Case for a Special Operations Response to Biological Terrorism (From Countering Biological Terrorism in the U.S.: An Understanding of Issues and Status, P 35-46, 1999, David W. Siegrist, Janice M. Graham, et al., -- See NCJ-191561)

• NCJ Number: 191563
• Author(s): Peter Hinkle
• Date Published: 1999
• Length: 12 pages
• Corporate Author: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
• Sale Source: Oceana Publications, Inc
• Publication Format: Book Chapter
• Publication Type: Issue Overview
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

This chapter looks at the status of counter biological plans and resources in the United States.

Abstract

Because the United States defines terrorism as criminal activity, legal ramifications limits a response to counter terrorist acts. U.S. agencies cannot preempt a criminal activity before it occurs. However, if terrorist activity were defined as armed aggression, then responses would not be so limited. The Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the State Department and the Defense Department (but only if requested by the former two) could get involved. Keys to have a successful response to countering a terrorist group include surprise and rehearsing. Traditionally, intelligence is not collected to support law enforcement agencies. If it is gathered as part of a criminal investigation, it is subject to the legal system's discover process. Defense lawyers can then gain access to sensitive information, and the intelligence community frowns upon that. Human intelligence on a terrorist group developing biological weapons could come from a citizen's complaint of noxious odors. In 1995, the religious group Aum Shinrikyo released the chemical nerve agent sarin in five Tokyo subway trains. The group had been preparing for the attack for three years, recruiting chemistry students and contacting foreign technicians skilled in chemical, biological, and nuclear warfare. They tested delivery systems and had close contacts in Moscow. A biological terrorist organization, in testing its weapon, can infect members of the organization and cause an uncontrolled outbreak from the weapon, providing clues to authorities for an investigation. A response would include neutralizing the biological agent, capturing perpetrators, gathering evidence to establish the complete parameters of the operation, and gathering evidence to prosecute the perpetrators. A special operational response against a threat before it can be employed would be greatly desired. However, if the facility is located outside the United States, sending in special forces would breach international law. To prevent a biological attack, the United States must prevent organizations from acquiring or using them, or know what to do in case of an attack. Table, footnotes