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Homeland Defense: Assumptions First, Strategy Second

NCJ Number
190354
Journal
Homeland Security Dated: October 2000 Pages: 1-8
Author(s)
Randall J. Larsen; Ruth A. David
Date Published
October 2001
Length
8 pages
Annotation
This document defines homeland defense and states five key assumptions regarding the term.
Abstract
The term homeland defense is nearly synonymous with how the term national security is used. There are two primary differences. Nation-states, large and small and some non-state actors have the capability to bring a new form of warfare to the American homeland. New types of weapons, primarily cyber and biological, are immune to the United States’ superpower status and traditional defenses. America does not seem ready to develop a strategy for homeland defense. Wide disagreements exist on the nature of the threat, the probability of attack, the roles and missions of the Federal, State, and local governments, and the role of the private sector. The first step to take action on this issue should be a Presidential White Paper on homeland defense. It should contain five key assumptions. The first is that the threat of asymmetric attacks on the homeland, either by nation-states or terrorist organizations, is real and will increase during the next decade. The second is that the Federal Government will play the leading role in deterrence, prevention, preemption, attribution, and retaliation. The third is that State assets (including the National Guard) and local governments will play the lead role in first response and consequence management. The fourth assumption is that the private sector will play a critical operational role, particularly in defending against and responding to cyber and biological attacks. The fifth is that an integrated warning/information/coordination system is required to ensure effective use of resources to mitigate effects during and after large-scale attacks or campaigns. In addition to the aforementioned assumptions, it is recommended that reliable warning capabilities on the part of the intelligence community be developed. 18 endnotes