NCJ Number
232615
Date Published
October 2010
Length
75 pages
Annotation
This study examined the extent of actions taken by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to stem the flow of bulk cash leaving the country, the regulatory gaps of cross-border reporting and other anti-money laundering requirements of stored value, and the extent to which the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has addressed them.
Abstract
Moving illegal proceeds across the border, whether in the form of bulk cash or stored value, represents a significant threat to national security. While the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP's) outbound inspection effort has shown some early results, particularly in the bulk cash seized, the program's future is uncertain. If the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to conduct outbound inspections, CBP faces important decisions regarding resources and processes for outbound inspections. By establishing performance measures related to program effectiveness, CBP could be better positioned to show the degree to which its efforts are stemming the flow of cash, weapons, and goods that stem from criminal activities. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is in the process of developing and issuing regulations related to the issuance of stored value. By developing a management plan with timelines for issuing final rules, FinCEN could be better positioned to manage its rulemaking efforts and reduce the risk of cross-border smuggling and other illicit uses of stored value. CBP is the lead Federal agency responsible for inspecting travelers who seek to smuggle large volumes of case, called bulk cash, when leaving the country through land ports of entry. FinCEN is responsible for reducing the risk of cross-border smuggling of funds through he use of devices called stored value, such as prepaid cards. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to examine (1) the extent of actions taken by CBP to stem the flow of bulk cash leaving the country and any challenges that remain, (2) the regulatory gaps, if any, of cross-border reporting and other anti-money laundering requirements of stored value, and (3) if gaps exist, the extent to which FinCEN has addressed them. This report presents the results of the study. Table, figures, and appendixes I-V