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Ambiguous Invocations of the Right To Remain Silent: A Post-Davis Analysis and Proposal

NCJ Number
176573
Journal
Seton Hall Law Review Volume: 29 Issue: 2 Dated: 1998 Pages: 558-598
Author(s)
W D Holly
Date Published
1998
Length
41 pages
Annotation
This analysis of the United States Supreme Court decision in Davis v. United States in 1994 focuses on the appropriate degree of clarity with which a custodial suspect must invoke the right to remain silent and on whether the Davis decision supplies the governing standard.
Abstract
The analysis focused on jurisprudential, substantive, and practical differences between the Fifth Amendment right to counsel and right to silence. The Court's decision focused on whether the statement "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" was sufficient to invoke a suspect's right to counsel when the suspect previously had waived his Miranda rights. The Court held that an equivocal or ambiguous request for counsel is insufficient to invoke the right to counsel and does not require police officers to cease the interrogation or to limit further questions to those seeking clarification. However, the differences in the right to counsel and the right to silence suggest the inappropriateness of a uniform standard to govern each right. Therefore, a model is proposed that provides a reasoned, practical approach to the recurring problem of ambiguous invocations of the right to remain silent while remaining responsive to both law enforcement interests and individual rights. Under this approach, a suspect would be held to have invoked the right to remain silent by any words or actions, including a refusal to answer questions, that could reasonably be interpreted by the police as intended to invoke the right to silence. This standard is similar but not identical to the Court's only two prior decisions that have specifically addressed the degree of clarity with which the privilege against self-incrimination must be invoked. Footnotes

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