USE OF ISEM (INSIDER SAFEGUARDS EFFECTIVENESS MODEL) IN STUDYING THE IMPACTS OF GUARDS TACTICS ON FACILITY SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS

• NCJ Number: 59825
• Journal: NUCLEAR MATERIAL MANAGEMENT Volume: 6 Issue: 3 Dated: (FALL 1977) Pages: 592-600
• Author(s): D ENGI; D D BOOZER
• Date Published: 1977
• Length: 9 pages
• Corporate Author: Institute of Nuclear Materials Management
• Publication Format: Article
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

THE USE OF THE INSIDER SAFEGUARDS EFFECTIVENESS MODEL (ISEM) IN ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES IS DESCRIBED IN THIS ANNUAL CONFERENCE REPORT.

Abstract

THE ISEM IS A STOCHASTIC, DISCRETE EVENT, MONTE-CARLO SIMULATION MODEL WHICH SIMULATES THE INTERACTION OF A GROUP OF INSIDERS (GUARDS OR OTHER EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE AUTHORIZED ACCESS TO THE FACILITY) WITH THE FACILITY'S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM. THE EFFECTIVENESS SENSITIVITY TO GUARD TACTICS IS DEMONSTRATED BY COMPUTING THE EFFECTIVENESS MEASURE OF A VARIETY OF GUARD TACTICS EMPLOYED AGAINST A NUMBER OF DISTINCT INSIDER PATHS THROUGH THE FACILITY. FOR THE PATHS CONSIDERED, THE INSIDER HAS EITHER THEFT OR SABOTAGE AS HIS OBJECTIVE AND CAN PERFORM COVERT AS WELL AS OVERT ACTIVITIES. THE TACTICS RANGE FROM SENDING A SINGLE GUARD FOR ASSESSMENT TO COLLECTING THE GUARDS EN MASSE PRIOR TO DISPATCHING THEM TO COMFORT THE INSIDER. THE SENSOR CONTROL AND ALARM LOCATIONS ARE CORRELATED WITH THE AUTHORIZED ACCESS AREAS OF THE INSIDER(S) AND, IF THE INSIDER HAS THE APPROPRIATE ACCESS, THE PROBABILITY OF AN INSIDER HAS THE APPROPRIATE ACCESS, THE PROBABILITY OF AN INSIDER SUCCESSFULLY DEFEATING A SENSOR CONTROL OR ALARM IS COMPUTED BASED UPON THE SURVEILLANCE SUBSYSTEMS AND THE INSIDER'S ATTRIBUTES. A HYPOTHETICAL FACILITY IS DIAGRAMMED TO DEPICT HOW ISEM FUNCTIONS. ONLY FIVE INSIDER PATHS WERE PLAYED AGAINST FOUR SETS OF GUARD TACTICS IN THIS MODEL; IN PRACTICE, CONSIDERABLY MORE INSIDER PATHS AND/OR GUARD TACTICS WOULD BE NECESSARY TO COVER THE SPECTRUM OF CONTINGENCIES THAT MIGHT OCCUR. THE METHODOLOGY PRESENTED HERE PROVIDES A STRUCTURE THROUGH WHICH AN ANALYST MAY CHOOSE GUARD TACTICS TO COMPLEMENT THE OTHER PORTIONS OF THE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM IN COMBATING THE PERCEIVED THREAT. THE METHODOLOGY IS NOT DEPENDENT ON THE PARTICULAR EFFECTIVENESS MODEL EMPLOYED NOR ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ADVERSARY IS AN INSIDER. REFERENCES ARE INCLUDED. (WJR)