CORRUPTION AND REGULATION - NEW YORK POLICE AND KENTUCKY SURFACE MINING

• NCJ Number: 34205
• Author(s): J M BROADUS
• Date Published: 1976
• Length: 231 pages
• Grant Number(s): 75-NI-99-0035
• Sponsoring Agency: US Dept of Justice; US Dept of Justice NIJ Pub
• Publication Format: Document
• Publication Type: Report (Study/Research)
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

A STUDY ON CORRUPTION IN REGULATORY OR QUASI-REGULATORY SITUATIONS; TWO CASES ARE EXAMINED IN WHICH EXTRA-LEGAL SERVICES IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF ESTABLISHED LAWS WERE EXCHANGED FOR PAYMENT.

Abstract

ONE CASE, KENTUCKY'S REGULATION OF STRIP-MINE RECLAMATION, INVOLVES A SMALL, ADMINISTRATIVELYCENTRALIZED AGENCY INTERACTING WITH A SINGLE LARGE INDUSTRY. THE OTHER CONCERNS A LARGE AND DIVERSE AGENCY, THE NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT, IN ITS REGULATORY OR QUASI-REGULATORY RELATIONSHIP WITH MANY DIFFERENT ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES, ONE OF THE LARGEST OF WHICH IS ORGANIZED CRIME. ANALYSIS OF THE CASES ASSUMES THAT, BY DECLINING TO ENFORCE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS OR BY MAKING FAVORABLE DISCRETIONARY RULINGS, REGULATORY OFFICERS CAN SUPPLY A SERVICE WHICH DIMINISHES REGULATED OPERATORS' COSTS OF DOING BUSINESS. IN BOTH CASES, CORRUPTION WAS CUSTOMARY, SYSTEMATIC, AND OF AN ECONOMIC NATURE DEFINED BY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND EVENTS. INFORMATION COSTS WERE HIGH, AND CORRUPTION FLOWED LARGELY FROM BILATERAL MONOPOLY BARGAINING IN RELATIVELY STABLE CONTEXTS. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT)