The history of international efforts to control the flow of funds to designated 'terrorist groups' via the formal financial system is examined.
The work shows thatdespite the high motivation of some governments and international banks to reduce terrorist attacks, which harm their citizens, customers, staff and profitsit remains difficult to determine how this private-public policing interface can rationally target 'risky capital'. Financial intelligence efforts have had little externally discernible impact on reducing levels of terrorism or on criminal convictions. It reviews evaluation problems in knowing whether the apparent lack of effects is due to measurement failure (estimating how much terrorist harm might have occurred had the controls not been imposed), theory failure or implementation failure. It argues for a more modest assessment of the likely impact of measures against financing terrorism and nuclear proliferation. References (Published Abstract)
- Remarks by the Honorable James K. Stewart to the Third Annual Symposium on Criminal Justice Issues at the University of Illinois on August 24, 1988
- A Meta-Analysis of School-Based Cyberbullying Prevention Programs' Impact on Cyber-Bystander Behavior
- Tweeting the Jihad Social media networks of Western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq