NCJ Number
145199
Journal
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Volume: 16 Issue: 3 Dated: (1993) Pages: 219-232
Date Published
1993
Length
14 pages
Annotation
This paper analyzes the reasons why Saddam Hussein, the dictator of Iraq, was unable to make effective use of the terrorist option to confront the countries that formed the United Nations (U.N.) coalition against Iraq during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91.
Abstract
At the beginning of the crisis, leaders of the U.N. coalition were concerned that pro-Iraqi terrorist attacks would accompany any initiation of hostilities with Iraq. These concerns were reinforced by Iraqi warnings and by Baghdad's long association with international terrorist movements. However, the Iraqis proved unable to make effective use of terrorism to support their war effort. This failure resulted from many factors, including effective counterterrorist measures by the allies. These included major deportations of Iraqi diplomatic staff throughout the world and the freezing of Baghdad's assets in Western banks as part of the U.N. economic sanctions against Iraq. In addition, several other countries with terrorist linkages pressured their own terrorist clients to refrain from helping Saddam Hussein. They did this for reasons of their own that nevertheless supported allied strategy. Finally, the Iraqis' lack of any preparation, prior to the crisis, for terrorist action meant that they were simply unable to conduct more than a few ineffective operations. (Author abstract modified)