collocated at the Louisiana Operations Center in Metairie, LA. Intelligence Support Teams (ISTs) are collocated within State Operations Centers in Jackson, MS; Montgomery, AL; Little Rock, AR; and at the Louisiana State Police (LSP) Intelligence and Investigative Support Center in Baton Rouge, LA. The BLOC/HIDTA Watch Center is located in Gulfport, Mississippi. The BLOC/HIDTA Watch Center, while part of the HIDTA's Intelligence Sub-system, is a separate initiative and, consequently, reports staffing and budgeting items independent of the ISN.

The NCG functions as the central coordination component through which the entire ISN intelligence sub-system communicates. The NCG communicates directly with other ISN components, including the ISTs, TOG, the IT Systems Administrators, and BLOC/HIDTA Watch Center in Gulfport, Mississippi to ensure a coordination of efforts. Real-time

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Methamphetamine hydrochloride, clear chunky crystals resembling ice, which can be inhaled by smoking, is referred to as "ice."

communication, data collection, and sharing and dissemination of information are achieved through connectivity via the GC HIDTA Wide Area Network (WAN).

The ISTs, which are included in the ISN initiative, are co-located with intelligence elements at each State's Criminal Information Center in Baton Rouge, LA; Jackson, MS; and Montgomery, AL. GC HIDTA participating agencies, GC HIDTA contract analysts, and National Guard personnel staff each IST. The principal function of each team is to provide HIDTA initiatives and participating agencies with tactical and investigative intelligence support for active investigations. The NCG supervisor provides direction to and oversight of the ISTs. Each IST is tasked with providing a full range of intelligence products and services including the collection, analysis, and dissemination of drug intelligence targeting DTOs. Analytical techniques routinely employed include, but are not limited to, tactical wiretap support, telephone toll analysis, document analysis, and flow charts.

Additional responsibilities include coordinating the development of threat assessments for both its area of responsibility and the GC HIDTA Threat Assessment. The ISTs also work with NDIC analysts in the preparation of threat assessments and other products. The ISTs are analytical extensions of the ISN. Thus, the ISN outputs apply to the ISTs and the ISTs contribute to the completion of the ISN outputs.

The TOG supports wire intercept capabilities for the GC HIDTA and assists the investigative teams by providing technical support for intelligence and operational purposes on a case-by-case basis. The team also maintains an inventory of HIDTA-supplied equipment, and assists in the evaluation and coordination of equipment requests.

# TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Little Rock Major Investigations/Mobile Deployment Team (HIDTA)	Little Rock, AR
U.S. Marshal's Service Fugitive Task Force (HIDTA)	Little Rock, AR
Northwest Arkansas Major Investigations Team (HIDTA)	Fayetteville, AR
4 <sup>TH</sup> Judicial District Drug Task Force (Byrne)	Fayetteville, AR
Madison/Morgan Counties Drug Task Force (HIDTA/Byrne)	Huntsville, AL
Jefferson County HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Birmingham, AL
Alabama Operations Center (HIDTA)	Montgomery, AL
Mobile/Baldwin Major Investigations Team (HIDTA)	Mobile, AL
Mobile/Baldwin Street Enforcement Team (HIDTA/Byrne)	Mobile, AL
Metro New Orleans Major Investigations Team (GC HIDTA)	Metairie, LA
Metro New Orleans Mobile Deployment Team (HIDTA)	Metairie, LA
City of New Orleans Major Investigations Team (HIDTA)	Metairie, LA
Multi-Agency Safe Neighborhood Task Force (HIDTA/Safe Streets)	Metairie, LA
Project STAR (HIDTA)	Harvey, LA
New Orleans Gang Task Force (HIDTA/Safe Streets)	New Orleans, LA
Mid-Louisiana Major Investigations/Interdiction Team (HIDTA)	Baton Rouge, LA
Southwest Louisiana Major Investigations/Financial Team (HIDTA)	Lafayette, LA

Caddo/Bossier Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Shreveport, LA
Northwest Louisiana Violent Crimes Task Force (HIDTA/Safe Streets)	Shreveport, LA
Monroe Metro Drug Task Force (HIDTA/Byrne)	Monroe, LA
Calcasieu Parish Combined Anti-drug Team (HIDTA/Safe Streets)	Lake Charles, LA
Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Task Force (Byrne)	Gretna, LA
Mississippi Operations Center Major Investigations Team (HIDTA)	Pearl, MS
Mississippi Operations Center Mobile Deployment Team (HIDTA)	Pearl, MS
North Mississippi Major Investigations Team (HIDTA)	Oxford, MS
Oxford/Lafayette County Task Force (Byrne)	Oxford, MS
Tri-County Major Investigation Team (HIDTA)	Gulfport, MS
Coastal Narcotics Enforcement Team (Byrne)	Gulfport, MS
Jackson County Major Investigations Team (HIDTA/Safe Streets)	Pascagoula, MS
Inter-Local Narcotics Task Force (Byrne)	Pascagoula, MS

## TASK FORCE COORDINATION

GC HIDTA initiatives are required to submit all of their targets and planned operations to SAFETNet, which not only links them to HIDTA initiatives nationwide, but also to agency-specific databases such as DEA's National Drug Pointer Information System (NDPIX). Non-HIDTA task forces and agencies are encouraged to participate in the HIDTA-sponsored deconfliction. GC HIDTA initiatives regularly meet with Federal, State, and local counterparts in their respective areas of responsibility to coordinate and share information.

GC HIDTA initiatives are encouraged to share information regarding local, regional, and national DTOs. This is accomplished through deconfliction, as well as regional meetings of task force commanders. The GC HIDTA Executive Board is comprised of heads of Federal, State, and local agencies operating in its four-State area. The Executive Board is regularly informed of ongoing operations conducted by all initiatives funded by the GC HIDTA.

The GC HIDTA provides funding toward standing and maintaining its intelligence subsystem. The intelligence subsystem includes funding a network of intelligence analysts strategically located throughout a four-State area to ensure the efficient collection, analysis, and dissemination of information to all law enforcement entities within the area. The dissemination of information is not only accomplished within the HIDTA, but it is also shared nationally through the circulation of its products which include threat assessments, information bulletins, and officer safety alerts. All GC HIDTA intelligence products are posted on the FBI-sponsored Law Enforcement Online (LEO) website, which is available to all JTTFs throughout the United States. Specific information generated by GC HIDTA initiatives is routinely forwarded to the appropriate JTTF.

## **HIDTA EVALUATION**

In general, the GC HIDTA is achieving its stated mission and long-term goals. The program is also achieving its short-term goals and meeting or exceeding most of its performance targets. Calendar Year (CY) 2008 statistical accomplishments show significant improvement over CY 2007 in a number of areas. Enforcement initiatives disrupted or dismantled 217 DTOs

and MLOs operating in its designated areas and beyond, a 13 percent increase over the previous year. The increase in DTOs dismantled in CY 2008 can be partially attributed to several excellent investigations, an increased post-Katrina rise in drug trafficking and violence in some areas, and results from the HIDTA's geographical expansion into Arkansas.

# Hawaii HIDTA – Designated in 1999 Executive Director – Larry Burnett

## PURPOSE AND GOALS

At the crossroad of the Pacific and gateway into the continental United States, the Hawaii HIDTA's participating agencies work together through enhanced coordination and integrated initiatives to disrupt and dismantle illicit drug distribution, production, money laundering, transportation, and trafficking within the region.

## **STRATEGY**

The Hawaii HIDTA has a clear-cut mission for its law enforcement and intelligence components. The Hawaii HIDTA fosters cooperative and effective working relationships between all 24 of Hawaii's Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies. These relationships are embodied in the collocated and commingled law enforcement personnel who are strategically aligned into task forces that focus on both long and short term multi-jurisdictional investigations, complex money laundering investigations, violent offenders and fugitives, border interdiction, and marijuana eradication. Additionally, the Hawaii HIDTA invests heavily in a robust IISC and the Region's only DHS-recognized Fusion Center. The Hawaii HIDTA intelligence-led policing approach pulls together targeted information into an analytical intelligence cycle so priorities can be established and the most pressing law enforcement threats can be dealt with in a focused/planned manner.

## **LOCATION**

The Hawaii HIDTA operates out of Honolulu, HI. It encompasses the City and County of Honolulu (the Island of Oahu), Maui County (the Islands of Maui, Molokai and Lanai), Hawaii County (the Big Island of Hawaii), and Kauai County (the Island of Kauai).

## **INITIATIVES**

The Hawaii HIDTA has 15 initiatives, which include 1 management, 1 training, 2 support, 4 intelligence, 2 interdiction, and 5 investigative initiatives.

## SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	32	2	244	6,500	50	66

## THREAT ASSESSMENT

The trafficking and abuse of crystal methamphetamine and a resurgence of cocaine, along with the production/cultivation of marijuana pose the greatest illicit drug threats to the State. Crystal methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana are far more socially disruptive and violent than the other illicit drugs of heroin, MDMA, steroids, and diverted pharmaceuticals, which are available in lesser quantities, and also pose a threat to the region. Often, these drugs are present alongside crystal methamphetamine and marijuana during police raids and autopsies of drugrelated deaths. Violence associated with illicit drug trafficking extracts an expensive toll on Hawaii's resources, families, and neighborhoods. Drug abuse contributes to domestic violence, child endangerment, and hospital emergency room visits. Property crimes rise exponentially with increases in Hawaii's drug abuse. Drug abuse adds pressure and higher price tags upon social and healthcare services. Turf wars between rival DTOs/gangs have resulted in confrontation and eruptions of violence. Criminal groups and DTOs are usually international or multi-state in scope, with ample opportunity to traffic drugs to, through, and from the area using Hawaii's exceptionally high volume of international and domestic air and/or ocean traffic. Hawaii is ranked among the highest in the Nation for methamphetamine abuse per capita, and consistently comes in fourth place or higher for annual marijuana production. Hawaii is fortyseventh in the Nation for land mass; imparting a dubious first-place ranking in available land to marijuana cultivation ratio.

# **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

The Hawaii HIDTA IISC has four components which provide investigative support, criminal intelligence, strategic intelligence, and the facilitation of communication and information sharing among initiatives, task forces, community stakeholders, decision makers, and participating law enforcement agencies. The IISC houses the Investigative Case Support Initiative (ICS), the Pacific Regional Informational Clearing House Initiative (PAC CLEAR), the Criminal Intelligence and Violent Crime Gang Initiative (CIU-Gang), and the HIDTA's Communications and Information Sharing Program (WSIN). These four components provide all of the case support, annual report, annual threat assessment, strategy, event deconfliction, and case activation.

The CIU-Gang focuses on criminal intelligence gathering and analysis. It enhances criminal intelligence analysis within the Hawaii HIDTA by facilitating the sharing of information from the Criminal Intelligence Units of the four county police departments and State corrections with the other elements of the IISC, enforcement task forces, and other HIDTA participating Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies. CIU-Gang determines the scope/threat level and provides a comprehensive intelligence picture of illicit drug trafficking and crime activities of organized criminal gangs, prison gangs, Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMG), and drug distribution gangs. The analysis of the gangs also includes the crimes they commit, other problems they present, and localities they affect. The information and intelligence collected through CIU-Gang is disseminated through a collaborative approach to law enforcement for suppression and enforcement strategies when dealing with major organized crime gangs. This initiative facilitates intelligence-led policing aimed at the dismantling or disruption of major gang DTOs. The CIU-Gang interfaces with RISSIntel and the national Gang Database through the Western States Information Network (WSIN).

The ICS is the nucleus of the Hawaii HIDTA intelligence program. The ICS supports the HIDTA mission by collecting, evaluating, analyzing, and disseminating timely information in support of investigative case activity relating to drug importation, drug distribution, money laundering, drug-related violent crime, and drug-related firearm trafficking. The ICS provides a full range of core investigative support to enforcement task forces and Federal/State prosecuting attorneys. The IISC supports the HIDTA mission by collecting, evaluating, analyzing, and disseminating timely intelligence on drug importation, drug distribution, money laundering, drug-related violent crime, and drug-related firearm trafficking. The ICS provides operational and tactical case support to investigations being conducted by HIDTA participating agencies, appropriate non-HIDTA law enforcement and other official intelligence money laundering, drugrelated violent crime, and drug-related firearm trafficking. The ICS provides operational and tactical case support to investigations being conducted by HIDTA participating agencies, appropriate non-HIDTA law enforcement, and other official intelligence entities. ICS support includes telephone toll and pen register analysis (analysis of phone call records), link analysis (analysis of connections among targets), event analysis (analysis of illegal activity or law enforcement action), post seizure analysis, financial investigative analysis and development of new analytical techniques. The ICS analysts are closely coupled to the agents and officers in the investigative and interdiction task forces, often working hand in hand during the investigative and prosecution process.

PAC CLEAR has primary responsibility for PMP input/maintenance and production of the HIDTA's annual reports, Threat Assessments, and Strategy. It serves as a regional strategic information clearinghouse for empirical and statistical data relating to illicit drug trafficking and abuse. PAC CLEAR consolidates and provides decision makers in law enforcement, public office, and community stakeholders with accurate, fact-based information to enhance operational efficiency and planning effectiveness.

Regional public safety, prevention, and treatment information exists, but is not universally accessible; nor is it packaged to be readily understood and used. Much of it is in occupational terminology, restricted access, and/or there are gaps in reporting requirements. PAC CLEAR consolidates source data into usable products shared among local, State, Federal, and Pacific Rim/Basin stakeholders. PAC CLEAR brings together citizen stakeholders in education, prevention, healthcare, and government in order to provide accurate, fact-based information in response to the harmful consequences of drug trafficking and use. PAC CLEAR is partnered with the research element of the University of Hawaii, such as the Center on the Family, and the other IISC components to make efficient use of University resources. Information and intelligence support includes trend and pattern analysis and the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information concerning the composition, scope, magnitude and dynamics, both internal and external, of the regional illicit drug problem and the resulting trends and threats to the public's safety.

All Hawaii HIDTA initiatives, and HIDTAs nationwide, link together through the RISSnet project. WSIN maintains the RISSnet gateway and a comprehensive intelligence database linked to all other RISSnet databases, giving initiatives nationwide access. Hawaii HIDTA is provided with 24/7 Watch Center protection and assistance, and deconfliction services (through the WSIN and NIN Watch Centers). In exchange, the HIDTA provides the WSIN Coordinator and staff with office space, parking, phones, postage, copier access, etc. Deconfliction services not only ensure officer safety but reduce duplication of effort and promote

coordination and information sharing among participating agencies. WSIN, by Executive Board mandate and written policy, provides case and subject deconfliction for all law enforcement agencies operating within the State of Hawaii. WSIN is a RISS ATIX and PAC CLEAR facilitator, providing resources to enhance coordination and promote information development and dissemination among participating/supporting partners in drug control efforts.

# TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS		
HI Impact Group 1 Task Force (HIDTA)	City and County of Honolulu (Oahu)		
HI Impact Group 3 Task Force (HIDTA)	City and County of Honolulu (Oahu)		
HI Impact Maui Task Force (HIDTA)	Maui County		
HI Impact Kona Task Force (HIDTA)	Hawaii (Big Island) County		
HI Impact Hilo Task Force (HIDTA)	Hawaii (Big Island) County		
HI Impact Kauai Task Force (HIDTA)	Kauai County		
Domestic Interdiction Task Force (HIDTA)	Honolulu International Airport:		
Domestic interdiction Task Poice (IIIDTA)	Operating Statewide		
Foreign Interdiction Task Force (HIDTA)	Honolulu International Airport		
Parcel Interdiction Task Force (HIDTA)	Honolulu International Airport		
Rapid Reduction Drug Unit (HIDTA)	City and County of Honolulu		
Project Safe Neighborhoods (HIDTA)	City and County of Honolulu		
Money Laundering & Asset Forfeiture Task Force (HIDTA)	City and County of Honolulu		
Marijuana Task Force (HIDTA)	City and County of Honolulu		
Fugitive Task Force (HIDTA)	City and County of Honolulu		
Hawaii Narcotics Task Force (JAG)	Encompasses Maui, Kauai, and		
Hawan Naicottes Task Poice (JAG)	Hawaii Counties		
	Maui County, Kauai County, Hawaii		
Statewide Marijuana Eradication Task Force (DCSEP)	County and the City & County of		
	Honolulu		

# TASK FORCE COORDINATION

The Hawaii HIDTA Executive Board stresses equal partnerships among the participating agencies, and is the coordinating body for drug investigations within the State of Hawaii (the only HIDTA encompassing an entire State). Although the SME and HNTF task forces are non-HIDTA funded, they coordinate and report activities on a monthly basis to a Hawaii HIDTA program analyst. All task forces, whether Hawaii HIDTA-sponsored or Justice Action Grant (JAG)/Byrne sponsored, coordinate with each other in the generation of threat assessment surveys.

Additionally, a Hawaii HIDTA task force commander serves as a coordinator between the HNTF and Hawaii HIDTA enforcement task forces. The coordinator hosts a quarterly drug unit commanders meeting which is intended to facilitate the exchange of information and address

issues of mutual concern. The task forces often work together on OCDETF prosecutions through investigative or resource sharing. The Hawaii HIDTA director, along with participating agency heads, coordinates with the OCDETF Assistant United States Attorney in evaluating all OCDETF proposals.

All law enforcement task forces, whether receiving JAG/Byrne or HIDTA funding in Hawaii, are mandated to use WSIN and part of the DOJ sponsored RISSnet, for coordination, case activation, and critical event/subject deconfliction. All other law enforcement components within the State of Hawaii, whether Federally funded or not, voluntarily use WSIN for deconfliction services and information sharing. Additionally, the drug task forces share information through the various components of the Hawaii HIDTA IISC.

The Hawaii HIDTA IISC maintains a 24/7 Watch Center, through an exchange of services with WSIN. The Watch Center coordinates all case activation, critical event/subject deconfliction, and communication activities. Within the Hawaii HIDTA IISC, the Investigative Case Support unit and the PAC CLEAR (a DHS designated Fusion Center) coordinate the reporting, analysis, and dissemination of information among the task forces. The CIU-Gang unit within the IISC coordinates the sharing of information among the different island police department intelligence units. The Hawaii HIDTA plays a central role in providing training to the task forces, to ensure the latest information and enforcement techniques are shared and coordinated.

The heads of all Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in Hawaii participate, either as a voting or advisory member, on the Hawaii HIDTA Executive Board. The Executive Board ensures information is shared among its membership.

The Hawaii HIDTA Executive Board has an established written policy and procedure mandating that the PAC CLEAR Fusion Center, the Hawaii HIDTA IISC and the Hawaii HIDTA task forces turn over and coordinate any terrorism-related information and/or investigative leads to the FBI led JTTF. JTTF analysts have access to the IISC.

## HIDTA EVALUATION

ONDCP will continue to work with the Hawaii HIDTA to improve performance, particularly with regard to information sharing, including the expansion of their PAC CLEAR program, which is designated as Hawaii's only Fusion Center by the Department of Homeland Security.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs, arresting and prosecuting traffickers, and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 48 DTOs, compared to 65 the prior year. Several factors influence the rate by which organizations are disrupted or dismantled. Hawaii HIDTA task forces focus on organizations causing the most harm to Hawaii HIDTA communities. It takes considerable time and manpower to conduct concrete investigations that will make an impact, and as a result, not every organization will be disrupted or dismantled in the year. While the number of DTOs disrupted or dismantled decreased, they were larger organizations which required more resources and time to investigate.

# Houston HIDTA – Designated in 1990 Executive Director – Stan Furce

# **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The mission of the Houston HIDTA is to disrupt the market for illegal drugs through the creation and maintenance of intelligence-driven task forces targeting major DTOs, money laundering organizations, and drug gangs. Further, the Houston HIDTA will enhance and help coordinate efforts among Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies.

## **STRATEGY**

Continue to foster cooperative and effective working relationships among Federal, State, and local agencies that participate and/or operate in the Houston HIDTA area to achieve the common goals of disrupting and dismantling DTOs, and reducing the demand for drugs.

# **LOCATION**

The Houston HIDTA operates out of Houston, Texas. The 17 counties that comprise the Houston HIDTA region include: Aransas, Brooks, Fort Bend, Galveston, Hardin, Harris, Jefferson, Jim Wells, Kenedy, Kleberg, Liberty, Montgomery, Nueces, Orange, Refugio, San Patricio, and Victoria. The City of Houston is also part of the HIDTA.

## **INITIATIVES**

The Houston HIDTA has 12 initiatives, which include 1 management, 3 intelligence and 8 investigation/interdiction initiatives.

# SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	109	2.73	13	11,400	525	3,399

# THREAT ASSESSMENT

The threat from illicit drug trafficking and associated violence within the Houston HIDTA remains high, in large part due to its close proximity to the U.S.-Mexico border, as well as its seaports and national highway infrastructure. As a result, the Houston HIDTA region is one of the most significant distribution and transshipment areas for the variety of illegal drugs trafficked from Mexico into the United States. It is also a primary consolidation point for bulk cash smuggled back across the border. Therefore, Houston is one of the principal centers for drug activity in the country. Houston has experienced an increase in pharmaceutical diversion

activities over the past several years, heightening the level of threat posed to the region and beyond. In addition to the imminent threat posed by the vast supply of illegal drugs moving through the Houston HIDTA, drug-related violence continues to escalate, especially among the region's gangs. Gangs within the Houston HIDTA continue to grow in strength and number. Their violence, often spurred by drug-related turf issues is increasingly brutal, heightening the severity of the impact of the drug trade in the region.

#### INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES

The mission of the HIISC is to provide accurate and timely intelligence analysis to law enforcement agencies regarding drug-related criminal activity within the Houston HIDTA. The HIISC, formerly known as the Joint Drug Intelligence Group (JDIG), was first funded by HIDTA in 1992. The FBI has used Houston as a model for its field intelligence groups. The HIISC provides strategic, organizational, and tactical intelligence on DTOs operating in the Houston HIDTA region using the full gamut of analytical techniques. To accomplish the mission, the HIISC uses two major squads consisting of five teams that provide and supervise intelligence and analytical support to the law enforcement community. The five teams are:

- Intelligence Research Team (IRT);
- Analytical Case Support Team (ACST);
- Case Development Team (CDT);
- Strategic Intelligence Team (SIT); and
- The HIISC Management Team

The IRT is comprised of law enforcement and contract and military analysts who use Federal, State, local, and commercial databases to identify and locate criminal suspects associates, organizations, businesses, and property. The IRT responds to requests from any law enforcement agency. The IRT analysts produce intelligence summaries that are a result of the analytical process and the identifying and resolution of intelligence gaps. In addition, the IRT provides case and subject deconfliction on all intelligence requests. The IRT interacts with other HIDTA initiatives practically every day. During CY 2008, 40 percent of the IRT's workload was in support of HIDTA initiatives and 93 percent was in support of HIDTA agencies.

The ACST supports the intelligence development phase of cases pursued by members of Houston HIDTA Initiatives or Southeastern Texas law enforcement agencies. One HIISC ACST analyst is embedded with the Texas Coastal Corridor Initiative located in Corpus Christi. ACST analysts collate and condense raw research information into a single comprehensive product focusing on the relevant facts regarding the criminal subjects, their criminal activities, and their DTO. ACST analysts forward the resultant research package to the requester to supplement any ongoing investigation. If the operational agency or initiative requests further assistance, the analyst who developed the original research package may be assigned to provide ongoing case support that continues through the prosecution phase. ACST members also assist the Case Development Team with their research and case development.

The CDT, also known as the proactive squad, employs investigators and analysts to develop leads for new cases and to refer actionable intelligence packages to HIDTA Initiatives and other law enforcement agencies. The case development process includes identifying a potential target, and performing analytical research, surveillance, and interviews of witnesses and informants. Additionally, the CDT proactively develops informants throughout the community

to assist the HIISC with its intelligence collection capability. Some CDT case referrals have a short turn-around time and often result in arrests and seizures that have a direct and immediate impact on the community. Other CDT cases require a substantial investigative and intelligence effort in order to fully identify and assess the scope of the targeted criminal conspiracy. In some scenarios, the cooperating informants are "passed on" to the operational enforcement group to help continue developing the investigation. The CDT routinely interacts with the ACST and the IRT during case development, and ACST analysts typically support CDT investigations. However, if there is no analyst assigned to a specific investigation, the investigator from the CDT will interact with the IRT in order to develop a case. The CDT will normally disseminate the investigative and intelligence work product to other HIDTA initiatives. In the case referral scenario, the CDT will usually interact before, during, and after the referral of the investigation. During CY 2008, 37 percent of CDT case referrals went to HIDTA initiatives and an additional 63 percent went to HIDTA member agencies.

The SIT has a nucleus of two analysts who develop and publish actionable intelligence research based on its value to the HIDTA community. SIT analysts use survey instruments, intelligence research, and interviews to identify unusual trends or circumstances involving DTOs operating in the Houston HIDTA region. Furthermore, the SIT proactively compares national trends to current and historical data regarding Houston-based drug traffickers. The SIT is responsible for collecting, drafting, and publishing the intelligence and information gathered from the annual HIDTA Threat Assessment surveys. SIT team members also conduct face-toface interviews with members of the Houston HIDTA law enforcement community to discuss in detail new trends and patterns of DTOs operating in the Houston HIDTA area. In addition to the annual threat assessment, the SIT identifies and responds to contemporary trends and threats in the Houston HIDTA region, as evidenced by the 2008 Telephonic Communications Assessment and 2008 Internet Based Communications Assessment. These documents provide succinct details of the threat environment, criminal organizations, and criminal activity trends that assist the HIDTA community and others in the development of enforcement strategies. The 2008 Telephonic Communications Assessment was so well received that the FBI's Information and Technology Branch posted the entire document on their FBI website.

The HIISC Management Team provides oversight of operational intelligence collection activities, intelligence research and development, administrative reporting, fiscal management, and personnel supervision on behalf of the HIDTA Executive Board and its Intelligence Subcommittee. The center is co-managed by an FBI ASAC and a Houston Police Department Supervisor. The HIDTA Intelligence Coordinator is under contract to Ft. Bend County Sheriff's Office and domiciled at the HIISC.

In 2006, the FBI joined the HPD-led GANGS Initiative in the development of a Multi-Jurisdictional Gang Task Force to address the major gangs operating in the Houston area. This task force targets the upper echelon of Houston's most violent and elusive gangs and conducts long-term, complex investigations with the goal of disrupting and dismantling these organizations. The Houston HIDTA supported this endeavor, and the HIISC contributed by providing five of the six analysts needed to support the different segments of the task force. This collaborative effort led to T-IIIs in three of the four investigations. Two of the wire-tap investigations have progressed to the prosecution stage. Both investigations have 14 pending indictments each. The third wire-tap investigation is in the indictment stage and is still active. These three investigations have significantly disrupted the targeted gang DTOs by targeting gang

leadership locally as well as regionally. This success is a direct result of excellent investigative effort, coupled with outstanding intelligence support provided by HIISC analysts.

The CDT continued developing actionable intelligence and referring leads to other HIDTA initiatives. In 2008, the CDT developed information and conducted phone analysis that led to the opening of an OCDETF investigation jointly run by the Houston HIDTA MIG, GC HIDTA, and the CDT. To date, this investigation has generated nine Federal indictments and arrests and the disruption of a significant multi-state methamphetamine DTO.

In 2006, the HIISC created a database designed to capture and exploit intelligence obtained from phone numbers found on business cards, scraps of paper, hotel stationery, or any other venue observed during enforcement operations. Houston HIDTA initiatives populate this pointer system database with telephone numbers typically overlooked or thrown in the trash. This database continues to grow. In 2008, several cases were connected/deconflicted as a result of this database. In 2007, the HIISC developed and implemented a standardized case support system among analysts supporting long-term investigations.

The "Case Support Package (CSP)" has seven components: a Case Synopsis, an Organizational Chart, a Timeline, Biographical Sheet on all significant members of the organization, a Deconfliction Report, a Link Chart of Significant Telephone Analysis, and Analyst Observations. The seven components are a framework that provides guidance and consistency for all assigned cases. The CSP was developed to facilitate information sharing and dissemination and to prevent information "stove piping" for non-FBI cases worked by HIISC analysts. The CSP fosters a consistent work product among analysts, provides an automatic checklist for case support, and is a training tool for new analysts. The CSP is also designed to assist analysts in keeping accurate statistical information needed for the HIDTA monthly and annual reports. The CSP is continuing to evolve. In 2008, the FBI began the transition phase to a new system of record. The HIISC is in the process of formatting the CSP and all intelligence products so information received and produced by HIISC analysts will have a seamless entry into the FBI records system. This will enhance the sharing of HIISC information.

In March 2007, the HIISC hosted a 60-day pilot program that provided state-of-the-art computerized analysis of telephone records obtained through standard investigative techniques. The highly successful pilot turned into a full-time program beginning in August 2007, and has since expanded nationally, with regional centers in Atlanta, Houston, and Los Angeles. This program has been successfully used by numerous HIDTAs across the country to locate dropped phones during wire-tap investigations, to locate suspects, and to quickly find pertinent links between the target and other members of a respective DTO. In addition to operating a regional center, the HIISC provides program deconfliction for all three regional centers and trained 116 students from HIDTAs across the Nation in 2008. In 2007, the HIISC also began a program similar to the Arrest Notification System instituted by the New York/New Jersey HIDTA. HIISC analysts search the Harris County Jail arrest log daily for felony arrests and parse out those suspects who list their home address as out-of-state or in an adjoining HIDTA county. An intelligence packet on the suspect is constructed and this information is sent to the respective HIDTA Intelligence Center for dissemination. If there is no HIDTA Intelligence Center in the area, the analyst will send the data to the local or State agency that would most likely benefit from the information. This process enhances communication between the HIISC and other areas of the United States. In 2008, there were 1700 different intelligence packets sent to 45 agencies in 28 states, and there were three requests for additional information.

TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Major Drug Squads (HIDTA)	Houston
Truck, Air, Rail and Port (HIDTA)	Houston
Targeted Narcotics Enforcement Team (HIDTA)	Houston
Texas Costal Corridor Initiative (HIDTA)	Corpus Christi
The Methamphetamine Initiative Group (HIDTA)	Houston
Ft. Bend Enforcement Team (HIDTA)	Stafford
Houston Money Laundering Initiative (HIDTA)	Houston
Gangs and Non-Traditional Gang Squad (HIDTA)	Houston
OCDETF Strike Force (OCDETF)	Houston
Multi-agency Gang Task Force (FBI)	Houston
Corpus Christi Violent Crimes Task Force (FBI)	Corpus Christi

## TASK FORCE COORDINATION

It is the policy of the Houston HIDTA Executive Board members that all participating agencies deconflict all events, whether or not they are related to a HIDTA initiative, through the HIDTA deconfliction initiative. Area agencies that do not participate in the HIDTA also deconflict drug and other events. Deconfliction through the Houston HIDTA IISC is generally done by HIDTA Initiatives and Houston-area agencies. The Houston HIDTA hosts a bi-monthly intelligence sharing meeting attended by both HIDTA and non-HIDTA agencies, including NDIC.

The Houston HIDTA IISC is collocated with the FBI JTTF in Houston, and sharing is routine and institutionalized. The manager of the FBI Field Intelligence Group is also the Houston HIDTA IISC Commander. His Deputy is a Houston Police Department Sergeant. The OCDETF Strike Force is in the DEA office and shares information daily with major drug squads, a HIDTA Initiative at DEA. It also shares information on an ad hoc basis with other HIDTA Initiatives, especially Ft. Bend Enforcement Team. DEA has formal task forces in Corpus Christi, Galveston, and Beaumont, Texas. The Corpus Christi task force is collocated with TCCI and shares information constantly. The others work with HIDTA ad hoc. The FBI violent crimes task force in Corpus Christi works closely and shares personnel with GANGS, a HIDTA Initiative. The FBI task force is not strictly a drug task force, but it has a drug nexus.

Other FBI and ATF task forces operating in the area that have a drug nexus to varying degrees include the Houston Asian Organized Crime Task Force; JTTF (4 RAs), Houston, Beaumont, Bryan/College Station, Corpus Christi Violent Crime Fugitive Task Force; Houston Coastal Safe Streets Task Force; Southeast Texas Safe Streets Task Force, Texas City, Texas; and the Counter Terrorism Intelligence Group, Houston. The ATF also has a VCIT task Force in Houston and three Project Gunrunner groups that operate in the area. Other than deconfliction, the cooperation with these task forces is ad hoc and frequent.

#### HIDTA EVALUATION

The initiatives and efforts of the Houston HIDTA program are primarily focused on drug trafficking threats that impact other areas of the country. They have enabled investigative initiatives to successfully destabilize drug trafficking and money laundering organizations that are connected with organizations in numerous States.

The effects of the continuing trafficking of illicit drugs in the Houston HIDTA region are felt throughout the country. Analysis of verified intelligence and of telephone records obtained through court orders and subpoenas reveals Houston connections to traffickers in all 50 States and many foreign countries. This supports the National Drug Intelligence Center's (NDIC) statement that Houston is potentially the most significant cocaine distribution center in the United States. Despite impressive law enforcement accomplishments, Houston-based DTOs or their cells still manage much of the Nation's drug supply. Accordingly, Houston HIDTA initiatives target some of the most important DTOs and MLOs in the world. Houston HIDTA initiatives continue to make major inroads against these organizations.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 152 DTOs, compared to 144 the prior year. Of the 475 DTOs identified, 275, or 58 %, operated beyond the Houston HIDTA region in multiple states, or were involved in international operations. Houston HIDTA Initiatives targeted 262 of these major operations, disrupting 87 and totally dismantling 27 international DTOs and 3 multi-state DTOs. Of the 152 DTOs disrupted, 117, or about 77 % were multi-state or international in scope.

# Lake County HIDTA – Designated in 1996 Executive Director – Charles Porucznik

# **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The mission of the Lake County HIDTA is to reduce drug availability and use by creating intelligence-driven drug task forces (initiatives) aimed at eliminating or reducing domestic drug trafficking and its harmful effects through the enhancement and coordination of drug trafficking enforcement efforts among Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies.

# **STRATEGY**

The HIDTA works with eighteen State and local jurisdictions, six law enforcement initiatives, and several Federal agencies in bringing a coordinated law enforcement effort to the county to combat drug trafficking.

## **LOCATION**

The Lake County HIDTA operates out of Crown Point, Indiana. It has one county in the State of Indiana: Lake County.

# **INITIATIVES**

The Lake County HIDTA has nine initiatives, which include one management, one training, one intelligence, and six investigation/interdiction initiatives.

# SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	42	1	1.5	1,400	700	24

# THREAT ASSESSMENT

Cocaine, particularly crack, poses the greatest drug threat to the region. Cocaine is transported from Mexico, the U.S. Southwest border and Chicago to, and through, Lake County, Indiana by Mexican DTOs. Street gangs in the northern section of the county protect their drug trade with violence and firearms. Heroin availability is increasing in the county. Some Gary, Indiana gangs operate open-air heroin markets, off of Interstate 80/94 ramps, for customer convenience. Marijuana is the most widely available and abused illicit drug in the county. A study by the Lake County Drug Free Alliance revealed marijuana is being smoked regularly by more Lake County high school students than tobacco. Methamphetamine availability and abuse are low in Lake County. Pharmaceutical drug diversion has increased, in line with national

trends. The increased use is fueled by a lack of social stigma associated with pharmaceutical drug abuse. The availability of the three most diverted drugs in Lake County (hydrocodone, oxycodone, and methadone) is stable.

## INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES

The Intelligence and Investigative Support Center (IISC) is the hub of Lake County HIDTA operations. The initiative was started in 1997 with the creation of the HIDTA. The IISC is jointly managed by the DEA and the Indiana State Police. The IISC is staffed by HIDTA analysts, DEA personnel, and the Indiana National Guard. The IISC provides accurate, detailed, and timely drug and non-drug intelligence to both HIDTA initiative partners, as well as other Lake County law enforcement agencies. The IISC provides both event and case subject deconfliction to HIDTA initiatives and outside agencies in Lake County. It is co-located in the HIDTA facilities with all of the other HIDTA initiatives except the Gang Response Investigative Team. The IISC expanded in 2007 with a variety of software and hardware improvements that make it a legitimate interagency intelligence center. Examples of this are: the regional gang database created and managed by the HIDTA; participation in SAFETNet, a deconfliction system currently linked to four regional HIDTAs that connected to the 18 other HIDTAs and the National Virtual Pointer System in 2005; the creation of a hardware and software link at the IISC which allows the two primary data systems used in the County by Police and Correctional facilities to interface; and deploying I2 Analyst Notebook and ArcView graphics and mapping programs. In 2009, the priorities were to increase quality case support activities, while adding strategic and predictive intelligence capabilities.

# TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
DEA Task Force Group 56 (State and local task force)	Merrillville
Lake County Combined Task Force (HIDTA)	Crown Point
GRIT Initiative (HIDTA)	Gary
Lake County Drug Task Force (Local task force)	Crown Point

# TASK FORCE COORDINATION

The Lake County Drug Task Force (LCDTF) coordinates with a number of other Lake County HIDTA initiatives. If LCDTF's operations encounter large amounts of drugs or any weapons, they will contact and coordinate with either the Lake County Combined Task Force (LCCTF), a DEA-led initiative, or the Firearms Interdiction Regional Enforcement Task Force (FIRE, an ATF-led initiative). LCDTF works with the Lake County HIDTA's Intelligence and Investigative Support Center (IISC) on certain operations and event/subject deconflictions, and with the Internal Revenue Service, Postal Inspectors, Immigration Customs Enforcement, and other agencies to effectively carry out their operations.

The Lake County HIDTA IISC assists all of the task forces with case support and analysis, critical event/subject deconfliction, and any requests for information, as well as the dissemination of information among the task forces. The Lake County HIDTA Regional Gang Database is an Internet-based system that allows any Federal, State, or local officer to check if someone is a gang member within the region. The IISC coordinates the activity within the database. The sharing of information among the task forces is usually done through the IISC, when permitted by the requesting unit. The Lake County HIDTA plays a central role in providing training to the task forces, to ensure the latest information and enforcement techniques are shared and coordinated.

The Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in Lake County participate, either as voting or advisory members on the Lake County HIDTA Executive Board. The Executive Board ensures information is shared among its membership.

The IISC and the Lake County HIDTA task forces turn over and coordinate any terrorism-related information and/or investigative leads to the JTTF.

# **HIDTA EVALUATION**

The Lake County HIDTA continues to seek ways to enhance its overall performance and is currently developing new capabilities to attack its regional threats. It has established an initiative that will focus on Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) and attacking illegal drug proceeds. The HIDTA is also expanding its interdiction operations along the many major highways that run through its area of responsibility.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 21 DTOs compared to 16 the prior year. Of 87 DTOs identified by the HIDTA, 65 were targeted and 21 were disrupted or dismantled.

In July 2007, ONDCP temporarily shut down the grant funding for the Lake County HIDTA due to fiduciary concerns. Funding was restored in December 2007 after the Executive Board established a new fiduciary and new leadership for the HIDTA and the Board. These changes had a significant impact on the investigative initiatives in 2007 and 2008.

# Los Angeles HIDTA – Designated in 1990 Executive Director – Roger Bass

## PURPOSE AND GOALS

It is the mission of the Los Angeles HIDTA (LA-HIDTA) to measurably reduce drug trafficking, thereby reducing the impact of illicit drugs in this and other areas of the country. This mission is to be accomplished through the use of multi-jurisdictional (Federal, State, and local), co-located, and co-mingled law enforcement and intelligence initiatives designed to attack, disrupt, and dismantle major drug trafficking and money laundering organizations operating in and through the LA-HIDTA region.

# **STRATEGY**

By design, the LA-HIDTA Strategy provides a comprehensive, dynamic law enforcement/intelligence plan which combines and coordinates regional drug control efforts in areas where they can have the most significant impact upon the threat. By Executive Board direction, this HIDTA consists of seven major operational task forces comprised of collocated Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies and three intelligence initiatives. It is their collective purpose to effectively and efficiently work within the Strategy to identify and target the major DTOs which operate at the higher levels of the illegal narcotic "food chain," in order to measurably reduce drug trafficking and its impact in this and other areas of the country.

# **LOCATION**

The LA-HIDTA operates out of Los Angeles, California. Its designated geographic area covers the four counties of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, and San Bernardino.

# **INITIATIVES**

The LA-HIDTA has 13 initiatives, which include 1 management, 1 training, 3 intelligence, 1 prosecution, and 7 investigation/interdiction initiatives.

# SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	109	2.95	13.36	200,000	1,210	220

## THREAT ASSESSMENT

Mexican DTOs and criminal groups control the wholesale distribution of illicit drugs in the LA-HIDTA region. They supply illicit drugs to distributors within the region and to distributors in most other significant drug markets throughout the country. Their influence is so profound that the LA-HIDTA region has become one of the most significant illicit drug distribution centers in the United States for cocaine, heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine, MDMA, and PCP. Sources of the investigations for most of the open DTO cases in the LA-HIDTA at the end of 2009 are Mexican nationals.

Additionally, the Mexican DTOs and criminal groups based in the LA-HIDTA region are increasing their control over illicit drug distribution in many drug markets, most recently in East Coast drug markets that have long been controlled by other trafficking groups, which further enhances the role of the region as a national-level drug distribution center. It clearly is a staging area for Mexican DTOs and some that have national presence.

The geographic, cultural, social, economic diversity, and general affluence of the population within the four county areas (12th largest economy in the world) have helped make the LA-HIDTA an open market for drug use, distribution, and manufacturing. At the same time, the highly developed transportation routes and the proximity to the United States/Mexico border have made the LA-HIDTA a primary distribution, storage, and supply hub for illicit drugs destined for all the major metropolitan areas in the United States. Further, due to the large rural and remote desert areas, the LA-HIDTA remains an ideal location for the clandestine manufacturing of methamphetamine, the future projected drug of choice.

# **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

It is the primary mission of the Los Angeles County Regional Criminal Information Clearinghouse (LACRCIC, or more commonly known as LA CLEAR) to ensure officer safety and operational efficiency by providing advanced technology, intelligence, and enhanced information sharing to all law enforcement agencies. As part of the LA-HIDTA Intelligence Support System, the LA CLEAR was created to provide an IISC for law enforcement agencies operating within the LA-HIDTA. The LA CLEAR is a member of the LA-HIDTA Intelligence Support System (ISS). The LA-HIDTA ISS is comprised of the three HIDTA-funded intelligence initiatives. These three intelligence initiatives make up the LA-HIDTA IISC. The LA CLEAR has electronic connectivity with all HIDTA initiatives and other agencies. The center provides a variety of services to both HIDTA-funded initiatives and other law enforcement agencies operating within the LA-HIDTA. The LA CLEAR is made up of the following components:

- A 24 hour, 7 day a week Intelligence & De-confliction Watch Center (War Room);
- The War Room use of the California State Intelligence Index (CSII) database, the Regional Information Sharing System Intelligence database (RISSIntel) as pointer systems, and national connectivity through the Regional Information Sharing System Network pointer system (RISS.NET), facilitate the sharing of information between law enforcement agencies operating within and outside the LA-HIDTA;
- An Analytical Unit that is comprised of an Investigative Analysis Section (Case Support);
   and a Research Analysis Section (Post Seizure Analysis and Domestic Highway Enforcement).

- o The Analytical Unit provides agencies with all types of operational, tactical, and analytical products, including telephone toll analysis, link analysis, charts, graphs, wire tap support, and targeting analysis.
- o The Analytical Unit also produces quarterly trend reports that have strategic analysis on enforcement trends, price/purity updates, lab seizure data and clandestine laboratory trend information.
- o The Analytical Unit has access to the CSII and RISS Intel databases, law enforcement databases, commercial databases such as Autotrak and Lexis-Nexus, as well as access to EPIC and DEA NADDIS.
- In addition, the LA CLEAR also has a Special Operations Support Unit that provides electronic intercept support through an on-site 50 station digital electronic intercept and surveillance center.
  - The Special Operations Support Unit also provides high tech equipment, support and training to law enforcement agencies operating in the LA-HIDTA with pole cameras, vehicle tracking devices, pager intercepts, and other equipment.
  - The Special Operations Support Unit has technicians on call 24 hours a day to assist law enforcement agencies with installing or repairing any of the above mentioned equipment.
- The LA CLEAR has a 120 seat training facility that doubles as a command post with sufficient telephone and data lines to support large operations.
- The LA CLEAR also has a 24 station computer training lab where classes are presented on a variety of programs including Pen-Link, Analyst's Notebook, etc.
- The LA CLEAR also has an Information Systems Support Unit that supports the over 160 computers, 20 servers, and 150 software applications on-site at LA CLEAR. This unit also maintains the HIDTA Node and is a RISS Node within RISS.net information-sharing highway.

# TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Southern California Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Los Angeles County
Los Angeles Interagency Metropolitan Police Apprehension Crime Task Force (HIDTA/BJA)	Los Angeles County
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Multijurisdictional Meth Enforcement Team (BJA)	Los Angeles County
Southwest Border Task Force (DEA)	Los Angeles County
Los Angeles Regional Criminal Information Clearinghouse (HIDTA/BJA)	Los Angeles County
Pacific Southwest Regional Fugitive Task Force (HIDTA)	Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino Counties
Los Angeles Joint Drug Intelligence Group (HIDTA)	Los Angeles County
Joint Regional Intelligence Center (DHS)	Los Angeles County
Los Angeles Joint Terrorism Task Force (FBI)	Los Angeles County
Regional Methamphetamine Task Force (HIDTA)	Los Angeles County

Regional Narcotics Suppression Program (HIDTA)	Orange County	
Regional Methamphetamine Task Force (HIDTA/BJA)	Orange County	
Orange County Sheriff's Department Domestic Highway Enforcement Team (BJA)	Orange County	
Orange County Joint Regional Intelligence Center (DHS/FBI)	Orange County	
Orange County Joint Terrorism Task Force (FBI)	Orange County	
Inland Regional Narcotic Enforcement Team (HIDTA)	San Bernardino County	
Regional Methamphetamine Task Force (HIDTA)	San Bernardino County	
San Bernardino County Marijuana Eradication Team (BJA)	San Bernardino County	
San Bernardino County West-End Narcotic Enforcement Team (BJA)	San Bernardino County	
San Bernardino County High Desert Task Force (BJA)	San Bernardino County	
San Bernardino Joint Terrorism Task Force (FBI Lead)	San Bernardino County	
Inland Crackdown Allied Task Force (HIDTA)	Riverside County	
Inland Narcotic Clearing House (HIDTA)	Riverside County	
Regional Methamphetamine Task Force (HIDTA)	Riverside County	
Riverside County Marijuana Eradication Team (BJA)	Riverside County	
Coachella Valley Narcotic Task Force (BJA)	Riverside County	
Allied Riverside Cities Narcotic Enforcement Team (BJA)	Riverside County	
Palm Springs Narcotic Enforcement Team (DEA)	Riverside County	
Riverside Joint Terrorism Task Force (FBI)	Riverside County	

# TASK FORCE COORDINATION

The LA-HIDTA facilitates cooperation and joint efforts among more than 72 Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, involving over 733 personnel participating in the LA-HIDTA Task Force and Intelligence initiative.

LA-HIDTA's Intelligence Support System (ISS) brings a working MOU between intelligence initiatives, enhances lines of communication, and defines areas of responsibility. The plan also brings an enhanced level of intelligence resources to the LA-HIDTA law enforcement community. Law enforcement's intelligence needs are addressed regardless of which component of the ISS is initially contacted for service. The ISS then focuses on defining viable targets and providing meaningful case support, based on major drug trafficking intelligence information that has been gathered by the ISS and various law enforcement elements within the region.

The LA-HIDTA Task Force then applies all necessary investigative resources to identify, prioritize, target, and dismantle the major poly-DTOs found operating in the LA-HIDTA on a regional, national, and international level. All task forces, in concert with the ISS, review ongoing cases. The goal is to re-evaluate their targets' viability and redistribute resources, if necessary, to ensure maximum impact and overall success. Case, subject, and event "all crimes" deconfliction are major components of these efforts.

The LA-HIDTA uses the California State Intelligence Index (CSII) to collect, disseminate, and coordinate all investigations that are categorized as any narcotic, gang, or terrorism crimes, as well as major felonies, or Part 1 Crimes, as categorized by the FBI. Field events, primarily involving undercover law enforcement investigators, are also coordinated through a system similar in concept to an air traffic control system. Communication with investigators is continuous and transcends jurisdictional boundaries.

The U.S. Federal Central District's Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (RTTAC) has been identified as the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC). The JRIC serves as a coordination center of terrorism intelligence for the JTTFs and FBI Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs) within the LA-HIDTA region. The JRIC is located in space adjacent to the Joint Drug Intelligence Group (JDIG), one of the LA-HIDTA Intelligence and Investigative Support Centers. Both of these centers are co-led by personnel from the FBI and local agencies which are represented on the LA-HIDTA Executive Board. To foster communications and joint use between personnel assigned to both the JDIG and the JRIC, the FBI S.C.I.F. is located in the JDIG. To share secure communications, analysts and managers assigned to the JRIC and all three LA-HIDTA Intelligence and Investigative Support Centers have access to the California Joint Regional Information Exchange System (Cal JRIES) as well as FBI's Law Enforcement On-Line (LEO) system. Additionally, appropriate law enforcement intelligence bulletins are passed between the LA-HIDTA Intelligence and Investigative Support Centers and the JRIC.

All law enforcement agencies, task forces (to include all JTTFs) and intelligence centers within the LA-HIDTA, as well as all HIDTA task force teams within both the Northern California HIDTA and the Central Valley California HIDTA, utilize the LA Clear to perform all case deconfliction and event deconfliction. Additionally, LA Clear performs the "off hour" (5:00 PM to 8:00 AM) phone-in tips and leads coverage; monitors State and Federal terrorism information-sharing databases; and monitors public news television channels covering local, regional, national, and international events, for both the State Bureau of Investigation and Intelligence Operations Center (BII/IOC) and for the Northern California Regional Threat Assessment Center (NC-RTTAC).

# **HIDTA EVALUATION**

ONDCP will continue to work with the LA-HIDTA to improve its ability to set appropriate targets, develop effective annual reports and strategies, enhance budget submissions, and follow policy and program regulations.

In order to streamline its intelligence initiatives, the LA-HIDTA has developed an Intelligence Architecture Plan that defines the intelligence responsibilities and priorities within the HIDTA, effectively bringing together its intelligence projects into what today is called the Intelligence Support System (ISS). It optimizes valued resources and enhances coordination of effort including the sharing of information.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 154 DTOs, compared to 118 the prior year. After prioritizing the 305 identified DTOs, the HIDTA specifically targeted 304 for immediate enforcement action. Of the 304 organizations targeted by the LA-HIDTA initiatives, 154 were dismantled or severely disrupted.

# Michigan HIDTA – Designated in 1997 Executive Director – Abraham L. Azzam

#### PURPOSE AND GOALS

The mission of the Michigan HIDTA is to reduce drug trafficking, terrorism, related violent crimes, and money laundering in the HIDTA Region. This will be accomplished through the coordination and sharing of intelligence, unified law enforcement effort, and community cooperation that will improve the quality of life in the State of Michigan.

#### **STRATEGY**

The Strategy of the Michigan HIDTA is to foster cooperative and effective working relationships among the 12 Federal, two State, and 81 local partners participating in Michigan HIDTA initiatives to achieve the common goals of disrupting and dismantling DTOs, and reducing the demand for drugs.

The Michigan HIDTA continues to conduct joint operations with Ohio in the Domestic Highway Enforcement (DHE) effort. We are attempting to expand this effort into a coordinated Great Lakes Strategy. The Michigan HIDTA is supporting limited maritime operations in coordination with Canadian authorities.

## **LOCATION**

The Michigan HIDTA operates out of Detroit, Michigan. It encompasses nine counties: Allegan, Genesee, Kalamazoo, Kent, Macomb, Oakland, Saginaw, Washtenaw, and Wayne.

## **INITIATIVES**

The Michigan HIDTA has 30 initiatives, which include 1 management, 2 training, 2 support, 1 intelligence, and 24 investigation/interdiction initiatives.

## SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	197	15	50	10,000	200	340

## THREAT ASSESSMENT

The State of Michigan has 3 of the top 10 busiest commercial land ports in the country, and the region is a major importation and distribution center for cocaine, heroin, marijuana, BC Bud, and MDMA (Ecstasy), as well as a recipient of cocaine, heroin and marijuana from the southern border, all of which are prevalent drugs in the Michigan HIDTA region. Cocaine, in

large quantities, and money, move through Michigan into Canada, and record seizures are made on both sides of the border. Methamphetamine continues to be a problem in western and rural Michigan. Michigan ranks 5<sup>th</sup> in the Nation (up from 9<sup>th</sup> in 2006) in the number of methamphetamine-related events reported to the National Seizure System at the EPIC. The one-pot method of making methamphetamine in liter soda bottles is prevalent with devastating results of fires, injuries, and toxic poisonings.

#### INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES

The supervisors from DEA and FBI are co-managers for the Investigative Support and Deconfliction Center. They meet on a regular basis to discuss current trends and to update each other on agency operations. This commitment provides an open environment with a free sharing of information across agency boundaries.

## TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Balkan Organized Crime (HIDTA)	Oakland County
Bay Area Narcotics Enforcement Team (HIDTA)	Saginaw and Bay County
Combined Hotel Interdiction Enforcement Team (HIDTA)	Wayne County
County of Macomb Enforcement Team (HIDTA)	Macomb County
Dangerous Drugs Group (HIDTA)	Wayne County
DEA Detroit Enforcement Group 6 (HIDTA)	Wayne County
Detroit Fugitive Apprehension Team (HIDTA)	Wayne County
Detroit Transportation Interdiction Unit (HIDTA)	Wayne County
Domestic Highway Enforcement (HIDTA)	Ingham County
Downriver Area Narcotics Organization (HIDTA)	Wayne County
FBI DPD Conspiracy One Organized Crime Task Force (HIDTA)	Wayne County
Financial Investigation (HIDTA)	Wayne County
Firearms Investigation (HIDTA)	Wayne and Genesee County
Flint Area Narcotics Group (HIDTA)	Genesee County
Forensic Enhancement (HIDTA)	Wayne and Ingham County
Grand Rapids Fugitive Task Force (HIDTA)	Kent County
HIDTA Unified/Homicide (HIDTA)	Wayne County
Livingston and Washtenaw Narcotics Enforcement Team (HIDTA)	Livingston and Washtenaw County
Methamphetamine Training (HIDTA)	Ingham County
Metropolitan Enforcement Team (HIDTA)	Kent County
Michigan State Police Technical Support (HIDTA)	Ingham County
Oakland County Narcotics Enforcement Team (HIDTA)	Oakland County
Southwest Enforcement Team (HIDTA)	Kalamazoo and Calhoun County
Violent Crimes Task Force (HIDTA)	Wayne County
West Michigan Enforcement Team (HIDTA)	Allegan and Ottawa County

#### TASK FORCE COORDINATION

The initiatives listed above comprise all of the task force initiatives supported by the Michigan HIDTA. They coordinate, through direct communication, case and event deconfliction conducted by the Michigan HIDTA Investigative Support and Deconfliction Center (ISDC), and through the initiating Federal agency for OCDETF cases. Each member agency of the Michigan HIDTA Executive Board has utilized the (ISDC) for deconfliction and case support purposes.

The Michigan HIDTA produces its annual Threat Assessment in conjunction with the NDIC. This assessment provides information on DTOs, MLOs, firearms trafficking organizations, terrorist groups, drug trafficking trends, production techniques, gangs, drug-related homicides, and information regarding threats along our border with Canada. The Michigan HIDTA houses components of the State and Detroit/Southeast Michigan Fusion Center.

The Michigan HIDTA is involved in highway interdiction through a comprehensive Domestic Highway Enforcement initiative. The EPIC's National Seizure System (NSS) is used for this initiative to gather and share data nationwide with other HIDTAs and other agencies. The NSS is also utilized for our initiatives involved with methamphetamine lab seizures.

The FBI Field Intelligence Group (FIG) has representatives from the JTTF assigned to the Michigan HIDTA and is collocated in the ISDC. Also housed at the Michigan HIDTA are representatives from ATF, ICE, DEA, Detroit Police Department, Michigan State Police, IRS, and the Michigan National Guard. These analysts are utilized for day-to-day intelligence gathering/sharing, dissemination and case support, and regularly communicate with task force participants.

#### HIDTA EVALUATION

The Michigan HIDTA is an example of "agency buy-in" amongst its participating agencies. This is best demonstrated by the small budgets requested by each initiative as participating agencies provide the majority of administrative, financial, and operational support required. As a result, the Michigan HIDTA has been able to field more initiatives than other HIDTAs receiving an equal amount of funding. This results in a greater presence of HIDTA-engaged drug task forces throughout the Michigan HIDTA's designated area of responsibility.

The Michigan HIDTA continues to monitor emerging threats within its area of responsibility and is quick to respond to them by shifting resources when appropriate. This rapid response to new threats is demonstrative of the HIDTA's increasing capability to conduct intelligence-lead enforcement operations, and is an excellent example of the HIDTA's progress in rapidly and effectively addressing new threats before they reach crisis level.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. During the course of 2008, the Michigan HIDTA initiatives had 317 DTOs under investigation and disrupted or dismantled 141 DTOs compared to 123 the prior year.

## Midwest HIDTA – Designated in 1996 Executive Director – David Barton

## **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The mission of the Midwest HIDTA is to reduce drug availability in critical and identified markets by creating and supporting intelligence-driven enforcement task forces whose activities are aimed at eliminating or reducing domestic drug trafficking. This is accomplished through enhancing and coordinating drug trafficking control efforts among Federal, State, and local enforcement agencies. Central to this mission is the expansion of cooperative, multi-jurisdictional law enforcement task forces, improvement in interagency collaboration, and the sharing of accurate and timely information and intelligence among participating agencies.

## **STRATEGY**

The Midwest HIDTA has developed a cohesive and comprehensive regional program focused on reducing and disrupting the importation, distribution, and manufacturing of illegal narcotics.

#### **LOCATION**

The Midwest HIDTA operates out of Kansas City, Missouri. It encompasses the following counties in seven States:

- Illinois: Rock Island;
- Iowa: Black Hawk, Linn, Marshall, Muscatine, Polk, Pottawattamie, Scott, and Woodbury;
- Kansas: Barton, Cherokee, Crawford, Finney, Franklin, Johnson, Labette, Leavenworth, Miami, Saline, Sedgwick, Seward, Shawnee, and Wyandotte;
- Missouri: Boone, Buchanan, Cape Girardeau, Christian, Clay, Cole, Franklin, Greene, Jasper, Jackson, Jefferson, Marion, Platte, Scott, St. Charles, Texas, and St. Louis (City of St Louis);
- Nebraska: Dakota, Dawson, Dodge, Douglas, Gage, Hall, Jefferson, Lancaster, Madison, Platte, Sarpy, and Scott's Bluff;
- North Dakota: Burleigh, Cass, Grand Forks, Morton, Ramsey, Richland, Walsh, and Ward;
- South Dakota: Beadle, Brookings, Brown, Clay, Codington, Custer, Lawrence, Lincoln, Meade, Minnehaha, Pennington, Union, and Yankton.

## **INITIATIVES**

The Midwest HIDTA has 49 initiatives, which include 1 management, 1 training, 2 support, 1 demand reduction, 1 prosecution, 39 investigation/interdiction, and 4 intelligence initiatives.

#### SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	368	4	19	17,700	5,853	10,105

#### THREAT ASSESSMENT

The Midwest HIDTA region continues to be a fertile environment for the importation, manufacturing, and distribution of narcotics. Overall, methamphetamine trafficking is the greatest problem faced by the HIDTA. However, densely populated urban areas in the region continue to experience major problems with all drugs, especially crack cocaine. Along with cocaine, methamphetamine and marijuana continue to be popular in the large urban cities of St. Louis, Kansas City, Des Moines, and Omaha. Heroin remains prevalent primarily in large urban inner city communities in St. Louis and Kansas City. MDMA, GHB, and other dangerous drugs known as "club drugs" are also consistently present in most urban areas. Law enforcement agencies indicate that Mexican DTOs dominate wholesale drug distribution and transportation. Small cities and rural areas are affected by methamphetamine on a wider scale than large cities; however that gap continues to narrow. All areas continue to see methamphetamine supplied through local production by small clandestine laboratories, facilitated by precursor chemical dealers, and pseudoephedrine smurfing operations. 11 Competing gangs and other DTOs continue to use violence to solidify and maintain their hold on drug trafficking within their areas of influence. Cooperative local, State, and Federal law enforcement efforts throughout the Midwest HIDTA region have met with noteworthy success in identifying, targeting, and prosecuting active DTOs and gang members involved in violent drug-related activity. Drug trafficking analysis indicates that high level DTOs have been taking root in the region. Many DTOs in the Midwest region are poly-drug operations. The larger urban areas of St. Louis, Kansas City, Des Moines, and Omaha continue to be drug transportation and distribution hubs for the region. Along with drugs, these cities are also in the crossroads of the Nation's highways and are important transit points for movement of DTOs' financial profits returning to the western United States and Mexico.

#### **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

The Midwest HIDTA Intelligence and Investigative Support Center (IISC), co-managed by the DEA and the Kansas City, MO Police Department, is a multi-agency coalition consisting of Federal, State, and local agencies located within the seven-state Midwest HIDTA region. Located in Kansas City, MO, the IISC is electronically linked to task force locations and key State agencies in each of the states. It collects and analyzes information from all Midwest HIDTA task forces and participating task forces and agencies. The IISC provides event and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> "smurfing" refers to the action of going from store-to-store purchasing the maximum limit allowable under the law of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine products and then pooling these products which will then be provided to a meth producer.

subject deconfliction services, multi-source name checks, investigative case support, toll analysis, charting, graphic work, as well as post-seizure and trend/predictive analysis. The IISC also provides continual evaluation of the threat to the region, identifying changes in patterns and trends. By improving the exchange of intelligence and information through more efficient coordination and communications, the IISC enhances the ability of Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to identify, arrest, and prosecute key members of DTOs and individuals involved in the clandestine manufacturing of narcotics. Trend and predictive analysis developed by the IISC assists the Midwest HIDTA Executive Board in utilizing its limited resources more efficiently. The IISC has been operational since 1998, and continues to develop the regional mission to support a seven-state effort. Event deconfliction through the Watch Center is fully implemented in the Kansas City metropolitan area. Expansion to other metropolitan areas, such as St. Louis, Omaha, and Des Moines, has occurred and further growth is anticipated during the year. The Watch Center is currently manned by elements of the Missouri National Guard and the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department.

## TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
ATF Intelligence Group (HIDTA)	Platte County, MO
Cedar Rapids DEA Task Force (HIDTA)	Linn County, IA
Des Moines DEA Task Force (HIDTA)	Polk County, IA
Fargo DEA Task Force (HIDTA)	Cass County, ND
Franklin County Narcotics Enforcement Unit (HIDTA/JAG)	Franklin County, MO
Garden City DEA Task Force (HIDTA)	Finney County, KS
Grand Forks County Task Force (HIDTA)	Grand Forks County, ND
III Corp Drug Task Force (HIDTA/JAG)	Dodge County, NE
Iowa Interdiction Support (HIDTA/JAG)	Polk County, IA
Jackson County Drug Task Force (HIDTA/JAG)	Jackson County, MO
Jefferson County Municipal Enforcement Group	
(HIDTA/JAG)	Jefferson County, MO
Kansas City DEA Interdiction TF (HIDTA)	Platte County, MO
Kansas City FBI Squad I (HIDTA)	Jackson County, MO
Kansas City Metropolitan Enforcement Initiative	
(HIDTA/JAG)	Jackson County, MO
Kansas City Street Crimes Task Force (HIDTA)	Jackson County, MO
Kansas City/Overland Park DEA Task Force (HIDTA)	Johnson County, MO
Kansas Intelligence and Information Exchange (HIDTA)	Shawnee County, MO
Kansas Interdiction Support (HIDTA)	Shawnee County, MO
Lincoln-Lancaster Drug Task Force (HIDTA/JAG)	Lancaster County, NE
Metro Area Safe Trails Task Force (HIDTA/JAG)	Burleigh County, ND
Midwest HIDTA IISC (HIDTA)	Platte County, MO
Missouri Interdiction and Information Exchange (HIDTA)	Cole County, MO

Muscatine Task Force (HIDTA/JAG)	Muscatine County, IA	
MUSTANG (HIDTA/JAG)	Boone County, MO	
Nebraska Interdiction Support (HIDTA)	Lancaster County, NE	
North Dakota Interdiction (HIDTA)	Burleigh County, ND	
Omaha Metro Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Douglas County, NE	
Pennington County Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Pennington County, SD	
Quad Cities Metropolitan Enforcement Group (HIDTA)	Rock Island County, IL	
Sioux Falls Task Force (HIDTA)	Minnehaha County, SD	
South Dakota Interdiction (HIDTA)	Pierre, SD	
Southeast Kansas Drug Enforcement Task Force (HIDTA)	Crawford County, KS	
Southeast Missouri Drug Task Force (HIDTA/JAG)	Cape Girardeau County, MO	
Springfield DEA Task Force (HIDTA)	Green County, MO	
St. Charles County Drug Task Force (HIDTA/JAG)	St. Charles County, MO	
St. Louis County Multi Drug Enforcement Task Force		
(HIDTA/JAG)	St. Louis County, MO	
St. Louis DEA Intelligence Group (HIDTA)	St. Louis City, MO	
St. Louis DEA Major Investigations and Conspiracy Group		
(37) (HIDTA)	St. Louis City, MO	
St. Louis DEA Violent Traffickers Task Force (HIDTA)	St. Louis City, MO	
St. Louis FBI Combined Enforcement Task Force (HIDTA)	St. Louis City, MO	
Tri-City Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Hall County, NE	
Tri-State Sioux City DEA Task Force (HIDTA/JAG)	Woodbury County, IA	
Wichita DEA Task Force (HIDTA)	Sedgwick County, KS	
WING Drug Task Force (HIDTA/JAG)	Scottsbluff County, NE	
Rural Area Interdiction Detail Task Force (JAG)	Buchanan County, IA	
Southeast Iowa Narcotics Task Force (JAG)	Burlington, IA	
South Central Iowa Drug Task Force (JAG)	Centerville, IA	
North Central Iowa Narcotics Task Force (JAG)	Cerro Gordo County, IA	
Iowa Great Lakes Task Force (JAG)	Clay County, IA	
S.W. Iowa Narcotics Enforcement Task Force (JAG)	Council Bluffs, IA	
Northeast Iowa Drug Task Force (JAG)	Decorah, IA	
Career Criminal & Drug Prosecution Support Task Force		
(JAG)	Dept. of Justice, IA	
Dubuque Area Drug Task Force (JAG)	Dubuque County, IA	
Johnson County Multi-Agency Drug Task Force (JAG)	Iowa City, IA	
Lee County Narcotics Task Force (JAG)	Keokuk, IA	
Mid Iowa Drug Task Force (JAG)	Marshall County, IA	
Southeast Iowa Inter-Agency Drug Task Force (JAG)	Ottumwa, IA	
Mid-Iowa Narcotics Enforcement Task Force (JAG)	Polk County, IA	

Scott County Drug Task Force (JAG)	Scott County, IA
Central Iowa Drug Task Force (JAG)	Story County, IA
Washington/Louisa Narcotics Enforcement Team (JAG)	Washington County, IA
Tri-County Drug Task Force (JAG)	Washington County, IA
Southeast Multi-County Agency (JAG)	Wahpeton, ND
Stutzman County Task Force (JAG)	Jamestown, ND
South Sakakawea Narcotics Task Force (JAG)	Sakakawea, ND
North Missouri Drug Task Force (JAG)	Adair County, MO
East Central Drug Task Force (JAG)	Audrain County, MO
Southwest Missouri Drug Task Force (JAG)	Barry County, MO
North County Municipal Enforcement Group (JAG)	Bridgeton, MO
Buchanan County Drug Strike Force (JAG)	Buchanan County, MO
Lake Area Narcotics Enforcement Group (JAG)	Camden County, MO
Clay County Drug Task Force (JAG)	Excelsior Springs, MO
COMET (Combined Ozarks Mutli-Juris. Enforcement Team)	
(JAG)	Greene County, MO
Nitro Task Force (JAG)	Ground County, MO
South Central Drug Strike Force (JAG)	Howell County, MO
Jasper County Drug Task Force (JAG)	Jasper County, MO
Lafayette County Narcotics Unit (JAG)	Lafayette County, MO
Mineral Area Drug Strike Force (JAG)	Leadington, MO
Northeast Missouri Narcotics Task Force (JAG)	Monroe, MO
Mid-Missouri Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Task Force (JAG)	Morgan County, MO
Bootheel Drug Task Force (JAG)	Pemiscot County, MO
Platte County Multi-Jurisdictional Enforcement Group (JAG)	Platte County, MO
Community Narcotics Enforcement Team (JAG)	St. Clair County, MO
Metro Multi-Jurisdictional Undercover Drug Program (JAG)	St. Louis, MO
Central Nebraska Cooperation for Drug Enforcement (JAG)	North Platte, NE
Regional Apprehension Program (JAG)	York, NE
Southeast Area for Drug Enforcement (JAG)	Beatrice, NE
Special Narcotics Abuse Reduction Effort (JAG)	Columbus, NE
DCI Statewide Drug Task Force (JAG)	Pierre, SD
Southwest Kansas Drug Task Force (JAG)	Liberal, KS

## TASK FORCE COORDINATION

The Midwest HIDTA plays a central role in assuring coordination and cooperation with HIDTA-designated initiatives, and to a lesser amount, with agencies and task forces that voluntarily participate. Many efforts are underway outside of HIDTA in State and local agencies to further enhance the capabilities of information exchange. All HIDTA enforcement drug task forces in the Midwest HIDTA share information with the HIDTA IISC and actively participate in

the HIDTA Intelligence Coordination Plan. Non-HIDTA task forces utilize the IISC and SAFETNet or their own agency or State programs. (In this region, OCDETF has no full-time enforcement task force infrastructure. Coordination is accomplished on a case-by-case basis.) The HIDTA provides the only formal coordination plan in the region.

The Midwest HIDTA IISC coordinates information sharing through several integrated groups. The DEA St. Louis Intelligence Group helps gather, analyze, and evaluate information for the St. Louis DEA regional enforcement area. The initiative electronically connects Firebird, Merlin, and HIDTA.net to facilitate the exchange of information and intelligence products. The St. Louis DEA Regional Wire Intercept Initiative provides a regionally based telecommunications interception strategy for Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies. Intelligence gained and distributed through the use of this investigative tool greatly enhances the ability to expand investigations. Additionally, the ATF's Regional Intelligence Group is collocated within the Midwest HIDTA IISC facility. This group provides intelligence support and assistance within the Kansas City division area of Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa. This collocation enhances the coordination of intelligence relating to firearms, gun tracing, domestic terrorism, and violent drug trafficking offenders.

All HIDTA task forces are required to use the HIDTA SAFETNet deconfliction system. All other task forces in the seven-State HIDTA area, whether Federally funded or not, have the ability to voluntarily use SAFETNet to enhance officer safety and event deconfliction. Currently, 136 task forces or agencies in the Midwest HIDTA region participate or have access to SAFETNet. SAFETnet also connects to the National Virtual Pointer System (NVPS), assuring interface with NDPIX and 11 other HIDTA deconfliction systems.

The intelligence subsystem deploys and implements dual purpose all-crime intelligence systems to help law enforcement agencies share, analyze, and disseminate criminal intelligence. The use of RISS and other technology makes it possible to connect multiple HIDTAs together. Midwest HIDTA is a NODE on this secure Virtual Private Network (VPN) system, and continues to develop and host intelligence resources for HIDTA agencies and task forces.

## **HIDTA EVALUATION**

The HIDTA leadership is keenly focused on the performance of initiatives and task forces. The HIDTA has developed tools to identify primary and secondary drug threat areas to enable agencies at local, regional, and headquarters levels to work together to develop customized plans and focus needed resources on specific identified problems. These tools help target specific drug threats in the HIDTA, which faces significant challenges due to the compartmentalization of drug networks and various business plans of multiple DTOs. The HIDTA Strategy tracks very well with the specific drug threats identified in the HIDTA Threat Assessment and the Market Analysis produced by the NDIC. Performance data provided in the Midwest HIDTA's most recent Annual Report indicates that the initiatives are targeting and impacting identified drug threats. Additionally, ONDCP recently conducted an on-site review of HIDTA initiatives, which verified that the Executive Board, the HIDTA staff, and task force commanders have instituted procedures to monitor and evaluate the performance and funding of the initiatives.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the HIDTA

disrupted or dismantled 477 DTOs, compared to 301 the prior year, several multi-year investigations having culminated in 2008. Of the 1037 DTOs the Midwest HIDTA Task Forces investigated in 2008; 426 were local, 472 were multi-state, and 139 were identified as international in scope.

# Milwaukee HIDTA – Designated in 1998 Executive Director – Edward Polachek

## **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The mission of the Milwaukee HIDTA is to substantially reduce drug-related activity through enhanced intelligence processes and coordinated law enforcement, prosecutions, and demand reduction efforts.

#### **STRATEGY**

The Milwaukee HIDTA will continue to foster cooperative and effective working relationships among the 16 local, State, and Federal participating member agencies to achieve the common goals of disrupting and dismantling DTOs, and reducing the demand for drugs. Through Milwaukee HIDTA enforcement initiatives working within the five member counties, investigative emphasis is placed upon the targeting of DTOs that pose the most significant threats, primarily those with ties to the Southwest and Northern borders (multi-state and international). In addition, the initiatives work cooperatively with counties bordering the HIDTA region, other HIDTAs, and law enforcement agencies via Domestic Highway Enforcement to develop multi-pronged investigations.

#### **LOCATION**

The Milwaukee HIDTA operates out of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. It encompasses the five counties of Dane, Kenosha, Milwaukee, Racine, and Waukesha.

## **INITIATIVES**

The Milwaukee HIDTA has nine initiatives, which include one management, one training, one support, one prevention, one prosecution, one intelligence, and three investigation/interdiction initiatives.

#### SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	39	1	3.5	770	275	80

#### THREAT ASSESSMENT

Cocaine remains the most readily available drug in the Milwaukee HIDTA region, followed by high-potency marijuana, both indoor and outdoor grown. Heroin abuse and resultant overdose deaths have increased as a result of prescription abuse. Distribution of

MDMA from Canada is expected to continue to increase. Drug-related violence and violent crime by gangs will continue to pose a serious threat to the Milwaukee HIDTA region.

## **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

The Intelligence and Investigative Support Center (IISC) was originally called the HIDTA Investigative and Technical Support (HITS) Center and was the first initiative formed with the creation of the Milwaukee HIDTA in 1998. It represents a unique combination of civilian criminal intelligence analysts, WI National Guard Drug Control Program intel analysts, FBI and DEA intel analysts, local law enforcement officers acting as technical surveillance officers, law enforcement supervisors (local and Federal), and university criminal justice seniors working as Interns. Overall, this is a combination that brings a breadth of skill to this fast-evolving area variously dubbed "intelligence-led policing," but in reality this is a team approach of skilled analysts working with investigators to find and analyze information and turn it into "actionable intelligence" that leads to operational successes.

The mission of the IISC is to provide accurate and timely information that has been analyzed by trained criminal intelligence analysts and is now "actionable intelligence" to law enforcement agencies regarding drug-related criminal activity within the Milwaukee HIDTA area. In addition, the IISC also supplies technical assistance for the vast array of surveillance equipment utilized for enforcement operations. It continues to provide strategic, organizational, and tactical intelligence on DTOs operating in the Milwaukee HIDTA region using a full array of analytical software such as Pen-Link and I2.

To accomplish the mission, the IISC recently implemented a team approach methodology. Within the IISC are five separate teams of analysts comprised of a team leader and other analyst(s) assigned to the team. The team leader is selected on the basis of experience, skill, and leadership ability, and is responsible for managing team efforts in supporting analytical casework. This approach further encourages analyst development by allowing less experienced analysts to learn new analytical skill sets under the mentorship of the team leader. The IISC supports the overall mission by collecting, evaluating, analyzing, and disseminating timely intelligence on drug distribution, drug-related firearm trafficking, homeland security targets, money laundering, and violent crime organizations and their members. The Milwaukee HIDTA intelligence subsystem is comprised of two components, the IISC and the Technical Support Unit (TSU). These intelligence components provide a full range of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence support to HIDTA initiatives, participating agencies, and other appropriate law enforcement and intelligence community entities. There is an ever-expanding exchange of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence between Milwaukee HIDTA and other HIDTAs throughout the country. The core intelligence subsystem functions include:

- Event Deconfliction;
- Case/Subject Deconfliction; and
- Post Seizure Analysis.

The Milwaukee HIDTA IISC functions as a key factor in implementing the HIDTA Strategy, and supports the HIDTA initiatives throughout the year as they execute strategic activities to accomplish the targeted outcomes. Tactical and operational intelligence, as facilitated by IISC personnel, provides the requisite coordination between initiatives and

agencies to achieve efficient and effective results, as mandated by the national HIDTA program goals. Full-time, co-located multi-agency personnel and databases provide the infrastructure. The IISC activities have been extremely successful performing the following key functions on behalf of the Milwaukee HIDTA initiatives and participating agencies:

- Facilitating connectivity between and/or among local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies, criminal databases, as well as other intelligence databases, HIDTA IISCs, national intelligence centers, and open source databases;
- Title-III and PEN register capabilities have proven to be an effective investigative tool and have enabled HIDTA initiatives to disrupt and dismantle major DTOs operating within and outside of the HIDTA region. Several cases were referred to FBI and DEA offices outside of the HIDTA region for additional investigation;
- Developing drug threat and needs assessments; specialized interdiction reports highlighting trafficking trends from across the country that involved subjects from Wisconsin;
- Encouraging reporting agency drug seizures to the National Drug Seizure system at EPIC:
- Author and disseminate intelligence bulletins related to DHE seizures for the States of Wisconsin and Minnesota;
- Providing a variety of analytical tools/graphical depiction capability for use by Milwaukee HIDTA law enforcement initiatives and participating agencies;
- Coordinating Wisconsin National Guard Drug Control Program resources to law enforcement initiatives and area law enforcement; and
- Collecting, analyzing, and disseminating all DHE seizure data for the State of Wisconsin in support of the National I-90/94 Corridor DHE Project.

In addition to these core functions, the IISC helps support two major national HIDTA efforts. One of these involves the Great Lakes/Northern Border Initiative, which promotes a free exchange of information and intelligence between numerous HIDTAs that are close in proximity to the Great Lakes and Canadian border. As new threats are identified and intelligence gaps discovered, efforts and strategies are developed by the Milwaukee HIDTA IISC to work in concert with all law enforcement partners, including DHS and participating HIDTAs. The other current initiative involves the intelligence development of Dominican DTOs operating with strong links from the East Coast to the Midwest and other emerging areas. By participating in this effort, Milwaukee enforcement efforts can be coordinated with other enforcement efforts from the East Coast and other areas.

The Milwaukee HIDTA IISC is continually seeking new ways to provide intelligence support to our member agencies and other law enforcement groups outside the HIDTA region. The IISC analysts have been a source of expertise for other departments as they attempt to increase their intelligence capabilities. By instituting mentoring and training opportunities for other departments, the ability to significantly disrupt or dismantle drug trafficking groups and other criminal entities is enhanced.

#### TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Milwaukee Metropolitan Enforcement Group (Byrne)	Milwaukee
Waukesha MEG (Byrne)	Waukesha
Kenosha and Racine Counties MEG (Byrne)	Kenosha and Racine Counties
Dane County Drug Task Force MEG (Byrne)	Madison
DEA Task Force for Southern WI (DEA)	Milwaukee
Drug Gang, REACT, Fugitive (HIDTA)	Milwaukee

#### TASK FORCE COORDINATION

The Milwaukee Metropolitan Enforcement Group (MMEG) is collocated with the HIDTA, but operates under its own Executive Board policies and is responsible for small to midlevel drug investigations in Milwaukee County. As cases get more complex they are turned over to one of the HIDTA initiatives. The remaining Multi-Jurisdictional Enforcement Group (MEG) units (Kenosha/Racine, Waukesha, and Dane) are likewise responsible for small to mid-level drug investigations in their respective counties and responsible to their own Executive Boards. Again, as their cases develop beyond their own geographic boundaries, they are turned over to a HIDTA initiative or DEA task force, as appropriate. The DEA task force focuses on major drug trafficking investigations throughout approximately 40 counties in the southern portion of Wisconsin.

The three HIDTA investigative initiatives are collocated in the HIDTA facility in Milwaukee and, as such, are directly involved with information sharing through the HIDTA systems in the IISC. One initiative, the Regional Enforcement Activity for Current Threats (REACT) focuses on interdiction (packages, highway, and heroin); another, the Drug Gang Task Force (DGTF) focuses on violent DTOs/gangs throughout southeast Wisconsin; and the third (Fugitive) focuses on apprehension of fugitives and participates in all HIDTA operations. Many of the targets of the Fugitive task force are predominately drug traffickers and murderers.

The Milwaukee HIDTA Executive Board is composed of all 16 member agencies and is committed to a results/impact-driven strategy that emphasizes demonstrated results, as certified in the PMP developed exclusively by HIDTA directors to demonstrate the value-added by cooperative, multi-agency intelligence-led investigations of major DTOs. The HIDTA initiatives have an Operations Coordinator, who is one of the task force supervisors charged with coordinating the investigations within the HIDTA to ensure maximum use of limited resources.

Coordination of all information is accomplished through the HIDTA IISC and through the use of a common case management system (ACISS) operated by the State of Wisconsin, Department of Justice, Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI). Criminal Intelligence Analysts from the HIDTA regularly meet with each of the task forces to gather and share information of an intelligence nature. All participate in the HIDTA's annual Threat Assessment, quarterly investigator meetings, i.e. the Southeast Law Enforcement Coordination Team (SELECT), where additional information is shared and training is provided on new investigative/analytic techniques or legal updates.

The HIDTA IISC supervisor and Deputy Director, along with the initiative supervisors, conduct meetings that address the targeting of DTOs.

All information is available for sharing not only within the Milwaukee HIDTA, but through a RISS connection to the State of Wisconsin, and through the NVPS. All targets are deconflicted nationally. Regional events are deconflicted via SAFETNet through the Chicago HIDTA server. This service is provided to all the MEGs and law enforcement across southern Wisconsin. The case management system, Automated Criminal Investigation Secure System (ACISS), is open to other HIDTAs across the country with approval from the Milwaukee HIDTA IISC Managers, and is currently utilized by the following HIDTAs: Chicago, Midwest, Lake County, Ohio, Michigan, New York/New Jersey, Washington/Baltimore, and Atlanta.

All units provide information to and receive information from the Fusion Center - Wisconsin State Information Center (WSIC) in Madison, the Southeast Terrorism Alert Center (STAC) in Milwaukee, and the FBI JTTF in Milwaukee. The HIDTA IISC has an FBI Analyst assigned to ensure the flow of information is uninterrupted, as many of the international cases with which HIDTA initiatives get involved identify money laundering and arms smuggling operations that could have a terrorism nexus.

#### **HIDTA EVALUATION**

The Milwaukee HIDTA program is quickly becoming the recognized focal point for multi-agency enforcement operations in and around the metropolitan Milwaukee area.

The program continues to report and provide solid evidence that a majority of DTOs working within its designated HIDTA region are interconnected with national and international drug trafficking networks and has taken innovative and aggressive steps to develop multi-HIDTA efforts tasked with attacking the threats. The HIDTA's management has made great strides in increasing its interaction and collaboration with other HIDTA programs and agencies in order to destabilize national and transnational drug trafficking networks.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 36 DTOs, compared to 27 the previous year. The HIDTA initiatives identified 83 DTOs of which they targeted 28 to dismantle or disrupt. By the end of calendar year 2008, the Milwaukee HIDTA had disrupted 29 and dismantled 7 DTOs originally identified. The significant increase in investigative success from 2007 to 2008 is a direct result of several key factors such as: increased utilization of the Intelligence and Investigative Support Center (IISC) and the increasing sophistication of analysts skills, as well as the incorporation of outlying counties (Kenosha, Racine and Waukesha) investigative units under the Regional Enforcement Activity for Current Threats (REACT) for case development, deconfliction and support via the statewide case management system, ACISS.

# Nevada HIDTA – Designated in 2001 Executive Director – Kent Bitsko

## **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The mission of the Nevada HIDTA (NV HIDTA) is to reduce the manufacture, trafficking, and distribution of methamphetamine, precursor chemicals, and other dangerous drugs by attacking and dismantling large-scale and often violent drug trafficking organizations. The goals of the NV HIDTA are to reduce drug availability by disrupting and dismantling DTOs, reduce the harmful consequences of drug trafficking, and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the region's law enforcement organizations.

## **STRATEGY**

The HIDTA program has been instrumental in fostering cooperation between State, local, and Federal agencies to a level not previously seen in Nevada. The relationships that have been built and the cooperative effort to attack DTOs by the participating agencies of the NV HIDTA will continue to improve and grow. There have been task forces reevaluated, new task forces created, and other task forces dismantled during 2008-2009. The expansion and restructuring of the pharmaceutical task force of the NV HIDTA should go a long way toward combating the increase and availability of pharmaceuticals in the NV HIDTA.

#### **LOCATION**

The NV HIDTA operates out of Las Vegas, Nevada. It encompasses two counties in the State of Nevada: Clark and Washoe.

#### *INITIATIVES*

The NV HIDTA has 14 initiatives, which include 1 management, 1 training, 1 prosecution, 1 intelligence and 10 enforcement initiatives.

#### SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	79	3	7	17,171	137	359

#### THREAT ASSESSMENT

The distribution and use of ice methamphetamine pose the most significant drug threat to the NV HIDTA region. <sup>12</sup> According to NV HIDTA intelligence, most of the ice available in the region is supplied by Mexican DTOs that transport the drug to the region from sources of supply in Mexico, Arizona, and California. Methamphetamine availability varies throughout the NV HIDTA region. This variability is most likely associated with different domestic source areas that supply ice to markets in the region. Marijuana is the most widely available and frequently used drug in the Nevada region. We have seen a significant increase in the number of indoor grows in the Clark County portion of the NV HIDTA, with over 100 indoor grows discovered by HIDTA task forces or local law enforcement in the area during 2008. NV HIDTA has also seen continued expansion of diverted pharmaceuticals available on the streets of Las Vegas and in the numerous nightclubs that tourists frequent on the Las Vegas Strip. The abuse and distribution of these drugs is not limited to these venues, contributes significantly to the rapidly expanding problem in the NV HIDTA. There has also been a significant increase in the availability and use of heroin in the area. The Clark County component of the NV HIDTA conducted investigations that involved high school students using heroin. The operations resulted in arrests of 10 customers and 24 Mexican national traffickers. Information provided by the customers through debriefings by NV HIDTA task forces revealed the traffickers sold them heroin as opium. Other heroin investigations were conducted in Reno. Seven pounds of heroin were seized as part of the dismantlement of a DTO, which is an extremely large seizure of heroin for the NV HIDTA region.

#### **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

Beginning in 2007, the Intelligence and Investigative Support Center (IISC) expanded to include intelligence personnel located within the Northern Nevada Drug Task Force. The IISC's mission will largely remain the same, but its responsibility has increased with the addition of Washoe County. The IISC's mission focuses on the production of comprehensive and timely intelligence products, both tactical and strategic in scope, that are intended to enhance NV HIDTA enforcement task force operations, as well as inform regional and national policy makers. The third primary component of the IISC's mission, de-confliction, will be performed in conjunction with the LACLEAR. LACLEAR will continue to provide all event de-confliction, while the IISC will complement LACLEAR efforts in reference to case/subject de-confliction. Since the NV HIDTA IISC is co-located with 6 of the 10 HIDTA enforcement task forces within the DEA Las Vegas District Office, the NV IISC and HIDTA enforcement personnel maintain the ability to interact with each other on a daily basis.

In reference to case support, the IISC continues to produce intelligence products in support of NV HIDTA task forces' most prolific investigations. During 2008, the IISC supported over 50 Title III intercepts initiated in just one investigation while maintaining support to every pen register established by HIDTA task forces. This includes pen registers generated by offsite task forces such as MLAR and MDTO. Overall, the IISC analyzed in excess of 900,000 pen/toll records, added 9,000 subscribers, and documented intelligence findings in approximately 200 DEA reports and 25 I-2 organizational charts. The IISC's involvement in every major NV

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Methamphetamine hydrochloride, clear chunky crystals resembling ice, which can be inhaled by smoking, is referred to as "ice."

HIDTA-funded investigation also led to approximately 380 IISC referrals to other HIDTAs and agencies.

The significance of the IISC's tactical support is also reflected in its timely and comprehensive strategic products. The IISC's exposure to a wide array of cases support increases in its intelligence collection capacity. In 2008, the IISC's commitment to strategic products generated eight intelligence bulletins that included assessments on diverted pharmaceuticals and the relationship between drug trafficking and Nevada gaming. Additionally, the IISC produced bulletins on several unique concealment methods and changes to regional trends in marijuana and cocaine distribution.

Finally, the IISC is routinely involved in subject/case de-confliction separate from LACLEAR. NV HIDTA enforcement utilizes the IISC to crosscheck names, addresses, and phone numbers on a daily basis, with the results are typically shared within 24 hours. The IISC's in-house DEA indices system allows analysts to check information against DEA-wide toll and intelligence records.

## TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Clark County Gang Task Force (HIDTA)	Clark County
Regional Offender Drug Enforcement Organization (HIDTA)	Clark County
Money Laundering & Asset Removal Task Force (HIDTA)	Clark County
Nevada Fugitive Investigative Strike Team (HIDTA)	Clark County
Nevada Interdiction Task Force (HIDTA)	Clark and Washoe Counties
Northern Nevada Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Washoe County
Pharmaceutical Narcotic Enforcement Team (HIDTA)	Clark County
Safe Streets Gang Task Force (HIDTA)	Clark County
Southern Nevada Joint Meth Task Force (HIDTA)	Clark County
Southern Nevada Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Clark County
Special Investigations Unit (HIDTA)	Clark County

## TASK FORCE COORDINATION

All Federally funded drug enforcement task forces in the HIDTA region that specifically target illegal drugs are funded by the HIDTA program. All of the task forces within the NV HIDTA are required to cooperate and interact with the IISC. Each of the individual agencies in the southern part of the State are required to run all of their deconfliction cases and subjects through LA CLEAR. Nevada membership in LA CLEAR is funded through the NVHIDTA. The Washoe County Task Forces use RISS for their deconfliction.

All Nevada task forces use the HIDTA IISC to do their case analytical support. This results in the information being available to all of the task forces. The other drug units that operate within the confines of the NV HIDTA area (but not funded through HIDTA) use LA CLEAR for their event and subject deconfliction.

There is no terrorism task force within the NV HIDTA. The NV HIDTA does work and share information with the Southern Nevada Fusion Center. The NV HIDTA has employed an analyst who will work out of the Fusion Center, the HIDTA director is a member of the Southern Nevada Fusion Center's Board of Governance, and the HIDTA IISC initiative manager is on the steering committee. This facilitates the flow of information between the HIDTA and the Southern Nevada Fusion Center.

Information-sharing meetings are facilitated by the IISC on a weekly basis and are attended by detectives and agents who are assigned to the individual HIDTA task forces. An initiative managers meeting is held bimonthly. These meetings further encourage information sharing.

#### **HIDTA EVALUATION**

The NV HIDTA reported data demonstrating initiatives improved outcomes, compared to 2007 data. The numbers of intelligence referrals to other agencies and other HIDTAs increased over last year's performance—an indication that collaboration and coordination with other initiatives, agencies, and HIDTAs has improved. The Executive Board is managing the performance of HIDTA initiatives, and will modify funding of initiatives based on their performance. However, new challenges have emerged in the NV HIDTA region. During 2008, the HIDTA reported a surge in heroin seizures both in the northern part of the HIDTA and in the Las Vegas area. In Las Vegas, drug traffickers were marketing heroin to high school-aged youth and young adults as opium to avoid the long-standing stigma of heroin.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 110 DTOs, compared to 96 the previous year. Consistent with the elements that characterize the NV HIDTA, many of the organizations identified during 2008 were cells of more extensive international and regional DTOs. By targeting the largest DTOs, and more specifically the methamphetamine DTOs, the NV HIDTA should achieve maximum impact on both the regional and national drug market.

## New England HIDTA – Designated in 1999 Executive Director – J. T. Fallon

## **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The mission of the New England (NE) HIDTA is to reduce drug availability by creating intelligence-driven drug and financial crimes task forces aimed at eliminating or reducing domestic drug trafficking and its harmful consequences through enhancing and helping to coordinate drug trafficking control efforts among Federal, State, and local agencies.

## **STRATEGY**

The NE HIDTA provides an agency-neutral program to balance regional law enforcement efforts, and coordinates a strategy to address the regional threat and national priorities. It continues to foster effective working relationships among six U.S. Attorneys' Offices, nine Federal law enforcement agencies, and scores of State and local law enforcement agencies. The 18-member NE HIDTA Executive Board approves the Strategy, as well as the Threat Assessment, budget, and initiatives. NE HIDTA task force initiatives are staffed with collocated Federal, State, and local law enforcement officers. Each task force initiative has a stated mission, strategy, objectives, and performance targets. The NE HIDTA Executive Board, Operations Subcommittee, Intelligence Subcommittee, and Management and Coordination initiative coordinate the integration of all initiatives to ensure a unified effort in achieving goals and objectives. The overall unifying goal among all agencies is to affect the disruption and dismantlement of DTOs. Coordination and partnership with the OCDETF program are fostered, as are partnerships with non-HIDTA agencies and organizations.

#### **LOCATION**

The NE HIDTA operates out of Methuen, Massachusetts. It encompasses 13 counties, in six states:

- Massachusetts (Essex, Hampden, Middlesex, Plymouth, Suffolk, Worcester);
- Connecticut (Fairfield, Hartford, New Haven);
- Rhode Island (Providence);
- Vermont (Chittenden);
- Maine (Cumberland); and
- New Hampshire (Hillsborough)

## **INITIATIVES**

The NE HIDTA has 19 initiatives, which include 1 management, 1 training, 1 intelligence, and 16 investigation/interdiction initiatives.

#### SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	126	4	5	6,000	56	363

#### THREAT ASSESSMENT

Heroin prices in gram quantities reportedly declined slightly in certain New England drug markets; however, there are no indications that this trend is permanent. The spread of prescription narcotic abuse in New England contributes to a growing heroin problem because chronic prescription narcotic abusers often switch to more affordable heroin. Methadone, a drug used to treat heroin addiction and chronic pain, is increasingly abused and available in the region, and has become the leading cause of drug-related deaths in Maine and New Hampshire. In the past year, some New England drug markets reported sustained cocaine shortages and higher prices. However, availability and prices in most markets appear to have reverted to traditionally observed pre-shortage levels. Crack cocaine distribution is increasing in Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, as Massachusetts and New York City metropolitan area street gangs travel to these states to expand their distribution markets. According to HIDTA intelligence, Mexican DTOs have emerged as significant transporters and suppliers of cocaine, marijuana, and heroin as well as limited quantities of ice methamphetamine within the NE HIDTA region. Mexican DTOs often work in concert with traditional Colombian and Dominican groups and have established sources of supply in Mexico, the U.S. Southwest border area, and more recently Atlanta, GA. <sup>13</sup> Ethnic street gangs, which frequently rely on midlevel and retail sales of illicit substances for revenue, are expanding in every New England State. Violence between these street gangs is increasing, as they compete for turf in a lucrative drug market area.

## **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

The mission of the NE HIDTA IISC (NEIISC) is to proactively collect, evaluate, collate, analyze, and disseminate detailed and relevant all-source information concerning DTOs, specifically Dominican and Colombian Trafficking Organizations, Consolidated Priority Targets (CPOT) and Regional Priority Targets (RPOT) impacting New England and other areas of the country. The NEIISC provides investigators with tactical all-source information, which supports cases on a daily basis, with special emphasis on cases being worked by other HIDTA initiatives. The NEIISC also provides strategic intelligence support, which assists investigators in probing major conspiracies, projecting potential criminal drug operations, and producing estimates of future major drug activities. This provides agencies with the necessary information to prioritize investigations and enforcement operations. The NEIISC Watch Center provides deconfliction services to minimize investigative conflicts between agencies.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Methamphetamine hydrochloride, clear chunky crystals resembling ice, which can be inhaled by smoking, is referred to as "ice."

The NEIISC is co-managed by an FBI Supervisory Special Agent and a Sergeant with the Massachusetts State Police. The IISC is co-located in Maynard, MA in a joint venture with the Commonwealth Fusion Center. This space is paid for by the Massachusetts State Police. The NEIISC utilizes advanced computer technology to assist in the collation, analysis, retrieval, and dissemination of all the collected data. This information includes, but is not limited to: Dominican and Colombian DTOs, emerging border/coastal threats, narco-terrorism, and other organized trafficking groups operating along the New England/Canada border and the New England coastline. The NEIISC implemented an Intranet/Internet solution to the challenge of supporting task forces in other states. Connectivity to other HIDTAs and other HIDTA task forces is achieved through the use of Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology. The NEIISC furthers this goal through implementation of a RISS node for the IISC. The NEIISC is committed to the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan, which mandates that all HIDTAs affiliate with the RISS.NET for information-sharing purposes.

A priority of the NEIISC is providing Federal, State, and local law enforcement with event and target deconfliction services through the IISC's web-based deconfliction systems. Communication to the New England HIDTA IISC is by voice telephone and facsimile transmission, with some remote entry by task forces. Subsequent RISS.NET connectivity between the IISC, the NE HIDTA task forces, and Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies enhance access to the agency site. The NEIISC consists of two operational components: Watch Center Section and Analytical Services Section.

## TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Central Massachusetts Task Force (HIDTA)	Worcester, MA
Financial Investigative Task Force (HIDTA)	Boston, MA
Fugitive Task Force (HIDTA)	Boston, MA
Greater Boston HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Boston, MA
Hartford County HIDTA Transportation Task Force (HIDTA)	Connecticut
New Haven-Fairfield County Task Force (HIDTA)	Connecticut
North Shore HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Methuen, MA
Northern Vermont HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Burlington, VT
Providence County HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Warwick, RI
Rhode Island HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Providence, RI
Southern Maine HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Portland, ME
Southern New Hampshire HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Manchester, NH
Southwestern Connecticut HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Bridgeport, CT
Western Massachusetts HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Springfield, MA
Maine Drug Enforcement Agency	Maine
New Hampshire Attorney General's Drug Task Force	New Hampshire
Vermont Drug Task Force	Vermont
Southern Vermont Drug Task Force	Vermont
Northwest Vermont Task Force	Vermont

Northeast Vermont	Vermont
Heroin Enforcement Action Team	Vermont
Essex County Drug Task Force	Essex County, MA
Northeast Merrimack Valley Drug Task Force	Essex County, MA
North Shore Drug Task Force	Essex County, MA
East Hampden County Narcotic Task Force	Hampden County, MA
Hampden County District Attorney's Narcotics Task Force	Hampden County, MA
Greater Boston Counter Crime Task Force	Middlesex County, MA
Suburban Middlesex County Drug Task Force	Middlesex County, MA
Southern Middlesex Drug Task Force	Middlesex County, MA
WEB Major Crimes Task Force	Plymouth County, MA
South Shore Drug Task Force	Plymouth County, MA
Boston Drug Task Force	Suffolk County, MA
North Suffolk Drug Task Force	Suffolk County, MA
North Worcester County Drug Task Force	Worcester County, MA
Community Narcotics Task Force	Worcester County, MA
Regional Drug and Crime Counter Crime Task Force	Worcester County, MA
Blackstone Valley Drug Task Force	Worcester County, MA

#### TASK FORCE COORDINATION

The mission of the Southern Maine HIDTA task force is to disrupt/dismantle core and secondary heroin, cocaine, and crack cocaine organizations, Regional Priority Organization Targets (RPOT), and other drug trafficking organizations operating in the Cumberland County, Maine area. The task force coordinates and shares intelligence with the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency, a State-sponsored agency with responsibility for the entire State of Maine, as necessary on cases of mutual interest.

The New Hampshire Attorney General's Drug Task Force coordinates closely with the Southern New Hampshire Task Force, a NE HIDTA-supported initiative, administered and directed by the DEA in the Hillsborough County area, and in connection with the New Hampshire State Police Narcotics Investigation Unit. In OCDETF cases, the NH DTF will often pool resources and play a supporting role for the HIDTA task force or NHSP/NIU.

The mission of the HIDTA-supported, DEA-led Northern Vermont HIDTA Task Force (NVTF) is to disrupt/dismantle core and secondary heroin, cocaine, crack cocaine, synthetic opiate, and marijuana drug trafficking organizations, including those individuals and organizations operating along the Northern Vermont/Canadian border. The task force identifies, targets, arrests, and prosecutes illicit drug organizations, whose activities impact the Northern Vermont area, specifically the HIDTA-designated Chittenden County, and other regions of the country, thereby reducing the flow of drugs, illicit drug assets, and related violence. The NVTF coordinates and shares intelligence with the Vermont Drug Task Force, a State-sponsored task force responsible for the entire State of Vermont.

In the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Federally funded drug enforcement task forces are located within six different counties. Each of the task forces is comprised of Federal, State, and/or local law enforcement officers. In a review of all 16 NE HIDTA task forces conducted by the NE HIDTA Director and his Deputy Director, varying levels of coordination and cooperation between Federally funded task forces, HIDTA task forces and OCDETF investigations were revealed. To maintain areas where there is good coordination and enhance weak areas, the Director will continue to impress upon HIDTA task force commanders the need for cooperating and sharing information with all enforcement agencies. He will also meet with the leadership of non-HIDTA law enforcement agencies to further expand cooperation and coordination.

The NE HIDTA facilitates the sharing of intelligence among the many task forces situated throughout New England through the IISC. The IISC supports HIDTA enforcement initiatives, but the future may hold possibilities for coordination of services between the NE HIDTA, the New England State Police Information Network (NESPIN) and State fusion centers, which would include the JTTF.

The HIDTA task forces make every effort to share intelligence with other HIDTA task forces through the efforts of the IISC. Strategies are being developed to increase the level of two-way intelligence sharing.

The HIDTA coordinates with the JTTF when investigative information or intelligence reveals a nexus to terrorism-related activity.

#### HIDTA EVALUATION

The NE HIDTA continues to seek innovative means to enhance its effectiveness. The decision to co-locate its IISC with the Boston Fusion Center has provided a more seamless flow of information between local, State, and Federal agencies, and has become a template for other HIDTAs.

Additionally, the NE HIDTA remains an important part of the Domestic Highway Enforcement initiative and has been a focal point for operations along the I-95 Corridor. The HIDTA is involved in the Priority Drug Investigation Project, a multi-HIDTA effort targeting Dominican DTOs.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 132 DTOs, compared to 137 the prior year. During 2008 the initiatives identified 309 DTOs, a 10% jump from the previous year. Of those identified, New England HIDTA task forces investigated 301 and disrupted or dismantled 132, 99% of those expected.

# New York/New Jersey HIDTA – Designated in 1990 Executive Director – Chauncey Parker

#### PURPOSE AND GOALS

The mission of the New York/New Jersey (NY/NJ) HIDTA is to reduce domestic drug trafficking and measurably reduce illegal drug use and crime by enhancing and coordinating drug trafficking control efforts. Recognizing that there is no single solution, the NY/NJ HIDTA seeks to accomplish its mission through collaborative, measurable initiatives including enforcement, information sharing, training, and prevention.

## **STRATEGY**

The strategy of the NY/NJ HIDTA is to build partnerships to reduce crime, particularly drug-related crime, by enhancing and coordinating drug enforcement efforts. The NY/NJ HIDTA accomplishes this mission by promoting cooperation between agencies through the creation of collocated, commingled task forces, providing technological capabilities to enhance and expedite investigations, and leveraging resources to ensure they are used in the most efficient way possible.

#### **LOCATION**

The NY/NJ HIDTA operates out of New York, NY. It encompasses 22 counties in 2 states:

- New York: New York City (Bronx, Kings, New York, Richmond, and Queens Counties), Albany, Clinton, Erie, Franklin, Monroe, Nassau, Onondaga, St. Lawrence, Suffolk, and Westchester Counties; and
- New Jersey: Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Mercer, Middlesex, Passaic, and Union Counties.

## *INITIATIVES*

The NY/NJ HIDTA has seven initiatives, which include one management, one training, one intelligence, and four investigation/interdiction initiatives.

## SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	133	7	6	82,200	2,057	1,037

#### THREAT ASSESSMENT

The NY/NJ HIDTA region is a national distribution center for illicit drugs, principally cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. Multi-kilogram to ton quantities of these drugs are transported to the region by air, land, and sea conveyances from drug source and transit countries, such as Canada, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico, as well as from other domestic locations, including Florida, Puerto Rico, and the Southwest. Wholesale quantities of illicit drugs that enter the region are typically divided into smaller quantities for further distribution within the region and transported to cities throughout the Northeast, Southeast, and Midwest.

Cocaine and heroin pose the most significant threats to the NY/NJ HIDTA region. Cocaine is frequently abused throughout the area, and crack cocaine distribution poses an increasing threat to New York City and the upstate New York counties, because this drug is becoming the primary source of income for several violent street gangs. Heroin is frequently abused in the NY/NJ HIDTA region, and its abuse is rapidly spreading to younger populations.

Other illegal drugs pose a serious threat to the NY/NJ HIDTA. Marijuana is the most commonly abused drug in the region; Canadian hydroponic marijuana poses a serious threat to the upstate New York HIDTA counties. This high-potency marijuana is increasingly available and abused in the NY/NJ HIDTA's upstate counties, particularly among young people and college students. Crystal methamphetamine and controlled prescription drug abuse is an increasing threat to the NY/NJ HIDTA region, as the drugs are rising in popularity and their abuse may be spreading to a wider population.

## **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

The Regional Intelligence Center (RIC), which is led by the New York City Police Department and located at the NY/NJ HIDTA Center in Manhattan, is staffed by 728 representatives from numerous Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies. The RIC is the central conduit for information sharing among law enforcement in the New York metropolitan area. The cornerstone of the RIC is the timely and accurate collection, analysis and dissemination of criminal intelligence, particularly drug intelligence. The Regional Intelligence Center is organized into five main sections: the Watch Section; the NYPD Intelligence Section; the Narcotics Intelligence Unit; the HIFC Money Laundering Intelligence Section; and the Firearms Section (Regional Crime Gun Center). Additional Intelligence Centers in New York and New Jersey include: New Jersey Intelligence Center, Westchester Intelligence Center, Nassau County Intelligence Center, Suffolk County Intelligence Center, Riker's Island Intelligence Center, Albany County Intelligence Center, Erie County Intelligence Center, Monroe County Intelligence Center, Onondaga County Intelligence Center, and the USSS Computer Forensics Lab.

The Watch, led by the NYPD, provides law enforcement with immediate access to a wide range of law enforcement and commercial databases 24 hours a day, seven days a week. They have information-sharing agreements with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in the New York metropolitan area. Watch analysts have access to virtually all law enforcement and commercial computer records.

Inquiries can be run on, among other things, persons, vehicles, business addresses, and telephone numbers. Federal, State, and local law enforcement use the Watch Section as a base of operations for intelligence sharing and coordination. As such, they provide participating

agencies with critical, time-sensitive and open-source information with access to centralized law enforcement and commercial databases. Agencies with restricted use databases that cannot be located at the Watch are accessible through an agency representative. All queries become permanent records in the NYPD IDS System which serves as a pointer-index for all requestors of the Watch.

The NYPD Intelligence Section is a collection of NYPD intelligence groups that collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence via IDS, the NYPD's case management system. IDS is available to all HIDTA participants, either directly or through the Watch Section. The intelligence is collected through debriefings, confidential informants, technical surveillance, liaison with other domestic and international law enforcement agencies, and the investigation of leads from the Counter-Terrorism Hotline or other sources. This section also develops and refers cases, monitors trends and links across cases and source data (including the Internet), monitors precinct patterns to assists in crime strategies, and provides analytical support to ongoing cases.

The mission of the Narcotics Intelligence Unit (NIU) is to collect, analyze, and distribute real-time tactical and strategic intelligence to law enforcement through the collaborative efforts of DEA and NYPD. The NIU reviews all drug arrests in New York State on a daily basis. DEA analysts conduct checks on the Federal Narcotics and Dangerous Drug Information System (NADDIS). If arrestees appear in NADDIS, they are considered "hits" and DEA case agents are notified. The NIU is also the epicenter of the Felony Arrest Notification/Hidden Trafficker project. The NIU prepares intelligence dossiers on particular drug arrests, which are given to arresting officers and/or District Attorneys' Offices on a real-time basis. The NIU prepares analytical reports on specific/exotic drug types as well as any new method of drug usage or distribution. They also track heroin stamp names from drug arrests and controlled buys. The NIU distributes intelligence alerts throughout the Intelligence Division for education and safety purposes. The unit also provides information and assistance to the DEA Domestic Monitoring Program (DMP), which provides data on the price, purity, and geographic source of heroin being sold at the retail level throughout the U.S. The NIU oversees the HIDTA Drug Intelligence Officers ("HIDTA DIOs") who are assigned to key locations throughout New York and New Jersey. The HIDTA DIOs collect drug intelligence daily and serve as drug intelligence "points of light" to enhance the timely sharing of drug intelligence throughout our region and beyond.

The HIFCA Money Laundering Intelligence Section is responsible for providing a comprehensive, integrated intelligence picture of drug related money laundering in New York City primarily to NY/NJ HIDTA initiatives and other law enforcement entities within the HIDTA region. The HIFCA Money Laundering Intelligence Section helps identify and target the most significant avenues drug dealers use to launder drug profits, including banks, wire services and bulk cash. The HIFCA Money Laundering Intelligence Section consists of three groups: the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) group, which provides a comprehensive review of suspicious activity reports from financial institutions; the Case Support group, which provides case support to NY/NJ HIDTA initiatives, the Liaison Group, which facilitates communication between financial institutions and law enforcement.

The Firearms Section, led by ATF, provides a central location for all criminal firearm databases. The Firearms Section gathers and consolidates all aspects of intelligence on illegal firearms use and trafficking, and makes that information available to law enforcement 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

The mission of the Firearms Section is to centralize gun crime information throughout New York State and to target armed narcotics (i.e., violent gangs) criminals in the New York metropolitan area. The center also seeks to establish collaborative partnerships to centralize information relating to crime, guns, and armed criminals and fully utilize innovative technology to reduce violent crime. The Watch Section has 24/7 access to the Gun Center, and can query the Gun Center's databases to determine, among other things, if any target has been identified as a potential firearms trafficker. In 2007, the Firearms Intelligence Unit was created within the Regional Crime Gun Center to collect and analyze intelligence related to the identification of individuals committing illegal sale, use, and possession of firearms within New York City and the trafficking of firearms into New York City.

In addition to the five sections identified above, the HIDTA has established the following intelligence centers throughout the region, which are connected to the RIC by email via the HIDTANET.

The Westchester Intelligence Center (WIC) is located in White Plains, NY, and has established a central point of contact for information sharing within Westchester County. The WIC provides analytical and strategic case support to Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies operating in Westchester County. The WIC also provides case/subject deconfliction services through SAFETNet, as well as intelligence profiles on gangs. The goal of the WIC is to assist law enforcement agencies through case support services to disrupt and/or dismantle DTOs operating in Westchester County.

The New Jersey Intelligence Center is collocated with the NJ Drug Trafficking Organization Task Force at the DEA office in Newark, New Jersey. The NJIC, linked to the RIC, provides strategic and analytical case support to law enforcement agencies in the five HIDTA counties in northern New Jersey, and outside the HIDTA area on a selected case basis. The NJIC is developing secure electronic connectivity among Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in the five county area, providing them with access to pre-existing Federal, State, and local law enforcement automated databases. The NJIC has also coordinated the implementation of the Photo Imaging Mugshot System (PIMS) in the five HIDTA counties in New Jersey. PIMS enables agencies to share arrest photographs and biographic data for arrestees. It is expected that the PIMS network will eventually be implemented throughout the State.

The Suffolk County Intelligence Center is located at the Suffolk County Police Department in Yaphank, NY. The SCIC is linked to the RIC and provides strategic and analytical case support to all law enforcement agencies in Suffolk County.

The Nassau County Intelligence Center is located at the Nassau County Police Academy in Massapequa Park, NY. It is linked to the RIC and provides strategic and analytical case support to all law enforcement agencies in Nassau County.

The primary function of the Intelligence Center at Riker's Island is to collect intelligence on index crime, narcotics, gangs and terrorism. All intelligence collected by participating agencies is entered into IDS. When applicable, case referrals are distributed to appropriate investigative units.

The USSS Computer Forensics Lab is staffed by representatives from the U.S Secret Service, New York State Police, Rockland County Sheriff's Department, ICE, DEA, U.S. Postal

Service, Department of Commerce, and ATF. The primary capabilities of the lab include forensic examinations of computers, cellular phones or any global telecommunication device, skimmer devices and all other digital electronic media storage, mobile wireless tracking, live computer forensic analysis and capture, trial preparation and expert testimony, and field-based technical assistance. The Computer Forensics Lab has recently been expanded and is available to both assist and provide access to all law enforcement agencies in the NY/NJ HIDTA region.

The Intelligence Centers in Albany, Erie, Monroe and Onondaga Counties work closely with the HIDTA Regional Intelligence Center in New York City, and other intelligence centers in New York State to provide a comprehensive picture of drug trafficking and drug-related crime throughout the State.

#### TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
New York OCDETF Strike Force (HIDTA)	New York, NY
New Jersey Drug Trafficking Organization Task Force (HIDTA)	Newark, NY
El Dorado Money Laundering Task Force (HIDTA)	New York, NY
Regional Fugitive Task Force (HIDTA)	New York, NY
New York HIDTA Intelligence and Investigative Support Center	
(HIDTA)	New York, NY
Buffalo Drug Enforcement Task Force (HIDTA)	Buffalo, NY
Central New York Drug Enforcement Task Force (HIDTA)	Syracuse, NY
Capital District Drug Enforcement Task Force (HIDTA)	Albany, NY
Rochester Drug Enforcement Task Force (HIDTA)	Rochester, NY
Franklin County Drug Enforcement Task Force (HIDTA)	Franklin County, NY
Adirondack Drug Enforcement Task Force (HIDTA)	Plattsburgh, NY
DEA New York Drug Enforcement Task Force (DOJ)	New York, NY
ATF Firearms Trafficking Task Force (DOJ)	Brooklyn, NY
ICE Airport Drug Enforcement Task Force (DHS)	Queens, NY
Westchester County Drug Enforcement Task Force (DOJ)	Westchester County, NY
FBI Westchester Violent Gang Task Force (DOJ)	Westchester County, NY
Long Island Drug Enforcement Task Force (DOJ)	Long Island, NY
Long Island Violent Gang Task Force (DOJ)	Long Island, NY
FBI Capital District Violent Gang Task Force (DOJ)	Albany, NY
ICE Erie County Drug Task Force (DHS)	Buffalo, NY
ICE Clinton County Drug Task Force (DHS)	Clinton County, NY
New York State Police Counter Narcotics Enforcement Teams (DOJ)	Albany, NY
FBI Violent Gang Task Force (DOJ)	Newark, NJ

## TASK FORCE COORDINATION

There are a number of established avenues of communication, coordination, and collaboration between these HIDTA-funded task forces. All are required to submit case, subject, and event information through the SAFETNet deconfliction system at the Regional Intelligence Center (RIC).

NY/NJ HIDTA task forces share information through various components of the Regional Intelligence Center. The Watch provides a one-stop shopping source for critical, time-sensitive information, such as criminal profile and database checks, 24 hours-a-day, seven days a week. The Narcotics Intelligence Unit (NIU) provides strategic analysis and case support for drug-related investigations, thereby facilitating cooperation and intelligence sharing. This includes a network of drug intelligence officers, strategically located throughout the NY/NJ HIDTA region to help ensure the efficient collection, analysis, and dissemination of criminal intelligence to area law enforcement entities. Additionally, through the NIU's Hidden Trafficker program, law enforcement personnel are notified when any individual from their region is arrested for a drug felony or violent crime in the New York metropolitan area. The Regional Gun Center gathers and consolidates intelligence on illegal firearms use and trafficking and makes that information available to law enforcement at all hours of the day.

Additionally, there are various informal coordination mechanisms among all of the task forces within the NY/NJ HIDTA. Participants interact through active cases, operational contacts, periodic meetings, coordinating committees, trainings, and conferences.

The NY/NJ HIDTA plays a central role in providing training to the task forces to ensure the latest information and enforcement techniques are shared and coordinated. Every year, thousands of law enforcement personnel from the region participate in courses through the NY/NJ HIDTA Training Initiative.

Leaders, or their representatives, from the Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies who participate in the task forces serve on the HIDTA Executive Board, thereby promoting information exchange and coordination. Task forces also participate in the preparation of the annual Threat Assessment and Strategy reports. The information they provide is shared with their agencies and with the Executive Board for review and approval.

#### HIDTA EVALUATION

The NY/NJ HIDTA continues to effectively engage drug trafficking and money laundering organizations within its area of responsibility. The HIDTA recognizes the drug trafficking threat along the Northern border and is taking steps to gather intelligence in order to effectively address the threat. The HIDTA's area of responsibility has been expanded to include counties in the Northern border region. Intelligence analysts have been deployed to that region to better define the drug trafficking problems.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, 677 DTOs were identified of which the HIDTA expected to dismantle or disrupt 97. The HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 78 DTOs, compared to 86 the prior year.

# North Florida HIDTA – Designated in 2001 Executive Director – Edward Williams

#### PURPOSE AND GOALS

The mission of the North Florida HIDTA (NF HIDTA) is to measurably reduce drug trafficking, related money laundering, and violent crime through a balanced partnership of Federal, State, and local law enforcement leaders directing intelligence-driven initiatives that are performance-oriented and aimed at eliminating or reducing drug trafficking and its harmful consequences in North Florida and the United States.

## **STRATEGY**

The NF HIDTA will continue to foster cooperative and effective working relationships among the 8 Federal, 9 State, and 18 local agencies in an effort toward achieving the common goal of disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking and money laundering organizations.

#### **LOCATION**

The NF HIDTA operates out of Jacksonville, Florida. It encompasses 10 counties: Alachua, Baker, Clay, Columbia, Duval, Flagler, Marion, Nassau, Putnam, and St. Johns.

#### **INITIATIVES**

The NF HIDTA has 15 initiatives, which include 1 management, 1 training, 1 prevention, 1 intelligence, 1 prosecution, and 10 investigation/interdiction initiatives.

## SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	48	3	12	1,750	739	62

## THREAT ASSESSMENT

The NF HIDTA continues to be a transportation hub for national and international DTOs. A large international seaport and three major interstate highways (I-95, I-75 and I-10) are used by DTOs to facilitate distribution within the area and to the rest of the U.S. The seaport added a new terminal in late 2008, with direct shipping routes from Asia, and plans are underway to add another terminal with direct Asian routes within a of couple years.

Cocaine and crack cocaine have consistently ranked as the region's greatest drug threats. However, production of high-grade hydroponic marijuana also continues. The recent turmoil in the U.S. housing market has led to a surplus of inexpensive homes. Growers purchase these

homes for the sole purpose of hydroponic marijuana production. Prescription drugs also pose an increasing threat to North Florida, as the number of deaths related to prescription drugs continues to overwhelmingly surpass the number of deaths related to illicit drugs. The region continues to fight methamphetamine production, especially in rural areas. MDMA remains readily available and is often sold in conjunction with other illicit drugs such as cocaine. Heroin remains available in the region.

The consolidated Jacksonville/Duval County area, which is the most densely populated area in the NF HIDTA, continues to lead the State of Florida in the per capita murder rate. Many of these murders and other violent crimes in the region are either directly or indirectly related to drug trafficking. In addition, law enforcement reports indicate an increase in the number of gangs and gang activity identified in the region. The presence of these gangs and the associated ancillary crimes has resulted in the expansion in mid-2009 of the NF HIDTA's violent crimes initiative to include the identification, apprehension, and referral for prosecution of criminal gang members and associates.

Illicit drug proceeds are continuously being transported into, through, and out of the region, while drug traffickers continue to launder their proceeds through sham businesses and illegal banking schemes such as structuring.

#### **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

The NF HIDTA IISC will be the sole intelligence component of the NF HIDTA, as the NFIISC is being eliminated due to lack of funding by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. The NF HIDTA IISC's mission will continue to support the NF HIDTA initiatives, providing tactical and strategic analysis, and other non-HIDTA law enforcement agencies with investigations that have a drug nexus.

#### TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Clay County Drug Task Force (JAG)	Clay County
Jacksonville Criminal Enterprise Investigative Task Force (FBI)	Duval County
Combined Alachua Drug Enforcement Team (HIDTA)	Alachua County
Cash and Asset Seizure Team (HIDTA)	Duval County
Fugitive Apprehension Strike Team (HIDTA)	Duval County
Gateway (HIDTA)	Columbia County
Maritime & Land Investigation and Interdiction Initiative (HIDTA)	Duval County
North Florida HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Duval County
Prescription Drug Squad (HIDTA)	Duval County
Tri-County (HIDTA)	St. Augustine
Unified Drug Enforcement Strike Team (HIDTA)	Marion County
Violent Crime and Narcotics Task Force (HIDTA)	Duval County

#### TASK FORCE COORDINATION

The NF HIDTA plays an integral role in facilitating the sharing of information and intelligence among various law enforcement agencies and task forces, including HIDTA and non-HIDTA participants. The Clay County Drug Task Force and the Jacksonville Criminal Enterprise Investigative Task Force were identified as non-HIDTA Federally funded task forces operating within the NF HIDTA region. Both task forces share information across all platforms of government – Federal, State, and local – to increase productivity and avoid duplication of investigative efforts. As the FBI's Jacksonville Criminal Enterprise Investigative Task Force primarily focuses on the dismantlement and disruption of violent criminal gangs, the drug investigative portions of their cases are referred to the NF HIDTA's VCNTF. There is a free exchange of information between the two task forces during routine and ad hoc meetings and via ongoing deconfliction processes.

Routinely, current and potential drug trafficking trends and officer safety issues are disseminated by the NF HIDTA HIDTA IISC through intelligence briefs to law enforcement agencies within the HIDTA and made accessible to a larger population of law enforcement personnel via the NF HIDTA webpage. Additionally, on an annual basis, analysts from the HIDTA IISC solicit current drug trends and related information from regional law enforcement drug units for analysis and synthesis into the NF HIDTA HIDTA's Annual Drug Threat Assessment, which is disseminated to a wide-reaching law enforcement community, NDIC, and ONDCP.

NF HIDTA task forces are mandated to submit case/subject and event information for deconfliction through the HIDTA Internet-Based Information System (HIBIS) and its subcomponent, NINJAS. Non-HIDTA agencies operating within the NF HIDTA are encouraged to share their case/subject and event deconfliction information with the HIDTA IISC for inclusion in HIBIS and NINJAS, in an effort to expand the deconfliction platform. The number of events submitted for deconfliction by non-HIDTA agencies operating within the NF HIDTA continues to surpass those submitted by the NF HIDTA task forces.

North Florida law enforcement and intelligence resources operate under a mutually agreed upon "Information and Intelligence Sharing Plan". This plan is the architecture for a regional "fusion system" that directs the sharing of information. This fusion system is entitled the Northeast Florida Fusion System Cell (NF-FSC) and is collocated in the NF HIDTA IISC. The IISC and the JTTF are two of the six "nodes" in the fusion system. The information is shared by way of personnel who routinely staff the NF HIDTA IISC and the FBI's JTTF, as well as members of other participating NF HIDTA law enforcement agencies.

### **HIDTA EVALUATION**

The NF HIDTA is meeting or exceeding its performance objectives and targeting the regional threat in a cost-effective manner. The NF HIDTA fosters a neutral environment and brings all levels of government together, enhancing cooperative law enforcement efforts. In addition, the HIDTA continues to play a fundamental role in promoting and assisting law enforcement and investigative support initiatives with information sharing and training needs.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the HIDTA

disrupted or dismantled 57 DTOs, compared to 53 the prior year. In 2008, NF HIDTA initiatives identified 156 DTOs of which it expected to dismantle or disrupt 48. By the end of 2008, 57 had been disrupted or dismantled. Based on the expected output of 48 DTOs to be disrupted or dismantled, the NFHIDTA achieved 119% of that goal.

# North Texas HIDTA – Designated in 1998 Executive Director – Lance Sumpter

#### PURPOSE AND GOALS

The mission of the North Texas HIDTA (NT HIDTA) is to reduce the availability of illicit drugs by creating intelligence-driven task forces aimed at targeting, disrupting, and dismantling drug trafficking/money laundering organizations, and to reduce drug-related violence impacting the region and other areas of the country.

## **STRATEGY**

The Executive Board provides the mission and vision of the HIDTA and manages the initiatives through four subcommittees: Budget, Intelligence, Domestic Highway Enforcement, and Initiative Review. These actions all work towards increasing effectiveness of the NT HIDTA. The Executive Board continually evaluates the NT HIDTA's initiatives to ensure their adherence to the ONDCP, HIDTA, and NT HIDTA goals. The Executive Board also determines if new initiatives should be implemented to address identified drug threats.

HIDTA initiatives are designed and implemented to identify, investigate, and dismantle or disrupt the area's most dangerous DTOs and MLOs. This especially includes those involved with drug-related violent crime, as well as targeting those DTOs that have the greatest adverse impact on the quality of life in the region.

#### **LOCATION**

The NT HIDTA operates out of Irving, Texas. It encompasses 21 counties in two States.

- Texas: Collin, Dallas, Denton, Ellis, Henderson, Hood, Hunt, Johnson, Kaufman, Lubbock, Navarro, Parker, Rockwall, Smith, and Tarrant, (Included within the designation are the cities of Dallas and Ft. Worth); and
- Oklahoma: Cleveland, Comanche, Muskogee, Oklahoma, Sequoyah, and Tulsa counties.

#### *INITIATIVES*

The NT HIDTA has 14 initiatives, which include 1 management, 1 training, 3 intelligence, and 9 investigation/interdiction initiatives.

## SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	30	3	7	17,128	47	22

#### THREAT ASSESSMENT

The Dallas/Fort Worth metropolitan area is the core of the NT HIDTA, a region recognized as a national distribution center for illicit drugs, due to its proximity to the U.S./Mexico border and its multifaceted transportation and financial infrastructures. Law enforcement investigations have revealed that Mexican DTOs are the primary suppliers of wholesale quantities of methamphetamine, powder cocaine, commercial grade marijuana, and black tar heroin in the NT HIDTA. These DTOs use "cell heads" in Dallas and Oklahoma City to manage the wholesale narcotic distribution within individual markets. Mexico is the primary source of ice methamphetamine, a principal drug threat in the area.

### **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

The Regional Intelligence and Investigative Support Center (RIISC) is a continuing, collocated, multi-agency initiative first funded in 1998. This initiative remains unchanged from last year in terms of mission, focus, organization, and other measures. The RIISC seeks to support the NT HIDTA operational initiatives in every way possible. Complete support services are available for every aspect of a drug investigation, from case targeting through prosecution. Targets are typically major poly-drug DTOs representing the greatest threats to communities within the NT HIDTA. Investigative techniques include full intelligence analysis and support.

The Oklahoma Intelligence Center (OIC) provides intelligence support to the HIDTA enforcement initiatives in Oklahoma. The OIC was first funded in 2002, and the primary mission has not changed. The OIC consists of intelligence analysts from the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics (OBN). These analysts collect and disseminate intelligence with regard to the two components of the HIDTA focus:

- Identification and investigation of DTOs that are bringing drugs into Oklahoma for both local and interstate distribution;
- Identification and investigation of money laundering operations associated with these traffickers.

The OIC provides intelligence and deconfliction support to the Oklahoma NT HIDTA enforcement initiatives. Currently the OIC is comprised of participants from OBN, but will seek to find Federal and National Guard participants in the future. All initiative participants are collocated in the OBN facility.

## TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Central Oklahoma Task Force (HIDTA)	Oklahoma City, OK
Central Oklahoma Metro Fugitive Task Force (HIDTA)	Oklahoma City, OK
Tulsa Regional Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Oklahoma City, OK
Commercial Smuggling Initiative (HIDTA)	Irving, TX
Eastern Drug Initiative (HIDTA)	Irving, TX
East Texas Violent Crime Initiative (HIDTA)	Irving, TX
Northern Drug Initiative (HIDTA)	Irving, TX

Southern Money Laundering Initiative (HIDTA)	Irving, TX
Violent Crime Initiative (HIDTA)	Irving, TX
Western Drug Initiative (HIDTA)	Irving, TX
Tulsa County Sheriff's Office	Tulsa County, OK
District 27 Drug Task Force	Sequoyah County, OK
District 5 Drug Task Force	Comanche County, OK
DEA Dallas Division Task Forces (DEA)	Dallas, TX
DEA Dallas Division Task Forces (DEA)	Fort Worth, TX
DEA Dallas Division Task Forces (DEA)	Tyler, TX
DEA Dallas Division Task Forces (DEA)	Lubbock, TX
DEA Dallas Division Task Forces (DEA)	Oklahoma City, OK

The NT HIDTA plays a central role in assuring coordination and cooperation as well as information sharing exist among all task forces and drug units. Efforts are being made to further participate with local and State fusion/intelligence centers. The NT HIDTA also provides numerous free training courses that are attended by area and out-of-state participants to further share intelligence and practices.

The HIDTA Executive Board requires all regional HIDTA task forces to use SAFETNet, as well as the NVPS, for target deconfliction. The HIDTA encourages all other enforcement task forces, whether Federally funded or not, to use SAFETNet for deconfliction purposes.

In Texas and Oklahoma, all drug task forces coordinate and share information with the HIDTA RIISC, the Texas Narcotic Information System (TNIS), the OIC, and/or other Federal, State, and local agencies. Intelligence analysts from participating Federal, State, and local agencies also share information through intelligence meetings hosted by their agencies, HIDTA, or through informal networking. HIDTA task forces deconflict through the HIDTA initiative, OIC. The OIC is anchored by the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics. The task forces, particularly in the metropolitan areas, often work together on overlapping investigations and resource sharing. The NDIC field specialists provide support on a regular, informal, and formal basis by assisting with an annual Drug Market Analysis and Threat Assessment.

# HIDTA EVALUATION

The NT HIDTA program is achieving its stated mission and long-term goals. The HIDTA's short-term goals and many of its performance targets are being met or exceeded.

The strategic location of the HIDTA as a storage area for national and transnational drug trafficking organizations was identified last year. The program reported that the Dallas/Fort Worth area was being used as a staging area for illicit drugs and a consolidation point for bulk currency and monetary instruments. The leadership of the program is addressing these problems with a new money laundering initiative. ONDCP has encouraged the HIDTA's management to increase its interaction and collaboration with other HIDTAs and agencies. In response, the HIDTA leadership engaged in additional collaboration efforts, including hosting a money

laundering conference in February 2010 to address regional and national money laundering, and the financing of illicit drug trafficking.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 32 DTOs, compared to 34 the prior year. The NT HIDTA identified 70 DTOs, 46% of the identified DTOs were either dismantled or disrupted.

# Northern California HIDTA – Designated in 1997 Executive Director – Ron Brooks

# **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The Northern California HIDTA (NC HIDTA)'s mission is to measurably reduce the availability of illicit drugs and drug-related crime and violence in support of the National Drug Control Strategy by encouraging: balanced governance of the HIDTA, interagency cooperation, the sharing of information, and use of strategic and tactical intelligence in the planning, budgeting, and investigative processes.

# **STRATEGY**

The NC HIDTA fosters a comprehensive response in combating illicit drug activity by bringing together all available law enforcement resources in a cohesive strategy to address the problem. NC HIDTA law enforcement initiatives focus on DTOs, money laundering groups, violent drug offenders, open-air drug markets, and domestic drug movement. Newly emerging narco-terrorism trends are also carefully monitored, and information is shared with the Northern California Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (NC RTTAC), the FBI's JTTF, the California State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (STTAC), the California Department of Justice Bureau of Investigation and Intelligence (BII), and local law enforcement agencies.

#### **LOCATION**

The NC HIDTA operates out of San Francisco, California. The 10 counties that comprise the NCHIDTA include: Alameda, Contra Costa, Lake, Marin, Monterey, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, and Sonoma.

# **INITIATIVES**

The NC HIDTA has eight initiatives, which include one management, one training, one intelligence, and five investigation initiatives.

# SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	32	3	105	19,500	120	137

#### THREAT ASSESSMENT

Ice methamphetamine trafficking and abuse are the most significant drug threats to the NC HIDTA region. Mexican DTOs are the primary transporters and distributors of the drug. They typically smuggle the drug to the region through U.S. ports of entry (POEs) along the U.S.-Mexico border. The HIDTA Performance Management Program documents that out of 65 DTOs within the NC HIDTA area of responsibility (as reported in 2009), 24 are sourced out of Michoacán, Mexico. Methamphetamine production, which declined significantly in previous years because of enforcement operations and legislation regulating the sale of precursor chemicals, appears to be on the rise again. After a steady decline in methamphetamine production in the NC HIDTA region since 2004, methamphetamine super-lab seizures increased from one laboratory in 2006 to four laboratories in 2008. Large-scale pseudoephedrine "smurfing" operations by Mexican DTOs and criminal groups that employ numerous individuals to purchase cold medications from local retailers are the likely sources of precursor chemical supplies for these super-labs. <sup>14</sup> More drug-related crimes, including violent crimes and property crimes, are attributed to methamphetamine trafficking and abuse than to any other illicit drug. Marijuana is the most widely available and commonly abused illicit drug in the region. Cannabis cultivation has increased dramatically in the NC HIDTA region over the last five years, making the region one of the most prominent marijuana production areas in the Nation. Moreover, California is the leading cannabis cultivation state in the U.S. According to statistics provided by the DEA through its San Francisco Field Division's Domestic Cannabis Eradication Suppression Program (DCESP), approximately 5.3 million marijuana plants were seized in Northern and Central California during Calendar Year 2008.

# **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

The mission of the NC HIDTA Bay Area Narcotics Information Network (BAYNIN), including its IISC, is to provide narcotic intelligence sharing, enhance officer safety, provide analytical case support, make available high technology surveillance, provide forensic computer analytical support and telephone intercept equipment, and provide narcotics training to all law enforcement agencies in the nine-county NC HIDTA(NC HIDTA) region.

During CY 2005 the Northern California Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (RTTAC) was collocated within BAYNIN IISC. The RTTAC is funded through the Department of Homeland Security and provides service to the NC HIDTA region. The RTTAC benefits from utilization of the existing HIDTA infrastructure, including centralized policy oversight, cross-training of HIDTA and RTTAC analysts to make the best of the power of exponential numbers to provide sufficiently robust analytical resources to handle times of surge demand. The RTTAC is staffed with State and local officers.

The collocation of the RTTAC within the BAYNIN IISC will ensure the sharing of information pertaining to the involvement of terrorist organizations financing their operations with the proceeds from drug trafficking, while at the same time ensuring intelligence collected during narcotics investigations is, when appropriate, shared with the RTTAC staff.

BAYNIN is a multi-agency coalition of Federal, State, and local agencies in the San Francisco Bay Area that have collocated to serve as a regional narcotic information center.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> "smurfing": refers to the action of going from store to store purchasing the maximum limit allowable under the law of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine products at each store and then pooling these products which will then be provided to a cook.

BAYNIN is designed to enhance the ability of NC HIDTA initiatives and agencies to identify, target, arrest, and prosecute key members of criminal organizations by facilitating the exchange of information through enhanced coordination and support.

NC HIDTA's Deputy Director, assigned by the California Department of Justice Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, provides overall management of the BAYNIN Initiative. A DEA group supervisor provides direct supervision of the analytical support staff. Analytical support is provided by SMCSO and the California National Guard. BAYNIN provides four primary services:

- Event and investigation deconfliction;
- Investigative support;
- Wire intercepts; and
- Specialized equipment.

BAYNIN provides NC HIDTA's task force personnel a critical event deconfliction system to coordinate critical law enforcement investigative or enforcement events, such as search and arrest warrants, undercover drug buy operations, and surveillance staffed and operated by the LA CLEAR. The primary purpose of the deconfliction system is officer safety. BAYNIN has connectivity with the Statewide Investigative Network System (SINS), which electronically links the San Diego, Los Angeles, Northwest, Hawaii, and Central Valley HIDTAs with NC HIDTA.

In addition, connectivity with the RISS and the EPIC gives investigators instant access to a wide range of intelligence databases and officer safety information. BAYNIN also offers to all participating agencies connectivity with commercial databases, various financial databases, allied agency databases, NADDIS, Firebird, Cal Photo, Cal Gang, and the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS).

Tactical case support, including toll analysis, link analysis, charts and graphs, and "one-stop record checks," is currently offered to participating agencies by BAYNIN's IISC. IISC analysts use software such as Analyst's Notebook, i-Base, Pen Link, and other recognized analytical tools to support counterdrug investigations in the NC HIDTA region. Priority is given to supporting investigations that have been accepted by the OCDETF and those targeting documented DTOs. BAYNIN also hosts a money-laundering enforcement and analytical unit, as well as a computer forensics unit, to participating agencies. In addition, BAYNIN provides strategic planning for HIDTA initiatives via its annual Threat Assessment.

Wire intercept services are provided by BAYNIN through a fully equipped and staffed Wire Intercept facility available at no cost to Federal, State, or local law enforcement agencies in the region to support drug investigations. This centrally located facility is in the San Francisco office of the California Department of Justice's Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement and serves as a platform to support Federal or State court-authorized wire intercepts (Title III cases), dialed number recorders (DNRs) and remote surveillance cameras. This 12-station facility is state-of-the-art and capable of receiving all existing voice and most data transmissions, including Nextel push-to-talk. NC HIDTA IISC support is available for any investigation utilizing the Wire Intercept facilities.

NC HIDTA currently communicates with other HIDTAs and other law enforcement agencies using the secure Regional Information Sharing System email service (RISS.NET). The IISC uses RISS Leads, Law Enforcement Online (LEO), and other services available through

RISS and LEO to share information and best practices with other law enforcement and counterdrug agencies. BAYNIN has a unique arrangement with the LA CLEAR to provide subject and event deconfliction. Benefiting from the economy of scale created by consolidation, BAYNIN is now able to provide 24 hours a day, seven days a week deconfliction service to its service area.

BAYNIN provides essential investigative support services to the entire NC HIDTA region. The IISC provides analytical services to all initiatives to ensure as many violators as possible are identified and relationships to other violators are discovered and then appropriately exploited. BAYNIN's event deconfliction services provide essential office safety, while ensuring agencies have the opportunity to share their information to enable them to work together and to more efficiently attack DTOs that cross jurisdictional boundaries.

# TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Alameda County Narcotics Task Force	Alameda County
Southern Alameda Narcotics Enforcement Team	Alameda County
The Southern Alameda County Gang Violence Suppression Task Force	Alameda County
East Bay PTO Task Force	Alameda County
Central Contra Costa Narcotic Enforcement Team	Contra Costa County
West County Narcotic Enforcement Team	Contra Costa County
Marin County Narcotics Task Force	Marin County
Narcotics Enforcement Unit County of Monterey	Monterey County
Monterey County Multi-Jurisdictional Meth Enforcement Team	Monterey County
County of Monterey Marijuana Eradication Team	Monterey County
San Francisco Metro (HIDTA)	San Francisco
Santa Clara County Specialized Enforcement Team	Santa Clara County
San Jose Police Department's Narcotics and Covert Investigation	San Jose
South Bay Metro Task Force (HIDTA)	San Jose
Santa Clara County Sheriff's Marijuana Eradication Team	Santa Clara County
Santa Clara County Sheriff's Office	Santa Clara County
Santa Cruz County Narcotics Enforcement Team	Santa Cruz County
San Mateo Narcotic Task Force	San Mateo County
North County PTO Task Force	Sonoma County
Sonoma County Narcotics Task Force	Sonoma County

Each task force is mandated by MOU or MOA to de-conflict and share information as a prerequisite to accepting Federal funds. Furthermore, the NC HIDTA outreaches to the OCDETF Pacific Region program by attendance and active participation at its weekly board meetings and annual conference. The NC HIDTA provides the OCDEFT Pacific Region a copy of its annual Threat Assessment and Annual Report.

Each task force de-conflicts through LA CLEAR or WSIN. That is accomplished by identifying a target, location, vehicle, boat, or telephone number and submitting the data via telephone, computer (direct data link or e-mail), or fax to LA CLEAR or WSIN for subject deconfliction. In the event of a search warrant or surveillance of some other type of law enforcement activity, the event is similarly entered into LA CLEAR or WSIN for event deconfliction. Depending on the results of the inquiry, the submitter is advised that there is no "hit" and can proceed, or advised that there is a "hit" and provided information on the source of the information and contact number.

Task Forces further share information through regularly scheduled area meetings, the annual Task Force Commanders Meeting, the CNOA Conference, and the annual Threat Assessment input.

The NC HIDTA facilitates cooperation, information sharing, and joint efforts among more than 50 Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, involving over 241 personnel participating in the NC HIDTA task force and intelligence initiatives. The NC HIDTA's IISC brings an enhanced level of intelligence resources to the NC HIDTA law enforcement community by supporting lines of communication and by providing and coordinating a secure exchange of data and intelligence. It does this by distributing intelligence products, attending Federal, State, and local intelligence meetings, providing investigative support and training, and by hosting narcotics related symposiums and conferences.

Within the investigative realm, the IISC focuses on defining viable targets and providing meaningful case support based upon major drug trafficking intelligence information that has been gathered by both IISC and various law enforcement elements within the region. This results in an intelligence product that supports the original investigation, documents trends, and identifies future resource and training needs.

The NC HIDTA task forces then apply all necessary investigative resources to identify, prioritize, target, and dismantle the major poly-DTOs found operating in the HIDTA on regional, national, and international levels. Case, subject, and event deconfliction are required components of these efforts.

Cooperation by each Federal, State, and local participant with the NC HIDTA is fluid and seamless. The HIDTA actively provides support to each Federal, State, and local participant and, because of this support, enjoys unfettered access to investigative data. Furthermore, each analyst has either obtained or is in the process of obtaining Secret or Top Secret security clearance to further support access to sensitive data and information sharing.

In November 2007, the NC HIDTA Executive Board established the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC). The NCRIC is comprised of the personnel, intelligence, and investigative equipment resources of the NC HIDTA and the Northern California Homeland Security Program (HSP). The NCRIC serves as the Regional "All Crimes" Intelligence Fusion

Center for the Federal Northern District of California. The NCRIC is a cooperative Federal, State, and local public safety effort to centralize the intake, analysis, fusion, synthesis, and appropriate dissemination of criminal and homeland security intelligence in the greater San Francisco Bay Area and the Northern Coastal counties of California.

To facilitate information-sharing and enforcement activities, three NCRIC intelligence analysts are embedded in the FBI JTTF. They are NCRIC employees and attend weekly staff meetings at the NCRIC to provide available information for case deconfliction and case support between the JTTF, HSP, and the NC HIDTA.

To share secure communications, analysts and managers assigned to the NCRIC have access to the California Joint Regional Information Exchange System (Cal JRIES) as well as FBI's LEO system. Additionally, appropriate law enforcement intelligence bulletins are passed between NC HIDTA IISCs to the NCRIC and FBI.

All law enforcement agencies, task forces (to include all JTTFs), and intelligence centers within the NC HIDTA, as well as all HIDTA task force teams, are required to utilize the LA CLEAR to perform all case deconfliction and event deconfliction.

The NC HIDTA is an essential element of information sharing among task forces. With sponsored training courses, meetings, and acting as a broker for multi-jurisdictional/multi-agency investigations, the HIDTA's contribution is significant. The intelligence analysts of the NC HIDTA are crucial to the success of many investigations.

Whereas the NC HIDTA's mission is directed at narcotic enforcement and the HSP's mission is terrorism related, they share the common responsibility and noble cause of securing the safety of our communities, States, and the Nation. This is accomplished by seamless information sharing, deconfliction, and secure communications regarding public safety and violence. Through the close partnership of the NC HIDTA and HSP, this is accomplished at the NCRIC.

#### **HIDTA EVALUATION**

ONDCP will continue to work with the NC HIDTA to improve its ability to set appropriate targets, develop effective annual reports and strategies, enhance budget submissions, and follow policy and program regulations.

The NC HIDTA has continued to grow into the core component of an All Crimes, All Threats, and All Hazards Fusion Center by collocating and partnering with the Department of Homeland Security Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center. The sharing of resources, training, and databases has elevated communications to "real time" response capabilities between the NC HIDTA and its law enforcement partners.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the NC HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 46 DTOs, compared to 27 the prior year. At the beginning of 2008 the HIDTA's initiatives had identified 95 DTOs operating in Northern California of which they expected to dismantle or disrupt 41.

# Northwest HIDTA – Designated in 1997 Executive Director – Dave Rodriguez

# **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The Northwest HIDTA mission is to measurably reduce large-scale importation and local drug trafficking by intercepting shipments, disrupting local manufacturing and trafficking operations, and reducing demand by supporting treatment and other effective demand reduction programs. The Northwest HIDTA focuses on high-value trafficking targets and financial infrastructures.

#### **STRATEGY**

Northwest HIDTA law enforcement initiatives have established priorities that focus on immobilizing DTOs, especially those involved with drug-related violent crime, and targeting those DTOs that have the greatest adverse impact on the quality of life in neighborhoods and communities. A concentration on firearm sales and use to perpetrate crime is another substantial commitment by all Northwest HIDTA investigative and prosecution initiatives. There is a determined effort to counter drug movement into and through the region and to arrest those who conceal the proceeds from illegal drug sales within the region. This is exemplified by the continuing enhancements to regional interdiction initiatives.

# **LOCATION**

The Northwest HIDTA operates out of Seattle, Washington. The fourteen counties that comprise the Northwest HIDTA region include Benton, Clark, Cowlitz, Franklin, King, Kitsap, Lewis, Pierce, Skagit, Snohomish, Spokane, Thurston, Whatcom, and Yakima.

# **INITIATIVES**

The Northwest HIDTA has 15 initiatives, which include 1 management, 1 training, 1 prevention/treatment, 1 intelligence, 2 interdiction, and 9 investigation initiatives.

# SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES i

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	83	7	221	24,251	314	609

# THREAT ASSESSMENT

Powder cocaine has replaced crystal or ice methamphetamine as the greatest illicit drug threat to Washington State, according to the 2009 Northwest HIDTA Threat Assessment Survey.

Use and addiction are widespread throughout the region. Marijuana is the most prevalent drug of abuse in the State. Cannabis cultivated in both indoor and outdoor grows throughout Washington, and to a lesser extent, Canadian-produced marijuana supply the drug market. Crystal methamphetamine is a significant drug threat to the State of Washington. Methamphetamine production, distribution, and use contribute to a wide range of criminal activities. Heroin is a significant threat, most readily available in the urban areas of the State. MDMA (commonly known as ecstasy) is also a significant problem, although most seizures appear destined for other markets.

# **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

The mission of the IISC is to provide HIDTA-wide intelligence and information sharing to the Northwest HIDTA initiatives. First funded by HIDTA in 1997, the key initiative of the Northwest HIDTA is the IISC. The primary task of the IISC is to provide analytical support and intelligence information services to the HIDTA task forces and participating agencies in the HIDTA region. The Northwest HIDTA IISC also provides intelligence data to other task forces and drug law enforcement agencies in the State. The goal is to coordinate efforts and improve investigative performance to disrupt the drug markets in HIDTA counties, thereby achieving a reduction in the availability and use of drugs among youth and adults. The Northwest HIDTA IISC focuses on high-value trafficking targets and financial infrastructure, while also supporting all HIDTA initiatives. The IISC has one Criminal Intelligence Specialist (CIS) co-located at the Spokane County HIDTA Task Force. The Northwest HIDTA IISC also coordinates activities and shares intelligence with the Pacific IBIT, which is an intelligence unit that is part of the Northwest HIDTA Border Task Force in Blaine, Washington.

# TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Clark-Skamania Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Vancouver
Cowlitz-Wahkiakum Narcotics Task Force (HIDTA)	Kelso
Northwest HIDTA Border Task Force (HIDTA)	Blaine
Northwest HIDTA Integrated Task Force (HIDTA)	Seattle
Snohomish Regional Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Marysville
Spokane County HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Spokane
Tacoma Regional HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Tacoma
Thurston County Narcotics Task Force (HIDTA)	Tumwater
Yakima County HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Yakima
Washington State Patrol Investigative Assistance Initiative (HIDTA)	Olympia
Northwest HIDTA International Money Laundering TF (HIDTA)	Seattle
Pacific Northwest Fugitive Apprehension Task Force (HIDTA)	Seattle
Puget Sound Violent Crimes Task Force (HIDTA)	Seattle
Eastside Narcotics Task Force (BYRNE)	Bellevue
Northwest Regional Drug Task Force (BYRNE)	Bellingham
Skagit County Interlocal Drug Enforcement Unit (BYRNE)	Mount Vernon

South Snohomish County Narcotics Task Force (BYRNE)	Lynnwood
Tri-City Metro Drug Task Force (BYRNE)	Pasco
West Sound Narcotics Enforcement Team (BYRNE)	Port Orchard

All drug task forces receiving HIDTA funding and operating in Washington State are mandated to use the Northwest HIDTA IISC deconfliction system. All task forces receiving other Federal funding are also required by the Washington State Administrating Agency to utilize the Northwest HIDTA deconfliction services. Additionally, all of the DOJ investigative agencies in Washington State have agreed to use the Northwest HIDTA Watch Center for deconfliction purposes. The Northwest HIDTA Watch Center uses the WSIN as the primary information source, with access to the national RISS database. This database supplies law enforcement with drug intelligence information from Federal, State, and local agencies. Through this connection with the WSIN/RISS database, Northwest HIDTA is also now connected to the National Virtual Pointer System (NVPS). The NVPS provides participating agencies the capability to exchange target pointer information through a single point of entry using a sensitive but unclassified secure network.

The task forces often work together on overlapping investigations or resource sharing. All drug task forces share information with the Northwest HIDTA IISC and the NDIC field specialist on a regular, informal basis, and formally by a mandated report and Threat Assessment survey. This annual Northwest HIDTA Threat Assessment survey is a requirement for all HIDTA task forces, and has been mandated for completion by all other task forces by the State Administrating Agency. The Washington Narcotics Investigators Association brings together the narcotics investigators in the State of Washington to facilitate and encourage active communication among education, treatment, and law enforcement personnel. Additionally, the Washington State Patrol sponsors semi-annual task force commanders conferences for all drug units and task forces throughout the State of Washington to exchange information and address issues of mutual concern. Each year, both of these organizations combine their individual conferences with similar organizations in the State of Oregon.

The Northwest HIDTA plays a central role in assuring coordination and cooperation as well as information sharing exist among all drug task forces. Through initiatives such as the DMEIP and the DHE, the Northwest HIDTA coordinates activities and promotes information sharing among task forces and agencies throughout Washington State that may be outside the HIDTA umbrella. Northwest HIDTA-sponsored training programs are available to all law enforcement personnel, not only to HIDTA task forces. In 2009, 57 training programs, many at no cost, were coordinated by the Northwest HIDTA and presented to 1150 law enforcement personnel throughout the area. The State WSIN representatives routinely coordinate with Northwest HIDTA trainers to present RISSIntel/RISSafe training of law enforcement agencies throughout the State. This has been a well-received opportunity to present a combined WSIN/HIDTA training and education program. The demands for Northwest HIDTA-loaned surveillance equipment continued through the year, and the HIDTA electronics technician worked in support of many agencies throughout the State.

#### **HIDTA EVALUATION**

ONDCP will continue to work with the Northwest HIDTA to improve its ability to set appropriate targets, develop effective Annual Reports and Strategies, enhance budget submissions, and follow policy and program regulations.

The Northwest HIDTA has implemented its second Native American Project in conjunction with the Snohomish Regional Drug Task Force and the following Tribes: Tulalip, Stillaquamish, Swinomish, and the Sauk Suiattle. The purpose of this project is to fund intelligence-driven operations to detect, deter, interdict, disrupt, and/or dismantle organizations involved in drug trafficking in general on tribal lands, specifically the Yakima Reservation.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. During 2008, Northwest HIDTA initiatives identified 135 DTOs. Further, the HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 77 DTOs, compared to 68 the prior year.

# Ohio HIDTA – Designated in 1999 Executive Director – Derek Siegle

# **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The mission of the Ohio HIDTA is to reduce drug availability by creating intelligencedriven task forces aimed at eliminating or reducing drug trafficking and its harmful consequences through enhancing and helping to coordinate drug trafficking control efforts among Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies.

#### **STRATEGY**

The Ohio HIDTA will continue to coordinate Federal, State, and local law enforcement activities to target DTOs involved in illegal drug production, transportation, and distribution. By commingling and collocating full-time and part-time Federal, State, and local law enforcement investigators, analysts, and officers, Ohio HIDTA-funded task forces achieve a balanced and effective attack on all aspects of the illicit drug market. To maximize results, the Ohio HIDTA facilitates cooperation and joint efforts among more than 101 Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, involving over 407 personnel participating in the Ohio HIDTA regional initiatives. These partnerships, developed over time, have become the foundation of the Ohio HIDTA program and are key to its success.

#### **LOCATION**

The Ohio HIDTA operates out of Cleveland, Ohio. The 11 counties that comprise the Ohio HIDTA region include Cuyahoga, Fairfield, Franklin, Greene, Hamilton, Lucas, Mahoning, Montgomery, Stark, Summit, and Warren.

# **INITIATIVES**

The Ohio HIDTA has 16 initiatives, which include 1 management, 1 training, 3 intelligence and 11 investigation/interdiction initiatives.

# SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	91	3.04	17.12	5,600	196	177

#### THREAT ASSESSMENT

The Ohio HIDTA region is linked to major domestic drug source areas, including Chicago, Detroit, New York City, the U.S. Southwest border, and Canada. Significant amounts of illicit drugs are seized annually from drug traffickers by Ohio HIDTA initiatives. While the distribution and abuse of cocaine, particularly crack cocaine, pose the greatest drug threat to the Ohio HIDTA region, heroin trafficking is increasing. Mexican black tar heroin and brown powder heroin availability is increasing because of increased transportation and distribution of the drugs throughout the region by Mexican DTOs. Marijuana and the diversion of controlled prescription drugs also pose significant threats to the Ohio HIDTA region. Most of the marijuana available and abused in the region is commercial- grade Mexican marijuana that is transported primarily from the U.S. Southwest border by Mexican DTOs. Locally produced marijuana is also available and is typically grown at indoor grow sites. Controlled prescription drugs are widely abused throughout the Ohio HIDTA region; distributors and abusers typically obtain the drugs through doctor-shopping, prescription forgery, theft, and unscrupulous physicians. Local and nationally affiliated street gangs distribute significant quantities of cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and other illicit drugs at the retail level in the Ohio HIDTA region. They are also involved in a variety of other criminal activities that significantly contribute to the overall crime rate.

#### INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES

The IISC provides tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence support to the Ohio HIDTA investigative and interdiction initiatives, as well as to other participating agencies. The Deconfliction Center within the IISC handles all event and subject deconflictions and performs numerous law enforcement and public database checks. The Analytical Unit within the IISC provides operational case support primarily in the form of telephone toll analysis, link analysis, biographical research, and post-seizure analysis. The Analytical Unit also provides strategic support in the form of the annual Threat Assessment and Intelligence Bulletins. The Analytical Unit is also responsible for drafting the Annual Report, the Initiative Budgets and Descriptions, and the annual Strategy. The IISC Coordinator is responsible for the management of the IISC and is assisted by an FBI Special Agent, a DEA Group Supervisor, and a Cleveland Police Department Lieutenant in the everyday supervision of the analysts and personnel assigned to the IISC. In the fall, the IISC hosted its annual two-day intelligence symposium with more than 150 analysts and investigators from local, State and Federal law enforcement agencies attending, including participants from other HIDTAs in the Great Lakes Region. The IISC's structure and design is ever-changing, as are the personnel assigned from the participating agencies.

# TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Akron/Summit County HIDTA Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Akron
DEA Youngstown Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Youngstown
Mahoning Valley Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Youngstown
Miami Valley Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Miamisburg
Hotel/Motel Interdiction Task Force (HIDTA)	Cleveland

Northwest Ohio Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Toledo
Northern Ohio Law Enforcement Task Force (HIDTA)	Cleveland
Northeast Ohio Interdiction Task Force (HIDTA)	Cleveland
South Central Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Columbus
Southwest Ohio Regional Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Lebannon
Stark County Violent Crimes Initiative (HIDTA)	Canton
Toledo Metro Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Toledo
Commercial Vehicle/Domestic Highway Enforcement Initiative (HIDTA)	Cleveland
Central Ohio Drug Enforcement Task Force	Newark
Clermont County Drug Unit	Batavia
Columbiana County Drug Task Force	Lisbon
Northeast Hamilton County Drug Task Force	Cincinnati
Grand Lakes Task Force	Wapakoneta
Greene County Agencies for Combined Enforcement (ACE)	Beavercreek
Lawrence Drug and Major Crimes Task Force	Ironton
Law Enforcement Against Pushers Drug Task Force (LEAP)	Delaware
Medina County Drug Task Force	Medina
Medway Drug Enforcement Agency	Wooster
METRICH Enforcement Unit	Mansfield
Multi-Area Narcotics Unit	Defiance
Ottawa County Drug Task Force	Port Clinton
Southeastern Narcotics Team Task Force	Cambridge
Southeast Area Law Enforcement Task Force	Garfield Heights
Trumbull, Ashtabula, Geauga Task Force	Middlefield
U.S. 23 Pipeline Major Crimes Task Force	Chillicothe
West Central Ohio Crime Task Force	Lima
Westshore Enforcement Bureau	Bay Village
Fairfield-Hocking Major Crimes Unit	Lancaster
Greater Warren County Drug Task Force	Lebanon
Lake County Narcotics Agency	Painesville
Lorain County Drug Task Force	Elyria
Mahoning Valley Law Enforcement Task Force	Youngstown
Stark County Drug Unit	Canton
Summit County Drug Unit	Akron
Hamilton County RENEW	Cincinnati
Franklin County Drug Task Force	Columbus

Task forces in Ohio coordinate with each other, with HIDTA task forces, and with OCDETF task forces. All task forces can use the Ohio HIDTA deconfliction program for both subject and event deconfliction. HIDTA task force commanders regularly meet with participating law enforcement agencies in the area of their HIDTA task force to share investigative information on drug traffickers, DTOs, and drug trends. Since many of the Ohio HIDTA task forces contain personnel from the Office of Criminal Justice Byrne Grant task forces, the commanders from both groups attend and share information through the Office of Criminal Justice Services (OCJS), the Ohio Task Force Commanders Associations, OCJS quarterly meetings, and quarterly HIDTA Task Force Commanders meetings with the Executive Director of the Ohio HIDTA. All non-HIDTA drug task forces receiving Federal funding are funded out of OCJS via the Byrne Grant. Any law enforcement agency can attend the quarterly HIDTA meetings to learn of opportunities to increase their unit's investigative abilities. In addition, the U.S. Attorneys' Offices meet regularly with the heads of Federal agencies involved in the HIDTA program and commanders to share information and set investigative goals on both HIDTA and OCDETF cases. The HIDTA's training programs are also available to officers and agents statewide.

The nature and extent of cooperation by each Federal, State, and local participant is ensured by the Ohio HIDTA. A deconfliction report is prepared monthly by the IISC. The report shows those agencies that are following the guidelines for subject and event deconfliction. The HIDTA Executive Director and coordinators visit HIDTA task forces to ensure commanders are holding regularly scheduled briefings with participating Federal, State, and local agencies. Finally, the U.S. Attorneys' Office ensures information is exchanged between investigators and agencies to enhance case investigations and prevent duplication of effort.

The nature and extent to which information-sharing and enforcement activities are coordinated with JTTFs is also ensured by the Ohio HIDTA: the HIDTA Executive Director, coordinators, and commanders attend the JTTF Executive Board monthly meetings. These meetings allow HIDTA personnel to hear of potential terrorism activities. HIDTA personnel can also assist the JTTF with information that has both a terrorism and drug nexus. Deconfliction is offered to terrorism task forces. The HIDTA Task Forces assist the JTTF during enforcement activities when needed. However, the sensitivity and protocol of some JTTF investigations do not allow for HIDTA task force support.

#### HIDTA EVALUATION

In 2008, the Ohio HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 72 of the 86 DTOs it expected to dismantle or disrupt. However, 54 of those DTOs were international or multi-state in scope, and 6 were tied to OCDETF cases. Such results reflect well on the Ohio HIDTA's ability to successfully engage higher-level DTOs. The HIDTA plays an integral part in the nationwide Domestic Highway Enforcement Corridor Projects and is participating to the fullest extent in the Priority Drug Investigations Project, a multi-HIDTA and multi-agency effort targeting Dominican DTOs.

# Oregon HIDTA – Designated in 1999 Executive Director – Chris Gibson

#### **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The primary mission of the Oregon HIDTA program is to reduce drug availability by creating intelligence-driven, multi-agency drug task forces aimed at eliminating or reducing domestic drug trafficking and its harmful consequences by enhancing and helping to coordinate drug trafficking control efforts among Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies.

The secondary mission of the Oregon HIDTA is aimed at reducing the local manufacturing and trafficking of methamphetamine and marijuana, and by reducing the supply of illegal drugs brought into Oregon from other States and foreign countries.

# **STRATEGY**

The Oregon HIDTA will continue to foster cooperative and effective working relationships among the 8 Federal agencies, 3 State agencies, 40 local agencies and the U.S. Attorneys' Office in the District of Oregon to achieve the common goals of disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking and money laundering organizations, and reducing the demand for, and availability of, drugs.

# **LOCATION**

The Oregon HIDTA operates out of Salem, Oregon. The eight counties that comprise the Oregon HIDTA region include Clackamas, Deschutes, Douglas, Jackson, Marion, Multnomah, Umatilla, and Washington.

# *INITIATIVES*

The Oregon HIDTA has 16 initiatives, which include 1 management, 1 training, 1 prevention, 1 intelligence, 1 drug fugitive, 1 interdiction, 1 investigation/prosecution, and 9 investigation initiatives.

# SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	63	2	55	31,500	273	255

#### THREAT ASSESSMENT

Methamphetamine continues to be widely used and trafficked throughout the Oregon HIDTA region. However, reported local methamphetamine lab seizures remain at low levels. From 2004 to 2008, labs reported by law enforcement declined by 95 percent, due largely to strict pseudoephedrine control legislation enacted by the Oregon legislature. While there was a low number of 21 reported methamphetamine labs in Oregon during 2008, crystal meth continued to be available, as Mexican drug traffickers imported the finished product from labs outside the State and from Mexico. More than 90 percent of Oregon law enforcement surveyed in 2009 reported methamphetamine as their area's greatest drug threat, with 96 percent indicating methamphetamine as the drug which contributes most toward violent and property crime. Methamphetamine-related crime, such as identity theft, abused and neglected children, and other serious personal and property crimes, continues to be a daily problem and is prevalent throughout the State.

In addition to methamphetamine use, marijuana use, cultivation, and trafficking are also expanding. Law enforcement officers report that outdoor marijuana cultivation sites discovered on public and private lands in Oregon, although increasing over the past several years primarily due to the expansion of operations by Mexican DTOs, decreased in 2008. According to HIDTA intelligence estimates, the number of known Mexican DTOs operating in the Oregon HIDTA region has more than doubled since 2005. The discovered plants number in the thousands per grow, as opposed to tens of thousands seized in previous years. The harvested product is distributed both locally and nationally. Additionally, Asian crime groups are increasingly involved in marijuana trafficking and have established large coordinated indoor grow operations in the Oregon HIDTA region.

Heroin, cocaine, and prescription drug abuse constitute the next level of major drug threat to Oregon communities. The threat posed by pharmaceutical abuse has grown in recent years. The non-medical use of prescription drugs appears to be an emerging problem in Oregon and reflects a national trend. Treatment admissions for prescription drug dependence increased 400% in Oregon in the last 10 years, and surpassed admissions for cocaine in 2005.

A 2008 study conducted by ECONorthwest estimated the total direct economic costs from drug abuse in Oregon at nearly \$2.7 billion in 2006. Of the estimated \$2.7 billion in costs, 70 percent was attributed to lost earnings from victims of crime and illicit drug users who perpetrate crime, 20 percent was tied to drug enforcement and the criminal justice system, and 10 percent was connected to healthcare costs. The problem is compounded as drug users and distributors often engage in illegal activities such as money laundering, identity theft, burglaries, property theft, fraud, and other crimes to support drug addictions and finance trafficking and distribution operations.

Federal arrests for drug violations increased in Oregon 44 percent from 2003 (180) to 2007 (259), the most recent data available. Additionally, 25 percent of the Oregon corrections population (includes incarcerated offenders and those on parole or probation) is in the system due primarily to drug offenses; twice the number for assault, burglary, and theft offense categories. Additionally, drug offenses account for over three times the number in the system for all other primary offense categories.

#### INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES

The Mission of the Oregon HIDTA IISC is to provide accurate, detailed, and timely tactical, investigative and strategic drug intelligence to HIDTA initiatives, HIDTA participating agencies, and other law enforcement agencies as appropriate, enabling a more effective and efficient utilization of drug investigative resources. The Oregon HIDTA IISC serves as a hub for the sharing and case deconfliction of drug intelligence among local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies in the region. The initiative is operated in conjunction with the Oregon State Department of Justice's Criminal Intelligence Unit (OCIU). The Oregon State Department of Justice is the sponsoring law enforcement agency for this initiative, and the HIDTA IISC staff is comprised of ODOJ employees and members from participating law enforcement agencies. The Oregon Department of Justice is also the fiscal agent for the Oregon HIDTA.

The Oregon HIDTA IISC is the centerpiece of a successful intelligence network created by the Oregon Department of Justice, and significantly enhanced by the HIDTA program in 1999. Services provided by the IISC continue to be in great demand, as law enforcement agencies discover the advantages of intelligence-lead investigations. A major enhancement to the IISC occurred in 2003. Funds allocated from the National HIDTA program allowed the Oregon HIDTA IISC to convert the original Oregon Department of Justice intelligence database to a web-enabled system allowing investigators to access the system from their desktop computer. This essentially put a direct connection for investigators to the IISC in their office, and therefore put the IISC on these investigators' minds. This built-in advertisement increased demand for analytical assistance, intelligence submissions, and inquiries significantly.

The initiative is coupled with a statewide intelligence system that coordinates intelligence and provides case and event deconfliction support to all participating agencies. The initiative is a designated RISS.Net Node which connects the Oregon HIDTA and the OSIN system to the other national RISS.Net Projects and architecture. The initiative also provides and manages encrypted sensitive but unclassified email for all HIDTA task forces and law enforcement agencies in Oregon.

Another major enhancement occurred in 2007 with the establishment of the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center. The center is comprised of analysts and investigators from the FBI, ATF, IRS, Oregon National Guard, the Oregon State Police, the Salem Police Department, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the Oregon Department of Justice. A decision was made to house the group within the existing HIDTA Watch Center to better integrate and streamline intelligence flowing into both intelligence operations. All cases are deconflicted by both groups for greater investigative efficiency. This initiative receives administrative oversight and direction from the Oregon HIDTA Executive Board, the HIDTA Director, and the Intelligence Subcommittee. The initiative has completed its electronic infrastructure, and has met all General Counter-drug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) goals and requirements for HIDTA IISCs.

The Oregon HIDTA hosts and operates a remote criminal intelligence database. This system is called the Oregon State Intelligence Network (OSIN) and provides all Oregon drug task forces, HIDTA drug task forces, State and local law enforcement agencies, and Federal law enforcement agencies, remote access to the intelligence database and geo-event deconfliction services. Using RISS.Net access via a secure intranet, law enforcement agencies are able to make direct, real-time intelligence submissions and inquires directly into the OSIN system. A query of the system gives law enforcement personnel access to not only drug crime-related

intelligence, but all crimes, gang, and criminal organization intelligence. This integration of intelligence resources enables personnel to recognize the connection drug crime suspects have with other major crimes, such as weapons-related offenses, identity theft, financial fraud, auto theft, and gang-related violence.

The OSIN website operates on the RISS.Net system and is now directly connected to the WSIN system. A query of either the OSIN database, or the WSIN system, automatically queries the other system. This system provides the initiative and its users with a secure and encrypted means of networking classified and confidential information. This includes e-mail communications, which are now integrated with the FBI sponsored LEO communication system.

In addition to the OSIN system, the HIDTA IISC also hosts an "outward facing" website called OSIN.info. The website is used to post important news stories, links to investigative websites, and all publications written by the IISC and the Oregon DOJ legal staff. Each analyst in this initiative currently has the ability to access a common case management system, and a wide variety of law enforcement, government, and commercial database resources from his/her workstation computer. This enables the analyst to conduct a significant amount of research from one location and provides another level of case/subject deconfliction through the networked case management system. Analysts also access the Internet and FinCEN from their workstations. They also have the capability, through the RISS.Net system, to electronically share analytical products with case investigators in a secure law enforcement environment.

TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Blue Mountain Narcotics Team (HIDTA)	Pendleton
Central Oregon Drug Enforcement (HIDTA)	Bend
Clackamas County Interagency Task Force (HIDTA)	Oregon City
Cops Mentoring Youth – Oregon Partnership (HIDTA)	Portland
Douglas County Interagency Narcotics Team (HIDTA)	Roseburg
HIDTA Interdiction Team (HIDTA)	Portland
Intelligence and Investigative Support Center (HIDTA)	Salem
Jackson County HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Medford
Marion County HIDTA DEA Task Force (DEA)	Salem
Medford Area Drug and Gang Enforcement (HIDTA)	Medford
Oregon State Police Training Initiative (HIDTA)	Salem
Portland Area Metro Gang Task Force (HIDTA)	Milwaukie
Regional Organized Crime Narcotics Task Force (HIDTA)	Portland
Westside Interagency Narcotics Team (HIDTA)	Beaverton
United States Marshals Service Fugitive Task Force (USMS)	Portland

All Oregon task forces receiving OCDETF, JAG/Byrne or HIDTA funding are encouraged to use the Oregon State Intelligence Network (OSIN), which is managed by the Oregon Department of Justice for subject and event deconfliction.

All drug task forces share information with the Oregon HIDTA IISC and NDIC field specialists. Many of the task forces work together on investigations and subsequently share information and resources. The Oregon HIDTA IISC publishes a weekly intelligence bulletin that is sent electronically to law enforcement agencies throughout the State. The Oregon HIDTA conducts quarterly information-sharing meetings with task force managers and supervisors. The Oregon Narcotics Association coordinates training conferences for narcotics officers twice per year. One of the conferences is in conjunction with the Washington State Narcotics Investigators Association (WSNIA). WSIN coordinators conduct information-sharing meetings on a regular basis with drug task force commanders throughout the State.

The Oregon HIDTA IISC is collocated with the State of Oregon Fusion Center, which shares information routinely and freely with the JTTF based in Portland.

#### **HIDTA EVALUATION**

ONDCP will continue to work with the Oregon HIDTA to improve its ability to set appropriate targets, develop effective Annual Reports and Strategies, enhance budget submissions, and follow policy and program regulations.

All of the Oregon HIDTA enforcement initiatives implement the HIDTA's Strategy by concentrating HIDTA resources for enforcement and investigative enhancements. These tools enable the HIDTA to target the members of high-value DTOs, which results in better cases, targeted prosecutions, reduced drug trafficking, reduced drug use and availability, improved community livability, and reduced drug-related crime and violence.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 53 DTOs, compared to 61 the prior year. Multi-state DTOs are often larger organizations which require more investigative resources to disrupt or dismantle than local DTOs. Of the 53 DTOs disrupted or dismantled in 2008, 32 (60%) were multi-state in scope.

# Philadelphia/Camden HIDTA – Designated in 1995 Executive Director – Jeremiah Daley

#### **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The mission of the Philadelphia/Camden HIDTA (PC HIDTA) is to reduce drug trafficking and related violent crime in the PC HIDTA region. To accomplish this, the PC HIDTA will:

- Facilitate interagency cooperation at the local, State, and Federal levels to strengthen law enforcement's ability to investigate DTOs and associated money laundering and violence;
- Improve intelligence gathering, analysis, and sharing capabilities to dismantle and/or disrupt drug gangs; and
- Provide mission-critical resources and services otherwise unavailable to regional law enforcement agencies.

#### **STRATEGY**

In light of both the new and persistent challenges it faces, PC HIDTA focuses on the following strategic priorities:

- Systematic targeting, investigation, apprehension and prosecution of the region's violent drug traffickers and major DTOs, with particular emphasis on violent drug gangs;
- Continuous identification and removal from the marketplace of the products and proceeds of drug trafficking by intelligence-driven interdiction and money laundering investigation;
- Targeted pursuit and apprehension of drug offenders and violent fugitives, capitalizing on PC HIDTA-supported partnerships;
- Improved collection, analysis and dissemination of drug and related criminal intelligence in support of PC HIDTA initiatives and area law enforcement objectives;
- Maximized inter-agency information sharing by expanded electronic connectivity within and beyond the PC HIDTA, utilizing both proven and emergent technologies and systems; and
- Enhancement of participating agencies' personnel through accessible and costefficient training arranged and delivered by PC HIDTA and its professional development partners.

#### **LOCATION**

The PC HIDTA operates out of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. It includes the counties of:

- Pennsylvania (Philadelphia City of Philadelphia), Chester and Delaware; and
- New Jersey (Camden City of Camden).

#### *INITIATIVES*

The PC HIDTA has 11 initiatives, which include 1 management, 1 training, 1 intelligence and 8 investigation/interdiction initiatives.

# SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	73	2.75	9.5	7,500	66	101

#### THREAT ASSESSMENT

The most significant trafficking and abuse threats to the PC HIDTA region include cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine, and diverted pharmaceutical drugs. Posed by individuals and organizations that use violence as a means to protect or enhance their illicit activities, high levels of firearm violence yield high rates of homicides, and threatens the area's residents, commerce, and visitors, harming the quality of life within the entire region. Through 2010, the PC HIDTA anticipates that:

- Mexican DTOs will continue to expand their presence and influence in the PC
  HIDTA region, transporting large amounts of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana from the
  South & Southwest to regional Dominican and Colombian DTOs. In addition, the
  increased trafficking of Mexican methamphetamine into the region poses an emerging
  threat:
- Dominican DTOs will become more influential in the PC HIDTA region. Many are
  cultivating relationships directly with heroin and cocaine sources along the U.S.
  Southwest border, as well as in the Caribbean region, which may ultimately allow
  them to operate more aggressively; and
- Street gangs will pose an expanding threat to the PC HIDTA region. Gangs, such as the Bloods in Camden, NJ, have been and continue migrating to suburban locations. This trend presents a new threat to communities previously untouched by drug-related violence.

# **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

The mission of the PC HIDTA IISC is to provide strategic and tactical intelligence and enforcement support to HIDTA Initiatives as well as HIDTA participating agencies. The vision of the IISC is to pursue coordination, cooperation, collaboration, and integration among regional law enforcement agencies. The IISC accomplishes this by facilitating cooperation among Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to share information and implement synchronized enforcement activities; enhancing intelligence sharing among Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies; providing reliable intelligence to law enforcement agencies needed to design effective enforcement strategies and operations; and supporting coordinated

law enforcement strategies to maximize use of available resources to reduce the supply of illegal drugs in the region and in the United States as a whole.

Through the use of traditional methods, innovative tools, and superior analytical techniques, the IISC provides near real-time and real-time investigative coordination (commonly described as event and target deconfliction); develops investigative leads and targeting information; provides analytical support to regional law enforcement initiatives; and provides operational and strategic intelligence related to drug distribution, money-laundering, and drug-related violence.

In addition to close collaboration with the Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania State Criminal Intelligence Centers, the IISC coordinates with local intelligence nodes located with the Camden Co. Prosecutor's Office's Joint Camden Task Force (JCTF) and the Philadelphia Police Department's Criminal Intelligence Unit (PPD-CIU). The JCTF node operates as an independent entity providing direct support to the JCTF and southern New Jersey and is completely integrated into the HIDTA-funded JCTF. The PPD-CIU serves as an intelligence collection sub-system for both the Philadelphia Police Department and the PC HIDTA. The PPD-CIU and the IISC collaborate to identify collection requirements and synchronize human intelligence collection and reporting.

The IISC was the initial initiative of the PC HIDTA and has been funded since the HIDTA's establishment. At that time, the initiative focused primarily on officer safety through case/event/subject deconfliction and information sharing through electronically searchable databases. Facilitated by the PC HIDTA Watch Center, these functions continue to be priorities, with the emphasis on deconfliction and information-sharing connectivity throughout the Mid-Atlantic region to the Washington/Baltimore HIDTA and NY/NJ HIDTA, as well as Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies.

The IISC continues to grow its research and analysis capability to provide a full range of services from case support through strategic intelligence analysis and reporting. Analytical staff are professionally developed through training and collaboration with other offices to exploit information using emergent technologies and non-traditional sources. Furthering inter-regional information exchange between HIDTAs, the IISC will identify opportunities to collaborate on issues of mutual strategic interest.

TASK FORCES	OPERATING	IN THE HIDT	<i>A REGION</i>
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TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Camden County HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Camden Co., NJ
Chester County HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Chester Co., PA
Delaware County HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Delaware Co., PA
USMS Fugitive Apprehension Initiative (HIDTA)	Eastern District of PA
Money Laundering & Drug Asset Forfeiture Task Force	Metropolitan Philadelphia, PA
(HIDTA)	area
Violent Drug Gang Task Force (HIDTA/DOJ-Safe Streets)	Metropolitan Philadelphia, PA
Violent Drug Gang Task Porce (HIDTA/DOJ-Sale Streets)	area
Drug Trafficking Organization Task Force Initiative (HIDTA)	Philadelphia, PA

DEA Intendiction Initiative Teels Force (HIDTA)	Metropolitan Philadelphia,	
DEA Interdiction Initiative Task Force (HIDTA)	Pennsylvania	
Suburban Camden County Drug Task Force (Byrne)	Camden County, New Jersey	
DEA-Phila. Task Force Group 4 (DEA)	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	
DEA-Phila. Task Force Group 5 (DEA)	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	
DEA-Task Force Group 6 (DEA)	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	
DEA-Phila. Task Force Group 7 (DEA)	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	
ICE Seepart Controbond Smuggling Group (DUS ICE)	Eastern District of	
ICE-Seaport Contraband Smuggling Group (DHS-ICE)	Pennsylvania	
ICE-Airport & Critical Infrastructure Protection Group (DHS-	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	
ICE)		
ICE-Gang Enforcement & Public Safety Task Force (DHS-	Eastern & Middle Districts of	
ICE)	Pennsylvania	
DEA-Camden RO Task Force (DEA)	Camden, Burlington,	
DEA-Canden RO Task Police (DEA)	Gloucester & Salem Cos., NJ	
FBI-Violent Offender Gang Task Force (DOJ-Safe	Camden Co., New Jersey	
Streets/FBI)		

The PC HIDTA designates and funds eight task force initiatives that support the HIDTA's overall strategy and addresses drug trafficking, money laundering and associated violent crime threats to the region. Five initiatives are directly engaged in drug law enforcement; the others address the collateral criminal behavior of money laundering, fugitives, and violent drug gangs that fester in conjunction with drug trafficking.

Through structured and unstructured communication channels, drug enforcement task forces in the PC HIDTA region continuously coordinate investigative activities with each other, the HIDTA, and OCDETF program administrators at managerial and operational levels. Law enforcement leaders in the PC HIDTA area set a mutually-supportive atmosphere through the Executive Board and its committees, and regularly confer with each other on strategic issues. Task force supervisors, agency managers, and prosecutors discuss case developments and intelligence developed by their investigators within and across agency lines, determining what resources need to be applied to bring about successful outcomes. At the operational level, supervisors and investigators from the various task forces regularly interact with each other, participating in OCDETF case review and coordination meetings, PC HIDTA initiative commanders meetings, and other structured settings, as well as informally.

All agencies' task forces participating in the PC HIDTA, by mutual agreement and program policy, as well as many non-HIDTA law enforcement agencies in the region, voluntarily and willingly contribute to and query the event and target deconfliction systems offered by the PC HIDTA IISC. Event deconfliction is provided 16 hours a day, 7 days a week via the IISC Watch Center, staffed by Philadelphia Police Department personnel, using an electronic system known as the "RISSafe Officer Safety Event Deconfliction System." This web-based platform, developed & operated by the RISS Program, permits agencies to enter

information about pending law enforcement "events" – e.g. controlled purchases, "reverse stings," surveillance activities, warrant service, etc. – including date, time, and location. Such information is compared with other records previously entered to identify potential conflicts, at which time task force supervisors are simultaneously notified and contact information exchanged. After PC HIDTA's normal operational hours, submissions are automatically forwarded to the Pennsylvania State Police Department Watch Center, which has partnered with PC HIDTA and the region's RISS Project – MAGLOCLEN – in implementing this system. Because RISSafe is a nationwide system, to which a number of HIDTAs, RISS Projects, and their participant agencies contribute, events planned to occur outside of the PC HIDTA region can also be "deconflicted," thereby increasing officer/agent safety and coordination of action.

Target deconfliction is provided around the clock by way of electronic connectivity through the PC HIDTA Information Sharing Network to the "Case Explorer" system. Developed and maintained by the Washington-Baltimore HIDTA, Case Explorer permits investigators to enter records of cases they are investigating, to include target name(s), biographical information and physical description, address(es) of interest, associate(s), vehicles used, type of criminal activity the target is believed to engage in, and numerous other fields of data. With each record, contact information for investigators and their supervisors is recorded. Upon a subsequent entry with points of data matching the original record, parallel notifications are made to each investigator and their supervisors of a potential investigative overlap. Investigators and their managers can communicate their interest, determine if independent or merged investigation should occur, and exchange investigative details heretofore unknown to each other, often accelerating the pace of enforcement action. Beyond comparing targets in the immediate region, the Case Explorer system connects with the Washington-Baltimore HIDTA and New York/New Jersey HIDTA, as well, permitting comparison of target information throughout these regions. The Case Explorer system also aids analytical efforts, as the data is retrievable by analysts at the PC HIDTA IISC, permitting closed cases to be examined for relevant leads in current investigations and assessments.

The PC HIDTA and its IISC provide several platforms for information-sharing activities among task forces. In addition to the deconfliction measures, the PC HIDTA facilitates identification, targeting, and investigation of high-threat DTOs by its Joint Intelligence and Operations Coordination Group (JIOCG) meetings. Monthly meetings, attended by first-line task force supervisors, analysts, and prosecutors (from PC HIDTA participant agencies as well as non-HIDTA agencies in the region), permit face-to-face exchange of intelligence, in addition to electronically submitted target information. This group's discussions complement the OCDETF program by promoting new cases for OCDETF designation, by increasing investigator's attention to currently designated cases, and by providing intelligence leads that connect activities of strategic targets identified by the JIOCG and the RPOTs and CPOTs identified under the OCDETF program.

Investigative information contained in multiple databases maintained by agency participants shared within the PC HIDTA community and other law enforcement agencies by way of the "Digital Information Gateway" (DIG) system acquired and managed by the PC HIDTA. This commercial software allows data from disparate systems, either in structured fields or unstructured text formats, to be queried and retrieved by analysts from the IISC and/or investigators at remote access points at agency/task force offices.

In addition to HIDTA-operated information-sharing systems, task forces exchange information with each other and with the larger law enforcement community through the State criminal intelligence centers operated by the Pennsylvania State Police (PaCIC) and New Jersey State Police (ROIC). The PC HIDTA maintains daily contact with these centers as well, and has collaborated with them on a number of drug trafficking, money laundering, and gang-related projects.

Along with case-specific analytical support, such as telephone toll and dialed number analysis, time and event charting, and background investigative workups, the PC HIDTA IISC also produces strategic analyses, threat assessments and intelligence bulletins, derived from requests for information to regional agencies that generate responses from task force participants, drug enforcement agencies and non-law enforcement agencies (such as public health departments) with valuable data, and information sources. Typically, such assessments and bulletins are electronically disseminated, resulting in up-to-date information exchanges with task forces and agency leadership.

The HIDTA also acts as an access point for State and local law enforcement to the EPIC National Seizure System, permitting entry to and query of nationwide data on drug and asset seizures from around the United States to be analyzed to formulate investigative leads. Furthermore, the PC HIDTA also acts as a liaison for its participant agencies with NDIC, working with NDIC field program specialists and Domestic Intelligence section analysts to acquire needed information for national drug threat assessments.

All counties in the PC HIDTA region are served by the FBI Philadelphia Field Office JTTF. A close relationship exists between the HIDTA IISC and the FBI Philadelphia Office Field Intelligence Group (FIG), and by extension, the JTTF. Designated liaison analysts provide a ready conduit between the PC HIDTA and the JTTF for any issues that may have bearing on homeland security threats. In addition, the FBI FIG supervisor sends the IISC manager unclassified "Intelligence Information Reports" (IIRs) pertaining to potential terrorist threats on a continuous basis. These reports, in turn, are disseminated to task forces and agency criminal intelligence centers for follow-up and reply to FBI offices with any additional information developed.

The PC HIDTA sends representation from its IISC to the region's "Anti-Terrorism Advisory Committee and Law Enforcement Sub-committee" meetings, jointly held by the U.S. Attorneys' Office, Eastern District of Pennsylvania (USAO-EDPA) and the FBI Philadelphia Field Office, where strategic and operational briefings on terror-related subjects are presented and discussed among law enforcement and public safety participants, and to the USAO-EDPA's "Money Laundering Work Group," where IRS "Suspicious Activity Reports" are reviewed for connection to terrorist financing as well as drug trafficking and tax evasion. FBI-JTTF members are part of both of these work groups.

#### HIDTA EVALUATION

The PC HIDTA continues to seek ways to garner multi-agency participation and cooperation within its area of responsibility. It remains the primary example of information and intelligence sharing in the region. As a result of its efforts, law enforcement has achieved multiple successes attacking major DTOs and violent criminal gangs in and around Philadelphia.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, PC HIDTA initiatives identified 139 DTOs, investigating 123 of them. Of those 123 DTOs, the HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 48, compared to 27 the prior year. This increase is due primarily to the addition of two new counties (Chester and Delaware, PA) where initiatives formed under the leadership of the respective District Attorney's Office – Criminal Investigations Divisions, were quickly able to identify and target DTOs in their jurisdictions. Those investigations yielded 19 disruptions/dismantlements of DTOs in their first year of operation.

# Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands HIDTA Designated in 1994 Executive Director – Jose Alvarez

#### PURPOSE AND GOALS

The Puerto Rico/U.S. Virgin Islands (PR/USVI) HIDTA participating agencies create intelligence-driven task forces comprised of Federal, State, and local law enforcement agents to eliminate or reduce drug trafficking and its associated criminal consequences.

#### **STRATEGY**

The PR/USVI HIDTA continues to foster cooperative and effective working relationships among 2 U.S. Attorneys' Offices, 10 Federal agencies, 9 State agencies, and 6 local agencies to achieve the common goals of disrupting and dismantling DTOs, and reducing the availability of drugs. The strategic plan incorporates 12 law enforcement joint task forces positioned throughout the region to counter drug trafficking and its consequences. In furtherance of the Executive Board's focus on strengthening the response to the marine threat, the Caribbean Corridor Strike Force has expanded its investigative capabilities from producing/transshipping countries to arrival zones with a more collaborative and collocated intelligence-driven force to address maritime, air, and land interdiction.

# **LOCATION**

The PR/USVI HIDTA operates out of San Juan, Puerto Rico. It encompasses all of the territories, including waterways and coastal waters, of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

# **INITIATIVES**

The PR/USVI HIDTA has 14 initiatives, which include 1 support, 1 training, 1 intelligence, 8 investigative, 1 marine investigation, and 2 marine interdiction initiatives.

# SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	45	2	20	2,750	100	25

#### THREAT ASSESSMENT

Maritime transportation remains the main method for cocaine, heroin, and marijuana trafficking in the Caribbean. Most loads leaving Colombia (CB) onboard go-fast vessels contain anywhere from 500 to 2,000 kilograms of cocaine. Venezuela (VZ) is a main transshipment country, and the increase in drug shipments from VZ is also a factor in the high incidence of drug seizures in the Caribbean Sea. DTOs in the continental United States are increasingly smuggling bulk cash through the PR/USVI HIDTA region. FinCEN reports that the number of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) filed by PR/USVI HIDTA financial institutions slightly increased during 2008. Some noteworthy money laundering trends identified include an increase in identity theft to commit loan fraud, mortgage loan fraud, suspicious bulk currency deposits at financial institutions, and wire transfers made to various countries that are not commensurate with the profile of the client or business.

# **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

The PR/USVI HIDTA IISC analyzes information and delivers accurate and timely strategic, organizational and tactical intelligence on cocaine, heroin, marijuana trafficking and distribution related criminal activity within Puerto Rico (PR) and United State Virgin Islands (USVI). The IISC facilitates effective and efficient information sharing in drug trafficking/distribution, money laundering and illegal firearms used in drug related crime activities among PR/USVI HIDTA participating agencies, non-participating agencies, and within all law enforcement community nationwide.

The HIDTA IISC shares information with all initiatives through the use of many commercial and criminal databases such as ACS, DRUGX, TECS, CHOICEPOINT, PEN LINK, FOIMS TELEPHONE APPLICATION, INTERNET, ROCIC, LEXIS-NEXIS, and others. The IISC provides electronic connectivity with other HIDTA initiatives through the use of CNCMS. The IISC provides event and case deconfliction, Post Seizure Analysis, telephone toll analysis, intelligence profiles, Title III support, charts, graphs, trend and pattern analysis, and others. The IISC provides financial analysis and also has a Hotline Duty Analyst who provides immediate assistance. The IISC provides coordination with EPIC, NDIC and JIATF-E.

# TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Air & Marine Interdiction Program (HIDTA)	San Juan, PR
Alliance for a Drug Free Puerto Rico (HIDTA)	San Juan, PR
Blue Lightning Strike Force (HIDTA)	St. Croix, USVI
Caribbean Corridor Strike Force (HIDTA)	San Juan, PR
Fajardo Major Organization Investigations (HIDTA)	Fajardo, PR
Money Laundering Initiative (HIDTA)	San Juan, PR
Ponce Major Organization Investigations (HIDTA)	Ponce, PR
PR Fugitive Task Force (HIDTA)	San Juan, PR
Safe Neighborhoods (HIDTA)	San Juan, PR

San Juan Major Organization Investigations (HIDTA)	San Juan, PR
St. Croix Major Organization Investigations/Marine Interdiction (HIDTA)	St. Croix, USVI
St. Thomas Major Organization Investigations (HIDTA)	St. Thomas, USVI
Caribbean Corridor Strike Force (HIDTA/OCDETF)	Guaynabo, PR

The PR/USVI HIDTA plays an important role in coordinating and sharing information with State and local law enforcement agencies. To date, there are over 26 law enforcement agencies participating in this sharing program in PR and the USVI that are in and outside the PR/USVI HIDTA. The HIDTA shares intelligence electronically, using U.S. Department of Justice information systems (USDOJ), Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) Regional Organized Crime Information Center (ROCIC), Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), HIDTAs, and other sources as well as other law enforcement and task forces outside the PR/USVI HIDTA. All Federally funded drug enforcement task forces in the HIDTA region that specifically target illegal drugs are funded by the HIDTA program.

PR/USVI HIDTA task forces coordinate activities and operations through subject and event deconfliction utilizing the Secure Automated Fast Event Tracking Network (SAFETNet) administered by the GC HIDTA. The initiatives share information through the IISC, which provides coverage to all PR/USVI HIDTA initiatives 24 hours/7 days a week. The PR/USVI HIDTA operates a hot line in its IISC. The hot line information is shared with all of the initiatives in the HIDTA. The IISC is made up of intelligence/criminal research specialists/analysts, task force officers, and special agents from: the DEA, ICE, FBI, CBP, ATF, PR Special Investigations Bureau (NIE), PR Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, PR Army and Air Force National Guard, the PR and USVI National Guard, and contract personnel. The IISC is in the process of establishing a satellite investigative support office in St. Thomas, whose functions will be to specialize in investigative support to the USVI.

The OCDETF attorney and the PR/USVI HIDTA collaborate on both the OCDETF and HIDTA strategic plans and Threat Assessments through the Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) for the District of Puerto Rico. Over 45 percent of OCDETF active cases originate within PR/USVI HIDTA task forces.

The HIDTA's IISC works with the law enforcement community in efforts to support each other in the intelligence arena. Analysts from Federal and State agencies who staff the State Fusion Centers also provide support to the HIDTA task forces and the IISC, thereby contributing to information sharing.

# HIDTA EVALUATION

The PR/USVI HIDTA was initiated as an "interdiction" HIDTA; a HIDTA whose objective was to interdict the drugs moving through the region. Its mission has since expanded to include investigations of major DTOs and regional threats. In 2008, the HIDTA added the Caribbean Corridor Initiative as an unfunded initiative in response to the changing threat. In 2009, the initiative was funded and its name changed to the Caribbean Corridor Strike Force. This HIDTA continues to target large complex DTOs and MLOs which results in lengthy cases, many of which have an international nexus.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. By the end of 2008, of the 56 DTOs targeted to be disrupted or dismantled, the HIDTA had disrupted or dismantled 29, compared to 66 DTOs in 2007. The PR/USVI HIDTA had unusually high results in 2007 which have not since been replicated.

# Rocky Mountain HIDTA – Designated in 1996 Executive Director – Thomas Gorman

# **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The mission of the Rocky Mountain (RM) HIDTA is to support the *National Drug Control Strategy* and to reduce drug use. Specifically, the Rocky Mountain HIDTA seeks to facilitate cooperation and coordination among Federal, State, and local drug enforcement efforts. This mission is accomplished through intelligence-driven, joint multi-agency co-located drug task forces sharing information and working cooperatively with other drug enforcement initiatives, including interdiction.

# **STRATEGY**

The RM HIDTA will continue to facilitate coordination and cooperation among the 10 Federal agencies and 103 State/local agencies that partner to accomplish the mission, which includes: 1) reducing drug availability by eliminating or disrupting DTOs; and 2) improving the efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement organizations in their efforts within HIDTA. To that end, RM HIDTA has an extensive training program, intelligence initiative, aggressive enforcement initiatives, and a Domestic Highway Interdiction program.

#### **LOCATION**

The RM HIDTA operates out of Denver, Colorado. It encompasses 4 States and 34 designated counties that include:

- Colorado: Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Denver, Douglas, Eagle, El Paso, Garfield, Grand, Jefferson, La Plata, Larimer, Mesa, Moffat, Pueblo, Routt, and Weld;
- Montana: Cascade, Flathead, Lewis and Clark, Missoula, and Yellowstone;
- Utah: Davis, Salt Lake, Summit, Utah, Washington, and Weber
- Wyoming: Albany, Campbell, Laramie, Natrona, Sweetwater, and Uinta

# **INITIATIVES**

The RM HIDTA has 35 initiatives, which include 1 management, 1 training, 1 intelligence, 4 interdiction and 28 investigative initiatives.

#### SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	117	1	3	16,100	435	603

#### THREAT ASSESSMENT

The NDIC completed a Threat Assessment on the Rocky Mountain region in the spring of 2009. The Threat Assessment identifies the region as having well-established Mexican DTOs distributing cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, and some heroin from Mexico into the region, and then transporting the illicit drugs to distribution centers or markets in the Midwest and Eastern States. The report indicates the Mexican DTOs are increasingly exploiting tribal lands in and adjacent to the RM HIDTA region for distribution of illicit drugs. These DTOs have increased the distribution of methamphetamine particularly "ice". They are also responsible for supplying drug distributing violent street gangs in the region whose drugs of choice are ice and crack cocaine. The NDIC report has also identified Asian DTOs transporting high potency B.C. bud marijuana and ecstasy from Canada to the Rocky Mountain region to be distributed throughout the United States.

# **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

The IISC has been HIDTA funded since 1997. The IISC is comprised of: (1) main IISC in Denver, Colorado, two analysts in Salt Lake City, Utah, and three analysts in Colorado Springs, Colorado. All three have separate fiduciaries. The Wyoming Intelligence unit receives RM HIDTA funds to support the Wyoming Law Enforcement Information Network (subject deconfliction) connectivity to Rocky Mountain Information Network (RMIN/RISS). The IISC's mission is to provide a mechanism to integrate various agency intelligence systems into one centralized source for investigative inquiries by HIDTA agency personnel; to utilize database and inquiries to alert agencies of investigative conflicts; to provide tactical case analysis for investigative agencies; and to develop a strategic intelligence system to provide timely and accurate information for future Threat Assessments.

RM HIDTA Strategy stresses cooperation and collaboration amongst the initiatives. The assistance of the HIDTA resources gives the task forces the ability to focus on the threat within the region and to attempt to identify the supplying organizations. To enhance the abilities of the enforcement initiatives to address the threat, the administration and intelligence initiatives have developed efficient methods of information sharing. The Rocky Mountain HIDTA Strategy is dedicated to addressing the current threat at a local, State, and national levels, while impacting the availability and use of all drugs throughout the country.

#### TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Colorado Criminal Interdiction (HIDTA)	Denver, CO
Colorado Springs Metro Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Colorado Springs, CO
Front Range Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Aurora, CO
Fugitive Location and Apprehension Group (HIDTA)	Aurora, CO
Metro Gang Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Aurora, CO
North Metro Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Broomfield, CO
Northern Colorado Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Ft. Collins, CO
Southern Colorado Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Colorado Springs, CO

Southwest Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Durango, CO
Two Rivers Drug Enforcement Team (HIDTA)	Glenwood Springs, CO
Weld County Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Greeley, CO
West Metro Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Golden, CO
Western Colorado Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Grand Junction, CO
Central Montana Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Great Falls, MT
Eastern Montana Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Billings, MT
Missoula County Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Missoula, MT
Missouri River Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Bozeman, MT
Montana Criminal Interdiction Program (HIDTA)	Great Falls, MT
Northwest Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Kalispell, MT
Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force (HIDTA)	Kaysville, UT
Salt Lake City Metro Narcotics Task Force (HIDTA)	Salt Lake City, UT
Utah County Major Crimes Task Force (HIDTA)	Orem, UT
Utah Criminal Interdiction Program (HIDTA)	Salt Lake City, UT
Washington County Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	St. George, UT
Weber Morgan Narcotics Strike Force (HIDTA)	Ogden, UT
Wyoming Central Enforcement Team (HIDTA)	Casper, WY
Wyoming Criminal Interdiction Program (HIDTA)	Cheyenne, WY
Wyoming Northeast Enforcement Team (HIDTA)	Sheridan, WY
Wyoming Southeast Enforcement Team (HIDTA)	Cheyenne, WY
Wyoming Southwest Enforcement Team (HIDTA)	Rock Springs, WY
Mountain Enforcement Team (Byrne/JAG)	Jackson, WY
Northwest Enforcement Team (Byrne/JAG)	Powell, WY
Central Utah Narcotic Task Force (Byrne/JAG)	Richfield, UT
Iron/Garfield County Narcotic Task Force (Byrne/JAG)	Cedar City, UT
Big Muddy River (Byrne/JAG)	Wolf Point, MT
Tri-Agency Drug Task Force (Byrne/JAG)	Havre, MT

The RM HIDTA plays the primary role in ensuring coordination, cooperation, and information sharing among all task forces and drug units, including those that are not in the HIDTA area and those that are not Federally funded. The response to this type of coordination has been very well received.

All task forces receiving HIDTA funding are mandated by policy to utilize the subject deconfliction system within their individual state. All drug task forces receiving HIDTA funds that are in metropolitan areas are required to use the HIDTA's SAFETNet event deconfliction system. Those task forces that are not HIDTA-funded voluntarily use SAFETNet to enhance officer safety and event deconfliction. Those task forces in the States that are not Federally funded also voluntarily use the State's law enforcement information network for subject

deconfliction. Deconfliction "hits" require interagency communication and coordination to prevent investigative overlap.

All drug task forces share information with the RM HIDTA IISC and NDIC field specialists on a regular, informal basis and formally by a mandated report and Threat Assessment survey. The task forces, particularly in the Denver Metropolitan area, often work together on overlapping investigations and/or resource sharing. The HIDTA coordinates either with the Drug Investigators Association or those responsible for JAG/Byrne funding and conducts periodic drug unit commander meetings for all drug units and task forces throughout the HIDTA, regardless of their funding sources. The purpose of these meetings is to exchange information on drug trafficking threats and to address issues of mutual concern.

#### **HIDTA EVALUATION**

The Rocky Mountain HIDTA has a strong management team. The HIDTA Strategy, initiatives, and task forces are focused on challenging regional drug threats. Based on an analysis of data and information submitted by the HIDTA, ONDCP believes the program is meeting its short-term goals and performance targets, and is achieving its stated mission and long-term goals. The Executive Board is closely monitoring the performance of the initiatives and task forces and reassigns the weakest performing task forces to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Last year, ONDCP encouraged the program's management to increase its interaction and collaboration with other HIDTA programs and agencies to destabilize national and transnational drug trafficking networks. The HIDTA has reported significant improvements in collaboration and information sharing, and has established performance targets to further increase the number of intelligence and case referrals.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs, arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the HIDTA identified 276 DTOs and disrupted or dismantled 117, compared to 114 the prior year.

# South Florida HIDTA – Designated in 1990 Executive Director – Timothy Wagner

#### **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The mission of the South Florida HIDTA (SFL HIDTA) is the same as that of the national program; to disrupt the market for illegal drugs in the region by assisting Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement entities participating in the HIDTA to dismantle and DTOs, with particular emphasis on drug trafficking regions that have harmful effects on other parts of the United States.

#### **STRATEGY**

SFL HIDTA continues to foster cooperative and effective working relationships among Federal, State, and local agencies, contributing over 680 full-time personnel collocated and united to achieve the common goals of disrupting and dismantling DTOs through long-term multiagency investigations and operations. The SFL HIDTA Strategy provides an array of 23 functional initiatives focused on the multiple regional drug threats identified in the SFL HIDTA Threat Assessment. The initiatives are designed to dismantle the major DTOs and simultaneously disrupt their flow of drugs and monetary assets. The initiatives are structured so as to apply the collective expertise of local, State, and Federal agencies. Their counterdrug efforts use the SFL HIDTA-orchestrated open and collaborative enforcement environment to achieve unity of effort in focusing on the threat.

Expansion of multi-HIDTA approaches to identifying, disrupting, and dismantling traditional threats and emerging ones such as pharmaceutical diversion and indoor marijuana grows is a critical feature of the HIDTA's short and long-term strategy. Significant progress has been achieved on these fronts in 2008/2009. SFL HIDTA intends to build on this progress in 2010 and 2011.

#### **LOCATION**

The SFL HIDTA operates out of Miramar, Florida. It includes Broward, Dade, Monroe, (City of Miami) and Palm Beach Counties.

#### **INITIATIVES**

The SFL HIDTA has 23 initiatives, which include 1 management, 2 support, 1 intelligence, and 19 investigation/interdiction/prosecution initiatives.

#### SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	144	7	72	9,800	1,890	240

#### THREAT ASSESSMENT

Major drug threats in the SFL HIDTA region include cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin, hydroponics marijuana, and diverted pharmaceuticals. Money laundering continues to be a major threat associated with all illicit drug trafficking. The scope of the money laundering threat in this region remains significant and of sufficient scope to warrant national level interest. South Florida remains a command and control center for South American and Caribbean drug trafficking and money laundering organizations. Street gangs reflected record growth in their membership over the last year, based on data reported in the SFL HIDTA Survey for 2008. Gangs have a nexus to illicit drug distribution across the entire metropolitan area from Key West to northern Palm Beach County, the latter reporting the largest increases. Hydroponics marijuana production in South Florida is a major illicit drug threat for the region. Production has more than doubled in the last year, making Florida the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest producer in the United States, second only to California. This threat is also characterized by increased violent crime in the form of home invasions, armed robberies, kidnappings, arsons, and homicides committed in furtherance of the criminal enterprise.

Diversion of pharmaceutical medications has become another major threat in South Florida. This drug market has expanded so rapidly that it warrants additional attention due to its impact on drug abuse and the general health of all age groups. This State, like the rest of the Nation, is facing an explosive epidemic involving the abuse of prescription drugs. In South Florida, hundreds of pain management clinics are operating and dispensing drugs in uncontrolled quantities. Due to the high concentration of pill mills and prescription drug availability in Florida, oxycodone products (OxyContin, Percodan, Percocet), hydrocodone (Vicodin, Lorcet), Xanax (alprazolam), Diazepam (Valium) and others (steroids for example) are being made available in all drug markets, in large quantities, and at low prices, contributing to increases in prescription drug abuse. Internet diversion and distribution of these same drugs is another source of supply that also fuels this drug market, and Florida is heavily involved in this distribution and sale of unregulated medications to customers and suppliers, connecting suppliers and consumers from anywhere in the world.

Mexican DTO presence in the region appears to be increasing, and is related to importation and distribution of commercial-grade marijuana, methamphetamine (powder and crystal), and cocaine. These illicit drugs arrive via land routes, airlines, and parcel services from all Southwest border States, including Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California.

#### **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

The mission statement of the SFL HIDTA intelligence unit is to facilitate the timely, effective, and cooperative exchange of information from Federal, State, local, commercial, and HIDTA databases with HIDTA initiatives and participating agencies. Strategic and tactical intelligence is collected, analyzed, and disseminated in support of drug distribution, drug-related money laundering, firearms trafficking, and gang-related violence investigations. The Intelligence Center (SFLHIC) is a multi-agency coalition of Federal, State, and local agencies that collocates agency representatives and their respective agencies and proprietary databases. The SFLHIC also maintains the HIDTA's pointer index and deconfliction systems. Information technology services are provided by employing state-of-the-art automation and communications technologies and developing total systems that provide efficient information. The SFLHIC was first funded by HIDTA and began operations in 1994.

#### TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Southeast Florida Regional Task Force (HIDTA)	Weston
South Broward Drug Enforcement Unit (HIDTA)	Plantation
Russian/Eurasian Organized Crime Task Force (HIDTA)	Plantation
IRS Task Force (HIDTA)	Plantation
Operation Top Heavy (HIDTA)	Plantation
Blue Lightning Operations Center/Rapid Deployment Operations (HIDTA)	Miramar
Transportation Conspiracy Unit (HIDTA)	Plantation
West African Task Force (HIDTA)	Plantation
Major Case Initiative (HIDTA)	Miami
Cobra 13 FBI Group (HIDTA)	Miami
Gang Strike Force (HIDTA)	Miami
Global Crime Task Force (HIDTA)	Miami
South Florida Money Laundering Strike Force (HIDTA)	Miami
Key West Drug Trafficking Task Force (HIDTA)	Key West
Monroe HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Marathon
Palm Beach County Narcotics Task Force (HIDTA)	West Palm Beach
Street Terror Offender Program Dade (HIDTA)	Miami
Street Terror Offender Program Broward (HIDTA)	Plantation
Street Gang and Criminal Organization Task Force (HIDTA)	Miami
Violent Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations (HIDTA)	Miami
West Palm Beach Task Force	West Palm Beach
Tactical Diversion Squad	Weston

#### TASK FORCE COORDINATION

All SFL HIDTA-funded task forces are required to coordinate with the HIDTA IISC regarding information and intelligence sharing, and are mandated to submit case, subject, and event information for deconfliction through NINJAS. Non-HIDTA agencies operating within the SFL HIDTA are encouraged to share their information and deconflict their case, subject, and event information to the IISC.

Strategic analysts from the HIDTA IISC solicit current drug trends and related information from regional law enforcement agencies for analysis that is incorporated into the HIDTA's annual drug Threat Assessment. This report, along with other intelligence products, is disseminated to the law enforcement community, NDIC, EPIC, other HIDTAs, and ONDCP.

South Florida law enforcement and intelligence resources operate under a mutually agreed upon "Information and Intelligence Sharing Plan" developed by the Southeast Region Domestic Security Task Force. This plan is the architecture for a regional "fusion system" which directs the sharing of information in an organized manner.

#### **HIDTA EVALUATION**

In 2008, the SFL HIDTA made progress toward achieving its performance objectives, and continues to target the regional drug trafficking threat. The focus of the HIDTA is high-level investigations. Of the 145 DTOs dismantled or disrupted, 46 percent were international in scope. The program has the demonstrated ability to focus its investigative efforts at a high level, and yet operate at below the national average cost per DTO and have a competitive ROI.

The SFL HIDTA has aggressively targeted the emergent threat of indoor marijuana cultivation and pharmaceutical diversion related to a local proliferation of pain clinics. SFL HIDTA initiatives are investigating several pain clinics engaged in illegal operations that result in diversion. The goal of the investigation is to bring Federal charges against the clinic operators and owners as warranted. This multi-State investigation is coordinated with other HIDTAs to target the DTOs that illegally distribute drugs obtained via the Miami-area pain clinics throughout the east coast.

# SWB HIDTA - Arizona Region – Designated in 1990 Director – Terence Azbill

#### **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

To facilitate Federal/State/local/tribal multi-agency task forces and other partnerships to increase the safety of Arizona's citizens by substantially reducing drug trafficking and money laundering, thereby reducing drug-related crime and violence.

#### **STRATEGY**

The Southwest Border HIDTA/Arizona Region's (SWB HIDTA/AZ Region) Strategy includes multi-agency collocated task forces to counter identified drug-threats. Composed of Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies, the task forces target the threats in a geographical region or provide specialized expertise directed at a specific threat. Based on the task force's mission, participating agencies in the SWB HIDTA/AZ Region have specific strategies, policies, and procedures. The SWB HIDTA/AZ Region Executive Committee, with seven local, three State, and ten Federal members, is the SWB HIDTA/AZ Region policy making committee. The Executive Committee synchronizes the strategy targeting the drug threat to reduce drug-related crime. As the coordination umbrella for all HIDTA initiatives and special projects in each jurisdiction, the Executive Committee empowers three subcommittees for specific objectives: intelligence, management, and finance.

A "centerpiece" collocated or collaborative multi-agency task force initiative in each county focuses on major drug case development and drug smuggling. These multi-dimensional task forces meet HIDTA program guidance criteria. Other initiatives augment the primary task forces by targeting money laundering, drug-related violence and corruption, fugitive apprehension, surveillance, training, and technical or intelligence support. DEA cases are encouraged and pursued as a priority. These include CPOT, RPOT, and OCDETF cases.

The SWB HIDTA/AZ Region provides the Southwest Border HIDTA (SWB HIDTA) with administrative, budget, and intelligence information. Leading the intelligence section of the DHE concept, the SWB HIDTA/AZ Region coordinates with HIDTAs nationwide.

#### **LOCATION**

The SWB HIDTA/AZ Region operates out of Tucson, Arizona. It encompasses eight counties: Cochise, La Paz, Maricopa, Mohave, Pima, Pinal, Santa Cruz, and Yuma.

#### *INITIATIVES*

The SWB HIDTA/AZ Region has 23 initiatives, which include 3 support, 1 treatment/prevention, 2 intelligence, and 17 investigation/interdiction initiatives.

#### SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	110	4	70	17,200	1,732	859

#### THREAT ASSESSMENT

The SWB HIDTA/AZ Region faces multi-pronged threats of northbound smuggling of marijuana, methamphetamine, and illegal aliens, and southbound smuggling of currency and weapons. Both engender escalation of violence directed against law enforcement and the public south of the border. These threats, orchestrated by Mexican DTOs (MDTOs), can precipitate other criminal activities: border banditry ('bajadores'), money laundering, political corruption, home invasions, kidnappings, auto theft, and theft of both drug and illegal alien loads.

To facilitate their smuggling, MDTOs implement a variety of methodologies to exploit the porous Arizona-Mexico border and Arizona's vast public and tribal lands. From Arizona, their marijuana warehousing and distribution networks extend throughout the United States via the interstate highway system. Affiliations with Mexican illegal alien smugglers; east coast Jamaican DTOs; and U.S.-based prison, outlaw motorcycle, and street gangs enhance their capabilities to market their illegal drugs. These gang members are usually violent and unfamiliar with the territory. Active, identified, or admitted gang members involved in incidents recently reported by law enforcement are: Batos Locos; Calle13 Latinos Contes of Chicago; Sureños, some from a local gang in East Los Angeles; Sureño13; and MS-13.

Concomitant with smuggling, Mexican criminal enterprises engage in a pervasive campaign of border violence. Mexican states bordering the southwestern United States are at the epicenter of violence in Mexico. Gun battles in the streets, brutal executions, beheadings, and assassinations of law enforcement officers and public officials are at epidemic levels in northern Mexico. The possibility this gang-related violence will spill over into Arizona is a preeminent threat to the SWB HIDTA/AZ Region. Kidnappings have increased, particularly in the Phoenix area with approximately 300 kidnapping incidents in 2009, home to a large number of 'drop houses' used to facilitate the transfer of illegal aliens throughout the United States.

#### **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

The IISC is the SWB HIDTA/AZ Region Intelligence System and is comprised of two sub-initiatives: the IISC located in Tucson, and the Arizona Drug Intelligence Task Force located in Phoenix. Both provide strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence support to the Arizona Region Enforcement Initiatives.

The Intelligence Division is an AZ Department of Public Safety (DPS)-led Federal, State, and local initiative. It is the central initiative of the IISC and is comprised of Post-Seizure Analysis Teams (PSAT) and an All Source Analysis Team (ASAT). Each group has a specific

area focus, but interacts with the others in order to accomplish the mission of the IISC. PSAT focuses on identifying the connection between seizures of smuggled narcotics, narcotics-related asset seizures, narcotics-related violent crimes, and the arrested persons associated with those crimes. The team provides intelligence research assistance to the region's multi-agency task forces and agencies conducting narcotics investigations through telephone tolls, link analysis, trend and pattern analysis, and analytical case support. PSAT also maintains databases on-site to conduct various searches on behalf of the task forces and other law enforcement agencies. All intelligence information from the task forces is processed through the PSAT for case deconfliction and initiation and intelligence coordination. ASAT is the SWB HIDTA/AZ Region's focal point for all sources of information and intelligence. It collects, evaluates, processes, and disseminates intelligence to the PSAT and SWB HIDTA/AZ Region task forces and other counternarcotic agencies. It is responsible for the development of Geographic Information System (GIS) intelligence products and the technical and analytical support of GIS. The ASAT provides the tactical/operational intelligence for COBIJA/DHE operations and other counterdrug projects as requested, and maintains and operates the GIS-SitMap. Also, ASAT intake sections act as a Watch Center during normal duty hours for event deconfliction submissions and citizen call-ins.

The Arizona Drug Intelligence Task Force (ADITF) is a multi-agency task force comprised of an intelligence research specialist, investigators, and analysts from local, State, and Federal agencies. The ADITF is managed by a DPS lieutenant and a DPS sergeant who serves as the Deputy Coordinator. There are currently 19 positions assigned to the unit, which is split into two squads. The ADITF utilizes advanced computer technology to assist in the collation, analysis, retrieval, and dissemination of all the collected data. The ADITF has a protocol for documenting major criminal drug conspiracies. This information is utilized to support historical conspiracy prosecutions on significant Mexican DTOs operating in Arizona and throughout the Southwest border region. The ADITF assists other law enforcement agencies and HIDTA initiatives by identifying connectivity nationally to other ongoing criminal drug conspiracy cases. In addition, ADITF provides connectivity to the Arizona Terrorism Intelligence Center (ACTIC) by assisting in identifying possible terrorism intelligence information with a nexus to illegal drug syndicates. Furthermore, the ADITF collects, collates, and analyzes criminal intelligence for dissemination on Colombian DTOs, methamphetamine manufacturers/distributors, Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, Asian Criminal Enterprises, Russian Organized Crime Groups, and Violent Street Gangs operating in Arizona and along the Southwest border. The ADITF closely interacts with the HIDTA Investigative Center in Tucson. The DPS sergeant in charge of coordinating and supervising reports directly to the HIDTA Intelligence Division Director.

#### TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Intelligence and Investigative Support Center - Arizona Drug	
Intelligence Task Force (HIDTA)	Phoenix
Pima County Financial Task Force (HIDTA)	Tucson
Domestic Highway Enforcement (HIDTA)	Arizona Region
Arizona Warrant Apprehension (HIDTA)	Phoenix, Tucson, and Yuma
Border Anti-Narcotics Network (HIDTA)	Ajo, Pima County
Cochise County Border Alliance Group (HIDTA)	Cochise County
Counter Narcotics Alliance (HIDTA)	Pima County
La Paz County Narcotics Task Force (HIDTA)	La Paz County
Maricopa County Methamphetamine Task Force (HIDTA)	Phoenix, Maricopa County
Mohave Area General Narcotics Enforcement Team (HIDTA)	Kingman, Mohave County
Metro Intelligence Support and Technical Investigative Center	
(HIDTA)	Phoenix
Pinal County HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Pinal County
Santa Cruz Metro Task Force (HIDTA)	Santa Cruz County
Yuma County Narcotics Task Force (HIDTA)	Yuma County
Arizona Weapons Smuggling and Violence Initiative (unfunded)	Phoenix
Apache County Cooperative Enforcement Narcotics Team	Apache County
Northern Arizona Street Crimes Task Force	Flagstaff
Gila County Narcotics Enforcement Task Force	Gila County
Southeastern Arizona Drug, Gang, and Violent Crime Task	
Force	Graham County
Greenlee County Narcotics Task Force	Greenlee County
Navajo County Major Crimes Apprehension Team	Navajo County
Partners against Narcotics Trafficking	Sedona
Maricopa County Neighborhood Narcotics Enforcement Team	Maricopa County
Pinal County Drug and Gang Enforcement Multi-Agency Task	
Force	Pinal County
Santa Cruz Metro Task force	Santa Cruz County
Counter Narcotics Alliance	Tucson, Pima County
Yuma County Narcotics Task Force	Yuma County

### TASK FORCE COORDINATION

The SWB HIDTA/AZ Region provides a forum for sharing important trends in drug trafficking and issues relating to current events along the Southwest border, and specifically the Arizona/Mexico border. The SWB HIDTA/AZ Region coordinates the direct/indirect sharing of information among other SWB HIDTA regions and task forces through personal relationships,

hosting intelligence meetings, and dissemination of information via electronic and hard copy formats at the Federal, State, local, and tribal levels. Initiatives located geographically in Phoenix and Tucson are collocated in the two metropolitan areas. The IISC and related nodes with Federal, State, and local agency personnel provide the agency databases for research and communication. Further dissemination of information occurs to the National Seizure System, EPIC, National Virtual Pointer System, and RISS for regional and national coordination.

The Coordinated Operational Planning System and Situational Map provide law enforcement agencies with information utilized to coordinate Region Domestic Highway Enforcement interdiction and enforcement activities. The SWB HIDTA/AZ Region works closely with EPIC and other HIDTAs to ensure the information is shared.

The various drug task forces in Arizona use HIBIS for both event and case deconfliction. This system provides for notification to enforcement groups conducting operations on the same target or area so a resolution can be arranged. There are regional intelligence meetings held around the State of Arizona where information and intelligence is shared and exchanged. Joint interdiction operations are coordinated through the DHE program.

The SWB HIDTA/AZ Region Director and the IISC Manager are members of the Southern Arizona JTTF Executive Committee. This allows collaboration, information sharing, and insight into information requirements of the JTTF. In addition, the Southwest border HIDTA Arizona Region houses the Southern Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) squad, which allows direct contact with the State intelligence fusion center. Electronic connectivity to fusion centers adds to the sharing of information. The ACTIC houses Federal, State, and local agency personnel having multi-crime and public safety responsibilities, to include terrorism.

#### **HIDTA EVALUATION**

The SWB HIDTA/AZ Region has accomplished a significant portion of its performance goals and objectives, disrupting or dismantling 106 of the 128 targeted DTOs and MLOs, or a little over 82 percent. Of the 106 DTOs/MLOs disrupted or dismantled, 38 were international in scope. The SWB HIDTA/AZ Region faces unique challenges associated with having within its region a Native American reservation that straddles the U.S./Mexico border. To address these challenges, HIDTA provides support to the Tohono O'Odham Nation by funding a Safe Trails initiative led by the FBI. SWB HIDTA/AZ Region is an active participant in the State's intelligence center and works with the Governor's office to monitor the violence occurring just south of the border with Mexico. Additionally, the Arizona Region has signed an MOU with the Colorado River Indian Tribes, providing funds for narcotics interdiction and investigations.

# SWB HIDTA - California Region – Designated in 1990 Director – Kean McAdam

#### **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The mission of the SWB HIDTA/California Region (SWB HIDTA/CA Region) is to measurably reduce drug trafficking, thereby reducing the impact of illicit drugs in the region and in other areas of the country. To accomplish this mission, the SWB HIDTA/CA Region assists in the coordination of joint operational and supporting initiatives to deter, disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately destroy the most significant DTOs, and their supporting transportation and money laundering organizations.

#### **STRATEGY**

The SWB HIDTA/CA Region assists in the coordination of joint operational and supporting initiatives to deter, disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately destroy the most significant DTOs and their supporting transportation and money laundering organizations. The SWB HIDTA/CA Region also emphasizes efforts against methamphetamine manufacturing, precursor supply, and abuse through innovative enforcement operations and demand reduction programs utilizing a multi-agency, joint concept of operations. The SWB HIDTA/CA Region continues to foster cooperative and effective working relationships among 700 Federal, State, and local full-time and part-time personnel from 50 agencies, who participate in initiatives to disrupt and dismantle DTOs and reduce the demand for drugs.

#### **LOCATION**

The SWB HIDTA/CA Region operates out of San Diego, California. It is made up of two counties: Imperial and San Diego.

#### *INITIATIVES*

The Region has 18 initiatives, which include 1 management and coordination, 4 support, 1 demand reduction, 1 prosecution, 1 intelligence, 9 investigation/interdiction initiatives, as well as the National Methamphetamine Pharmaceuticals Initiative (NMPI).

#### SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	57	2	120	100,000	125	1

#### THREAT ASSESSMENT

San Diego and Imperial counties are national distribution centers for illicit drugs entering the U.S. from Mexico, and Central and South America, including heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana, and major domestic marijuana production sites. In 2007, over 290,731 kilograms of drugs valued at over \$1.55 billion were seized and permanently removed from the market, as well as over \$12 million in proceeds and assets. As mandated by the HIDTA program, SWB HIDTA/CA Region initiatives focus on larger drug operations, resulting in 71 OCDETF cases, of which 34 were CPOTs or RPOTs. Investigations (including the 2009 OCDETF Case of the Year – Operation Imperial Emperor) indicate that traffickers operating within the region continue to supply major markets throughout the U.S., including Las Vegas, Portland, Boston, Detroit, Miami, New Orleans, New York, Chicago, Tampa, and Charlotte.

#### **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

The San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center provides coordination and information sharing among local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies within the two-county region, nationally, and with all other HIDTAs and RISS projects. The SD-LECC's goals are to: 1) conform to the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan; 2) conform to the ONDCP/SWB/ SWB HIDTA/CA Region program guidance; 3) conform to the RISS/WSIN guidelines; and 4) support all law enforcement entities in reducing crime, and drug trafficking and use in America.

The SD-LECC functions as the all-crimes Intelligence and Investigative Support Center for the SWB HIDTA/CA Region, and the principal intelligence coordination center for participating drug and all-crimes law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and other local, State, and Federal agencies. The primary elements include: 1) a Watch Center for case deconfliction through the exchange of vital narcotic and criminal intelligence information, and the use of maps and a relational database to coordinate and deconflict crucial law enforcement activities, such as investigations, surveillances, searches, and arrests, in the interest of case and officer safety; 2) a surveillance/ technical equipment pool; 3) investigative support units (ISU) that provide tactical analytical case support and focus on targeting and strategic planning; 4) a gang team and a border and financial crimes team with analysts and agents who focus on strategic and operational intelligence and tactical case support in their respective crime areas; and 5) an information technology (IT) unit which provides support to the SWB HIDTA/CA Region and affiliated initiatives, the SD-LECC, and the Imperial Valley Law Enforcement Coordination Center - including the development and implementation of IT policy, network planning and implementation, and hardware/software support.

The ISU prepares the SWB HIDTA/CA Region Annual Threat Assessment that is the baseline for area strategies - and subsequently for the Region's initiatives. The initiatives achieve the desired outcomes of the strategies, which are: improved intelligence support to the region and other HIDTAs, disruption/dismantlement of significant DTOs, fully coordinated counterdrug interdiction operations along the border and with the other Southwest border HIDTA Regions, and a decrease in drug use.

In late 2008, the San Diego Narcotic Information Network (NIN) relocated from the offices of the DEA in San Diego, CA into a newly developed fusion center. While at the DEA, the NIN was collocated with elements of the Major Mexican Traffickers initiative, the

Commercial Interdiction Unit, the Clandestine Lab Enforcement Group, the San Diego Regional Prescription Drug Task Force, and the San Diego Integrated Narcotic Task Force, which contains HIDTA and non-HIDTA elements. DEA had provided office space to the NIN since its inception in 1992 at no cost to HIDTA.

Currently, the legacy NIN is one-third of San Diego's fusion center - the San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center (SD-LECC). The FBI's JTTF and the Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center are also located at the center. The FBI has agreed to fund the rent at the facility for the next 10 years, at approximately \$1.5 million per year. The fusion center is designed to be a partnership consisting of local, State, and Federal agencies that act as an information-sharing gateway with the intent to assist law enforcement and other public safety entities to detect, prevent, and solve crimes and potential acts of terrorism, through the production of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence.

Local, State, and Federal agencies, including the San Diego County Sheriff's Department, the San Diego Police Department, the Chula Vista Police Department, the California National Guard, the California Department of Justice, CBP, the FBI, the DEA and ICE, are combining their intelligence resources at the center, partially through contributed personnel from all of these agencies.

Information integration is being accomplished through deployment of a new LAN for use by all center participants. There are currently 165 integrated workstations. Capabilities of the LAN, called LECCnet, include an intelligence report depository on the portal that proactively notifies users of content based on alert subscriptions, and the ability for authorized users to securely access their LECCnet files and applications remotely. Additionally, seven different agency networks have been installed, further increasing the ability to share, correlate, and analyze intelligence information. Future objectives include the deployment of LECCnet at both the SWB HIDTA/CA Region and the Imperial Valley Law Enforcement Coordination Center.

In Imperial County, the Investigative Support Unit is collocated at the Law Enforcement Coordination Center, along with the California Department of Justice Street Interdiction Team and Border Interdiction Team, DEA's Major Mexican Traffickers Group, and the Imperial County Narcotic Task Force. Other participants in the San Diego center include a full-time Marijuana Initiative analyst, a representative from the NDIC, and a DHS analyst.

#### TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Imperial Valley Drug Coalition (HIDTA)	Imperial
Marine Task Force (HIDTA)	San Diego
Major Mexican Traffickers Initiative (HIDTA)	San Diego and Imperial
San Diego Narcotics Task Force - Commercial Interdiction	
Unit (HIDTA)	San Diego
San Diego Violent Crime Task Force (HIDTA)	San Diego and San Marcos
Operation Alliance Joint Task Force (HIDTA)	San Diego
Combined Border Prosecutions Initiative (HIDTA)	San Diego and Imperial
Marijuana Initiative (HIDTA)	San Diego

San Diego Regional Pharmaceutical Narcotic Enforcement	
Team (HIDTA)	San Diego
San Diego/Imperial Counties Law Enforcement Coordination	
Center (HIDTA)	San Diego and Imperial
National Methamphetamine and Chemicals Initiative (HIDTA)	San Diego
Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory (HIDTA)	San Diego
Border Crimes Suppression Team (SWB Recovery Act - DOJ)	San Diego County
	San Diego and Imperial
DHS-ICE Border Enforcement Security Teams (4 total) (DHS)	Counties
Customs Border Patrol Border Intelligence Center (DHS)	San Diego
DEA Narcotic Task Force (HIDTA)	San Diego

#### TASK FORCE COORDINATION

Each agency has its own strategies, requirements, and missions. The SWB HIDTA/CA Region Executive Committee coordinates the integration and synchronization of efforts to reduce drug trafficking, eliminate unnecessary duplication, and improve the direction, production, and systematic sharing of intelligence.

The Executive Committee provides a coordination umbrella over networked joint task forces, the intelligence center, task forces not funded by the SWB HIDTA/CA Region, and single agency task forces and narcotics units within the region's area of responsibility. The Committee is formed of 16 Members/Officers, eight Federal and eight State/local, with the chair and vice-chair rotating between Federal and State/local yearly. The Chair and Vice Chair of the SWB HIDTA/CA Region are also members of the Southwest Border HIDTA Executive Board.

An Intelligence Subcommittee, co-chaired by Federal and State/local representatives, provides guidance and oversight to the Intelligence and Investigative Support Center (the San Diego/Imperial Law Enforcement Coordination Center - SDLECC) and develops intelligence policies for the approval of the Executive Committee.

To accomplish its mission, the SWB HIDTA/CA Region coordinates intelligence-driven, joint, multi-agency coordinated initiatives, which are organized into five mutually supporting subsystems. The emphasis is on seamless mutual support between intelligence, interdictors, investigators, and prosecutors, with cross-attachment and collocation of enforcement groups responsible for differing operational methods, target regions, and target levels of investigation. The flow of information, both intelligence and investigative/operational, is critical to comprehensive success against the widely varying drug threats in the region.

All task forces and member agencies utilize the subject and event deconfliction services of the SDLECC: over 100,000 subject inquiries and 11,000 critical enforcement events were handled by the SDLECC in 2009. The SDLECC is a node in the WSIN (which covers California, Oregon, Washington, Arkansas, and Hawaii). These inquiries and events are electronically shared on a real-time basis with all the participants in the WSIN system, and most significantly with the HIDTA IISCs in the western States. Further, the SDLECC is the collocation and combination of the HIDTA IISC and the regional Homeland Security Fusion Center. One facility with free access houses the joint intelligence analysis center, the Regional

Terrorism Threat Analysis Center, JTTF. In this way, the agencies in the region have committed to full intelligence and information sharing and fusion.

The SWB HIDTA/CA Region Intelligence Subsystem links and integrates with the Intelligence Subsystems of the other SWB HIDTA Regions, utilizing border-wide IISC participation in Operation Cobija, DHE, IISC Managers meetings, the RISS, Anti-Drug Network- Unclassified (ADNET-U), and other sensitive but unclassified (SBU) networks. Additionally, the CBAG holds quarterly initiative meetings to exchange information and address issues of mutual concern.

#### HIDTA EVALUATION

The SWB HIDTA/CA Region is meeting its performance objectives and goals in a cost-effective manner. The Region targets CPOTs, regional DTOs, and multi-state targets to disrupt and/or dismantle. It has been directly involved in investigating high-priority targets or providing intelligence to the agencies conducting those investigations. The California Region has a state-of-the-art Intelligence and Investigative Support Center in which all units are collocated and comingled, thereby ensuring immediate sharing of information. The region also participates with LA CLEAR for deconfliction. The SWB HIDTA/CA Region recently expanded its prevention efforts by joining with the other three HIDTAs within the State and establishing a prevention initiative.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the SWB HIDTA/CA Region disrupted or dismantled 34 DTOs, compared to 58 the prior year. This decrease is due to several major cases involving international-level DTOs. These investigations achieved highly significant milestones in 2008, with arrests, indictments and extraditions of key Mexican cartel members.

# SWB HIDTA - New Mexico Region – Designated in 1990 Director – Ernesto Ortiz

#### **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The mission of the SWB HIDTA/New Mexico Region (SWB HIDTA/NM Region) is to reduce drug availability by creating intelligence-driven drug task forces aimed at eliminating or reducing domestic drug trafficking and its harmful consequences. This is accomplished through initiatives that enhance and help to coordinate drug trafficking control efforts among Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies. This mission will develop a synchronized system involving coordinated intelligence, interdiction, investigation, and prosecution efforts to measurably reduce drug trafficking, thereby reducing the impact of illicit drugs in the State and other areas of the country.

#### **STRATEGY**

The SWB HIDTA/NM Region's integrated systems approach will use intelligence to synchronize the efforts of enforcement, prosecution, and support initiatives. There are 17 initiatives that include 12 multi-jurisdictional task forces with 48 local, 11 State and 11 Federal law enforcement participating agencies. These initiatives will focus on interdiction, investigation, prosecution, and intelligence sharing. SWB HIDTA/NM Region initiatives will continue to focus efforts to reduce the transshipment/distribution of illicit drugs and prescription controlled drugs into and through New Mexico, and the transshipment of money and weapons south across the U.S. Southwest border. The region emphasizes the development of Consolidated CPOTs, RPOTs, and OCDETF level cases initiated through interdiction and investigative efforts.

#### **LOCATION**

The SWB HIDTA/NM Region operates out of Las Cruces, New Mexico. It is made up of 16 counties: Bernalillo, Chaves, Doña Ana, Eddy, Grant, Hidalgo, Lea, Lincoln, Luna, Otero, Rio Arriba, Sandoval, Santa Fe, San Juan, Torrance, and Valencia.

#### **INITIATIVES**

The SWB HIDTA/NM Region has 17 initiatives, which include 1 management, 1 training, 1 support (Crime Labs), 1 prosecution, 1 intelligence, and 12 investigation/interdiction initiatives.

#### SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	120	1	8	3,523	2,263	865

#### THREAT ASSESSMENT

Illicit drug smuggling and transshipments are the major drug threats in the State of New Mexico. The quantity of illegal drugs transported through New Mexico far outweighs the consumption rate within the State. However, the distribution and abuse of Mexican ice methamphetamine pose a serious threat to the SWB HIDTA/NM Region. Local methamphetamine production is also on the rise, but the magnitude of the threat is minimal, compared to the distribution and use of Mexican ice methamphetamine.

The State's proximity to Mexico, its geography along the 180 mile sparsely populated, shared border, the presence of well established DTOs with direct ties to Mexican cartels, and its transportation infrastructure make it a principal drug smuggling area and transshipment and distribution center for marijuana, cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and other illicit drugs, including prescription controlled drugs, in the region and many other U.S. drug markets. The State's geography continues to be the most significant factor contributing to the drug threat in New Mexico. The open border areas between POEs, mostly a mixture of farmlands and mountainous terrain in the "Boot Heel" area of southwest New Mexico, coupled with a limited law enforcement presence and access to the State's transportation infrastructure, makes this area vulnerable for exploitation by DTOs. Criminal groups; street, prison, and outlaw motorcycle gangs; as well as local independent dealers exacerbate the drug problem in New Mexico as retail-level distributors.

#### INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES

The IISC supports all law enforcement and judicial initiatives in their efforts to address and target the identified drug threats in New Mexico. The IISC is the intelligence and information sharing center for the HIDTA in the New Mexico Region. The IISC is able to improve the ability of HIDTA initiatives to disrupt and dismantle DTOs through collaboration, analysis, and information sharing. The IISC assists initiatives with intelligence-driven investigations through research, analysis, and coordination of information. The IISC provides tactical, investigative, and strategic intelligence to initiatives, HIDTA participants, and other law enforcement agencies. The IISC's core functions include: event and subject deconfliction, case support and post-seizure analysis, Pen-Register and Wire-Tap support, Threat Assessments, bulletins, and special projects. The IISC manages the electronic connectivity to commercial and law enforcement databases for the HIDTA in New Mexico. The IISC manages the HIDTA Information Technology Network, ORION intelligence database, event deconfliction system (SAFETNet), and wiretap/pen register equipment. The IISC provides familiarization training as

needed. The IISC coordinates all intelligence matters, including interagency liaison for the SWB HIDTA/NM. The IISC supports major drug investigations, including RPOT/CPOT and OCDETF cases. The IISC is the primary collection hub for all highway enforcement intelligence and data in the State of New Mexico. Both the strategic and tactical units of the IISC provide intelligence support to marijuana eradication efforts in the State of New Mexico. The IISC generates and disseminates intelligence regarding financial crimes and targets via direct access to the FinCEN Network and participation in the U.S. Attorney-sponsored SARs Review Team.

#### TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
NM Border Operations Task Force (HIDTA)	Las Cruces and Deming
NM DEA HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Albuquerque and Las Cruces
FBI Safe Streets (HIDTA)	Albuquerque
Fugitive/Violent Offender Task Force (HIDTA)	Albuquerque
Middle Rio Grande Valley Task Force (HIDTA)	Albuquerque
NM Enhanced Linewatch Operations (HIDTA)	Southern New Mexico
NM DPS (HIDTA)	New Mexico
Region II HIDTA Narcotics Task Force (HIDTA)	Farmington
Region III Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Santa Fe
Region VI – Lincoln County Narcotics Enforcement Unit (HIDTA)	Lincoln County (Ruidoso)
Region VI – Chaves County Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Chaves County (Roswell)
Region VI – Lea County Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Lea County (Hobbs)
Region VI – Otero County Narcotics Enforcement Unit (HIDTA)	Otero County (Alamogordo)
Region VI – Pecos Valley Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Carlsbad
Regional Interagency Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Las Cruces
FBI Safe Streets Task Force (FBI)	Farmington and Las Cruces
Project Exile (ATF)	Albuquerque
BEST ( ICE)	New Mexico – Statewide (Based
	out of El Paso, Texas)
Methamphetamine Initiative Task Force – 2 <sup>nd</sup> Judicial DA	Albuquerque
New Mexico DEA Tactical Diversionary Squads	Albuquerque, New Mexico
(Pharmaceuticals)	Arouquerque, New Mexico
JTTF – FBI	Albuquerque, New Mexico
Public Corruption & Border Crimes Task Force (FBI)	Base out of Hartsville, Tennessee
Region IV Drug Task Force (JAG)	Las Cruces, New Mexico
Region V Drug Task Force (JAG)	Clovis, New Mexico
Safe Trails (FBI)	Farmington, New Mexico
NM Gang Task Force (JAG)	Albuquerque, New Mexico

#### TASK FORCE COORDINATION

The SWB HIDTA/NM Region provides a coordination umbrella for local, State, tribal, and Federal drug enforcement efforts. The Executive Committee, which includes participation from 20 key law enforcement agencies throughout the State, provides leadership and fosters an attitude of teamwork and equality between its Federal, State, and local partners. It also ensures a strategy-driven, systemic approach to synchronize drug enforcement efforts and leverage resources, thereby increasing the efficiency and effectiveness among participating agencies. Collocation of Federal, tribal, State, and local investigators is the key to success in this program. Its Executive Committee mandates information sharing by all participating agencies, thereby making this approach more effective. Frequently, SWB HIDTA/NM Region cases receive OCDETF designation, which makes more resources available.

The region mandates its task forces, and encourages non-HIDTA law enforcement participants, to use event and case/subject deconfliction. This mitigates officer safety issues, minimizes duplication of efforts, and leverages resources. The SWB HIDTA/NM Region IISC (NM IISC) is the coordinating hub for deconfliction activities.

The NM IISC coordinates the sharing of information for all its initiatives. It also shares information with other law enforcement agencies and intelligence centers. The IISC facilitates the sharing of information concerning organizational structures of DTOs, transportation, and distribution modes of operation and other related intelligence. Drug task forces, groups, or units, not already part of or affiliated with a HIDTA task force, coordinate with HIDTA electronically or through daily contact. Non-HIDTA local police and sheriffs' offices are informed of investigations within their jurisdiction for coordination and deconfliction purposes and, if necessary, for local participation.

The SWB HIDTA/NM Region also sponsors a Narcotics Information Sharing Training Conference semiannually. The day-and-a-half conference serves as a venue for sharing information, ideas, and tactics among drug enforcement initiatives. The conference also includes participation from representatives from Mexico. The Region evaluates its initiatives annually in regards to sharing information. It conducts annual, onsite reviews and monitors each initiative through the use of the HIDTA PMP system.

#### HIDTA EVALUATION

The SWB HIDTA/NM Region recently moved the Intelligence and Investigative Support Center to Albuquerque, with a branch center in Las Cruces, NM. While initially the Las Cruces Node was operating with local law enforcement only, Federal agencies have placed analysts within the node in response to the threat in the area nearest the border with Mexico. The FBI is the lead agency for this initiative, and DEA fully participates, as do other Federal, State, and local agencies. The SWB HIDTA/NM Region Director has made progress within the Region and has been a critical player in revamping the initiatives to ensure effective and efficient operations. The Region includes a large Native American population and land, and has added several initiatives that conduct operations in Indian Country.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the SWB HIDTA/NM Region disrupted or dismantled 120 DTOs, compared to 104 the prior year. HIDTA

initiatives had identified 261 DTOs operating in the Region, of which 166 DTOs were expected
to be dismantled or disrupted.

# SWB HIDTA - South Texas Region – Designated in 1990 Director – Antonio Garcia

#### **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The mission of the SWB HIDTA/South Texas Region (SWB HIDTA/STX Region) is to reduce drug availability by creating intelligence-driven drug task forces aimed at eliminating or reducing domestic drug trafficking and its harmful consequences through enhancing and helping to coordinate illicit drug trafficking control efforts among Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies.

#### **STRATEGY**

Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies combine their efforts with multi-jurisdictional co-located/co-mingled drug task forces and initiatives. These intelligence-driven drug task forces pursue coordinated efforts to reduce the smuggling, transshipment, and distribution of drugs into and through the State of Texas. The SWB HIDTA/STX Region employs intelligence-driven investigations and interdiction activities targeted at drug transshipments, including extensive systematic follow-up investigations involving intelligence analysis and sharing of information, along with an aggressive prosecution structure that focus on the disruption and dismantlement of DTOs in accordance with the *National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy*. SWB HIDTA/STX Region initiatives are organized seamlessly into Enforcement, Intelligence, Prosecution, Support, and Management and Coordination. Through an intensive initiative and task force review and inspection process, along with statistical information gathered through the HIDTA PMP system, the Executive Committee holds initiatives accountable for their productivity.

#### **LOCATION**

The SWB HIDTA/STX Region operates out of San Antonio, Texas. It is made up of 14 counties: Bexar, Cameron, Dimmit, Hidalgo, Jim Hogg, Kinney, La Salle, Maverick, Starr, Val Verde, Webb, Willacy, Zapata, and Zavala.

### *INITIATIVES*

The Region has 18 initiatives, which include 1 management, 1 training, 6 intelligence, and 10 investigation/interdiction initiatives.

#### SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	82	5	40	21,800	3,504	1,229

#### THREAT ASSESSMENT

The SWB HIDTA/STX Region is a principal high-transit smuggling corridor for illicit drugs and illegal aliens along the U.S./Mexico border. It continues to be a major transshipment zone for marijuana, cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and other illegal narcotics. The region consists of 14 counties, with 13 situated along the U.S/Mexico border. These counties represent 50 percent of the Texas/Mexico border. Seventeen of the 25 POEs along the United States southwest border are within the South Texas Region. The POEs, coupled with the region's interstate highways, make the Region one of the most strategically important drug smuggling corridors in use by both domestic and Mexican DTOs. Despite the low population in some areas, the region may influence drug trafficking and availability at the national level more than any other area along the U.S. /Mexico border. Gang activity continues to be a threat in the area, due to gang associations with the Gulf Cartel and other DTOs and cartels.

#### **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

The South Texas HIDTA Intelligence Center (STHIC) is a full-service IISC which also includes a subject and event Deconfliction Center. The STHIC provides near real-time interaction with intelligence elements across the region and Nation through HIDTA.net and other Federal, State, and local systems. The STHIC consists of three elements: a Deconfliction Center; an operational and tactical analytical support team; and a strategic analysis unit. The IISC provides near real-time criminal and open source database query checks and case support; analytical case support including telephone toll, link, and event/flow analysis; charting and forecasting; drug trends reporting and assessing; events; and enforcement. With multi-agency, joint task force personnel, the STHIC strives to give near-real-time responses to LEA queries regarding information within its available databases. The center furnishes analytical support by collecting, analyzing, reporting, and processing information received into useable intelligence relevant to customer needs. Besides providing deconfliction services to the South Texas HIDTA Region, the STHIC has partnered with the North Texas HIDTA in providing deconfliction support to the NTX HIDTA region, including the State of Oklahoma. The Deconfliction Center responded to LEA in 64 counties across central and South Texas in CY 2008. The SWB STX HIDTA partnerships and LEA across the Nation may access the STHIC's numerous intelligence products via its website on HIDTA.net. Analytical support is provided from 7:00 AM to 6:00 PM, Mon-Fri. Deconfliction coverage is provided 24-hours a day, seven days a week. The STHIC is collocated and commingled with other HIDTA elements.

#### TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Brownsville HIDTA Investigative Task Force (HIDTA)	Brownsville
Border Patrol Intelligence Center (HIDTA)	Del Rio
Eagle Pass Multi-Agency Investigative Task Force (HIDTA)	Eagle Pass
Hidalgo County Task Force (HIDTA)	Edinburg
Laredo Financial Narcotics Enforcement Task Force (HIDTA)	Laredo
Laredo Multi-agency Task Force (HIDTA)	Laredo
McAllen Intelligence Center (HIDTA)	McAllen

Multi-agency Drug Related Public Corruption Task Force	McAllen		
(HIDTA)			
McAllen DEA Task Force (HIDTA)	McAllen		
McAllen ICE Task Force (HIDTA)	McAllen		
San Antonio DEA Task Force (HIDTA)	San Antonio		
San Antonio Department of Public Safety Task Force (HIDTA)	San Antonio		
San Antonio Police Department Task Force (HIDTA)	San Antonio		
South Texas HIDTA Del Rio Task Force (HIDTA)	Del Rio		
South Texas HIDTA Intelligence Center (HIDTA)	San Antonio		
South Texas HIDTA McAllen Initiative (HIDTA)	McAllen		
South Texas HIDTA San Antonio Initiative (HIDTA)	San Antonio		
Starr County HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Rio Grande City		
Unified Narcotics Intelligence Task Force (HIDTA)	Brownsville		
White Sands HIDTA Task Force (HIDTA)	Brownsville		
OCDETF Strike Force (U.S. Attorneys' Office)	Laredo, Webb County;		
OCDETT Strike Poice (U.S. Attorneys Office)	McAllen, Hidalgo County		
DEA Funded Task Forces (DEA)	San Antonio, Bexar County		
BEST Task Forces, Immigration and Custom Enforcement	Laredo, Webb County;		
(DHS)	Harlingen, Cameron County		
	San Antonio, Bexar County;		
Joint Terrorism Task Force (FBI)	McAllen, Hidalgo County;		
John Terrorishi Task Porce (PBI)	Brownsville, Cameron County;		
	Laredo, Webb County		
	San Antonio, Bexar County;		
Safe Streets Task Force (FBI)	McAllen, Hidalgo County;		
Saic Succes Task Polec (LDI)	Brownsville, Cameron County;		
	Laredo, Webb County		

#### TASK FORCE COORDINATION

Quarterly Intelligence and Information Conferences are held across the SWB HIDTA/STX Region. Regular attendees include representatives from the GC HIDTA and the Houston HIDTA, as well as NDIC and EPIC; many of the attendees are from non-HIDTA participating agencies as well as the Texas National Guard, and military personnel from Joint Task Force North (JTFN). Personnel from these Federal agencies participate in the South Texas HIDTA-sponsored information-sharing conferences, as well. From these conferences, numerous agencies acquire new knowledge and information on the South Texas HIDTA Investigative Support and Deconfliction Center. The Deconfliction Center has partnered with the North Texas HIDTA to provide deconfliction services to law enforcement agencies in 198 counties in South and North Texas and Oklahoma. 359 Federal, State, and local agencies receive deconfliction support through the South Texas IISC. All task force personnel are mandated by the Executive

Committee and their respective agency heads to participate in the deconfliction process, resulting in enhanced officer safety and the merging of investigations.

The SWB HIDTA/STX Region has implemented "Gateway/Destination" information-sharing meetings to bring together personnel from those HIDTAs that are directly impacted by drug trafficking activity originating in the South Texas area. These two-way exchanges of information have identified significant links between ongoing investigations in different jurisdictions, resulting in solving of one homicide investigation, a number of fugitive arrests, and several investigative conspiracy cases.

The SWB HIDTA/STX Region does not routinely or directly participate with either the Southern or Western Judicial Districts JTTF. However, JTTF task forces frequently participate in the South Texas HIDTA quarterly intelligence and information-sharing conferences. The Region's IISC provides support as requested by the JTTF on a case-by-case or event-to-event basis. The SWB HIDTA/STX Region participates with the Texas Division of Emergency Management (DEM), Texas Border Support Operations Center (BSOC), and the State Fusion Center in the sharing of pertinent information.

#### HIDTA EVALUATION

The SWB HIDTA/STX Region has undergone a change in its management staff, with Director Garcia bringing in new personnel. The Region has refocused its energy on meeting its performance objectives and inputting that data into the HIDTA PMP database. While the South Texas Region disrupted or dismantled only 57 of 74 expected DTOs, 52 of these were either multi-state or international in scope. Often, these investigations require a longer period of time to develop. The Region has 67 open OCDETF cases, including 14 initiated within the last year. In CY 2008 South Texas had 39 active CPOT cases and 10 active RPOT cases. This Southwest Border HIDTA Region has established four intelligence nodes along the border with Mexico and has linked information with the Texas Narcotics Information System and the three other HIDTAs within the State. After careful evaluation of each of the initiatives in the Region, South Texas has revamped many of these to make them more effective. The new leadership and the Executive Committee are committed to improving the HIDTA region, and have made progress in that direction.

# SWB HIDTA - West Texas Region – Designated in 1990 Director – Travis Kuykendall

#### PURPOSE AND GOALS

The mission of the SWB HIDTA/West Texas Region (SWB HIDTA/WTX Region) mission is to dismantle the DTOs in the region and to stop the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, via cooperative efforts in intelligence, investigation, interdiction, forfeiture, and prosecution initiatives.

#### **STRATEGY**

The SWB HIDTA/WTX Region continues to foster cooperative and effective working relationships among 1 U.S. Attorneys' Office, 10 Federal agencies, 7 State agencies, and 19 local agencies to achieve the common goals of disrupting and dismantling DTOs, and securing the West Texas 12-county region of the U.S. Southwest border, preventing multi-ton quantities of illicit drugs from ever reaching their intended market.

#### **LOCATION**

The SWB HIDTA/WTX Region operates out of El Paso, Texas. It is made up of 12 counties: Brewster, Crockett, Culberson, Ector, El Paso, Hudspeth, Jeff Davis, Midland, Pecos, Presidio, Reeves, and Terrell.

#### **INITIATIVES**

The Region has 16 initiatives, which include 1 management and coordination, 1 training, 1 prosecution, 1 intelligence, and 12 investigation/interdiction initiatives.

#### SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	118	2	50	17,700	95	275

#### THREAT ASSESSMENT

Mexican DTOs are the primary organizational threat to the West Texas Region. They maintain sophisticated command-and-control centers in Mexico, where they exert nearly total control over drug smuggling operations in the region. Control of drug trafficking in the El Paso, Texas/Juarez, Mexico plaza is currently in flux. Multiple Mexican drug trafficking cartels have been battling for control of drug trafficking in the region, leading to extreme levels of violence on the border; none of these organizations has yet been able to establish dominance. In 2009, the

disruption of the Barrio Azteca Gang, through nearly a dozen arrests of several key members, has allowed other gangs, such as the Crips and Latin Kings, to increase their drug trafficking activities in the HIDTA region. Seizures of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine have decreased in the region over the past three years, most likely the result of the ongoing violent conflict between cartels in the El Paso/Juarez plaza, and increased, coordinated law enforcement "surge" operations along the border.

#### INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES

The West Texas Region Intelligence Initiative (WTRII) was created to provide a seamless intelligence support system for the narcotics and other law enforcement operational initiatives and units in the Region. This multi-agency system - led by the El Paso County Sheriff's Office, and co-managed with the FBI and DEA – is designed to provide timely, actionable information to the agent/officer. Deconfliction services provided by the WTRII help improve officer safety issues and maximize the efficient use of resources. As a central hub for LEA intelligence sharing and dissemination, the WTRII aims to directly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement organizations and their efforts within the HIDTA.

The WTRII consists of three nodes, which provide operational units with a seamless intelligence support system. The structure and policies of the entire initiative comply with the Federal General Counter Drug Intelligence Plan (GCIP).

The IISC is the hub of the WTRII and is located in the El Paso Federal Criminal Justice Building. The IISC is the initial point of contact on all service requests to the WTRII. It also sponsors yearly marketing presentations (on services provided by the WTRII), to all law enforcement personnel in the region. The AMBBIC provides limited intelligence support in the Alpine/Marfa/Big Bend areas of the SWB HIDTA/WTX Region. TNIS provides national database connectivity, a central information repository and limited analytical support. The IISC coordinates the efforts of the AMBBIC and TNIS components of the initiative so the narcotics agent/officer is serviced by a seamless intelligence support system. The WTRII in El Paso is known as the IISC. The EPPD, CBP, ICE, and TDPS Intelligence units in the El Paso area also support the IISC in its mission.

The IISC provides database query, deconfliction pointer index services, and a full range of tactical and strategic analytical support and reports. It also provides translation/transcription services for all of the HIDTA initiatives. The IISC develops intelligence-driven investigations to provide to the operational units. It is the hub of communications between all of the agencies/initiatives, the West Texas Region administrative center, and the other SWB Regions through the development and operation of a secure intranet/e-mail system. The AMBBIC is located at the CBP-Marfa station, which services law enforcement personnel in Presidio, Brewster, Jeff Davis and Pecos counties. The CBP-Marfa Sector is the lead agency, and is electronically connected to the El Paso IISC via a WAN with e-mail capabilities. The AMBBIC provides limited query, tactical, and analytical support to the operational units in their area. Deconfliction, strategic analytical support, and communications issues are handled at the El Paso IISC. Collateral duty agents at each of the CBP checkpoints along the border are also participating in this initiative by feeding intelligence information to the IISC through the AMBBIC.

The Texas Narcotics Information System (TNIS) is the data repository for the WTR-IISC. They assist with analytical and deconfliction support for operational units in the West Texas area. Texas DPS is the POC at the WTRII and provides 10 analysts to the various Texas HIDTAs, 2 of which are located at the El Paso IISC. The SWB HIDTA/WTX Region funds two records technicians who provide statewide deconfliction support at the Texas Department of Public Safety Headquarters in Austin. Due to the availability of information at the DPS Headquarters and the limited number of analysts, it is not feasible to collocate analysts at all initiatives. The SWB HIDTA/WTX and STX Regions support RNIS, as do the North Texas HIDTA and the Houston HIDTA.

#### TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Alpine Multi-Agency Task Force (HIDTA)	Alpine
Border Corruption Task Force (HIDTA)	El Paso
El Paso Multi-Agency Task Force (HIDTA)	El Paso
Enterprise Money Laundering Initiative (HIDTA)	El Paso
Operation Lone Star (HIDTA)	Marfa
Permian Basin Multi-Agency Task Force (HIDTA)	Midland
Southwest Trafficking Interdiction Narcotics Group (HIDTA)	El Paso
Stash House Task Force (HIDTA)	El Paso
Transportation Task Force (HIDTA)	El Paso
El Paso Strike Force (OCDETF)	El Paso
BEST (ICE)	El Paso

#### TASK FORCE COORDINATION

All drug task forces receiving HIDTA funds are mandated to use the SWB HIDTA/WTX Region's SAFETNet event and subject deconfliction services. All agencies receiving HIDTA funds are mandated to use SAFETNet as well. Other task forces, whether Federally funded or not, utilize SAFETNet to enhance officer safety and event deconfliction.

The SWB HIDTA/WTX IISC is the hub for all drug intelligence and investigation information in the West Texas area of responsibility. All agencies and task forces, whether HIDTA funded or not, share drug trafficking intelligence and case information through the IISC.

Through cooperation developed by the SWB HIDTA/WTX IISC, all information is available through the IISC to any law enforcement agency. All agencies in the West Texas HIDTA region, and many agencies outside of the Region's area of responsibility, participate in the services of the IISC. This participation ensures the full sharing of information to all law enforcement agencies in the region.

The SWB HIDTA/WTX Region has taken a leadership role among all agencies, task forces, and units in the region to facilitate coordination of operations, management of information and intelligence, and monitor events connected to the drug related violence in Juarez. This open, holistic approach is an effort to prevent and prepare for the spillover of

violence into this region of the United States. All joint operations, task forces, and intelligence units, whether Federally funded or not, are involved in these processes.

The IISC is a member of, and is commingled with, the JTTF in El Paso, Texas.

#### HIDTA EVALUATION

The SWB HIDTA/WTX Region is meeting its performance objectives in a cost-effective manner. The return on investment of \$23 for each dollar invested represents a drop from previous years, in part because of the level of violence occurring in Juarez and the actions taken by the Government of Mexico in response to that violence. These actions have disrupted the flow of illegal drugs across the border, resulting in a decrease in seizures by HIDTA task forces. The West Texas IISC continues to gather and share information with participating task force members and other Regions of the SWB HIDTA. The West Texas Region, along with the other SWB HIDTA Regions, is responding to a growing level of violence that impacts the U.S. side of the border with Mexico. The five SWB HIDTA regions are increasingly interacting with each other to ensure critical trends and intelligence information are shared. The West Texas Intelligence and Investigative Support Center is within the Federal Building in El Paso with all Federal, State, and local partners. Information that is gathered here is shared with the other Regions of the SWB and with EPIC. West Texas continues to monitor the violence occurring south of the border and has been effective in assisting its participating State and local partners.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, the SWB HIDTA/WTX Region identified 247 DTOs, of which it expected to disrupt 136, and disrupted or dismantled 134 DTOs compared to 149 the prior year. This decrease is attributed to the fact that larger, more complex DTOs were targeted where the greatest positive impact can be achieved. Disrupting or dismantling a large complex DTO generally takes longer than stopping a street level operation, but can substantially reduce the illicit drug trade.

# Washington/Baltimore HIDTA – Designated in 1994 Executive Director – Thomas Carr

#### **PURPOSE AND GOALS**

The mission of the Washington/Baltimore (W/B) HIDTA is to improve interagency collaboration, promote the sharing of accurate and timely information and intelligence, and provide specialized training and other resources to W/B HIDTA participating law enforcement and treatment/ criminal justice agencies. This will enhance their ability to provide superior services and meet their performance targets. Through its state-of-the-art IISC, its highly trained and skilled professional staff will utilize the HIDTA Performance Management Process to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA initiatives throughout the W/B HIDTA region and, when practical, in other areas of the country. The aim of the initiatives is to disrupt and dismantle DTOs and money laundering operations, prosecute traffickers, and seize their drugs and profits.

#### **STRATEGY**

The W/B HIDTA will continue to foster cooperation and effective working relationships with the 107 Federal, State, and local agencies that participate in the HIDTA program. Information and intelligence sharing are becoming a routine practice due to the efforts of the W/B HIDTA participating agencies. The implementation of the HIDTA Gang Intelligence System, used to track criminal gangs, and the use of Case Explorer, HIDTA's case management system, will continue to facilitate information and intelligence sharing. These systems will aid W/B HIDTA's intelligence-driven initiatives to dismantle and disrupt DTOs, while W/B HIDTA's treatment and prevention initiatives will continue to reduce the demand for drugs in the region.

#### **LOCATION**

The W/B HIDTA operates out of Greenbelt, Maryland. The 14 counties and 5 cities that comprise the HIDTA region include:

- The District of Columbia;
- Maryland: Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Charles, Howard, Montgomery, Prince George's (City of Baltimore); and
- Virginia: Arlington, Chesterfield, Fairfax, Loudoun, Hanover, Henrico, Prince George, Prince William, (City of Alexandria, City of Petersburg, and City of Richmond)

#### **INITIATIVES**

The W/B HIDTA has 47 initiatives, which include 1 management, 2 network support, 1 training, 2 intelligence, 4 prevention, 12 treatment, 3 prosecution, and 22 investigation initiatives.

#### SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

YEAR	DTOs Expected to be Disrupted/ Dismantled	Target Return on Investment: Assets	Target Return on Investment: Drugs	Number of Deconflictions Expected to be Submitted	Number of Investigations Expected to be Provided Analytical Support	Number of Initiative Leads Expected to be Referred
2009	141	6	5	15,500	215	434

#### THREAT ASSESSMENT

The primary drug threats to the W/B HIDTA region remain crack cocaine, cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and pharmaceuticals. Methamphetamine is readily available in the region; however, the level of production in the HIDTA region has never been significant. The W/B HIDTA region has been primarily a consumer market, and drugs entering the area have typically been routed through another area, especially New York. Evidence suggests this pattern is changing. More cases indicate drugs are coming into the region through hubs in North Carolina and Georgia from the U.S. Southwest border. Drug money laundering has been, and continues to be, of significant concern, and there is conclusive proof that terrorist activities are linked to money laundering operations in the region. In addition, criminal street gangs, many of which are involved in the drug trade, have quickly multiplied. The W/B HIDTA has documented over 277 gangs and 7,401 gang members operating throughout the region.

#### **INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES**

The IISC was reorganized for 2010 by merging the Investigative Support Initiative with the Investigative Intelligence Initiative. The IISC is composed of two units: the Watch Center Unit and the Investigative Intelligence Unit. This initiative is designed to improve the ability of HIDTA enforcement, treatment/criminal justice and prevention initiatives to counter drug trafficking and use in the Washington/Baltimore region by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information and intelligence that is accurate, detailed, and timely. This initiative facilitates the sharing of information and investigative intelligence among Federal, State, and local members of HIDTA initiatives, and their participating agencies. Analysts from both units, as well as those housed in other initiatives, meet monthly to exchange information, discuss best practices, and support each others' tactical, operational, and strategic efforts.

Formed in 1995, the Investigative Intelligence Unit (IIU) is designed to improve the ability of HIDTA enforcement initiatives to counter drug trafficking in the Washington/Baltimore region by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating investigative intelligence that is accurate, detailed, and timely. This initiative facilitates the sharing of investigative intelligence among Federal, State, and local members of all HIDTA initiatives and/or agencies. Intelligence Analysts use automated Federal and State law enforcement indices, PenLink, and I2 Analyst Notebook to assist in case support. The principal nature of investigative support involves communication analysis. The initiative provides operational intelligence support to investigations conducted by the HIDTA enforcement initiatives or their agencies. This includes time-sensitive analysis for all HIDTA initiative requesters of Dialed Number

Recorders, subpoenaed IIU information, pager and clone pager data, seized documents, and financial data. The IIU is part of the IISC and routinely interacts with the Watch Center Initiative.

The Watch Unit (WU) at the W/B HIDTA has been funded since 1995 and has evolved through time to meet the ever-changing needs of law enforcement, treatment providers, and prevention agencies within the region. The mission of the WU is to provide strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence that HIDTA initiatives and HIDTA-participating agencies can use to identify the regional drug threat, set priority enforcement targets, facilitate the disruption of the market for illegal drugs, and help measure the performance of all HIDTA initiatives. This is accomplished by developing and maintaining a cadre of skilled analysts, allocating analytical resources in the most effective and efficient manner among the units within the WU, and working in close coordination with all applicable HIDTA initiatives and participating agencies.

In an effort to support the overall HIDTA goals, the specific goal of the W/B HIDTA WU is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the W/B HIDTA initiatives by assisting in the identification of DTOs and MLOs for the purpose of dismantlement and disruption.

#### TASK FORCES OPERATING IN THE HIDTA REGION

TASK FORCES	LOCATIONS
Baltimore DEA Heroin Initiative (HIDTA)	Baltimore, MD
Baltimore Diversion Initiative (HIDTA)	Baltimore, MD
Baltimore Seaport Initiative (HIDTA)	Baltimore, MD
Baltimore Special Investigation Group (HIDTA)	Baltimore, MD
Capital Area Regional Fugitive Task Force (HIDTA)	Greenbelt, MD
DEA Cross Border Initiative (HIDTA)	Washington, DC
Drug Money Laundering Initiative (HIDTA)	Baltimore, MD
Delivery Systems Parcel Interdiction Initiative (HIDTA)	Baltimore, MD
Major Drug Traffickers Initiative (HIDTA)	Baltimore, MD
Major Offenders Initiative (HIDTA)	Washington, DC
Mass Transportation Initiative (HIDTA)	Baltimore, MD
Northern Virginia Drug Initiative (HIDTA)	Annandale, VA
Northern Virginia Drug Money Laundering Initiative (HIDTA)	Annandale, VA
Northern Virginia Gang Initiative (HIDTA)	Manassas, VA
Northern Virginia Mass Transportation Initiative (HIDTA)	Washington, DC
Northern VA Regional Drug Initiative (HIDTA)	Annandale, VA
Northern Virginia SAR Initiative (HIDTA)	Annandale, VA
Open Air Drug Market Initiative (HIDTA)	Southern MD
Prince George's Safe Streets Initiative (HIDTA)	Beltsville, MD
Metropolitan Area Drug Task Force (HIDTA)	Beltsville, MD
Montgomery County Safe Streets Initiative (HIDTA)	Montgomery County, MD

Regional Airport Drug Interdiction Initiative (HIDTA)	VA
Richmond Metropolitan Drug Initiative (HIDTA)	Richmond, VA
Southern Maryland Interdiction Initiative (HIDTA)	Southern MD
Southern Maryland Major Conspiracy Initiative (HIDTA)	Greenbelt, MD
Strategic Task Force of Narcotics and Guns Initiative (HIDTA)	Washington, DC
Violent Crime Safe Street Initiative (HIDTA)	Baltimore, MD
Violent Traffickers Initiative (HIDTA)	Baltimore, MD
Washington Area Gang Initiative (HIDTA)	Washington, DC
Weapons Enforcement Initiative (HIDTA)	Baltimore, Maryland

#### TASK FORCE COORDINATION

All Federally funded drug enforcement task forces in the HIDTA region that specifically target illegal drugs are funded by the HIDTA program. The W/B HIDTA has taken a leadership role in ensuring coordination and cooperation, as well as information sharing among all task forces and drug units operating throughout the HIDTA region. Intelligence products are routinely distributed to all task forces and drug units through the W/B HIDTA IISC. The W/B HIDTA is electronically linked to the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC), which is focused on the terrorist threat to the region. Any information related to the terrorist threat is immediately forwarded electronically to the MCAC. Likewise, MCAC forwards drug related information to the IISC.

All task forces are eligible to use the HIDTA event and case deconfliction services. Those receiving HIDTA funding are mandated to use W/B HIDTA's Case Explorer software for case deconfliction. All drug task forces receiving HIDTA funds are also mandated to use NINJA for event deconfliction.

All drug task forces are eligible to share information with the W/B HIDTA IISC and NDIC Field Specialists on a regular, informal basis. Agencies within the HIDTA region are formally solicited annually to provide information about the drug threat to the region in the HIDTA's Threat Assessment Survey. Additionally, W/B HIDTA's Gang Intelligence System is available to all agencies in Maryland, the District of Columbia, and Virginia. This system allows participating agencies to share gang data as well as drug data.

#### HIDTA EVALUATION

The HIDTA has taken the lead in the Priority Drug Investigations Project and has been the impetus for new and enhanced efforts at technology-supported, intelligence-lead policing.

HIDTAs reduce drug availability by targeting, disrupting, or dismantling major DTOs; arresting and prosecuting traffickers; and seizing their drugs and profits. In 2008, HIDTA initiatives identified 368 DTOs operating in the W/B HIDTA area. Whereas it expected to dismantle or disrupt 124 DTOs, the HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 148 DTOs in 2008, compared to 139 the prior year.

#### APPENDIX A

# The Domestic Highway Enforcement (DHE) Strategy – Leveraging Diverse Intelligence Components

The mission of the DHE Strategy is to promote collaborative, intelligence-led, unbiased policing in coordinated and mutually supportive multi-jurisdictional law enforcement efforts on the Nation's highways. The DHE Strategy both improves the investigative efforts of the HIDTAs in attacking drug trafficking organizations, and has significant impact on traffic safety, homeland security, and criminal activity.

Essential to the effectiveness of this effort is a focus on the collection of intelligence, sharing that information, developing powerful analytical tools, and communication among analysts and operators.

The key components of this effort are:

<u>DHE Public Safety Corridor Projects:</u> The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) has identified eight major transportation corridors throughout the United States. Representatives from the State Police and Patrols on each of these corridors participate in monthly DHE conference calls with intelligence analysts from the HIDTA Intelligence and Investigative Support Centers (IISC), the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), the National Guard, Canadian authorities, NDIC, and Federal law enforcement. These calls are an active exchange of trends, intelligence, best practices, and shared plans along the range of public safety issues on these vital commercial and travel routes.

**<u>El Paso Intelligence Center:</u>** EPIC is a principal partner in the DHE strategy. The Center provides:

- The National Seizure System (NSS) is the core repository for information relating to seizures accomplished by DHE operators, along with seizures reported by other State, local, and Federal agencies. This information and intelligence is analyzed at EPIC and by HIDTA IISCs, State Fusion Centers, and others giving the fullest picture of criminal activity trends and patterns. EPIC coordinates with other data systems such as the HIDTA Internet Based Information System (HIBIS), Arizona Cop Share, and the Department of Homeland Security's Blue Lightening Operations Centers (BLOC), and Air and Marine Operations Centers (AMOC) to build a complete and timely central repository for critical information.
- The DHE community serves as a platform for sharing intelligence analysis, situation reports, and posting and sharing operations (to promote the best possible deployment and efficiency of resources) and for maintaining contact lists for the representatives of all 48 States active in the DHE Strategy.
- The Predictive Intelligence Unit provides a high level of analysis of patterns and trends along major sections of the transportation corridors essential to maximizing the deployment of operational personnel and identifying key trends.

- The Tactical Information Notification capability leverages the EPIC watch, enabling operators to communicate real time "roadside to roadside" intelligence to other operators throughout the United States.
- Analytical tools that enable regional and local analysts to effectively evaluate the information at EPIC to develop actionable intelligence for their area of responsibility.
- DHE Convoy is a new effort partnering with the United States Department of Transportation in the development of intelligence concerning criminal activity relating to commercial motor vehicle carriers.
- The EPIC Watch is available around-the-clock to respond to agents and officers providing vital officer safety information and key intelligence to operators.

<u>National Drug Intelligence Center:</u> NDIC provides critical threat assessments vital to determining large-scale patterns of activity, and also supports its mission and strategy by the deployment of Strategic Debriefing Teams to support DHE operations. These teams are an asset to ensure key intelligence information is captured, analyzed, and shared.

<u>National Guard Bureau:</u> The National Guard funds nine analysts who work in the Regional Coordinating Center HIDTAs and support a regional analytical and information sharing function.

Regional Coordinating Committees (RCC): The DHE Strategy is managed at a regional level by one of the HIDTA directors serving as the chair of the RCC in each of the nine defined areas. The RCC is composed of two representatives from each of the States in that region and meets regularly to promote communication, assess needs, and facilitate collaborative planning and mutual support among the law enforcement agencies involved in the Strategy. A HIDTA director (currently Atlanta) serves as the National Chair and one (soon to be two) full-time coordinator is funded to oversee the Strategy. Each year, a national conference brings together the analysts, RCC personnel, and representatives from Federal law enforcement in an active information sharing and planning conference that shapes the next year's goals and objectives.

HIDTA IISCs: The Intelligence and Investigative Support Centers provide the localized analysis, ensure the capture and flow of intelligence and information to EPIC and the other DHE partners, and form the critical part of making sure information is both flowing and serving the needs of the law enforcement operational personnel who carry out the Strategy. The HIDTA IISCs are at the core of turning information into the identification of involved drug trafficking organizations, which guides the investigative efforts to successfully disrupt and dismantle them. The IISCs are also vital to identifying the linkages between activity in one HIDTA area and that in others, promoting coordination among the HIDTAs and other agencies to ensure the full scope of criminal activity is identified and acted upon.

#### APPENDIX B

### The Northwest HIDTA's Northern Border Efforts: Fueled By Intelligence and Sustained By Cooperation

The Washington-Canada border serves as a major transshipment point for drugs, illicit proceeds, and precursors. Washington State's topography and location render it susceptible to drug smuggling and production. The Washington section of the U.S.-Canada border is approximately 430 miles in length, with 13 official ports of entry (POE). A significant portion of this international border is located in remote, dense forest. Remote expanses of public land are susceptible to many types of drug-related criminal activities, from methamphetamine production to large-scale cannabis cultivation. Public lands that are adjacent to the U.S.-Canada border also serve as routes for drug, precursor chemical, and currency smuggling. Most of the area on both sides of the U.S.-Canada border is sparsely populated and encompassed by densely forested public lands, where crossing the border can be accomplished without detection. Other threats to the United States' northern border include illegal alien entry and threats relating to terrorist activities.

DEA's Federal-wide Drug Seizure System (FDSS) data indicates that Washington ranked first in the Nation (based on dosage unit) for Federal seizures of MDMA for the last five years. Intelligence indicates, however, that much of the MDMA originates in Canada and is being shipped through the State to other markets. Seizures at the U. S.–Canada border increased ninefold over the last four years. Additionally, in 2008 a Northwest HIDTA initiative conducted a seizure of 203,897 dosage units of the stimulant Benzylpiperazine (BZP) at the U.S.-Canada border. Many of these drugs are sold and abused by middle class, suburban, young adults at raves, nightclubs, and on college campuses. The 42-mile stretch of the far western edge of the Washington–Canada border, which encompasses the Blaine Sector, is the primary shipment point. This region contains the main I-5 corridor entry point between Washington and Canada, thus naturally generating the most seizures over other entry points. Various DTOs manufacture MDMA in Canada and subsequently transport it across the border through Washington State, destined for markets throughout the country.

Law enforcement officials in Bellingham, Blaine, Everson, Lynden, Mount Vernon, and Sumas—cities located near the U.S.-Canada border—report the smuggling of Canada-produced marijuana into and through their jurisdictions is a significant problem. The Puget Sound is a staging area for the transportation of marijuana from Canada into other areas of the United States. Marijuana produced in Canada is often exchanged for cocaine or weapons, which are then smuggled across the border into Canada. Since the Pacific Northwest is a major staging ground for cocaine smuggling into Canada, transporters have changed their methods in efforts to elude law enforcement. Commercial vehicles are subject to Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) screenings at the border, which can detect drugs hidden inside vehicles. Since private vehicles are not usually subject to VACIS screenings and cocaine transportation does not necessitate large concealment areas, criminals can transport significantly profitable amounts of cocaine inside private vehicles. Powder cocaine is transported into Washington, destined for drug markets in other States and Canada. Transportation routes for cocaine in Washington include I-5 to Canada, and I-90 and U.S. 2, which connects Washington to Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, and States farther east. In February 2008, during a secondary inspection of a

northbound commercial tractor-trailer at the Pacific Highway, British Columbia POE, Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) identified what was the largest cocaine seizure—334 pounds or 152 kilos—ever made by CBSA in the Pacific Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET) region. Since 2006, 9 out of the 10 largest cocaine seizures have occurred at either the Pacific Highway or the Lynden/Aldergrove POEs. Commercial trucks accounted for six of the cocaine seizures, but the two largest (each over 200 kilos) were found on SUVs.

A report published in 2007 by NDIC estimated that Canadian-based DTOs generate between \$5.2 billion and \$21.2 billion in illicit funds annually from wholesale distribution of marijuana and MDMA. These funds are transported across the international border, with heavy traffic in the Washington region. Increased scrutiny at U.S.-Canada border POE on Interstate 5 has caused traffickers to find more remote crossings to the east and to utilize aircraft to move greater quantities of high-potency marijuana to the U.S. There is some evidence to suggest these groups may be moving their operations into Washington State to avoid enhanced border security and scrutiny. According to the Northwest HIDTA Threat Assessment, Asian criminal groups, predominantly of Vietnamese or Chinese decent, have moved indoor marijuana grow operations into the United States and into Washington State, predominantly into King, Pierce, and Snohomish counties. These grows are capable of producing the same high-potency marijuana as produced in Canada. By placing the grow operations inside the United States, the traffickers have not only subverted the dangers of smuggling across the international border, but made distribution of the marijuana across the United States vastly simpler.

Bi-national, multi-agency intelligence has confirmed that DTOs are using small helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and float planes to traffic narcotics in and out of the U.S. in Eastern Washington, Idaho, and Western Montana. Typically, these DTOs are trafficking Marijuana and MDMA southbound from Canada into the U.S., while sending cocaine and currency back into Canada. Various sources of intelligence indicate that a typical DTO can move multiple loads a day, each load weighing from 150 pounds to as much as 400 pounds, several days a week during peak activity periods. DEA's "Operation Blade Runner" during the spring of 2009 is a clear example of the continuing threat. "Blade Runner" was a sting operation, (based on a State and local traffic stop) conducted against one of these DTOs that resulted in nine arrests, the initial seizure of two helicopters, and over 900 pounds of drugs valued at \$13 million.

Since 2004, law enforcement agencies operating on or near the border have seen a significant increase in reports of suspicious aircraft activity along the U.S.-Canada border particularly in Eastern Washington and Northern Idaho. In an area roughly defined as being between Oroville, Washington and Eureka, Montana, there are substantially more reports of suspect aircraft than anywhere else along the Northern border. It is believed that this area is preferred by air smugglers primarily because of terrain features that make electronic detection difficult (i.e., deep canyons in which aircraft can fly) and easy ground ingress/egress routes in this area. Reports of cross-border air traffic in the Pacific Northwest have increased significantly from 2004 to 2008, with a total of 200 suspicious sightings reported during FY 2008. Bi-national law enforcement agencies believe a considerable amount of this smuggling goes undetected, and until sufficient law enforcement resources are brought to bear in this area, the DTOs will likely continue, and potentially expand, their air smuggling operations.

Northwest HIDTA Border Task Force: The Northwest HIDTA Border Task Force (NWHBTF) is an interdiction and investigative initiative with a mission to dismantle and disrupt targeted cross-border drug trafficking organizations through the seizure of drugs, assets, and prosecutions. The NWHBTF is a joint Federal, State, and local effort with three distinct components, including joint U.S.-Canada staffed intelligence (Pacific Integrated Border Intelligence Team (IBIT)), law enforcement (IBET-Land and IBET-Air/Marine) teams, and a prosecution unit.

Intelligence and Investigative Support Center: The Northwest HIDTA Intelligence and Investigative Support Center (IISC) provides HIDTA-wide intelligence and information sharing to the Northwest HIDTA initiatives. The primary task of the IISC is to provide analytical support and intelligence information services to the HIDTA task forces and participating agencies in the HIDTA region and the U.S.-Canada border area. The Northwest HIDTA IISC also coordinates activities and shares intelligence with the Pacific IBIT, which is an intelligence unit that is part of the Northwest HIDTA Border Task Force in Blaine, Washington.

<u>Domestic Highway Enforcement Initiative:</u> The Pacific Northwest Domestic Highway Enforcement (PNW DHE) program is an effective tool aimed toward the disruption of drugtransportation and the distribution elements of drug trafficking organizations. This initiative outlines a vast operational area, which will encompass the major highway corridors used for the transportation of drugs not only in Washington State, but also in the Pacific Northwest region of the U.S., to include Idaho, Montana, and Oregon.

The NW HIDTA Director, as the Regional Coordinator, established a Regional Coordination Committee (RCC) to oversee the DHE Strategy in the area. In addition, the Northwest HIDTA has a dedicated HIDTA analyst who collects all subject, event, and seizure data gleaned from the enforcement efforts of this initiative, the results of which are shared with law enforcement in the region.

Integrated Border and Marine Enforcement Teams: These teams are strategically placed along the border and combine their efforts in gathering and sharing critical information to maintain a safe border. There are 23 teams in 15 regions covering the entire U.S.-Canada border, working with partners at the Federal, Provincial/State, and local levels to ensure border security. IBETs focus on criminals and terrorists who may attempt to cross the U.S.-Canada border. The two countries conduct comprehensive training programs for IBET personnel, from both the United States and Canada, to enhance their awareness and understanding of one another's laws and regulations. IBETs are an excellent example of U.S.-Canada law enforcement agencies working together to protect the common border.

Joint Enforcement Coordination/ Project North Star: The ninth annual U.S.-Canada Cross-Border Crime Forum (CBCF) took place in Ashville, NC, in the fall of 2006. Both countries signed an agreement at that time that allows for the electronic exchange of ballistics information between the two countries. The participants at previous CBCFs also reiterated the importance of the role of Project North Star. Since becoming formally aligned with the CBCF in early 2001, the role of Project North Star as a mechanism for joint law enforcement coordination has been significantly enhanced. Project North Star will continue to identify and prioritize joint obstacles for law enforcement at the border, bring these obstacles to policy makers at the U.S.-Canada

CBCF for resolution, and work to increase and establish new, joint representation of the American and Canadian law enforcement community at the bi-national, regional, and local levels.

<u>Shiprider Agreement:</u> The recently concluded Shiprider agreement provides a new tool for law enforcement cooperation by providing trans-border law enforcement authority to Canadian law enforcement operating along and across the border. During the trial operation in 2007, the U.S. Coast Guard and RCMP officers worked together on maritime law enforcement issues in the Strait of Juan de Fuca and other inland marine waters.

The Strait of Juan de Fuca represents the longest continuous U.S. international maritime border. Many parts of this region are remote, while others have an extremely high density of small vessel traffic. Smuggling of marijuana, ecstasy, and cocaine abounds in this region. Smugglers in the Northwest are highly resourceful and have recently taken to smuggling by helicopter in remote regions and using sophisticated hidden compartments in land vehicles. As the United States works to mitigate these land-based smuggling routes, maritime smuggling may rise.

Initiatives such as IBETs have helped stem cross-border threats. For example, the Coast Guard established a camera in an isolated, strategic location, and allowed Canada to access and operate the camera. Operation Shiprider, an IBET program that teamed U.S. and Canadian law enforcement officers to man law enforcement vessels and enforce each nation's laws, has proven to be a successful method to address threats along the international maritime border. As part of this program, the Coast Guard received a request from the Government of Canada to participate in cross-border cooperative Shiprider operations in support of the 2010 Vancouver Olympics.

# In addition to enforcement and intelligence initiatives, the following describes meetings in which NW HIDTA participates on a regular basis that deal with Northern border issues:

- The Northwest HIDTA Director and representatives from U.S.-Canada law enforcement attend the bi-monthly Joint Management Team for the Pacific IBIT.
- The Northwest HIDTA Director and representatives from U.S.-Canada law enforcement attend the semi-annual Project North Star Regional Coordination Group-Pacific Conference.
- A Northwest HIDTA analyst attends a monthly Northern Border intelligence-sharing meeting.
- In December 2007, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Washington State Patrol and others sponsored a symposium for police and law enforcement agencies in Washington State titled, "Integrated Best Practices to Combat Marijuana Grow-Operations: British Columbia Case Study."
- In October 2007, the NW HIDTA Director facilitated an initial meeting of Pacific Coast Chiefs to include the Royal Canadian Mounted Police on traffic safety and training issues as well as the Domestic Highway Enforcement program.

#### APPENDIX C

# The Appalachia HIDTA & the South Florida HIDTA: A Case Study In Cooperation

The State of Kentucky has had a tremendous prescription drug abuse problem for many years. In 2000, Kentucky became one of the first States to institute a prescription drug monitoring system. The Kentucky All Schedule Prescription Electronic Reporting (KASPER) system has been the national model for prescription drug monitoring. As time progressed, many in Kentucky who abused prescription medication found it necessary to travel out of State to obtain their drugs, due to the KASPER system.

Beginning in early 2008, Kentucky drug investigators began noticing an increasing number of Florida prescription medications during their investigations. The problem seemed to be increasing exponentially over a short period of time. In addition, over the past few years, Kentucky officials saw a marked increase in the number of overdose deaths.

In late 2008, Kentucky investigators began contacting authorities in South Florida, clearly the main source of the prescriptions, to coordinate some of the investigations. After research into the issue, it was discovered that there was a drastically growing number of pain management clinics appearing in the three Florida counties of Broward, Dade and Palm Beach (currently over 160 in these three counties alone). With analytical assistance from DEA, it was further discovered that the top 50 oxycodone distributors in the Nation were located in Florida.

In December 2008, ONDCP staff, members of the South Florida HIDTA, and members of the Appalachia HIDTA met in London, KY for an in-depth discussion of the issue, which included identifying the threat and the course of action to address the problem. ONDCP provided discretionary funding to both the South Florida HIDTA and Appalachia HIDTA, and a plan of action was developed. It was decided that both HIDTAs would work as a team and would focus on the four most egregious clinics in South Florida by developing investigations in Kentucky of DTOs traveling to Florida to obtain and traffic the drugs.

In early 2009, several Kentucky DTOs were identified and found to be transporting as many as 15-18 people to South Florida on a monthly basis. The sponsors were paying all expenses (hotel, food, etc.) for their cooperators and, after their return to Kentucky, they would take half of the drugs or, in some cases, purchase the entire amount from the cooperator. DTOs were then identified and targeted. Some had GPS tracking devices placed on their vehicle in Florida and were tracked back to Kentucky, where traffic stops were then conducted. For others, controlled buys were made and search warrants conducted on their residences. Many of these individuals cooperated with investigators and became cooperating witnesses in the case, while others became cooperating informants. This method of investigation proved to be successful, and continued for several months.

In April of 2009, Florida Global Medical, in Plantation, FL, became the primary focus for the Kentucky investigators. A cooperating informant was told by the physician that they could bring along friends and that they would be provided prescriptions as well.

On October 28, 2009, 60 Federal arrest warrants were executed in both Florida and Kentucky. Warrants were executed on the clinic owners as well as physicians. More were executed on DTOs in Kentucky that were utilizing Florida Global Medical as their source of drugs. In addition to the Federal arrest warrants that were executed, nearly 500 additional State warrants were executed in the State of Kentucky on individuals who had been traveling to Florida and returning to Kentucky to sell the drugs. This was the largest single arrest effort undertaken in the State of Kentucky. As of April 2010, the case was still active in State and Federal court systems (U.S. Attorneys' Office for the Eastern District of Kentucky).

#### APPENDIX D

# The New England HIDTA Intelligence and Investigative Support Center and the State of Massachusetts Commonwealth Fusion Center: A Successful Integration

It was recognized by all affected partners that the Intelligence and Investigative Support Center (IISC) envisioned by the Executive Board at the inception of the New England HIDTA (NEHIDTA) in 1999 was not the one that existed in 2007. The mission of the IISC remained constant, while, over the years, the dedication of appropriate manpower by New England law enforcement to achieve its mission declined. This was due to many reasons, to include the ripple effect that the events of September 11, 2001 had on the finite resources of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Massachusetts State Police (MSP), co-managers of the IISC.

NEHIDTA's Management & Coordination met with both co-managers to remind them of the level of commitment necessary to ensure a viable IISC. Suggestions as to how to employ best practices utilized by other IISCs were provided. After considerable thought, the FBI and the MSP suggested a collocation of the IISC to the State of Massachusetts Commonwealth Fusion Center (CFC) would be most appropriate. MSP managed the CFC and the FBI was mandated to have a full-time presence in it. It was believed the IISC employing the HIDTA principles of collocation, cooperation, coordination, and communication would thrive at the CFC.

The input, counsel, and approval of the NEHIDTA Executive Board was sought every step of the way. The NEHIDTA Executive Board approved an initial feasibility study of the move. Following a presentation by the CFC commander, the NEHIDTA Executive Board approved the relocation plan and the required budget adjustments for the move. They also authorized a lease renegotiation, reflecting the move from rented space to the rent-free CFC.

After a 14 month effort, the NEHIDTA IISC has fully relocated to the CFC. The obvious benefits of the move include:

- Leveraging of law enforcement resources;
- Increase in IISC/CFC productivity;
- Enhanced mission focus; and
- Elimination of duplicative entities/efforts

The less-obvious benefits, but those having the most long-term, positive aspects, include:

- Enhanced Federal, State, and local law enforcement familiarity and collaboration;
- Resource sharing;
- Increase in availability and access of multiple databases; and
- Increased financial efficiency.

ONDCP is developing a strategy to mirror this successful partnership across the county.