NCJ Number
226465
Journal
Justice Quarterly Volume: 26 Issue: 1 Dated: March 2009 Pages: 2-29
Date Published
March 2009
Length
28 pages
Annotation
This study examined the inner workings of a highly formalized plea bargaining unit in a large urban prosecutor’s office from the lawyer’s perspective, with attention to whether and how attorneys created a balance of power in pursuing justice and whether attorneys behaved differently under a new, highly rationalized model of plea bargaining compared to models used 30 years ago.
Abstract
The rationalized approach to plea-bargaining undertaken by the Superior Court in Seattle, WA, incorporated some of the concepts of Biba (2004c) and Uviller (2000). Bibas suggests that plea bargaining reform should not focus on creating alternative systems, eliminating plea bargaining, or reducing prosecutorial power in plea negotiation, but rather create a balance of power by enhancing the power of other legal actors. Bibas agrees with Uviller’s suggestion that setting the criminal charges and negotiating pleas should be handled dispassionately and be institutionally separated from trying cases; however, Bibas also advocates limiting the types of plea offers made available. Despite such structural changes in the King County Prosecutor’s Office (Seattle) in the creation of its Early Plea Unit (EPU) in 1990, the neutrality sought by Uviller has not occurred in plea bargaining. Efficiency was achieved by the EPU in 70 percent of the cases, but it is questionable as to whether or not justice was achieved. The structure, resources, and rules gave considerable more power to the prosecutors than under the traditional model. Particularly in complex cases, the imbalance of power led to tension and mistrust. At a minimum, the prosecutor’s office should examine its screening procedures for the 30 percent of cases that are not resolved in the EPU. In addition, four recommendations are offered for achieving neutrality and a balance of power in plea negotiations. 53 references