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JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF NONSTATUTORY 'IMMUNITY GRANTS' ABROGATION BY ANALOGY

NCJ Number
15813
Journal
Hastings Law Journal Volume: 25 Issue: 2 Dated: (JANUARY 1974) Pages: 435-465
Author(s)
S M LEONARD
Date Published
1974
Length
31 pages
Annotation
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS OF THE 1972 DECISION BY THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS IN UNITED STATES V. CARTER.
Abstract
IN THIS CASE, THE COURT RULED THAT AN INFORMAL PROSECUTORIAL GRANT OF IMMUNITY MADE BY A UNITED STATES ATTORNEY IN ONE DISTRICT IS BINDING ON A UNITED STATES ATTORNEY IN ANOTHER DISTRICT SO LONG AS THE DEFENDANT RELIED ON IT IN GIVING THE INCRIMINATING TESTIMONY. THE AUTHOR MAINTAINS THAT THE COURT'S FAILURE TO ADDRESS ITSELF TO THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN PLEA BARGAINS AND IMMUNITY AGREEMENTS, AND ITS FAILURE TO CONFRONT THE IMPORTANT ISSUE OF THE PROSECUTOR'S AUTHORITY TO MAKE BINDING GRANTS OF IMMUNITY LEADS TO TWO INEVITABLE RESULTS: UNAUTHORIZED JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF THE PROSECUTORIAL POWERS OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY, AND EFFECTIVE EMASCULATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE SAFEGUARDS BUILT INTO STATUTORY GRANTS OF IMMUNITY. ANALYZED ARE THE 'VOLUNTARINESS' REQUIREMENT AND THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION RELATED TO PLEA BARGAINING, THE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS OF IMMUNITY AGREEMENTS, AND THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PRESERVATION OF A WITNESS' FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE UNDER TRANSACTIONAL VERSUS USE IMMUNITY. THE AUTHOR THEN SUGGESTS THAT THE COURT IN CARTER COULD HAVE ARRIVED AT ITS DECISION ONLY BY MAKING AT LEAST THREE ASSUMPTIONS: 1. THAT A PROSECUTORIAL PROMISE OF FREEDOM FROM PROSECUTION CAN BE ENFORCED ON PRINCIPLES RELEVANT TO OTHER TYPES OF PLEA BARGAINS. 2. THAT SUCH A PROMISE, EVEN IF ENFORCEABLE IN ITS OWN JURISDICTION, COULD BE EXTENDED TO INCLUDE PROSECUTIONS IN OTHER DISTRICTS. 3. THAT THE PARTICULAR PROMISE IN THIS CASE WAS SUFFICIENTLY EXPLICIT TO WARRANT ENFORCEMENT; OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THAT THE DEFENDANT'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROMISE WAS REASONABLY SUSCEPTIBLE OF SUCH BROAD INTERPRETATION. SHE SUGGESTS THAT ALL OF THESE ASSUMPTIONS ARE HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE AND POINTS OUT THAT THE COURT, IN ITS DECISION, NEVER CONFRONTED ANY OF THESE ISSUES DIRECTLY. AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION IS PROPOSED WHICH THE AUTHOR MAINTAINS SERVES THE ENDS OF THE DEFENDANT IN CARTER AND OF THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. SHE ARGUES THAT HAD THE COURT IN CARTER BASED ITS DECISION ON AN EVIDENTIARY RULING PROHIBITING THE USE OF COMPELLED TESTIMONY IN ANY SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDING, IT COULD HAVE, WITHIN ITS OWN AUTHORITY, ADEQUATELY PROTECTED THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS WHILE NOT ENGENDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN UNWARRANTED LIMITATION OF THE PROTECTION OFFERED BY THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OR ESTABLISHING AN UNDESIRABLE INTERFERENCE WITH THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF LAW ENFORCEMENT. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED)