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Cybercrime Cyberterrorism Cyberwarfare: Averting an Electronic Waterloo

NCJ Number
190917
Date Published
1998
Length
94 pages
Annotation
This document makes recommendations for efforts the United States should undertake to minimize or prevent cyberterrorism.
Abstract
Computers are new weapons. They can attack the Pentagon, overload telephone lines, and shut down power grids. Cyberterrorists have declared holy war on the United States. Most political leaders are reluctant to face the fact that not only are the traditional prerogatives of national sovereignty being challenged by the Information Revolution, but they are disappearing rapidly in cyberspace. Intelligence augmentation is displacing artificial intelligence. A man has already been able to control a computer by thought alone after receiving an electronic implant that fused with his brain cells. In conventional power the United States is preeminent, but it is vulnerable to information warfare. Information warfare attacks include software attacks, hacking, or physical attacks. Strategic information warfare (SIW) has strategic targets, goals, and extended campaigns. The United States should not detect much hard evidence of SIW threats when they exist; but there is evidence that information warfare threats are feasible. Nations, non-state actors, multinational corporations, and criminal organizations may be some of the perpetrators of SIW. A smart adversary would attack the United States at the information systems on which the U.S. military depends, such as commercial transportation services and commercial communication networks. Several factors complicate U.S. efforts to address the SIW threat, including traditional concepts of deterrence that do not apply to SIW. Developing a deterrent for information warfare (IW) is complex and difficult. Should some targets be off-limits in IW? How should the United States plan IW operations? Detecting IW adversaries is difficult because IW resources are easy to conceal and perpetrators have incentives to maintain secrecy. Public-private cooperation, better technology for enhancing security in the private sector, interagency coordination for critical infrastructure protection, and clarifications of roles and responsibilities for U.S. agencies are some ways to address the threat. Addressing the SIW threat should recognize three principles: the Government should focus on areas where it has a unique advantage; it must set real priorities; officials should concentrate government activities in areas in which government is an effective actor. Recommendations include: explaining the threat to the public; developing national security policies for the information revolution; making strategic information dominance a national security objective; working with the private sector; and preparing the military for information age conflicts.