NCJ Number
189771
Journal
Emerging Infectious Diseases Volume: 5 Issue: 4 Dated: July-August 1999 Pages: 591-592
Date Published
1999
Length
2 pages
Annotation
This article examines the threat of bioterrorism in relation to public health agencies.
Abstract
The use of biological weapons was banned in 1972, however, caches of these weapons still exist and their illegal use cannot be discounted entirely. Unlike other weapons that can be readily detected, an attack with a biological agent could remain undetected for days, would be widely scattered, and might not be identified immediately. Public health agencies are responsible for the surveillance, detection and investigation, identification, and development of prevention and control strategies regarding infectious diseases. Preliminary assessments of the Nation’s capabilities for responding to possible bioterrorist attacks have identified many deficiencies, such as inadequate surveillance systems, lack of rapid diagnostic techniques, insufficient stockpiles of vaccines, inefficient communication systems, and insufficient training of medical personnel. A strategic plan for reducing the consequences of new and reemerging infectious diseases proposes corrective measures for addressing these problems. A value-added approach to infrastructure development is not a new concept in public health. In 1951, the concept was introduced of training a corps of young physicians that could investigate outbreaks of disease in strategic areas. These physicians received several weeks of instruction in epidemiology, biostatistics, and public health administration. The Center for Disease Control founded this service, called the Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS). The program has increased public health preparedness and made important contributions to the control of communicable diseases. Trained to consider diseases as problems of populations, EIS alumni remain a valuable resource when disease outbreaks occur. 8 references.