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START: Overcoming Remaining Challenges

NCJ Number
230296
Journal
Journal of Strategic Security Volume: 2 Issue: 3 Dated: September 2009 Pages: 25-32
Author(s)
Elizabeth Zolotukhina
Date Published
September 2009
Length
8 pages
Annotation
This article discusses the steps necessary to replace the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) which expired on December 5, 2009.
Abstract
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was first signed between United States President George H.W. Bush and Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev on July 31, 1991. The Treaty requires both countries to reduce their strategic holdings of nuclear warheads on a specified maximum number of strategic delivery systems. There are three main strategic delivery systems for both countries: land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs); submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); and long-range heavy bombers. The article discusses the efforts of the George W. Bush administration to improve the United States' strategic flexibility without relying solely on comprehensive strategic arms control treaties. In May 2002, the United States and Russia signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT or Moscow Treaty) to place the U.S.-Russian bilateral strategic arms control relationship on a stable basis. The article examines the efforts of the Obama Administration on this issue, specifically the beginning of official talks on April 24, 2009, to replace START and the continued negotiations with Russian officials. The article explores the focus of the Russian Government in pushing for a new treaty to replace START and supersede SORT, and notes that one of the most important issues that continue to divide the two countries is which warheads are to be counted. The author notes that while the new agreement will contain a moderate reduction in the number of warheads that will be allowed and that success is likely, it is not guaranteed due to the potential existence of disruptive external factors such as further NATO enlargement and Russian policy towards former Soviet republics. A discussion of future policy prerogatives of the Obama administration regarding missile defense is presented. References

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