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Current Trends in Agroterrorism (Antilivestock, Anticrop, and Antisoil Bioagricultural Terrorism) and Their Potential Impact on Food Security

NCJ Number
192051
Journal
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Volume: 24 Issue: 2 Dated: March-April 2001 Pages: 107-129
Author(s)
Joseph W. Foxell Jr.
Date Published
March 2001
Length
23 pages
Annotation
This analysis of terrorism against society’s agricultural infrastructure focuses on methods used and the risks that this form of terrorism will occur.
Abstract
Agroterrorism includes the intentional introduction of animal or plant pests or the cultivation or production of pathogens or toxic products for the purposes of causing poultry, livestock, crop, soil, or human disease, poisoning, or death. Potential terrorist techniques and technology include the contamination of crops or livestock, the contamination of animal feed, adulterated seed, and the contamination of municipal water supplies. The relatively indirect and indiscriminate nature of an agroterror attack meshes perfectly with the perceived shift in terrorism goals, which have ostensibly veered away from attempting to achieve specific political results and instead increasingly seek the destruction of societies that are regarded as enemy societies. Factors that combine to make agroterrorism an increasingly likely threat include access to agroterrorist weapons, the vulnerability of the agricultural infrastructure, the lack of reporting requirements for outbreaks of plant diseases, and a general shift in the motives of terrorists and the purpose of terrorist acts. Several United States adversaries, including Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba, have reputedly stockpiled agroterrorism agents for possible future use against the United States. An additional concern is that bioagricultural weapons may have been sold to extortionists or organized criminal gangs involved in narcoterrorism. The risk with the direst consequences would be a complex, multisector type of attack and is precisely the risk the country must be prepared to deter or defeat. Reference notes