NCJ Number
63819
Journal
Journal of Legal Studies Volume: 4 Dated: (1975) Pages: 311-326
Date Published
1975
Length
16 pages
Annotation
THIS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS POINTS OUT THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF BRIBERY AND THE CRIME RATE AND SUGGESTS THAT UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, BRIBERY IS BETTER DEALT WITH THROUGH FINES DIRECTED AT OVERALL CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.
Abstract
ECONOMISTS GENERALLY ASSUME THAT BRIBERY SHOULD BE REGULATED BY LEVYING STIFFER PENALTIES AND LOWERING THE PROBABILITY OF A SUCCESSFUL BRIBE. THIS METHOD OF SEPARATING PUNISHMENT FOR BRIBERY FROM PENALTIES FOR OTHER CRIMES RESTS ON THE DUBIOUS ASSUMPTION THAT PENALTIES FOR ONE FORM OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY HAVE NO EFFECT ON OTHER FORMS OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY. HOWEVER, CRIME AND BRIBERY MARKETS ARE INTERRELATED BECAUSE THE AMOUNT OF THE BRIBE OFFERED BY AN APPREHENDED CRIMINAL WILL DEPEND ON THE EXPECTED REDUCTION IN THE FINE FOR THE CRIME, WHICH IN TURN DEPENDS ON THE SEVERITY OF THE CRIME COMMITTED. CONVERSELY, THE SEVERITY OF THE CRIME COMMITTED BY THE VIOLATOR DEPENDS ON THE EXPECTED COST OF A BRIBE FINE. SUCH TREATMENT OF THE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN MARKETS IS HELPFUL IN EVALUATING THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS ON THE CRIME RATE, THE SEVERITY OF CRIME, THE SCALE OF BRIBERY, AND CHANGES IN PUBLIC POLICIES. EQUATIONS AND TABLES ILLUSTRATE THAT THE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN THE CRIME MARKET AND THE BRIBERY MARKET IS SUCH THAT HIGHER FINES FOR BRIBERY MAY INCREASE THE FREQUENCY AND SCALE OF BRIBERY. THIS FINDING IMPLIES THAT A PUBLIC POLICY THAT RAISES THE PENALTIES FOR ONE TYPE OF ILLEGAL BEHAVIOR MIGHT CAUSE INCREASED ACTIVITY IN ANOTHER ILLEGAL MARKET; THUS, POLICIES WHICH SUCCESSFULLY DEAL WITH THE BRIBERY PROBLEM MAY RESULT IN A MORE SEVERE CRIME PROBLEM. FOOTNOTES ARE PROVIDED. (MHP)