NCJ Number
100711
Journal
Hastings Law Journal Volume: 35 Issue: 3 Dated: (January 1984) Pages: 429-475
Date Published
1984
Length
47 pages
Annotation
Whatever the merits of a ''good faith' exception to the fourth amendment (search and seizure) exclusionary rule, the U.S. Supreme Court should not adopt a similar exception to the Miranda rule.
Abstract
Because the fourth amendment exclusionary rule aims at deterring illegal searches and seizures, a good faith exception may be appropriate. In contrast, the Miranda exclusionary rule is grounded in the mandate of the self-incrimination clause itself. Good faith issues are irrelevant in determining whether self-incriminating evidence is admissible. The Supreme Court, as a result of its improper emphasis on deterrence as the primary goal of the Miranda exclusionary rule, has imperiled the core values of the privilege against self-incrimination. Adoption of a good faith exception would signal a return to a case-by-case analysis of subjective factors, the approach found wanting by the Miranda Court. If the state were permitted to compel defendants to incriminate themselves on the ground that their interrogators meant no harm, the privilege against self-incrimination would be eviscerated. 288 footnotes. (Author summary modified)