NCJ Number
86025
Date Published
1980
Length
19 pages
Annotation
The tactical, behavioral, and administrative responses of military and police forces to terrorist hostage-taking incidents are described, based on 10 simulations conducted as training exercises for a variety of police units.
Abstract
The simulations used a scenario for those who played the roles of terrorists, but those who were members of the responding forces were unaware of the type of exercise in which they would be involved. No formal scripts were used in the simulations. Several common patterns emerged during the 10 simulations. For example, the first officers who responded to a call or who were first contacted by the terrorists often had an initial attitude of disbelief. The expressions of disbelief sometimes slowed reaction times and formed barriers to the immediate development of effective administrative measures. This early disorganization was particularly characteristic of civilian police departments, whereas military units had contingency plans because of the need to be prepared for full-scale assaults by hostile forces. In addition, the individuals and departments initially wanted to respond with action rather than with negotiations. This action orientation was an impediment to effective negotiation. However, after an hour of initial disorganization, routines were established within the designated command posts. The simulated terrorists initially were able to seize and hold the initiative. As time passed, the police units realized that the crises would not be resolved quickly. Potential problems of securing the area in the event of an actual incident also became evident. In addition, adversary relationships developed with the media. The experiences demonstrated the need for coordination at all levels within a police department and the unevenness of current training and skills. Eight reference notes are provided.