NCJ Number
189715
Date Published
October 2000
Length
330 pages
Annotation
The report examines the U.S. Government's unconventional terrorism preparedness programs, puts a threat of an attack in perspective, and suggests ways to wisely use Federal funds to enchance preparedness.
Abstract
According to a 1999 Council on Foreign Relations survey, Americans perceive international terrorism and chemical and biological weapons as the two most serious threats facing the country. There is confusion about the gravity of the threat and the government's response to it. Technically, it is not easy to unleash biological weapons, as Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese cult, found out when its release of an agent in 1995 resulted in few deaths. The largest death toll in a single unconventional attack has been 19, but in 96 percent of the cases, 3 or fewer people have been killed. The Army training course is a good starting point, but there are redundancies and gaps. Front-line officials claim cities are not prepared because responders are not trained and the medical community is not set up to deal with an attack. The cost of Federal training programs is shared with local communities, but some find it difficult to receive funding and others with funding found their preparedness levels degrading. Both national and local politicians should fund preparedness over the long-term. Because medicines need to adjust to ever-evolving bacterial strains that resist antibiotics, Washington needs to make fiscal investments commensurate with researching and developing drug therapies. Because they are ineffective, response teams from the National Guard should be abolished and the money from them should go to local programs, such as outfitting hospitals with decontamination capabilities. Other recommendations include enabling hospitals to manage a surge of infectious disease patients or including lessons learned from other cities' experience in domestic preparedness training. Footnotes, tables