NCJ Number
30044
Journal
Maryland Law Review Volume: 35 Issue: 1 Dated: (1975) Pages: 134-146
Date Published
1975
Length
13 pages
Annotation
IN ROSS V. MOFFITT (1974), THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DID NOT COMPEL STATES TO PROVIDE FREE COUNSEL TO AID INDIGENT DEFENDANTS IN PREPARING PETITIONS FOR STATE OR FEDERAL DISCRETIONARY APPEALS.
Abstract
THIS NOTE ANALYZES THE COURT'S REASONING IN LIGHT OF ITS OTHER DECISIONS CONCERNING THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS. THE AUTHOR MAINTAINS THAT THE ROSS COURT'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN A FIRST APPEAL OF RIGHT AND SUBSEQUENT DISCRETIONARY APPEALS IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE COURT'S PRIOR EQUAL PROTECTION HOLDINGS - IN GRIFFIN V. ILLINOIS (1956) AND BURNS V. OHIO (1958). IN THESE CASES THE COURT RULED THAT THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE COMPELS THE STATES TO AFFORD THE INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANT EQUAL ACCESS TO THE APPELLATE PROCESS WITH NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN APPEALS OF RIGHTS AND SUBSEQUENT DISCRETIONARY APPEALS. ANOTHER PRIOR DECISION, DOUGLAS V. CALIFORNIA (1973) HELD THAT STATES MUST PROVIDE NOT ONLY ACCESS, BUT MEANINGFUL APPELLATE REVIEW COMPLETE WITH APPOINTED COUNSEL. THE AUTHOR ALSO SUGGESTS THAT ONLY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE, RATHER THAN THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE, OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CAN DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH A STATE MUST COMPENSATE FOR THE INDIGENCY OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS. HE MAINTAINS THAT THE ADVANTAGE OF DUE PROCESS OVER EQUAL PROTECTION IS THAT THERE WOULD BE NO NEED TO SHOW THAT INDIGENTS ON FIRST APPEAL AND INDIGENTS ON SUBSEQUENT DISCRETIONARY APPEALS WERE SO DIFFERENT THAT IT WAS RATIONAL TO CLASSIFY - AND THEREFORE TREAT - THEM DIFFERENTLY. INSTEAD, ONE WOULD MERELY NEED TO SHOW THAT WHILE FAIRNESS REQUIRES COUNSEL ON FIRST APPEAL IT IS NOT SO UNFAIR AS TO VIOLATE DUE PROCESS NOT TO PROVIDE COUNSEL ON SUBSEQUENT DISCRETIONARY APPEALS. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED)