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Children's Conceptual Knowledge of Lying and Its Relation to Their Actual Behaviors: Implications for Court Competence Examinations

NCJ Number
196640
Journal
Law and Human Behavior Volume: 26 Issue: 4 Dated: August 2002 Pages: 395-415
Author(s)
Victoria Talwar; Kang Lee; Nicholas Bala; R. C. L. Lindsay
Date Published
August 2002
Length
21 pages
Annotation
This study assessed the assumptions underlying the court competence examination given to child witnesses.
Abstract
Children are required to undergo examinations in court to determine whether they are considered legally competent to testify. Questions are asked to test the child’s conceptual understanding of truth telling and lying and to establish the child’s moral commitment to truth telling. If not satisfied with the child’s answers, the judge will not permit the child to testify, which could result in the acquittal of a person guilty of abusing the child. Despite the extensive research on children’s conceptual knowledge of lie- and truth-telling and to a lesser extent, research on lie- and truth-telling behavior, no study has directly examined the relation between the two. This raises questions about the validity of the two major assumptions underlying current court competence examinations. In Experiment 1, 3- to 7-year-olds’ conceptual understanding of truth- and lie-telling was assessed, placing them in a situation where they might be motivated to lie. Experiment 2 examined the second assumption underlying the competence examination, whether discussing lie- and truth-telling and having children promise to tell the truth leads them to be more likely to tell the truth. In Experiment 3, children were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: the discussion condition and the promise condition. In the discussion condition, children were asked to promise to tell the truth before responding to the critical peeking question. In the promise condition, children were not asked any questions about lie- and truth-telling. The study supported the second legal assumption that discussion with children about the concepts and moral implications of lie- and truth-telling in combination with the act of a child promising to tell the truth has a truth-promoting effect. The study failed to confirm the first legal assumption that children who, understanding the concept and moral implications of truth- and lie-telling, are more likely to tell the truth than those who do not understand these concepts. 40 references