NCJ Number
189764
Date Published
December 2000
Length
38 pages
Annotation
This document outlines the rationale of the United States domestic preparedness program and identifies the most significant problems of domestic preparedness.
Abstract
Domestic preparedness is essentially a no-win proposition. Either there will be no attack, and the program will seem wasteful; or there will be an attack, and the value of the program will be tested amidst the suffering and terror of innocent people. Because of the legislative origins of the different components of the domestic preparedness program, the implementation of each program element began immediately and independently of the other program elements. The already complex process of building domestic preparedness has been vastly complicated by the program’s institutional and legal entrenchment. Left alone, each program element will likely make certain improvements in the country’s preparedness for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism. But the lack of coordination at the Federal level will squander resources and perplex the interface with State and local agencies. However, it is possible to improve efficiency and achieve meaningful forms of success in the domestic preparedness program by concentrating on the key public management challenges facing the program. These include defining the desired end-state and a metric for measuring progress; reducing the uncertainties of real-life response; and coping with the program’s enormous technical and institutional complexity. Also challenging the program is managing the legal dimensions of preparedness; sustaining the achievements of the program over time; and leveraging the program to meet other Federal, State, and local priorities. 61 notes.