NCJ Number
79237
Journal
Criminal Justice Journal-Western State University, San Diego Volume: 3 Issue: 2 Dated: (Spring 1980) Pages: 323-339
Date Published
1980
Length
17 pages
Annotation
The expansion of psychiatric evidence and mental state defenses under California case law is traced. Methods are suggested for using criminal insanity as a complete defense to general as well as specific intent crimes.
Abstract
Early in the 20th century expansion of mental defense theories, California provided a bifurcated system for judging criminal insanity. In the initial trial, the defendant is presumed sane in order to determine if a crime occurred, and evidence material to insanity is excluded. After conviction on the underlying crime, a second hearing is conducted, with the burden on the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was insane at the time of the crime. In contrast, defenses going directly to mens rea (mental state) but not amounting to legal insanity, such as diminished capacity, have always been available during the defense case-in chief. A review of California case law shows that the defense of diminshed capacity has grown rapidly over the years to the point that it is clearly accepted in California; however, the concept is limited traditionally to cases of specific intent. The decision in People v. Wetmore dealt a revolutionary blow to California's concept of criminal insanity. In reversing the rulings of the trial court, the State Supreme Court held that any psychiatric evidence of diminished capacity, including evidence traditionally associated with legal insanity, is admissible on the issue of specific intent. After Wetmore, evidence of legal insanity can be submitted in support of a 'not guilty' plea. Should the prosecution not be able to prove the requisite mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant is freed. Whether Wetmore and the classic defense of unconsciousness (the defendant's mental state being totally separated from involvement in the physical act of the crime) can grow into a system whereby any psychiatric disorder can be used to attack the mental element of any crime depends not only on the future litigants and the forensic psychiatrists, but also on whether legislators will let this trend continue without legislative intervention. It is apparent that the public's opposition to releasing an obvious offender because of 'technical' mental incapacity will produce some restrictive legislation in this area. A total of 79 footnotes is provided.