NCJ Number
190910
Journal
International Review of Penal Law Volume: 71 Issue: 3-4 Dated: 2001 Pages: 325-353
Date Published
2001
Length
29 pages
Annotation
This analysis focused on the underlying principles of criminal responsibility in England, Canada, the United States, and France.
Abstract
The discussion focused on the common rules and main distinctions between the law in these countries, differences between Anglo-Saxon and French criminal law, the irreducible minimum requirement of liability in these countries, and whether a supranational criminal law existed based on the philosophical foundations of moral responsibility. The analysis used a theory that proposed a dissection of the moral element of the crime into two components, one relation to the individual and one to the offense definition. Defenses and factors relating to the individual’s responsibility included infancy, insanity, a mistake of fact, necessity, duress, intent, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. The moral element relating to the individual was a core concept that was universal in every system of law based on the consent of the will and the idea of a voluntary act. The moral element relating to the definition of the crime was the fault expressly specified or tacitly implied in the offense definition and referred to the culpability of the accused and the reprobation of society. Therefore, in England, Canada, the United States, and France an offense can require proof of a positive state of mind or the absence of a mental state of care. The analysis concluded that the growth of the principles governing criminal responsibility in these four countries was a process rooted in the deepest layers of their philosophical traditions. Footnotes