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Nuclear Black Market

NCJ Number
190919
Date Published
1996
Length
57 pages
Annotation
This document provides recommendations for addressing a black market for nuclear weapons.
Abstract
The prospect for a nuclear black market is likely to worsen before it gets better. Quantities of weapons-usable materials seized have been less than needed to make a nuclear weapon. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the number of reported nuclear smuggling incidents has increased. The black market consists of sellers (thieves), middlemen (traffickers), and potential buyers. A short list of buyers would include North Korea and several Middle Eastern states. The threat would increase dramatically if organized crime groups with international connections were to become involved as middlemen. The likelihood of the theft of nuclear materials is outpacing improvements in protection. Many efforts to lessen the threat of nuclear black markets are succeeding, but they fall short in terms of financing and time when compared to the magnitude and immediacy of the problem. The risk to U.S. interests associated with thefts of materials means the United States must seek innovative ways to address warhead security. Many layers of defense are needed. Because inadequate protection is inevitable, attention must be paid to post-theft measures as well. Bilateral cooperation on a case-by-case basis has been and likely will continue to be the most effective form of interdiction cooperation. But the United States also should pursue multilateral cooperation to pool data and share analyses. Some measures, such as deployments of technical sensors and specialized training of border control officials, are inadequate to meet the threat. But the importance of human intelligence cannot be overstated. Neutralizing a nuclear threat is more robust at a national level than at an international level. The United States has no choice but to help if asked, but political and safety risks abound whether a neutralization effort succeeds or fails. The United States should carefully craft guidance for responding to a request for assistance abroad.

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