NCJ Number
177209
Date Published
1996
Length
170 pages
Annotation
While most discussions of judicial accountability have focused on judge recruitment and selection, this volume addresses the issue from the perspective of disciplining and removing errant judges.
Abstract
Three basic prototypes are available for sanctioning judicial misbehavior in western democracies: (1) the English system in which discipline is the prerogative of Parliament; (2) the French civil service model in which judges largely police their own ranks; and (3) the American system in which the electorate holds the power to remove judges. The historical evolution of these systems is traced, with emphasis on the political power of judges, judicial independence, democratic theory and judicial power, judicial review, and civil and common law traditions. The authors conclude judicial accountability must be understood in a democratic context as the element that makes the power of any judge potentially temporary and always conditional. 237 references, 405 notes, and 1 figure