NCJ Number
138761
Journal
Georgia Law Review Volume: 24 Issue: 2 Dated: (Winter 1990) Pages: 423-446
Date Published
1990
Length
24 pages
Annotation
Since the judicial reaffirmation of the death penalty in 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to define the limits of capital punishment under the eighth amendment.
Abstract
The recent decisions of Penry v. Lynaugh, Stanford v. Kentucky, and South Carolina v. Gathers demonstrate a continuing trend toward easing substantive and procedural restraints on the imposition of capital punishment. In Penry and Stanford, the Court broadened the category of those subject to the death penalty to include the mentally retarded and juveniles, respectively. The Court determined that mentally retarded individuals may be constitutionally executed, writing its opinion in the language of deterrence and retribution. Likewise, in Stanford, the Court permitted the execution of 16-year-olds. In Gathers, the Court addressed evidentiary questions and moral culpability. In this case, the Court disallowed evidence relating to a victim's personal characteristics in the sentencing phase of a murder trial as irrelevant and unrelated to the crime's circumstances. Although the analysis of all three cases presents more questions than answers, two likely trends are identified. First, courts will probably continue to apply the death penalty to those arguably incapable of understanding the punishment, thus thwarting the impact of the penal goal of deterrence. Second, the Court's decision in Gathers may lead to the eventual overrule of Booth v. Maryland, where the Court narrowed what could comprise admissible evidence in a capital case. 140 footnotes