

X ~~DRAFT~~ TECHNICAL REPORT

ARREST CONVICTABILITY AS A MEASURE OF POLICE PERFORMANCE

- PART ONE -

THE REPLICATION ANALYSES

AUGUST 15, 1980(R)



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INTRODUCTION

Of the many crime control tools available to the police, the arrest--the decision to invoke the criminal process--is perhaps the most visible and the most controversial. The arrest has long been used to measure police performance. This has been done in terms of both arrest frequency and the rate at which offenses are cleared by arrest. These measures, however, have come under sharp attack, principally because they ignore arrest quality and related due process considerations.

According to Murphy (1975):

> Many of the arrests police make are of poor quality. This is the natural result when too much stress is laid upon number of arrests and not quality. In far too many instances, police arrests fail to pass the court's determination of probable cause at arraignment.

A similar point has been made by the American Bar Association (1973):

> Even though the prevention of crime and the apprehension of offenders must be a primary responsibility of the police, the use of arrest as a measurement of performance without inquiring into the quality of the arrest or the ultimate disposition of the case is improper. To measure the quality of police performance based upon the number of arrests made is analogous to measuring the performance of a doctor on the basis of the number of operations performed--without any regard for the need for the operation or for its success.

The close relationship between arrest quality and the objective of due process has been described in a Rand (1970) report:

> Within the criminal justice system, the police function is to identify and arrest suspected offenders and gather evidence for the final determination of legal

innocence or guilt. A supporter of the Due Process Model would hold that, all other factors being equal, an arrest that leads to conviction is more valuable than an arrest that does not, since only in the former is legal guilt established and the criminal sanction properly applied. A more extreme proponent of the Due Process Model might even argue that an arrest that does not lead to conviction inflicts a net cost on society since the defendant is liable to feel some undesirable effects even though he is not legally guilty.

A common, but clearly unacceptable, rejoinder to these criticisms is that the police are responsible for the arrest and the prosecutor for the conviction, i.e., the police cannot materially influence conviction rates. It is evident that the goals of the police and prosecutor are as similar as those of any two components of the criminal justice system. Both aim to remove the offender from the street, deter others from committing crime, and preserve public order.

Yet it is all too clear that the police and prosecutor are not as closely aligned in pursuit of their common goals as they could be. The police have traditionally viewed their crime control responsibilities in terms of simply making arrests, rather than in terms of making arrests that hold up in court. And the prosecutors, often burdened with enormous case loads, have viewed their responsibilities in terms of convicting only those defendants whose cases survive the mass-dismissal phenomenon that occurs between arrest and adjudication.

A. FINDINGS FROM INSLAW'S EARLIER STUDY

What Happens After Arrest?, an INSLAW study of police operations in the District of Columbia, found that the police can be a crucial determinant of what happens after the arrest. The study analyzed 14,865 adult arrests made by the District of

Columbia's Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) and presented for prosecution to the Superior Court Division of the United States Attorney's Office in 1974. (In the District of Columbia, the U.S. Attorney is the prosecutor of common law offenses--all felonies and most serious misdemeanors.)

The data source was the Prosecutor's Management Information System (PROMIS), which has been operating in the U.S. Attorney's Office since 1971 and which records up to 250 pieces of information on each arrest from the time the arrest is presented for screening until it is disposed of by some means. A focal point of the analysis was the impact on arrest convictability of three items recorded in PROMIS: the recovery of tangible evidence, the securing of witnesses, and the span of time that elapses between the offense and the arrest.

One of the principal findings of the study was that when the arresting officer manages to recover tangible evidence, the prosecution is more likely to convict the defendant:

> We find that the arrests that wash out of the court tend to be supported by less evidence at the time the case is brought to the prosecutor than those that end in conviction. When tangible evidence, such as stolen property and weapons, is recovered by the police, the number of convictions per 100 arrests is 60 percent higher in robberies ..., 25 percent higher in other violent crimes ..., and 36 percent higher in nonviolent property offenses.... (p. 42)

Another finding concerned the value of witnesses: "When the police manage to bring more cooperative witnesses to the prosecutor, the probability of conviction is significantly enhanced for both violent and property crimes" (p. 42). A related finding concerned the relationship of the victim and the arrestee, i.e., whether they were strangers, related, or otherwise known to one another.

> Related to the role of witnesses is our finding that a conviction was much more likely to occur in an arrest in which the victim and arrestee did not know one another prior to the occurrence of the offense. This holds for robberies, other violent crimes, and nonviolent property offenses.... A deeper insight into this result can be obtained by examining the rate at which the prosecutor rejected or dismissed cases due to witness problems; we find the rate of rejection due specifically to witness problems, such as failure to appear in court, to be substantially higher for offenses that were not recorded as stranger-to-stranger episodes.... (p. 43)

A third major finding concerned the length of time between the offense and the arrest: "When the police are able to make the arrest soon after the offense--especially in robberies, larcenies and burglaries--tangible evidence is more often recovered and conviction is ... more likely" (p. 89). This finding is more complex and more qualified than the other two:

> We find that another feature of the arrest influences the likelihood that the arrestee will be convicted--the length of the delay between the time of the offense and the time of the arrest. We find this delay to be longest in robberies, with 55 percent of the arrests made more than 30 minutes after the offense. The conviction rate for robbery arrests--especially the stranger-to-stranger arrests--declines steadily as the delay grows longer. In stranger-to-stranger robbery episodes, 40 percent of all persons arrested within 30 minutes of the offense were convicted; for the suspects apprehended between 30 minutes and 24 hours after the occurrence of the offense, the conviction rate was 32 percent; for arrests that followed the occurrence of the crime by at least 24 hours, the conviction rate was only 23 percent....
>
> To the extent that arrest promptness does increase the conviction rate, it appears to do so largely out of the enhanced ability of the police to recover tangible evidence when the delay is short. In stranger-to-stranger robbery episodes, recovery of evidence is more than twice as likely when the arrest is made within 30 minutes of the occurrence of the offense than when it is made at least 24 hours later.... This pattern is similar for violent offenses other than robbery ... and somewhat less extreme in the case of nonviolent property offenses....

> While prompt arrest may sometimes yield more witnesses, the data indicate that more witnesses are especially common in those arrests in which the delay between the offense and the arrest is longer than five minutes.... This is likely to reflect the fact that crimes are usually committed without many witnesses; prompt arrests are primarily a result of the proximity of the police, not the existence of several witnesses. When an offender does commit an offense in the presence of two or more witnesses, he is more likely to be apprehended, but rarely within five minutes. The additional support of witnesses in cases involving longer delay was reflected also by our finding that in arrests for violent offenses (including robbery) the prosecutor rejected or dismissed cases due to witness problems at a significantly lower rate when the delay was long.... (p. 43)

The study also looked at a number of police officer characteristics in an effort to determine whether differences in performance among officers were influenced by officers' personal characteristics.

The data set included the following characteristics: age, sex, years of experience on the force, marital status, and residence (within or outside of the District). The principal finding concerned officers' experience:

> While more experienced officers tend to produce more convictions and have higher conviction rates than officers with less time on the force ... the other characteristics in the data--age, sex, residence, and marital status--are, at best, only mild predictors of an officer's ability to produce arrests that become convictions. (p. 55)

Despite this finding of little association between officer characteristics and conviction rates, the analysis did reveal another kind of association between officers and conviction rates: "Over half of the 4,347 MPD arrests [adult felonies and serious misdemeanors] made in 1974 that ended in conviction were made by as few as 368 officers--15 percent of all the officers who made arrests, and 8 percent of the entire force"

(p. 48). (Thirty-one percent of all MPD officers who made arrests [the total number of arresting officers was 2,418] made no arrests that led to conviction.) The finding for felony arrests only was equally compelling: over half of those 2,047 arrests that ended in conviction were made by "a handful of 249 officers" (p. 48).

Regarding the concern about quantity of arrests versus quality, noted above, the conviction rate for the arrests made by the 368 high arrest-convictability officers was 36 percent, considerably higher than the 24 percent averaged by the other MPD officers who made arrests in 1974. The study concluded: "It is evident that the officers who produced the most convictions did not do so merely by making numerous arrests" (p. 48).

B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study is twofold: (1) to replicate in other jurisdictions the basic aspects of the earlier study of police operations in the District of Columbia, which found that some officers make adult felony and serious misdemeanor arrests that are systematically more likely to lead to conviction than the arrests of other officers; and (2) to conduct further research--largely through intensive interviews in two sites--into the extent to which officer characteristics and special work-related techniques influence the performance of individual police officers--in particular their ability to recover physical evidence and to locate and maintain the cooperation of lay witnesses.

One part of the study is a straightforward replication. The other is an effort to go beyond the earlier study in an attempt to uncover which factors contribute to higher rates of arrest convictability or, said another way, arrest quality.

Perhaps the most interesting finding that emerged from What Happens After Arrest? was that a small number of police officers made a majority of the arrests that ended in conviction. As noted above, 15 percent of officers making arrests (8 percent of the force) made in excess of 50 percent of those arrests that ended in conviction. Conversely, 31 percent of officers making arrests made no arrests that led to conviction. Our hypothesis is that there may very well be differences between these two groups--differences that could be mitigated by changes in policy or procedures. Thus, the overall goal of the study is to identify those policies that might be altered so as to increase the quality of arrests made by police officers. Candidate areas include police recruitment, orientation, training, assignment, career development, and pre-arrest, arrest, and post-arrest policies, procedures, and support services.

1. The Replication Analyses

In Part One of the study we replicate the basic aspects of the analysis described in What Happens After Arrest? and re-examine its principal findings. In essence, we want to know whether the findings from the District of Columbia are generalizable. Do a small number of officers make a majority of the arrests in Los Angeles and New Orleans as they do in Washington, D.C.? Is evidence as important to conviction in

Manhattan or Cobb County (Georgia) as it is in Washington, D.C.? How important are witnesses in Indianapolis and Salt Lake County?

It may be that the findings of the earlier research can be generalized to other jurisdictions. It may also be the case that, for example, variations in arrest quality across individual officers generally are greater in Washington, D.C., than in other jurisdictons, or less, or about the same.

One police observer cautions against overgeneralizing about police departments. In his book, Police: Street Corner Politicians, Muir (1977) states: "The peculiar characteristic of police departments in the United States is that they are local and very different one from the other. An observer of a single police department must constantly check against a tendency to overgeneralize."

The replication analysis was conducted for seven jurisdictions, including Washington, D.C., using 1977-1978 data. The jurisdictions were selected on the basis of three criteria.

(1) PROMIS user--to permit empirical tracking of criminal cases from arrest to sentencing;

(2) Geographic and demographic factors--to ensure a range of jurisdictions from all areas of the country; and

(3) Willingness of the jurisdiction to cooperate--including not only the District Attorney, who would have to make the data available for analysis, but also the police departments whose arrests would be analyzed. (In several sites, the police departments supplied personnel data.

From approximately 12 PROMIS jurisdictions that had been operational for more than a year, seven were chosen for study.

The seven provide an interesting mix of large- and medium-size jurisdictions, and they represent each major area of the country. The participating jurisdictions are identified below:

-- Cobb County, Georgia--a small, southeastern jurisdiction--more suburban than rural;

-- Indianapolis, Indiana (Marion County)--a large, midwestern jurisdiction, essentially urban and suburban;

-- Los Angeles County, California--West Coast, the nation's largest county in terms of population;

-- Manhattan (New York County, New York)--the most densely populated jurisdiction in the country, completely urbanized, eastern;

-- New Orleans (Orleans Parish)--a mostly urbanized, southern city;

-- Salt Lake County--a less urbanized county in the Rocky Mountains;

-- Washington, D.C.--the Federal City, a medium-size city in the mid-Atlantic area and the site of the earlier study.

In both Washington, D.C., and Manhattan, we decided to look only at arrests presented by the largest police department--the New York Police Department and the Washington Metropolitan Police Department, respectively. In Los Angeles, we decided to look only at the Los Angeles Police Department. For New Orleans, essentially all of the arrests presented to the prosecutor were made by the New Orleans Police Department. For Cobb County, Salt Lake, and Indianapolis, however, we looked at arrests brought by both the sheriff and police departments. In general, our decisions about which departments from any given

PROMIS jurisdiction to include in the study were based on the department's willingness to cooperate with the study, manageability, and which departments were responsible for most of the arrests showing up in PROMIS.

2. The Analysis of Police Officer Interview Data

Part Two of the study involved the conduct of in-depth interviews with police officers who had high rates of arrest convictability and those with low rates of arrest convictability. Our purpose was to determine whether there are differences between the two groups, in terms of personal characteristics and other factors, that help to explain differences in arrest convictability.

In October 1979, nearly 100 sworn members of Washington, D.C.'s, Metropolitan Police Department were interviewed. And in December 1979, approximately 80 members of the New York City Police Department were interviewed.

From the interviews we sought, first, to describe officers with high convictability rates (HCR) and those with low convictability rates (LCR) in their attitudinal and behavioral aspects. To what extent and in what ways are HCR officers different from or similar to LCR officers?

Second, we sought to determine whether attitudes, perceptions, and basic knowledge of police practices account for high arrest convictability rates. To this end, a self-administered written questionnaire was developed (see Appendix A for a copy of the questionnaire). Seven sets of variables that might be related to the HCR phenomenon were covered in the questionnaire:

- Officer background/demographic characteristics;
- General attitudes toward job and career;
- Perceptions of the organizational context--the department, prosecutor, courts, and community--and the reward system;
- Role concepts;
- Attitudes toward arrests;
- Perceptions of the value of physical and testimonial evidence; and
- Basic knowledge of police procedures.

Third, we sought to explicate any special techniques employed by the high achieving officers. To this end, a second questionnaire was developed and administered by INSLAW staff and interviewers employed and trained for this purpose. (A copy of this questionnaire is included as Appendix B.)

C. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

Part One, which consists of Chapters I, II, and III, reports on the "Replication Analyses." Chapter I is a brief exposition on the seven replication sites. Following general comments about the PROMIS data bases in the seven jurisdictions, we present a discussion of arrest disposition patterns in each jurisdiction. (Additional narrative detail for each jurisdiction is contained in Appendix C.)

In Chapter II, we first discuss factors affecting arrest convictability over which the police have no control. This includes the inherent convictability of certain types of crime, as well as the relationship between the victim and the defendant. Next, we examine factors that are somewhat more under the control of the police: lay witnesses, recovery of

evidence, elapsed time from offense to arrest, and interactions among time, evidence, and witnesses. The concluding section summarizes the findings from the seven jurisdictions and compares them with those of the earlier study.

In Chapter III, we address officer-related factors affecting arrest convictability. Here, we report on whether, as in Washington, D.C., a small number of officers make a majority of the arrests that end in conviction. Next, we look at high achievers in terms of their assignment. (One of the recurring criticisms of the earlier study was that it did not take "arrest opportunity" into account.) Next, we look at the impact of a series of police officer characteristics: officer age, length of service, race, sex, education, and marital status. A concluding section contains a summary of findings from this part of the analysis.

Part Two describes the analysis of the interview data. Chapter IV provides basic information about how the interviews were conducted. Chapters V and VI document analyses of the written questionnaire administered in Washington, D.C., and in New York City (Manhattan), respectively. Chapter VII is a report of findings from the personal interviews that attempted to uncover special techniques employed by arresting officers.

Part Three (Chapter VIII) contains a discussion of the conclusions that emerge from the study.

PART ONE

REPLICATION ANALYSES

I. THE REPLICATION SITES

The seven replication jurisdictions are diverse in most aspects: physical size, total population, population composition, crime and arrest dimensions, criminal justice expenditures and employment, police and prosecutor organization and functioning, steps in the judicial process, and disposition of arrests in the replication year. (Table I.1 presents an overview of these jurisdictional characteristics; additional details are provided in Appendix C.) The number of jurisdictions and their diversity are important in terms of lending credibility to the findings that either support or conflict with the earlier findings from the District of Columbia.

Much of the analysis in this report reflects differences in the way police and prosecutors perform their work. Some of these differences stem from the fact that we are dealing with different people performing similar activities. Other differences, however, result from the fact that the scope of activities differs. This includes the number and type of offenses handled by the police and the prosecutor, available manpower, and the range of procedures that the police and the prosecutor have at their disposal. Sociodemographic factors may also lead to variations in how law enforcement agencies operate.

It is the purpose of this chapter, starting with the prosecutor's office, to identify the range of differences among the jurisdictions. It is important to remember that what follows is <u>not</u> an evaluation of the operations of the various agencies.

Table I.1
OVERVIEW OF JURISDICTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

JURISDICTION REPLICATION PERIOD	SPECIAL NOTES	DEMOGRAPHIC DATA	CRIME AND ARREST DIMENSIONS	THE POLICE	THE PROSECUTOR	POLICE-PROSECUTOR INTERFACE	THE ARREST MIX
Cobb County, GA Calendar 1977	Smaller jurisdiction than others; in the Atlanta SMSA; urban, suburban, and rural	County -- area: 343 sq. mi. pop: 240,000 Marietta -- pop: 31,300	As the smallest jurisdiction, Cobb had fewer total crimes and lowest rate per 100,000 (1975) Arrest data unavailable	Three police agencies included: Cobb Co. Police Department; C.C.Sheriff's Dept.; Marietta Police Dept.	District Attorney, eight assistants, and support staff handle about 4,000 cases per year	An investigator usually brings case to the prosecutor rather than arresting officer	Adult felonies only in the data base; office does handle juvenile prosecution
Indianapolis, IN (Marion County) October 1, 1977 - September 30, 1978	Large midwestern jurisdiction; consolidated city/county except for law enforcement	County -- area: 392 sq. mi. pop: 782,000 "Old City" of Indianapolis -- pop: 485,000 (est)	Comparative data for 1975 indicates highest crime rate of seven jurisdictions Arrest data incomplete; IDP P + I arrests in 1977 = 5057	Two police agencies included: Indianapolis P.D. (1,368 employees) and M.C. Sheriff's Dept. (523 employees)	County prosecutor, with a staff of 150 (half attorneys), handles 4,000 felonies and 45,000 misdemeanor arrests per year	IPD's automated reporting system speeds arrest data to DA's office. Arresting officer usually appears too	Adult felonies in the PROMIS data base
Los Angeles, CA July 1, 1977 - June 30, 1978	Study includes only arrests made by Los Angeles Police Department; West Coast jurisdiction	County -- area: 4,069 sq. mi. pop: 6,987,000 City -- area: 464 sq. mi. pop: 2,727,000	L.A. City reported 217,800 Index Crimes to FBI; rate of 7987 in line with other large cities	LAPD, with 7000 members, is small in terms of officers per 1,000 population. Very forward looking dept.	County Prosecutor has staff of 2,000; of that total 1,000 handle criminal prosecutions. Office is decentralized	Investigator brings arrest information to DA within 24 hours; arresting officer seldom called for info	46,438 adult felony arrests in data
Manhattan, NY (New York County) Calendar 1978	Highest population density; highly urbanized; eastern; part of a single police department	area: 23 sq. mi. pop: 1,429,000 density: 62,000 per sq. mi.	1978 police data lists 150,900 Index Crime. Crime a very serious problem. 1978 arrests - 36,287	A portion of the NYCPD provides law enforcement services to the borough of Manhattan	District Attorney of New York has a large staff; converted to vertical prosecution before replication year	Arresting officer will present arrest within 8 to 24 hours to one of six trial bureaus	Data base includes felonies, misdemeanors and traffic offenses; arrest selection done to mirror Washington; including 40,393 closed cases
New Orleans, LA (Orleans Parish) Calendar 1977	Mostly urbanized, southern city with a single police department	area: 197 sq. mi. pop: 560,000 density is third behind Manhattan and Washington	NOPD reported 39,900 Index Crimes to FBI in 1977. Crime rate for 1975 second lowest of seven sites. 10,800 arrests reported to FBI in 1977	A single police department of 2000 employees (1600 sworn) provide service to the city and parish.	A staff of 179, includes 59 attorneys and 120 support personnel. Also, 23 NOPD officers serve as investigators	Arresting officer brings arrest report to prosecutor's office within 10 days of arrest	Data base included many minor crimes; selection similar to Manhattan's to mirror Washington; 10,286 arrests examined
Salt Lake County Utah Calendar 1977	A less urbanized county in the Rocky Mountains, includes Salt Lake City	County -- area: 764 sq. mi. pop: 512,000 City -- area: 59 sq. mi. pop: 170,000	1975 comparative data indicates a fairly high crime rate among seven jurisdictions. Two depts. reported 6400 Pt. I arrests (1977)	Two agencies included: Salt Lake City P.D. (475 employees) and Salt Lake County Sheriff's Dept. (456 employees)	A staff of 23 includes 15 who handle felony prosecution	An investigator usually brings arrest report to prosecutor	Data base very comparable to Washington's. All 3451 arrests included in analysis
Washington, D.C. Calendar 1977	The Federal City, urban, medium size--location of the original study	area: 61 sq. mi. pop: 712,000 density in excess of 11,600/sq. mi.	1975 comparative data puts Wash., D.C. third behind Indianapolis and Manhattan in crime rate. MPD reported 10,704 arrests	Washington's Metropolitan Police Department, is a large, well-equipped urban force. About 4,000 officers/500 civilians	Appointed U.S. Atty. is federal and local prosecutor for the District of Columbia	Arresting officer presents arrest data to screening unit within 18 to 24 hours of arrest	This was the controlling jurisdiction in terms of arrest mix--adult felonies and serious misdemeanors

The purpose is to describe and, through analysis, to explain the differences so as to provide an appropriate context for the analyses in Chapters II and III.

In this chapter we present an arrest disposition "tree" for the replication period in each jurisdiction and comment on the information presented. We begin by repeating the 1974 arrest disposition information for Washington, D.C., that appeared in What Happens After Arrest? and then contrast the dispositions of arrests in the various jurisdictions in 1977-1978.

Before turning to the arrest disposition trees, several points should be noted. First, the analysis looks only at arrests that reached a final disposition--even if the disposition was reached between the end of the study period and the time the data were extracted from the data base. This has several implications: arrests and dispositions will tend to be fewer than the number of arrests reported by the police or the prosecutor, and there will be minor variations in case disposition totals and disposition percentages from those published by the several district attorneys. These minor variations, however, should have little or no impact on findings and conclusions drawn from the data bases.

Second, we regard disposition as the formal (and final) action of the court or the court's representative, the prosecutor, regarding a person who was placed under arrest. The PROMIS system does not track arrests that are not presented to the prosecutor.

Third, in interpreting arrest disposition information for a given prosecutor's office, one must be mindful of the overall context within which the prosecutor operates. This includes the type of arrests handled (i.e., only felonies, some misdemeanors and all felonies, or all misdemeanors and felonies), whether the police have the power (or assume the power) to pre-screen arrests, and the extent to which prosecutors are able to refer cases for alternative prosecution or non-adjudicated disposition.

As pointed out below, a substantial amount of variation exists in the number and types of arrests presented for prosecution. Variation also exists due to the fact that police in some jurisdictions are more likely to pre-screen arrests than police in others. Among some jurisdictions, acceptance rates may appear quite disparate. In certain instances, a low acceptance rate reflects a statutory requirement that all arrests, regardless of police-perceived merit, be presented for prosecution. In other instances, a high acceptance rate may reflect considerable prior screening by the police--in which case the average arrest presented may have greater prosecutive potential.

The distribution of final dispositions may also vary because of the range of alternatives that are available to the prosecutor. The resources of some prosecutors' offices constrain them simply to accept or reject a case; others may be able to make a decision among prosecution, referral for other prosecution, diversion, or rejection. This will greatly impinge on the interpretation of final disposition rates. The

acceptance rate for Los Angeles, for example, is roughly half that for Washington, D.C. Many of the arrests not accepted, however, are not outright rejections, but referrals for other prosecution, the ultimate disposition of which are not tracked by PROMIS.

A number of additional factors may also contribute to variations in the distribution of dispositions among the different jurisdictions. These include the prosecutor's work load, the court's work load, the availability of correctional facilities, community standards, and a host of other factors.

Consequently, one should not look at the data presented as providing evidence of the relative efficiency of the various prosecutors' offices. The differences that occur do present interesting contrasts, but they are by no means sufficient to permit interjurisdictional evaluations.

A. WASHINGTON, D.C.

PROMIS provides tracking of all arrests presented to the Superior Court Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office. Those cases consist of all felonies and many major misdemeanors (primarily those that carry a potential maximum sentence of at least six months incarceration). Figures I.1 and I.2 show the disposition of cases in 1974 and 1977, respectively.

For calendar 1977, 14,841 cases presented to the U.S. Attorney are recorded as having reached a final disposition. This is approximately 1,700 fewer cases than were in the data base in 1974. The case "acceptance" rate has remained fairly stable, with 77 percent of the cases presented being accepted for prosecution. Since 1974, there has been a shift in case

Figure I.1
DISPOSITION OF FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR CASES PRESENTED TO THE SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Washington, D.C. 1974



Based on 16,580 closed arrests for felonies and major misdemeanors
*Less than .5%

Figure I.2
DISPOSITION OF FELONY AND
MISDEMEANOR CASES PRESENTED
TO THE SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
Washington, D.C. 1977



Based on 14,841 closed arrests for felonies and major misdemeanors

*Less than .5%

disposition patterns; "pleas to actual" charges rose from 22 to 30 percent, and there was a consequent reduction in court dismissals, nolles, grand jury rejections, and court trials. Of all cases presented, approximately 38 percent resulted in some finding of guilty, as opposed to 31 percent in 1974. Of all cases accepted for prosecution, just under half, 49 percent, resulted in a guilty finding.

Compared with median values for all jurisdictions, Washington shows a lower rejection rate at screening (22 percent vs 31 percent), but the percentage of subsequent rejections or nolles is considerably higher (30 percent vs 7 percent). Court dismissals are also higher than the median (7 percent vs 4 percent). Prosecutor nolles plus judicial dismissals (30 percent plus 7 percent), together with acquittals (2 percent), total 39 percent. This is more than twice the median (14 percent). On the other hand, the guilty subtotal (38 percent) is just under the median (39 percent).

B. COBB COUNTY

The District Attorney of Cobb County screens arrests presented for felony prosecution. For 1977, we found 2,078 closed felony arrests. Of that total, 55 percent were accepted for felony prosecution, 5 percent were referred for other prosecution, and the remainder were turned down. Of those presented to the prosecutor, 39 percent ended in some kind of guilty disposition; nearly 71 percent of those cases accepted resulted in a conviction. (See Figure I.3.) Interestingly, nearly all of these convictions were through pleas--the distribution of pleas to actual or lesser charges is not known,

Figure I.3
DISPOSITIONS OF FELONY ARRESTS
PRESENTED TO THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Cobb County, Georgia 1977



Based on 2,078 closed arrests made in 1977
*Less than .5%
**Actual and Lesser combined, not available separately

however. Less than 2 percent of all cases presented were disposed by bench or jury trial, acquittals and convictions included.

Compared with median values from the seven jurisdictions, Cobb County rejects more cases than average (40 percent vs 31 percent). Sixty-five percent of all rejections (26 percent of the arrests) were attributed to witness problems. Acceptances (55 percent) were at the median; other figures are approximately at or near the median. Pleas and findings of guilt match the median (39 percent); other dispositions (rejections, nolles, dismissals, and acquittals) are also at the median (14 percent).

C. INDIANAPOLIS

The Marion County prosecutor screens both felonies and misdemeanors presented by the police. Only felonies, however, are tracked by PROMIS. Those misdemeanors screened as "potential felonies" are recorded in PROMIS. Some of these are eventually referred for prosecution as misdemeanors in Municipal Court, and others are sent to Municipal Court for bindover and are later re-presented for prosecution as felonies. Consequently, a large proportion of arrests presented to the prosecutor are listed as "referred for misdemeanor or other prosecution"--about half. For most of these, PROMIS tracking ends at that point. A very small number of the "bindovers" eventually end up as being re-presented for felony prosecution. Consequently, some double counting occurs; the result is a small inflation of rejections and corresponding deflation of acceptances.

Keeping this in mind, the data show 4,904 arrests presented for felony prosecution. Of these, 31 percent were accepted for felony prosecution, and 19 percent were rejected for prosecution altogether. The remainder were referred for other prosecution. Of those cases presented, 23 percent actually resulted in a felony prosecution and conviction; 74 percent of the cases prosecuted as felonies resulted in a felony conviction (see Figure I.4).

Because 50 percent of arrests are referred for other prosecution, it is virtually meaningless to compare disposition rates in Indianapolis with median values for other jurisdictions.

D. LOS ANGELES

Of the 53,055 adult felony arrests presented by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), 46 percent were accepted for prosecution as felonies, 35 percent were rejected for prosecution, and 19 percent were referred for either misdemeanor or other prosecution. Approximately 31 percent of all cases presented resulted in a felony conviction, while 67 percent of all cases accepted resulted in some kind of conviction (see Figure I.5).

Compared with median values from the other jurisdictions, Los Angeles rejects more cases (35 percent vs 31 percent) and refers more (19 percent vs 5 percent). Only Indianapolis (at 50 percent) refers a significant part of its case load; all other jurisdictions refer less than 6 percent. As a result, acceptances are lower than average (46 percent vs 55 percent).

Figure I.4
DISPOSITION OF ARRESTS
PRESENTED FOR FELONY PROSECUTION
Indianapolis (Marion County), Indiana
October, 1977 - September, 1978



Based on 4,904 arrests
*Less than .5%

Figure I.5
DISPOSITION OF FELONY ARRESTS
PRESENTED TO THF DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Los Angeles County
July, 1977 - June, 1978



Based on 53,055 closed felony arrests

Once a case is accepted, rejections or nolles are less frequent (2 percent vs 7 percent).

E. MANHATTAN

The data reveal that of the 40,393 closed cases in the 1978 DANY (District Attorney of New York County) PROMIS data base, only 16 percent were not accepted for prosecution. Of those cases presented, 68 percent resulted in some finding of guilt, and 81 percent of the cases accepted for prosecution resulted in a conviction. (See Figure I.6.)

New York's low rate of rejection (16 percent) makes comparison with other jurisdictions virtually meaningless.

F. NEW ORLEANS

We examined 10,286 arrests presented to the District Attorney during 1977. Based on that total, we found that 52 percent were accepted for prosecution, 2 percent were referred for other prosecution, and the remainder were turned down. Of the cases presented, 40 percent resulted in some finding of guilt, while 77 percent of the cases actually prosecuted by the District Attorney resulted in conviction. (See Figure I.7.)

Compared with medians for all the jurisdictions, New Orleans rejects more cases (46 percent vs 31 percent). A majority of the rejections are attributed to problems related to evidence and witnesses. Surprisingly, "violation of due process" shows up as a significant percentage (6 percent in New Orleans vs 2 percent as the next highest percentage). Another noteworthy item is the percentage of arrestees who were diverted (6 percent vs 2 percent for one jurisdiction and 1

Figure I.6
DISPOSITION OF FELONY AND
MISDEMEANOR CASES PRESENTED
TO THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Manhattan (New York County), New York 1978



Based on 40,393 closed arrests for felonies and major misdemeanors

*Less than .5%

Figure I.7
DISPOSITION OF FELONY AND
MISDEMEANOR CASES PRESENTED
TO THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
New Orleans, Louisiana 1977



Based on 10,286 closed arrests for felonies and major misdemeanors.

*Less than .5%

percent for another). Several jurisdictions noted diversion of less than 1 percent. Other percentages are in line with the medians for all the jurisdictions.

G. SALT LAKE

Of the 3,431 arrests in the data base, 66 percent were accepted for prosecution, 3 percent were referred to some other jurisdiction for prosecution, and the remainder (31 percent) were turned down. Of those arrests presented, 40 percent resulted in conviction, while 61 percent of those accepted for prosecution resulted in conviction. (See Figure I.8.)

Salt Lake County is at the median for all jurisdictions studied in terms of rejections (31 percent). The leading cause for rejection was witness problems (18 percent vs a 9 percent median); this was the only jurisdiction wherein witness-related rejections exceeded 50 percent of the total rejections. Acceptances are higher than the median (66 percent vs 55 percent), as are subsequent rejections or nolles (20 percent vs 7 percent).

Pleas to actual charges are somewhat less than the median (20 percent vs 25 percent), and pleas to a lesser charge were considerably higher (15 percent vs 4 percent).

Overall conviction rate (noted above as 40 percent) was about at the median--39 percent.

***

Reviewing briefly, the acceptance rates in the study jurisdictions varied from 31 to 84 percent, which accounted for much of the variation in overall conviction rates (probability

Figure I.8
DISPOSITION OF FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR CASES PRESENTED TO THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Salt Lake County, Utah



Based on 3,451 closed felony and misdemeanor arrests

*Less than .5%

of conviction, given arrest). This relationship is evidenced by the smaller amount of variation in prosecution conviction rates (probability of conviction, given acceptance for prosecution). More detailed results are shown in summary in Table I.2.

For the most part, variation in acceptance rates results from the arrest mix, as well as arrest volumes, screening criteria, and other local factors. Our observations indicated that the arrest mix is the dominant factor. Some prosecutors are charged with handling both felonies and misdemeanors, some just felonies, and others all felonies and a limited number of misdemeanors. Even though we have taken measures to limit the noncomparability of cases being considered, a substantial amount of variation remains. As shown in the table, however, if we limit the examination to simply those crimes that are prosecuted, or to the FBI's UCR Part I type crimes that are prosecuted, there is considerably less variation among the jurisdictions.

Many of the differences shown in the table are further compounded by real differences among the jurisdictions. These include real differences in the kinds and quantity of arrests that are made, differing policies regarding the prosecution of particular offenses (particularly with respect to "victimless" crimes), and variations in the extent of prosecution necessary to meet the community's standards and expectations.

Table I.2
CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL COMPARISON OF
PROSECUTION ACCEPTANCE RATE AND SELECTED CONVICTION RATES

Jurisdiction	Prosecution Acceptance Rate[a]	Overall Conviction Rate[b]	Prosecution Conviction Rate[c]	Serious Crime Conviction Rate[d]
Washington, D.C.	77%	38%	49%	48%
Los Angeles	40%	27%	68%	69%
Manhattan	84%	68%	81%	74%
New Orleans	52%	40%	77%	82%
Indianapolis	31%	23%	74%	77%
Salt Lake	66%	40%	61%	66%
Cobb County	55%	39%	71%	72%

a. acceptances/arrests.
b. convictions/arrests.
c. convictions/acceptances
d. UCR Part I Offenses.

II. FACTORS AFFECTING CASE DISPOSITION

As is frequently the case in adapting management data for research purposes, some problems were encountered in preparing the data base for analysis. These ranged from dissimilarities in the way PROMIS terminology is used to omission of particular data elements. Table II.1 summarizes the availability and reliability of data elements used in the replication.

Table II.1. AVAILABILITY AND RELIABILITY OF DATA ELEMENTS

Jurisdiction	Evidence Indicator	Lay Witnesses	Vic/Def Relation	Elapsed Time	Declination Reason
Cobb County	2	2	2	2	2
Indianapolis	4	1	1	3	1
Los Angeles	5	1	5	5	2
Manhattan	1	2	5	1	1
New Orleans	5	1	1	3	1
Salt Lake	5	1	5	1	1
Washington, D.C.	4	1	1	1	1

Key:
1--Available and reliable
2--Available and reliable, but limited either numerically or in the range of information
3--Available, but does not appear reliable
4--Sparsely available and highly unreliable
5--Unavailable

In Cobb County, very few of the data elements of interest were recorded in the PROMIS data base. Because of this, we manually collected data about 1977 arrests from arrest and prosecution reports. Unfortunately, the files that were available to us represent a skewed sample in that many of the cases that resulted in pleas were omitted.

The Los Angeles data presented different problems. Not only were several of the key indicators absent from the data base, much of what was generally there was not available for

cases that were rejected by the prosecutor. The arrest date, for example, was not entered for over 90 percent of the declinations. Witness information was lacking as well. Consequently, what we can say about Los Angeles is limited.*

For Manhattan, the integrity of the data appears to be quite good, but a key variable--witnesses--was not recorded in the same way it was for the other jurisdictions. We are able to say only "yes" or "no" regarding the existence of witnesses, rather than being able to count them. Consequently, the "multiple witness" hypothesis could not be tested in Manhattan.

In Indianapolis, while all arrests presented to the felony branch of the prosecutor's office are logged into PROMIS, those that are referred for non-felony prosecution are not tracked once they are so referred. For purposes of this study, we do not have final dispositions on those cases, except for a few that come back as "bindovers." Cases that are sent to Municipal Court for bindover and that do come back for felony prosetion are handled as new cases. Consequently, to eliminate double-counting of such cases, and to eliminate cases for which we do not have final dispositions ("referral" is not necessarily a non-conviction), cases referred in this way were dropped from the analysis. Such referrals were much less frequent in other jurisdictions; however, where appropriate, they were similarly excluded. The end result is uncertain. If those deleted cases result in convictions, then the analysis underestimates the conviction rates of officers. If they are

*Because of this limitation, for example, the officer-based file, referred to later, does not contain a representative sample of arrests.

subsequently declined, dismissed, or acquitted, then this analysis overstates the conviction rates. Either way, these exclusions should be kept in mind in reviewing the analysis.

A. DEFINITION OF "CONVICTION"

For purposes of this study, the term conviction means a finding or plea of guilty to at least one charge presented to the prosecutor. A non-conviction occurs any time none of the charges in a case ends in a guilty disposition. The latter includes cases that are not prosecuted (declinations and referrals, except those noted above), nolles, cases turned down by the grand jury (where applicable), cases dismissed by the court, as well as acquittals.

It has been asserted by some that perhaps this definition of conviction is inappropriate and should not be applied to the police. This objection points to the fact that many of these processes--court, prosecutor, and grand jury dismissals, for example--are beyond police control. This argument is not without merit.

Much that the police officer does prior to presenting the case to the prosecutor, however, may in fact have a direct bearing on how far a case is processed, as well as on what the final disposition will be. Witnesses vital to the prosecution's case may have been obtained because of police action. Without the proper recovery and handling of evidence, certain cases may not be strong enough to convince a grand jury that indictment is warranted. In a limited number of cases, the testimony of the police officer may itself play a crucial role in determining whether a conviction is obtained.

In any event, to the extent these processes are beyond the control of the police, they affect the outcome of all arrests and do not bias the outcome with respect to any particular group of officers. The case may be helped or hurt by prosecutor, court, or defense counsel handling; however, cases enhanced by police action will still, on average, fare better than cases that are not so enhanced, if only due to greater longevity in the criminal justice process.

Given our definition of conviction, we can begin to answer the question: For those cases that are presented to the prosecutor, what factors tend to be related to the probability of conviction? More specifically, what is there that is related to police work or arrest handling that can affect the likelihood of conviction? Additionally, what factors intervene in these relationships, further increasing or decreasing the probability of conviction?

B. INHERENT CONVICTABILITY

The most obvious factor that determines the likelihood of conviction is the nature of the crime itself. Some crimes are inherently more difficult to convict. This difficulty is related to what is legally necessary to establish guilt, the prosecutor's view of the offense and the imperative to convict, the public's view of the offense, the defendant's perception of the availability of plea bargaining and other alternatives, as well as the judge's perception of the crime, the accused, and justice as a whole.

Much of what we ascribe to the "inherent" convictability of a crime is not so much a part of the crime itself, as it is a

part of what the crime typically involves. Such crimes as assault, rape, and auto theft, for example, tend to be harder to convict because they frequently involve victims and defendants who are known or related to each other. The existence of such relationships makes it difficult to enlist and to maintain the support of witnesses, who may be torn by loyalty, fear, or other emotional responses to their personal involvement with the defendant. Other crimes, such as homicide, through their social importance and relevance, i.e., salience, make witnesses more likely to cooperate. Homicide also produces more deliberate and careful handling throughout the criminal justice process, thus increasing its chances for conviction.

Additionally, some crimes involve a combination of factors, which further compounds the difficulty of obtaining a conviction. Rape, for example, not only frequently involves a victim and defendant who are nonstrangers, it is also technically difficult to convict, more so in some jurisdictions than in others. The chain of evidence is extremely difficult to maintain, given the nature of the offense, the victim's psychological and physical trauma, and the victim's desire to expunge reminders of the offense as quickly as possible. Even the most skilled police officers have difficulty obtaining and maintaining victim cooperation in such instances.

The inherent convictability of the offenses in our data base is reflected in the overall conviction rates for felonies and serious misdemeanors in the study sites. This is shown in Tables II.2a through II.2g. As shown later, inherent convictability may vary even within a crime category--some types

Table II.2a
DISPOSITION BY CRIME TYPE
Cobb County

CRIME	# OF ARRESTS	GUILTY
ROBBERY	38	47%
VIOLENT	242	10%
homicide	5	60%
sexual assault	21	29%
aggravated assault	188	5%
simple assault	5	20%
other	23	22%
PROPERTY	739	42%
larceny	256	32%
burglary	177	53%
unlawful entry	0	--
auto theft	67	34%
other	239	46%
VICTIMLESS	135	61%
sex	1	0%
drugs	126	59%
gambling	8	100%
OTHER	122	29%
weapons	5	40%
bail	29	76%
other	88	13%
ALL	1,276	37%

Table II.2b
DISPOSITION BY CRIME TYPE
Indianapolis

CRIME	# of Arrests	Guilty
ROBBERY	300	58%
VIOLENT	298	48%
homicide	80	68%
sexual assault	81	41%
aggravated assault	87	40%
simple assault	6	0%
other	44	39%
PROPERTY	1208	46%
larceny	393	35%
burglary	523	58%
unlawful entry	11	0%
auto theft	178	41%
other	103	43%
VICTIMLESS	478	36%
sex	2	0%
drugs	471	36%
gambling	5	20%
OTHER	110	22%
weapons	65	14%
bail	14	64%
other	31	19%
ALL	2394	44%

Table II.2c
DISPOSITION BY CRIME TYPE
Los Angeles

CRIME	# of Arrests	Guilty
ROBBERY	863	68%
VIOLENT	1065	64%
homicide	192	70%
sexual assault	201	68%
aggravated assault	561	61%
simple assault	0	--
other	111	65%
PROPERTY	1835	72%
larceny	370	67%
burglary	964	73%
unlawful entry	1	100%
auto theft	310	72%
other	190	78%
VICTIMLESS	1621	51%
sex	31	61%
drugs	1296	59%
alcohol	33	73%
gambling	261	10%
OTHER	143	65%
weapons	100	62%
bail	2	100%
other	41	71%
ALL	5527	64%

Table II.2d
DISPOSITION BY CRIME TYPE
Manhattan

CRIME	# OF ARRESTS	GUILTY
ROBBERY	1306	52%
VIOLENT	3297	39%
homicide	166	50%
sexual assault	227	37%
aggravated assault	1538	46%
simple assault	1012	21%
other	354	54%
PROPERTY	9332	63%
larceny	5773	63%
burglary	1795	70%
unlawful entry	473	50%
auto theft	67	34%
other	1224	60%
VICTIMLESS	14034	81%
sex	8452	92%
drugs	3972	56%
gambling	1610	87%
OTHER	2252	55%
weapons	1034	54%
bail	102	52%
other	1116	56%
ALL	30221	68%

Table II.2e
DISPOSITION BY CRIME TYPE
New Orleans

CRIME	# of Arrests	Guilty
ROBBERY	824	32%
VIOLENT	1651	24%
homicide	396	23%
sexual assault	188	23%
aggravated assault	751	19%
simple assault	227	47%
other	89	25%
PROPERTY	3753	47%
larceny	1078	29%
burglary	880	47%
unlawful entry	5	100%
auto theft	34	41%
other	1756	57%
VICTIMLESS	2709	45%
sex	192	67%
drugs	2446	44%
alcohol	1	0%
gambling	70	21%
OTHER	833	42%
weapons	489	50%
bail	125	46%
other	219	21%
TOTAL	9770	41%

Table II.2f
DISPOSITION BY CRIME TYPE
Salt Lake

CRIME	# of Arrests	Guilty
ROBBERY	200	36%
VIOLENT	507	32%
homicide	79	40%
sexual assault	99	39%
aggravated assault	214	24%
simple assault	79	34%
other	36	39%
PROPERTY	1397	49%
larceny	442	44%
burglary	497	55%
unlawful entry	10	20%
auto theft	200	44%
other	248	51%
VICTIMLESS	898	39%
sex	13	31%
drugs	829	39%
alcohol	38	23%
gambling	18	83%
OTHER	449	26%
weapons	82	38%
bail	185	13%
other	182	34%
TOTAL	3451	40%

Table II.2g
DISPOSITION BY CRIME TYPE
Washington, D.C.

CRIME	# OF ARRESTS	GUILTY
ROBBERY	1,572	41%
VIOLENT	2,724	25%
homicide	120	63%
sexual assault	282	29%
aggravated assault	1,525	24%
simple assault	739	21%
other	58	19%
PROPERTY	5,320	37%
larceny	2,606	35%
burglary	1,038	51%
unlawful entry	482	17%
auto theft	476	29%
other	718	39%
VICTIMLESS	3,111	45%
sex	1,576	44%
drugs	1,155	46%
gambling	380	45%
OTHER	2,053	39%
weapons	821	48%
bail	918	34%
other	314	31%
ALL	14,780	37%

of sexual assault, for example, are much more difficult to convict than others. Consequently, great care must be taken in interpreting these rates. The implications of this are discussed more fully later. For the present, the reader should bear in mind that the inherent convictability of an offense is a multidimensional concept that reflects the relative ease or difficulty in obtaining a conviction, having to do with witnesses, evidence, and judicial and police policies and procedures.

The relationship between the victim and the defendant is a less nebulous variable. The existence of a prior relationship between victim and defendant affects the extent to which such offenses are reported to the police, pursued in an investigative sense by the police, and accepted for prosecution by prosecutors, grand juries, and judges. Almost always the data show that a prior relationship on ther part of the victim and the defendant is related to lower conviction rates and lower sentence severity.

As shown in Tables II.3a through II.3d, offenses in which the victim and defendant were "friends or acquaintances" were convicted from half as often to 60 percent as often as offenses in which they were strangers. When a family relationship existed, such offenses were convicted from less than a quarter as often to just under half as often as offenses involving strangers. This finding, which holds across most categories of crime, has been well documented in other studies, not only in regard to the conviction outcome, but in related processes as well, such as witness cooperation (Forst, et al., 1977; Cannavale, 1976; Vera,, 1977).

Table II.3a
CONVICTION RATE, BY RELATIONSHIP AND CRIME GROUP
Cobb County

CRIME GROUP	NON STRANGER		STRANGER		UNKNOWN		NOT INDICATED	
	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate
ROBBERY	3	0%	6	67%	10	50%	19	47%
VIOLENT	111	9%	26	8%	53	11%	52	14%
PROPERTY	130	20%	136	59%	253	37%	220	49%
VICTIMLESS	2	50%	13	54%	84	63%	36	58%
ALL OTHER	44	2%	4	75%	32	47%	42	38%
ALL OFFENSES	290	13%	185	53%	432	40%	369	44%

Table II.3b
CONVICTION RATE, BY RELATIONSHIP AND CRIME GROUP
Indianapolis

CRIME GROUP	Family		Friend/Acquaintance		Stranger		Unknown		Not Indicated*	
	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate
ROBBERY	1	100%	16	56%	178	73%	54	65%	51	0%
VIOLENT	28	71%	53	64%	83	71%	46	63%	88	0%
PROPERTY	2	100%	26	69%	186	83%	460	82%	534	0%
VICTIMLESS	0	---	1	100%	22	86%	227	66%	228	0%
ALL OTHER	0	---	1	0%	6	83%	26	73%	77	0%
ALL OFFENSES	31	74%	97	64%	475	77%	813	75%	978	0%

* The absence of conviction for this group of cases reflects the fact that prosecution was declined and additional data on these cases were not entered into PROMIS.

Table II.3c
CONVICTION RATE, BY RELATIONSHIP AND CRIME GROUP
New Orleans

CRIME GROUP	FAMILY		FRIEND/ACQUAINTANCE		STRANGER		UNKNOWN		NOT INDICATED		VICTIMLESS	
	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate
ROBBERY	14	7%	142	21%	446	37%	180	26%	16	38%	26	62%
VIOLENT	200	16%	616	19%	456	35%	273	25%	55	9%	51	35%
PROPERTY	88	19%	603	37%	1,709	53%	1,040	45%	95	37%	218	50%
VICTIMLESS	18	72%	107	56%	367	52%	535	43%	68	28%	1,613	44%
ALL OTHER	42	14%	79	35%	183	50%	200	47%	26	19%	304	40%
ALL OFFENSES	362	19%	1,547	30%	3,161	48%	2,228	41%	260	27%	2,212	44%

Table II.3d
CONVICTION RATE, BY RELATIONSHIP AND CRIME GROUP
Washington, D.C.

CRIME GROUP	FAMILY		FRIEND/ACQUAINTANCE		STRANGER		OTHER		NOT INDICATED	
	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate
ROBBERY	14	29%	178	30%	933	45%	249	39%	198	34%
VIOLENT	300	17%	1,028	20%	762	35%	324	29%	310	26%
PROPERTY	88	26%	575	32%	2,762	39%	1,022	36%	873	36%
VICTIMLESS	18	28%	37	22%	1,642	44%	480	42%	934	49%
ALL OTHER	25	20%	90	39%	717	39%	518	34%	703	44%
ALL OFFENSES	445	20%	1,908	25%	6,816	41%	2,593	36%	3,018	41%

This confirmation of past findings reinforces what we already know--that our means for handling offenses that involve acquainted or related victims and defendants are inadequate. This does not necessarily mean that it is desirable to increase the conviction rates for such offenses--there are valid reasons why attrition is appropriate. The real question concerns why such cases are handled by the prosecutor rather than being referred for other action. Some jurisdictions do have special procedures for handling such cases, but most do not. Prosecution often does little to insure that the specific problems that led to the arrest will not recur. Given that, perhaps more attention should be paid to subjecting such cases to some process other than criminal prosecution, such as those offered by a special arbitration unit, citizen complaint center, or other non-criminal justice entity.

C. FACTORS WITHIN REACH OF THE POLICE

In this section, we focus our attention on three factors over which the police tend to have some control: witnesses, recovery of evidence, and the time that elapses between the offense and the arrest.

1. Witnesses

In discussing the importance of lay witnesses, we are referring both to victims and to other lay witnesses. Their cooperation is necessary in reporting the offense, verifying to the police and prosecutor that the offense took place, and demonstrating to the court the defendant's culpability. Very often the police officer represents a lay witness's first contact with the criminal justice system. The treatment

witnesses receive plays a significant role in determining whether they will cooperate with the authorities, as well as the amount of satisfaction and confidence they will have with respect to the police and others in the criminal justice community. Consequently, it is incumbent upon the police officer to ensure that the first contact does not add to any sense of doubt or insecurity that witnesses may have about becoming involved in a case.

The opportunity for a significant police role in this regard has been demonstrated in the literature. Cannavale (1976), for example, found many instances in which witnesses were questioned in front of the suspect. Consequently, witnesses often gave false names and addresses to prevent the suspect from knowing their identities and where they could be located. Additional problems may exist in that the police do not give other potential witnesses an opportunity to contribute--by leaving the scene too soon or by neglecting to canvass the immediate area for additional witnesses. The greatest opportunity for obtaining information about an offense exists immediately after the offense has occurred--before witnesses have an opportunity to disappear or to forget. Thus, the police play a vital role in seeing to it that witnesses are located and their cooperation is obtained.

The findings of this study are indeed consistent with the notion that witnesses greatly enhance the probability of conviction. The data suggest that having witnesses usually was significantly better than no witnesses at all. In the aggregate, cases having at least one witness were significantly more

likely to result in conviction than cases recording no witnesses at all--in Cobb County, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, and New Orleans. In the aggregate, cases having at least two witnesses were significantly more likely to result in conviction than cases having fewer than two witnesses, with the exception of Manhattan. In Manhattan, having at least one witness was significantly better than having no witnesses at all, except for victimless crimes.

However, as shown in Tables II.4a through II.4g, there are a number of exceptions. For victimless crimes in Manhattan, Salt Lake, Los Angeles, and Washington, having one (one or more for Manhattan) witness was associated with lower conviction rates than having no witnesses at all. In Salt Lake, all specific offense categories (i.e., excluding the "all other" category) showed arrests with a single witness as being less likely to result in conviction than arrests with no witnesses at all. In Washington, D.C., in addition to victimless crimes, violent crimes with one witness result in conviction less often than violent crimes with no witnesses. There are a number of other instances for which the primary effect (i.e., witnesses enhancing the probability of conviction) does not occur--the differences were insignificant.

We infer, therefore, that the value of witnesses is not uniformly related to their presence or absence. Rather, it would appear that their value lies more in their ability to corroborate the facts about the offense, as supported by other witnesses. The testimony of a single witnesses is not always enough to convict. Many cases that have only a single witness

are deemed insufficient for prosecution and are rejected. In fact, that one person testifies about an offense may be worse than no lay witnesses at all. One lay witness may cloud the facts about the case, causing doubt in the minds of those evaluating the merit of the case. With two witnesses saying similar things, the necessary element of corroboration is present and enhances the probability both that the case will be prosecuted and that it will end in conviction.

We look next at the relationship between number of witnesses and conviction rates, by crime group, in each of the jurisdictions.

Cobb County (Table II.4a). With one exception (violent crimes), having one witness appears better than having no witness. With one witness, conviction rates are significantly enhanced, especially in property offenses; for the other offenses, the number of cases was too small to warrant such inferences.

Indianapolis (Table II.4b). This jurisdiction shows a virtually consistent pattern: one witness is better than none, and two or more enhance conviction even more (with the exception of "all other" crimes). However, as with Cobb County, the fact that a large proportion of cases had no reported witnesses casts some doubt on the precise reliability of the numbers.

Los Angeles (Table II.4c). For the aggregate of all offenses, the rate of conviction increases from 61 percent (no witness) to 66 percent (one witness), to 70 percent (two or more witnesses). But, taking the various crime categories

Table II.4a
CONVICTION RATE, BY WITNESSES AND CRIME GROUP
Cobb County

CRIME GROUP	NO REPORTED WITNESSES		ONE WITNESS		TWO OR MORE	
	# OF ARRESTS	RATE	# OF ARRESTS	RATE	# OF ARRESTS	RATE
ROBBERY	14	21%	8	63%	16	63%
VIOLENT	168	3%	16	0%	58	35%
PROPERTY	398	19%	89	52%	252	73%
VICTIMLESS	122	57%	6	83%	7	100%
ALL OTHER	96	25%	7	43%	19	42%
ALL OFFENSES	798	22%	126	47%	352	65%

Table II.4b
CONVICTION RATE, BY WITNESSES AND CRIME GROUP
Indianapolis

CRIME GROUP	NO REPORTED WITNESSES		ONE WITNESS		TWO OR MORE	
	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate
ROBBERY	36	6%	84	52%	180	72%
VIOLENT	71	9%	69	48%	158	65%
PROPERTY	394	3%	350	56%	464	75%
VICTIMLESS	446	33%	18	67%	14	79%
ALL OTHER	78	3%	14	79%	18	61%
ALL OFFENSES	1025	17%	538	55%	834	72%

individually, there is no clear-cut pattern, with the exception of victimless crimes, in having one witness or more than one. In the victimless crime category it does; a 48 percent rate (one witness) increases to 67 percent (two or more witnesses). Again, the large number of arrests reported to have no witnesses raises questions about the precise accuracy of the numbers here.

Manhattan (Table II.4d). The data base for Manhattan indicates whether there were or were not witnesses, but not the number of witnesses involved. In four of the five categories, the conviction rate increases with one or more witnesses: robbery (31 to 54 percent); violent crime (31 to 44 percent); property crime (48 to 72 percent), and all others (54 to 57 percent). In victimless crime cases, the rate declines from 82 percent to 76 percent. Inasmuch as "victimless" is the most numerous crime category, the rate for all offenses declines from 70 to 63 percent.

New Orleans (Table II.4e). Given one witness, conviction rates jump dramatically, although the large number of reported arrests for robbery without witnesses leads one to view these numbers with some suspicion. For all offenses, the rate increases from 22 percent to 81 percent--almost 60 percent. The influence of two or more witnesses is systematic but not large for each of the major crime categories: robbery (7 percent), other violent (3 percent), other property (1 percent), and victimless (7 percent).

Salt Lake County (Table II-4f). In Salt Lake, the number of cases with no witnesses reported was small, especially for

Table II.4c
CONVICTION RATE, BY WITNESSES AND CRIME GROUP
Los Angeles

CRIME GROUP	No Reported Witnesses		One Witness		Two or More	
	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate
ROBBERY	525	67%	218	70%	120	68%
VIOLENT	476	61%	295	64%	294	70%
PROPERTY	1053	73%	467	72%	315	71%
VICTIMLESS	1314	50%	188	48%	86	67%
ALL OTHER	117	64%	36	72%	23	70%
ALL OFFENSES	3485	61%	1204	66%	838	70%

Table II.4d
CONVICTION RATE, BY WITNESSES AND CRIME GROUP
Manhattan

CRIME GROUP	NO REPORTED WITNESSES		ONE OR MORE WITNESSES*	
	# OF ARRESTS	RATE	# OF ARRESTS	RATE
ROBBERY	126	31%	1180	54%
VIOLENT	1266	31%	2031	44%
PROPERTY	3565	48%	5767	72%
VICTIMLESS	13756	82%	278	76%
ALL OTHER	1714	54%	538	57%
ALL OFFENSES	20427	70%	9794	63%

*Detail unavailable for further refinement.

Table II.4e
CONVICTION RATE, BY WITNESSES AND CRIME GROUP
New Orleans

CRIME GROUP	NO REPORTED WITNESSES		ONE WITNESS		TWO OR MORE	
	# OF ARRESTS	RATE	# OF ARRESTS	RATE	# OF ARRESTS	RATE
ROBBERY	526	6%	81	72%	217	79%
VIOLENT	1196	7%	122	68%	333	71%
PROPERTY	1910	10%	666	84%	1177	85%
VICTIMLESS	2367	40%	169	81%	172	88%
ALL OTHER	629	29%	79	82%	126	77%
ALL OFFENSES	6628	22%	1117	81%	2025	82%

Table II.4f
CONVICTION RATE, BY WITNESSES AND CRIME GROUP
Salt Lake

CRIME GROUP	NO REPORTED WITNESSES		ONE WITNESS		TWO OR MORE	
	# OF ARRESTS	RATE	# OF ARRESTS	RATE	# OF ARRESTS	RATE
ROBBERY	20	40%	66	8%	114	52%
VIOLENT	34	38%	247	10%	226	55%
PROPERTY	93	41%	548	22%	756	69%
VICTIMLESS	86	33%	404	19%	370	63%
ALL OTHER	196	12%	172	16%	119	63%
ALL OFFENSES	429	26%	1437	18%	1585	64%

robbery and other violent crime categories. In each of the five major categories, the probability of conviction jumps by about 45 percentage points when the number of witnesses increases from one to two or more.

Washington, D.C. (Table II-4g). With two exceptions, having one witness does not enhance the probability of conviction. Conviction rates for property crime and the "all other" category appear to be enhanced with one witness, but the other categories show decreases of from 1 to 6 percent. With the exception of the "all other" category, having two or more witnesses enhances the probability of conviction.

2. Physical Evidence

The question of the effect of physical evidence is more difficult to assess. PROMIS does provide for an indicator of whether evidence was recovered. However, as indicated in an earlier section, these data were available from only two jurisdictions in a useful form. They were available from two others, but in a form so limited as to make its value questionable.

For Cobb County (Table II.5a), evidence was indicated as present if the case jacket on file at the District Attorney's office contained reference to evidence recovered by the police at or near the scene of the crime. For Manhattan (Table II.5b), evidence was indicated as present if the PROMIS case record showed a property registration number (used for ownership tracking of property recovered by the police). While we do draw inferences from the existence of an evidence indicator, we should point out that, except in Cobb County, where that

Table II.4g
CONVICTION RATE, BY WITNESSES AND CRIME GROUP
Washington, D.C.

CRIME GROUP	NO REPORTED WITNESSES		ONE WITNESS		TWO OR MORE	
	# OF ARRESTS	RATE	# OF ARRESTS	RATE	# OF ARRESTS	RATE
ROBBERY	211	37%	685	36%	676	47%
VIOLENT	536	24%	922	18%	1266	32%
PROPERTY	1594	31%	1898	36%	1828	43%
VICTIMLESS	2906	45%	145	39%	60	53%
ALL OTHER	1589	38%	271	45%	193	43%
ALL OFFENSES	6836	38%	3921	33%	4023	40%

Table II.5a
CONVICTION RATE, BY EVIDENCE AND CRIME GROUP
Cobb County

CRIME GROUP	EVIDENCE		NO EVIDENCE		NOT INDICATED	
	# OF ARRESTS	RATE	# OF ARRESTS	RATE	# OF ARRESTS	RATE
ROBBERY	11	64%	8	25%	21	43%
VIOLENT	38	16%	152	8%	53	13%
PROPERTY	242	55%	278	25%	246	48%
VICTIMLESS	89	62%	10	60%	39	56%
ALL OTHER	13	46%	69	19%	47	34%
ALL OFFENSES	393	53%	517	20%	406	42%

Table II.5b
CONVICTION RATE, BY EVIDENCE AND CRIME GROUP
Manhattan

CRIME GROUP	EVIDENCE		NO EVIDENCE	
	# OF ARRESTS	RATE	# OF ARRESTS	RATE
ROBBERY	642	56%	664	47%
VIOLENT	893	50%	2404	35%
PROPERTY	5384	68%	3948	56%
VICTIMLESS	4911	65%	9123	90%
ALL OTHER	1232	59%	1020	51%
ALL OFFENSES	13,062	65%	17,159	71%

information was hand collected, such physical evidence may not have been recovered by the arresting officer(s). Here we are more able to say whether <u>having</u> evidence, regardless of the source, is associated with the likelihood of conviction.

For Cobb County, we found that cases with evidence were more likely to be convicted than cases without--overall, more than two and one-half times as likely. For Manhattan, in cases of robbery, violent, and property crimes, physical evidence was associated with higher conviction rates. Also in Manhattan, cases of victimless crimes with evidence were significantly <u>less</u> likely to be convicted.

We found this latter result to be most peculiar, and proceeded to examine it more carefully. We partitioned "victimless" crime into its three major constituents--consensual sex (pornography and prostitution), drug offenses, and gambling. As expected, evidence does enhance the probability of conviction for gambling offenses. However, evidence was not found to be related to conviction rate for drug offenses, and it showed a <u>negative</u> relationship with conviction rate for consensual sex offenses. Two interesting things were happening, both due to an interaction between crime and evidence.

For drug offenses, evidence is almost always associated with the case (for 85 percent of the drug arrests in Manhattan evidence was indicated as having been collected). It is not the presence of evidence that helps get a conviction, rather it is the <u>quality</u> of that evidence, as well as the manner by which

it was obtained. Were there no evidence, there probably would not have been an arrest in most instances. Consequently, evidence does not affect the conviction rate for drug offenses in a way that is measurable within this study.

Consensual sex offenses, on the other hand, showed a negative relationship with evidence--those with evidence were less likely to be convicted. This category, however, is not completely homogeneous. It was noted that for pornography cases, which have a relatively lower inherent convictability, evidence is almost always a requisite. For soliciting, which has a higher inherent rate of conviction, evidence is almost never a consideration. Consequently, we have a coincidence of low convictability cases that almost always occur with evidence and high convictability cases that almost never involve evidence. This coincidence combines to weight the opposite cells in a contingency table and makes it appear that there is a strong negative evidence effect. If, in fact, evidence contributes in pornography cases, it would have to be qualitatively assessed <u>within</u> such cases to determine the value, given that, by the measure we are using it always occurs (i.e., there is no variation on which to stratify). Thus, the apparent effect of evidence in the case of "victimless" crimes is an artifact of the data--disguised due to the heterogeneity of that crime category.

3. <u>Response Time</u>

A third factor that is at least somewhat within the control of the police is the elapsed time between the offense and the

arrest. Here, as well, there are problems of measurement. We found, for example, in many jurisdictions that it was common practice to list the same time for both the arrest and the offense. Clearly, such should be the case only if the officer is at the scene at the time of the offense. We know that, in general, arrests do not result from such proactive discovery, but rather from reacting to calls for assistance. (Black, 1967) Consequently, the "no delay" category listed in Tables II.6a through II.6e is somewhat ambiguous. Based on this, it would be rather tenuous to infer much significance from differences between a "no delay" and a "1-5 minute" delay. Considerably more believable are those cases that list delays of other than zero. Moreover, we should also be mindful that cases that take longer than a day for an arrest to occur are more likely to be warrant arrests--situations in which the case is investigated, a warrant is obtained, and an arrest is made. In such cases, a longer delay may represent <u>more</u> processing and the existence of a stronger case. Consequently, for purposes of comparison here, we will examine only cases wherein delay is likely to represent actual delay rather than an opportunity for other kinds of enhancement--e.g., investigation and the issuance of a warrant.

The discussion that follows focuses on cases in which there were measured delays of 1 to 5 minutes, 6 to 30 minutes, or between one-half and 24 hours. We have these data for five of the seven jurisdictions. Cobb County's data are subject to the time-reporting caveat noted above.

With the exception of Indianapolis, all of the data show arrests made between 1 and 30 minutes to be more likely to result in conviction than arrests made later (one-half to 24 hours). Individual and isolated exceptions were discovered; however, in general, arrests made within 5 minutes were even more likely to result in conviction than arrests taking longer. Comments on response time in the five jurisdictions follow.

Cobb County (Table II.6a). The numbers are too small to draw any reliable inferences.

Indianapolis (Table II.6b). As noted above, Indianapolis departs from the norm with arrests made within 30 minutes. For the three categories within 30 minutes, the rate of conviction is 41 percent. For the two categories over 30 minutes, the rate is 50 percent.

Manhattan (Table II.6c). Conviction rates in Manhattan decline for each major crime group as the delay grows long. The sharpest drop is in violent crimes: the conviction rate declines from 50 percent when the arrest is made within five minutes of the offense to 28 percent when the arrest follows the offense by at least 24 hours.

Salt Lake (Table II.6d). For Salt Lake, the number of arrests that were reported to have been made with no delay, or with the delay unknown, amounted to 67 percent of all arrests. For the 1,123 remaining arrests spread across the five crime categories and four remaining delay categories, no clear pattern emerged for the effect of delay on conviction rates.

Table II.6a
CONVICTION RATE, BY TIME AND CRIME GROUP
Cobb County

CRIME GROUP	NO DELAY†		1-5 MINUTES		6-30 MINUTES		½-24 Hours		1 DAY +		UNKNOWN	
	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate
ROBBERY	0	--	0	--	2	100%	6	50%	11	36%	19	47%
VIOLENT	4	25%	0	--	1	0%	62	13%	83	10%	92	9%
PROPERTY	8	63%	1	0%	8	25%	85	49%	403	39%	234	44%
VICTIMLESS	20	55%	0	--	3	100%	21	43%	23	78%	68	60%
ALL OTHER	1	100%	0	--	1	0%	16	25%	51	33%	53	25%
ALL OFFENSES	33*	55%	1*	0%	15*	47%	190	35%	571	36%	466	37%

*The number of arrests is too small to be meaningful.

†"No Delay" category is subject to question due to measurement problems; see accompanying text for comments.

Table II.6b
CONVICTION RATE, BY TIME AND CRIME GROUP
Indianapolis

CRIME GROUP	NO DELAY		1-5 MINUTES		6-30 MINUTES		½-24 Hours		1 DAY +	
	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate
ROBBERY	68	56%	11	64%	23	65%	46	54%	125	60%
VIOLENT	93	46%	5	20%	20	20%	56	41%	91	60%
PROPERTY	553	46%	45	44%	80	49%	190	34%	207	60%
VICTIMLESS	384	34%	9	11%	11	18%	22	36%	15	40%
ALL OTHER	76	18%	2	0%	3	33%	11	9%	7	86%
ALL OFFENSES	1174	41%	72	40%	137	45%	325	37%	445	60%

†"No Delay" category is subject to questions due to measurement problems; see accompanying text for comments.

Table II.6c
CONVICTION RATE, BY TIME AND CRIME GROUP
Manhattan

CRIME GROUP	NO DELAY+		1-5 MINUTES		6-30 MINUTES		½-24 Hours		1 DAY +		UNKNOWN	
	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate
ROBBERY	359	59%	161	57%	220	47%	288	50%	197	47%	81	40%
VIOLENT	951	50%	195	49%	474	37%	802	31%	689	28%	186	47%
PROPERTY	4,907	67%	668	66%	1,236	60%	1,300	57%	668	48%	553	65%
VICTIMLESS	10,147	81%	746	77%	1,139	85%	930	86%	254	80%	818	83%
ALL OTHER	1,472	55%	169	63%	187	62%	198	47%	108	37%	118	64%
ALL OFFENSES	17, 836	73%	1,939	68%	3,256	65%	3,518	58%	1,916	44%	1,756	70%

+"No Delay" category is subject to questions due to measurement problems; see accompanying text for comments.

Table II.6d
CONVICTION RATE, BY TIME AND CRIME GROUP
Salt Lake

CRIME GROUP	NO DELAY+		1-5 MINUTES		6-30 MINUTES		½-24 Hours		1 DAY +		UNKNOWN	
	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate
ROBBERY	25	8%	5	40%	15	33%	45	40%	49	53%	61	31%
VIOLENT	139	20%	6	17%	24	71%	87	28%	65	55%	186	30%
PROPERTY	310	43%	34	65%	71	65%	130	53%	256	62%	596	43%
VICTIMLESS	486	31%	9	56%	13	39%	15	53%	74	51%	263	51%
ALL OTHER	124	27%	11	55%	18	50%	27	33%	169	14%	138	33%
ALL OFFENSES	1,084	32%	65	56%	141	58%	304	42%	613	46%	1,244	41%

+"No Delay" category is subject to questions due to measurement problems; see accompanying text for comments.

Washington, D.C. (Table II.6e). A mixed pattern emerges in the District of Columbia: in the aggregate, higher conviction rates for arrests made in less than 30 minutes, followed by a lower rate for arrests made from 30 minutes to 24 hours after the offense. Over 24 hours, the rate increases.

4. Response Time and Witnesses and Evidence

The high rate of conviction for arrests made within five minutes of the offense led us to theorize a relationship between response time and the likelihood of recovering evidence and obtaining witnesses. It was hypothesized that the sooner the officer arrives at the scene, the more likely it is that witnesses will still be available or that evidence useful in establishing the necessary elements of the offense will not have been disturbed. Whether this is empirically the case is examined below.

Data on time and witnesses were available for Cobb County, Indianapolis, Manhattan, Salt Lake, and Washington, D.C. (See Tables II.7a through II.7e.) Data on time and evidence were sufficient for our purposes only for Cobb County and Manhattan (Tables II.8a and II.8b). In each instance, we looked at the relationship between these factors in the aggregate, as well as across crime categories. That analysis found several data artifacts (discussed below) that yielded some counterintuitive findings. In general, however, the aggregate and detailed data led consistently to the same conclusions. Because the multiple crossings of variables yielded meaningless tables (when controlling for crime), the data presented here have been aggregated. Where required, aggregate data are supplemented by a discussion of detailed findings.

Table II.6e
CONVICTION RATE, BY TIME AND CRIME GROUP
Washington, D.C.

CRIME GROUP	NO DELAY+		1-5 MINUTES		6-30 MINUTES		½-24 Hours		1 DAY +		UNKNOWN	
	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate	# of Arrests	Rate
ROBBERY	108	31%	237	46%	294	45%	353	42%	556	37%	24	38%
VIOLENT CRIME	304	21%	332	24%	634	24%	824	22%	560	33%	70	40%
PROPERTY CRIME	915	28%	1,033	38%	1,165	39%	1,072	36%	1,028	43%	107	32%
VICTIMLESS CRIME	892	44%	1,331	44%	473	51%	259	39%	128	44%	28	50%
ALL OTHER	608	40%	305	47%	161	37%	224	34%	715	37%	40	48%
ALL OFFENSES	2,827	35%	3,238	41%	2,727	38%	2,732	33%	2,987	39%	269	39%

+"No Delay" category is subject to question due to measurement problems; see accompanying text for comments.

Table II.7a
WITNESSES, BY TIME
Cobb County

# of Witnesses	No Delay	1-5 Minutes	6-30 Minutes	½-24 Hours	1 Day+	Unknown
No Witnesses	73%	100%	40%	58%	60%	68%
One Witness	12%	--	20%	13%	11%	7%
Two or More	15%	--	40%	29%	29%	25%
N	33	1	15	190	573	469

Table II.7b
WITNESSES, BY TIME
Indianapolis

# of Witnesses	No Delay	1-5 Minutes	6-30 Minutes	½-24 Hours	1 Day +	Unknown
No Witnesses	58%	35%	33%	31%	15%	43%
One Witness	20%	24%	28%	28%	21%	15%
Two or More	22%	42%	39%	41%	58%	42%
N	1174	72	137	325	445	241

Table II.7c
WITNESSES, BY TIME
Salt Lake

# of Witnesses	No Delay	1-5 Minutes	6-30 Minutes	½-24 Hours	1 Day+	Unknown
No Witnesses	9%	13%	5%	8%	29%	9%
One Witness	56%	24%	34%	39%	16%	41%
Two or More	35%	63%	61%	53%	55%	50%
N	1134	68	148	314	646	1435

Table II.7d
WITNESSES, BY TIME
Manhattan

# of Witnesses	No Delay*	1-5 Minutes	6-30 Minutes	½-24 Hours	1 Day +	Unknown
No Witnesses	80%	61%	56%	50%	46%	70%
One or More Witnesses	20%	39%	44%	50%	54%	30%
N	19302	2115	3664	3856	2165	1897

* "No Delay" category is subject to question due to measurement problem

Table II.7e
WITNESSES, BY TIME
Washington, D.C.

# of Witnesses	No Delay*	1-5 Minutes	6-30 Minutes	½-24 Hours	1 Day +	Unknown
No Witnesses	69%	64%	38%	25%	33%	42%
One Witness	20%	20%	29%	33%	30%	30%
Two or More	11%	16%	33%	42%	37%	29%
N	3258	3753	2197	3148	3470	308

* "No Delay" category is subject to question due to measurement problem.

Table II.8a
EVIDENCE, BY TIME
Cobb County

Tangible Evidence	No Delay	1-5 Minutes	6-30 Minutes	½-24 Hours	1 Day+	Unknown
Evidence	70%	100%	73%	47%	31%	19%
No Evidence	30%	0%	27%	53%	44%	32%
Not Indicated	--	--	--	--	25%	49%
N	33	1	15	190	573	469

Table II.8b
EVIDENCE, BY TIME
Manhattan

Tangible Evidence	No Delay	1-5 Minutes	6-30 Minutes	½-24 Hours	1 Day+	Unknown
Evidence	43%	60%	45%	41%	19%	41%
No Evidence	57%	40%	55%	59%	81%	59%
N	19302	2115	3564	3856	2165	1897

In Cobb County and Salt Lake, shorter delays between offense and arrest time were associated with a higher incidence of multiple witnesses, ignoring (as indicated aboye) time categories that involved measurement problems. This tended to support our hypothesis that shorter delays lead to a higher incidence of witness availability. In Manhattan, the aggregate data indicated that longer delays were more likely to produce witnesses. However, that result was produced as an artifact of aggregation--controlling for crime eliminated the apparent contradiction. In Washington, D.C., however, there existed a counterintuitive relationship that persisted even when controlling for crime. In contrast to Cobb County and Salt Lake, especially for violent and property offenses, longer periods of elapsed time between the offense and the arrest were associated with a greater incidence of multiple witnesses in Washington, D.C. This finding bears out what was found using the 1974 data, as reported in What Happens After Arrest? The results for Indianapolis were mixed; two or more witnesses were significantly more likely after 24 hours, but there were no differences among the 1-5 minutes, 6-30 minutes, and 1/2-24 hour intervals.

As before, we speculate that the positive association between time and witnesses is an indication that arrests tend not to be made in the first place when witness support is lacking. Arrests made after a longer period of time may be made in many instances precisely because more than one witness was available.

We were able to look at evidence and time only for Cobb County and Manhattan--the quality of the evidence variable was

too poor for inferences about other jurisdictions. In both jurisdictions, ignoring the "no delay" category, there was a strong relationship between time and evidence--the shorter the delay, the more likely evidence was to be recovered. This strongly supports the 1974 finding from Washington, D.C.

In short, we infer that time's influence on the conviction rate exists primarily because a shorter delay increases the probability of evidence recovery. Additional evidence (Salt Lake and Cobb County) would indicate that some of time's effect also exists because it enhances the probability of obtaining witnesses. Because of the strong witness effect in Washington, D.C., however, a time-witness interaction does not necessarily result in the expected findings. Because of the difficulty in establishing cause and effect, we could not test to determine whether some marginal effect of time on witnesses existed. This does not mean, however, that longer delays lead to more witnesses, but rather that, in the case of longer delays, arrests will be made only if witnesses are available.

D. COMPARATIVE FINDINGS

In this section, by way of a summary, we juxtapose the major findings from What Happens After Arrest? and the replication analyses.

1. Witnesses and Convictability

> When the police manage to bring more cooperative witnesses to the prosecutor, the probability of conviction ... is significantly enhanced.

This finding was confirmed by our data for Cobb County, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Manhattan (except for victimless

crimes), and New Orleans. The mixed findings in Salt Lake County and Washington, D.C., regarding having only one witness, should be noted in passing. The value of two or more witnesses was, however, confirmed in these two jurisdictions.

2. Physical Evidence and Convictability

> When the arresting officer manages to recover tangible evidence, the prosecutor is considerably more likely to convict the defendant.

The above effect was found to be 60 percent higher in robberies, 25 percent higher in other violent crimes, and 36 percent higher in nonviolent property offenses.

For Cobb County, we found that, for each crime category, cases with evidence were more likely to be convicted than cases without--overall, more than two and one-half times as likely.

For Manhattan, evidence was associated with higher conviction rates for robbery, violent crimes, and property offenses.

3. Response Time and Convictability

> When the police are able to make the arrest soon after the offense--especially in robberies, larcenies and burglaries--tangible evidence is more often recovered and conviction is ... more likely.

In the replication analyses for Cobb County, Manhattan, Salt Lake County, and Washington, D.C., arrests made between 1 and 30 minutes after the crime was committed were more likely to result in conviction than arrests made later (1/2 to 24 hours). In Indianapolis the results were mixed. In general, however, arrests made within 5 minutes of the offense were more likely to result in conviction than arrests taking longer.

4. Response Time and Witnesses

> More witnesses tend to be associated with cases in which the duration between offense and arrest is longer ... [because] arrests made after longer delays were frequently a product of the support of multiple witnesses.

In Washington, D.C. (during the replication period), longer amounts of elapsed time between the arrest and the offense were associated with a greater incidence of multiple witnesses.

In Cobb County, Salt Lake, and Manhattan (the latter only when controlling for crime type), the findings were contrary. Prompt arrest was significantly related to a higher incidence of multiple witnesses (or a greater likelihood of having any witnesses, in Manhattan).

5. Response Time and Evidence

> Prompt arrest in violent offenses ... does appear to influence the retrieval of tangible evidence [but it was not] a sufficient force to cause prompt arrest to be a substantial influence on the conviction rates....

For Cobb County and Manhattan, we found support for the conclusion that prompt arrest increases the likelihood of obtaining physical evidence. Arrests made soon after the offense occurred were systematically more likely to have evidence than arrests taking longer.

III. THE POLICE OFFICER AND ARREST CONVICTABILITY

In the 1974 study of Washington, D.C., arrests, we found that 15 percent of the arresting officers accounted for just over half of the arrests that resulted in conviction, and that 31 percent of the arresting officers accounted for no convictions at all. The fact that so many officers produced no convictions and that a small proportion of the department produced so many raised questions concerning arrest-conviction productivity. Is that kind of distribution unique to Washington, D.C., or does it exist elsewhere? Is the distribution significant, or could it have resulted because of chance? If not the latter, is the coexistence of exceptionally high and low arrest-conviction productivity related to something that the officers are doing, or is it more a matter of assignment and factors beyond the officers' control?

A. ARREST AND CONVICTION PROBABILITIES AND HYPOTHESES

To address the questions above, we began by analyzing arrest and conviction distributions for each jurisdiction using 1977-78 data. In each of the replication sites, we found distributions that were similar, but with varying amounts of concentration at the bottom and top. Table III.1 summarizes those findings. To address the question whether these distributions were the result of random process, a Monte Carlo technique was used to distribute both arrests and convictions among the arresting officers.* The results of that analysis provide

*The real numbers of arrests that ended in conviction and those that did not were randomly distributed among the actual number of officers.

a picture of how the concentrations would look if they had occurred entirely due to "chance."

Table III.1
ACTUAL AND RANDOM DISTRIBUTIONS OF ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS

Jurisdiction Name	Fraction With 50% Of the Convictions		Fraction With No Convictions	
	Actual	Random	Actual	Random
Cobb County	12.3%	22.4%	29.2%	23.3%
Indianapolis	17.0%	21.9%	37.4%	31.6%
Los Angeles	19.1%	23.1%	21.0%	22.0%
Manhattan	7.9%	33.9%	18.2%	0.0%
New Orleans	10.8%	29.3%	23.6%	4.7%
Salt Lake	14.0%	25.3%	25.1%	16.1%
Washington	12.4%	27.6%	26.9%	10.5%

In each jurisdiction, the proportion of officers making just over half of the arrests that resulted in conviction is lower than if the distribution process had been random. Similarly, the proportion of officers making arrests that resulted in no convictions is higher than that from a random process, except for Los Angeles. For jurisdictions other than Los Angeles and Indianapolis, the differences between actual and random officer distributions are significant at the .05 level.* We infer from this that some process or phenomenon other than randomness underlies the fact that so few officers account for so much of the arrest-conviction productivity, as defined above.

In Los Angeles, as pointed out earlier, all arrests rejected at screening are excluded from our officer data base.

*Statistically, the probability that items identified as "different" were taken from the same distributions, or said another way, the probability that they are not different, is .05 or 5 percent.

The result is that a number of officers' conviction rates are overestimated, and a number of officers whose arrests were all rejected at screening are excluded from the analysis. Because most non-convictions result from rejection at screening, this has the dual effect of overestimating the proportion getting half of the convictions and of underestimating the proportion receiving no convictions. Similar exclusions were made for Indianapolis as noted on page II-2. Therefore, interpretation of the Los Angeles and Indianapolis data should be approached with these factors in mind.

The purpose of this part of the analysis was to attempt to uncover the processes that explain why the distributions take the forms that they do. We considered several hypotheses:

-Particular officers are more adept in obtaining arrests that lead to conviction, due to special skills, training, or the use of special techniques.

-Police departments are structured in such a way that a disproportionate amount of opportunity to make arrests that result in conviction falls heavily upon a small but well-defined portion of the department. These officers might be defined by rank (detective, for example), geographical assignment, or by some other structural pattern that determines arrest productivity.

-Particular officers are able to select their arrests so as to maximize their individual conviction rates--i.e., by choosing to make arrests for crimes that are inherently easier to convict, and by choosing not to make arrests for crimes that are not as likely to result in conviction.

-Specific sets of attitudes toward police work are distributed in such a way that some officers are "high achievers" and others are "low achievers."

These four hypotheses summarize different possible explanations for the kinds of distributions identified. They relate to skill, opportunity, discretion, motivation. There are, of

course, a variety of combinations of these hypotheses. It is by no means necessary that these are even competing hypotheses --elements of each may play a role in any given officer's situation. The purpose of this analysis, then, is to measure those factors, where possible, and to determine whether they can explain variation in arrest convictability performance.

For each jurisdiction, we first identified all of the arresting officers, tallying the numbers of arrests, convictions, and witnesses for each arrest. We also produced weighted indicators of the quality of those arrests and convictions and measured the opportunity to make arrests. For each jurisdiction, the basic factors available for analysis were as follows:

- -Number of arrests
- -Number of convictions
- -Weighted number of convictions (sum of maximum sentences for each conviction)
- -Weighted number of arrests (sum of maximum sentences for each arrest)
- -Inherent convictability (weighted average conviction rate for each officer's mix of arrests)
- -Unit arrest rate (average number of arrests per officer within officer's unit of assignment)
- -Average number of lay witnesses per arrest

Additionally, for the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department, the Indianapolis Police Department, and the Salt Lake Police Department and Sheriff's Office, we were able to obtain the age, sex, department entry date, education, and marital status for each officer.

B. MEASUREMENTS OF ARREST PRODUCTIVITY

Police productivity can be measured by many criteria; these might include the number of arrests, the number of convictions, the conviction rate, citations, supervisory ratings, or citizen complaints against officers. The measure one chooses is largely determined by the nature of the topic being addressed. In this study, we are concerned with arrest convictability, which can be measured in several ways.

This study considers two ways of looking at arrest convictability--conviction rate (the simple conviction rate and a weighted conviction rate) and the weighted and unweighted number of convictions. The conviction rate is simply the proportion of an officer's arrests that results in a plea or finding of guilty to any charge. Even if an arrest consists of seven charges, only one of which (and perhaps the least serious) results in a conviction, that arrest is counted as a conviction. Thus, the simple conviction rate is the number of arrests that have any charges convicted divided by the total number of arrests. The weighted conviction rate is the total number of months of sentence the arrestees could receive (based on the top charges at conviction) divided by the total number of months of sentence the defendants could receive (based on the top charges at arrest). The weighted conviction rate takes into account both the seriousness of the charges and the incidence of conviction. Using the first measure, two officers with 50 percent conviction rates would be identical, regardless of the nature of the convicted charge. Using the weighted measure, an officer with one serious felony conviction

resulting from two serious felony arrests would be rated substantially higher than an officer with one less serious felony conviction resulting from the same two serious felony arrests. Thus, the second measure tells us not only how many, but also how "good" the convictions were.

In our analysis, both ratio and nonratio measures of arrest productivity are used. Ratio measures are useful in that they automatically control for a range of variation by specifying the amount of potential that is realized. Less useful, nonratio measures take on more or less significance depending upon the universe from which they are selected. Several other studies have used the number of arrests as a measure of arrest performance. They have been criticized in that they fail to take account of the quality of those arrests. Similarly, the number of convictions taken by itself is not complete in that it does not reflect how many opportunities for conviction actually existed (compare, for example, an officer with 5 convictions and 6 arrests with an officer with 10 convictions and 50 arrests: which one is more "successful"?). This study deals with that problem by using ratios and by controlling for the number of arrests when looking at convictions.

The conviction rate (weighted and unweighted), however, does not necessarily reflect the opportunity to make arrests, nor does it reflect the success of a given officer's arrests relative to that of other officers with arrests for similar offenses. Two measures generally available within this study were calculated to alleviate this gap: a unit arrest rate (the average number of arrests per officer within a given unit of

assignment) and the inherent convictability of an arrest (how often a particular offense is convicted). The unit arrest rate reflects the actual average arrest experience, allowing us to control for the opportunity to make arrests. This measure was available for most jurisdictions. The inherent convictability measure reflects the average convictability of an officer's mix of arrests, which is a suitable control in testing performance variation among officers.

1. Factors Related to Assignment

Here, we were interested in determining the extent to which variation in performance among officers was related to factors beyond the officer's control--such as assignment and the associated opportunity to make arrests, and the opportunity to make arrests for particular offenses.

The earlier study did not control for assignment in any rigorous manner. This study uses the unit of assignment indicated in PROMIS to test whether particular assignments were likely to yield greater numbers of arrests, which we use as a proxy for arrest opportunity. Almost universally, where such an indicator was available, different assignments showed considerably different opportunities for arrest--in terms of both quantity and quality (conviction number and rate). Taken by itself, the unit arrest rate was negatively correlated with conviction rate in New Orleans, Salt Lake, and Indianapolis. It was positively correlated with conviction rate in Manhattan and Washington, D.C. In each of these five cities, the correlation was significant (P .05). In Los Angeles the

CONTINUED

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correlation was negative but it was not statistically significant. A unit arrest rate was not available for Cobb County, because police units were not indicated in the data.

Controlling for inherent convictability (Table III.2), the unit arrest was significant (P .05) in Indianapolis, New Orleans, Salt Lake, and Manhattan. In each of the six jurisdictions except Manhattan, controlling for inherent convictability, the unit arrest rate was negatively correlated with conviction rate. From these varied findings, we draw several inferences.

First, being in a "high arrest" unit does not guarantee a high conviction rate--in fact, controlling for the arrest mix (via inherent convictability), officers in high arrest units in Indianapolis, Salt Lake and New Orleans had lower conviction rates. The degree to which the unit arrest rate determines an

Table III.2
CONVICTION RATE AS A FUNCTION OF UNIT ARREST RATE AND INHERENT CONVICTABILITY

CITY	UAR		EASE		R-SQUARE
Indianapolis	<.001	(-)	<.001	(+)	<.001 (.19)
Los Angeles	<.423	(-)	<.001	(+)	<.001 (.07)
Manhattan	<.001	(+)	<.001	(+)	<.001 (.13)
New Orleans	<.001	(-)	<.001	(+)	<.001 (.12)
Salt Lake	<.001	(-)	<.029	(+)	<.001 (.05)
Washington, D.C.	<.126	(-)	<.001	(+)	<.001 (.19)

UAR= Unit Arrest Rate EASE= Inherent Convictability

officer's conviction rate largely depends upon the implications of "more versus less" arrest activity for the jurisdiction in question. That is, does "more" mean more of the same kinds of arrests, or does "more" mean a larger volume of arrests that are easier to convict?

In New York, where units are primarily geographical rather than functional, officers in "high arrest" units coincidentally are in units that have arrests for offenses that are highly convictable. Beyond this, however, controlling for offense mix, officers still tend to get higher conviction rates than expected. As shown later, officers with more arrests tend to have more convictions, at the margin. Consequently, in Manhattan, having more arrests and being in a high arrest unit are associated with higher conviction rates. Apparently, the more active officers are indeed more successful in obtaining arrests that lead to conviction.

Second, there appears to be a work load effect in New Orleans, where we found a negative correlation between unit arrest rate and conviction rate, units identified in PROMIS were based on both geographical area and function (such as the vice squad). Officers with fewer arrests, other things being equal, tend to get higher conviction rates. In Salt Lake, where units are organized primarily around function, the same thing occurs. We would infer that officers with a narrower range and lower volume of arrest activity have more time and attention to devote to each arrest, the result being a greater probability of conviction.

This contrasts with Manhattan where, apparently, more active officers seem to have established a method of achieving higher conviction rates. Such may be due to the nature of those highly convictable arrests--consensual sex or gambling--wherein the offender usually pleads guilty. In such cases, arrest handling by an experienced officer may have an impact on whether the arrestee pleads guilty. Such officers may have established routines that are effective in convincing an offender that a plea is the easiest route. Without the benefit of a special class of highly convictable offenses, findings for Indianapolis, Salt Lake and New Orleans would indicate that a lighter work load, rather than the experience gained from a high volume of arrests, is a better index of arrest convictability.

Third, arrest mix is a significant determinant of conviction rate. As measured by inherent convictability it was always positively correlated with the conviction rate. Table III.3 shows the R-square between (unweighted) conviction rate and inherent convictability and number of arrests. Only in Cobb County did we fail to find a significant relationship between conviction rate and inherent convictability (both from zero-order correlation and when controlling for other factors). We can conclude, however, that, in general, part of the variation in conviction rate among officers is explained by variation in their mix of arrests--those with an "easier" mix tend to have significantly higher conviction rates.

An additional way of testing whether variation in conviction rate is explained by the opportunity to make arrests

Table III.3
SIMPLE CORRELATION BETWEEN CONVICTION RATE AND INHERENT CONVICTABILITY AND ARREST ACTIVITY

JURISDICTION	INHERENT CONVICTABILITY	NUMBER OF ARRESTS
Cobb County	<.01	<.01
Indianapolis	.41*	.05*
Los Angeles	.05*	<.01
Manhattan	.19*	.03*
New Orleans	.17	<.01
Salt Lake	.31*	-.31*
Washington, D.C.	.18*	<.01

* P <.05

is to test for a correlation between the conviction rate for individual officers and their own number of arrests. As shown in Table III.3, even though the correlation was significant in three jurisdictions, it was so small that there does not appear to be enough evidence to warrant discussion of any real effect. Again, when tested in a multivariate analysis, the sign of the coefficient for arrest was usually negative (though usually insignificant), which is consistent with the findings about unit arrest rates presented above.

2. Factors Related to Officer Characteristics

Using personnel data from four law enforcement agencies (Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C.; Salt Lake Police and Sheriff's Departments; and Indianapolis Police Department), we were able to examine officer arrest convictability performance by personal characteristics, including age, sex, education, rank, marital status, and length of service within the particular agency.

The primary method used here was analysis of variance.* The dependent variable was the simple conviction rate (which was highly correlated with weighted conviction rate, and weighted and unweighted convictions). Officers were placed into groups within each of the six independent variables (sex, age, education, experience, rank, and marital status). The results of that analysis are shown in Tables III.4 through III.9. Where indicated by an asterisk, significance beyond P .05 was found. The analysis of variance was further supplemented by multiple regression analysis. We also looked at the numbers of arrests, convictions, and lay witnesses, as well as the average level of inherent convictability.

Note that in Tables III.4 through III.9, the aggregate inherent convictability need not equal the aggregate conviction rate. Inherent convictability was based on all arrests (e.g., 3,451 in Salt Lake), including those for which we have no officer information. Conviction rate was calculated only for arrests for which we knew the arresting officer (2,400 arrests made by 487 officers in Salt Lake). The calculation was similarly performed for the other jurisdictions. However, for Salt Lake, the occurrence of missing information was not evenly distributed with respect to case disposition. A disproportionate number of cases rejected at screening were missing police officer information. The result is that the conviction rate among cases with a known police officer is

*A statistical technique to estimate relationships between variables.

greater than the conviction rate among all cases (the latter of which includes arrests for which the officer is unknown and which have a lower than average conviction rate)., Thus, the inherent convictability measure reflects the probability of conviction regardless of the identity of the arresting officer--i.e., the probability of conviction given that the arrest was made in the jurisdiction by the police department(s) being considered. The conviction rate, on the other hand, is the probability of conviction given that the arrest was made within the particular group of officers that have been identified. The result is that the latter is probably biased upwards for Salt Lake, since it is likely that many of the unaccounted for arrests were made by these rather than by an (as yet) unidentified group of officers. We hasten to add, however, that it is unlikely that the bias exists in a way that is correlated with the other measures being identifed in this study. Since this data limitation prevented us from estimating the "real" conviction rates of the officers, we performed the same analysis using an inherent convictability score based only on the officers who were identified. We performed that analysis for two jurisdictions (New Orleans and Salt Lake). In both instances, all of the conclusions reported here were identical. So, even when we used the biased data set to form the measure of inherent convictability, the same conclusions were reached. For the analysis, however, we decided to use the "real" inherent convictability, so that each officer's actual performance was measured against the true probability of conviction, given arrest.

a. Officer Age. Officers were grouped by age into two categories--under 30 and 30 or older. The analysis revealed that, for the Indianapolis Police Department and the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department, older officers tended to have higher conviction rates. (See Table III.4) In both jurisdictions, the younger officers tended to get about the same number of convictions as the older officers, but with an average of about 1 to 1.5 more arrests, which result in lower conviction rates. Additionally, perhaps related to officer performance, the younger officers' average number of lay witnesses was significantly lower. However, when we controlled for experience, we found no separate effect due

Table III.4
TABLE OF MEANS BY OFFICER AGE

	UNDER 30	30 OR OLDER	UNKNOWN	TOTAL
INDIANAPOLIS				
ARRESTS	4.1209	3.1186	------	3.3976
CONVICTIONS	1.2198	1.2500	------	1.2416
CONVICTION RATE	0.3003	0.4037	------	0.3749
INHERENT CONV.	0.4488	0.4696	------	0.4638
LAY WITNESSES	0.9210	1.1227	------	1.0666
OFFICERS	91	236	------	327
SALT LAKE				
ARRESTS	5.6061	7.7966	2.6639	4.9281
CONVICTIONS	3.2879	2.3559	1.3033	1.95480
CONVICTION RATE	.6450	.4306	.5672	.5281
INHERENT CONV.	.4308	.4131	.4424	.4302
LAY WITNESSES	1.6705	1.5121	1.6197	1.5861
OFFICERS	66	177	240	487
WASHINGTON, D.C.				
ARRESTS	6.4942	5.3609	------	6.0727
CONVICTIONS	2.3882	2.1338	------	2.2936
CONVICTION RATE	.3587	.3856	------	.3687
INHERENT CONV.	.3702	.3797	------	.3737
LAY WITNESSES	1.2066	1.3422	------	1.2570
OFFICERS	1123	665	0	1788

to age. The experience factor exhibited nearly identical relationships with the dependent variables as did age. There is considerable question about what the exact nature of the relationship is, however. The problems of confounding have been discussed by Forst (1977), Cohen and Chaiken (1972), and Hale and Wilson (1974). Here, while we are able to recognize the problem, as exhibited by the correlations among age, experience, and conviction rate, we cannot determine whether an effect is due to age (i.e., young aggressive officers vs. older less aggressive officers), assignment (younger officers having a mix of arrests that is different from older officers), or experience.

In Salt Lake, however, the younger officers tended to have a much higher conviction rate than the older officers (65 percent as contrasted with 43 percent). This finding held true for both the police and sheriff's departments. The younger officers (in both departments) made fewer arrests and had more convictions. The inherent convictability of their arrest mixes was different but not enough to explain the difference in conviction rate. Additionally, the two groups did not differ significantly in the number of lay witnesses each had associated with its arrests.

Unfortunately, these findings do little to shed light on the question of confounding factors. However, we would speculate that there are some effects that are registered differently in different kinds of socio-demographic settings. Alternatively, from the data, it appears that there may be an optimal level of arrest activity that is associated with high

arrest convictability performanace. In Washington, D.C., and Indianapolis, younger officers are making more arrests than the older ones and are not faring as well in terms of conviction rate. In Salt Lake, where the younger officers make fewer arrests, the conviction rate is higher for them.

With respect to age, consequently, our conclusions are mixed. In the two larger jurisdictions, older officers had slightly higher conviction rates. In the smaller jurisdiction, Salt Lake, the younger officers of both law enforcement agencies made fewer arrests and had more convictions, which resulted in substantially higher conviction rates. The standard reasoning seems to fail in the case of the latter--i.e., that experience and rank, associated with age, would lead to higher arrest convictability productivity. For these two agencies, as shown below, experience also is inversely correlated with conviction rate. Whatever the case, perhaps work load is an important consideration as a factor that is related to age and/or experience, depending on how a police department is organized.

b. Officer Sex. Officers were grouped by sex as well. Here, the results were somewhat less ambiguous. In Washington, D.C., in the study using 1974 data, we found an effect due to sex, but one that was substantially reduced or eliminated when we controlled for specific crimes and level of experience. Again, in 1977, for Washington, D.C., male officers had conviction rates that were significantly higher than females, but the controls led to different conclusions than in 1974 (See Table III.5). These results compare interestingly with earlier

findings. Bloch and Anderson (1974) found that female officers made fewer arrests than male officers. Sherman (1975), Sichel (1977), and Bartell Associates (1977) reported similar findings. Melchionne (1974), however, found no difference.

Table III.5
TABLE OF MEANS BY SEX

	FEMALE	MALE	UNKNOWN
Indianapolis			
Arrests	2.60	3.44	
Convictions	.93	1.26	
Conviction Rate	.38	.37	
Inherent Conv.	.47	.46	
Lay Witnesses	1.06	1.07	
Officers	15	312	
Salt Lake			
Arrests	3.17	7.30	2.66
Convictions	1.17	2.65	1.30
Conviction Rate	.31	.49	.57
Inherent Conv.	.44	.42	.44
Lay Witnesses	1.24	1.56	1.62
Officers	6	237	244
Washington, D.C.			
Arrests	7.43	5.99	
Convictions	1.43	2.34	
Conviction Rate	.25	.38	
Inherent Conv.	.36	.37	
Lay Witnesses	.99	1.27	
Officers	97	1691	

Here, for Washington, D.C., in 1977, we found females making significantly more arrests than male officers, while in Indianapolis and Salt Lake the reverse was true. In Salt Lake,

male officers had higher conviction rates, but not significantly, and the number of female officers was too small to permit additional tests. In Indianapolis, also insignificant, the reverse was true. In each of the three jurisdictions, the number of females amounted to a small fraction of the police department (2 percent in Salt Lake, 4.6 percent in Indianapolis, and 5.5 percent in Washington).

Multivariate analyses were performed to control for other factors, thought to be related to sex (experience, rank, inherent convictability, and age), that might tend to explain the effect of sex on conviction rate. In Washington, D.C., female officers tend to be younger and to have less experience and rank than male officers. Moreover, on average, the mix of arrests made by female officers tends to be slightly less convictable than that for male officers. As a result, their conviction rate is significantly lower than that for male officers. Controlling for these other factors, however, the effect of sex persisted. Apparently, something other than inherent convictability, age, experience, and rank--quite possibly, assignment--accounts for the fact that female officers in Washington, D.C., have lower conviction rates than male officers.

As an additional test, noting the relationship between witnesses and conviction rate and that female officers have lower rates of witness recovery, we tested to see whether including witnesses would explain the sex effect. To a small extent, as was with the other factors, it did; however, even taken all at the same time, a sex effect persisted. Female

officers in Washington, D.C., tend to make more arrests and produce fewer convictions than male officers, controlling for age, rank, experience, arrest mix, and the average number of lay witnesses associated with those arrests. We might speculate that arrests presented by female officers are received differently by prosecutors and judges than cases presented by male officers. If, for example, prosecutors are more likely to reject cases presented by females, other things being equal, the observed effect would be obtained. While such is the case, i.e., such arrests are more likely to be rejected, we have no way of determining from our data whether such rejections are due to a systematic bias against women or to some other factors not identified in this study.

c. Officer Education. Several studies have looked at the relationship between officer education and performance--though none at the primary performance measure being considered here. Bozza (1973) found that education was positively related to the number of arrests officers make. Cohen and Chaiken (1972) and Cascio (1977) found college education to be associated with lower rates of citizen complaints against officers.

For education, we grouped the officers into three categories: no college, some college (including associate's degree), and at least four years of college. There does not appear to be any consistent relationship between education and conviction rate (Table III.6). In Washington, D.C., those with some education beyond high school have higher conviction rates--but not significantly so. This result persists as well

when controlling for arrest mix and rank, two factors that tend to produce confounding effects in the analysis of other factors.

In Salt Lake, officers with some college education have significantly higher conviction rates than officers with only a

Table III.6
TABLE OF MEANS BY YEARS OF COLLEGE EDUCATION

	NONE	1 TO 3	4 OR MORE	UNKNOWN
Indianapolis				
Arrests	3.42	3.22	3.78	2.69
Convictions	1.27	1.17	1.26	1.23
Conviction Rate	.38	.35	.34	.46
Inherent Conv.	.48	.45	.44	.41
Lay Witnesses	1.12	.95	1.00	1.32
Officers	187	77	50	13
Salt Lake				
Arrests	6.76	3.98	5.12	2.66
Convictions	2.57	2.31	2.83	1.30
Conviction Rate	.46	.58	.55	.57
Inherent Conv.	.43	.38	.40	.44
Lay Witnesses	1.57	1.55	1.50	1.62
Officers	178	13	52	244
Washington, D.C				
Arrests	6.01	5.92	7.26	----
Convictions	2.27	2.16	2.99	----
Conviction Rate	.36	.40	.40	----
Inherent Conv.	.37	.39	.39	----
Lay Witnesses	1.26	1.22	1.24	----
Officers	1476	212	100	0

high school education. However, in Indianapolis, officers with some college (or more) tend to have slightly lower conviction rates, though not significantly. Given the conflicting directions, the significance we find in one jurisdiction does not warrant concluding that an effect exists due to education.

This is consistent with multivariate tests that indicate no significant effect due to education.

d. Officer Rank. Rank was somewhat more difficult to deal with. The intention was to divide the officers into uniformed patrol and detectives. Only in Washington, D.C., however, was the partition that straightforward. In Washington, there was a rank effect--detectives had significantly higher conviction rates than uniformed patrolmen (Table III.7). However, the rank effect seems to be entirely due to the inherent convictability of the mix of arrests. Controlling for that factor, no rank effect was found.

Table III.7
TABLE OF MEANS BY OFFICER RANK

Washington, D.C.	Private	Detective
Convictions	2.15	2.91
Arrests	5.93	6.69
Conviction Rate	0.35	0.44
Inherent Convictability	0.36	0.43
Lay Witnesses	1.24	1.33
Officers	1451	337

e. Officers' Marital Status. There was no consistent pattern in the relationship between marital status and conviction rate (Table III.8). In no instance was there a significant difference associated with marital status. Additionally, the small and insignificant differences were in different directions (higher for married officers in two jurisdictions and lower for married officers in a third). Consequently, marital status does not appear to contribute to arrest conviction performance.

Table III.8
TABLE OF MEANS BY MARITAL STATUS

	Single	Married	Other
Indianapolis			
Arrests	3.32	3.49	3.19
Convictions	1.20	1.24	1.29
Conviction Rate	.36	.37	.41
Inherent Convictability	.45	.47	.45
Lay Witnesses	.99	1.07	1.07
Officers	59	199	69
Salt Lake			
Arrests	7.52	7.27	2.70
Convictions	2.96	2.58	1.30
Conviction Rate	.50	.49	.56
Inherent Convictability	.38	.43	.44
Lay Witnesses	1.47	1.59	1.61
Officers	48	187	252
Washington, D.C.			
Arrests	6.10	5.60	7.07
Convictions	2.36	3.03	2.59
Conviction Rate	.37	.36	.37
Inherent Convictability	.38	.36	.38
Lay Witnesses	1.27	1.21	1.23
Officers	1263	355	170

Other includes divorced, separated, and unknown marital status. Accurate comparisons only for married vs. single.

f. Length of Service. There have been several attempts to address the effect of officer experience on performance. Friedrich (1977) and Forst (1977) both found that less experienced officers were more active than more experienced officers. However, Forst found that more experienced officers were more likely to bring their (fewer) arrests to conviction. Sherman (1980) speculated that the difference may be due to generational differences and early socialization into police work.

The findings here, however, suggest that the relationship may be somewhat less complicated than that. As was also the case with officer age for Salt Lake, we have an instance in which more experienced officers are making more arrests than younger officers and have correspondingly lower conviction rates. This suggests an effect due to work load.

Length of service was divided into three categories--less than one year, one to five years, and six or more years. Here as well, mixed results were obtained (Table III.9). In Indianapolis, conviction rates were highest at the extreme levels of experience. In Washington, D.C., there was a weak positive relationship between conviction rate and experience; officers having six or more years of experience had conviction rates that, on average, were 5 percent higher than the conviction rates for officers with less than one year of experience. Because of the mixed findings, there would appear to be substantial evidence for attributing at least part of the difference to work load, rather than experience. The uniformity of that dimension is striking, especially in that it coincides with the reversal of the expected effect due to experience.

g. Comparative Findings. In What Happens After Arrest? we found that "while more experienced officers tend to produce more convictions and have higher conviction rates than officers with less time on the force, the other characteristics in the data--age, sex, residence, and marital status--are, at best, only mild predictors of an officer's ability to produce arrests

that become convictions." The effect of age, for example, was found to be insignificant within given experience groups; the reverse was significant. This led us to the conclusion that the important effect was due to experience.

Table III.9
TABLE OF MEANS BY LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE

	Under Year	1 To 6 Years	Over 6 Years
Indianapolis			
Arrests	4.00	3.81	3.07
Convictions	2.27	1.15	1.27
Conviction Rate	.40	.33	.40
Inherent Convictability	.50	.45	.47
Lay Witnesses	1.00	.98	1.13
Officers	10	133	184
Salt Lake			
Arrests	2.33	4.68	9.26
Convictions	1.67	2.74	2.55
Conviction Rate	.69	.57	.42
Inherent Convictability	.38	.44	.40
Lay Witnesses	1.69	1.60	1.52
Officers	6	99	137
Washington, D.C.			
Arrests	3.20	7.13	5.50
Convictions	.98	2.50	2.22
Conviction Rate	.34	.34	.39
Inherent Convictability	.36	.37	.38
Lay Witnesses	1.15	1.25	1.27
Officers	46	704	1033

For 1977-1978, we found that experience appears to mean different things in different jurisdictions. Having the benefit of a cross-jurisdictional data set, we observed that experience does not necessarily coincide with more arrests that

lead to conviction. Experienced officers had lower conviction rates in Salt Lake, but higher rates in Washington, D.C. The effect of experience was not consistent. Rather, work load (as measured by numbers of arrests), which tended to be relatively heavier for more experienced officers in Salt Lake (than for less experienced officers), and relatively lighter in Washington, D.C., tended to be a more consistent predictor of conviction performance. Officers with a heavier work load tend to have a lower proportion of their arrests end in conviction. Consequently, experience was not seen as being a good predictor of performance, as measured here. Work load, which may vary directly or inversely with experience, depending on police agency structure, was a more consistent indicator.

There does not appear to be substantial evidence for attributing variation in officer performance to personal demographic characteristics, such as age and education. There does, however, appear to be an effect associated with officers' sex. Nothing in the data could explain away this effect due to sex--neither rank, experience, age, nor assignment to the extent that assignments could be measured. While the subsequent analyses (concerning the interviews with officers) may help to shed light on these relationships, the sample does not contain a statistically significant number of female officers to allow us to draw inferences. Consequently, while we may speculate about potential bias against arrests presented by female officers, the available data do not permit us to go any further.

In short, we can go only so far in using personal characteristics to explain variation in officer arrest convictability performance. Officer sex and rank do tend to explain part of the difference; however, they are hardly useful in the application of specific policies. Our findings also reflect on the extent to which inherent convictability and witness and evidence skills explain performance variation among officers. However, these only point to the importance of not jumping to conclusions based only on conviction rates. Work load, also, helps determine the context within which officer performance comparisons must be made. Work load may provide some useful insights to those responsible for the allocation of manpower.

None of this, however, tells us specifically what it is that officers are doing differently. The aim of this section has been to go as far as possible in explaining those differences, and then to take the officers who are different (even controlling for what we can explain) and interview them. Through that next step (Part Two), we hope to further isolate and identify factors that can significantly explain variation in performance among officers.

In the following section, we detail the multivariate analyses that yield the selection of our sample. Further, we try to shed more light on the dynamics of arrest convictability and its correlates.

C. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES

Given that the replication had in fact confirmed the existence of an officer effect--i.e., that particular officers do tend to substantially outperform or underperform others with

respect to the identified measure (arrest convictability), the next step was to identify those officers at the extremes and to interview them. The purpose of the interviews was to gain additional information and to attempt to explain why their performance was so systematically different from that of other officers.

Several criteria guided the development of the sampling frame for interview. The selection had to be designed so as to maximize the opportunity for gathering information--i.e., from extremely different groups at the top and bottom. We also had to be sure that such officers would not be selected for interview if their position in the performance ranking was an artifact of assignment.

To incorporate these criteria, we used a curvilinear regression model. The basic idea was to select officers whose performance was significantly higher or lower than we could expect based on what we already knew about their assignment, mix of arrests, and the quality of their convictions and arrests. Several alternative forms were tried. The basic form that accomplished the controls we sought to impose was as follows:

$$CONSEN = B(0) + B(1)ARRSEN + B(2)EASE$$

where

CONSEN = number of convictions weighted by their seriousness,*

*The maximum sentence possible, within the particular jurisdiction, was used as a weight for seriousness. Consequently, a conviction for homicide receives relatively more weight than a larceny conviction. This provides a control that down weights officers whose convictions result from charge attrition after overcharging or plea bargaining.

ARRSEN = number of arrests weighted by their seriousness,

EASE = inherent convictability of the officer's mix of arrests.

This specification has several problems, however. One of the criteria for inclusion in this study was that officers must have made arrests. Consequently, there is a tendency in the scattergrams (Figures III.1 and III.2) for clusters of points to be on a series of planes parallel to or on the independent (X) axis. The result is that the estimated regression plane passes through the X-axis rather than the origin (since there are no (0,0,0) points in the space. As a result, for small real values of ARRSEN, the expected value of CONSEN was negative. This problem had serious implications for the sample selection procedures that were to be followed.

The next step was to plot a confidence contour about the regression plane. Officers would be selected if they fell significantly above or below the regression plane (as bounded by the confidence contour). With the above specification, it was possible for an officer with a very low ARRSEN value to have an expected CONSEN that was negative. In fact, using this specification, several officers with no convictions would have selected as high achievers because, given a difficult mix of arrests, their expected performance was negative--zero was

substantially higher. Consequently, although the specification does provide the general controls we sought, the predictive results were not acceptable. Additional constraints were necessary.

The alternative specification had two requirements--positive values of ARRSEN should not yield negative expected values for CONSEN, and zero values of ARRSEN (although no such points existed for this data set) must yield an expected value of zero for CONSEN. These criteria were met by changing the specification in two ways. First, the intercept was supressed to force the regression plane through the origin. Consequently, only negative ARRSEN values could yield negative values for CONSEN. As shown in the scattergram for CONSEN=f(ARRSEN) (Figure III.1), the heavy concentration of

Figure III.1.
APPROXIMATE SCATTERGRAM FOR CONSEN=F(ARRSEN)



points with CONSEN close to or equal to zero, while ARRSEN varies over a wider range would usually lead to a negative y-intercept, at Y'. Consequently, low values for ARR or ARRSEN would predict negative values for CON. By forcing the line through the origin, C', all positive values of ARR or ARRSEN yield positive values for CON and CONSEN, respectively.

Second, ARRSEN was included in each term on the right side of the equation. Thus, when ARRSEN is zero, the expected value of CONSEN is zero, because each of the terms on the right side of the equation contains a multiplication by ARRSEN:

CONSEN = B(1)ARRSEN + B(2)(ARRSEN)(EASE).

The result is a curvilinear regression plane. Note the possibility for multicollinearity exists in that ARRSEN is contained in each of the right-hand terms. This is especially so if a correlation exists between ARRSEN and EASE (seldom the case). However, given that the specification is not intended to be structurally complete but is designed instead to yield specific types of predictions, the structural integrity of the model should not be a major issue. In fact, more complete structural multivariate specifications are discussed in the following section. For the purposes of interview selection and for stratification of the groups selected, the model is entirely appropriate.

To expand a little more. The aim here was to use available data to predict the expected performance of officers and then to select a sample of upper and lower outlyers and a small

group near the middle. Note that EASE is the population's expected conviction rate for a given mix of arrests. Consequently, EASE multiplied by the number of arrests is the expected number of convictions:

E(CONSEN)=(EASE)x(ARRSEN).

The selection model included ARRSEN as a separate factor because, when we did not control for factors deemed inappropriate here but not elsewhere, there appeared to be a separate effect from ARRSEN, apart from its interaction with EASE.

For Washington, D.C., the first specification was used for the original sample selection. The result was that a certain proportion of those selected was not characteristically different from the middle group when the second specification was applied. As a result, for analysis, the second specification was applied and the interview respondents were trichotomized--high, medium, and low performers, by the dimension in the model. Note that this yielded a third group with central characteristics so that "linearity" could be tested with respect to attitudes or other factors identified in the interview. That is, this allowed us to test whether a group that falls in the middle on arrest convictability also falls in the middle for some other dimension.

For Manhattan, the identical technique was applied so that the results would be comparable. Knowing the implications of the selection method, however, allowed us to obtain high and low groups that were more extreme than in Washington, D.C., and

a middle group with an overall lower variance from the population mean. The second specification again was used to trichotomize once the sample was complete.

The method used to trichotomize the sample is an adaptation of a method described by Kmenta (1971). A confidence interval is constructed around each of the estimated points from the regression. They are then joined to form a confidence band. In order to get a large enough sample in each group, it was necessary to draw the confidence band at the 20 percent level on either tail of the distribution. This is shown in Figure III.2. Officers significantly higher than the expected value for CONSEN (controlling for the independent factors) at the 20 percent level were placed in the high group. Officers

Figure III.2.
CONFIDENCE BAND FOR CONSEN=F(ARRSEN,ARRSEN*EASE)



significantly lower than expected at the 20 percent level were placed in the low group. The remaining officers (non-outlyers) were placed in the middle group. This trichotomization scheme was applied to the entire population. Wherever the officer fell in the overall population determined his position in the

sample. Consequently, officers in each of the groups within the interview sample are statistically representative of similar groups within the population, which will facilitate our ability to generalize about them.

For purposes of comparison, the same kind of trichotomization technique was applied to each of the jurisdictions being studied. The groups were tested for variation in convictions, arrests, conviction rate, inherent convictability, and witness productivity. This allowed the validation of the technique across the seven jurisdictions. We were thus able to verify that the resultant groups were different with respect to conviction rates and the number of convictions, that the extreme groups had similar levels of arrest activity, and that the inherent convictability had been effectively controlled for (i.e., did not vary across groups). The regressions used to form the trichotomies are shown in Table III.10, and the subsequent tri-part analysis is shown in Table III.11.

Table III.10
REGRESSIONS USED FOR SAMPLE SELECTION AND TRICHOTOMY

		ARRSEN		QSEN	
JURISDICTION	R-SQUARE	Coeff.	P(2-Tail)	Coeff.	P(2-Tail)
Cobb County	.83	.49	<.001	.40	<.001
Indianapolis	.64	-.40	<.001	1.51	<.001
Los Angeles	.80	.14	.002	1.03	<.001
Manhattan	.89	-.07	.018	1.11	<.001
New Orleans	.90	.02	.723	1.25	<.001
Salt Lake	.73	-.71	<.001	2.59	<.001
Washington, D.C.	.72	-.15	<.001	1.40	<.001

Table III.11
TABLE OF MEANS BY ARREST CONVICTABILITY TRICHOTOMY

	LCR	MCR	HCR	ALL
Cobb County				
Arrests	3.32	1.67	7.11	2.47
Convictions	0.55	1.17	6.42	1.50
Conviction rate	0.11	0.71	0.95	0.61
Inherent convictability	0.42	0.39	0.38	0.39
Lay witnesses	1.26	1.92	2.41	1.83
Number of officers	44.00	156.00	19.00	219.00
Indianapolis				
Arrests	4.82	2.40	4.77	2.80
Convictions	1.21	0.90	2.89	1.12
Conviction rate	0.36	0.41	0.75	0.44
Inherent convictability	0.58	0.45	0.50	0.46
Lay witnesses	1.23	1.15	1.62	1.20
Number of officers	34.00	419.00	53.00	509.00
Los Angeles				
Arrests	2.97	2.04	3.28	2.41
Convictions	1.31	1.31	2.67	1.55
Conviction rate	0.34	0.65	0.88	0.63
Inherent convictability	0.44	0.39	0.42	0.40
Lay Witnesses	0.64	0.56	0.62	0.61
Number of officers	368.00	1405.00	371.00	2144.00
Manhattan				
Arrests	13.59	7.38	11.31	7.86
Convictions	7.72	5.07	8.33	5.35
Conviction rate	0.39	0.57	0.79	0.57
Inherent convictability	0.64	0.63	0.59	0.63
Lay witnesses	0.50	0.49	0.59	0.50
Number of officers	206.00	3464.00	163.00	3835.00
New Orleans				
Arrests	15.03	4.85	16.03	5.92
Convictions	7.00	2.46	11.31	3.06
Conviction rate	0.43	0.50	0.75	0.51
Inherent convictability	0.43	0.42	0.41	0.42
Lay witnesses	0.79	0.98	0.89	0.96
Number of officers	90.00	1101.00	35.00	1226.00
Salt Lake				
Arrests	16.54	3.64	11.37	4.93
Convictions	1.27	1.56	6.89	1.95
Conviction rate	.14	.54	.68	.53
Inherent convictability	.45	.43	.39	.43
Lay Witnesses	1.23	1.59	1.85	1.59
Number of officers	26	423	38	487
Washington, D.C.				
Arrests	9.54	5.56	8.78	6.07
Convictions	1.85	2.11	4.69	2.29
Conviction rate	0.17	0.36	0.61	0.37
Inherent convictability	0.41	0.37	0.40	0.37
Lay witnesses	1.45	1.22	1.49	1.26
Number of officers	117.00	1530.00	141.00	1778.00

One additional test was also permitted within this framework, that of witness productivity. If the ability to obtain witnesses was a substantial contributor to the success or lack thereof of particular officers, then, controlling for the other factors, the high achievers should have higher numbers of lay witnesses associated with their cases. In fact, the results were somewhat mixed.

In all jurisdictions except Los Angeles, the top group of officers did average more witnesses than the bottom group, this finding was significant above the .08 level (alpha above .05 are considered unacceptable in this part of the analysis). Only in Salt Lake was the "effect" linear (significant at the .03 level), that is H M L (where H, M, and L are the three respective officer groupings--high, medium and low) with respect to witnesses. In Cobb County, the effect was also linear, but was not significant at the .05 level. In Indianapolis, Washington, D.C., and Manhattan, a H L M pattern was discovered, where the top and bottom have the correct relationship but the middle group does not fit in linearly. Here, the relationship was significant beyond the .005 level. In New Orleans, again the highs were above the low, but the middle group was higher than either--but we hasten to add that this relation was nowhere near significant. In Los Angeles, the LCR group was slightly (but insignificantly) higher than the HCR group, while both the low and high groups were significantly higher than the middle group.

In view of this, it appears that obtaining lay witnesses, while related to conviction rate in general, is not a dimension

that is measuring the same thing as our grouping trichotomy--only convictions and conviction rate parallel the grouping dimension. This obtains despite the fact that witnesses and convictions and conviction rate are correlated, before being associated with particular officers. This lends support to our earlier suggestion that there may be more than one underlying dimension that explains arrest convictability performance.

D. ADDITIONAL MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES

As indicated previously, the technique used for trichotomizing the sample was not necessarily the best structural specification of the relationship between conviction rate and independent factors. Using factors identified in the zero-order correlation tests, we sought to explain as much of the variation in conviction rate as possible using available data. In several jurisdictions, it was possible to use additional factors available from personnel records. We will begin by describing the specifications that could be tested for all seven jurisdictions.

For purposes of multivariate analysis, we considered two basic concepts--a conviction rate, and the number of convictions with the number of arrests as a control. A further variation of these two was produced by weighting either with the maximum possible sentence associated with a given arrest or conviction offense. This provided us with four different dependent variables to consider:

RATE = simple unweighted conviction rate,

RATSEN = weighted conviction rate,

CON = number of convictions, and

CONSEN = weighted number of convictions.

The basic data available for all seven jurisdictions was quite limited. Consequently, the purpose here is not to explore numerous recombinations of the variables, but to provide a multivariate test of the independent variables identified above to explain jurisdictional exceptions, and to discuss additional factors that might have improved our ability to explain the dynamics of arrest convictability. Highlights of this analysis are discussed below.

Using the unweighted conviction rate (RATE) as the dependent measure, we tested:

$$RATE = B(1) + B(2)EASE + B(3)WIT.$$

This specification was significant above the .001 level in each of the seven jurisdictions. Both of the independent variables were significant above the .01 level for all jurisdictions except for WIT (average number of lay witnesses per arrest) for both Manhattan and Los Angeles, and except for EASE for Cobb County. All significant coefficients had the expected sign--positive--indicating that higher values for both EASE and WIT increase the conviction rate. The multiple R-square (which tells the proportion of variance in the dependent variable explained by variation in the independent variables) varied from .05 in Los Angeles to .46 in Indianapolis. The inherent convictability of the mix of arrests, combined with the number of lay witnesses, appears to

be able to explain a moderate amount of variation in conviction rate in most instances. For Manhattan, as indicated earlier, the lack of significance of WIT can be attributed to the dichotomous nature of the variable. In Los Angeles, controlling for other factors, it appears that (keeping in mind that declined prosecutions are excluded from our Los Angeles data) the number of lay witnesses does not contribute to an officer's conviction rate. As shown in an earlier chapter, the number of lay witnesses generally is more important in determining acceptance for prosecution than in determining the probability of conviction given acceptance. Given that the Los Angeles data exclude cases rejected at screening, we would expect the effect of witnesses to be small, if significant at all. Similar data limitations would explain the lack of significance of EASE for Cobb County, where numerous cases that were pled but not indicted were excluded from the data base.

The same two variables were tested using the weighted conviction rate (RATSEN) as a dependent variable. The equation estimated here is:

RATSEN = B(1) + B(2)EASE + B(3)WIT.

Again, as for RATE, equations for all jurisdictions were significant above the .001 level, and all coefficients were significant, with the exception of WIT in Manhattan and Los Angeles, and EASE in Cobb County.

The rationale for including EASE and WIT for explaining the conviction rate is relatively straightforward--the more witnesses one obtains, and the "easier" the mix of arrests, the

higher one's conviction rate. On the other hand, one hypothesis called for including the number of arrests as an independent factor--that more arrest activity would lead to higher levels of "success" (or, alternatively, that more arrest activity dilutes the effectiveness an officer can have, which results in a lower conviction rate). Contrary to either of these alternative hypotheses, in this model there was no significant relationship between conviction rate and the number of arrests.

The third dependent measure identified was the number of convictions (CON), and the fourth was that used for the sample selection, the weighted number of convictions (CONSEN). On average, the expected value of CON is determined by the interaction of EASE and ARR. That is,

E(CON) = (EASE) (ARR), unweighted and
E(CONSEN) = (EASE) (ARRSEN), weighted.

If a given officer experiences the expected incidence of conviction for his particular arrest mix, then his number of convictions will be the inherent convictability of his mix multiplied by the number of arrests. For the sample selection model, the specification was

CONSEN = B(1)ARRSEN + B(2)(ARRSEN)(EASE), where

the value of CONSEN was set by some fraction of the weighted arrests plus the product of weighted arrests (ARRSEN) and the expected rate of conviction (EASE). Empirically, both terms were usually significant; however, in order to control the

characteristics of the equation, it was necessary to constrain the model in two ways that limited the range of its theoretical utility. First, we suppressed the constant in order to force only positive values of CONSEN for real values of ARRSEN. Second, we eliminated EASE, except in combination with ARRSEN, so as to force the right side of the equation to always equal zero for cases in which ARRSEN=0.

Consequently, for our sample selection, we allowed the expected value of CONSEN to be the theoretical expectation plus any additional effect from maximum possible sentence variation. A more complete test of the relationship, analogous to an analysis of variance with main terms and one interaction term, was performed using multiple regression:

CONSEN = B(1) + B(2)ARRSEN + B(3)EASE + B(4)(ARRSEN)(EASE), and

CON = B(1) + B(2)ARR + B(3)EASE + B(4)(ARR)(EASE).

These two forms were tested for each jurisdiction. The interaction term was significant each time, as was expected, since E(CON)=EASE x ARR. However, it was not always true that additional variation in convictions could be attributed to the level of arrests or to the level of inherent convictability (also the expected conviction rate). In two jurisdictions, ARR and ARRSEN were not significant, and in three jurisdictions (four for CONSEN) EASE was not significant. This was most likely due to multicollinearity between each of the pairs of independent factors (except, usually, ARR and EASE). Even so, we took the process one step further, using the residuals from

CON=F((EASE)(ARR)) (weighted and unweighted) regressed on arrests and EASE. Here, there was some additional effect from EASE, but not from arrests.

In the final iteration, having discovered a low probability of an independent effect from arrests, we estimated the forms as:

CON = B(1) + B(2)EASE + B(3)(ARR)(EASE) + B(4)WIT, and

CONSEN = B(1) + B(2)EASE + B(3)(ARRSEN)(EASE) + B(4)WIT.

Again, all of the equations were significant above the .001 level, as was the interaction term. However, WIT was significant (above the .05 level) in only four jurisdictions, and EASE was significant in only five jurisdictions (both for CON and CONSEN). Apparently, once the expected number of convictions is calculated, there is little additional effect from other factors, although in some jurisdictions there clearly are additional effects.

Interestingly, the sign of EASE was negative for all of the sites, except Washington, D.C. This means that once most of the variation in conviction rates has been explained using the expected rate (EASE) multiplied by the number of arrests (ARR or ARRSEN), higher values for EASE lead to lower values of CON and CONSEN. That is, departure from the expected number (or weighted number) of convictions is negatively related to the inherent convictability of an officer's mix of arrests. The easier that mix, the more likely an officer is to fall below his theoretical expectation. The more difficult the mix, the more likely an officer is to exceed his theoretical

expectation. We could posit two possible explanations for this. One is that more experienced officers may handle the more difficult cases. Here, the department's track record would indicate lower expected performance. The fact that, at the margin, a case is more difficult to convict, promotes the probability that it will be handled by someone more likely to receive a conviction. Thus, while the linear effect of EASE is clearly positive, the marginal effect is negative. Alternatively, the additional EASE component may simply be the product of indexing. That is, for any given value of EASE that is higher than the population mean, the probability is relatively higher that any given individual will be below it. For values of EASE lower than the population mean, the probability is relatively greater that the individual will be above it. Put another way, the lower the expectation, the easier it is to exceed it, and the higher the expectation, the more likely it is that an individual will fall short.

The effect of WIT was relatively straightforward. For those cases in which it was significant, the presence of additional lay witnesses serves to enhance the convictability of an arrest. Usually, increasing the average number of lay witnesses per case by one would lead to an increase in convictions of about .3 to .4 (thereby necessitating an increase in witnesses by 2.5 or 3 to yield a one-unit increase in convictions). Putting this into perspective, in Indianapolis, which has the largest witness effect, holding EASE and expected convictions constant, adding an average of one witness per arrest would increase an average conviction rate from 42 to

48 percent (about 14 percent of the total). Considering that the average number of witnesses obtained in Indianapolis is less than one per arrest, this small increase in conviction rate would require that officers double their witness efforts (provided that witness cooperation is related to officer performance). From the standpoint of sentencing, each additional witness per case would yield an additional 20 months maximum sentence. We hasten to add that this is the maximum one would expect from these jurisdictions, in that Indianapolis has the largest witness coefficient.

* * *

Reviewing briefly, we have identified a number of factors that are associated with and tend to help explain variation among officers in their ability to get convictions. The most important factors tend to be the inherent convictability of their mix of arrests, how many lay witnesses are associated with each arrest, and the officer's sex, rank and experience. Even so, there appears to be a certain amount of variation that is not explained.

Most of the factors so far identified are not easily addressed through police department policy. A department could emphasize obtaining and working with witnesses as a means of increasing the productivity of arrests. However, holding the mix of arrests and total potential conviction product (EASE and ARRSEN) constant, the remaining variation does not appear to be explained entirely by witnesses. As well, additional gains that might result from increasing the number of lay witnesses per arrest seem to be small.

Rather, it appears that something associated with particular types of experience is more likely to account for this additional variation. Perhaps there are differences in the way police officers think, approach problems, or carry out their arrest and follow-through activities that tend to account for differing case outcomes. As expected, a certain amount of those differences are understandable by examining other case and officer variables available through PROMIS and personnel records. Incongruities in these findings, however, call for additional analyses of officer attitudes and practices. These are examined in the sections that follow.

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~~REVIEW DRAFT~~

Final
~~DRAFT REPORT~~

ARREST CONVICTABILITY AS A MEASURE OF POLICE PERFORMANCE

- PART TWO -
ANALYSES OF SURVEY DATA

- PART THREE -
CONCLUSIONS

AUGUST 15, 1980(R)



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PART TWO

ANALYSES OF SURVEY DATA

IV. SURVEY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes key elements of the survey design and methodology: the goals of the surveys, questionnaire development, questionnaire content, interviewer recruitment and training, respondent selection and recruitment, interviewing, protocol, and data preparation and coding procedures. Chapter III describes the statistical process by which officers to be surveyed were selected.

A. GOALS OF THE SURVEYS

The surveys of police officers had two principal goals:

(1) To determine the attitudinal and perceptual variables that discriminate LCR officers from HCR officers. Seven sets of variables that were potential discriminators of the two types of officers were identified: (a) background and demographic characteristics, including career patterns and experience; (b) general attitudes toward job and career, including level of satisfaction and perceived improvement or deterioration in job satisfaction; (c) perceptions of the organizational context within which the officer operates and processes his or her arrests, e.g., support from the department, the prosecutor's office, the courts, and the community, and the reward system generated by each of these components; (d) the expansiveness or narrowness of the officer's role concept, most notably, whether the officer believes that making arrests that result in conviction is important; (e) attitudes toward arrests; (f) perceptions of the value of physical and testimonial evidence; and (g) level of knowledge about routine procedures.

(2) To identify and explicate the special techniques employed by HCR officers when they make arrests and perform activities ancillary to making arrests. From a wide-ranging review of investigative activities, five emerged as interview topics: (a) collecting physical evidence; (b) locating witnesses and maintaining witness cooperation; (c) interrogating/interviewing suspects; (d) working with the prosecutor; and (e) working with informants.

The goals of the surveys were deliberately broad-ranging. Since the phenomenon under study is relatively unexplored, its investigation required an approach with considerable breadth rather than one that sharply focused on a few issues. The purpose of this general line of inquiry was to produce information for training programs regarding procedures that might enhance the quality of arrests.

B. QUESTIONNAIRE DEVELOPMENT

Two questionnaires were developed. The first (Part A) addressed the attitudinal and perceptual issues included under the first goal discussed above. It was highly structured, designed for self-administration, and in almost all instances, required that respondents give short, readily codable replies. The second questionnaire (Part B) probed the techniques employed by the officers in arrest and related activities. This instrument consisted mostly of open-ended questions and was designed to be administered by an interviewer eliciting in-depth descriptions of the activities that officers engage in before, during, and after making arrests. (Copies of the questionnaires are included as Appendixes A and B, respectively.)

Development of the two questionnaires was based on both a literature review and in-depth exploratory interviews with a small, carefully drawn sample of police officers from Washington, D.C. Although there is a substantial literature dealing with the attitudes of police officers, there is, nevertheless, a dearth of empirical studies of the relationship between officers' attitudes and their performance or productivity. Thus, the overall conceptual framework for the questionnaire on attitudes and perceptions was derived primarily from the social-psychological literature on work, job satisfaction, and job performance.*

Exploratory in-depth interviews with 10 police officers (both detectives and patrolmen) from the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) aided the development of both questionnaires. These interviews, which lasted almost two hours each and were tape recorded, were relatively unstructured and sought to determine the officers' attitudes about such general issues as their job, their fellow officers, and their supervisors, as well as the specific procedures and techniques they employed during various arrest and arrest-related activities.**

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* A comprehensive review of this literature appears in Katzell, et al. (1975).

** In addition, a battery of items was developed that tapped basic knowledge of routine procedures by adapting questions from "Training Keys" provided by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). A set of items on the relative value of particular pieces of testimonial and physical evidence was created by consulting prosecutors and then pretested on a small sample of prosecutors.

Various drafts of the questionnaires were reviewed by project consultants. The final draft of each was pretested on 12 officers drawn from the Metropolitan Police Department and a neighboring suburban police force (Arlington County, Virginia). The objective of the pretest was to assess the comprehensibility of the wording of the questions, the organization of the questionnaires, the adequacy of the format, and whether the perceived content of each item was the content intended. Each pretest was conducted in two sessions, which reflected the manner in which the actual field work would be conducted. Respondents were asked to complete the first questionnaire and to note any difficulties they encountered. The supervisor of the pretest then reviewed the questionnaire with the respondent, probing for problems in the four areas noted above. Next, respondents were interviewed using the second, largely open-ended instrument. Interviewers noted any problems encountered either by the respondent or themselves in the course of the interview. The second session concluded with respondent commentary on the questionnaire, after which the interviewer and the pretest supervisor reviewed and evaluated the instrument. Pretests were conducted in two stages. After eight pretests, appropriate revisions were incorporated into the questionnaire. A subsequent pretest assessed the quality of those revisions.

The self-administered questionnaire contained questions about a wide range of factors that might influence an officer's conviction rate. Figure IV.1 presents an overview of the variables inquired about, grouped into three categories: those

FIGURE IV.1. SOME HYPOTHETICAL DETERMINANTS OF POLICE PERFORMANCE



concerning the officer, the arrest, and the arrest/case outcome. Each is discussed below.

Regarding officer characteristics, we obtained information about various aspects of each officer's background: age, sex, race, education, and training. We also measured officers' attitudes toward their job and their department and their overall satisfaction with their own performance. Officers were asked to specify their own and their supervisors' criteria for evaluating police performance. Finally, we asked questions to ascertain the officer's knowledge of the law and of police procedures.

Arrest characteristics were measured in terms of the nature of the arrests officers make and whether the officers routinely collect evidence or locate witnesses. We also asked the officers to define the characteristics of a "good arrest" and a "poor arrest," to indicate how often they make good arrests, and to describe the positive and negative consequences of making good arrests and poor arrests.

The arrest or case outcome, i.e., whether an officer's arrests usually end in a conviction and sentence or reach some other disposition, may have important consequences for the officer's motivation and morale. Consequently, we asked officers a number of questions about the means they have for learning the outcomes of their arrests.

As noted above, the open-ended questionnaire was developed through intensive interviews with police and prosecutors to establish what they viewed as important in doing their jobs and what factors were crucial to bringing good cases to the prosecutor. Analysis of those interviews revealed the five basic areas of police work noted in Section A above. Thus, the instrument was designed to elicit responses to questions bearing on those five areas.

In each instance, officers were asked to recall whether they had ever engaged in certain activities relating to those areas, the exact nature of the circumstances, and how they had proceeded. The purpose of the questions was to determine what kinds of circumstances the officers perceived as difficult,

what they did to deal with those difficulties, and what their specific goals and procedures are in doing their jobs. Further, officers were asked to distinguish between what they usually do and what they do in "special" circumstances. A final set of questions asked each officer to relate, in each area of work, what it was, if anything, that he or she did differently from other officers.

C. INTERVIEWER RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

The quality of interviewers is always an important factor in the success of a survey, and particularly so in this study. The activities that the officers were asked to describe in the face-to-face interviews encompassed behaviors that were apt to be "second nature" to them and thus difficult to discuss beyond citation of surface details. Therefore, it was important that interviewers probe respondents, yet do so in a way that did not lead them or make them feel they were being pressed. In addition, we anticipated that interviewer-respondent rapport might be particularly difficult to establish. Some officers might be reluctant to disclose elements of their behavior for fear they may be giving away secrets or revealing procedures that the interviewer might not fully understand or approve of.

For these and related reasons, we assembled a team of eight interviewers who had prior police experience at the local, state, or federal level and prior interview experience. Interviewers attended a two-day training session just prior to the start of field work, during which each interviewer did a "dry run" interview with a police officer, which was then critiqued by the field supervisor.

D. RESPONDENT SELECTION

Using the statistical technique described in Chapter III, we identified officers whose conviction rates were significantly above and below expected levels, controlling for charge seriousness, charge reduction, and the inherent convictability of the arrest mix. The officers were then arranged in a stratified listing.

For Washington, D.C., a sample of 200 respondents was generated. Selection of an initial group of 100 respondents was based on a "blocking" technique, whereby officers with the most similar adjusted conviction rates were paired; from each pair, one was randomly selected for inclusion in the study. Each officer who declined to participate was replaced with his or her paired counterpart. The purpose of this procedure was to eliminate the potential for bias due to a correlation between nonresponse and performance. If both members of a pair declined to participate, they were replaced with an "unused" officer from a pair of officers whose adjusted conviction rates were most similar to those of the pair that declined.

For Manhattan, it was more difficult to identify and locate officers on the basis of data in PROMIS. Therefore, from the stratified sample, we selected the 200 officers with the highest adjusted conviction rates and the 200 with the lowest, double the number selected in Washington. The lists were then integrated into two new lists so that is was impossible for those contacting the officers to distinguish between HCR and LCR officers. The lists were arranged so that sequential extraction beginning at the top would yield a representative

selection of the HCR and LCR officers. The second list was to be used only after the first was completely exhausted.

Even though sampling was done in different ways, a subsequent comparison of the officers actually interviewed revealed that comparable groups were obtained from Washington, D.C., and Manhattan. There were, aside from refusals, no detectable induced sampling biases.

The refusals did not change the sample in any significant way. However, because so large a sampling frame was necessary (20 percent in each tail of the distribution, both in Washington, D.C., and in Manhattan), we were concerned that some of the officers in the sample might not be statistically different from those in the middle, unsampled, group. Using the more rigorous specification described in Chapter III, the respondents were then restratified into three, rather than two, groups for analysis. This insured that the HCR and LCR groups were not only different from each other, but from the middle group as well. In the analysis, we make reference to the middle group (MCR) only when necessary to expand or explicate findings. In general, however, in the self-administered questionnaire portion, for example, significant differences between the HCR and LCR groups were so few that reference to the middle group (i.e., for testing linearity) was not appropriate.

E. RESPONDENT RECRUITMENT

The procedure for recruiting selected respondents varied owing to differences in the nature of participation from the two police departments.

In Washington, D.C., we were not permitted to conduct interviews during on-duty time. Interviews were arranged for off-duty time and the officers were compensated accordingly. Through a grant from the Washington, D.C., Office of Criminal Justice Plans and Analysis, we were able to compensate each officer at the rate of $35 per interview. To a certain extent, we attribute the high response rate in Washington to the fact that payment was involved.

When arrangements for the payment were completed, a bulletin was circulated to the entire force, with the cooperation of the Chief of Police, announcing the survey and encouraging cooperation among all officers who were asked to participate. Letters were then sent to the 100 officers (at their police department unit addresses), asking them to contact INSLAW to make an appointment to be interviewed. Anyone who did not call for an appointment within four days of receipt of the letter was re-contacted by mail. Further failure to contact INSLAW within two days prompted a phone call to the officer to urge his or her participation. It was only after direct refusal over the telephone that a respondent was categorized as a "refuser" and replaced. Replacement officers were recruited by telephoning them at their precincts.

Through persistent contact and rescheduling, we were able to obtain 99 interviews in Washington, D.C. Of the 99 officers, four were removed from the sample.* Interviewing of MPD

*For reasons inherent in the data base (the apparent re-assignment of badge numbers or misidentification in PROMIS), we determined that four officers had been selected mistakenly. In the case of several, the interviews were curtailed shortly after their initiation when the error was realized. Subsequent efforts to replace them with alternates were unsuccessful.

officers was conducted from September 28, 1979, to October 19, 1979, in the Washington, D.C., offices of INSLAW.

For the Manhattan sample, with the cooperation of the New York City Police Department (NYCPD), INSLAW staff verified the identities of officers (beginning with the highest HCR and the lowest LCR officer). The department then ordered the officers to report to the auditorium at Police Headquarters at an appointed time. Upon arrival, the officers were given the option of participating or not. Due to time contraints (one week on-site and not three as in Washington), refusals and no-shows, 83 written questionnaires were completed and 73 personal interviews were conducted.

An effort was made to reach 100 interviewees with the self-administered questionnaire. Approximately 30 questionnaires were mailed to the NYCPD coordinator who distributed them, a letter of request from INSLAW, and an addressed, postage paid envelope. By this technique an additional 13 questionnaires were returned (of the 13 only 10 were included in the analysis); 93 self-administered questionnaires were eventually subjected to analysis.

F. INTERVIEWING PROTOCOL

The essential features of the interviewing protocol were identical for both Washington, D.C., and Manhattan. Respondents arrived at the interview site and were greeted by a staff member who described the exercise they were about to participate in, emphasized the need for them to be totally candid in their responses, and stressed the confidentiality of their replies. If, at this point, the officer agreed to participate,

he or she was asked to sign a master ledger and was then escorted to a desk to complete the self-administered questionnaire. Once done with this task, the officer was then randomly assigned to an available interviewer who administered the second questionnaire. Upon completion of the interview, the respondent was asked not to divulge the content of the questionnaire to fellow officers, as some of them might be among the study's respondents. At no time were respondents apprised of the specific research objectives of the project, although they were told that we were hoping to learn about officers' attitudes toward police work and methods they employed in performing their jobs. Neither the interviewer nor the respondent was told whether the respondent was a high or low conviction rate officer.

The average duration of the self-administered questionnaire was 60 minutes. On average, the personal interviews lasted 1 to 2 hours; some were as short as 30 minutes and some lasted longer than 3 hours. One of the drawbacks of the interview guide was that, through our desire to probe the officers' responses, many of the questions touched on the same subject. A number of officers voiced discontent at this aspect, and some clearly were anxious to terminate the interview as quickly as possible. In general, however, cooperation was quite good.

G. DATA PREPARATION AND CODING

Data entry for most of the written questionnaire was relatively straightforward in that the responses were a number from, say, one to five or a yes or no. The few open-ended

questions were coded independently by coders who did not know the officers' HCR/LCR status.

The interview guide, however, presented a number of challenging problems. The responses to the interview questions were quite varied. This necessitated use of an elaborate coding technique to reduce the responses to an analyzable dimension. First, we examined a large number of questionnaires and compiled lists of the responses that were being provided. Next, we collapsed similar responses into categories and associated codes with each category. Following the code building, we trained two coders to go through each of the interviews and translate the varied responses into analyzable codes. For approximately 50 of the interviews, both coders coded the same questionnaires. At the conclusion of a coding session, they compared results and resolved as many discrepancies as possible. Following that, they met with the project analyst who reviewed all of the discrepancies (including those already resolved) and made a ruling or interpretation for each one. The aim of this process was to ensure consistency and correctness in the coding. After the first 50 interviews were coded, the number of differences had been reduced to well below 5 percent. Following that, the coders worked separately. Periodic spot checks and open consultation with the analyst ensured that the coding results were consistent and correct.

Coded data were then entered into the computer. A computer program was used to ensure that the data entered were logically consistent. When typographical errors were detected, data were corrected manually by going back to the coding instruments; if

a coding error was detected, the data were corrected by referring back to the questionnaire. This was followed by a 10 percent check of the finished data base against the coding instrument, which revealed virtually no remaining entry errors.

* * *

In the chapters that follow, we describe the analyses performed on the information obtained through these surveys. In Chapters V and VI, we detail the results of the self-administered questionnaires from Washington, D.C., and Manhattan. In Chapter VII, we examine the information obtained in the interviews. Study conclusions are presented in Chapter VIII.

V. WRITTEN QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS: WASHINGTON, D.C.

This chapter presents the findings from the written questionnaires completed by 34 HCR officers and 35 LCR officers from the District of Columbia's Metropolitan Police Department.* When we found differences between the responses of the two groups of officers, we used appropriate tests of statistical significance to determine whether the differences observed were large enough for us to infer that HCR and LCR officers in general (not just those whom we had sampled) differ with regard to that characteristic. The reader should note, however, that the number of officers included in these analyses is small and that only large differences observed between the two groups approach a conventional level of statistical significance. Because of the exploratory nature of this research and the reduced power of the statistical tests, we set our significance criterion at $p \leq .10$ and will discuss trends that are of interest even if they fail to meet this criterion.

A. OFFICERS' BACKGROUNDS

Table V.1 presents demographic characteristics of the HCR and LCR officers. There were few differences between the two groups, and none was statistically significant. Most of the officers were white males between the ages of 26 and 44; the HCR officers were slightly older than the LCR officers. Approximately two-thirds of them were married, and a majority had received at least some college education. A higher

* The remaining 26 officers were in the middle conviction rate (MCR) group and are not discussed in this analysis.

Table V.1

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF HCR AND LCR OFFICERS,
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Officer Characteristic	HCR Officers (N = 34)	LCR Officers (N = 35)
Sex:		
Male	97%*	91%*
Female	3	9
Age:		
18-25	9%	9%
26-30	32	43
31-34	24	17
35-44	35	31
Race:		
Black	27%	29%
White	73	71
Education:		
Less than high school	3%	0%
High school graduate	29	37
Some college	41	51
College graduate	24	9
Graduate degree	3	3
Marital status:		
Single	6%	14%
Divorced/separated	29	11
Married	65	75

*Percents rounded.

proportion of HCR officers (27 percent) had completed college than LCR officers (12 percent).

The majority of both HCR and LCR officers had been members of the Metropolitan Police Department for at least six years. As seen in Table V.2, less than 15 percent of the officers had served in the department for five or fewer years. In addition, almost all of the officers had policed only in the D.C. department. One HCR and one LCR officer indicated that they had previously been police officers in another police department.

The majority of both HCR and LCR officers currently held the rank of patrolman, and two-thirds of them indicated that their current assignments allowed them substantial opportunity for making arrests. Thus, these officers presumably had substantial experience to draw on in completing the questionnaire.

Officers in the HCR group were more likely to have earned a degree in a police-related field, and LCR officers were more apt to be currently seeking a degree in a police-related field or to have taken nondegree courses. For both groups, courses tended to be in the social sciences or the humanities. About one-half of the HCR and LCR officers indicated that they had taken classes at the police academy beyond those that were required.

Despite the fact that the two groups of officers were chosen because of their differing conviction rates, officers of both groups indicated that they had received commendations or awards within the last two years. Moreover, the types of

Table V.2

EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING OF HCR AND LCR OFFICERS,
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Officer Characteristic	HCR Officers (N = 34)	LCR Officers (N = 35)
Years in the D.C. Police Department		
3-5	13%*	12%*
6-10	56	71
11-15	31	18
Current rank		
Patrolman	53%	60%
Detective	38	23
Unknown	9	17
Received an award or commendation in last two years	79%	74%
Degree in field relevant to police work	24%	14%
Is seeking degree in field relevant to police work	6%	20%
Has taken nondegree courses/ classes relevant to police work	15%**	43%**

*Percents rounded
**P<.05

awards given to HCR and LCR officers were the same; most were for outstanding police work--closing cases and making arrests--rather than for rescuing persons or other types of community service. This could mean that LCR officers were perceived by their department to be functioning as well as HCR officers or that criteria other than conviction rate are used to select recipients of these awards. We know, for example, that some awards are given to entire units for their performance. On the other hand, these findings may also indicate a lack of additional recognition for officers who attain higher conviction rates. This issue will be addressed later when we look at officers' perceptions of the consequences for officers who make good or poor arrests.

B. OFFICERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD SELVES AND JOB

1. Satisfaction with Job

We had hypothesized that HCR officers might be more satisfied with their jobs as police officers than LCR officers. We found, however, that both HCR and LCR officers tended to be satisfied with their jobs. As shown in Table V.3, approximately three-quarters of both groups reported that they were mostly satisfied with their jobs. Both groups were also likely to report satisfaction with their current assignment. Dissatisfaction with current assignment was a little more likely among LCR officers, but the actual number of officers was quite small.

We also asked the officers whether their job satisfaction had increased, decreased, or remained about the same over the

Table V.3

JOB SATISFACTION OF HCR AND LCR OFFICERS,
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

	HCR Officers	LCR Officers
Satisfaction with job as a police officer:	% (34)	% (35)
Very/mostly satisfied	74	77
A little more satisfied than dissatisfied	18	17
A little more dissatisfied than satisfied	6	--
Very/mostly dissatisfied	3	6
	101%*	100%
Satisfaction with current assignment:	% (33)	% (33)
Very/mostly satisfied	91	73
A little more satisfied than dissatisfied	3	6
A little more dissatisfied than satisfied	3	6
Very/mostly dissatisfied	3	15
	100%	100%

*Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.

last few years. Eighty-two percent of the HCR officers and 69 percent of the LCR officers reported that their job satisfaction had changed; in each group about half said it had increased and the rest reported a decrease.

A final question in this series asked officers to estimate how satisfied they would be if they were working in a nonpolice job. Approximately one-half of each group said they would be less satisfied, and approximately 40 percent of each group said they did not know how satisfied they would be.

We conclude, therefore, that most MPD officers studied were relatively satisfied with their jobs. No significant differences were found between HCR and LCR officers with regard to job satisfaction.

2. Ratings of Job Quality

Next, we asked the officers to rate the quality of different aspects of their jobs on a five-point scale (from poor to excellent). Table V.4 presents the mean ratings of HCR and LCR officers. We found considerable similarity in the ratings of the two groups. Moreover, the Spearman correlation of the rank order of the ratings by the two groups of officers was +.95, which indicates that items rated highly by HCR officers were also rated highly by LCR officers.

Both groups of officers rated aspects of their own performance, that of their supervisors, and that of evidence technicians most highly. The courts, the prosecutors, and police administrators were rated lowest. Both groups also

Table V.4

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' RATINGS OF THE QUALITY OF ASPECTS OF THEIR JOB, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

ITEM RATED (Presented In Descending Order Of HCR Officers' Ratings)	MEAN RATING OF HCR AND LCR OFFICERS. (Scale: 1 = Poor, 2 = Fair, 3 = Good, 4 = Very Good, 5 = Excellent)#		
	HCR Officers (N = 34)**	LCR Officers (N = 35)**	P*
The quality of the work done by evidence technicians and the crime lab	3.66	3.41	> .10
The quality of the arrests made by the police in this department	3.29	2.97	> .10
Your immediate supervisor	3.24	2.91	>.10
The quality of the job that uniformed officers in this department are doing	3.18	3.03	>.10
The number of evidence technicians in this department	3.04	3.04	>.10
The quality of the formal police training you received	3.03	2.91	>.10
The degree to which your job uses your skills and talents	2.97	2.94	>.10
The quality of the job that detectives in the department are doing	2.75	2.91	>.10
The ability of the police to control crime	2.68	2.80	>.10
The prosecutor's office's general ability to get convictions	2.68	2.74	>.10
The quality of police equipment (cars, radios, etc.)	2.65	2.49	>.10
The quality of the feedback you receive from your supervisor on how good a job you are doing	2.59	2.34	>.10
The quality of the job that prosecutors in this city are doing	2.44	2.50	>.10
The quality of the job that higher criminal courts in this city are doing	2.36	2.33	>.10
Your salary	2.34	2.39	>.10
The quality of the administration of this department	2.06	1.97	>.10
Community support for the police	2.03	2.03	>.10
The quality of the job that lower criminal courts in this city are doing	1.72	1.88	>.10

*By T-test

**N's vary slightly from item to item because of missing responses.

#Spearman rank order correlation of the relative ordering of HCR and LCR officers' ratings of the items = +.95.

rated support of the community for the police to be, on the average, poor.

3. Definition of a Successful Officer

We asked each officer to describe the qualities of an extremely successful police officer. Table V.5 presents the responses, broken down into two categories: characteristics related to performance, and those related to the officer's personality.

Knowledge of the job was the performance characteristic most frequently cited by HCR officers. A little less than one-third of both groups listed this as a characteristic of an extremely successful police officer. Sensitivity to the community was the second most frequently given response of HCR officers, but it was the most frequent response made by LCR officers. The latter were twice as likely to list this characteristic as were HCR officers, and this difference was significant at the $p<.05$ level. One important aspect of this finding is its consistency; in several other aspects of the written questionnaire, to be presented, we found a heightened sensitivity among LCR officers to community and citizen-related issues.

About one-third of HCR and LCR officers stated that an extremely successful officer has a good attitude or morale. Officers in the HCR group were more likely than LCR officers to describe successful officers as being dedicated and able to work with others.

After the officers described the characteristics of an extremely successful officer, they were asked to rate their

Table V.5

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' CONCEPTIONS OF AN EXTREMELY SUCCESSFUL POLICE OFFICER, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Characteristics of an Extremely Successful Officer[a]	Percent of Officers Who Said This[†]	
	HCR Officers (N = 34)	LCR Officers (N = 35)
Performance related:		
Knows the job	29	29
Sensitive to the community	24**	54**
Has ability to handle difficulties/crises	18	20
Knows the law	18	9
Has ability to adapt to routine situations	15	20
Has knowledge of the community	12	11
Personality related:		
Has good general attitude or morale	35	29
Dedicated	29*	9*
Team work/able to work with fellow officers	12	0

[a]Includes all items listed by at least 10 percent of HCR or LCR officers.

[†]Percents total more than 100 because of multiple responses per officer.

**P<.05.

*P<.10.

own success as an officer on a six-point scale (from extremely successful to extremely unsuccessful). Three-quarters of the HCR officers (76 percent) stated that they considered themselves to be very or extremely successful, compared with about one-half (54 percent) of the LCR officers, a difference that was significant at the p .10 level. Officers in the LCR group were about twice as likely as HCR officers to call themselves "somewhat successful."

We noted above that HCR officers and LCR officers were about equally likely to say that they were very or mostly satisfied with their jobs as police officers. Our finding that HCR officers perceived themselves to be more successful in their jobs than did LCR officers seemed to imply that job satisfaction was unrelated to an officer's perception of his success, for if successful officers were more satisfied with their jobs we would have found greater satisfaction among HCR officers. We tested this possibility by dividing each group of officers according to whether they had stated that they were very/extremely successful or that they were less successful, and then looked at the percentage of each subgroup who said they were very or mostly satisfied with their jobs as police officers. The results appear on the page. We found no association between an officer's perception of his success and his satisfaction with his job. Officers who believed they were very or extremely successful were as likely to be very or mostly satisfied with their job as officers who believed they were less successful. Apparently, an officer's job satisfaction

within the Metropolitan Police Department is not primarily dependent on personal perceptions of success at the job.

Percentage of Officers Who Reported They Were Very/Mostly Satisfied with Their Jobs, by Perceived Success and Status

	Officers who reported they were:			
	Very/Extremely Successful		Less Successful	
Officer Group	(N)	%	(N)	%
HCR officers	(26)	73	(8)	75
LCR officers	(19)	79	(16)	75

C. JOB PRIORITIES AND EVALUATION CRITERIA

1. Importance of Impressing Various Persons

We asked the police officers to rate how important it was to them that each of eight groups of persons have a favorable impression of them. The ratings were made on a five-point scale (from "not important at all" to "extremely important"). Table V.6 shows how the officers rated each of the eight groups.

The first thing that should be noted is that all groups of persons received a mean rating of 3.00 or higher, which indicates that police officers tended to believe that it was at least "somewhat important" that each of these groups have a favorable impression of them. In addition, we found considerable similarity in the way officers rated each of the groups. None of the differences between the mean ratings of HCR and LCR officers was statistically significant at $p<.10$, although one rating, the importancce of impressing citizens,

Table V.6

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE TO THEM OF IMPRESSING VARIOUS PERSONS, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

	MEAN RATING OF THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPRESSING PERSONS AT LEFT (Scale: 1-Not Important at All; 2-Slightly Important; 3-Somewhat Important; 4-Very Important; 5-Extremely Important		
TO IMPRESS:	HCR OFFICERS (N=34)**	LCR OFFICERS (N=35)**	P*
Uniformed officers you work with	4.29	4.20***	>.10
Your supervisor(s)	4.15	4.00	>.10
Citizens	4.03***	4.40	.10
Prosecutors	4.00	3.74	>.10
Detectives you work with	3.82	3.91	>.10
Judges	3.65	3.91	>.10
Evidence technicians/ Crime Lab personnel	3.36	3.51	>.10
Officers of higher rank than your own (who are not your supervisors)	3.15	3.14	>.10

*By T-Test.

**N's vary slightly from item to item because of missing responses.

***In a separate task officers were asked to indicate which of the eight groups of persons were most important to impress. This was the group chosen by the greatest percentage of officers.

was close to statistical significance at the .10 level. (Normally, we would dismiss this finding because of the large number of statistical tests performed. However, additional information to be presented, plus the finding above that LCR officers were more likely to say that sensitivity to the community was an indication of officer success, leads us to believe that there may be a systematic difference here between HCR and LCR officers).

Both HCR and LCR officers rated uniformed officers they work with, their supervisor, and citizens to be persons whose favorable impression was very important to them.

After each officer rated each of the eight groups of persons, he or she was asked to select the one group of the eight whose favorable impression was most important. The group selected by the most LCR officers was citizens. Thirty-eight percent of the 34 responding LCR officers chose this group. The next most important group was their supervisors, chosen by 24 percent of the LCR officers. Officers in the HCR group were most likely to indicate that the uniformed officers they worked with were the persons they most wanted to have a favorable impression of them. This group was chosen by 44 percent of the 32 responding HCR officers, as compared with 18 percent of the 34 responding LCR officers. Citizens were the second most important group, selected by 19 percent of the HCR officers. Thus, we find again the tendency for more LCR officers to express sensitivity to the community than HCR officers.

2. Factors Important to Police Officers In Evaluating Their Performance

We presented HCR and LCR officers with a list of 16 factors that could be used to evaluate a police officer's job performance and asked them to rate the importance of each factor when they evaluate their own performance. Ratings were again made on a five-point scale (from "not at all important" to "extremely important").

Table V.7 indicates there were few differences in the way the two groups of officers rated the items. In only 2 of the 16 items were the mean ratings of the HCR and LCR officers sufficiently different so as to be statistically significant at the $p \leq .10$ level. Officers in the LCR group rated the items "avoiding antagonizing the public" and "being highly visible to the public when you're on patrol" as more important than did HCR officers.

We would normally dismiss the importance of these two differences, because with the larger number of statistical tests we conducted, we would expect to find one or two statistically significant differences to occur just by chance. However, because the probability levels for these differences were both $<.05$, and because they both indicate that LCR officers ascribe greater importance to issues related to the public than do HCR officers, we suspect that the two types of officers may in fact differ with regard to their sensitivity to the public.

The 16 factors in Table V.7 are presented in descending order of the mean ratings of the HCR officers. Thus, "making

Table V.7

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' OPINIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE TO THEM OF VARIOUS FACTORS IN EVALUATING THEIR OWN PERFORMANCE
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Importance To The Officer Of:	MEAN RATING OF HCR AND LCR OFFICERS# (SCALE: 1-Not At All Important, 2-Slightly Important, 3-Somewhat Important, 4-Very Important, 5-Extremely Important) HCR Officers (N=34)**	LCR Officers (N=35)**	P***
Making good arrests	4.76	4.63	>.10
Your ability to testify in court	4.73	4.77	>.10
How thoroughly and carefully you complete your arrest and offense reports	4.44	4.54	>.10
Your ability to locate evidence at the scene of the crime	4.41	4.66	>.10
Obtaining the cooperation of the witnesses	4.38	4.57	>.10
Maintaining the cooperation of witnesses	4.32	4.34	>.10
Locating witnesses to crimes	4.29	4.46	>.10
Your ability to work well with the prosecutor after an arrest has been made	4.18	4.17	>.10
Arriving quickly at the scene of a crime	4.06	4.37	>.10
How well you get along with your fellow officers	3.88	3.91	>.10
The number of arrests you make that result in conviction	3.79	3.80	>.10
Avoiding antagonizing the public	3.59	4.09	<.05
Being available for calls	3.59	3.60	>.10
The number of your cases that get cleared by arrest*	3.28	3.31	>.10
The number of felony arrests that you make	3.12	3.00	>.10
Being highly visible to the public when you're on patrol	2.45	3.51	<.01

*Asked only of detectives, for HCR N=18, for LCR N=13.
**N's vary slightly for individual items because of missing information.
***By t-test.
#Spearman rank order correlation of the relative ordering of the item ratings for HCR and LCR officers =+.94.

good arrests" was the behavior given the highest overall rating of importance by the HCR officers. The mean rating for this item (4.76) indicates that HCR officers tended to rate "making good arrests" to be extremely important when they evaluate their own performance. Officers in the LCR group also rated this behavior highly, although it was the third highest item for them. *

There was considerable similarity in the rank ordering of the mean ratings of the 16 items for the two groups of officers. The five items that received the highest rankings from HCR officers were also among the top five for the LCR officers, although the actual rankings did not always agree exactly. Similarly, the three behaviors that received the lowest ratings from HCR officers were also among the three lowest rated items for the LCR officers. This overall similarity in the relative importance of these items for the two groups of officers is indicated by the Spearman rank order correlation of +.94.

*These ratings could have been influenced by the officers' knowledge that the study concerned officers who make good arrests.

We conclude that both groups of officers tend to ascribe similar degrees of importance to these factors when they evaluate their own job performance. However, we did again find some evidence that LCR officers may be a little more sensitive to the public than HCR officers.

3. Police Officers' Perceptions of Factors Important to Their Supervisors

We presented the HCR and LCR officers with the same list of 16 items that could be used to evaluate an officer's job performance. This time, however, we asked them to rate how important each factor was to their supervisors in rating an officer's job performance. Ratings were made on the same five-point scale. Table V.8 presents these findings.

The two groups of officers rated their supervisors similarly. None of the differences in the mean ratings of importance of the 16 items was statistically significant. In addition, the rank order of the importance of the factors was similar in the two groups (Spearman rank order correlation, +.90). Thus, both groups of officers indicated that it was very or extremely important to their supervisors that the police officer avoid antagonizing the public. This item received the highest mean rating of importance from both HCR and LCR officers.

The two groups of officers also agreed on the behavior that they believed was least important (of the 16) to their supervisors. They indicated that an officer's arrest convictability success is only slightly or somewhat important to supervisors. This is somewhat surprising, in view of the

Table V.8
HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS FACTORS TO THEIR SUPERVISOR IN EVALUATIING OFFICERS' PERFORMANCE,
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Importance To The Supervisor Of:	MEAN RATING OF HCR AND LCR OFFICERS# (SCALE: 1-Not At All Important, 2-Slightly Important, 3-Somewhat Important, 4-Very Important, 5-Extremely Important) HCR Officers (N=34)**	LCR Officers (N=35)**	P***
Avoiding antagonizing the public	4.42	4.24	>.10
Being available for calls	4.18	3.76	>.10
How thoroughly and carefully you complete your arrest and offense reports	4.09	4.18	>.10
Arriving quickly at the scene of a crime	4.06	3.84	>.10
The number of felony arrests that you make	3.91	3.70	>.10
The relative number of your cases that get cleared by arrest*	3.89	4.00	>.10
Your ability to locate evidence at the scene of the crime	3.66	3.82	>.10
Locating witnesses to crimes	3.62	3.30	>.10
Obtaining the cooperation of witnesses	3.59	3.21	>.10
How well you get along with your fellow officers	3.59	3.31	>.10
Making good arrests	3.53	3.45	>.10
Your ability to be highly visible to the public when you're on patrol	3.23	3.31	>.10
Maintaining the cooperation of witnesses	3.03	2.90	>.10
Your ability to testify in court	2.85	2.91	>.10
Your ability to work with the prosecutor after an arrest has been made	2.68	2.58	>.10
The number of arrests you make that result in conviction	2.45	2.53	>.10

*Asked only of detectives, for HCR N = 18; for LCR N = 14.
**N's vary slightly for individual items because of missing information.
***By t-test.
#Spearman rank order correlation of the relative ordering of the item ratings for HCR and LCR officers = +.90.

fact that we had selected the two groups of officers specifically because they differed with regard to their conviction rates.

4. Comparison of Officers' Self-ratings With Their Perceptions of Their Supervisors' Ratings

For both HCR and LCR officers, we found little similarity between the rank order of the mean ratings of importance of the 16 items to themselves and to their supervisors. For example, "making good arrests" was the most important item to HCR officers, but it was the eleventh item in their ratings of their supervisors. Similarly, LCR officers rated "their ability to testify in court" first, but they rated it thirteenth for their supervisors. The negative Spearman rank order correlations for the rank order of officers' self-ratings and their ratings of their supervisors (-.24 for HCR officers; -.10 for LCR officers) illustrate this trend for officers to rate the importance of these items differently for their supervisors than for themselves. In the next section, we present findings from a small survey of MPD field supervisors and contrast these results with those obtained from the officers.

5. Supervisors' Actual Ratings and Their Relationship To Officers' Ratings

During the week in which police officers were completing the written questionnaire, we conducted telephone interviews

with police supervisors in each of the MPD precincts in the District of Columbia.*

Twelve of the 13 supervisors interviewed were men. All were between the ages of 30 and 44 (mean = 38.6 years). They had served in the department for an average of 15.7 years and had held supervisory positions for at least 4 years (mean = 8.0 years). Five were lieutenants and 8 were sergeants. Thus, the persons interviewed had considerable police experience on which to draw in answering the interviewer's questions.

The structured telephone interview asked the supervisor for information about (a) his or her ratings of the importance of various criteria for evaluating police officers' job performance and (b) his or her experience in the police department.

Each supervisor was asked to rate the importance of the 16 performance criteria when they evaluate their officers' job performance. These 16 items and the rating scales used were identical to those that the police officers had employed. (Minor changes in wording were made to convert the items from self-ratings to supervisors' ratings.) The mean ratings of the

*The interviewer explained the purpose of the study and requested permission to conduct the interview. Nonsupervisory personnel and persons who worked primarily in the office were excluded from the survey. Cooperation was enhanced by the fact that INSLAW had circulated a memo throughout the department describing the study and stressing the department's approval.

Because no formal sampling procedures were used, the results of this survey may not be representative of all MPD supervisory personnel in the District of Columbia.

importance of each item to 12 of the supervisors are presented in Table V.9.*

All of the items were considered to be at least somewhat important (on the average) to the supervisors. The most important item was the officer's ability to testify in court. This was followed by items concerned with the officer's making good arrests and with the thorough completion of arrest and offense reports. The items of least importance to the supervisors were the number of arrests that an officer makes and the number of a detective's cases that are cleared by arrest.** Table V.10 compares the officers' ratings of the importance of the items to themselves and to their supervisors and the supervisors' ratings. To facilitate comparison among the ratings, only the rank order of the mean importance of each item is presented. The mean ratings for each of the items have been presented in the prior tables. It should be noted that we do not know how many of the 12 supervisors actually supervised the police officers who completed questionnaires.

It is clear from Table V.10 that the police officers' perceptions of the importance of these factors to supervisors do not agree with the supervisors' ratings of the items. For

*One supervisor was dropped from study because he indicated that the criteria did not apply to the type of officers he supervised.

**Since supervisors knew the present study was concerned with arrest and convictability, it is not surprising that they rated the quantity of arrests to be of low priority.

Table V.9

SUPERVISORS' OPINIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS FACTORS IN EVALUATING OFFICERS' JOB PERFORMANCE, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Importance To The Supervisor Of:	MEAN RATING OF SUPERVISORS (N=12)* (Scale: 1-Not At All Important, 2-Slightly Important, 3-Somewhat Important, 4-Very Important, 5-Extremely Important)
Their ability to testify in court	4.75
Their making good arrests	4.58
How thoroughly and carefully they complete their arrest and offense reports	4.58
Their ability to locate evidence at the scene of the crime	4.50
Their obtaining the cooperation of witnesses	4.42
Their maintaining the cooperation of witnesses	4.33
Their ability to work with the prosecutor after an arrest has been made	4.33
Their locating witnesses to crimes	4.17
Avoiding antagonizing the public	3.83
The number of arrests they make that result in conviction	3.75
Their arriving quickly at the scene of a crime	3.67
How well they get along with their fellow officers	3.58
Being highly visible to the public when they are on patrol	3.50
Their being available for calls	3.42
The number of arrests that they make	3.33
The number of their cases that get cleared by arrest	3.17

*Only six supervisors responded to the item, "The Number Of Their Cases That Get Cleared By Arrest." This item was applicable only to persons who supervised detectives. All 12 supervisors rated the other items.

Table V.10

COMPARISON OF THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS FACTORS TO HCR AND LCR OFFICERS AND TO THEIR SUPERVISORS WHEN THEY EVALUATE OFFICERS' JOB PERFORMANCE, D. C. Metropolitan Police Department

(Each column presents the rank order of 16 items, according to the mean rating of 'importance': 1=item which received the highest mean rating. The average rank is presented for tied items.)

Officer's Ability Or Performance	HCR OFFICERS' RATINGS (1) Importance To Officer	HCR OFFICERS' RATINGS (2) Perceived Importance To Supervisor	SUPERVISORS' RATINGS (3) Importance To Supervisor	LCR OFFICERS' RATINGS (4) Importance To Officer	LCR OFFICERS' RATINGS (5) Perceived Importance To Supervisor
Making good arrests	1	11	2.5	3	8
Ability to testify in court	2	14	1	1	13
How thoroughly and carefully the officer completes arrest and offense reports	3	3	2.5	5	2
Ability to locate evidence at the scene of the crime	4	7	4	2	5
Obtaining the cooperation of the witnesses	5	9.5	5	4	12
Maintaining the cooperation of the witnesses	6	13	6.5	8	14
Locating witnesses to crimes	7	8	8	6	11
Ability to work well with the prosecutor after an arrest has been made	8	15	6.5	9	15
Arriving quickly at the scene of a crime	9	4	11	7	4
How well officer gets along with fellow officers	10	9.5	12	11	9.5
The number of arrests that result in conviction	11	16	10	12	16
Avoiding antagonizing the public	12.5	1	9	10	1
Being available for calls	12.5	2	14	13	6
The number of cases that get cleared by arrest	14	6	16	15	3
The number of felony arrests that officer makes	15	5	15	16	7
Being highly visible to the public when on patrol	16	12	13	14	9.5

#Caution should be utilized in interpreting the ranks presented. The item ranked 16th in each column received the lowest mean rating of importance. This does not necessarily signify that this item was of no importance to the respondents. To discover the actual mean level of importance given to an item, the reader should consult Tables V-7, V-8 and V-9.

SPEARMAN RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS OF THE RANK ORDER OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ITEMS

Importance to Officer vs. Perceived Importance to Supervisor: HCR Officers (Column 1 vs. 2) = -.24; LCR Officers (Column 4 vs. 5) = -.10.

Importance to Officer vs. Actual Importance to Supervisors: HCR Officers (Column 1 vs. 3) = +.94; LCR Officers (Column 4 vs. 3) = +.93.

Perceived Importance to Supervisor vs. Actual Importance to Supervisor: HCR Officer (Column 2 vs. 3) = -.31; LCR Officers (Column 4 vs. 3) = -.22.

example, both HCR and LCR officers indicated that supervisors were most concerned with avoiding antagonizing the public. In contrast, this item was ranked ninth by the supervisors. Similarly, supervisors indicated that an officer's ability to testify in court was very important (this received the highest mean rating of importance), but HCR and LCR officers indicated that this factor was of relatively less importance to the supervisor (this item was ranked fourteenth and thirteenth by HCR and LCR officers, respectively, when they rated importance to their supervisors). Thus, not only was there little agreement between the officers' perceptions of what was important to their supervisors and what the supervisors said was important, but there often was a tendency for the two sets of ratings to be opposite to each other. This inverse relationship is reflected in the negative Spearman rank order correlations of the two sets of rankings (-.31 for HCR officers; -.22 for LCR officers).

This discrepancy between officers' views of their supervisors and supervisors' views of themselves takes on added significance when one looks at the officers' ratings of the importance of these factors to themselves. As can be seen in Table V.10, officers' self-ratings agree substaintally with supervisors' self-ratings. The same five items that received the highest mean ratings of importance from HCR and LCR officers were also among the top five items rated by the supervisors. Similarly, the four lowest rated items for the three groups is the same, although the rankings did not always

agree exactly. This similarity in the self-ratings of officers and supervisors' ratings is underscored by the Spearman rank order correlations between the two sets of ratings, +.94 for HCR officers, +.93 for LCR officers.

These findings present a picture of misperception of supervisors by police officers. (Had we expected these results, we would have asked police supervisors to rate the importance of these items to their officers in order to discover whether supervisors accurately perceive their officers.) Both police officers and their supervisors tend to assign similar degrees of importance to these factors for evaluating officers' performance. However, police officers perceive that their supervisors evaluate their performance differently than they do, and often in a manner antithetical to their own.

A number of theories in the field of social psychology hold that confusion can cause tension in individuals (Festinger, 1957; Aronson, 1968). It would be consistent with such theories to suggest that police officer morale could be adversely affected by the types of disparities we have uncovered. We know from other areas of our survey that officers indicated general satisfaction with their jobs. However, we did not ask them extensively about their feelings toward their supervisors. Further research could indicate whether communication problems do in fact exist between police officers and their supervisors in the District of Columbia and the steps that could be taken to reduce them. Unfortunately,

these findings apply to both HCR and LCR officers and do not, therefore, shed light on why the two groups differ with regard to their conviction rates.

D. KNOWLEDGE OF EVIDENCE AND LAW

We asked HCR and LCR officers to state their opinions about the value of different types of evidence for obtaining a conviction. We did this by presenting each officer with short descriptions of nine cases. After each description, the officer was asked to choose which of two types of evidence, if available, would be more valuable to the prosecutor. The officer could also indicate that it was impossible to choose between the two alternatives or that he did not know the answer. For example, after reading a brief description of an assault case, officers were asked whether (1) or (2) below would be more valuable evidence:

(1) Photographs of an assault victim's injuries and wounds

OR

(2) A written, signed statement from the victim, giving the facts of the assault

(3) Impossible to choose--they're equally valuable

(4) Don't know.

The HCR and LCR officers answered the nine questions similarly, and there were no statistically significant differences between their responses. In an attempt to examine whether the two groups of officers differed in terms of their responses to a group of these questions, we presented these

same questions to a group of 16 prosecutors in the District of Columbia. There were six questions for which at least 80 percent of the prosecutors had selected the same response. We arbitrarily called an officer's answer "correct" if it agreed with the answer chosen by 80 percent of the prosecutors. We found no differences between HCR and LCR officers when we counted the number of questions that had been answered "correctly" (HCR officers had a mean score of 3.9; LCR officers, 3.5).

To obtain an index of the job-related knowledge of the officers, we adapted 10 questions for our questionnaire from IACP "Training Keys.". The questions covered such topics as the existence of probable cause, police procedures, crime definitions, and the admissibility of evidence in court. We found that both groups of officers answered the items similarly, and each question was answered correctly by at least half of each group. When we counted the total number of questions answered correctly by HCR and LCR officers, we again found no differences. Listed below is the distribution of the officers' scores on the test.

Number of Correct answers (of 10)	HCR officers (N = 34)	LCR officers N = 35)
2-4	3%*	3%
5-7	41	29
8-10	56	69
Mean number correct:	7.7	8.0

*Percentages rounded

We conclude that HCR and LCR officers did not differ significantly from each other with regard to their ability to answer

these 10 questions correctly. Of course, it is possible that the two groups might differ in their knowledge of other areas not covered in our brief test. Moreover, it is conceivable that both HCR and LCR officers do possess the same degree of knowledge but behave differently in the field. Police behaviors are examined in Chapter VII.

E. ARREST CHARACTERISTICS

1. Definition of Good and Poor Arrests

One factor that might differentiate HCR officers from LCR officers would be their conception of a good arrest. We therefore asked the officers to specify in their own words their understanding of the terms "good arrest" and "poor arrest." Table V.11 presents the officers' characterizations of a good arrest.

Table V.11

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' CONCEPTION OF A "GOOD ARREST"
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

A Good Arrest Is[a]	Percent of Officers Who Said This*	
	HCR Officers (N=34)	LCR Officers (N=35)
Obtaining a conviction	38	20
Collecting physical evidence	29	32
Lawful-has probable cause	29	32
Arresting the right person	29	29
Lawful	12	11
Locating witnesses	9	11

[a]Includes all items listed by at least 10 percent of HCR or LCR officers.

*Percents total more than 100 because of multiple responses per officer.

The HCR officers were almost twice as likely as LCR officers to characterize a good arrest as one that results in a conviction. Although this difference was not statistically significant, it is in the direction one would predict, given the fact that the two groups were defined by their differing conviction rates.

Both groups of officers were about equally likely to list the five other items appearing in Table V.11. Almost one-third said that collecting physical evidence, having probable cause, and arresting the right person were characteristics of a good arrest. A smaller percentage of officers mentioned that the arrest should be lawful (without specifying what this meant) or one in which witnesses are located.

Table V.12 presents the officers' definitions of a poor arrest. Almost one-half of both groups stated that a poor arrest was one that was unlawful. Most of the characteristics of poor arrests are the obverse of the characteristics of good arrests already presented. Although not obtaining a conviction was perceived to be an indicator of a poor arrest, only 12 percent of the HCR officers mentioned it. A small proportion of the HCR officers indicated that there was no such thing as a poor arrest. None of the LCR officers stated this.*

* We examined whether officers who defined a good arrest as one that leads to a conviction were more likely to obtain witnesses than officers who did not mention this criterion. The two groups were equally likely to obtain witnesses.

Table V.12

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' CONCEPTION OF A POOR ARREST, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

A Poor Arrest Is[a]	Percent of Officers Who Said This[‡]	
	HCR Officers (N=34)	LCR Officers (N=35)
Unlawful	47	46
Not collecting physical evidence	21	17
Arresting the wrong person	15	20
Complainant not willing to follow through	12	14
Arrest serves officer's self-interest	12	20
Not obtaining a conviction	12	6
There is no such thing	12	0

[a] Includes all items listed by at least 10 percent of HCR or LCR officers.

[‡] Percents total more than 100 because of multiple responses per officer.

2. Consequences of Good/Poor Arrest

One reason why HCR officers have higher conviction rates may be that they perceive different consequences for making good or poor arrests than do LCR officers. We therefore asked each officer to indicate the positive and negative consequences for officers who generally make good or poor arrests.

As shown in Table V.13, the most frequently listed positive consequence of a good arrest was the self-satisfaction that officers said they get from making good arrests. Forty-one percent of the HCR officers and 46 percent of the LCR officers said this. The next most frequently indicated response was

recognition received from superiors, followed by the recognition received from fellow officers. The LCR officers were twice as likely as HCR officers to list "recognition by the community" again showing a heightened sensitivity to citizens' responses. A small percentage of both groups of officers (15 to 20 percent) indicated that there were no positive consequences for making a good arrest or that they did not know of any. For the most part, both groups of officers perceived similar types of positive consequences stemming from good arrests.

Table V.13

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' OPINIONS OF THE POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR OFFICERS WHO MAKE GOOD ARRESTS, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Positive Consequence[a]	Percent of Officers Who Said This[‡]	
	HCR Officers (N=34)	LCR Officers (N=35)
Self satisfaction	41	46
Recognition by superiors	24	26
Recognition by fellow officers	15	20
Reputation	12	3
Recognition by community	9	20
There are no positive consequences or does not know of any.	15	20

[a]Includes all items listed by at least 10 percent of HCR or LCR officers.

[‡]Percents total more than 100 because of multiple responses.

Table V.14 presents officers' perceptions of the negative consequences for officers who make poor arrests. Each group tended to perceive similar consequences, except that the HCR officers were somewhat more sensitive to the effect of poor arrests on their reputations. Again, LCR officers evidenced a slightly higher sensitivity to the community than did HCR officers. Between one-fourth and one-third of the officers indicated that there were no negative consequences or they did not know of any.

Table V.14

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' OPINIONS OF THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR OFFICERS WHO MAKE POOR ARRRSTS, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Negative Consequence[a]	Percent of Officers Who Said This[‡]	
	HCR Officers (N=34)	LCR Officers (N=35)
Reputation suffers	21	3
Officer may be liable for damages	18	23
Held in low esteem by fellow officers	18	26
Held in low esteem by supervisor	12	23
Held in low esteem by prosecutor	9	17
Held in low esteem by community	6	14
There are no negative consequences or does not know of any.	33	26

[a]Includes all items listed by at least 10 percent of HCR or LCR officers.

[‡]Percents total more than 100 because of multiple responses.

After the officers specified their conception of a good arrest and a poor arrest, they were asked to rate the quality of their own arrests over the past several years. (A six-point scale, with one representing "poor arrests" and six representing "good arrests" was used). Ninety-four percent of each group of officers indicated that their arrests rated a five or a six. This is understandable given the variety of conceptions of good and poor arrests presented in Tables V.11 and V.12, respectively. We would expect the two groups of officers to have different self-ratings only if most of the officers defined good arrests in terms of the conviction rates obtained. This clearly was not the case.

We also asked each officer to estimate how many adult felony arrests made in his unit were poor arrests. Four percent of the 28 responding LCR officers and 34 percent of HCR officers ($X^2 = 6.86$, significant at $p < .01$) indicated that virtually none of the arrests made in their units were poor. This is consistent with our finding, reported above, that HCR officers tended to be more likely to state that there was no such thing as a poor arrest. (Both of these findings will be related to an additional finding in a subsequent section.)

Location of witnesses and obtaining evidence were both characteristics of good arrests indicated by HCR and LCR officers alike. We asked the officers to think about their adult felony arrests or investigations over the past several years and to estimate how often they collected physical evidence or located witnesses. The majority of both groups of officers (HCR, 88 percent; LCR, 79 percent) indicated that they

collected physical evidence at least one-half of the time. The HCR officers, however, were more likely than LCR officers (88 percent compared with 64 percent, significant at p .10) to indicate that they located witnesses half the time or more. Thus, one of the factors that might contribute to HCR officers' higher conviction rates may be that they more often locate witnesses.

It seemed reasonable to us that some officers might perceive positive consequences of making poor arrests and negative consequences of making good arrrests. Such perceptions could hinder an officer's performance and might explain why LCR officers had lower conviction rates than HCR officers.

Table V.15 presents the officers' perceptions of the positive consequences that exist for officers who generally make poor arrests. Only about one-third of each group of officers indicated that there were positive consequences of making poor arrests. The most frequently reported positive consequence concerned the receipt of better assignments or supervisor approval, usually from an increased quantity of arrests. This is consistent with findings, presented earlier, that indicated that officers perceive that their supervisors place more importance on the number of arrests that officers make than on the number of arrests that result in conviction. Other benefits noted by a small group of officers were increased overtime (usually resulting from more court time) and the fact that poor arrests often would be settled without the officer having to go to court. The results of Table V.15 do

not indicate, however, that LCR officers differ significantly from HCR officers in this regard.

Table V.15

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' OPINIONS OF THE POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR OFFICERS WHO MAKE POOR ARRESTS, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Positive Consequence[a]	Percent of Officers Who Said This:[b]	
	HCR Officers (N=34)	LCR Officers (N=35)
Better assignments, supervisor approval, higher arrests	21%	26%
Increased overtime	9	11
Avoid dealing with court system	6	0
There are none or does not know of any	65	66

[a]Items noted by 6 percent or more of HCR or LCR officers.

[b]Percents total more than 100 because of multiple responses.

Table V.16 presents officers' perceptions of the negative consequences for officers who make good arrests. Contrary to what one might expect, HCR officers were more likely to indicate that there were negative consequences, which might attest to the candor of this group of officers, although this difference was not statistically significant. A frequently cited negative consequence was the problem that officers face

when they deal with the courts. They often centered on dissatisfaction with case disposition and the penalties given. This finding is consistent with those presented earlier that indicated that HCR and LCR officers rated the quality of the criminal courts relatively low. In addition, it is consistent with a finding, to be presented in the next section, that indicates that HCR officers tended to believe that most persons arrested for felonies were guilty of the offense. Other negative consequences cited by a few officers were loss of leisure time, that good arrests take more time and reduce one's quantity of arrests, and the resulting envy and jealousy of peer and departmental personnel.

3. Officers' Arrest-related Attitudes

We asked each officer to rate his agreement with a number of statements having to do with arrest procedures. Table V.17 presents the mean rankings of items by the groups of officers. Only one of the items tended to be rated differently by HCR officers than by LCR officers. The HCR officers were more likely to agree with the statement that most adults arrested for felonies are guilty of the offense. Seventy-one percent of the HCR officers agreed with this statement, compared with 53 percent of LCR officers.

We thought that this was a finding worth pursuing, because it suggested that HCR officers may start with a "hard line" view toward offenders and believe that officers' actions are usually correct. We therefore looked at whether agreement with this statement was related to the officer's opinion that there

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TABLE V.16
HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' OPINIONS OF THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR OFFICERS WHO MAKE GOOD ARRESTS, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Negative Consequence[a]	Percent of Officers Who Said This	
	HCR Officers (N=34)	LCR Officers (N=35)
Problems of dealing with court system[b]	18%	9%
Loss of leisure time	12	11
Make fewer arrests	6	6
Envy, jealousy or department personnel	3	9
There are none or does not know of any.	29	49

[a]Items noted by 6 percent or more of HCR or LCR officers.

[b]Time spent in court, dissatisfaction with disposition, dislikes going to court.

was "no such thing as a poor arrest" (see Table V.12) or that virtually none of the arrests made in his department were poor arrests. We found that the four HCR officers who said that there is "no such thing as a poor arrest" agreed with the statement that "most adults arrested for felonies are guilty of the offense." In addition, 9 of the 10 HCR officers who said that virtually none of the arrests in their department were poor agreed with this statement, compared with 13 of the 19

TABLE V.17

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' AGREEMENT WITH VARIOUS STATEMENTS ABOUT POLICE PERFORMANCE
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

STATEMENT ABOUT POLICE PERFORMANCE	MEAN AGREEMENT WITH STATEMENT (Scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither Agree or Disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree)		
	HCR Officers (N = 34)**	LCR Officers (N = 35)**	p*
It's important that the uniformed officer look for physical evidence whenever he/she makes an arrest	4.12	4.29	>.10
Most adults arrested for felonies are guilty of the offense	3.97	3.60	<.10
The people in the community expect the police to make a lot of arrests	3.29	3.20	>.10
This department expects officers to make a lot of arrests each year	3.26	3.29	>.10
This department expects officers to make a large number of arrests that result in convictions	2.82	2.76	>.10
It's not necessary to give a lot of detailed information when filling out an arrest report	2.38	2.03	>.10
If I generally make good arrests, I'm more likely to get promoted	2.29	2.49	>.10
Rules and regulations really don't help when you arrive at a crime scene and make an arrest	2.26	1.97	>.10
If I make a lot of arrests, I'm more likely to get promoted	2.21	2.63	>.10
Police officers shouldn't concern themselves with what happens after arrest--that's the business of the prosecutor and the courts	2.00	2.17	>.10
Arresting someone usually scares them into not committing crimes in the future	1.91	1.91	>.10
The arresting uniformed officer really doesn't have a responsibility to locate witnesses	1.85	1.77	>.10
There isn't much that police officers can do to help the prosecutor get convictions for the people they arrest	1.68	1.71	>.10
Arrest reports are a waste of time	1.65	1.60	>.10
Once I make an arrest and the offender has been booked, my role in the case should end	1.56	1.54	>.10
Realistically speaking, physical evidence has little value in court	1.32	1.46	>.10

*By T-test

**N's vary slightly from item to item because of missing responses.

@Spearman rank order correlation of the relative ordering of HCR and LCR officers' ratings of the items = +.96.

officers (68 percent) who indicated that a higher proportion of the arrests made in their department were poor. Thus, some HCR officers may hold beliefs that indicate that an officer is always right when he makes an arrest.

Both groups of officers tended to disagree with statements that indicated that a police officer's role in a case ends with the arrest, as well as with statements that played down the importance of obtaining witnesses, of the value of physical evidence, or of completing arrest reports. Interestingly, the officers also tended to disagree with the statement that "arresting someone usually scares them into not committing crimes in the future." Seventy-four percent of the LCR officers and 80 percent of the HCR officers disagreed with this statement. Thus, despite the fact that the officers indicated that they make good arrests, they perceived little deterrent effect. The overall similarity in the ratings of the two groups of officers is reflected in the Spearman rank order correlation of the ratings of +.96.

F. ARREST/CASE OUTCOME

We were also interested in determining whether HCR and LCR officers differed with regard to their opinions on the relative attractiveness of various dispositions for cases involving adult felony arrests. The officers were asked to draw on their experiences over the past several years and their feelings about the guilt or innocence of adult arrestees to decide whether more or fewer cases should result in certain dispositions. Table V.18 presents these findings.

Table V.18

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' OPINIONS ABOUT HOW OFTEN CERTAIN DISPOSITIONS SHOULD OCCUR FOR ADULT FELONY ARRESTS, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Opinion Regarding Disposition of Adult Felony Arrests	Percent of Officers Who Said This			
	HCR Officers (N)	%	LCR Officers (N)	%
More cases should:				
Result in conviction and imprisonment	(30)	83	(33)	85
Have trials that result in a guilty verdict	(31)	77	(30)	80
Fewer cases should:				
Plea bargain for a reduced sentence	(31)	84	(34)	74
Plea bargain for a reduced charge	(32)	75	(34)	79
Have trials that result in a not guilty verdict	(28)	75	(30)	77
Be dismissed immediately	(31)	68	(30)	67

The responses of the two groups of officers were again quite similar. Most officers indicated that more cases should result in trials that end in a guilty verdict, and in convictions that are accompanied by imprisonment of the arrestee. The officers wanted to see fewer cases in which plea bargaining resulted in a reduced charge or sentence and fewer cases that were dismissed immediately.

We next gave the officers a list of factors that might affect dismissal rates and asked whether each would increase or decrease the number of dismissals. Table V.19 presents those factors that 50 percent or more of either group of officers indicated would reduce the number of dismissals.

Almost all officers indicated that dismissals could be reduced if citizens more often called the police immediately after a crime was committed. Other factors that were perceived to reduce dismissals were prosecutors who were better skilled and more organized and arresting officers who did a better job locating witnesses.

Officers said that several factors would not decrease the number of dismissals. A majority of each group of officers indicated that having more uniformed officers, detectives, or evidence technicians would not decrease dismissals. This provides an element of contrast with the findings in Table V.19 that show that officers believed that increasing the number of prosecutors or judges might lower the number of dismissals.

One reason why HCR officers have higher conviction rates might be that they are more interested in learning the outcome of the cases for their arrestees. They might use feedback on their dispositions to improve and correct their techniques. We therefore asked the officers to respond to a set of questions about their interest and ability to learn the outcomes of their arrests. As Table V.20 shows, 85 percent or more of HCR and LCR officers indicated that they were very or extremely interested in knowing the outcome of their arrests and/or in knowing the reasons for those outcomes. Moreover, two-thirds

of each group of officers reported that they almost always learn the outcome of their arrests. Thus, we found no evidence to support the possibility that HCR and LCR officers differ with respect to the desire for feedback about case outcomes in court. On the other hand, most officers --74 percent of the HCR and 80 percent of the LCR officers--indicated that they knew of no formal procedures (or were unsure of their existence) in the department for routinely obtaining such feedback.

Table V.19

EVENTS THAT HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' BELIEVE WOULD REDUCE THE NUMBER OF DISMISSALS FOR ADULT FELONY CASES, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Dismissals would be reduced:	Percent of Officers Who Said This: HCR Officers (N = 34)*	LCR Officers (N = 35)*	p**
if citizens more often called the police immediately after a crime was committed	91	86	>.10
if there were more prosecutors to handle the case load	91	73	>.10
if detectives did a better job interviewing witnesses	89	77	>.10
if arresting officers did a better job locating witnesses	82	82	>.10
if prosecutors were more skilled and better qualified	79	81	>.10
if uniformed officers did a better job searching for evidence when they made arrests	78	71	>.10
if the prosecutor's office were better organized	77	73	>.10
if officers and detectives did a better job interrogating subjects	76	76	>.10
if judges had more sympathy for victims of crimes	76	71	>.10
if judges were less concerned with legal technicalities	75	62	>.10
if detectives did a better job searching for evidence	74	76	>.10
if uniformed officers did a better job interviewing victims/ witnesses	70	80	>.10
if responding officers did a more thorough and accurate job in filling out crime reports	70	79	>.10
if the responding officers did a better job preserving the crime scene	70	76	>.10
if there were more judges on the bench	70	74	>.10
if detectives and uniformed officers cooperated more with each other at and around the time of arrest	66	68	>.10
if crime lab technicians did a better job processing evidence	61	63	>.10

*N's vary slightly for each item because of missing information.
**By T-test

TABLE V.20

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' INTEREST IN LEARNING THE OUTCOME OF THEIR ADULT FELONY ARRESTS, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Officer's Response	Percent of Officers Who Said This	
	HCR Officers (N=34)	LCR Officers (N=35)
Interest in knowing the outcome of arrests/cases:		
Extremely/very interested	85	89
Somewhat interested	9	11
Slightly or not at all interested	6	0
Interest in knowing the reasons for outcome of cases/arrests:		
Extremely/very interested	91	89
Somewhat interested	6	6
Slightly/not at all interested	3	5
Actually learns the outcome of arrests/cases:		
Usually/almost always	68	66
About half the time or less	32	34

VI. WRITTEN QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS: MANHATTAN

In this chapter, we present findings obtained from 31 HCR officers and 33 LCR officers from the New York City Police Department (NYCPD). Because the size of the sample of officers from New York is similar to that from the District of Columbia, the same significance criterion and approach used for the analysis of the D.C. officers' responses will be used here.

A. OFFICERS' BACKGROUNDS

Table VI.1 presents some demographic characteristics of the HCR and LCR officers. Most of the officers from both groups were between the ages of 26 and 44, but HCR officers were somewhat older than LCR officers. All officers but one were male, and most were married. The educational backgrounds of the two groups were also similar, with about three-fourths having attended college. Sixteen percent of the HCR officers, and 15 percent of the LCR officers were college graduates.

The training and experience of HCR and LCR officers were also very similar (see Table VI.2). Eighty-seven percent of each group of officers had spent between 6 and 15 years in the New York City Police Department; only one officer in each group had ever served in another police department. Most officers held the rank of patrolman, and they indicated that their current assignments provided substantial opportunities to make arrests. A majority of both groups of officers had received a commendation or award within the last two years, which suggests that, as in Washington, D.C., conviction rate is not a

Table VI.1

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF HCR AND LCR OFFICERS,
New York City Police Department (Manhattan)

Officer Characteristic	HCR Officers (N = 31)	LCR Officers (N = 33)
Sex:		
Male	97%*	100%*
Female	3	0
Age:		
18-25	0	0
26-30	13	15
31-34	32	52
35-44	45	27
45-54	10	6
Race:		
Black	13	21
White	81	67
Other	6	12
Education:		
High school graduate	26	21
Some college	55	64
College graduate	13	9
Graduate degree	3	6
Not recorded	3	0
Marital status:		
Single	13	3
Divorced/separated	10	3
Married	74	94
Not recorded	3	0

*Percentages rounded.

criterion for judging officers' performance. For both groups, these awards were primarily for arrest-related events, such as apprehending a person with a gun, rather than for performing special services, like preventing a suicide.

TABLE VI.2

EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING OF HCR AND LCR OFFICERS,
New York City Police Department (Manhattan)

Officer Characteristic	HCR Officers (N = 31)	LCR Officers (N = 33)
Years in the Police Department		
3-5	3%*	0%*
6-10	42	42
11-15	45	45
Unknown	10	12
Current rank		
Patrolman	77%	61%
Detective	12	12
Unknown	10	27
Received an award or commendation in last two years	77%	91%
Degree in field relevant to police work	16%	19%
Is seeking degree in field relevant to police work	19%	24%
Has taken nondegree courses/ classes relevant to police work	55%	55%

*Percentages rounded.

B. ATTITUDES TOWARD SELVES AND JOB

1. Satisfaction with Job

Table VI.3 presents the officers' rating of their satisfaction with their jobs and current assignments. The HCR officers were almost twice as likely as LCR officers to report that they were very or mostly satisfied with their job as police officers (significant at p .05). Looked at slightly differently, one-third of the LCR officers expressed dissatisfaction with their jobs, compared with only 13 percent of the HCR officers. The HCR officers also tended to be more satisfied with their current assignments than were LCR officers.

Table VI.3

JOB SATISFACTION OF HCR AND LCR POLICE OFFICERS,
New York City Police Department (Manhattan)

	HCR Officers	LCR Officers
Satisfaction with job as a police officer:	% (31)	% (33)
Very/mostly satisfied	68**	36**
A little more satisfied than dissatisfied	19	30
A little more dissatisfied than satisfied	3	9
Very/mostly dissatisfied	10	24
Satisfaction with current assignment:	% (31)	% (32)
Very/mostly satisfied	81	63
A little more satisfied than dissatisfied	13	25
A little more dissatisfied than satisfied	3	6
Very/mostly dissatisfied	3	6

*Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.

**P<.05.

Approximately two-thirds of both groups indicated that their satisfaction with their jobs had changed in the past several years. Of the HCR officers who reported a change, 90 percent indicated that their satisfaction had decreased. Similarly, 83 percent of the LCR officers who experienced a change in satisfaction said that it had decreased. Thus, although HCR officers were more satisfied with their jobs than LCR officers at the time they completed the questionnaire, both groups of officers were experiencing a decline in their job satisfaction.

Both groups of officers were about equally likely to report that they would be less satisfied if they were working in a nonpolice job (55 percent and 42 percent, respectively). However, 24 percent of the LCR officers said they would be more satisfied working in a nonpolice job, compared with only 3 percent of the HCR officers (significant at p .05 by Fisher's exact test. About one-third of both groups of officers did not know whether their satisfaction would be different in a nonpolice job.

Caution should be used in ferreting the reasons behind the job dissatisfaction found among LCR officers. It is possible that the fact that the LCR officers made arrests that were less likely to result in a conviction contributed to their job dissatisfaction or that some unmeasured factor precipitated both their reduced performance and their job dissatisfaction. However, we do know from results to be presented in the next section that both HCR and LCR officers placed relatively less

importance on conviction rates than on other factors in evaluating their own performance. This may indicate that an officer's perception of his lower conviction rate would not necessarily lead to reduced job satisfaction. Regardless of the specific sources of the LCR officers' dissatisfaction, the fact that a majority of both groups of officers reported a decrease in their job dissatisfaction over the past several years suggests that the morale of New York police officers should receive further study.

2. Ratings of Job Quality

Table VI.4 presents the officers' mean ratings of the quality of different aspects of their jobs. The HCR and LCR officers rated the items similarly. The quality of the work done by evidence technicians and the crime lab and the job done by uniformed officers in the department were rated highest by both groups of officers. Items rated lowest included the officer's salary, the quality of the job done by lower courts, and the quality of the administration of the police department.

Only one difference between the mean ratings of HCR and LCR officers was statistically significant. The HCR officers rated the ability of the police to control crime somewhat higher than did LCR officers. The similarity of most of the ratings of the two groups of officers is reflected in the Spearman rank order correlation of +.92.

3. Definition of an Extremely Successful Officer

Table VI.5 presents HCR and LCR officers' opinions of the characteristics of an extremely successful police officer. The

Table VI.4

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' RATINGS OF THE QUALITY OF ASPECTS OF THEIR JOB, New York City Police Department (Manhattan)

ITEM RATED (Presented In Descending Order of HCR Officers' Ratings)	MEAN RATING OF HCR AND LCR OFFICERS (Scale: 1 = Poor, 2 = Fair, 3 = Good, 4 = Very Good, 5 = Excellent)#		
	HCR Officers (N = 31)**	LCR Officers (N = 33)**	p*
The quality of the work done by evidence technicians and the crime lab	3.81	3.94	>.10
The quality of the job that uniformed officers in this department are doing	3.68	3.39	>.10
Your immediate supervisor	3.43	3.13	>.10
The quality of the formal police training you received	3.40	3.27	>.10
The quality of the arrests made by the police in this department	3.27	3.21	>.10
The quality of the job that detectives in the department are doing	2.80	2.69	>.10
The ability of the police to control crime	2.65	2.15	<.05
The quality of the feedback you receive from your supervisor on how good a job you are doing	2.65	2.16	>.10
The degree to which your job uses your skills and talents	2.55	2.18	>.10
The prosecutor's office's general ability to get convictions	2.20	2.25	>.10
The quality of the job that higher criminal courts in this city are doing	2.19	2.19	>.10
The number of evidence technicians in this department	2.18	2.37	>.10
The quality of the job that prosecutors in this city are doing	2.00	1.88	>.10
Community support for the police	2.00	1.75	>.10
The quality of police equipment (cars, radios, etc.)	2.00	1.85	>.10
The quality of the administration of this department	1.90	1.82	>.10
The quality of the job that lower criminal courts in this city are doing	1.48	1.42	>.10
Your salary	1.45	1.45	>.10

*By t-test
**N's vary slightly for individual items because of missing information.
#Spearman rank order correlation of the relative ordering of HCR and LCR officers' ratings of the items = +.92.

Table VI.5

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' CONCEPTIONS OF AN EXTREMELY SUCCESSFUL POLICE OFFICER, New York City Police Department (Manhattan)

Characteristics Of An Extremely Successful Officer[a]	Percentage of Officers Who Said This[‡]	
	HCR Officers (N = 31)	LCR Officers (N = 33)
Performance related:		
Sensitive to the community	32**	61**
Has knowledge of the community	32	33
Knows the job	16	18
Has the ability to handle difficulties/crises	13	18
Has ability to adapt to routine situations	13	18
Personality related:		
Has good general attitude/ morale	32	27
Dedicated	19	24
Teamwork/able to work with fellow officers	13	6
Honest	10	9
Calm and reasonable	6	21
Even-handed	3	12

[a]Includes all items listed by at least 10 percent of HCR or LCR officers.
‡Percentages total more than 100 percent because of multiple responses.
**p<.05.

LCR officers were almost twice as likely as HCR officers (61 percent and 32 percent, respectively; significant at p .05) to indicate that "sensitivity to the community" was a characteristic of an extremely successful police officer. This finding is similar to that reported in Chapter V for MPD officers and suggests that the greater sensitivity toward community-related issues found among LCR officers in Washington, D.C., might also exist among LCR officers in New York. One should note, however, that both groups of New York officers were equally likely to state that "knowledge of the community" was a characteristic of an extremely successful police officer.

The most frequently cited personality characteristic of an extremely successful officer was "having a good attitude or morale." This was indicated by between one-fourth and one-third of both groups of officers. Dedication to the job was also cited by a substantial minority of both groups of officers. The LCR officers were more likely to say that an extremely successful officer was calm or reasonable, but neither this difference nor those involving any of the other personality-related responses was large enough to approach statistical significance.

After listing the characteristics of an extremely successful police officer, each officer rated his perception of his own success. Similar proportions of HCR and LCR officers (58 percent and 45 percent, respectively) rated themselves to be very or extremely successful officers. Most of the remaining officers rated themselves to be somewhat successful.

This contrasts with the results for Washington, D.C., where HCR officers rated themselves to be more successful than did LCR officers. We also found that police officers in the District of Columbia seemed to be satisfied with their jobs, regardless of how successful they perceived themselves to be. The relationship between job satisfaction and perceived success among New York officers was considerably different. The results are displayed below.

Percentage of NYCPD Officers Who Reported They were Very/Mostly Satisfied With Their Jobs, By Perceived Success and Status

	Percent of officers who said they were very or extremely satisfied	
	Officers who thought they were:	
Officer Status	Very/extremely Successful (N) %	Less Successful (N) %
HCR officers	(18) 67	(13) 69
LCR officers	(15) 60*	(18) 17*

*p .05

The HCR officers tended to be satisfied with their jobs, regardless of how successful they perceived themselves to be. In addition, LCR officers who believed themselves to be very or extremely successful were about as likely to be satisfied with their jobs as were HCR officers. It was officers who had low conviction rates and perceived themselves to be relatively less successful who were unlikely to be very satisfied with their jobs. Only 17 percent of such LCR officers said they were very

or extremely satisfied with their jobs.* Thus, the lower job satisfaction that we found for LCR officers is present only among those who perceived themselves to be relatively less successful at their jobs. Both a lower level of performance (as indicated by a reduced conviction rate) and a self-perception of limited success may be necessary to produce dissatisfaction with one's job. It should be noted, however, that the data do not permit us to determine whether the dissatisfaction preceded or followed the LCR officers' lower level of performance.

C. JOB PRIORITIES AND EVALUATION CRITERIA

Table VI.6 presents the officers' mean ratings of the importance to them of impressing various persons. The ratings of the HCR and LCR officers were similar. Both groups indicated that it was very important to them to impress citizens and their supervisors. The HCR officers did ascribe more importance than LCR officers to impressing higher ranking officers and evidence technicians and lab personnel. However, these items were rated lowest by both groups of officers. When asked to specify the one group that it was most important to impress, HCR and LCR officers were most likely to indicate the "uniformed officers you work with." Forty-three percent of the

*The 55 percent of the LCR officers who said they were relatively less successful accounted for 71 percent of all LCR officers who were not very/extremely satisfied with their jobs.

Table VI.6

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE TO THEM OF IMPRESSING VARIOUS PERSONS, New York City Police Department (Manhattan)

To Impress:	MEAN RATING OF THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPRESSING PERSONS AT LEFT (Scale: 1 = Not Important At All, 2 = Slightly Important, 3 = Somewhat Important, 4 = Very Important, 5 = Extremely Important) HCR Officers (N = 31)**	LCR Officers (N = 33)**	p+
Citizens	4.19	4.03	> .10
Your supervisor(s)	4.16	4.03	> .10
Uniformed officers you work with	4.07***	3.97***	> .10
Prosecutors	3.77	3.45	> .10
Judges	3.61	3.33	> .10
Detectives you work with	3.60	3.59	> .10
Officers of higher rank than your own (who are not your supervisors)	3.35	2.91	< .10
Evidence technicians/crime lab personnel	3.10	2.52	< .10

*By t-test.
**N's vary slightly for individual items because of missing information
***In a separate task officers were asked to indicate which of the eight groups of persons were most important to impress. This was the group chosen by the greatest percentage of officers.

28 responding HCR officers and 50 percent of the 30 LCR officers said this. "Citizens" was the next most frequently chosen group, selected by 29 percent of responding HCR officers and 20 percent of LCR officers, followed by "supervisors."

Table VI.7 presents officers' opinions of the importance to themselves of various factors when they evaluate their own job performance. We found considerable similarity in the way HCR and LCR officers rated the items. Only 2 of the 16 items were rated differently enough by the two groups of officers to meet our criterion of statistical significance. The HCR officers placed more importance on their ability to work well with the prosecutor after an arrest is made and on avoiding antagonizing the public than did LCR officers. The latter difference was in the opposite direction of that found for officers in the District of Columbia: LCR officers in the District placed more importance on avoiding antagonizing the public than did HCR officers.

Arriving quickly at the scene of a crime and the officer's ability to testify in court were among the highest rated items for both groups of officers. The number of felony arrests that the officer makes and the number of arrests that result in conviction were among the lowest rated items, although the mean ratings indicated that officers did ascribe some importance to both of those factors. The Spearman rank order correlation for the rank order of the ratings of HCR and LCR officers was +.82.

Table VI.8 presents HCR and LCR officers' perceptions of the importance of the same 16 factors to their supervisors when they evaluate officer performance. No statistically significant differences were found between the ratings of the two groups of officers. Both groups thought that supervisors place considerable importance on an officer's arriving quickly

Table VI.7

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' OPINIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE TO THEM OF VARIOUS FACTORS IN EVALUATING THEIR OWN PERFORMANCE, New York City Police Department (Manhattan)

Importance To The Officer Of	MEAN RATING OF HCR AND LCR OFFICERS# (Scale: 1 = Not at All Important, 2 = Slightly Important, 3 = Somewhat Important, 4 = Very Important, 5 = Extremely Important) HCR Officers (N = 31)**	LCR Officers (N = 35)**	p***
Arriving quickly at the scene of a crime	4.61	4.36	>.10
Your ability to testify in court	4.52	4.42	>.10
How thoroughly and carefully you complete your arrest and offense reports	4.35	4.06	>.10
Your ability to locate evidence at the scene of the crime	4.29	4.36	>.10
Obtaining the cooperation of witnesses	4.06	3.88	>.10
Your ability to work well with the prosecutor after an arrest has been made	4.06	3.64	<.10
Making good arrests	4.03	4.18	>.10
Locating witnesses to crime	4.03	3.85	>.10
The number of your cases that get cleared by arrest	4.00	3.38	>.10
How well you get along with your fellow officers	3.97	3.97	>.10
Maintaining the cooperation of witnesses	3.94	3.76	>.10
Being available for calls	3.94	3.85	>.10
Avoiding antagonizing the public	3.94	3.30	<.05
Being highly visible to the public when you're on patrol	3.74	3.33	>.10
The number of arrests you make that result in conviction	3.52	3.55	>.10
The number of felony arrests that you make	2.81	2.97	>.10

*Asked only of detectives, for HCR N = 37, for LCR N = 8.
**N's vary slightly for individual items because of missing information.
***By t-test
#Spearman rank order correlation of the relative ordering of the item ratings for HCR and LCR officers = +.82.

Table VI.8

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS FACTORS TO THEIR SUPERVISORS IN EVALUATING OFFICER PERFORMANCE
New York City Policy Department (Manhattan)

Importance To the Supervisor Of:	MEAN RATING OF HCR AND LCR OFFICERS# (Scale: 1 = Not At All Important, 2 = Slightly Important, 3 = Somewhat Important, 4 = Very Important, 5 = Extremely Important) HCR Officers (N = 31)**	LCR Officers (N = 33)**	p***
How thoroughly and carefully you complete your arrest and offense reports	4.03	3.84	>.10
Arriving quickly at the scene of a crime	4.03	4.29	>.10
Your ability to testify in court	4.00	3.52	>.10
The relative number of your cases that get cleared by arrest	4.00	4.29	>.10
Avoiding antagonizing the public	3.97	3.70	>.10
Your ability to be highly visible to the public when you're on patrol	3.93	3.50	>.10
Being available for calls	3.90	4.16	>.10
Your ability to locate evidence at the scene of the crime	3.83	3.74	>.10
Making good arrests	3.77	3.77	>.10
The number of felony arrests that you make	3.73	3.81	>.10
Obtaining the cooperation of witnesses	3.63	3.19	>.10
How well you get along with your fellow officers	3.53	3.19	>.10
Locating witnesses to crimes	3.50	3.29	>.10
Your ability to work with the prosecutor after an arrest has been made	3.43	3.17	>.10
Maintaining the cooperation of witnesses	3.37	3.00	>.10
The number of arrests you make that result in conviction	3.27	3.07	>.10

*Asked only of detectives, for HCR N = 6, for LCR N = 7.
**N's vary slightly for individual items because of missing information.
***By t-test.
#Spearman task order correlation of the relative ordering of the item ratings for HCR and LCR officers = +.82.

at the scene of a crime. "Maintaining the cooperation of witnesses" and "the number of arrests you make that result in conviction" received the lowest ratings from both HCR and LCR officers. Thus, as we found in Washington, D.C., HCR officers were not performing better because they perceived their supervisors to place more importance on conviction rates. The similarity in the ratings of the two groups of officers is reflected in the Spearman rank order correlation of +.82.

In contrast to the results obtained for Washington, D.C., police officers, we did find some similarity, although small, between the officers' ratings of the importance of these factors to themselves and their perceptions of the importance of the factors to their supervisors. The HCR officers indicated, for example, that arriving quickly at the scene of the crime was very important to themselves and to their supervisors. The number of arrests that result in conviction was rated next to the lowest in importance to HCR officers and it was rated the lowest for their supervisors. The Spearman rank order correlation between HCR officers' self-ratings and their perceptions of their supervisors' ratings was +.45. We found less of an association between LCR officers' ratings of the importance of these factors to themselves and to their supervisors. This is reflected in the Spearman rank order correlation of +.16.

Using the same procedures described in Chapter V, we conducted an informal survey of police department field supervisors in Manhattan. Twenty-one supervisors answered our

questions about the relative importance of the 16 items when they evaluate officers' job performance. Table VI.9 presents those results.

The supervisors indicated that each of the items was, on the average, at least "somewhat important." The highest rated item was "arriving quickly at the scene of the crime." Making good arrests, obtaining the cooperation of witnesses, and being available for calls were also rated highly. The number of arrests made that result in conviction, how well the officer gets along with others, and the number of arrests that the officer makes were least important to the supervisors.

Table VI.10 presents the comparisons of the officers' ratings of the importance of these items to themselves and to their supervisors, and the supervisors' actual ratings. As we did for the D.C. officers' results, we present the rank order of the mean ratings that have been provided in prior tables. We found that HCR and LCR officers' perceptions of their supervisors were positively correlated with the supervisors' actual ratings (Spearman rank order correlations = +.42 and +.35, respectively). For example, HCR and LCR officers perceived supervisors to place relatively great importance on arriving quickly at the scene of the crime. This factor received the highest rating of importance by the supervisors. One should note also, however, that there were some inconsistencies in the two types of ratings. For example, both groups of officers thought that supervisors place more importance on the number of arrests than supervisors indicated they do.

TABLE VI.9

SUPERVISORS' OPINIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS FACTORS IN EVALUATING OFFICERS' JOB PERFORMANCE, New York City Police Department (Manhattan)

Importance To the Supervisor Of:	MEAN RATING OF SUPERVISORS (N = 21)* (Scale: 1 = Not At All Important, 2 = Slightly Important, 3 = Somewhat Important, 4 = Very Important, 5 = Extremely Important)
Their arriving quickly at the scene of a crime	4.57
Their making good arrests	4.38
Their obtaining the cooperation of witnesses	4.14
Their being available for calls	4.14
Their ability to testify in court	4.10
Avoiding antagonizing the public	4.05
Their maintaining the cooperation of witnesses	4.00
The number of their cases that get cleared by arrest	4.00
Their ability to locate evidence at the scene of the crime	3.95
Their ability to work well with the prosecutor after an arrest has been made	3.95
Being highly visible to the public when they are on patrol	3.86
How thoroughly and carefully they complete their arrest and offense reports	3.86
Their locating witnesses the crimes	3.71
The number of arrests they make that result in conviction	3.52
How well they get along with their fellow officers	3.29
The number of arrests that they make	3.05

*Only 11 supervisors responded to the item, "The Number of Their Cases That Get Cleared By Arrest." This item was applicable only to persons who supervised detectives. All 21 supervisors rated the other items.

Table VI.10

COMPARISON OF THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS FACTORS TO HCR AND LCR OFFICERS AND TO THEIR SUPERVISORS WHEN THEY EVALUATE PERFORMANCE, New York City Police Department (Manhattan)

(Each column presents the rank order of 16 items according to the mean rating of importance#: 1 = items which received the highest mean rating. The average rank is presented for tied items.)

Officer's Ability or Performance	HCR OFFICERS' RATINGS (1) Importance To Officer	HCR OFFICERS' RATINGS (2) Perceived Importance To Supervisor	SUPERVISORS' RATINGS (3) Importance To Supervisor	LCR OFFICERS' RATINGS (4) Importance To Officer	LCR OFFICERS' RATINGS (5) Perceived Importance To Supervisor
Arriving quickly at the scene of a crime	1	1.5	1	2.5	1.5
Your ability to testify in court	2	3.5	5	1	9
How thoroughly and carefully you complete your arrest and offense reports	3	1.5	11.5	5	4
Your ability to locate evidence at the scene of the crime	4	8	9.5	2.5	7
Obtaining the cooperation of witnesses	5.5	11	3.5	7	12.5
Your ability to work well with the prosecutor after an arrest has been made	5.5	14	9.5	11	14
Making good arrests	7.5	9	2	4	6
Locating witnesses to crimes	7.5	13	13	8.5	11
The number of your cases that get cleared by arrest	9	3.5	7.5	13	1.5
How well you get along with your fellow officers	10	12	15	6	12.5
Maintaining the cooperation of witnesses	12	15	7.5	10	16
Being available for calls	12	7	3.5	8.5	3
Avoiding antagonizing the public	12	5	6	15	8
Being highly visible to the public when you're on patrol	14	6	11.5	14	10
The number of arrests you make that result in conviction	15	16	14	12	15
The number of felony arrests that you make	16	10	16	16	5

#Caution should be utilized in interpreting the ranks presented. The item ranked 16th in each column received the lowest mean rating of importance. This does not necessarily signify that this item was of no importance to the respondents. To discover the actual mean level of importance given to an item, the reader should consult Tables 30, 31 and 32.

SPEARMAN RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS OF THE RANK ORDER OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ITEMS

Columns 1 vs. 2 = +.45
Columns 1 vs. 3 = +.46
Columns 2 vs. 3 = +.42
Columns 4 vs. 5 = +.16
Columns 5 vs. 4 = +.44
Columns 3 vs. 5 = +.35

correlation between the officers' importance of these factors to themselves and ratings. Thus, both supervisors and officers iving quickly at the scene of a crime was ant. Similarly, officers and supervisors e number of felony arrests made was the least items rated. The Spearman rank order relations between the supervisors' ratings and the officers' ngs were +.48 for HCR officers and +.44 for LCR officers. Thus, both groups tended to assign similar weights to these factors, although the similarity in the ratings was not as great as we found for officers and supervisors in the District of Columbia.

D. KNOWLEDGE OF EVIDENCE AND THE LAW

We compared HCR and LCR officers' opinions of the value of evidence by presenting them with the same 9 situations that we presented to D.C. officers. We found no statistically significant differences between the choices of the HCR officers and the LCR officers. We administered the 9 questions to 23 prosecutors in New York and found that there were 6 questions for which at least 80 percent of the prosecutors chose the same response. Arbitrarily labeling these responses to be correct, we computed the total number of "correct" answers that each officer made. We again found no differences between the two groups of officers. The HCR officers answered "correctly," on the average, 3.6 of the 6 questions, compared with a mean of 4.0 correct responses for LCR officers.

Listed next are the number of correct answers for New York officers to 10 questions on job-related knowledge adapted from IACP "Training Keys."

Number of correct answers (of 10)	HCR officers (N=31)	LCR officers (N=33)
2-4	6%	3%
5-7	55	45
8-10	39	52
Mean Number Correct:	6.9	7.4

As was the case for officers in the District of Columbia, we found that HCR and LCR officers did not differ significantly from each other in their ability to answer these questions.

E. ARREST CHARACTERISTICS

1. Definitions of Good and Poor Arrests

Table VI.11 presents officers' conceptions of the term "good arrest." Over all, there was considerable similarity in the way the two groups of officers defined a good arrest. Both groups were most likely to indicate that a good arrest is one in which physical evidence is collected or one that results in a conviction. Smaller proportions of officers indicated that a good arrest is one that is lawful or one in which the right person is arrested. The LCR officers were a little more likely than HCR officers to cite the latter characteristic, but this difference was not statistically significant.

Table VI.12 presents the officers' conceptions of a poor arrest. Again, we found considerable similarity between the two groups of officers. Many of the characteristics were

simply the opposite of those indicative of a good arrest. Thus, not collecting physical evidence or not obtaining a conviction were viewed as characteristics of a poor arrest. Additional definitions of a poor arrest were those made to further the officer's self-interest or those that had problems with witnesses.

Table VI.11

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' CONCEPTIONS OF A "GOOD ARREST," New York City Police Department (Manhattan)

A Good Arrest Is[a]	Percent of Officers Who Said This[#]	
	HCR Officers (N = 31)	LCR Officers (N = 33)
Collecting physical evidence	29	27
Obtaining a conviction	23	30
Lawful-has probable cause	13	3
Arresting the right person	13	24
Lawful	10	3

[a] Includes all items listed by at least 10 percent of HCR or LCR officers.
[#] Percentages total more than 100 because of multiple responses per officer.

After defining good and poor arrests, each officer rated the quality of his arrests over the past several years on a six-point scale identical to that used by the D.C. officers.

Table VI.12

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' CONCEPTIONS OF A "POOR ARREST,"
New York City POlice Department (Manhattan)

A Poor Arrest Is[a]	Percent of Officers Who Said This[†]	
	HCR Officers (N = 31)	LCR Officers (N = 33)
Not collecting physical evidence	29	21
Unlawful-no probable cause	16	21
Arrest serves officer's self-interest	16	18
Not obtaining a conviction	13	9
Witness problems	10	9
Arresting the wrong person	0*	15*

[a]Includes all items listed by at least 10 percent of HCR or LCR officers.
[†]Percentages total more than 100 because of multiple responses per officer.
*p<.05.

Seventy-seven percent of the 30 responding HCR officers and 88 percent of the LCR officers rated their arrests as being five or six. All but one of the remaining officers rated their arrests as fours. Thus, the majority of both groups of officers believe they are making good arrests.

Each officer also rated the quality of the arrests made in his unit. Thirty-six percent of the 22 HCR officers who made an estimate indicated that very few or virtually none of the adult felony arrests made by officers in their unit were poor, compared with 16 percent of the 25 responding LCR officers. Although this difference was not statistically significant, it is in the same direction found for D.C. officers.

Officers were also asked to indicate how often over the past several years they collected physical evidence or called in an evidence technician and how often they located one or more lay witnesses. As we found for D.C. officers, the majority of both groups of officers (HCR, 67 percent; LCR, 58 percent) indicated that they collected evidence more than one-half of the time. However, 27 percent of 26 responding HCR officers indicated that they located a witness more than one-half of the time, compared with 19 percent of 31 responding LCR officers. This difference was not statistically significant, but was in the same direction that we found for D.C. officers. Whether HCR officers do in fact locate witnesses more often than LCR officers is probably worthy of further study.

2. Consequences of Good and Poor Arrests

We asked each officer to indicate the positive and negative consequences of making good and poor arrests. As with D.C. officers, the most likely positive consequence noted for making a good arrest was the self-satisfaction that resulted. As Table VI.13 shows, 32 percent of the HCR officers and 27 percent of LCR officers indicated this. Other positive consequences mentioned by both groups of officers included obtaining good assignments and promotions and the recognition received from superiors and fellow officers. Similar proportions of each group of officers indicated that there were no positive consequences or that they did not know of any.

Table VI.13

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' OPINIONS OF THE POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR OFFICERS WHO MAKE GOOD ARRESTS, New York City Police Department (Manhattan)

Positive Consequence[a]	Percent of Officers Who Said This[‡]	
	HCR Officers (N = 31)	LCR Officers (N = 33)
Self-satisfaction	32	27
Good assignments	10	6
Promotions more likely	10	12
Recognition by superiors	3	15
Recognition by fellow officers	3	15
There are no positive consequences or does not know of any	45	35

[a] Includes all items listed by at least 10 percent of HCR or LCR officers.
[‡] Percentages total more than 100 because of multiple responses.

Table VI.14

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' OPINIONS OF THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR OFFICERS WHO MAKE POOR ARRESTS, New York City Police Department (Manhattan)

Negative Consequence[a]	Percent Of Officers Who Said This[‡]	
	HCR Officers (N = 31)	LCR Officers (N = 33)
Held in low esteem by fellow officer	13	12
Held in low esteem by the community	13*	0*
Officer may be liable for damages	10	3
Held in low esteem by supervisor	6	21
There are no negative consequences or does not know of any	55	60

[a]Includes all items listed by at least 10 percent of the HCR or LCR officers.
[‡]Percentages total more than 100 because of multiple responses per officer.
*p<.05, by Fisher's exact test.

Table VI.14 presents officers' opinions of the negative consequences for officers who make poor arrests. First, it should be noted that a majority of both groups of officers indicated that there were no negative consequences or that they did not know of any. When a negative consequence was cited, it was likely to be that the officer would be held in lower esteem by the supervisor or fellow officers. We did find, however, that HCR officers were more likely than LCR officers (13 percent compared with 0 percent, $p<.05$) to indicate that the community would hold them in lower esteem, although this was suggested by only a minority of HCR officers. This is further evidence that LCR officers in New York do not show the heightened sensitivity to the community that we found among LCR officers in Washington, D.C.

The HCR officers were more likely than LCR officers to state that there were no positive consequences for officers who generally made poor arrests. As Table VI.15 shows, 90 percent of the HCR officers indicated that there were no positive consequences for such officers, compared with 61 percent of LCR officers, a difference significant at the $p<.03$ level. Almost one-fourth of the LCR officers indicated that officers who make poor arrests benefit from receiving more overtime money. Another small proportion of officers also indicated that by making such arrests the officer could gain better assignments.

Table VI.15

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' OPINIONS OF THE POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR OFFICERS WHO MAKE POOR ARRESTS, New York City Police Department (Manhattan)

Positive Consequence	Percent of Officers Saying This[a]	
	HCR Officers (N = 31)	LCR Officers (N = 33)
Increases overtime	6%	24%
Better assignments or impresses supervisor	3	15
Don't go to trial or court	0	6
Other positive consequences	0	6
There are none* or does not know of any	90**	61**

[a]Percentages may total more than 100 percent of multiple responses.
*Includes four officers who said that the officer would be transferred or receive advanced training.
**$p<.03$.

In order to examine whether LCR officers who perceived positive consequences for officers who make poor arrests behave differently than do LCR officers who did not perceive positive consequences, we looked at their responses to two questions about the frequency with which they obtained evidence or located witnesses during their investigations. The 13 LCR officers who perceived positive consequences were more likely than the other 20 LCR officers to report that they obtained evidence one-half the time or more (91 percent and 65 percent, respectively, significant at p .10), but they were less likely to indicate that they located witnesses one-half the time or more (zero percent and 42 percent, respectively, significant at p .01). The fact that the likelihood of locating witnesses tended to be higher among HCR than LCR officers in Washington, D.C., and to a lesser extent in New York, suggests that their perception of positive consequences for poor arrests might be one reason why LCR officers in New York had lower conviction rates.

If LCR officers were more likely to perceive positive consequences for officers who make poor arrests, it seemed plausible that they might also be more likely to see negative consequences for officers who make good arrests. Table VI.16 indicated that this was the case. Seventy-one percent of HCR officers indicated that they knew of no negative consequences for officers who make good arrests, compared with 36 percent of LCR officers, a difference significant at the p .03 level. The LCR officers tended to list a number of negative consequences

for officers who made good arrests. Some said that the officer would experience disappointments in the court process and case outcome, and others mentioned the resulting civilian complaints and the lack of recognition for officers who make good arrests. The jealousy and envy of fellow officers were also cited as negative consequences.

Table VI.16

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' OPINIONS OF THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR OFFICERS WHO MAKE GOOD ARRESTS, New York City Police Department (Manhattan)

Negative Consequences	Percent of Officers Who Said This[a]	
	HCR Officers (N = 31)	LCR Officers (N = 33)
Court-related problems[b]	3%	18
Overtime produces problems	13	15
Civilian Complaints	3	12
No recognition	0	15
Envy of department personnel	0	9
Job-related injuries	6	0
Other negative consequences	10	9
There are none* or does not know of any	71*	36*

[a]Percentages may total more than 100 because of multiple responses.
[b]Includes too much time spent in court, and dissatisfaction with dispositions.

*P<.03.

It has been well established that persons tend to act in ways that maximize the positive consequences of their behavior and minimize the negative consequences. The fact that LCR officers were more likely to report positive consequences for making poor arrests and negative consequences for making good arrests suggests a possible rationale for why those officers have lower conviction rates. Unfortunately, our data do not permit us to discern whether LCR officers' beliefs contributed to their lower conviction rates or if their statements are a form of "sour grapes" over their lower performance, assuming that they are aware of such performance. Regardless, the perceptions of the two groups of officers are so different that the New York City Police Department might wish to take steps to clarify and perhaps alter the consequences for officers who make arrests. For example, enhanced communication and cooperation between the police and the courts might eliminate officers' apparent disenchantment with this phase of the criminal justice system and reduce their aversion to appearance in court. Similarly, regulations regarding eligibility for promotions might be changed so that they are tied to the quality of the officers' arrests.

3. Officers' Arrest-related Attitudes

Table VI.17 presents the officers' mean ratings of agreement with statements about arrest procedures. We found considerable similarity between the responses of HCR and LCR officers. The LCR officers agreed more with the statement that it was important that the uniformed officer look for physical

Table VI.17

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' AGREEMENT WITH VARIOUS STATEMENTS ABOUT ARRESTS, New York City Police Department (Manhattan)

STATEMENT ABOUT ARRESTS	MEAN AGREEMENT WITH STATEMENT (Scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither Agree or Disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree)		
	HCR Officers (N = 31)**	LCR Officers (N = 33)**	p*
It's important that the uniformed officer look for physical evidence whenever he/she makes an arrest	3.87	4.33	<.01
Most adults arrested for felonies are guilty of the offense	3.65	3.55	>.10
The people in the community expect the police to make a lot of arrests	3.23	3.48	>.10
This department expects officers to make a large number of arrests that result in convictions	2.90	2.82	>.10
This department expects officers to make a lot of arrests each year	2.71	2.67	>.10
It's not necessary to give a lot of detailed information when filling out an arrest report	2.42	2.36	>.10
Police officers shouldn't concern themselves with what happens after arrest--that's the business of the prosecutor and the courts	2.19	2.30	>.10
If I generally make good arrests, I'm more likely to get promoted	2.19	1.85	>.10
Rules and regulations really don't help when you arrive at a crime scene and make an arrest	2.16	2.48	>.10
The arresting uniformed officer really doesn't have a responsibility to locate witnesses	2.06	2.00	>.10
If I make a lot of arrests, I'm more likely to get promoted	2.03	1.79	>.10
Arresting someone usually scares them into not committing crimes in the future	1.94	2.00	>.10
There isn't much that police officers can do to help the prosecutor get convictions	1.94	1.88	>.10
Arrest reports are a waste of time	1.68	1.70	>.10
Once I make an arrest and the offender has been booked, my role in the case should end	1.68	1.72	>.10
Realistically speaking, physical evidence has little value in court	1.57	1.52	>.10

*By t-test.
**N's vary slightly for individual items because of missing information.
#Spearman rank order correlation of the relative ordering of the item ratings for HCR and LCR officers = +.93.

evidence when making an arrest. It should be noted, however, that this was the highest rated item for both groups of officers. Both groups of officers also tended to agree with the statement that most adults arrested for felonies are guilty of the offense; HCR officers did appear to agree with that statement even more strongly than the LCR officers, although the difference was not significant, as it was in Washington, D.C.

As we found for D.C. officers, both groups of New York officers tended to disagree with statements indicating a reduced role for the officer after the arrest was made and a limited value for obtaining evidence and locating witnesses. In addition, 84 percent of HCR officers and 85 percent of LCR officers disagreed wth the statement that "arresting someone usually scares them into not committing crimes in the future." The Spearman rank order correlation for the relative importance of these items to HCR and LCR officers was +.93.

F. ARREST/CASE OUTCOME

Drawing on his knowledge of the guilt or innocence of adult arrestees over the past several years, each officer rated whether more or fewer cases should reach various dispositions. Table VI.18 presents these findings. As we found for officers in Washington, D.C., HCR and LCR officers held similar opinions of the attractiveness of various possible dispositions. Both groups of officers wanted to see more cases ending in guilty verdicts at trial and more cases that result in conviction and imprisonment. Similarly, both HCR and LCR officers wanted to see fewer cases dismissed immediately, end in not guilty

verdicts, and be plea bargained for reduced charges or sentences.

Table VI.18

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' OPINIONS ABOUT HOW OFTEN CERTAIN DISPOSITIONS SHOULD OCCUR FOR ADULT FELONY ARRESTS, New York City Police Department (Manhattan)

Opinion Regarding Disposition of Adult Felony Arrests	Percent of Officers Who Said This			
	HCR Officers (N)	%	LCR Officers (N)	%
More cases should:				
Have trials that result in a guilty verdict	(28)	86	(28)	71
Result in conviction and imprisonment	(31)	81	(32)	88
Fewer cases should:				
Be dismissed immediately	(28)	89	(29)	83
Have trials that result in a not guilty verdict	(27)	85	(25)	64
Plea bargain for a reduced charge	(31)	74	(32)	91
Plea bargain for a reduced sentence	(30)	73	(31)	90

When asked about the effect of various measures on the number of dismissals, HCR and LCR officers responded similarly. Most thought that dismissals would be reduced if more prosecutors were available to handle the case load and if prosecutors were better skilled and organized (See Table VI.19). The HCR officers were a little more likely to indicate

Table VI.19

EVENTS THAT HCR AND LCR OFFICERS BELIEVE WOULD REDUCE THE NUMBER OF DISMISSALS FOR ADULT FELONY ARRESTS, New York City Police Department (Manhattan)

Dismissals would be reduced:	Percent of Officers Who Said This: HCR Officers (N = 34)*	LCR Officers (N = 35)*	p**
If there were more prosecutors to handle the case load	89	76	>.10
If prosecutors were more skilled and better qualified	86	88	>.10
If judges were less concerned with legal technicalities	85	70	<.05
If citizens more often called the police immediately after a crime was committed	84	76	>.10
If the responding officers did a better job preserving the crime scene	83	82	>.10
If detectives did a better job interviewing witnesses	81	88	>.10
If arresting officers did a better job locating witnesses	80	88	>.10
If the prosecutors' office were better organized	75	68	>.10
If detectives did a better job searching for evidence	75	77	>.10
If uniformed officers did a better job interviewing victims/witnesses	74	72	>.10
If uniformed officers did a better job searching for evidence when they made arrests	74	79	>.10
If officers and detectives did a better job interrogating suspects	74	63	>.10
If detectives and uniformed officers cooperated more with each other at and around the time of arrest	68	79	>.10
If judges had more sympathy for victims of crimes	66	81	>.10
If there were more detectives	65	50	>.10
If there were more judges on the Bench	64	73	>.10
If responding officers did a more thorough and accurate job in filling out crime reports	61	70	>.10
If crime lab technicians did a better job processing evidence	56	57	>.10

*By t-test.
**N's vary slightly for each item because of missing information.

that dismissals would be reduced if judges were less concerned with legal technicalities. Moreover, as was found in Washington, D.C., officers tended to believe that increasing the number of uniformed officers would have no effect on the number of dismissals (47 percent of HCR officers and 52 percent of LCR officers).

As Table VI.20 indicates, most HCR and LCR officers reported that they were extremely or very interested in learning the outcomes of their arrests and the reasons for them. Similar proportions of each group indicated that they almost always do learn the outcome. However, most officers indicated that it takes some effort to obtain information about the outcome of a case and approximately three-fourths of each group of officers said that either there was no formal procedure in the department for obtaining such information or they were unsure whether one existed.

G. SUMMARY COMPARISON OF FINDINGS FROM MANHATTAN AND WASHINGTON, D.C.

Table VI.21 presents an overview of the principal findings obtained from the self-administered questionnaires completed by the police officers from Manhattan and the District of Columbia. Perhaps the most significant finding exhibited by officers in both police departments was that HCR officers were more likely to spend more time locating witnesses than were LCR officers. Although the differences between HCR and LCR officers were not as pronounced among officers from Manhattan as among officers from Washington, the fact that similar trends were detected suggests that the effort expended in locating witnesses may be

Table VI.20

HCR AND LCR OFFICERS' INTEREST IN LEARNING THE OUTCOME OF THEIR ADULT FELONY ARRESTS, New York City Police Department (Manhattan)

Officer's Response	Percent of Officers Who Said This*	
	HCR Officers (N=34)	LCR Officers (N=35)
Interest in knowing the outcome of arrests/cases:		
Extremely/very interested	71	64
Somewhat interested	26	27
Slightly or not at all interested	3	9
Interest in knowing the reasons for outcome of cases/arrests:		
Extremely/very interested	77	67
Somewhat interested	16	27
Slightly/not at all interested	6	6
Actually learns the outcome of arrests/cases:		
Usually/almost always	48	58
About half the time or less	52	42

*Percentages rounded

Table VI.21

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS OBTAINED FROM THE SELF-ADMINISTERED QUESTIONNAIRES COMPLETED BY POLICE OFFICERS FROM WASHINGTON, D.C. AND MANHATTAN

TOPIC	OFFICERS FROM WASHINGTON, D.C.	OFFICERS FROM MANHATTAN
BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS	• HCR and LCR officers similar in sex, age, marital status, education, police experience, and receipt of department awards.	• HCR and LCR officers similar in sex, age, marital status, education, police experience, and receipt of department awards.
ATTITUDES TOWARD SELF AND JOB	• HCR and LCR officers both satisfied with their jobs. • HCR officers more likely to view selves as very or extremely successful. • Both HCR and LCR officers tended to misperceive the relative importance to supervisors of various factors for evaluating officers' performance. • LCR officers tended to show greater sensitivity to the community than HCR officers.	• HCR officers more satisfied with jobs than LCR officers, but both groups reported decreasing satisfaction. • Similar proportions of HCR and LCR officers tended to view themselves as very or extremely successful. • Misperception of supervisors not found • Findings regarding LCR and HCR officers' sensitivity to the community were mixed.
KNOWLEDGE OF EVIDENCE AND LAW	• No differences between HCR and LCR officers.	• No differences between HCR and LCR officers.
ARREST CHARACTERISTICS	• HCR officers tended to be more likely to define a good arrest as one that leads to conviction. • Both groups of officers tended to perceive similar consequences for making good or poor arrests. • Both groups of officers rated the quality of their own arrests highly. • HCR officers were likely to spend more time locating witnesses. • HCR officers more likely to say most adults arrested for felonies are guilty.	• HCR and LCR officers had similar definitions of good and poor arrests. • LCR officers were more likely to perceive positive consequences for making poor arrests. and negative consequences for making good arrests. • Both groups of officers rated the quality of their own arrests highly. • HCR officers tended to spend more time locating witnesses. • Both groups of officers tended to believe that most adults arrested for felonies are guilty.
ARREST/CASE OUTCOME	• Both groups of officers valued similar dispositions and were very interested in learning the outcome of their cases.	• Both groups of officers valued similar dispositions and were very interested in learning the outcome of their cases.

a key behavior that differentiates officers with high conviction rates from those with low rates.

The HCR and LCR officers from both cities had similar backgrounds, comparable knowledge of the law and the value of evidence, and strong interests in learning the outcomes of their cases. Our findings thus suggest that implementing differential recruitment practices, special education programs, and efforts to encourage officers to learn case outcomes would probably not have a significant impact on officers' conviction rates.

The overall conclusion to be reached from this phase of the study is that HCR and LCR officers were quite similar on the largely attitudinal dimensions that were measured. This should not be too surprising, however, given the extensive research that indicates that a person's attitudes are often not associated with his or her actual behavior. In the next chapter, we continue our quest for factors that might account for the differential conviction rates of the officers by focusing on potential behavioral differences between HCR and LCR officers.

VII. ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEW DATA: WASHINGTON, D.C., AND MANHATTAN

In this chapter we examine officer responses during the intensive interviews that were conducted after the officers completed the self-administered questionnaire. We address a number of questions raised in the research plan and reiterated below. First, we discuss the analysis of interviews. This includes examination of specific sections of the interviews. In the final section, we review major findings and address "special techniques" or procedures identified by officers during the interviews.

As discussed in Chapter III, a multiple regression model was used to determine which officers would be selected for the interviews. The model also pointed up some findings that should be reviewed at this time. First, the model explained a significant amount of the variation among officers in terms of their ability to bring convictable arrests to the prosecutor, both in Washington, D.C., and in New York. In Washington, D.C., the model explained 72 percent of the variance in total conviction sentences produced by the officers, and in New York, it explained 89 percent. Much of the variation among officers was explained by such factors as the inherent convictability of the mix of arrests, the number and seriousness of the arrests, and the fact that many arrests were subject to charge reduction. The result of this was, as shown in the analyses of the self-administered questionnaire, that few significant differences were found between those identified as high and low

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conviction rate officers. (Recall that more significant differences were found in Washington, D.C., than in New York, bearing out the prediction of the model.) Conse- quently, in both interview sites, the ability of the interviews to further identify factors significantly related to these differences was rather small.

In the analysis that follows, we look at five areas of police work in an attempt to identify additional factors related to arrest convictability.* Throughout this discussion, the reader should bear in mind the small amount of unexplained variation that existed, especially in New York.

The research plan identified a number of questions to be addressed in the interviews. Specifically, we examined differences between HCR and LCR officers in regard to the following:

(1) Use of various department resources (information and services from specialized units).

(2) Special techniques the officers can describe and relate to arrest procedures.

(3) Amount of court experience.

(4) Adherence to legal and procedural rules.

(5) Obtaining additional information from offenders.

(6) Obtaining additional information from victims and witnesses.

*As noted in Chapter IV, the five areas are (1) collecting physical evidence, (2) locating witnesses and maintaining witness cooperation, (3) interrogating/interviewing suspects, (4) working with the prosecutor, and (5) working with informants.

(7) Obtaining additional information leading to the collection of physical evidence.

(8) Getting reluctant witnesses to cooperate.

A. THE ANALYSIS

The goal in the analysis of the interview information was to assess how the HCR and LCR officers differed in the way they responded. To do this, we grouped the officers according to how they fell out in the trichotomy that was used to produce the sample. The analysis was performed for the sample sizes indicated in Table VII.1. (The final selection of officers to be interviewed was discussed in Chapter IV.)

Table VII.1

INTERVIEW SAMPLE SIZES FOR WASHINGTON, D.C., AND MANHATTAN

	Washington	Manhattan
HCR	34	27
MCR	26	20
LCR	35	26
Total	95	73

In the analysis, we sought to identify two dimensions with respect to officer responses: quantity and content. The first dimension, quantity, tests simply whether one group is more or less able than the other to provide responses to the questions presented and whether particular areas of inquiry produce more analyzable information than others. The second, content or diversity, seeks to measure the range of information that is

provided by the respective groups of officers. This dimension involves the question on how diverse the tools or methods are upon which the officers draw. It looks at the specific types of responses offered by the officers to determine which solutions are provided by the different groups. Through the second dimension, also, we sought to determine what "special techniques" officers could identify and (by looking at who said what) to assess whether such techniques were likely to contribute to or detract from high achievement with respect to arrest convictability. In the subsections that follow, we look at each of the five areas of officer activity and at the two dimensions within them, to the extent that they can be addressed.

1. Collection of Evidence

As indicated in the replication analysis, the existence of physical evidence can have an impact on whether certain arrests result in conviction. We were not, however, able to determine from PROMIS data who was responsible for obtaining that evidence--arresting officer, detective, evidence technician, prosecutor, or some other person in the criminal justice system. We do infer, however, that given the effect of evidence on the probability of conviction, officers who make an effort to obtain evidence will, other things remaining equal, obtain more convictions than officers who do not make such an effort.

In the interviews, officers were asked whether they had ever collected physical evidence of three types: (1) evidence

that proves a crime has been committed, (2) evidence that links the suspect with the crime scene, and (3) evidence that links the suspect and the victim. They were then asked to describe those situations and the procedures they used to obtain the evidence. They were asked further to describe circumstances in which the collection of evidence was particularly difficult and how they dealt with those circumstances.

In each instance, the coding of responses allowed for up to five or six distinct responses to be coded (even if two distinct responses yielded identically coded values). First, we assessed the frequency with which officers were providing responses. Table VII.2 shows the gross frequency of procedures identified by the officers to deal with evidence problems.

Table VII.2

INCIDENCE OF EVIDENCE COLLECTION BY TYPE OF EVIDENCE
Mean Number of Mentions Per Officer

Washington, D.C.	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Evidence Type	Frequency	RPO	Frequency	RPO	Frequency	RPO
Proves:						
Crime Committed	247	7.26	174	6.69	185	5.29
Suspect at Scene	95	2.79	97	3.73	93	2.80
Contact with Victim	65	1.91	60	2.31	57	1.63
Number of Officers	34		26		35	

Manhattan	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Evidence Type	Frequency	RPO	Frequency	RPO	Frequency	RPO
Evidence that Proves:						
Crime Committed	160	5.93	67	3.35	141	5.42
Suspect at Scene	52	1.93	9	.45	52	2.00
Contact with Victim	29	1.07	8	.40	24	.92
Number of Officers	27		20		26	

In both Washington, D.C., and Manhattan, the most noteworthy difference between the HCR and LCR groups was within the category of evidence that proves a crime was committed. Counting duplicate responses, the HCR groups in both cities were able to list more procedures for obtaining that type of evidence. As might be expected from the model that produced the sample, the difference is more notable for Washington, D.C. For the category of evidence that proves that the victim was at the scene (or that the suspect and victim came into contact), there was considerably less difference between the HCR and LCR groups; the HCR officers in both cities listed slightly more techniques and procedures than the LCR officers. For the category of evidence that proves that the suspect was at the scene of the crime, there was virtually no difference between the responses of the two groups. Of course, total number of responses is only a gross indicator of the quantity of information that was provided by the officers, since duplicates are included. For this count, we listed only those procedures that represented significant responses (i.e., other than "nothing can be done") and made no attempt to differentiate among the diverse answers that were given by the officers. Nor was any attempt made at this point to apply statistical tests to these gross figures.

Next we looked at the actual answers provided by the officers to the above questions about how they get evidence of various types. As shown in Table VII.3, there were few

significant differences in the way in which the HCR and LCR groups responded. For the category of evidence that helps prove a crime was committed, the LCR officers in Washington, D.C., were significantly (p=.10, chi-square test) more likely to say "preserve the scene" than HCR officers. In contrast, HCR officers were significantly more likely to say "search the surrounding area," "locate and/or probe witnesses," and "locate and/or probe the victim." These differences were not borne out by the New York interviews, however. In New York, the only significant difference was that the HCR group was more likely than the LCR group to list "investigate or follow-up" as a procedure for obtaining evidence that proves the crime was committed.

Table VII.3

PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING EVIDENCE THAT HELPS PROVE A CRIME WAS COMMITTED, FREQUENCY AND PERCENT OF OFFICERS WHO MENTIONED ITEM AT LEAST ONCE

	D.C.						Manhattan					
	HCR(34)		MCR(26)		LCR(35)		HCR(27)		MCR(20)		LCR(26)	
PROCEDURE	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
arrive quickly	4	12	0	0	3	9	3	11	1	5	0	0
preserve scene	14	41	14	54	23	66	13	48	8	40	9	35
canvass general area	13	38	7	27	15	43	8	30	2	10	6	23
search surrounding area	28	82	18	69	19	54	17	63	9	45	16	62
search for specifics	11	32	8	31	7	20	4	15	3	15	7	27
locate/probe witness	18	53	9	35	7	20	5	19	4	20	10	38
locate/probe victim	12	35	9	35	5	14	12	44	4	20	6	23
locate/probe suspect	8	24	6	23	6	17	10	37	3	15	6	23
surveillance	4	12	4	15	1	3	8	30	1	5	9	35
interview first officers	27	79	19	73	27	77	22	81	11	55	13	50
investigate/followup	27	79	19	73	27	77	22	81	11	55	13	50
measure/diagram	10	29	7	27	10	29	6	22	5	25	3	12
other	1	3	2	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	12
nothing	5	15	0	0	2	6	0	0	2	10	7	27

For the category of evidence that proves the suspect was at the scene of the crime, we found only one significant difference in either city. In Washington, D.C., LCR officers were more likely to say that they searched for specific items (such as clothes, blood, and debris) that would link the suspect with the scene. (See Table VII.4.) In the third category (evidence that proves the victim was at the scene, or that shows that the victim and suspect came into contact), there were no significant differences. (See Table VII.5.)

Table VII.4

PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING EVIDENCE THAT PROVE THAT THE SUSPECT WAS AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME, FREQUENCY AND PERCENT OF OFFICERS WHO MENTIONED ITEM AT LEAST ONCE

	D.C.						Manhattan					
	HCR(34)		MCR(26)		LCR(35)		HCR(27)		MCR(20)		LCR(26)	
PROCEDURE	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
arrive quickly	1	3	2	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4
preserve scene	1	3	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	4
canvass general area	5	15	2	8	1	3	2	7	0	0	1	4
search surrounding area	11	32	8	31	11	31	5	19	1	5	9	35
search for specifics	4	12	6	23	12	34	2	7	0	0	2	8
locate/probe witness	4	12	6	23	5	14	5	19	0	0	4	15
locate/probe victim	9	26	4	15	4	11	2	7	0	0	4	15
locate/probe suspect	6	18	7	27	7	20	1	4	0	0	5	19
surveillance	1	3	3	12	0	0	5	19	0	0	3	12
interview first officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	0	0	0	0
investigate/followup	10	29	12	46	11	31	12	44	2	10	8	31
measure/diagram	3	9	2	8	3	9	3	11	1	5	2	8
other	0	0	4	15	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	4
nothing	1	3	4	15	3	9	0	0	0	0	2	8

Table VII.5

PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING EVIDENCE THAT PROVES THE VICTIM WAS AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME AND/OR CAME IN CONTACT WITH THE SUSPECT, FREQUENCY AND PERCENT OF OFFICERS WHO MENTIONED ITEM AT LEAST ONCE

	D.C.						Manhattan					
	HCR(34)		MCR(26)		LCR(35)		HCR(27)		MCR(20)		LCR(26)	
PROCEDURE	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
arrive quickly	1	3	2	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
preserve scene	1	3	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	8
canvass general area	4	12	2	8	2	6	0	0	0	0	1	4
search surrounding area	6	18	6	23	7	20	1	4	1	5	2	8
search for specifics	5	15	4	15	5	14	1	4	0	0	1	4
locate/probe witness	4	12	2	8	4	11	1	4	1	5	2	8
locate/probe victim	4	12	5	19	5	14	4	15	0	0	3	12
locate/probe suspect	5	15	3	12	6	17	1	4	0	0	3	12
surveillance	2	6	0	0	0	0	1	4	1	5	1	4
interview first officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
investigate/followup	9	26	10	38	7	20	5	19	1	5	3	12
measure/diagram	1	3	0	0	2	6	0	0	1	5	1	4
other	0	0	1	4	0	0	1	4	0	0	0	0
nothing	1	3	1	4	2	6	0	0	0	0	3	12

In some questions, the officers were asked to describe the circumstances that were associated with those efforts to collect evidence, as well as the procedures that applied in particular circumstances. However, given the small number of officers and the open-ended nature of the interviews, the number of different responses possible vastly exceeds the number of police officers who were interviewed. Consequently, significant variation in the way that officers deal with specific circumstances did not exist to an extent that could be tested. Even so, we looked at a breakdown, by circumstance, of methods and procedures used. We found no significant HCR-LCR variation.

Although the cross-categorization of circumstances and procedures did not lend itself to analysis, we did look at the circumstances that were identified by the officers. As above, the results were not very revealing. For each category of evidence, the circumstances described by the officers fell into six distinct groups; in a seventh group only the offense was mentioned. These are shown, with the proportion of officers listing those circumstances at least once, in Tables VII.6 through VII.8.

Again, as with the procedures used, there were few differences. In fact, the only statistically significant difference between the circumstances identified by HCR and LCR officers was that HCR officers were much more likely to say that their problems in collecting evidence to prove that a crime was committed involved the contamination of evidence.

Table VII.6

CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH OFFICERS FIND IT DIFFICULT TO COLLECT EVIDENCE THAT HELPS PROVE A CRIME WAS COMMITTED
Number and Percentage of Officers Mentioning A Circumstance at Least Once

Washington, D.C.	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Circumstance Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Contaminated evidence	24	71%*	6	23%	10	29%
Crime Scene	11	32%	7	27%	8	23%
Victim problems	5	15%	5	19%	4	11%
Witness problems	2	6%	2	8%	1	3%
Suspect problems	3	9%	4	15%	1	3%
Physical location of evidence	8	24%	10	38%	8	23%
Other	2	6%	0	--	2	6%
Number of officers	34		26		35	

Manhattan	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Circumstance Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Contaminated evidence	6	22%	3	15%	8	31%
Crime Scene	5	19%	2	10%	6	23%
Victim problems	0	--	1	5%	1	4%
Witness problems	4	15%	0	--	0	--
Suspect problems	4	15%	0	--	2	8%
Physical location of evidence	8	30%	3	15%	8	31%
Other	4	15%	3	15%	2	8%
Number of officers	27		20		26	

*p=.10

Table VII.7

CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH OFFICERS FIND IT DIFFICULT TO COLLECT EVIDENCE THAT HELPS PROVE THAT SUSPECT WAS AT SCENE OF CRIME
Number and Percentage of Officers Mentioning A Circumstance at Least Once

Washington, D.C.	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Circumstance Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Contaminated evidence	13	38%	10	38%	10	29%
Crime Scene	8	24%	8	31%	5	14%
Victim problems	3	9%	2	8%	2	6%
Witness problems	0	--	0	--	2	6%
Suspect problems	0	--	0	--	1	3%
Physical location of evidence	2	6%	1	4%	2	6%
Number of officers	34		26		35	

Manhattan	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Circumstance Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Contaminated evidence	2	7%	0	--	7	27%
Crime Scene	7	26%	1	5%	4	15%
Victim problems	3	11%	0	--	2	8%
Witness problems	0	--	0	--	0	--
Suspect problems	0	--	0	--	0	--
Physical location of evidence	0	--	1	5%	0	--
Number of officers	27		20		26	

Table VII.8

CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH OFFICERS FIND IT DIFFICULT TO COLLECT EVIDENCE THAT PROVES THE VICTIM AND SUSPECT CAME INTO CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER
Number and Percentage of Officers Mentioning A Circumstance at Least Once

Washington, D.C.	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Circumstance Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Contaminated evidence	7	21%	4	15%	2	6%
Crime Scene	2	6%	1	4%	2	6%
Victim problems	4	12%	4	15%	5	14%
Witness problems	0	--	1	4%	1	3%
Suspect problems	3	9%	2	8%	0	--
Physical location of evidence	2	6%	2	8%	6	17%
Other	0	--	0	--	0	--
Number of officers	34		26		35	

Manhattan	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Circumstance Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Contaminated evidence	1	4%	1	5%	3	12%
Crime Scene	2	7%	0	--	3	12%
Victim problems	2	7%	0	--	0	--
Witness problems	1	4%	0	--	2	8%
Suspect problems	1	4%	0	--	1	4%
Physical location of evidence	1	4%	1	5%	1	4%
Other	1	4%	1	5%	1	4%
Number of officers	27		20		25	

Seventy-one percent of the HCR officers (24 out of 34) said that they encountered that as a problem, whereas only 29 percent of the LCR officers (10 out of 35) mentioned such circumstances (Table VII.6). This was found only for Washington, D.C. None of the differences in Manhattan was significant. For both jurisdictions, the HCR officers did tend more often to indicate circumstances in which it is difficult to collect evidence proving a crime was committed.

2. Locating Witnesses and Maintaining Witness Cooperation

Officers were asked whether they had ever located or helped to locate civilian witnesses in connection with an arrest. As before, if they responded affirmatively, their answers were coded into as many as five or six distinct responses for each question. The first question asked the officers to describe how they usually go about getting or finding witnesses. Next, they were asked to identify the circumstances in which it was difficult to obtain witnesses and to describe both the circumstances and the procedures associated with them. One of these circumstances was selected and further responses were solicited about why the case was particularly challenging. Finally, the officers were asked to talk about the specific reasons why some witnesses usually fail to cooperate and to tell how they go about gaining cooperation in such circumstances.

As before, we calculated the gross frequency of methods and procedures that the officers were able to provide. For both Washington, D.C., and Manhattan, officers in the HCR groups provided more information than officers in the LCR groups.

This was the case for procedures for locating witnesses as well as for methods of obtaining witness cooperation. We do note that, as before, these measures are only gross indicators, and the application of statistical tests of significance is inappropriate. They do indicate, however, an overall tendency for high conviction rate officers to provide more information than low conviction rate officers. Whether this is a reflection of overall ability, however, would require inferences we are not prepared to draw. The results of this analysis are shown in Table VII.9

Table VII.9

PROCEDURES FOR LOCATING WITNESSES AND WAYS OF OBTAINING WITNESS COOPERATION
Number of Responses Per Officer

Washington, D.C.	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Procedure Cited	Frequency	RPO	Frequency	RPO	Frequency	RPO
Witness Persuasion Techniques	158	4.65	152	5.85	143	4.09
Procedures for Locating Witnesses	141	4.15	101	3.88	104	2.97
Number of officers	34		26		35	

Manhattan	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Procedure Cited	Frequency	RPO	Frequency	RPO	Frequency	RPO
Witness Persuasion Techniques	85	3.15	47	2.35	71	2.25
Procedures for Locating Witnesses	56	2.07	22	1.10	43	1.65
Number of officers	27		20		26	

Next we looked at what was being said by the officers. Here we calculated the percentage of officers in each group who mentioned a given procedure or method at least once. No additional counting of duplicate or repetitive replies (unlike the gross measure above) was performed. As for our investigation of evidence techniques, we found few differences between the HCR and LCR groups.

Officers were asked to list and describe procedures for locating witnesses. Of the substantive procedures provided in response, no differences were found. The HCR and LCR officers in both jurisdictions either replied in a non-specific way (i.e., no more specific than "locate and probe witnesses") or they tended to say "investigate and follow-up on leads." In Washington, D.C., HCR officers were significantly less likely than LCR officers to say "nothing can be done." (See Table VII.10.)

Those responses were provided with respect to specific circumstances (see below). In breaking the responses down by circumstances, however, there did not appear to be any pattern related to HCR and LCR groupings.

Officers were also asked to list and describe methods of persuading witnesses to cooperate. For the most part, no sharp differences emerged in the methods listed by HCR and LCR officers. One interesting difference is that LCR officers were more inclined to try to appeal to the witness's sense of civic responsibiliity than were HCR offices. (See Table VII.11.)

Similarly, officers were asked to describe circumstances in which witness cooperation was especially difficult to obtain.

Table VII.10

METHODS OF LOCATING WITNESSES
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF OFFICERS MENTIONING AT LEAST ONCE

Manhattan	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Method Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Arrive quickly	0	--	0	--	0	--
Preserve Scene	0	--	0	--	2	8
Canvass general area	5	19	3	15	5	19
Search surrounding area	1	4	0	--	1	4
Locate/probe witnesses	9	33	5	25	10	38
Locate/probe victim	2	7	1	5	0	--
Locate/probe suspect	0	--	0	--	1	4
Surveillance	0	--	1	5	0	--
Investigate/followup	15	56	4	20	10	38
Other	1	4	1	5	2	8
"Nothing can be done"	3	11	4	20	4	15
Number of officers	27		20		26	

Washington, D.C.	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Method Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Arrive quickly	1	3	2	8	0	--
Preserve Scene	0	--	1	4	0	--
Canvass general area	15	44	9	35	14	40
Search surrounding area	4	12	5	19	3	9
Locate/probe witnesses	21	62	16	62	18	51
Locate/probe victim	4	12	6	23	5	14
Locate/probe suspect	1	3	0	--	0	--
Surveillance	0	--	0	--	0	--
Investigate/followup	26	76	20	77	20	57
Other	1	3	2	8	2	6
"Nothing can be done"	4	12	5	19	11	31*
Number of officers	34		26		35	

*p=.10

Table VII.11

PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING WITNESS COOPERATION
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF OFFICERS MENTIONING AT LEAST ONCE

Washington, D.C.	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Procedure Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Seek Court Assistance	5	15	8	31	4	11
Use "psychology"	30	88	22	85	27	77
Ease burden (nfs)	15	44	8	31	4	15
Provide protection	2	6	9	35	6	17
Place on phone alert	3	9	5	19	1	3
Provide transportation	4	12	7	27	3	9
Compensate witness	12	35	12	46	13	37
Contact employer	1	3	3	12	2	6
Stress civic resp.	10	29	9	35	15	43
Threaten subpoena	8	24	5	19	5	14
Be persistant	7	21	3	12	2	6
Tactical harassment	3	9	3	12	3	9
"Not much you can do"	7	21	3	12	5	14
Other	0	--	4	15	1	3
Number of Officers	34		26		35	

Manhattan	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Procedure Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Seek Court Assistance	5	19	2	10	0	--
Use "psychology"	16	59	7	35	15	58
Ease burden (nfs)	5	15	1	5	2	8
Provide protection	8	30	5	25	9	35
Place on phone alert	1	4	2	10	0	--
Provide transportation	2	7	0	--	1	4
Compensate witness	1	4	0	--	1	4
Contact employer	1	4	0	--	1	4
Stress civic resp.	5	19	6	30	8	31
Threaten subpoena	3	11	5	25	4	15
Be persistant	1	4	0	--	1	4
Tactical harassment	2	7	1	5	1	4
"Not much you can do"	2	7	2	10	3	12
Other	1	4	1	5	0	--
Number of Officers	27		20		26	

Again, no sharp differences emerged between the two groups in either city. (See Table VII.12.) Officers cited a variety of reasons, many of which were related to problems of witness reluctance--due to fear, apathy, criminal involvement, or sympathy with the offender. An analysis of the specific methods that officers used to cope with these circumstances was not very revealing in that the number of observations was so small. Shown in Table VII.13, we selected the largest general category for both Washington and Manhattan--reluctant witnesses.

Table VII.12

CIRCUMSTANCES CITED AS REASONS FOR WITNESS DIFFICULTIES
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF OFFICERS MENTIONING AT LEAST ONCE

Washington, D.C.	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Circumstance Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
No obvious witnesses	12	35	11	42	7	20
Non-cooperative	14	41	11	42	13	37
Crowd situation	1	3	1	4	4	11
Reluctant witnesses	28	82	23	88	23	66
Time lapse	2	6	1	4	4	11
Other	2	6	2	8	6	17
Number of officers	34		26		35	

Manhattan	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Circumstance Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
No obvious witnesses	5	19	3	15	1	4
Non-cooperative	8	30	3	15	1	4
Crowd situation	2	7	0	--	3	12
Reluctant witnesses	10	37	5	25	7	27
Time lapse	1	4	0	--	0	--
Other	4	15	4	20	1	4
Number of officers	27		20		26	

Table VII.13 illustrates a problem that existed throughout the analysis of the interviews and that is generally associated with content analysis. Although the form of the interviews was highly structured, the content was not, so as not to inhibit the amount of information provided by the officers. So diverse were the answers and so small the number of interviewees that looking at the data broken down into any detail becomes statistically unreliable. The cells turn out to be too small to allow us to detect from these interviews whether HCR and LCR officers are systematically dealing with reluctant witnesses in different ways.

3. Interrogating and Interviewing Suspects

Officers were also asked about their experiences with interviewing suspects. We asked them to tell us what their goals are in conducting such interviews and how they usually go about attaining them. Next, we sought responses about the circumstances in which it was more difficult than usual for them to achieve their goals in interrogating suspects and how they dealt with those circumstances. Finally, we selected one of those circumstances and sought more explicit responses to questions about how they dealt with it.

Again, we began by looking at the gross response rates for HCR and LCR officers in Washington and in Manhattan. Unlike the questions concerning evidence and witnesses, however, in both Washington and Manhattan, the gross number of substantive responses per officer was marginally higher for the LCR group than for the HCR group. (See Table VII.14.) We should point

Table VII.13

Frequency of Responses to
"How do you attempt to persuade reluctant witnesses"
Washington, D.C.

	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Response	freq.	%	freq.	%	freq.	%
Canvass general area	3	9%	4	15%	4	11%
Locate additional witnesses	9	26%	10	38%	7	20%
Probe victim	0	--	1	4%	1	3%
Investigate, followup, use experts	18	53%	13	50%	15	43%
Other	0	--	0	--	1	3%
"Nothing can be done"	5	15%	2	8%	5	14%
Number of Officers	34		26		35	

Frequency of Responses to
"How do you attempt to persuade reluctant witnesses"
Manhattan, New York

	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Response	freq.	%	freq.	%	freq.	%
Locate additional witnesses	5	19%	4	20%	1	4%
Probe victim	1	4%	1	5%	0	--
Investigate, followup, use experts	5	19%	2	10%	6	23%
"Nothing can be done"	0	--	0	--	1	4%
Number of Officers	27		23		26	

out, however, that the "difference" is rather small and is only noteworthy because of its consistency across both jurisdictions.

Table VII.14

METHODS FOR INTERROGATING AND INTERVIEWING SUSPECTS
METHODS CITED--TOTAL AND NUMBER PER OFFICER

Washington, D.C	HCR	MCR	LCR
Number of Methods Cited	220	185	232
Number of Methods Per Officer	6.47	7.12	6.63
Number of Officers	34	26	35

Manhattan	HCR	MCR	LCR
Number of Methods Cited	127	58	126
Number of Methods Per Officer	4.70	2.90	4.50
Number of Officers	27	20	28

Looking at Table VII.15, we see that both HCR and LCR officers in Manhattan and Washington say they use psychological skills, tricks, or attempt to establish rapport with the suspect in order to accomplish their goals or to deal with particular circumstances. The only significant difference found in either city was that, in Manhattan, HCR officers tend to stress just being straight with the suspect more often than do LCR officers. The direction of this relationship is supported by the difference shown in Washington; however, there it is not statistically significant. Also not significant, but worth mentioning, is the fact that in Washington, LCR officers tend to be more likely to confront suspects with whatever evidence they have against them as a method for getting them to

talk. We cannot, however, infer from this that it is a "bad" tactic--more information would be necessary to evaluate specific tactics.

Table VII. 15

METHODS CITED FOR INTERROGATING AND INTERVIEWING SUSPECTS
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF OFFICERS MENTIONING AT LEAST ONCE

Washington, D.C.	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Method Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Use Psychology	28	82	23	88	32	91
Direct questions	22	65	16	62	19	54
Instinct/play by ear	12	35	7	27	7	20
Confront with evidence	6	18	8	31	12	34
Provide incentives	3	9	4	15	5	14
Other	17	50	15	58	16	46

Manhattan	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Method Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Use Psychology	17	63	11	55	22	63
Direct questions	15	56	3	15	7	20
Instinct/play by ear	3	11	1	5	2	6
Confront with evidence	2	11	2	10	4	15
Provide incentives	5	19	2	10	3	12
Other	11	41	7	35	13	37

Looking at the circumstances listed by officers, Table VII.16, we find that HCR and LCR officers in both jurisdictions tend to list a variety of circumstances, but there does not appear to be any consistent pattern to those listed. No significant differences in the number of officers mentioning specific circumstances were found. Again, efforts to further examine the circumstances--to determine whether HCR and LCR officers offer similar solutions to similar problems--were unsatisfactory due to the dispersion of the responses and the small number of observations.

Table VII.16

CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH INTERROGATION OF SUSPECT IS PROBLEMATIC
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF OFFICERS MENTIONING AT LEAST ONCE

Washington, D.C.	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Circumstance Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Suspect is street wise	13	38	13	50	18	51
Suspect is incapacitated	5	15	8	31	5	14
Suspect hostile or claims no knowledge	13	38	8	31	13	37
Multiple or unidentified suspects	5	15	3	12	4	11
Defendant-victim interplay	0	--	0	--	0	--
Interplay among defendants	1	3	4	15	3	9
Crowd situation	12	35	7	27	14	40
Facts uncertain	0	--	1	4	0	--
Other	3	9	5	19	2	6

Manhattan	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Circumstance Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Suspect is street wise	10	37	2	10	7	27
Suspect is incapacitated	4	15	4	20	3	12
Suspect hostile or claims no knowledge	8	30	5	25	11	42
Multiple or unidentified suspects	3	11	0	--	0	--
Defendant-victim interplay	0	--	0	--	1	4
Interplay among defendants	3	11	0	--	2	8
Crowd situation	3	11	1	5	4	15
Facts uncertain	0	--	0	--	0	--
Other	5	5	0	--	1	4

Finally, we looked at the goals cited by officers as their purpose in conducting the interrogation (Table VII.17). Here, both HCR and LCR officers in Washington and Manhattan tended to say that their goal was to "establish the guilt or innocence" of the suspect. In Washington, significantly more HCR officers than LCR officers said that one of their goals was to obtain details about the crime. Additionally, a few of the HCR officers (3 in Washington and 1 in Manhattan) mentioned a goal of stressing the "legality of the process," which LCR officers never mentioned as a goal. We note this with interest only, however, in that the contrasts are not statistically significant.

Table VII.17

GOALS CITED AS OBJECTIVES OF INTERROGATION
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF OFFICERS MENTIONING AT LEAST ONCE

Washington, D.C.	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Goal Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Obtain data on suspect	17	50	11	42	20	57
Establish rapport	2	6	3	12	3	9
Prove guilt or innocence	30	38	20	77	30	86
Obtain details of crime	10	29*	5	19	3	9
Identify witnesses	2	6	1	4	1	3
Maintain legality	3	9	0	0	0	0

Manhattan	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Goal Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Obtain data on suspect	12	44	7	35	14	54
Establish rapport	6	22	2	10	8	31
Prove guilt or innocence	17	63	11	55	15	58
Obtain details of crime	12	44	3	15	5	19
Identify witnesses	0	--	0	--	0	--
Maintain legality	1	4	1	5	0	--

*p=.10

4. Working with the Prosecutor

The fourth area of inquiry was about how police officers work with prosecutors. Given that a high proportion of arrests accepted for prosecution result in conviction, the ability of an officer to prevent rejection of an arrest can contribute substantially to the overall likelihood of conviction. Aside from presenting an arrest that is well founded, an officer who is so motivated may be able to facilitate the prosecution of a case by conducting further investigation, working with witnesses, or by doing other tasks helpful to the prosecutor. In so doing, he is likely to learn how to make better arrests in the future, as well. A good working relationship with the prosecutor can help toward these ends.

Officers were questioned in detail about their interactions with prosecutors: the types of work that they generally do with the prosecutor after arrest, what they consider important for a successful working relationship with the prosecutor, and whether they are able to "shop" for a prosecutor--i.e., find one that is more sympathetic to their particular situation. Those who had "shopped" for prosecutors were asked how they go about it and what attributes they sought in so doing. Next, we asked officers to focus on a particular case in which they viewed their work with the prosecutor as essential to its conviction. Those who could think of specific instances were asked to tell about what they accomplished, and how. Finally, they were asked to tell us whether their work with the prosecutor had ever turned up additional evidence or witnesses,

or whether their efforts had helped to maintain the cooperation of certain witnesses through the prosecution process.

In both jurisdictions, about half of the officers said that they had worked with prosecutors. The HCR officers were no more likely than LCR officers to have done so. Officers listed a range of activities they had engaged in in working with the prosecutors, and most said that they had worked in the areas of seeking additional witnesses and evidence, along with seeking to obtain the cooperation of witnesses. There was no consistent or significant pattern, however, in the way in which HCR and LCR officers responded. (See Table VII.18.)

Next we looked at what officers said was necessary for a good working relationship between the police and the prosecutor. Most tended to say that "professionalism" and "competency" were the most important attributes (Table VII.19). Nearly as many said that "mutual understanding" was necessary as well. There was a slight tendency (though not statistically significant) for LCR officers to view "mutual understanding" as more important than did the HCR officers, and for HCR officers to have a similarly weighted view of professional competency. As before, however, this is only a tendency and not a finding, but one that is consistent for both Washington and Manhattan.

For those who said that they had "shopped" for a prosecutor, most claimed to have gone about it in similar ways (Table VII.20). That may have consisted of requesting that the case be assigned to a specific attorney, looking for a

Table VII.18

WAYS IN WHICH POLICE OFFICERS WORK WITH PROSECUTORS
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF OFFICERS MENTIONING AT LEAST ONCE

Washington, D.C.	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Activity Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Pretrial (hearings, Grand Jury, etc.)	4	12	7	27	4	11
Trial (testimony, trial preparation, etc.)	2	6	6	23	1	3
Witness investigation	17	50	16	62	18	51
Evidence investigation	13	38	14	54	9	26
Defendant investigation	3	9	3	12	3	9
Paperwork	9	26	7	27	12	34
Talking with prosecutor	4	12	2	8	2	6
Other	5	15	5	19	3	9
Number of officers	34		26		35	

Manhattan	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Activity Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Pretrial (hearings, Grand Jury, etc.)	4	15	3	15	6	23
Trial (testimony, trial preparation, etc.)	2	7	0	--	1	4
Witness investigation	13	48	7	35	13	50
Evidence investigation	7	26	4	20	5	19
Defendant investigation	0	--	0	--	0	--
Paperwork	6	22	2	10	3	12
Talking with prosecutor	5	19	0	--	5	19
Other	3	11	0	--	2	8
Number of officers	27		20		26	

Table VII.19

ATTRIBUTES OF A GOOD PROSECUTOR-POLICE WORKING RELATIONSHIP
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF OFFICERS MENTIONING AT LEAST ONCE

Washington, D.C.	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Attribute Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Mutual understanding honesty and candor	18	53	19	73	24	69
Open lines of Communication	2	6	3	12	7	20
Experience	3	9	8	31	3	9
Professional competency	27	79	19	73	23	66
Other	1	3	2	8	4	11
Number of officers	34		26		35	

Manhattan	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Attribute Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Mutual understanding honesty and candor	16	59	8	40	18	69
Open lines of Communication	9	33	4	20	7	27
Experience	7	26	1	5	5	19
Professional competency	21	78	12	60	18	69
Other	0	--	1	5	1	4
number of officers	27		20		27	

Table VII.20

PROCEDURES USED BY OFFICERS TO "SHOP" FOR PROSECUTORS
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF OFFICERS MENTIONING AT LEAST ONCE

Washington, D.C.	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Prodecure Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Go to unit chief	0	--	1	4	0	--
Request that case be assigned to specific prosecutor	0	--	2	8	1	3
Look for someone you know	4	12	5	19	2	6
Ask specific attorney to request/paper the case	4	12	1	4	0	--
Other	1	3	0	--	0	--
Number of officers	34		26		35	

Manhattan	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Prodecure Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Go to unit chief	0	--	0	--	0	--
Request that case be assigned to specific prosecutor	0	--	0	--	-	--
Look for someone you know	1	4	1	5	0	--
Ask specific attorney to request/paper the case	2	7	0	--	0	--
Other	0	--	1	5	0	--
Number of officers	27		20		27	

"familiar face," or requesting that a particular attorney screen the case. The numbers of responses were too small, however, to determine whether the HCR and LCR officers proceeded in different ways.

Finally, of those who had "shopped" for a prosecutor, we asked about the attributes they sought. Again, there was a strong emphasis on mutual understanding and professional competency (Table VII.21). Experience was also cited. Interestingly, the HCR officers in both jurisdictions were substantially more likely than the LCR officers to offer their views of attributes they looked for in prosecutors.

Table VII.21

ATTRIBUTES THAT POLICE OFFICERS LOOK FOR IN PROSECUTORS
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF OFFICERS MENTIONING AT LEAST ONCE

Washington, D.C.	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Prodecure Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Mutual understanding	7	21	6	23	4	11
Experience	3	9	1	4	0	--
Professional competency	3	9	6	23	2	6
Other	3	9	2	8	0	--
Number of officers	34		26		35	

Manhattan	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Prodecure Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Mutual understanding	3	11	2	10	0	--
Experience	2	7	1	5	0	--
Professional competency	2	7	2	10	0	--
Other	0	--	0	--	0	--
Number of officers	27		20		27	

5. Working with Informants

A final area of inquiry focused on use of, or work with, informants. Use of informants was hypothesized to be one of the tools that officers could use effectively in doing their jobs. Officers were asked about whether they had ever worked with informants. Next, they were asked about what kinds of people make the best informants, and why. They were then asked how they generally go about getting the cooperation of those people, what specific problems they had encountered in dealing with informants, and how they went about dealing with those problems.

In Washington and Manhattan, HCR and LCR officers tended to mention a wide variety of people as potentially good informants (Table VII.22). The most common response was "people (criminals) who need favors." A number of officers also said that the "criminal element" also make good informants (apart from those who are "in trouble" at the moment). Police "buffs" and people who have a "stake" in the community were also listed. The variety of responses, however, illustrates a problem in analysis--there was no significant pattern to the types of responses given.

Next, we asked officers how they usually go about getting the cooperation of informants. In both jurisdictions, most gave a variety of responses that could not be coded into a similar category. The most common responses that could be put into a single category included use of a psychological approach and the offering of some kind of assistance to the informant. Interestingly, the HCR officers in both jurisdictions were

Table VII.22

TYPES OF PEOPLE WHO MAKE THE "BEST" INFORMANTS
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF OFFICERS MENTIONING AT LEAST ONCE

Washington, D.C.	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Type Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Criminals/ persons facing charges or in need of favors	20	59	18	69	13	37
Those who have an interest in the community	3	9	4	15	5	14
People with grudges	2	6	6	23	6	17
People who associate with criminals	9	26	8	31	10	29
Police buffs	2	6	4	15	1	3
Friends or relatives of the suspect	2	6	2	8	2	6
People that work on the streets (such as mail carriers)	3	9	3	12	3	9
People who need money	3	9	3	12	6	17
No particular "types"	1	3	0	--	0	--
Other	1	3	0	--	1	3
Number of officers	34		26		35	

Manhattan	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Type Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Criminals/ persons facing charges or in need of favors	15	56	8	40	14	54
Those who have an interest in the community	8	30	3	15	5	19
People with grudges	4	15	2	10	3	12
People who associate with criminals	3	11	2	10	7	27
Police buffs	5	19	0	--	4	15
Friends or relatives of the suspect	0	--	0	--	0	--
People that work on the streets (such as mail carriers)	0	--	1	5	0	--
People who need money	7	26	1	5	5	19
No particular "types"	0	--	0	--	2	8
Other	0	--	0	--	1	4
Number of officers	27		20		27	

slightly (not significantly) less inclined to indicate use of the psychological approach than were the LCR officers. Few said that they used some form of coercion (such as the courts or threatening with some kind of criminal charge) and of those who did, there was no HCR-LCR pattern (Table VII.23).

Asked about the types of problems they usually have with informants, officers tended to respond similarly, in both groups and in both jurisdictions (Table VII.24). The most commonly cited problem was that the informant or the information provided by him was unreliable and would not stand up in court. Other frequently cited problems related to the officer's not being able to offer the informant payment for the information or to try to maintain a good relationship with the informant. Again, however, there was no significant variation in the way HCR and LCR officers responded.

Finally, officers were asked what techniques they employ to deal with informant problems (Table VII.25). Again, the similarity of responses in New York and Washington, as well as across HCR and LCR groups, was more striking than any differences. Most tended to say that they offer the informant money (to maintain cooperation), use a psychological approach, or offer assistance (especially in a criminal case). Again, there was a marginal but insignificant tendency for LCR officers to say that they use a psychological approach. However, the small sample prevented further examination of the difference.

Table VII.23

METHODS CITED AS WAYS TO SECURE INFORMANT COOPERATION
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF OFFICERS MENTIONING AT LEAST ONCE

Washington, D.C.	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Method Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Payment	3	9	6	23	6	17
Offer assistance	5	15	2	8	6	17
Use psychology	10	29	12	46	11	31
Voluntary (method not needed)	4	12	7	27	6	17
Coercion (e.g. threat)	1	3	0	--	0	--
Other	21	62	20	77	20	57
"Nothing can be done"	1	3	8	31	2	6
Number of officers	34		26		35	

Manhattan	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Method Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Payment	4	15	2	10	2	8
Offer assistance	9	33	3	15	7	27
Use psychology	5	19	4	20	9	35
Voluntary (method not needed)	1	4	0	--	5	19
Coercion (e.g. threat)	3	11	3	15	3	12
Other	21	78	9	45	20	77
"Nothing can be done"	3	11	2	10	3	12
Number of officers	27		20		27	

6. Additional Analyses

The final section of the interview questionnaire asked the officers to tell what they do that is different from what other officers do with respect to witnesses, evidence, prosecutors, suspects, and informants. Many officers tended to say "nothing" or to give responses that were similarly coded. This coding, coupled with the large number of officers saying "nothing," rendered this part of the analysis particularly difficult--especially within the empirical constraints that were imposed (i.e., level of significance).

Table VII.24

PROBLEMS POLICE OFFICERS HAVE WITH INFORMANTS
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF OFFICERS MENTIONING AT LEAST ONCE

Washington, D.C.	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Problem Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Unreliable	16	47	13	50	11	31
Difficult to verify	2	6	6	23	6	17
Protect confidentiality	2	6	0	--	3	9
Credibility at trial	3	9	5	19	3	9
Unable to offer money	8	24	13	50	10	29
Maintaining relationship	8	24	4	15	3	9
Having nothing "on" them	3	9	3	12	6	17
No real problems	5	15	5	19	4	11
Number of officers	34		26		35	

Manhattan	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Problem Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Unreliable	14	52	7	35	14	54
Difficult to verify	2	7	0	--	4	15
Protect confidentiality	0	--	0	--	0	--
Credibility at trial	3	11	2	10	4	15
Unable to offer money	7	26	3	15	7	27
Maintaining relationship	8	30	3	15	4	15
Having nothing "on" them	1	4	0	--	5	19
No real problems	2	7	3	15	3	12
Number of officers	27		20		27	

Consequently, for this section, we departed from a completely objective analysis in order to determine if some important factors might have escaped the coding process. For the final section of the questionnaire, an analyst carefully read all of the officers' responses to determine whether some nuance or "variation in theme" could be detected. This procedure, however, constrasts with that used elsewhere in that is was not "blind"--the analyst knew the source (i.e., whether an HCR or LCR officer) of each questionnaire.

Table VII.25

METHODS USED TO DEAL WITH SPECIFIC INFORMANT PROBLEMS
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF OFFICERS MENTIONING AT LEAST ONCE

Washington, D.C.	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Method Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Offer money	10	29	12	46	12	34
Offer assistance	10	29	9	35	7	20
Coercion	5	15	2	8	4	11
Use psychology	10	29	14	54	15	43
Other	2	6	1	4	1	3
Number of officers	34		26		35	

Manhattan	HCR		MCR		LCR	
Method Cited	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Offer money	9	33	2	10	8	31
Offer assistance	13	48	5	25	10	38
Coercion	2	7	1	5	4	15
Use psychology	9	33	3	15	13	50
Other	2	6	1	4	1	3
Number of officers	27		20		27	

The questionnaires were arranged into two groups--HCR and LCR. The final section (dealing with officer-perceived differences) was then read for all of the LCRs; consistent themes and items that were either particularly unusual or recurred within a group were noted. The same was done for the HCR questionnaires. Following this, the two sets of notes were compared to determine whether anything might have been overlooked.

This subjective comparison tended to support the bulk of the remainder of the analysis--few concrete differences. However, some differences worth mentioning were noted. The HCR officers were consistently more likely to say that they are more persistent than other officers and they they are more likely to follow through on arrests they make. Not so frequently, but worth mentioning, some HCR officers said that they have a special way of obtaining the cooperation of reluctant witnesses. That method consisted either of obtaining additional witnesses to bolster the cooperativeness of reluctant witnesses or of bringing reluctant witnesses together to try to produce mutual support.

While we offer these as findings, we hasten to point out the subjective manner of their discovery. Still, that does not diminish their potential importance.

Some additional tendencies were also noted in this examination. Based on these, we performed one additional test to determine whether the inferences that might be drawn were correct.

Based on a number of tentative findings, we performed one additional test to determine whether the inferences we were drawing were correct. Two coders (other than those who did the original coding upon which the above analysis is based) were asked to read through certain sections of the interviews and to answer a group of questions about the officers' work with suspects and witnesses. Based on the officer's responses, we asked them to indicate the amount of effort the officer appeared to exert to locate witnesses; the amount of effort exerted to obtain the cooperation of witnesses; the officer's sensitivity to the welfare of witnesses; the amount of effort the officer appeared to exert to interrogate and interview suspects; the extent to which the officer stressed the use of direct questions to obtain facts about the case; and the extent to which the officer stressed the development of rapport with the suspect.

The coders were asked to rate their responses on a five-point scale: (1) not/none at all, (2) a little, (3) somewhat, (4) much, (5) very much. In the event of blank responses, the coders indicated that there was insufficient information. Additional leeway was given as well to indicate insufficient information when the officer's answer did not allow our questions to be addressed. Omitting "insufficient information" responses, we found considerable consistency between the two coders (correlation between the coders on the six items ranged between (r=.7 and r=.9).

Next, we took the mean coder responses and performed one-way analysis of variance to determine if, in fact, the HCR

and LCR officers were being rated differently. The results of that analysis are shown in Table VII.26. At the p=.1 level, we found no differences between HCR and LCR officers in Washington, D.C. In New York, however, HCR officers were rated as exerting more effort than LCR officers in locating and obtaining witnesses and their cooperation and in interrogating and interviewing suspects. They also appeared more sensitive to the welfare of witnesses than LCR officers. These items were all significant a the .1 level, and only the question concerning effort in questioning suspects was not significant above the .05 level (p=.06 for that question).

Table VII.26
MEAN RESPONSE TO SELECTED ITEMS

	New York				Washington			
Item	HCR	n	LCR	n	HCR	n	LCR	n
Effort to locate witnesses	3.35*	(13)	2.61	(14)	3.44	(33)	3.27	(32)
Effort to set wit. cooperation	3.65*	(13)	2.86	(14)	3.69	(31)	3.45	(29)
Sensitivity to wit. welfare	3.19*	(13)	2.32	(14)	2.37	(31)	2.71	(29)
Effort to question suspects	3.58*	(13)	3.00	(14)	3.68	(31)	3.55	(29)
Use of direct questions	1.96	(13)	1.89	(14)	1.95	(29)	2.20	(28)
Attempt to establish rapport	3.00	(13)	2.57	(14)	3.13	(27)	3.02	(27)

By and large, these findings are consistent with what was found elsewhere in this study. However, support for the direct versus the indirect approach in dealing with suspects was not found. In Washington, D.C., though not significant, we did find the expected direction--HCR officers using a direct approach more than LCR officers, and LCR officers using a more

psychological approach to establish rapport more than HCR officers.

B. SUMMARY OF THE SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS

We find only sporadic evidence of strong or systematic differences between HCR and LCR officers from the analysis of the open-end interview data. This is not too surprising in view of at least three important considerations:

(1) Some officers identified as HCR or LCR officers may have been so identified due largely to circumstances beyond their control during the sample period. A longer sample period would lessen these "luck-of-the-draw" instances.

(2) Many of the officers interviewed may in fact behave quite differently from the way they reported in the interview. Many of these officers may not even be aware of these differences.

(3) Many of the factors that separate the HCR and LCR officers may not be identifiable in an interview. The model used to draw the sample left little variation to be explained by other factors to begin with. Among the factors that remain may be such difficult-to-identify characteristics as common sense, instinct, ability to reason quickly under duress, and ability to communicate with a variety of people.

In view of these considerations, it may be regarded as somewhat remarkable that we found as many differences as we did, a number of which were consistent across the two sites surveyed. So as not to overlook the possibility of something that might emerge as significant in an alternative context, we summarize not only the statistically significant differences, but other tendencies as well.

1. Major Differences Between HCR and LCR Officers

In obtaining evidence to support an arrest, LCR officers sampled (in Washington) were more likely to say that it is

necessary to preserve the crime scene. The HCR officers were more likely to say that it is important to search the surrounding area, locate and questions witnesses, and locate and question the victim. In New York, HCR officers were more likely to stress the importance of investigative and follow-up activities. Perhaps even appearing trite in that its language has been popularized in the creative media, "preserving the scene" may not be as important as leaving the scene in pursuit of important clues. In the responses given us, there appeared to be an almost mechanical adherence to this exact phrase. If we can infer anything from the fact that this response is given less frequently by the more "successful" officers, then perhaps we can infer that a case is enhanced by paying more attention to the total context of an offense than to its specifics.

This latter idea is supported by the finding that, in looking for evidence that proves the suspect was at the scene of the crime, LCR officers were much more likely to say that they look for specific things--such as hairs, fibers, and debris.

In a number of instances, we note that officers drew a blank in responding to specific problems. In one instance (that of revealing methods of locating witnesses, in Washington), we found that that LCR officers were significantly more likely to say that "nothing could be done" than the HCR officers. This is supported by a general tendency for LCR officers to provide more answers of "nothing" than HCR officers. It may be that, having solved few such problems, the LCR officers more often draw a blank. This hypothesis, however, could not be fully addressed here.

In dealing with suspects, we found that HCR officers in New York were significantly more likely to attempt to get the "straight story" from suspects. In contrast, we found a tendency (though insignificant statistically) for LCR officers to emphasize the use of psychology or establishing rapport with the suspect. This is supported somewhat by the significant finding in Washington that HCR officers more frequently cite "getting the details of the crime" as an interrogation goal. There was also a tendency for HCR officers to cite maintaining the "legality of the process" as a goal more often than LCR officers. Perhaps the more "down to business" replies of the HCR officers indicate a greater commitment to professionalism. Whether it is this attribute that contributes to their greater success at getting convictions, however, can be inferred only tenuously.

Paralleling this tenuous inference, we also detected, but not statistically, a tendency for the HCR and LCR officers to identify different aspects of a police-prosecutor working relationship as being important to success. The LCR officers, similar to their tendency to develop a rapport with suspects, tended to stress reaching a "mutual understanding" with the prosecutor. In contrast, HCR officers were relatively more likely to cite professional competency as a desirable aspect. Again, the "down to business" tone, the emphasis on professionalism, notwithstanding the lack of statistical significance, seems to emerge.

2. Officer Variation and Perceptual Filters

At the conclusion of the face-to-face interviews, interviewers were asked to rate the respondents on four items:

- honesty of response
- fullness of response
- understanding of questions
- ability to articulate answers.

They were also asked to indicate whether they thought, based on the interview, the respondent was an HCR officer or whether they were unable to say. (Recall that neither the interviewer nor the respondent was given this information.) Finally, they were asked to indicate the degree to which they were confident of that perception. The analyses presented thus far have seldom indicated statistically significant findings. The purpose here was to determine whether the interviewers would be able to discriminate between the HCR and LCR officers. Our finding was that they were not. As shown in Table VII.27, of the interviewers who offered a guess about the conviction performance of respondents, they were right only about half of the time. In both Washington, D.C., and Manhattan, interviewers were more able to determine that LCR officers were not high conviction rate officers than they were to determine that HCR officers were in fact high conviction rate officers.

Interviewers whose certainty about their judgments was high were not more likely to be right than those who were less certain. None of the interviewers expressed low certainty about their guesses. As shown in the table, those who were highly certain about their guesses were right an equal

Table VII.27

INTERVIEWERS' PERCEPTIONS ABOUT HCR/LCR STATUS
OF POLICE OFFICER RESPONDENTS

Washington, D.C.	Percent Guessing Right: All	n	Highly Certain	n	Medium Certain	n
HCR	44%	27	43%	23	50%	4
LCR	57%	30	61%	18	50%	12
All Combined	51%	57	51%	41	50%	16
Manhattan						
HCR	43%	23	44%	16	43%	7
LCR	57%	21	33%	12	88%	8
All Combined	50%	44	39%	28	67%	15

amount of time as those whose certainty was in the medium range, in Washington, D.C. Interviewers with medium certainty about the officers in Manhattan, however, were more likely to be correct than those expressing high certainty.

None of the other dimensions measured--honesty, fullness of response, understanding, and articulation--tended to be correlated with actual officer performance either. As shown in Table VII.28, these other dimensions tended to be related to interviewer perceptions of HCR/LCR status but not to the actual status.

Table VII.28

CORRELATES FOR PERCEIVED AND ACTUAL OFFICER
PERFORMANCE STATUS

Performance Status	Honesty R	Fullness R	Understanding R	Articulation R
Perceived	.35	.59	.53	.51
Actual	-.04	-.12	.00	-.17

It appears clear from this analysis that, whatever their criteria, the interviewers' perceptions of what does and does not contribute to the performance measure used in this study does not correlate well with the actual measurement. Interviewers were told, in instruction sessions, the basis upon which officers were identified and selected. However, they were not told which officers were which. We are left with several mutually compatible alternatives.

First, it is possible that, despite the instruction sessions, some of the interviewers superimposed other criteria onto their determination of HCR/LCR status. It is clear that their own perceptions correlate well with their perceptions of the other dimensions--honesty, fullness of response, understanding, and articulation. Therefore, it is possible that these dimensions, rather than the one upon which the officers were chosen and grouped (arrest convictability), formed the basis of the interviewers' perceptions. There is, after all, no strong a priori reason to believe that HCR officers, or conversely LCR officers, would, as a group, be more honest, perceptive, or articulate within the context of an interview than the other group. There is no reason to presuppose that skills that lead an officer to high arrest convictability performance would necessarily be highly correlated with skills that help them do well in an interview. Therefore, it is possible that, guided by these other perceptions, the judgment of the interviewer need not be highly

correlated with the actual HCR/LCR status of the respondent--since the criteria may be very different.

Additionally, it is possible that at least some of the interviewers did in fact equate those other dimensions with those relating to arrest convictability. In that case, then their subjective impressions about what leads to high or low arrest convictability are not borne out by the empirical analysis, i.e., they were wrong.

In any event, throughout this analysis, there has been a general lack of strong correlation between particular responses and the HCR/LCR groupings of officers. Perhaps this last analysis can offer a clue as to why. The process of obtaining information about procedures and activities using this process is an imperfect one. For it to work properly, a number of conditions need to be met, most of which are met only partially. First, the respondent must be aware of exactly what procedures he or she follows--they must be able to discern between what they are supposed to do and what they actually do. If, for example, all of the officers, regardless of actual HCR/LCR status, believe that they are doing what they are supposed to do, then, having the police academy as a common denominator, they will all say the same thing.

Second, the respondents must be forthright and articulate about what they do and must understand the questions put to them. If, regardless of what they believe, the respondents tend to say that they do what they believe is right rather than what they actually do, or if they tend to misunderstand the

questions, then their answers will tend to converge about a common ground.

Third, the interviewer must be able to understand the respondent and to draw out full explanations of procedures. If the interviewer is unable to discern between fine differences (differences that appear minor may be really quite important), then, in the process of transcribing the comments, he may tend to lump different answers together. To the extent that the interviewer summarizes or embellishes, we encounter measurement error.

Fourth, the interviewer must not allow his impressions of the respondent to guide his conduct of the interviews. Since the interviewer obviously focuses on factors that appear unrelated to measured officer performance, he may also tend to exert varying amounts and types of efforts with respect to different respondents. Drawn out differently, variation among respondents may be distorted by variation within a single interviewer's style, not to mention variation among interviewers. This could be particularly troublesome in view of the interviewers' general inability to figure out which were the HCR officers and their tendency to attribute honesty, articulateness, and so on, to the officers they perceived to be in the HCR group.

Fifth, the coding process--that of taking the written questionnaires and converting similar answers into the same coded responses--must result in correct interpretation of the answers. Again, the tendency to generalize can render answers

similar that are in fact different. Even if all of the other filters were benign, reductionism could eliminate much real variation among respondents. Persons untrained in law enforcement could easily fail to grasp a crucial distinction.

Given all of these filters, and given the other considerations cited earlier (sampling error, elusive factors) it is not surprising that a small sample of officers would yield few statistically significant differences. More surprising, in fact, is that some of the differences appear not only significant, but consistent with other elements of the study. That they would emerge despite the imperfect process may lend credence to them.

With the benefit of hindsight, of course, there are a number of things that might have been done differently that could have yielded a more precise means for measuring variation among the officers. These relate to the reduction of the filters discussed above, to the lengthening of the period used to draw the sample, and to combining the survey data with observations of how the HCR and LCR officers actually conduct themselves on the job.

Even so, each of these alternatives involves problems of its own, each one introducing new objections. The reality is that, given the scope of the research question, there is no perfect way to measure police activity. We have taken one approach. Alternative approaches are likely to encounter additional problems while producing additional and perhaps cumulative insights that add to what we know about police

work. The fact that problems have been and will be encountered, however, should not negate the importance of such research. There is still much that can be learned.

CONTINUED

4 OF 5

PART THREE

CONCLUSION

VIII. CONCLUSION

Contrary to a common public perception, the police do not spend most of their time apprehending criminals. Officers in positions to make arrests in this country average an arrest for a serious offense only once every other month or so.*

Because arrests do not occur very frequently--certainly far less frequently than offenses--and because of the central importance of arrests to the control of crime, it is essential that when an arrest is made, it be made well. It is clear that too many arrests are not made well.

For each jurisdiction that we examined using PROMIS data for 1977-78, some police officers demonstrated substantially more skill than others in producing arrests that lead to conviction. A small fraction of the more than 10,000 officers studied who made arrests in these jurisdictions--12 percent--accounted for more than half of all the arrests that led to conviction: 19 percent of all arresting officers studied in Los Angeles County accounted for half of the convictions there; 17 percent in Indianapolis; 14 percent in Salt Lake; 12 percent in Washington, D.C., and in Cobb County, Georgia; 11 percent in New Orleans; and only 8 percent in

*This estimate is based on data presented in the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports. In 1978 there were 542,000 law enforcement employees on state, local, and federal payrolls, 431,000 of whom were full-time law enforcement officers (p. 230). We assume that the majority of full-time police officers are in positions to make arrests. The FBI reports that 2.3 million arrests were made in 1978 for serious offenses--homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and larceny (p. 186).

Manhattan. At the other extreme, 699 (18 percent) of the 3,835 officers who made arrests in Manhattan produced no arrests that ended in conviction, despite Manhattan's high conviction rate (over 60 percent of all arrests) and the large number of arrests per officer (8). In Indianapolis, 189 (37 percent) of the 506 officers who made arrests made none that ended in conviction. For the seven jurisdictions combined, 2,289 (22 percent) of the 10,205 officers who made arrests produced not a single arrest that ended in conviction.

And these findings do not result merely as a by-product of the officer's assignment. Sharp differences remain after accounting for the officer's unit of assignment and the inherent convictability of his or her unique mix of cases. Moreover, we find little systematic evidence that these differences are related to the officer's age, sex, education, rank, marital status, or length of service.

Through self-administered and in-person interviews with officers in Manhattan and Washington, D. C., we attempted to obtain some insights into the differences between officers who consistently make convictable arrests and those who do not. The difficulties in obtaining such insights were legion: some officers identified as high or low conviction rate officers (HCR and LCR, respectively) may have just happened to have had a high or low rate during the sample period due to luck; officers interviewed may in fact behave quite differently from the way they reported in the interview, and many of these officers may not even be aware of the difference; many of the factors that separate HCR and LCR officers may not lend

themselves readily to articulation in an interview, factors such as basic common sense, keen instinct, ability to reason quickly and calmly under duress, self-confidence on the street, ability to communicate effectively with a variety of people, and so on. As a result of these difficulties, HCR and LCR officers gave similar sets of responses to most of the questions they were asked.

Despite these difficulties, however, some factors that appear to lie beneath the differences between high and low conviction rate officers did emerge from the interviews. The HCR officers indicated that they tended to focus greater attention on locating and dealing with witnesses than did LCR officers. The HCR officers were also somewhat more willing than LCR officers to use a more direct, factual line of questioning, in combination with a more psychological, indirect approach; LCR officers tended to rely exclusively on the latter approach. The HCR officers expressed more interest in follow-up investigation than did LCR officers, and they tended to agree more strongly than LCR officers with the statement that most adults arrested for felony offenses are guilty of the offense. The LCR officers were more inclined to regard sensitivity to the community as a trait of a successful officer.

We also examined the responses given by officers with high conviction rates to explore whether these officers use special techniques that might contribute to their ability to make consistently convictable arrests. While we cannot be certain that any particular technique was really related to an officer's high conviction rate, some potentially useful methods

were nonetheless revealed. Several HCR officers reported success in improving the cooperativeness of an existing witness by locating additional witnesses in order to create an atmosphere of mutual support. Several also emphasized the importance of persistence or "follow-through" in various aspects of post-arrest activity--collecting and processing physical evidence, locating and maintaining contact with witnesses, and obtaining any evidence that proves that the defendant committed the offense.

Some especially revealing survey results had to do not with differences between HCR and LCR officers, but with areas of agreement. Both groups of officers perceived limitations in the means to make arrests that hold up in court, and few incentives to do so as well. Both groups of officers expressed difficulty in obtaining information about the outcome of a case in court; the vast majority in both New York and Washington indicated that they were aware of no formal procedure for acquiring such information. Both groups of officers had received approximately the same level of official recognition for good performance in the form of commendations and awards.

Thus, it may be remarkable that the police are able to make the difference that they do, in terms of what happens after arrest. We found many officers in this study who make convictable arrests consistently, despite limited means for obtaining feedback about what happens after the arrest, despite limited incentives for making an arrest that will be easier for the prosecutor to work with, and despite the fact that these

officers typically have primary responsibilities that lie elsewhere--provision of public services, maintenance of public order, traffic control and safety, crowd control, community relations, provision of public information, internal administration, and so on.

It remains to determine how to bring about conditions that will improve the quality of the more than two million arrests for serious crimes made annually in the United States. Clearly, this task begins with intention and with the availability of needed information. Police officers will make better arrests when the intent to do so is greater. The results of this study indicate that too many officers show no signs of having a strong intention to make arrests that lead to conviction.

One potentially useful way for the police to improve the quality of their arrests is for every police officer--from the commissioner or chief to the patrolman--to be more aggressive in requesting feedback from the prosecutor about the court outcomes of cases brought earlier. The officer can ask: How did my arrests turn out? Was the evidence adequate? Were the witnesses cooperative? Were there any technical problems in the way that evidence was obtained? Did I provide sufficient post-arrest support in terms of follow-up investigation, witness contact, appearances in court, testimony, and so on? Should I do things differently next time?

And the commissioner or chief can ask: How is my department doing as a whole, as compared with previous periods

and other departments? Which officers need the most help in improving the quality of their arrests? Which officers are the most successful, and what can we learn from them to pass on to others in the department? Where do specific problem areas exist, in terms of obtaining and processing physical evidence, obtaining and maintaining witness support, and working with the prosecutor after arrest? Can the district attorney help me in interpreting the available information about what is happening after arrest? Can he help me by providing more information? Different information? What kind of information do I need most?

Arrest quality is, of course, not the only issue that police departments have to concern themselves with. By the same token, improving the quality of arrests is a long neglected area of police responsibility that need not come at the expense of other important spheres of police responsibility. Improvement in this area can even enhance the ability of the police to meet those other responsibilities. For example, by improving the quality of arrests, the police should be able to slow down the "revolving door" that enables many offenders to continue to plague the community and undermine respect for the entire justice system.

The police offer the first official line of defense against criminal activity. When an arrest is the appropriate police response--and in many instances it is not--the police need no longer make the arrest thinking that how it is made does not matter much. There can be no doubt that the police do make a difference--they determine largely what happens after arrest.

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