NCJ Number
80182
Journal
Ohio Northern University Law Review Volume: 5 Issue: 3 Dated: (1978) Pages: 687-718
Date Published
1978
Length
32 pages
Annotation
This article examines the constitutionality of Ohio Criminal Rule 11(C)(3), which provides a procedure designed to protect the rights of capital defendants desiring to plead guilty to a crime for which they may receive the death penalty.
Abstract
Ohio Rule 11(C)(3) differs in purpose and effect from the death penalty statutes affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court. The death penalty statutes upon which the Supreme Court has recently passed judgment were applied to cases involving capital defendants' going to trial to contest guilt. The Ohio Rule is a rule of court procedure designed to guide trial judges when presiding over a defendant who wishes to plead guilty to a capital crime. When viewed from the perspective of the Furman era capital punishment decisions, Rule 11(C)(3) poses two issues of possible constitutional infirmity. One issue is whether the rule grants the sentencing body too much discretion in the imposition of the death penalty. The Ohio Rule arguably overcomes this challenge, because it does not extend to the trial judge the power to impose a death sentence. It only permits the judge to alter the sentencing process to prevent the death penalty from being imposed. The second constitutional issue presented by the rule is whether pleas are encouraged by the possibility that a life sentence will be imposed in place of a death penalty, should the defendant plead guilty. The rule, however, does not exclude the possibility that a defendant pleading guilty will receive the death sentence. A constitutional shortcoming could develop only if a consistent pattern of dismissed specifications evolve in the application of the rule. A total of 154 footnotes are given. (Author abstract modified)