NCJ Number
13271
Date Published
1973
Length
15 pages
Annotation
DISCUSSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS IN LIGHT OF RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS CONCERNING REVOCATION OF PAROLE.
Abstract
THE DECISION IN 'MORRISSEY V. BREWER' REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM THE 'HANDS OFF' DOCTRINE TRADITIONALLY ADHERED TO BY THE COURTS. IT HOLDS THAT PAROLE AND REVOCATION PROCEDURES MUST COMPORT WITH DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS. REGARDING HEARINGS, THOSE REQUIREMENTS ARE DEFINED. 'GAGNON V. SCARPELLI' INDICATES THAT IN SOME INSTANCES, DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT COUNSEL BE APPOINTED IN ORDER TO ASSURE THAT THE PAROLEE OR PROBATIONER WILL PROPERLY PRESENT THOSE FACTORS RELEVANT TO THE REVOCATION DECISION. BOTH CASES PRESERVE THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS, TO WHICH THE 'FULL PANOPLY OF RIGHTS ATTACH.' SPECIFICALLY AFFORDING DUE PROCESS RIGHTS, THE AUTHOR CONTENDS, WILL ALLOW FOR FURTHER CHALLENGES BASED ON CLAIMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATION. LIKEWISE, DUE TO VAGUE STANDARDS SET OUT IN 'GAGNON V. SCARPELLI,' THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL QUESTION WILL UNDOUBTEDLY GENERATE MUCH LITIGATION. THE ARTICLE REVIEWS COMPLIANCE WITH THESE NEW REQUIREMENTS BY PAROLE BOARDS, THEIR EFFECTS ON INTERSTATE COMPACTS, AS WELL AS THEIR CONCURRENCE WITH THE PAROLE STANDARDS OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS.