U.S. flag

An official website of the United States government, Department of Justice.

NCJRS Virtual Library

The Virtual Library houses over 235,000 criminal justice resources, including all known OJP works.
Click here to search the NCJRS Virtual Library

Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction: The Case of the Second Intifada

NCJ Number
215001
Journal
Social Forces Volume: 84 Issue: 4 Dated: June 2006 Pages: 1969-1986
Author(s)
Robert J. Brym; Bader Araj
Date Published
June 2006
Length
18 pages
Annotation
Through an examination of Palestinian suicide bombings, this article analyzes three potential arguments: the psychopathology of suicide bombers, the deprivations experienced, the religious environments from which they originate and the degree to which suicide bombing serves their strategic interests.
Abstract
After an analysis of the 138 suicide bombings occurring between 2000 and 2005 in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, known as the second intifada, much of the impetus for Palestinian suicide bombings can be explained by the desire to retaliate against Israeli killings of Palestinians and that much of the impetus for Israeli killings of Palestinians can be explained by the desire to retaliate for suicide bombings. The results, objectives, and precipitants of suicide bombing during the second intifada reveal little of the strategic logic. Characterizing suicide bombing, based on the second intifada, as strategically rational is an oversimplification. This article attempts to substantiate this argument that suicide bombing is an action that typically involves mixed motivations and mixed organizational rationales, suicide bombing campaigns are not always or even often timed to maximize the strategic advantages of insurgents, and suicide bombing campaigns sometimes encourage targets to make minor concessions, often failing to achieve their main objectives. References