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Protecting the Homeland: Report of the Defense Science Board 2000 Summer Study Executive Summary, Volume I

NCJ Number
190356
Date Published
February 2001
Length
14 pages
Annotation
This document provides information on a study assessing preparedness of the Nation in the event of unconventional attacks and provides recommendations.
Abstract
The Defense Science Board 2000 summer study focused on defense against three weapons of mass destruction (biological threats, unconventional nuclear threats, and information warfare threats) and on the related intelligence needs for civil support. Weapons are now integrated within the civilian and commercial infrastructures rather than military specific. This dual-use nature of technology makes capabilities increasingly difficult. The capabilities to address this threat include five interdependent elements: early capability assessment; actions taken to prevent attack of the United States, either through deterrence or through direct interdiction; protection of critical assets and infrastructure; consequence management, should an attack occur; and attribution of the perpetrators of such an attack, and, in certain cases, retaliation. The task force found that this Nation does not have an effective, early capability to assess the biological weapons threat, and cannot prevent such a crisis. The infrastructure does not exist to execute the desired consequence management measures. The Nation’s healthcare system now operates at near 95 percent capacity and does not have the ability to absorb a mass casualty event. The databases and associated machinery for attribution are not available today and are therefore inadequate. There are many deficiencies in the capability to defend against information warfare, particularly in early capability assessment and the derived capability of prevention by deterrence or interdiction. The capability to defend against unconventional nuclear attack is more developed than capabilities against biological and information warfare attacks. Recommendations for unconventional nuclear threat are to deploy sensor networks to protect U.S. forces; engage the National Labs in intelligence; enhance nuclear forensics to provide timely attribution; and better secure nuclear materials in Russia. Recommendations for the information warfare threat are to properly implement the Global Information Grid; recruit and retain, and vet information-technology professionals; and imbed defensive information operations into mission activities. Recommendations for biological weapons threats are develop and field the infrastructure to rapidly detect and identify a bioagent attack; and promulgate early warning and assure response through a Joint Biodefense Organization.