NCJ Number
129375
Date Published
1991
Length
67 pages
Annotation
This chapter considers the application of the right against double jeopardy in U.S. Supreme Court cases involving former acquittals, multiple convictions, and termination without acquittal or conviction.
Abstract
The fifth amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." An introductory discussion of the interests protected in the double jeopardy right addresses the raising and resolving of double jeopardy issues, attachment of jeopardy, the "separate sovereignties" exception, and government appeal. A situation involving a previous acquittal presents the strongest case for the rigorous application of the double jeopardy doctrine. The question usually raised in such a context is what constitutes an "acquittal." The cases presented that bear on this issue are Burks v. United States (1978) and Ashe v. Swenson (1970). In the application of the double jeopardy right to multiple convictions, the issues typically raised are whether the application of double jeopardy is different when former convictions are involved and whether it makes any difference if the "prior" conviction occurred in the same prosecution as the conviction which the defendant desires to prevent. These issues are addressed in the cases of Brown v. Ohio (1977), Missouri v. Hunter (1983), and Grady v. Corbin (1990). The development of double jeopardy protection against aborted prosecutions focuses on mistrials and case dismissals. These issues are addressed in Illinois v. Somerville (1973) and United States v. Scott (1978). Case notes are included.